Heirs of Navarro v.

IAC

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO
PASCUAL

Facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Bataan and subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries. Both was denied. However, the grant was given. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title
to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held:

The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates
are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code.

The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. And thus, a
part of the public domain.

Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public
utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services which the
petitioners utterly fail to show.

REPUBLIC VS. CA

FACTS:

The respondents (Tancincos) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the
Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to
their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the
registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their
overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what
actually happened was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the river
bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human
intervention and that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:

Whether accretion took place

RULING: No

Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to said property
was made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question total
almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion.

Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the river bank. Deposits made by human intervention are excluded.

The lands sought were not even dry land. The entire area was under one to two meters of water.

Therefore, registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed.

Baes v CA and Republic of the Philippines GR 108065 July 6, 1993

FACTS

ISSUE

WON Baes owned Lot 1-B.

HELD

Art. 461, NCC

River beds abandoned through NATURAL CHANGE ipso facto belong to owner whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the are lost. Owners of the land adjoining the river bed
have the right to acquire by paying its value (must not exceed value of new beds area)

If change is due to concessioners authorized by the Government, the concession may be granted to
concessioners. No grant = land belongs to owners of land covered by the waters. Must not prejudice tge
superior rights of third persons with sufficient title.

If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for damage/loss due to natural reasons, there is no reson
not to compensate when the change was effected through artificial means.
The loss was caused by a deliberate act of Government. The Government is obliged to compensate Baes
for the loss.

However, Baes has already been compensated through the fair exchange of lots between him and the
Government.

Property 54 Santos v Bernabe (1929)

Facts Santos and Tiongson deposited sacks of palay in Bernabe's warehouse. Santos deposited 778
cavans and 38 kilos, while Tiongson deposited 1026 cavans and 9 kilos. Tiongson filed a complaint
against Bernabe to recover his sacks. A writ of attachment was granted, and 924 cavans and 31.5 kilos of
palay found in the warehouse were sold at public auction and delivered to Tiongson. Santos intervened
in the attachment of the palay because the sacks of rice belonging to him and to Tiongson were not
separated from each other. He cannot contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans and
31.5 kilos of palay as part of those deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, because, in asking
for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe and
not to him.

Issue Is the attachment valid?

Held Yes, the attachment is valid but the cavans must be distributed proportionally between Santos and
Tiongson. Since there was no way to separate Santos' 778 cavans and 38 kilos from Tiongson's deposit,
Article 381 of the Civil Code applies. Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot
be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part
belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled. The number of kilos in a
cavan not having been determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which
were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof, and
Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.

Tandog vs Mcapagal

FACTS:

The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square meters

situated at Sitio Inarawan, Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City.

The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time
immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945.

When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they
found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon
used falsified documents to justify their possession of the land which they sold to the
government. For his part, Renato Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent.
 Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, a
complaint for quieting of title.

Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners

allegations in their complaint.

The Trial Court granted the motion for demurrer to evidence of respondents and
dismissed the complaint.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower Court.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of herein respondents are judicial admissions, that
can be considered as cloud to the interest of herein petitioners in the disputed property.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on

their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The
alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their possession were
merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by petitioners. We
have consistently ruled that documents which may have been marked as exhibits during
the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be considered as
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.

It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property that is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to do
so.

Petition is hereby denied.

Ono vs Lim

Facts:

1992, Lim filed in RTC Cebu a petition for reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT, alleging
that the same OCT was lost during World War 2 by his mother, Luisa. This land was located in Balamban,
Cebu which was sold to Luisa by spouses Ono. Although the deed evidencing the sale was lost, the only
legitimate son of Ono had executed a notarized document in favor of Luisa denominated as
confirmation of the sale which was duly filed in Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.
Now, Spouses Ono's successors-in-interest opposed Lim's petition contending that they had the
certificate of title of the land.

Lim then converted the petition into a complaint for quieting of title, averring that they had been in
actual possession of the property since 1973, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits and paying
taxes corresponding to it.

The other party claimed that the land was never sold to Luisa, and that the confirmation by the
legitimate son was fabricated, the signature not being authentic.

The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and
that the Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title.

Issues:

Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to
quiet title;

Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse
possession;

Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of Luisa and whether or not
said deed was lost during World War II;

Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and

Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine.

Held: Petition has no merit.

(1) Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when the objective is
to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect
or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof.

(2) Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim
did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein,
instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to
Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.

DBT Mar-Bay Construction Inc. vs Panes

Facts:
A parcel of land was conveyed by Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services rendered. On
June 24, 1992, the respondents Panes and his sons filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages
and petition for injunction against Regalado and DBT.

Respondents alleged that per certificate issued by the DENR the land was verified to be correct and on
file. Respondents also claimed the Ricaredo and his immediate family had been and still are in actual
possession of the subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd world war. To perfect his
title, Ricaredo filed with the RTC QC.

On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura)
filed their Answer with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value when
they bought a house and lot from Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered
owner thereof. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses
Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which
rendered a decision in their favor.

On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the
subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that
respondents were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over
the property had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that
the other respondents did not allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the
relief prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a
chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT
No. 200519 are located in Rizal and Cubao Quezon City while the subject property is located in
Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap
of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found
that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted
evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings
and proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches
and prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for
Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.

Issues:

(1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion
for Reconsideration? (2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject
property?

Held:

(1) Affirmative. The facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or
otherwise established by the evidence. However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order
was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for
reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.

Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property
has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by
laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same
must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.

Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under
Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land
Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No.
1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the
respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.

MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October 8, 2003

Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by PrimitivaLejano and LorenzaAraniego.
The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from his father
TeofiloAbejo, the only heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole
fishpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo
in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein
despite the expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by TeofiloAbejo and by his
successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of
the fishpond.

Issue: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether Abejo was entitled to
rent?

Held: Under Article 484, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract. Article 487 also provides that anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file
an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of the
action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant
from the property because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.

If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is
no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an
agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the
house.

The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs
lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.

MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY

Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was originally owned by one Julain Melencio who died before
the 1905, leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta held nothing but a widow's usufruct
in the land. Contract of lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for the establishment of a
rice mill with necessary buildings for warehouses and quarters for employees. Document evidencing
lease acknowledged but never recorded with the Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession of the land
and erected the mill and other necessary buildings. lease was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who transferred
it to Uy Eng Jui & Co.(unregistered partnership); until the lease finally came to Dy Tiao Lay. Land was
registered under the Torrens system in 1913 but the lease was not mentioned in the title, though it was
mentioned that one house and 3 warehouses were owned by Yap Kui Chin. 1920 - heirs of Julian
Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance. After Mrs. Macapagal, wife of one
the heirs of Julian, Ramon, demanded an increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to P300/mo., she was
informed by Dy Tiao Lay that a written lease existed and that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled
to an extension of the lease at the original rental. Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and in
such case the lease was executed without their consent and was thus void. The power of the majority
(of co-owners of an indivisible property) would be confied to decisions touching the management and
enjoyment of the common property and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease of 12 years
w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded and which can be performed only by owners of the
property leased. Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee
(constituting a sundering of the ownership which transcends mere management) then the part owners
representing the greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease the property
for a period longer than 6 years w/o the consent of all co-owners. In this case, the fact that the lease
was for 20 years amounted to an act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere act of management, thus
necessitation the consent of ALL co-owners.

AGUILAR V. CA- CO-OWNERSHIP

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot
object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their
respective interests.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could
spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will
get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to
take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of
the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed
a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she
would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the
scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex
parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the
proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the
action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC
erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial
was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?
RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the
appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference
may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant the motion if it
sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for
the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of
discretion when they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in
equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other
cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the
thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200
each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court
ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO

G.R. No. 171571

March 24, 2008

FACTS:

2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in four equal
shares.

It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold the entire
two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the
adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.

In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected a
security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within
the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security.

MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.

Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the
lots but the same was ignored.

Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City. Respondents further alleged
that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the
lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore alleged that
neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition of
the share of Tito Dignos.

The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from the time
the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since
it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it
had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all
events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by estoppel and laches.

The trial court found for respondents. the CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:

1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents

2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD: the petition is denied

1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to thesale.This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.

Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of
Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.

2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence that it
acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie.
It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito
Dignos heirs the following material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two lots
were registered: x x x x

That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have been lost and/or destroyed
and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-
VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so
that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law x x x x