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Bamforth and Spaulding 1982 - Explanation, Archy, History, Science
Bamforth and Spaulding 1982 - Explanation, Archy, History, Science
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The 19th century surely represents a triumphant period for science. The
line of progress from Galileo to Newton to the contemporary physicists
179
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180 BAMFORTH AND SPAULDING
which does not fit the model cannot be an explanation. Nor do the propo-
nents of the CL model see their analysis as restricted to any particular
field or type of explanation. The analysis is presumably universally appli-
cable to any type of explanation in any field. He characterizes Hempels
presentation (Hempell965) as the clearest and most detailed exposition of
the covering law model.
We agree with Morgan on the essential aspect of the covering law
model and on his characterization of the Hempel presentation, but we are
puzzled by his unqualified statement on the claim for the prescriptive and
universal properties of the model on the part of the proponents of the CL
model. Presumably Hempel is one of these proponents, but he does not
seem to make such claims. He states (1965:33): What is the nature of the
explanations empirical science can provide? What understanding of em-
pirical phenomena do they convey? This essay attempts to shed light on
these questions by examining in some detail the form and function of
some of the major types of explanatory account that have been advanced
in different areas of empirical science. We interpret this and similar
statements to mean that Hemple does see himself as doing a natural
history of scientific explanation, of analyzing preexisting and undoubted
examples of scientific explanation to discover the essence of their
explanatory quality. Instead of instructing scientists on how to explain,
Hempel is attempting to explicate some important features of the expla-
nations that scientists make. The prescriptive force that Morgan notes
results from the outcome of the analysis: in every case of scientific expla-
nation examined, subsumption under a covering law or general principle
is detected. We would modify Morgans statement (. . . anything which
does not tit the model cannot be an explanation.) to anything which is
clearly an explanation in science and history seems to fit the model. The
ability to recognize explanations is prerequisite to the analysis of the
character of scientific and historical explanations.
Hempel continues: The terms empirical science and scientific ex-
planation will here be understood to refer to the entire field of empirical
inquiry, including the natural and the social sciences as well as historical
research. This broad use of the two terms is not intended to prejudge the
question of the logical and methodological similarities and differences
between different areas of empirical inquiry, except for indicating that the
procedures used in those different areas will be taken to conform to cer-
tain basic standards of objectivity. According to these standards, hypoth-
eses and theories-including those invoked for explanatory purposes-
must be capable of test by reference to publicly ascertainable evidence,
and their acceptance is always subject to the proviso that they may have
to be abandoned if adverse evidence or more adequate hypotheses or
theories should be found. This is indeed a broad scope for application,
186 BAMFORTH AND SPAULDING
are tossing a fair coin (and some other assumptions), we can deduce with
the aid of the binomial expansion that two tosses will result in two heads
with a probability of .25, in a head and a tail with a probability of SO, and
in two tails with a probability of .25. Here we are explaining the frequency
distribution rather than any particular outcome of the tossing; we do not
know why the outcome was two heads in this trial.
In inductive-statistical explanation, the frequency distribution is simply
inferred from empirical evidence; we might note that in sites of the Illinois
Hopewell type about 10% (an illustrative value only) of the potsherds are
tempered with limestone, and our explanation for the observation that
about 10% of the potsherds on a newly discovered site are limestone-
tempered would be that it is an Illinois Hopewell kind of site. We offer no
answer to the question Why do Illinois Hopewell sites exhibit a relative
frequency of about 10% for limestone-tempered sherds? Further, all that
we can reply to the question Why is this potsherd limestone-tempered?
is that is came from an Illinois Hopewell site and that experience shows
that some potsherds from such sites are limestone-tempered. We need
more information about Illinois Hopewell sites before we can offer a
better explanation.
We note in passing that the term deductive-nomological is some-
times applied to all covering law explanations because there are deductive
elements in even inductive-statistical explanations. We observe collec-
tions of potsherds from a sample of Illinois Hopewell sites and note that
each exhibits about a 10% relative frequency for limestone-tempered pot-
sherds. On this evidence, we infer inductively that all Illinois Hopewell
sites are similar with respect to this relative frequency. If we assume that
this inference of homogeneity is correct, then we can argue deductively
that any collection from a new Illinois Hopewell site will exhibit the
estimated 10% of limestone-tempered potsherds; the assumed homogene-
ity provides the universal premise needed for deductive inference. But the
presence of this deductive element in the chain of inference does not
contradict the basic inductive-statistical character of explanations derived
from the observations. The estimated about 10% limestone-tempered
is a frequency distribution derived inductively from empirical observa-
tion, not a value deduced from and explained by some background theory
of Hopewell cultural behavior. It probably would be desirable to charac-
terize the explanatory process as inferential-nomological to avoid
confusion; here we follow Maxwell (1975: 124- 125), who suggests simi-
larly that hypothetic0-inferential is a better term than hypothetico-
deductive to describe explanatory reasoning.
The puzzle in need of explanation can arise in more than one way: the
explanation seeker might be ignorant of the relevant covering law or
general principle (or covering laws and general principles), or he may
188 BAMFORTH AND SPAULDING
ARCHAEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
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