THE MARTIAL LAW AND HABEAS CORPUS CASES proceeding mentioned therein may be resorted to.

g mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the
Edcel Lagman et al. vs. President Roa Duterte et al. ,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
FACTS:
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,
Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third
Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of
Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion12
since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from
allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.1
Xxx xxx xxx
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because the Presidents Report contained false, inaccurate, contrived and
hyperbolic accounts.21
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis since the Presidents Report mistakenly included the attack on the military
outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in
August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano
carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as
additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It contends that these
events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been
resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested.26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military
establishment or any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the Presidents proclamation of martial law lacks
sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the
Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military
was even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Groups plan to take over
Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was
undetermined28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign
fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29
B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
The Cullamat Petition, anchored on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, likewise
seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it
lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety
warrants its declaration.
appropriate proceeding referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of using
the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of
Article VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory,
but discretionary only, on the part of the Court.62 The Court has the discretion not to
give due course to the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774
are the appropriate proceeding covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is promulgated;
RULING: Locus standi of petitioners.- Yes. Petitioners are citizens and have locus standi
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., the constitutional question
is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.
As a general rule, the challenger must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on
legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which
provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. [T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of
the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be suing in their capacities as citizens of
the Republic; similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be Filipino
citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City. In the Lagman
Petition, however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing
as citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives. That they
are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress could have elicited a
vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House
Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason
to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is
declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being
espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend
towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues
involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will
not venture into this matter. After all, the Court is not entirely without discretion to
accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of
standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel
assumption of jurisdiction. In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the
fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since
Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will
therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides,
respondents did not question petitioners legal standing.

C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)

The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and should be
invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. It contends that
the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first,
the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains
that the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use;
moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of
the situation.

According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to
require the imposition of martial law.

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law. The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII
lays the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional
provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the appropriate
FORTUN AND ANGELES VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent
civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this, on November 24,
2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a
state ofemergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. On
December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that province except for identified areas of the MILF. Two days
later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress
in accordance with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that
body a report in person or in writing of her action. In her report, President
Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken
up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President
described the scope of the uprising, the nature, armed units in strategic
positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan
Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and
the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized
"PNP/Police" markings. On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session,
convened pursuant to sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review
the validity of the Presidents action. But, two days later or on December 12,
2009, before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to
challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959
affecting Maguindanao on the following grounds: 1. For gross insufficiency of
the factual basis in proclaiming a state of martial law and suspending the
[writ] in the Province of Maguindanao. 2. It is patently illegal and
unconstitutional for lack of any factual basis. 3. The validity of Proclamation
No. 1959, declaring a state of martial law in the province of Maguindanao,
except for the identified areas of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the
same area.
President Arroyos issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised
in the present petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the
petitions have ceased to present an "actual case or controversy" with the
lifting of martiallaw and the restoration of the writ, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of which is the subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963
is allegedly a "supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or value
the consolidated petitions.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised
in the petitions moot and academic.
HELD: Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised
moot and academic because the court has nothing to review. The
Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ of habeas corpus was already lifted
through Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could perform its duty
to review and validate. It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They
exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after
the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation
on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
ZALDY AMPATUAN VS. SEC. RONALDO PUNO
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57
men and women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named
places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the
supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached
the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of
emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents
occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared
unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive
the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in
subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as
Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this
power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the
ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass
killing
ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when
she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency,
only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized
her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed
Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that
the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents
exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
RANDOLF DAVID VS PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017
Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was
not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon
the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that
PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to
the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create
or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REYES
[GR 159085, 3 February 2004];
FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and
direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building
in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These
acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by
virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was
issued.
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of
the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It
sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS
AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article
VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3)
Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?

(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to
bring suit?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised
within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported
their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
 ARTICLE VII. SEC. 19
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA
GR No . 206666 21 January 2015
FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Guilty of the crime of PLUNDER. The penalty imposable for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is
Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted
to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
NORBERTO JIMENEZ & LORETO BARRIOQUINTO VS FERNANDEZ
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty

On October 25, 2007, the current President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
FACTS: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was
nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for
period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
the COMELEC.However, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President
proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Arroyo restored the formers right to vote and be voted for a public office. The
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the
subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political
committed the crime being charged to them.
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for
HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be
Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. She relied on
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and
Election Code (OEC). But the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of
it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
merit.12
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
While this case was pending before the Court, or on May 13, 2013, the former President
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36,
and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former
RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
President Arroyo.
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
HELD: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
committed no offense.
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by
Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty
enjoined by law or were so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of
as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
discretion.
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil
is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services
to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction,
civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
VERA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-31218 February 18, 1970FACTS:
FACTS: Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado,
includingintervenor Alfredo Oliveros, were found guilty of the crime of
homicide by CFI of Camarines Sur dated July 25, 1966. However, at the time
the decision of therespondent CFI was promulgated and read to petitioners
on August 23, 1966, the judge who rendered and signed it, the Honorable
Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to holdoffice as of July 31, 1966. On appeal, all
the herein petitioners including intervenor,no jurisdictional question was
included among the alleged errors. Then came thedecision of respondent CA
on February 13, 1969. Thereafter, the presentpetitioners, including the
intervenor, filed petition for certiorari before SupremeCourt on July 2, 1969
to review the aforesaid decision of respondent CA. Three legalquestions were
raised, in such petition. Again, no jurisdictional question was raised. Two
motions for reconsideration were thereafter filed, however both motions
forreconsideration were denied on August 26, 1969.
Thus, this petition forcertiorari. Petitioners rely on Jimenez v. Republicas well
as the earliercase of People v. Court of Appealsas authority for the view that
a decisionpromulgated by the judge who prepared it after he had left the
benchcould have no binding effect.
ISSUE: WON petitioners could still raise the question that Judge Surtida
havingretired previous to the promulgation of the sentence, it must be
declared null andvoid.
RULING: It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the sentence is
one of competent jurisdiction. It is an admitted fact in this case that
respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by the then
Judge Jose T. Surtida, wasvested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case
against petitioners. The canons of fairness are not thereby set at naught.
Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of having been the victims of arbitrary
governmental action. They were given all theopportunity to defend
themselves not only before the respondent Court of FirstInstance of
Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. In anearlier
petition forcertiorari, to review the judgment of respondent CA, they did
notmeet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they
failed toreceive the protection that due process accords every accused. What
was said by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion:
"The law, as we have seen, is sedulous inmaintaining for a defendant charged
with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity
to defend. Privileges sofundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a
fair trial that could beacceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be
kept inviolate andinviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof.But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the
accuser also. Theconcept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to
a filament.We are to keep the balance true."
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL VS ALEJO LABRADOR & TEOFILO SANTOS
Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
FACTS: Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by
the president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the
position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be
excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already
convicted of final judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant
to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador
ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the
pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise
of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the
power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not
extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it
and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is
the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which
the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory
and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such
disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In
the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the respondent
to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the
disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within
the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the
impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in
the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would
be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.