Chapter 1 General Considerations
his franchise by travelling along an
Unsworth Transportation International
Phils. v. CA, July 26, 2010
Phylum General Insurance Co v. PKS
Shipping Co, April 9, 2003
Travel and Tours Advisers v. Cruz, March
14, 2016
Facts
A bus of the petitioner bumped the rear
portion of the jeepney of the respondent
leading to it ramming into an acacia tree
which resulted to the death of Alberto Cruz
and serious physical injuries of Virginia
Munoz.
Petitioner argued that it was Cruz who was
negligent suddenly entering the lane of the
petitioner's bus without seeing to it that the
road was clear for him to enter said lane. In
addition, petitioner alleged that at the time
Case Digest 2017
of the incident, Edgar Hernandez violated
unauthorized line/route and that the
jeepney was overloaded with passengers,
and the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. was
clinging at the back thereof.
Issue
1. Was petitioners PUB out of line?
2. Is the petitioner liable?
HELD
NO, "Veering away from the usual route" js
different from being "out of line." A public
utility vehicle can and may veer away from
its usual route as long as it does not go
beyond its allowed route in its franchise, in
this case, Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-
Manila. Therefore, the bus cannot be
considered to have violated the contents of
its franchise. On the other hand, it is
indisputable that the jeepney was traversing
a road out of its allowed route.
YES, Although the presumption is against
the jeepney for violating traffic regulations,
such presumption is overturned since
drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted
by other evidence, can be applied. In fact
even the conductor saw the jeepney from
10 to 15 meters away, thus it cannot be said
that the driver was not aware of its
presence and he could have slackened his
speed.
Petitioner is liable for failing to observe due
diligence for its employees. Here, Edgar
Calaycay was duly authorized by the
defendant company to drive the bus at the
time of the incident. Its claim that it has
issued policies, rules and regulations to be
followed, conduct seminars and see to it
that their drivers and employees imbibe
such policies, rules and regulations, have
their drivers and conductors medically
checked-up and undergo drug-testing, did
not show that all these rudiments were
applied to Edgar Calaycay. No iota of
evidence was presented that Edgar Calaycay Brinas v. People, November 25, 1983
had undergone all these activities to ensure
that he is a safe and capable driver. In fact,
their general manager suggested that
attendance to the seminars is compulsory
only among drivers and conductors in
Manila.

But given that Hernandez still violated the

traffic rules and regulations, it must bear
50% of the costs of the judgement while the
Petitioners bear the other 50%.

Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,

Chapters 2-4 Obligations of the Common October 31, 1969
Carrier, Passenger and Shipper and
Defenses of the Common Carrier

Lara v. Valencia , June 30, 1958

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,

November 14, 1988

Mecenas v. CA, December 14, 1989

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 Loadmaster Custom Services v. Glodel
Brokerage, January 10, 2011

PAL v. CA, September 15, 1993

Spouse Cruz v. Sun Holiday, June 29, 2010

Abeto v. PAL, July 30, 1982

Baliwag Transit v. CA, May 15, 1996

Malayan Insurance Co. v. Phil First

Insurance, July 11, 2012

Spouses Vitoria v. Continental Airlines,

January 16, 2012

Case Digest 2017


Maranan v. Perez, June 26, 1967
FACTS
Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a
taxicab owned and operated by Pascual
Perez when he was stabbed by its driver
Simon Valenzuela.
Defense
That the carrier is under no absolute
liability for assaults of its employees upon
the passengers.
Issue
Was the carrier liable?
HELD
Gillaco was decided under the provisions of
the Civil Code of 1889 which unlike the
present Civil Code imposes upon common
carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against willful assaults or
negligent acts committed by their
employees.
The previous view is that a carrier is only
liable when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty.
Now it is enough that the assault happens
within the course of the employees duty.
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De Gillaco v. Manila Railroad, November
18, 1955
Facts
Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila
Railroad Company assigned in the Manila-
San Fernando La Union line, had a personal
grudge against Tomas Gillaco. He was then
assigned in the Tutuban Station when he
saw Tomas Gillaco in a train coach after
which he shot him with his carbine.
ISSUE
Was MRR subsidiary liable?
Defense
1. That Devesa was not in actual
performance of his ordinary duties
during the slay
2. The complaint did not aver sufficient
facts to establish ex contractu
liability
HELD
NO, The cact of guard Devesa because of a
personal grudge he nurtured since the
Japanese occupation was entirely
unforeseeable by MRR. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the
two would meet.
Also, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 am
or two hours after the commission of the
crime. He did not have duties to discharge
in connection with the Calamba-Manila line
as he was assigned to guard the Manila-San
Fernando line. In fact, he was in Paco
station awaiting transportation to Tutuban.
The doctrine of Respondent Superior
cannot apply since employers are only HELD
responsible for acts or omissions of the
employee in the scope of his employment.

Bachelor Express v. CA, July 31, 1990
Facts
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by
Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by
Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a
stampede which resulted in the death of
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut.
A passenger at the rear portion suddenly
stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the
passengers; that when the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut were found lying down the road
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the
death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture
that the death of the said passengers was
caused by a third person who was beyond
its control and supervision, thus making it
caso fortuito.
ISSUE
Is the carrier liable?
HELD RTC dismissed but reversed in CA
YES, The stabbing in the bus is within the
context of force majure but in order that a
common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not
enough that the accident was caused by
force majeure. The common carrier must
still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the injuries resulting from such
accident.
Here, the negligence of the common carrier,
through its employees, consisted of the lack
of extraordinary diligence required of
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common carriers, in exercising vigilance and
utmost care of the safety of its passengers,
exemplified by the driver's belated stop and
the reckless opening of the doors of the bus
while the same was travelling at an
appreciably fast speed. At the same time,
the common carrier itself acknowledged,
through its administrative officer, Benjamin
Granada, that the bus was commissioned to
travel and take on passengers and the
public at large, while equipped with only a
solitary door for a bus its size and loading
capacity, in contravention of rules and
regulations provided for under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code they were
negligent for during the stampede the door
of the bus remained locked and the bus did
not slow down but maintained to run at
about 30-40 miles per hour.
Compania Maritima v. Insurance Company
of North America, October 30, 1964
Facts
MacLeod contracted Compania Martitima
for the shipment and subsequent
transshipment of 2,645 bales of hemp to
Boston, Massachusetts. Compania Maritima
sent two barges to the private wharf to pick
up the cargoes free of charge. While waiting
for the arrival of the ship to where the
hemp would be loaded, the barges sank
resulting in the damage or loss of 1,162
bales of hemp.
Issue
Was there a contract of carriage perfected?
HELD
Yes, The contract of carriage was
consummated when the carrier sent the
lighters, even if free of charge, as a
preparatory act.
Standard Vaccum Oil Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Co., April 18, 1956
Facts
Plantiff entered into a contract with
defendant to transport between the ports
of Manila and Nin Bay, Sangay, Iloilo,
2,916.44 barrels of bulk gasoline belonging
to plaintiff. The gasoline was delivered in
accordance with the contract but defendant
failed to transport it to its place of
destination, hence the suit.
Defendants tugboat, Snapper, came to a
dead spot as it passed Santiago Point in
Batangas due to a broken idler. It was able
to contact the tugboat Tamban for help but
when it came the Snapper has already sank
after a hole was opened on its hull when it
crashed into a rock.
Issue
Is the carrier liable?
HELD
YES, it is negligent as shown by the
following circumstance:
1. It was surplus property yet the
tugboat was put into operation
without first submitting it to an
overhaul in a dry-dock. In fact, it
operates always after acquiring a
special permit from the Bureau of
Customs which specifically state that
they were issued "pending
submission of plans and load line
certificate, including test and final
inspection of equipment."
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2. It did not carry the necessary spare
parts. All they had then was a worn
out spare driving chain
3. It has an incomplete manpower.
According to law, a tugboat of the
tonnage and powers of one like the
"Snapper" is required to have a
complement composed of one first
mate, one second mate, one third
mate, one chief engineer, one
second engineer, and one third
engineer, (section 1203, Revised
Administrative Code), but when the
trip in question was undertaken, it
was only manned by one master,
who was merely licensed as a bay,
river and lake patron, one second
mate, who was licensed as a third
mate, oner chief engineer who was
licensed as third motor engineer,
one assistant engineer, who was
licensed as a bay, river, and lake
motor engineer, and one second
assistant engineer, who was
unlicensed.
4. The delay for rescues was caused
not so much because of the lack of
available ships in the vicinity where
the "Snapper" stalled but because
defendant did not have in readiness
any tugboat sufficient in tonnage
and equipment to attend to the
rescue. The tug "Tamban" that was
ordered to extend help was fully
inadequate for the purpose. It was a
small vessel that was authorized to
operate only within Manila Bay and
did not even have any map of the
Visayan Islands
De Guzman v. CA, December 22, 1988
Facts
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner
Pedro de Guzman a merchant and
authorized dealer of General Milk Company
(Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
contracted with respondent for the hauling
of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a
warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal,
to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on
or before 4 December 1970.
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were
delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes
never reached petitioner, since the truck
which carried these boxes was hijacked
somewhere along the MacArthur Highway
in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took
with them the truck, its driver, his helper
and the cargo.
Cendana argued that he is not a common
carrier and cannot be HELD liable because
the loss was due to a force majure
RTC HELD Cendana liable while the CA
reversed the judgement.
Issue
1. Is Cendana a common carrier?
2. Is he liable?
HELD
YES, even though he merely "back-hauled"
goods for other merchants from Manila to
Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was
done on a periodic or occasional rather than
regular or scheduled manner, and even
though private respondent's principal
occupation was not the carriage of goods
for others. There is no dispute that private
respondent charged his customers a fee for
hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell
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below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. Also the fact that he has no
CPC is of no moment as the law imposes
duties and liabilities upon common carriers
for the safety and protection of those who
utilize their services and the law cannot
allow a common carrier to render such
duties and liabilities merely facultative by
simply failing to obtain the necessary
permits and authorizations.
NO, Under Article 1745 (6) above, a
common carrier is HELD responsible and
will not be allowed to divest or to diminish
such responsibility even for acts of
strangers like thieves or robbers, except
where such thieves or robbers in fact acted
"with grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." Here, it is applicable as Three (3) of
the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with
firearms. The robbers not only took away
the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped
the driver and his helper, detaining them for
several days and later releasing them in
another province (in Zambales).
Fabre v. CA, July 26, 1996
Facts
On November 2, 1984 private respondent
Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged for consideration with
petitioners school bus for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union.
The driver Cabil was forced to take a detour
to the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan
for the bridge in Carmen was under repair.
At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came
upon a sharp curve on the highway, running
on a south to east direction, which he
described as "siete." The road was slippery
because it was raining, causing the bus,
which was running at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel
brace and sign along the road and rammed
the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a
full stop only after a series of impacts. The
bus came to rest off the road. A coconut
tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed
its front portion. Several passengers were
injured.
Issue
1. Is Cabil negligent?
2. Was Fabre negligent in the
supervision of his employees?
3. Is Fabre a common carrier?
HELD
YES, the fact that it was raining and the road
was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove
his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even
on a good day the normal speed was only
20 kilometers an hour, and that he was
unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly
negligent and should be HELD liable for the
injuries suffered by private respondent
Amyline Antonio.
YES, Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of
or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
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This liability of the common carriers does
not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their
employees. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in
allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,
apparently did not consider the fact that
Cabil had been driving for school children
only, from their homes to the St.
Scholastica's College in Metro Manila. They
had hired him only after a two-week
apprenticeship. They had hired him only
after a two-week apprenticeship. They had
tested him for certain matters, such as
whether he could remember the names of
the children he would be taking to school,
which were irrelevant to his qualification to
drive on a long distance travel, especially
considering that the trip to La Union was his
first. The existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of
negligence on the part of an employer.
YES, The above article makes no distinction
between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom,
as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making
such distinctions.
Crisostomo v. CA, May 31, 1991
Facts
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo
contracted the services of respondent
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc.
to arrange and facilitate her booking,
ticketing and accommodation in a tour
dubbed "Jewels of Europe". Menor, the
companys ticket manager and niece,
delivered a ticket dated June 14, 1991.
When her aunt came to the airport on June
15, she learned that the flight has already
left.
Upon complaining, Menor was able to
secure that her aunt take another tour, the
British Pageant. On her return, Crisostomo
asked for reimbursement for the first tour.
Crisostomo argues that she missed the flight
because she was not properly informed of
the flight details thus not observing
extraordinary diligence and that her 2nd tour
was a substitute for the 1st.
Issue
1. Is the travel agency a common
carrier?
2. Is Caravan Travel liable?
HELD
NO, The object of petitioners contractual
relation with respondent is the latters
service of arranging and facilitating
petitioners booking, ticketing and
accommodation in the package tour. In
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contrast, the object of a contract of carriage
is the transportation of passengers or
goods. It is in this sense that the contract
between the parties in this case was an
ordinary one for services and not one of
carriage. Since the contract between the
parties is an ordinary one for services, the
standard of care required of respondent is
that of a good father of a family under
Article 1173 of the Civil Code or due
diligence.
NO, Contrary to petitioners claim, the
evidence on record shows that respondent
exercised due diligence in performing its
obligations under the contract and followed
standard procedure in rendering its services
to petitioner. As correctly observed by the
lower court, the plane ticket issued to
petitioner clearly reflected the departure
date and time, contrary to petitioners
contention. The travel documents,
consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers
and instructions, were likewise delivered to
petitioner two days prior to the trip.
Bascos v. CA, April 7, 1993
Facts
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano
Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE) entered into
a hauling contract 2 with Jibfair Shipping
Agency Corporation whereby the former
bound itself to haul the latter's 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes
Drive, Del Pan, Manila to the warehouse of
Purefoods Corporation in Calamba, Laguna.
To do so, CIPTRADE subcontracted Estrellita
Bascos (petitioner) to transport and to
deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal. Bascos
failed to deliver the goods.

Bascos argues that she has no liability as her
truck was leased by CIPTRADE thus she is
not a common carrier and that the loss was
due to a hijacking or force majure.
Issue
1. Was Bascos a common carrier?
2. Was there force majure?
HELD
YES, a contract is what the law defines it to
be and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. Here although called a
contract of lease, it is a contract of carriage.
The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of
the business engaged in by the carrier
which he has HELD out to the general public
as his occupation rather than the quantity
or extent of the business transacted." In this
case, petitioner herself has made the
admission that she was in the trucking
business, offering her trucks to those with
cargo to move. Judicial admissions are
conclusive and no evidence is required to
prove the same.
NO, For a hijacking to be considered as
force majure it must be established with
grave and irresistible force, petitioner
presented her accusatory affidavit, Jesus
Bascos' affidavit, and Juanito Morden's
"Salaysay". However, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals have concluded
that these affidavits were not enough to
overcome the presumption.
1. Petitioner's affidavit about the
hijacking was based on what had
been told her by Juanito Morden. It
was not a first-hand account. While
it had been admitted in court for
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lack of objection on the part of
private respondent, the respondent
Court had discretion in assigning
weight to such evidence.
2. the affidavit of Jesus Bascos did not
dwell on how the hijacking took
place.
3. The affidavit of Juanito Morden, the
truck helper in the hijacked truck,
was presented as evidence in court,
he himself was a witness as could be
gleaned from the contents of the
petition. Affidavits are not
considered the best evidence if the
affiants are available as witnesses.
4. The subsequent filing of the
information for carnapping and
robbery against the accused named
in said affidavits did not necessarily
mean that the contents of the
affidavits were true because they
were yet to be determined in the
trial of the criminal cases.
FGU Insurance v. GP Sarmiento Trucking,
August 6, 2002
Facts
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS)
undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty
(30) units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck,
driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant
site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along
South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro
Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
Dagupan City. While the truck was
traversing the north diversion road along
McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol,
Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an
unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a
deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid
Concepcion and in turn files against GPS for
reimbursement.
Issue
1. Is GPS a common carrier?
2. Is the GPS liable?
3. Is the driver liable?
HELD
NO, GPS, being an exclusive contractor and
hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering or offering its services to no other
individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier. Common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air, for hire or
compensation, offering their services to the
public,8 whether to the public in general or
to a limited clientele in particular, but never
on an exclusive basis. The true test of a
common carrier is the carriage of
passengers or goods, providing space for
those who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee.
YES, In culpa contractual, upon which the
action of petitioner rests as being the
subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the
mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes
the existence of a contract of carriage
between it and petitioners assured, and
admits that the cargoes it has assumed to
11
Case Digest 2017
deliver have been lost or damaged while in
its custody. In such a situation, a default on,
or failure of compliance with, the obligation
in this case, the delivery of the goods in its
custody to the place of destination - gives
rise to a presumption of lack of care and
corresponding liability on the part of the
contractual obligor the burden being on him
to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do
so.
NO, without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault, may not himself be
ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not
being a party to the contract of carriage
between petitioners principal and
defendant, may not be HELD liable under
the agreement. A contract can only bind the
parties who have entered into it or their
successors who have assumed their
personality or their juridical position.
Lita Enterprises v. Second Civil Cases
Division, April 27, 1984
Facts
Sometime in 1966, the spouses Nicasio M.
Ocampo and Francisca Garcia, herein
private respondents, purchased in
installment from the Delta Motor Sales
Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard
cars to be used as taxicabs. Since they had
no franchise to operate taxicabs, they
contracted with petitioner Lita Enterprises,
Inc., through its representative, Manuel
Concordia, for the use of the latter's
certificate of public convenience in
consideration of an initial payment of
P1,000.00 and a monthly rental of P200.00
per taxicab unit. To effectuate Id agreement,
the aforesaid cars were registered in the
name of petitioner Lita Enterprises, Inc,
Possession, however, remained with tile
spouses Ocampo who operated and
maintained the same under the name Acme
Taxi, petitioner's trade name.
About a year later, on March 18, 1967, one
of said taxicabs driven by their employee,
Emeterio Martin, collided with a motorcycle
whose driver, one Florante Galvez, died
from the head injuries sustained therefrom.
2 of the taxicabs were levied to pay for the
judgement thus leading to Ocampo deciding
to register his taxicabs in his name. He
requested the manager of petitioner Lita
Enterprises, Inc. to turn over the
registration papers to him, but the latter
allegedly refused.
Issue
Can he enforce his claim?
HELD
NO, The parties are in pare delicto. The
"kabit system" is invariably recognized as
being contrary to public policy and,
therefore, void and inexistent under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, It is a fundamental
principle that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will
leave them both where it finds them. Under
Art. 1412, if the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, neither party
may recover what he has given by virtue of
the contract.
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, June
20, 2012
Facts
12
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On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30
p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was
driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in
Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of
Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets,
Espinas stopped his car. When the signal
light turned green, he proceeded to cross
the intersection. He was already in the
middle of the intersection when another
car, traversing President Quirino Street and
going to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and
bumped his car. As a result of the impact,
Espinas car turned clockwise. The other car
escaped from the scene of the incident, but
Espinas was able to get its plate number.
Upon inquiry, he learned that the owner of
the car is Filcar.
Filcar denied liability arguing that while it is
the registered owner of the car that hit and
bumped Espinas car, the car was assigned
to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor,
the husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar further
stated that when the incident happened,
the car was being driven by Atty. Flors
personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Issue
1. Is the Filcar liable as a registered
owner?
2. Can he claim the defense of due
diligence under Art. 2180?
HELD
YES, Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed
the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Public policy dictates that whether there is
an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the
driver is irrelevant in determining the
liability of the registered owner.
NO, the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the
Civil Code by making these defenses
unavailable to the registered owner of the
motor vehicle.
25. La Mallorca v. CA, May 14, 1996
Facts
Plaintiff boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352
bound for Pampanga which was owned and
operated by the defendant. Mariano was
about to board the bus, not knowing that
his daughter Raquel followed him. . While
said Mariano Beltran was on the running
board of the bus waiting for the conductor
to hand him his bayong, the bus suddenly
started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact
that the conductor has not given the driver
the customary signal to start, since said
conductor was still attending to the baggage
left behind by Mariano Beltran. His child
was run over by the bus.
La Mallorcas defense is that it is not liable
as the child was no longer a passenger
during the accident.
Issue
Is the carrier liable?
HELD
YES, It has been recognized as a rule that
the relation of carrier and passenger does
not cease at the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
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Case Digest 2017
selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances.
In the first place, the driver, although
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put
off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
the bus even before the bus conductor gave
him the signal to go and while the latter was
still unloading part of the baggages of the
passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The
presence of said passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the
contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can be HELD liable for the
negligence of its driver under Art. 2180.
Phil. Charter Insurance Corp. v. Unknown
Owner of the Vessel M/V National Honor
Shipping Corporation of the Phils. July 8,
2005
Facts
On 24 January 1991, Samkyung Chemical
Company, Ltd., based in Ulsan, South Korea,
shipped 62.06 metric tons of the liquid
chemical DIOCTYL PHTHALATE (DOP) on
board MT "TACHIBANA". The consignee was
Plastic Group Phils., Inc. (PGP) in Manila.
PGP insured the cargo with herein
petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance
Corporation against all risks.
The ocean tanker MT "TACHIBANA"
unloaded the cargo to Tanker Barge LB-1011
of respondent Chemoil Lighterage
Corporation, which shall transport the same
to Del Pan Bridge in Pasig River. Tanker
Barge LB-1011 would unload the cargo to
tanker trucks, also owned by the
respondent, and haul it by land to PGPs
storage tanks in Calamba, Laguna.
Upon inspection by PGP, the samples taken
from the shipment showed discoloration
from yellowish to amber, demonstrating
that it was damaged, as DOP is colorless
and water clear. After hiring GIT, an
independent insurance adjuster, it was
learned that cargo tanks showed manhole
covers of ballast tanks ceilings loosely
secured. Furthermore, it was noted that the
rubber gaskets of the manhole covers of the
ballast tanks re-acted to the chemical
causing shrinkage thus, loosening the covers
and cargo ingress to the rusty ballast tanks.
In the respondents defense before the CA,
it alleged in the main that PGP failed to file
any notice, claim or protest within the
period required by Article 366 of the Code
of Commerce, which is a condition
precedent to the accrual of a right of action
against the carrier. A telephone call which
was supposedly made by a certain Alfred
Chan, an employee of PGP, to one of the
Vice Presidents of the respondent,
informing the latter of the discoloration, is
not the notice required by Article 366 of the
Code of Commerce.
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Issue
Was the requirement of proper notice
under Art. 366 properly relayed?
HELD
NO, The filing of a claim with the carrier
within the time limitation therefore actually
constitutes a condition precedent to the
accrual of a right of action against a carrier
for loss of, or damage to, the goods. The
shipper or consignee must allege and prove
the fulfillment of the condition. If it fails to
do so, no right of action against the carrier
can accrue in favor of the former. The
aforementioned requirement is a
reasonable condition precedent; it does not
constitute a limitation of action.
Here, both courts HELD that, indeed, a
telephone call was made by Alfredo Chan to
Encarnacion Abastillas, informing the latter
of the contamination. However, nothing in
the trial courts decision stated that the
notice of claim was relayed or filed with the
respondent-carrier immediately or within a
period of twenty-four hours from the time
the goods were received. The allegation
that the drivers were informed of it holds
no weight as they were also not presented
in the witness stand.
LRTA v. Natividad, February 6, 2003
Facts
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour
past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding
or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
Navidad fell into the tracks and was it by a
moving train.
LRTA defended that Escartins assault upon
Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on
the tracks, was an act of a stranger that
could not have been foreseen or prevented.
Also it has no employer-employee
relationship with Roman as the latter is an
employee of Prudent.
Issue
1. Is the carrier, LRTA, liable?
2. Is the security agency liable?
HELD
YES, the duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates
it not only during the course of the trip but
for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose
to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In
either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
NO, there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the
death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
that the negligence of its employee,
Escartin, has not been duly proven.
La Mallorca v. CA, May 14, 1966
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Case Digest 2017
Facts
The suit arose by reason of the death of
Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of
Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo
Tolentino, in a head-on collision between
petitioner's bus, on which she was a
passenger, and a freight truck traveling in
the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao
Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959.
The immediate cause of the collision was
the fact that the driver of the bus lost
control of the wheel when its left front tire
suddenly exploded.
Petitioner argued that the tire blowout is a
fortuitous event.
Issue
Is the carrier liable?
HELD
YES, In the present case, the cause of the
blow-out was known. The inner tube of the
left front tire, according to petitioner's own
evidence and as found by the Court of
Appeals "was pressed between the inner
circle of the left wheel and the rim which
had slipped out of the wheel." This was,
said Court correctly HELD, a mechanical
defect of the conveyance or a fault in its
equipment which was easily discoverable if
the bus had been subjected to a more
thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to
the road that morning. The bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident.
Considering that the tire which exploded
was not new thus caso fortuito cannot be
entertained.
Lim v. CA, January 16, 2002

Facts
Private respondent Donato Gonzales
purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from
Gomercino Vallarta, holder of a certificate
of public convenience for the operation of
public utility vehicles plying the
Monumento-Bulacan route. While private
respondent Gonzales continued offering the
jeepney for public transport services he did
not have the registration of the vehicle
transferred in his name nor did he secure
for himself a certificate of public
convenience for its operation. Thus Vallarta
remained on record as its registered owner
and operator.
On 22 July 1990, while the jeepney was
running northbound along the North
Diversion Road somewhere in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, it collided with a ten-wheeler-truck
owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and
driven by his co-petitioner Esmadito
Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned responsibility
for the accident, explaining that while he
was traveling towards Manila the truck
suddenly lost its brakes. Petitioner offered
private respondent 20,000 pesos as
compensation but the latter wants a new
jeep hence the complaint for damages.
Issue
Can Gonzalez claim compensation since he
is under the kabit system?
HELD
YES, In the present case it is at once
apparent that the evil sought to be
prevented in enjoining the kabit system
does not exist.
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1. neither of the parties to the
pernicious kabit system is being
HELD liable for damages.
2. the case arose from the negligence
of another vehicle in using the public
road to whom no representation, or
misrepresentation, as regards the
ownership and operation of the
passenger jeepney was made and to
whom no such representation, or
misrepresentation, was necessary.
Thus it cannot be said that private
respondent Gonzales and the
registered owner of the jeepney
were in estoppel for leading the
public to believe that the jeepney
belonged to the registered owner.
3. the riding public was not bothered
nor inconvenienced at the very least
by the illegal arrangement.
On the contrary, it was private respondent
himself who had been wronged and was
seeking compensation for the damage done
to him. Certainly, it would be the height of
inequity to deny him his right.
British Airways v. CA, February 9, 1993
Facts
During the early part of March 1981, said
principal paid to the Jeddah branch of
petitioner British Airways, Inc. airfare tickets
for 93 contract workers with specific
instruction to transport said workers to
Jeddah on or before March 30, 1981.
Thereafter, private respondent instructed its
travel agent, ADB Travel and Tours. Inc., to
book the 93 workers with petitioner but the
latter failed to fly said workers, thereby
compelling private respondent to borrow
money in the amount of P304,416.00 in
order to purchase airline tickets from the
other airlines since the 93 workers it had
recruited who must leave immediately since
the visas of said workers are valid only for
45 days and the Bureau of Employment
Services mandates that contract workers
must be sent to the job site within a period
of 30 days. This circumstance happened 3
more times amounting to failure to
transport 93 passengers.
Petitioner argued that private respondent
has no cause of action against it there being
no perfected contract of carriage existing
between them as no ticket was ever issued
to private respondent's contract workers
and, therefore, the obligation of the
petitioner to transport said contract
workers did not arise.
Issue
Is the carrier liable?
HELD
YES, In dealing with the contract of common
carriage of passengers for purpose of
accuracy, there are two (2) aspects of the
same, namely: (a) the contract "to carry (at
some future time)," which contract is
consensual and is necessarily perfected by
mere consent (See Article 1356, Civil Code
of the Philippines), and (b) the contract "of
carriage" or "of common carriage" itself
which should be considered as a real
contract for not until the carrier is actually
used can the carrier be said to have already
assumed the obligation of a carrier.
Here, the contract "to carry" is the one
involved which is consensual and is
perfected by the mere consent of the
parties. The appellee's consent to the said
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contract "to carry" its contract workers from
Manila to Jeddah. The appellant's consent
thereto, on the other hand, was manifested
by its acceptance of the PTA or prepaid
ticket advice that ROLACO Engineering has
prepaid the airfares of the appellee's
contract workers advising the appellant that
it must transport the contract workers on or
before the end of March, 1981 and the
other batch in June, 1981.
The third essential requisite of a contract is
an object certain. In this contract "to carry",
such an object is the transport of the
passengers from the place of departure to
the place of destination as stated in the
telex.
Schmitz Transportation and Brokerage
Corp. v. Transport Venture Inc., April 22,
2005
Facts
SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the
port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V
"Alexander Saveliev" (a vessel of Russian
registry and owned by Black Sea) 545 hot
rolled steel sheets in coil. It was then
discharged at the port of Manila in favor of
the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe
Corporation (Little Giant), were insured
against all risks with Industrial Insurance
Company Ltd. Schmitz Transport, whose
services the consignee engaged to secure
the requisite clearances, to receive the
cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver
them to its (the consignees) warehouse at
Cainta, Rizal, in turn engaged the services of
TVI to send a barge and tugboat at shipside.
37 of the 545 coils were unloaded to the
barge. But due to inclemental weather the
unloading was stopped and the workers
abandoned the barge. The barge then
capsized losing the 37 coils.
Issue
1. Was the loss due to a fortuitous
event?
2. Is Petitioner liable?
3. Is TVI liable?
HELD
NO, [T]he principle embodied in the act of
God doctrine strictly requires that the act
must be occasioned solely by the violence
of nature. Human intervention is to be
excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect is
found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his
active intervention or neglect or failure to
act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.
Here, the cause of the sinking was the lack
of tugboat to tow the barge to pier given
the deteriorating sea conditions.
YES, as long as a person or corporation
holds [itself] to the public for the purpose of
transporting goods as [a] business, [it] is
already considered a common carrier
regardless if [it] owns the vehicle to be used
or has to hire one."
As to the defense that it is a broker-agent of
Little Giant in effecting the transportation of
the cargoes from the shipside and into Little
Giants warehouse, It cannot shift liability
since in their Service Contract, while Little
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Case Digest 2017
Giant was named as the consignee,
petitioner did not disclose that it was acting
on commission and was chartering the
vessel for Little Giant.
YES, TVIs failure to promptly provide a
tugboat did not only increase the risk that
might have been reasonably anticipated
during the shipside operation, but was the
proximate cause of the loss. A man of
ordinary prudence would not leave a
heavily loaded barge floating for a
considerable number of hours, at such a
precarious time, and in the open sea,
knowing that the barge does not have any
power of its own and is totally defenseless
from the ravages of the sea. That it was
nighttime and, therefore, the members of
the crew of a tugboat would be charging
overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling
for one such tugboat. Thus petitioner and
TVI are solidarily liable.
LHUILLIER vs BRITISH AIRWAYS
Filed for damages for bad treatment by
airline personnel
HELD
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the
action for damages before
1. the court where the carrier is
domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has
its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has
an establishment by which the
contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of
destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that
respondent is a British corporation
domiciled in London, United Kingdom with
London as its principal place of business.
Hence, under the first and second
jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring
her case before the courts of London in the
United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and
baggage check presented by both the
petitioner and respondent, it appears that
the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy.
Consequently, under the third jurisdictional
rule, the petitioner has the option to bring
her case before the courts of Rome in Italy.
Finally, both the petitioner and respondent
aver that the place of destination is Rome,
Italy, which is properly designated given the
routing presented in the said passenger
ticket and baggage check.
It is thus settled that allegations of
tortious conduct committed against an
airline passenger during the course of the
international carriage do not bring the case
outside the ambit of the Warsaw
Convention.
PAL v SAVILLO
He was supposed to participate in a golf
tournament in Indonesia but he was not
taken by Singapore airlines. His PAL ticket
should have allowed that.
He filed a demand letter on 1994 and a
complaint on 1997.
HELD
this Court distinguished between the (1)
damage to the passengers baggage and (2)
humiliation he suffered at the hands of the
airlines employees. The first cause of action
was covered by the Warsaw Convention
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Case Digest 2017
which prescribes in two years, while the
second was covered by the provisions of the
Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four
years.
these allegations will not fall under the
Warsaw Convention, since the purported
negligence on the part of PAL did not occur
during the performance of the contract of
carriage but days before the scheduled
flight.
ONG YIU vs. CA
Blue maleta was forwarded the next days
flight. Upon receipt, it was refused for the
lock was already open
HELD
We do not find any evidence of bad faith
in this. On the contrary, We find that the
defendant had exerted diligent effort to
locate plaintiff's baggage. The message was
sent within less than one hour after
plaintiff's luggage could not be located.
PAL is however liable for the loss in
baggage to 100 pesos under the limited
liability rule. Regardless if he did not sign
the ticket, it is a binding contract of
adhesion. The validity of this stipulation is
not questioned by the plaintiff. They are
printed in reasonably and fairly big letters,
and are easily readable. Moreover, plaintiff
had been a frequent passenger of PAL from
Cebu to Butuan City and back, and he, being
a lawyer and businessman, must be fully
aware of these conditions
EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION v CA
One crate of bus parts from Japan was
found missing. Petitioner was the carrier.
HELD
Par. 18 is binding as it was a contract of
adhesion which was clear and Maruman
Trading had an option to declare a higher
value. Also Maruman shouldve already
know this given that it trades extensively
It was HELD that even if the consignee was
not a signatory to the contract of carriage
between the shipper and the carrier, the
consignee can still be bound by the
contract. Moreover, the consignee was
bound when he filed a claim for
reimbursement on the strength of the BoL.
ALITALIA v IAC
Prof. Pablo was supposed to give a lecture
in Italy under the UN FAO but was unable to
because her luggage carrying the
presentation was lost and only found after
the date of her scheduled presentation
HELD
Art. 16 is not controlling. The Convention
does not thus operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances of an airline's
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent
of that liability. The Warsaw Convention has
invariably been HELD inapplicable, or as not
restrictive of the carrier's liability, where
there was satisfactory evidence of malice or
bad faith attributable to its officers and
employees.
She is not, of course, entitled to be
compensated for loss or damage to her
luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage
was ultimately delivered to her in Manila,
tardily but safely. She is however entitled to
nominal damages
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Case Digest 2017
CHINA AIRLINES vs CHIOK
Chiok had a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-
Manila PAL ticket. On his way back to
Manila from HK he was not allowed to
board because his name was not in the
computer. He expressed the need to get
back to Manila on the day since he has a
business option being the founding director
of the Philippine Polysterene Paper
Corporation.
HELD
PAL is liable because in a general pool
partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing
airline is the principal in a contract of
carriage, while the endorsee-airline is the
agent. CAL is also still liable.
SANTOS v NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES
Despite confirmation petitioner was not
allowed to board his flight from San
Francisco to Manila by NOA
HELD
The Warsaw Convention was
constitutional because the treaty which is
the subject matter of this petition was a
joint legislative-executive act.
But the more important consideration is
that the treaty has not been rejected by the
Philippine government. The doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus does not operate
automatically to render the treaty
inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal
act of rejection, usually made by the head
of State, with a statement of the reasons
why compliance with the treaty is no longer
required.
 We agree with the latter case. The place of
destination, within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention, is determined by the
terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between
the passenger and the carrier. Examination
of the petitioner's ticket shows that his
ultimate destination is San Francisco.
Although the date of the return flight was
left open, the contract of carriage between
the parties indicates that NOA was bound to
transport the petitioner to San Francisco
from Manila. Manila should therefore be
considered merely an agreed stopping place
and not the destination.
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only
one of the places where the complaint is
allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By
specifying the three other places, to wit, the
principal place of business of the carrier, its
place of business where the contract was
made, and the place of destination, the
article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term
"domicile."
UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY
Uy had an overweight baggage which he
paid for and learned also that his bags were
slashed. UA paid him an amount under the
limited liability rule but he extra-judicially
demanded more.
HELD
respondent's failure to file his complaint
within the two (2)-year limitation of the
Warsaw Convention does not bar his action
since petitioner airline may still be HELD
liable for breach of other provisions of the
Civil Code which prescribe a different period
or procedure for instituting the action,
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Case Digest 2017
specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which
prescribes four (4) years for filing an action
based on torts.
the Warsaw Convention reveal that the
delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year
limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an
absolute bar to suit and not to be made
subject to the various tolling provisions of
the laws of the forum. This therefore
forecloses the application of our own rules
on interruption of prescriptive periods.
Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let
local laws determine whether an action had
been commenced within the two (2)-year
period, and within our jurisdiction an action
shall be deemed commenced upon the
filing of a complaint. Since it is indisputable
that respondent filed the present action
beyond the two (2)-year time frame his
second cause of action must be barred
Hence, despite the express mandate of
Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an
action for damages should be filed within
two (2) years from the arrival at the place of
destination, such rule shall not be applied in
the instant case because of the delaying
tactics employed by petitioner airline itself.
KENG HUA PAPER PRODUCTS CO. INC. v CA
the shipment was discharged at the
Manila International Container Port. Notices
of arrival were transmitted to the defendant
but the latter failed to discharge the
shipment from the container during the free
time period or grace period. The said
shipment remained inside the plaintiffs for a
total of four hundred eighty-one (481) days.
During the 481-day period, demurrage
charges accrued. Within the same period,
letters demanding payment were sent by
the plaintiff to the defendant who, however,
refused to settle its obligation which
eventually amounted to P67,340.00.
Petitioner argues that he is not bound by
the bill of lading because it declined to
receive the shipment and acceptance of it
would be tantamount to smuggling, the
shipment having gone overboard to 20,000
kilos from the supposed 10,000 kilos.
HELD
He is bound by the bill of lading. He only
objected against it after 6 months from
receiving notices of its arrival. Also mere
apprehension of violating said custom laws,
without a clear demonstration that taking
delivery of the shipment has become legally
impossible, cannot defeat the petitioners
contractual obligation and liability under
the bill of lading.
Also the fact that there was a discrepancy
between the initial demands for demurrage
and the amount reached by the CA is of no
moment since the longer the cargo
remained unclaimed, the higher the
demurrage.
SEA-LAND SERVICE, INC vs IAC
Paulino Ques, the consignee, shipment
carried by Sealand was pilfered while in
custody of the arrastre operator in Cebu.
Hence the formal claim.
HELD
a consignee in a bill of lading to recover
from the carrier or shipper for loss of, or
damage to, goods being transported under
said bill
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Case Digest 2017
The private respondent had no direct part
or intervention in the execution of the
contract of carriage between the shipper
and the carrier as set forth in the bill of
lading in question. As pointed out in
Mendoza vs. PAL, supra, the right of a party
in the same situation as respondent here, to
recover for loss of a shipment consigned to
him under a bill of lading drawn up only by
and between the shipper and the carrier,
springs from either a relation of agency that
may exist between him and the shipper or
consignor, or his status as a stranger in
whose favor some stipulation is made in
said contract, and who becomes a party
thereto when he demands fulfillment of
that stipulation, in this case the delivery of
the goods or cargo shipped
Furthermore, this Court has also ruled 19
that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is
applicable up to the final port of destination
and that the fact that transshipment was
made on an interisland vessel did not
remove the contract of carriage of goods
from the operation of said Act.
PAGI v SWEET LINES
Some of the cargoes in the two shipments
of Low Density Polyethylene were damaged
or missing.
HELD
It is to be noted that the carriage of the
cargo involved was effected pursuant to an
"Application for Delivery of Cargoes without
Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20,
1977 in Davao City with the notation
therein that said application corresponds to
and is subject to the terms of bills of lading
MD-25 and MD-26. It would be a safe
assessment to interpret this to mean that,
sight unseen, petitioners acknowledged the
existence of said bills of lading. By having
the cargo shipped on respondent carrier's
vessel and later making a claim for loss on
the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners
for all intents and purposes accepted said
bills. Having done so they are bound by all
stipulations contained therein. Verily, as
petitioners are suing for recovery on the
contract, and in fact even went as far as
assailing its validity by categorizing it as a
contract of adhesion, then they necessarily
admit that there is such a contract, their
knowledge of the existence of which with
its attendant stipulations they cannot now
be allowed to deny.
Non-compliance with the requirement of
filing a notice of claim under Article 366 of
the Code of Commerce does not affect the
consignee's right of action against the
carrier because said requirement applies
only to cases for recovery of damages on
account of loss of or damage to cargo, not
to an action for refund of overpayment, and
on the further consideration that neither
the Code of Commerce nor the bills of
lading therein provided any time limitation
for suing for refund of money paid in excess,
except only that it be filed within a
reasonable time.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. MARITIME
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES
The case was brought by DOLE, the
consignee, for the damage of a shipment of
machine parts.
HELD
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Case Digest 2017
An Extra-judicial demand does not toll the
prescriptive period in COGSA
AIR FRANCE vs. GILLEGO
Gillego was a Sorsogon congressman who
was was invited to participate as one of the
keynote speakers at the 89th Inter-
Parliamentary Conference Symposium on
Parliament Guardian of Human Rights to be
HELD in Budapest, Hungary and Tokyo,
Japan from May 19 to 22, 1993. AF lost his
luggage hence the suit
HELD
There was bad faith because the PIR
confirmed that the petitioner to locate
respondents luggage were telex searches
allegedly made on May 17, 21 and 23, 1993.
There was not even any attempt to explain
the reason for the loss of respondents
luggage. But the moral damages must be
reduced from 1 million to 200,000 since it is
made to alleviate the moral suffering of the
victim.
SABENA BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES v CA
Sta Agustins luggage was lost when she
came to manila from her stopover in
brussels. Upon notice, she was informed
that the luggage was lost the 2nd time
around. The loss was 4,265 dollars.
HELD
The Warsaw Convention however denies
to the carrier availment of the provisions
which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct
or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court seized
of the case, is considered to be equivalent
to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is
(similarly) caused x x x by any agent of the
carrier acting within the scope of his
employment. Here the airline lost the
luggage twice
AMERICAN AIRLINES vs. CA
Petitioner was not part of private
respondents conjunction ticket but rather
was availed when he exchanged the unused
portion of his conjunction ticket for a one
way ticket from Geneva to New York with
the petitioner. Petitioner sues because he
was detained by the petitioners guards
before being allowed to board.
HELD
when the petitioner accepted the unused
portion of the conjunction tickets, entered it
in the IATA clearing house and undertook to
transport the private respondent over the
route covered by the unused portion of the
conjunction tickets, i.e., Geneva to New
York, the petitioner tacitly recognized its
commitment under the IATA pool
arrangement to act as agent of the principal
contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to
the segment of the trip the petitioner
agreed to undertake. As such, the petitioner
thereby assumed the obligation to take the
place of the carrier originally designated in
the original conjunction ticket. Thus he
could file in Mani lung par. 3 of Art 28 of the
Warsaw Convention
MANAY, JR v CEBU AIR,INC
Jose purchased 20 roundtrip tickets from
Manila to Palawan. The branch office
employee, recapped the first page out of 3
pages to him only since it was what
contained the details specified by Jose.
From Palawan they learned that 9/17 of
them cant board because their tickets have
24
Case Digest 2017
a different boarding time. A flight earlier in
the day which has already left.
HELD
When a common carrier, through its
ticketing agent, has not yet issued a ticket to
the prospective passenger, the transaction
between them is still that of a seller and a
buyer. The obligation of the airline to
exercise extraordinary diligence
commences upon the issuance of the
contract of carriage.92 Ticketing, as the
act of issuing the contract of carriage, is
necessarily included in the exercise of
extraordinary diligence.
It is not disputed that on June 13, 2008,
petitioner Jose purchased 20 Manila-
Palawan-Manila tickets from respondents
ticketing agent. Since all 20 tickets were
part of a single transaction made by a single
purchaser, it is logical to presume that all
20 passengers would prefer the same
flight schedule, unless the purchaser stated
otherwise.
BUT he is barred from claiming because he
shouldve checked the flight details under
his obligation as an air passenger to observe
due diligence. Tickets were issued 37 days
before their flight. They were balikabayan
well-versed with these things. The
departure time was clearly reflected