EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,
Oppositors-Appellees.
PONENTE: SANCHEZ, J.

Facts:
Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents
[appellees], and six siblings [including petitioner-appellant].
On May 1963, petitioner filed in CFI Rizal a petition for probate
the holographic will of Rosario. On June 1963, appellants
opposed the probate on the ground that by the institution of
petitioner as universal heir of Rosario, oppositors - appellants
[who are compulsory heirs of Rosario in the direct ascending
line] were illegally preterited and that in consequence thereof,
the institution is void.

On August 1963, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground

of absolute preterition. On November 1963, the CFI dismissed
the petition holding that the will is a complete nullity.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but was denied. Hence, the
present appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CFI can pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will. [YES]
2. Whether or not there is preterition in this case. [YES]

Ruling:
Decision Appealed from is Affirmed.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our

attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The courts area
of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on,
the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the
testatrixs testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions
solely to be represented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
therein. 1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted

aside the question of whether or not the will should he allowed
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity
of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has
declared that the will been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner
and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal,
travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for

probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in
the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come once again
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of
the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
nullity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioners sole assignment of error challenges the

correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete
nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the
applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

"Nov. 17, 1951.

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness
whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of
November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID"

The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the

Civil Code which, in part, provides:

"Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator. shall annul the institution of heir; the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious . . ."

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is

a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889,
which is similarly herein copied, thus

"Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the
institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be
valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. . ."

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition

employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point
Manresa comments:

"La pretericion consiste en omitir al heredero en el testamento.

O no se le nombra siquiera, o aun nombrandole como padre,
hijo, etc., no se leinstituye heredero ni se le deshereda
expresamente, ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes,
resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta

que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de
aquelloa a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia
forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero

forzoso.) b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero
forzoso nada reciba en el testamento. 5

It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a

clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a
clear-cut definition of the word annul:

"To annul means to abrogate, to make void;. . .In re Morrows

Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484." 6

"The word annul as used in the statute requiring court to

annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wifes
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate;
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S.2A:34-25). Madden v.
Madden, 40 A.2d 611, 614, 136 N.J. Eq. 132." 7

"ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make

void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex
parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, S.E. 2d. 771, 774." 8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario
Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents,
now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the
will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucin de heredero, dando
caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento," referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal
heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are
therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Says Manresa:

"En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se

anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade
limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se
expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto
perjudique a la legitima del desheredado. Debe, pues,
entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con
preferencia al 817." 10

The same view is expressed by Sanches Roman:

"La consequencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de

heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en
linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada, total o
parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiere dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo
universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos,
cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad
del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de
la pretericion el de que anulara la institucion de heredero. . ."
11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute,

there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in
totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing
at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an
expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the
statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria
annual del Tribunal Supremo, correspondiente a 1908," which
in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

". . . El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la

nulidad de la institucion de heredero no consiente
interpretacion alguno favorable a lo persona instituida en el
sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso
pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el
acto no se ha realizado debiendo; por lo tanto, procederse
sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un
testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribuido todos
sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta
consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos,
sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que seo conocida la voluntad de quien
testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz,
por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya
institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando
asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero que no
outoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los
principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque
parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convertir este juicio en regla de
interpretacin, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer." 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854

that, annulment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Legacies and
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the
mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of
preterition would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in
addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition
granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that
preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la
pretericin" ; but added (in reference to legacies and
bequests), "pero subsistiendo, . . . todas aquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucin de
heredero . . ." 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open
to intestate succession the entire inheritance including la
porcin libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado,
mejora o donacin." 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us

except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
ensues.

4. Petitioners mainstay is that the present is "a case of

ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition." 15
From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854
"does not apply to the case at bar." This argument fails to
appreciate the distinction between preterition and
disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testators will of the

forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law." 17 In Manresas own words: "La
privacin expresa de la legitima constituye le desheredacin.
La privacin tacita de la misma se denomina pretericin. 18
Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria" ; preterition, upon the
other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria." 19 Express as
disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a
legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrixs

parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs
suffer from preterition.

On top of this the fact that the effects flowing from preterition
are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the
institution of heir." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice
the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresas
expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the
preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and
legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos,
adquieren el derecho a todo; deshereda dos, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 segn el caso." 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively

disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance
of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr.

Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

"But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by

universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage
should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it
must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory,
if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814
and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the
provisions of articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and
will]l never have application at all. And the remaining
provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction
of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by article 817. Thus, instead
of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of
the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due

mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
legacies and betterments, and a general from a special
provision. With reference to Article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be
observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with a
thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. And
they are separate and distinct not only because they are
distinctly and separately treated in said article but because
they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular
or special title. . . But again an institution of heirs cannot be
taken as a legacy,"25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question

"a complete nullity." Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however,
that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.

- Digested [18 September 2017, 11:28]

***