Ejercito v.

Sandiganbayan | Gab
November 30, 2006
Joseph Victor G. Ejercito, Petitioner, v. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and People of the Philippines, Respondents
Carpio Morales, J.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari under ROC, Rule 65

SUMMARY: In People v. Estrada, et al., a criminal case for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel file multiple requests for subpoenas, which were granted by the Sandiganbayan.
Ejercito, claiming that the bank accounts subject of the subpoenas, filed motions to quash said subpoenas, which the Sandiganbayan denied. Ejercitos MR was denied, so he filed the
present petition for certiorari under ROC, Rule 65 with the SC. The SC ruled that though trust accounts are covered by the term deposits in RA 1405, his accounts are not protected
under RA 1405. Furthermore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply at bar. Finally, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman
may conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it earlier conducted.
DOCTRINES (related to topic):
RA 1405, Sec. 2 clearly shows that the term deposits was intended to be understood broadly.
o The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation of deposits.
o Generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited, but also to those which are invested.
Thus, the exception to RA 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
Following Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include those
accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been transferred.
Nowhere in RA 1405 provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
FACTS:
In People v. Estrada, et al., a criminal case for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB) or his/her authorized representative to produce certain
documents during the hearings on January 22 and 27, 2003:

I. For Trust Account 858;

1. Account Opening Documents;
2. Trading Order 020385;
3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;
4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of:
a. Bank of Commerce MC 0256254 amounting to P2,000,000;
b. Urban bank Corp. MC 34181 amounting to P10,875,749.43;
c. Urban Bank MC 34182 amounting to P42,716,554.22;
d. Urban Bank Corp. MC 37661 amounting to P54,161,496.52;
5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999; and
6. Ledger of the SPAN 858.
II. For Savings Account 0116-17345-9
SPAN 858
1. Signature Cards; and
2. Statement of Account/Ledger
III. Urban Bank Managers Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Managers Check Application Forms:
1. MC 039975 amounting to P70,000,000;
2. MC 039976 amounting to P2,000,000;
3. MC 039977 amounting to P2,000,000; and
4. MC 039978 amounting to P1,000,000
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts in the name of Jose Velarde and to testify thereon.
January 21 2003: The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution.
Subpoenas were later accordingly issued.
The Special Prosecution Panel filed another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum for the President of EIB or his/her authorized
representative to produce the same documents subject of the previous Subpoena Duces Tecum and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27 and
29, 2003 and subsequent dates, until completion of the testimony.
The new request was granted by the Sandiganbayan.
o January 24, 2003: A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly issued.
Ejercito, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution Panel had requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank
accounts belonging to him, attended the hearing on January 27, 2003 and filed before the Sandiganbayan a letter1.
o The accounts referred to by Ejercito in his letter are Trust Account 858 and Savings Account 0116-17345-9.
The Special Division of the Sandiganbayan later advised Ejercito that his remedy was to file a motion to quash.
January 28, 2003: Ejercito filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the EIB President
dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.
o Ejercito claimed that his bank accounts are covered by RA 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions
stated therein.
o Ejercito claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been
made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the
then Urban Bank.
o The disclosure being illegal, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use of the information.
The prosecution filed another Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the EIIB President to produce, on the hearings
scheduled on February 3 and 5, 2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas, with the exception of the Bank of Commerce MC 0256254
amounting to P2,000,000 as Bank of Commerce MC 0256256 amounting to P200,000,000 was instead requested.
o The request covered the following documents:

1
Your Honors:
I write this court relative to the concern of subpoenaing the undersigneds bank account.
xxxx
I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services of a lawyer to help me protect my rights and those of every banking depositor. But the one I have in mind
is out of the country right now.
May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the subpoena be held in abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take appropriate legal steps in connection with
the prosecutions request for the issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts.
1
 IV. For Savings Account 1701-00646-1:
1. Account Opening Forms;
2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and
3. Statements of Account
The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to Aurora Baldoz, PDIC Vice President-CR-II to
produce the following documents on the scheduled hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003:

1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special Private Account Number] 858;
2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
4. Urban Bank check 052092 amounting to P36, 572, 315.43;
5. Urban Bank check 052093 amounting to P107,191,780.85; and
6. Signature Card Savings Account 0116-17345-9.
January 31, 2003: The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan.
February 7, 2003: Ejercito filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003 directed
to Baldoz be quashed.
The Sandiganbayan issued 2 Resolutions denying Ejercito Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28, 2003 and February
7, 2003.
Ejercitos MR was denied, so he filed the present petition for certiorari under ROC, Rule 65 with the SC.
ISSUE #1:
W/N Trust Account 858 is covered by the term deposit as used in RA 1405 (YES)
RATIO #1:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in RA 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie.
o The term deposits used in RA 1405 is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank.
Policy behind RA 14052
o If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to 3rd persons, then such account, regardless of whether it
creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law seeks to protect to
boost the economic development of the country.
Trust Account 858 is one such account.
o The Trust Agreement between Ejercito and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, placement, or investment of funds by Urban
Bank for and in Ejercitos behalf.
o The money deposited under Trust Account 858, was intended not merely to remain with the bank, but to be invested by it elsewhere.
o To hold that this type of account is not protected by RA 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other
ventures, contrary to the policy behind RA 1405.
RA 1405, Sec. 23 clearly shows that the term deposits was intended to be understood broadly.
o The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation of deposits.
o It is clear from the provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited, but also to those which are invested.
RA 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account 858.
ISSUE #2:
W/N Ejercitos Trust Account 858 and Savings Account 0116-17345-9 are excepted from the protection of RA 1405 (NO)
RATIO #2:
The protection afforded by the law is not absolute as there are exceptions thereto, as RA 1405, Sec. 2 provides.
In the present case, 2 exceptions apply: (1) The examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco: Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two
classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other.
Cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth, as stated by RA 7080, Sec. 24.
The overt or criminal acts as described in RA 7080, Sec. 1(d)5 also shows that the similarity between plunder and bribery since bribery is essentially included
among these criminal acts.
o All the enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each case, it may be said that no reason is seen why these 2 classes of cases cannot be
excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential.
Bribery and overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public officers and in either case the idea that a public office is a public trust and any person who
enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny applies with equal force.
Thus, the exception to RA 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.

2
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may
be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.
3
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
4
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder.
5
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes.

xxx

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

xxx
2
 Ejercito: The CA confused the cause of action with the subject of the action.
The meaning of subject matter of the litigation, as used in RA 1405 is explained in Union Bank of the Philippines v. CA:
The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the object of the action is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal
relief; but the subject of the action is neither of these since it is not the wrong or the relief demanded, the subject of the action is the matter or thing with
respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done, and this ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject
matter, or the thing in dispute.

xxx

In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where thebank inadvertently caused the transfer of the amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,000.00, the
Court sanctioned the examination of the bank accounts where part of the money was subsequently caused to be deposited

xxx

Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the subject matter of the litigation since the money deposited was the very thing
in dispute.
The plunder case pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President
Estrada.
Following Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include those
accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been transferred.
o Trust Account 858 and Savings Account 0116-17345-9 in Ejercitos name fall under this description and must, thus, be part of the subject matter of
the litigation.
ISSUE #3:
W/N the extremely-detailed information contained in the Special Prosecution Panels requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of
Ejercitos bank accounts, in violation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine (NO)
RATIO #3:
Marquez v. Desierto: before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must
be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account
holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
Ejercitos attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable at bar fails.

The exclusionary rule and RA 1405

Nowhere in RA 1405 provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
o RA 1405, Sec. 5 only states that [a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a
fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
U.S. v. Frazin [involving the US Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA)]:

Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression remedy, it would not be appropriate for us to provide one in the exercise of our
supervisory powers over the administration of justice. Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, we
would encroach upon the prerogatives of Congress were we to authorize a remedy not provided for by statute.
The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson: When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its acts[a]bsent a specific reference to an
exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the act.

Fruit of the poisonous true and violation of law

Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving RA 1405, there is no reason to apply the same at bar.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine presupposes a violation of law.
o If there was no violation of RA 1405 at bar, there would be no poisonous tree to begin with, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into Ejercitos bank accounts is recounted by the People. 6
The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of the People.
o There is no reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Sandiganbayan.
The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the examination by the Ombudsman of Ejercitos bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent
jurisdiction, was lawful.
The Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on Ejercitos bank accounts about 5 months before Marquez was promulgated.

6
long before the issuance of the Marquez ruling, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting under the powers granted to it by the Constitution and R.A.6770, and acting on information obtained
from various sourcesissued a Subpoena Duces Tecum addressed to Urban Bank.the description of the documents sought to be produced at that time included that of numbered accounts 727,
737, 747, 757, 777 and 858The subpoena did not single out account 858.

xxxx

PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a certification as to the availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858 and T/A 858 and the non-availability of bank records as to the other accounts
named in the subpoena.

Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsmanagain issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim Receiver, directing the production of
documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and T/C 858.

In compliance with the said subpoenaMs. Dela Paz, as interim receiver, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of documents under cover letter:

1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-22-99, 1-07-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B Placements of Various Branches as of February 29, 2000 and as of December 16, 1999; and
3. Trading OrdersA78102 and A078125.

Trading Order A07125 is filed in two copies a white copy which showed set up information; and a yellow copy which showed reversal information.

We are continuing our search for other records and documents pertinent to your request and we will forward to yousuch additional records and documents as we might find until then.

The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the managers checks, detailed in the Subpoena Duces Tecum

PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecumand provided copies of the managers checksrequested under cover letter.
3
 While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with as to RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date
it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute.
o Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA: a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subjectto the
qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, andwhen there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
When SC construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law in Marquez, that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there
must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction, it was reversing an earlier doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima.
o Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the now Office of the Ombudsman (then the Tanodbayan) in the course of its preliminary
investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
o The SC, citing PD 1630, Sec. 10, held that [t]he power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum at the time in
question is not disputed, anddoes not admit of doubt.
As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, the SC upheld the power of the Tandobayan under PD 1630 to issue
subpoenas duces tecum for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Marquez practically reversed Banco Filipino despite the fact that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under RA 6770, Sec. 15 was essentially the same as that under
PD 1630, Sec. 10.
As the Marquez ruling reversed a prevailing doctrine, so it may not be retroactively applied.
The Ombudsmans inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before a court of competent jurisdiction was valid at the time it was
conducted.
Likewise, the Marquez ruling that the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the
Ombudsman at bar.
o This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of RA 6770 or RA 1405, but a judge-made law, which, following People v. Luvendino, can only be given
prospective application.
As the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman at bar were legal, invocation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is misplaced.
Even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is not barred from requiring the production of the same documents based solely on information obtained
by it from sources independent of its previous inquiry.
o The Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already possessed information giving him grounds to believe that: (1) There are bank accounts bearing the
number 858, (2) that such accounts are in Urban Banks custody, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank accounts of former President Estrada, who
was then under investigation for plunder.
Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible for the Ombudsman to issue the subpoena duces tecum addressed to the President and/or Chief
Executive Officer of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof7.
The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing the number 858 was, according to the People, obtained from various sources.
o In the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered must be upheld.
With the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the independent information, may now proceed to
conduct the same investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually obtain the same information previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, since Ejercitos
bank records are not protected by RA 1405.
o Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure of the same documents to the Ombudsman, in avoidance of what would be a
time-wasteful and circuitous way of administering justice, the challenged subpoenas are upheld.

In Sum
The Sandiganbayan did not commit GAD in issuing the challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to Ejercitos Trust Account 858 and Savings Account 0116-
17345-9 because:
o These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law as there are 2 exceptions to the RA 1405 applicable at bar: (1) The
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials and (2) the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while
exception (2) applies because the money deposited in Ejercitos bank accounts forms part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.
o The fruit of the poisonous tree principle, which states that once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply at bar.
RA 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule.
There is no basis for applying the same at bar since the primary source for the detailed information regarding Ejercitos bank accounts in the
investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman was lawful.
o Even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts
that it earlier conducted, there being a plunder case already pending against former President Estrada. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay
in the administration of justice.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are dismissed. The Sandiganbayans Resolutions are upheld.

Marquez v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135882)

Facts:

Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to
various accounts maintained at the bank where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain George Trivinio purchased trail managers check and deposited some of it to an account
maintained at petitioners branch. Petitioner after meeting with the FFIB Panel to ensure the veracity of the checks agreed to the in camera inspection. Petitioner being unable to
readily identify the accounts in question, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from
the court due to the clear conflict between RA 6770 and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in contempt before the Ombudsman.

7
(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits, etc.) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E.
Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858.
4
Issue:

Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the accounts is an allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.

Ruling: NO.

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending
investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the
Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the
office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case
in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

*In contrast to Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan. Interestingly, time is of the essence. A different ruling in Ejercito was enunciated because there was already a pending investigation
months before the ruling made in this case as to the exemption in the power of the Ombudsman.

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.

G.R. No. 135882

June 27, 2001

En banc

FACTS:

In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected
were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g)
relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which
provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts
and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same
footing as the courts of law in this regard.

The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-
97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank
(TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the UBP.

On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the banks main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty.
Macalino to view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in question could not
readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had long been dormant, hence
were not covered by the new account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.

The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB
MCs as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the
depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the order.

Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of
time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.

On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply
with the order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is
punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.

On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the
Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16,
1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would be charged with indirect contempt and
obstruction of justice.
5
The lower court denied petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite
her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey
the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman.

2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA
1405).

HELD:

An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions:

1. Where the depositor consents in writing;

2. Impeachment case;

3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;

4. Deposit is subject of litigation;

5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely
confidential except:

(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or
irregularity,

(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof
shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,

(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,

(4) In cases of impeachment,

(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or

(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the
Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and
similar orders.

GANAAN v. IAC

6
 Gutierrez, J. October 16, 1986 GR no. 69809

Doctrine To fall under RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act there must either be a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200.
Summary Ganaan was charged with violation of RA 4200 for listening on a telephone conversation using an extension telephone. Trial court found him guilty and
this decision was affirmed by the IAC. SC reversed this ruling and found that an extension telephone does not fall into the same category as the devices
listed in RA 4200.

Facts Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconic. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for
direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal.
The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.
Ratio/Issues
I. Whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature (YES)
The telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public.

Only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension
telephone line.

However, affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the
listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the
listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables
are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to
pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be
accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals.
Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.

II. Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under Rep. Act No. 4200 (NO)

The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the
case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone.

Held Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED.

RAMIREZ v. CA
J. Kapunan September 28, 1995 GR 93833

Doctrine Taping of a communication by a person other that a participant to the communication constitutes a violation of the provisions of RA 4200.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense.

The phrase private communication does not include private conversations.

Summary Garcia insulted and humiliated Socorro in a confrontation in the formers office. Socorro filed a civil case for damages, using a transcript of
their conversation as proof. The transcript was obtained from her unauthorized taping of their private conversation. Garcia filed a criminal
information against Ramirez for violating RA 4200. The Court found for Garcia.

7
Facts A civil case for damages was filed by Socorro D. Ramirez alleging that Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to her dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
Garcia: wala kang utang na loob! I helped you get your job under Dr. Tamayo.
Ramirez: (hindi makasingit na magsalita)
In support of her claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the event, which was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation she made herself.
As a result of Socorro's recording of the event, Garcia filed a criminal case against Socorro for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
Petitioners defense:
The applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that:
a. The provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than
those involved in the communication.
b. The substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts
charged would not constitute a violation.
c. R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation."
Ratio/Issues WON taping of a communication by a person other that a participant to the communication constitutes a violation of the provisions of
RA 4200 - YES
1. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
2. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
3. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication.
a. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any".
b. Consequently, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator.
4. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records shows that in enacting R.A. 4200, our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

WON the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute - YES
1. The substance of the conversation need not be specifically alleged in the information.
2. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein.
3. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

WON the phrase private communication include private conversations - NO

1. The contention narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
2. Communicare (latin word) = "to share or to impart."
a. Communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or
b. Signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)".
3. These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, between Ramirez and Garcia, in the privacy of the
latter's office.
4. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the
bill quoted below:
Held The instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

September 28, 1995 | GR No. 93833 | J. Kapunan
Parties: Socorro D. Ramirez, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia, respondent
Summary: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case against Ester Garcia, alleging that the respondent humiliated her in a hostile and furious manner that was offensive to the dignity of
petitioner in one of their previous conversations. To prove such allegation, she used a transcript of a tape recording of the said conversation. Because of this, Garcia filed a criminal
case against Ramirez for violation of RA 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Upon arraignment, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200.
Doctrine/Relation to Topic: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish.
Facts:
- Garcia confronts Ramirez. It was in that conversation where the alleged hostile humiliation happened.
- Ramirez used the tape recording she had of her conversation with Garcia to create and transcript and use it as evidence for her Civil Case against Garcia.
- Garcia filed a case against Ramirez, alleging that she secretly taped their conversation, and that such was illegal, in violation of Sec. 1, RA4200, the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
- Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200.
- The RTC ruled in favor of Ramirez, affirming that the secret wiretapping must be done by someone other than the parties involved in the conversation.
- Later, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision, saying that the allegations constitute a violation of RA4200.

Issues:
1. W/N RA 4200 applies only to unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
2. W/N RA 4200 only penalizes private communications and not private communications.
Held/Ratio:
1. No, the provision does not merely include the unauthorized taping of a conversation by a party other than those involved.
8
 - The legislative intent was clear in the language and confirmed by the Senate Congressional Records
The legislative intent was already clear upon reading the clear and unambiguous language of the statute that is shall be illegal for ANY person, not authorized by ALL
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communications by means of a tape recorder.

The Court took a look at the Senate Congressional Records as well to ascertain that conclusion. The cited conversation of Senators Tanada, Diokno and Padilla
confirmed that RA 4200 applied to recordings of person to person conversations without all of the involved parties consent.
2. No, because private communications also includes private conversations. To construe it as petitioners assertion that the two are different would narrow down the meaning of
private communications to the point of absurdity.

Senator Tanadas Explanatory Note on RA42000 explains that the point of the law was to provide privacy of communications, because all people have an aspect of life that they
might not want to expose. That includes free conversations, since free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenities that are not to be taken seriously.
Notes:
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Apellate Court was cited in the opinion, but it served as a contrasting case in the case at hand, in that the Gaanan case involved the use of an extension
telephone for the purpose of overhearing a conversation without authorization. Such did not violate RA4200 because a telephone extension was not a devise enumerated in Sec. 1,
RA4200 nor was it similar in those that were included.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Lerma

Nota Bene: the 4th admin case yung may direct bearing on collateral matters

Facts:

- 5 administrative cases were filed with OCA against Muntinlupa RTC Judge Alberto Lerma for violating SC rules, directives and circulars, for making untruthful
statements in his certificates of service, gross ignorance of the law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion
and for serious regularity
- Each case was assigned to an Investigating Justice of the CA for investigation and recommendation
A. RTJ 07-2076 (OCA v. Lerma 1)
o Ruperto Bruno was charged with violation of PD 1866 (Firearms) in Pangasinan RTC. However, he was already detained in QC jail due to the pendency of
another criminal case
o Pangasinan RTC ordered all notices of hearings and proceedings be forwarded to QC Jail Warden who in turn informed him that Bruno was already
transferred to BuCor in Muntinlupa
o SC through a resolution directed that the case be raffled in RTC Muntinlupa to arraign the accused and consequently take his testimony while the RTC
Pangasinan to continue with the proceedings
o Case was raffled to Judge Lerma
o When the prosecution formally offered its exhibits, the firearm subject of the information was not included
o PAO lawyer for defense filed a motion for demurrer which Lerma granted
o OCA charged Judge Lerma with exceeding his authority under the SC resolution since his authority was limited to the arraignment of the accused and the
taking of his testimony; it did not authorize him to decide the merits of the case
o Under ROC 150.9(4), violation of a SC directive was a less serious offense
o LERMA:
there was neither a conscious nor a deliberate intent on his part to disobey;
through inadvertence, he was not able to recall the limits of the SC directive;
nonetheless he ruled on the merits in a way not tainted with fraud, dishonesty or corruption
o Investigating Justice:
In criminal actions, venue is jurisdictional
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its territory)
Had he exercised a moderate degree of caution by perusing the records, he would have found out that the information clearly stated that
Brunos violation was committed in Rosales, Pangasinan
o SC: GUILTY, 15k fine

B. RTJ 07-2077 (Atty. Lourdes Ona v. Lerma)

o Makati RTC rendered a decision in Van Twest v. Anacleto and/or Intl Corporate Bank, ordering Bank to release in favor of Van Twest the proceeds of an
Foreign Currency Trust Deposit, and Gloria Anacleto to return to the latter a sum of money
o Before decision was rendered, Van Twest had disappeared and was believed to have been kidnapped and killed
o Atty Ernesto Perez, representing Van Twest, filed a motion for execution, informing the Makati RTC that he was appointed as administrator of Van Twests
estate in absentee proceedings in Muntinlupa RTC presided over by Lerma
o Makati RTC granted the motion
o Union Bank filed a Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion in special proceeding praying the abeyance of Atty. Perezs powers as administrator
o Lerma was on official leave at time of filing, and thus Judge Aguinaldo (pairing judge of Muntinlupa RTC) acted and granted the motion
o Prompted by the above, Union Bank filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment in the civil case
o Atty. Perez countered with an Omnibus Motion to lift Judge Aguinaldos Order for having been issued without jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion and/or
violation of due process of law, and cite Union Bank for Indirect Contempt
o At the hearing of the Omnibus Motion, Lerma ordered (Order A) Atty. Ona (Union Bank counsel) to file Opposition and/or Comment
o However, on the same day, Lerma issued another order (Order B) bearing the same date, ruling that the Bank had not shown any legal basis to set aside the
appointment of Atty. Perez as administrator
o Atty. Ona wrote to the OCA alleging that the above order was irregular:
At the hearing of the Omnibus Motion, the motion by Atty. Perez was deemed submitted for resolution only after the complainant (Union
Bank) shall have filed its Opposition/Comment or until the 10-day period to file shall have expired
Order B was secretly railroaded to give Atty Perez a ground to oppose Union Banks Motion to recall in the civil case
Even the court staff of Lerma were not aware of Order B, since he did not furnish Atty Ona a copy until she made inquiries
Contents of Order B contradicted the Order A and rendered the pending incident moot and academic
o LERMA: denied the charge
o SC: GUILTY, dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits except earned leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service
Issuance of the divergent orders raises serious questions of impropriety that taint Lermas credibility, probity and integrity
Moreover, clandestine issuance gives rise to an inference of bad faith
Violates ROC 140.8 gross ignorance of the law
Gross ignorance, defined error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of BF
Gross negligence, defined characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable
9
 C. RTJ 07-2078 (Jose Mari Duarte v. Lerma)
o The case of Mateo v. Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village Association was raffled to Lermas Branch
o Mateo sought for the declaration of the General Membership Meeting and Election of AAVA as void ab initio with prayer for TRO
o Mateo won, despite the defendants contention that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and for lack of COA
o Defendants appealed to CA
o Mateo filed a petition for Indirect contempt against the defendants for their alleged defiance of the RTC decision which ordered them to enjoin themselves
from performance of their duties as governors of AAVA
o Lerma issued an Order declaring Duarte, Arceo and Romuladez (board mems) guilty of indirect contempt for which the latter moved for reconsideration and
was granted
o In the meantime, CA agreed with their contention that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the dispute; therefore, case should have been dismissed
o Mateo filed a complaint with the SC contending that Lerma was grossly ignorant of the law for having assumed jurisdiction over the case, and for grave
abuse of discretion
o LERMA:
Mateo should have filed a Rule 65 certiorari petition instead of an administrative complaint
o Investigating Judge: administrative case should be dismissed
o SC: GUILTY, 40k fine
RE: Jurisdiction
Gross ignorance of the law not enough that the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption
However, when the law is so elementary and the matter of jurisdiction is an elementary principle that judges should be knowledgeable of
not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. They are expected to keep abreast of our laws and the changes therein as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme
Court. They owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judicial competence
requires no less. It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of justice is demanding. By virtue of the delicate position which he
occupies in society, he is duty bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity
RE: Indirect contempt - proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and
upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings (cf. ROC 71.48)
The procedural requirements are mandatory considering that contempt proceedings against a person are treated as criminal in
nature. Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings
Records do not show that Duarte, et al were afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges. Lerma should have conducted a hearing.
Power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of
the law and the constitutional rights of the individual

D. RTJ 07-2079 (Ret. Gen. Meliton Goyena v. Lerma)

o Bennie Cuason was charged with estafa (315.2a) for defrauding Brig. Gen. Goyena in investing 20M in residential units at the Diamond Bay Condominium
o Cuason gave him condominium certificates, but Gen. Goyena found out that these units were non-existent or had not yet been constructed
o The case was initially raffled to Muntinlupa RTC under Judge Juanita Guerrero
o While pending there, Cuason entered his appearance with a plea to determine w/n probable cause exists for the purpose of the arrest warrant (2-14-06)
o Gen. Goyena countered by filing a motion to deny application for judicial determination of above and to cite Cuason for contempt on the ground of forum
shopping (3-17-06)
o However, because Branch 204 was designated as a special court for drug cases, the case was re-raffled to the sala of Lerma (5-2-06)
o Lerma issued an Omnibus Order dismissing the case (9-4-06)
On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the arguments and evidence of both parties, believes that there was payment already
made as to the principal obligation as admitted by the complainant in his affidavit dated September 20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being
left is the payment of interest which, under the premises, is in [the] form of condominium certificates. So also, while the complainant questions
the authenticity of those certificates as well as the existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused, indubitably, was able to
satisfy this Court as to the authenticity of the questioned certificates and the existence of the units by showing proofs to that effect.
o Gen. Goyena filed a very urgent manifestation with motion for the court to conduct ocular inspection
as correctly found by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, the two (2) condominium units used in partly settling the liabilities
of the accused to the private complainant do not exist a fact that should have been established by now, if only the court allowed the ocular
inspection prayed for;
the court overlooked the pronouncement in the very case it has relied on, that "Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and
may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist"; and
the order dismissing the case was improperly or irregularly issued
o Gen. Goyena then filed a letter-complaint addressed to Chief Justice Panganiban charging Lerma with abuse of judicial authority and disrection, serious
irregularity and gross ignorance of the law
o Lerma inhibited himself from the case and returned the records to the Clerk of Court for re-raffling
o OCA:
It was only on 6-19-06 that Lerma set Cuasons motion for determination of probable cause for heaing
And it took another 48 days before he issued the Omnibus Order dismissing the case
Caused delay in rendering an Order and for abuse of judicial discretion and authority
o SC: GUILTY on both, 21k fine
RE: delay in rendering an Order
cf. period to resolve probable cause in arrest warrants in ROC 112.6
While Lerma could not have have ascertained the existence of probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant against Cuason within 10
from the filing of the complaint or information Criminal Case No. 06-179 having been re-raffled to his sala only on 5-2-06 prudence
demanded that respondent judge should have determined the existence of probable cause within 10 days from July 17, 2006, the date he heard
the respective arguments of the parties. This interpretation is in keeping with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112.
By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the two-page omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, respondent judge should be
held liable for undue delay in rendering an order, which is classified as a less serious charge
RE: abuse of judicial discretion and authority
Information clearly charged Cuason with estafa; therefore, the issue boiled than to w/n the condominium units exist. The logical thing to do
would have been to order the conduct of an ocular inspection
Instead, Lerma relied on the certificate of registration, the development permit, the license to sell, the building permit, and the condo certificate
of title
ROC 128.4 - evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence

8
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt
shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision

10
 Relevancy is, therefore, determinable by the rules of logic and human experienceRelevant evidence is any class of evidence which has
rational probative value to the issue in controversy
Logic and human experience teach us that the documents relied upon by respondent do not constitute the best evidence to prove the existence
or non-existence of the condominium units. To repeat, the best evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the units
themselves (weird ratio: akala ko ba relevant evidence have rational probative value; bakit biglang pumasok ang issue ng best evidence?)
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable cause. At the very least, he should have asked the
prosecutor to present additional evidence, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the
alternative, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed instead of precipitately ordering the dismissal of the case. The circumstances
required the exercise of caution considering that the case involved estafa in the considerable amount of P20 Million

E. RTJ 07-2080 (OCA v. Lerma 2)

o Galindez, President of the Alabang Country Club, and Hirofumi Hotta, Operations Manager of TAT Filipinas Golf Club, both in response to a letter from
OCA, stated that Lerma played golf on various dates
o Records from Office of Admin Services show that Lerma did not declare his absences for 5 dates coinciding with the dates declared by Alabang`
o Hermogena Bayani, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer issued a certification that Lerma did not file any application for a leave of absence on the dates
submitted by TAT
o OCA asserted that on days that Lerma played golf, he was absent for half the working hours, positing that this is not merely truancy but also dishonesty and
falsification of certificates of service
o LERMA:
Contrary to OCAs allegations he only played 18 times in 6 years which could not be characterized as habitual to the extent that it jeopardized
the discharge of his functions
He shared his courtroom with other Muntinlupa judges and played on dates when no other place was available for him to carry out his official
functions
His physician advised him to exercise more vigorously after he was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension
He never missed a day in hearing cases pending in his sala
o Investigating Justice:
Evidence insufficient to show that Lerma played at Alabang on said dates; BUT found substantial evidence for the dates submitted by TAT
Filipinas
Godofredo dates were based on logbook entries made by the starter (A started is a person who records in the logbook the names of the
individuals who play in the golf court, which can either be the player himself or the member who brings in guests); on cross-ex, he admitted
that he is not the custodian of the logbook; he is neither the starter nor the person who wrote the entries in the logbook; he does not recognize
the handwriting
Hirofumi testified that Aquino, a front desk receptionist, made the listing based on data stored in their office computer
Aquino (TAT receptionist) testified that she saw Lerma sign the registered member forms prior to playing golf
o SC: GUILTY, 15k fine
Testimony of Aquino + Bayanis certification establish his violations of:
SC Memo Order No. 11-19-73 5-day, 40-hour work week schedule (8 to 12; 12:30-4:30)
Admin Circular No. 3-99
Admin Circular No. 5-88
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and making untruthful statements in the certificate of service are considered less
serious charges under ROC 140.9

BSB Group v Go
Action: Petition for review under rule 45
Facts:
- BSB Group, Inc., presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, Bangayans wife, who was
employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
- Bangayan filed a case a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft[5] against respondent alleging that respondent deposited customer checks to her personal account on
her Security Bank account in Divisoria Branch.
- Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.
- The prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of Security Banks Divisoria
Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch which was granted by
the Trial Court
- Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said
bank account
o while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case, she, in nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security
Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.
- the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. Marasigans testimony sought to prove
that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers,
endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank.
- But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] invoking, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under
R.A. No. 1405 in relation to the testimony and as well as the related documents to the testimony.
- The trial court denied the motion
- The respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
- The CA reversed set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.
- Arguments:
o Petitioner
testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security Bank had a direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft
and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.
o Respondent
the money represented by the Security Bank account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information
suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case.
She advanced the notion that the term cash money stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported to have
stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account.

Issue: Whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case
Decision: Evidence is inadmissible
11
Ratio:
- In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution.
- The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to
another.
- petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by
claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to
establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa
- Proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account,
becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

HERRERA v. ALBA
Carpio, J. 15 June 2005 G.R. No. 148220
Doctrine Neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Phils. At best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive
effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the ROC. Evidence is
relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.
Summary Petitioner is denying paternity over Rosendo Alba. Respondent moved for DNA testing to prove paternity. Petitioner opposed contending it has not gained
acceptability here and that it violates his right against self-incrimination. The SC ruled in favor of respondent.
Facts On 14 May 1998, 13 yr. old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner.
On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, she presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who was an Associate Professor of Cell Biology at DLSU and head of the UP Natural Sciences Research
Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the
test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing
violates his right against self-incrimination.
RTC granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing.
CA affirmed RTC decision.
Ratio/Issues WoN DNA testing is a valid probative tool to determine filiation- YES.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings-> not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the
present case), or inheritance

Burden of proving paternity->on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father

4 significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a. a prima facie case -> exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required
to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father.
b. affirmative defenses-> There are 2 affirmative defenses available to the putative father: he may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother,
because of either physical absence or impotency; or that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
c. presumption of legitimacy -> A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The childs legitimacy may be
impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
d. physical resemblance between the putative father and child -> may be offered as part of evidence of paternity
o Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula
that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

In the present case, the TC encountered 3 out of 4 aspects.

o Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware that her assertion
is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. (1)
o Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armis assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi and stated that respondent is Armis child with
another man. (2)
o Armi countered petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. (4)

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

Family Code:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ROC:
The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

12
 JURISPRUDENCE- > Court rulings specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation
o Pe Lim v. CA: The issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father.
o Art. 278, NCC: voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father.
o A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
o Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation.
o A student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, CANNOT be taken as
authentic writing.
o Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts.
Co Tao v. CA: The result of the blood grouping test showed that the putative father was a possible father of the child.
Jao vs CA: The result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.

IN THIS CASE, the Court is asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate
a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Pp vs. Vallejo: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

However, Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by P and R refer to 2 US cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence: Frye v. U.S. and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.

Frye vs US: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
State vs. Schwartz (modified Frye standard): Admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys compliance with
appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results.
Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (modified Frye-Schwartz standard): The US SC ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have superseded the Frye standard.
o Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility
of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the
issue. Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory/technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory /technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
techniques operation; and (5) whether the theory/technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael (further modified the Daubert standard): This led to the amendment of Rule 702 (of the Federal Rules of Evidence) in
2000:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Applicability of US Cases in our Jurisdiction

Neither the Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Phils. At best, American jurisprudence merely has a
persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or
the ROC. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.

Sec. 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows: The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.

In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

It isnt enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the
DNA profile of the putative father doesnt necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American
jurisdiction, TCs should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion.

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is a
refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

WoN DNA testing would violate his right against self-incrimination- NO.

Sec. 17, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Ps contention: obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination

SC: P ignores SCs earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.

Held Petition is granted.

13
Prepared by: Charm Delmo [Evidence| Prof. Rowie Morales]

BANG KO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP)

vs.
FELICIANO LEGASPI

G.R. No. 205966 March 2, 2016

Facts:
BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC, RTC issued preliminary
injunction, enjoining defendants Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr. and petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting for and in their behalf, from pursuing the construction,
development and/or operation of a dumpsite or landfill in Barangay San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, in an area allegedly covered by OCT No. P858/Free Patent No. 257917.
Respondent Legaspi then filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner BSP. RTC denied. On Legaspis MR,
Legaspi argued that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property. RTC
denied because since the subject property contains an area of 838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property would have an assessed value of less than P20,000.00
which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and that a tax declaration showing the assessed value of P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal value of
P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint. However, on appeal CA granted , Legaspis petition. Hence, BSP seek to set aside the CAs decision.

Issue:
WON the RTC properly take judicial notice of the subject propertys value, hence it has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 209-M-2008.

Held:
Yes. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession
of real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The non-inclusion on the face of the
complaint of the amount of the property, however, is not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex "N" in the complaint) of the property in question
showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together with the
complaint. In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa and Partners Co., Ltd., the Court ruled that in determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should
also consider the attachments to the complaint. Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of
the complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. RTC committed no error in taking judicial notice of the
assessed value of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same
case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the
same court. Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the same document is already considered as on file with the court,
thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such. considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-six
(4,838,736) square meters, the RTC acted properly when it took judicial notice of the total area of the property involved and the prevailing assessed value of the titled property,
and it would also be at the height of absurdity if the assessed value of the property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.

Petition GRANTED.

CLT Realty Development Corp. vs. Hi-Grade Feeds Corp.

GR No160684; September 2, 2015; Perez, J.

SUMMARY: This case arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which were formerly a part of the Maysilo Estate, the land of caveat emptor. Hi-Grade
traces its title to TCT 4211 (Lot 26) registered under the names of Ruiz and Leuterio, which was derived from OCT 994, the mother title. Ruiz and Leuterio sold Lot 26 to Gonzalez
who obtained a TCT in his name. when Gonzalez died, his surviving spouse obtained a new TCT under her name and had the land subdivided into 7 lots. 7 new TCT were then
registered under the children of Gonzalez. The Government expropriated these 7 lots, cancelled the 7 TCTS, consolidated them, then further subdivided the property into 77 lots. One
of the 77 lots was registered under Villanueva, which was further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B. 17-B was later on registered to Madulid who later on sold the said lot to Hi-Grade.
Another lot from the 77 lots, Lot 52, was registered under Alvarez. Alvarez sold the same to Madulid, who, in turn sold to Hi-Grade. CLT, on the other hand, got its title from
Hipolito by virtue of a DAS with REM (history was not supplied, but CLT also traces its title to OCT 994 but with a different registration date. CLT pointed out certain details to
prove that Hi-Grades title was fake and spurious, i.e., that the TCTs from which it derives its title did not contain any reference to Lot 26. Basically, its saying that Hi-Grades title
does not pertain to Lot 26 (it does not fall within the boundary of the mother lot)). RTC ruled in favor of CLT, stating that Hi-Grades title cannot prevail over CLTs title because it
suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Before the CA, the OSG intervened, pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens System. The CA also took judicial notice,
on motion of Hi-Grade, of the Senates Report on the Maysilo Estate. CA reversed the RTC, ruling as baseless the RTCs reliance on the testimonies of CLTs witnesses on the
alleged patent infirmities and defects of TCT 4211. SC held that taking judicial notice of the Senates report was well within the ambit of the law. As for the intervention of the
Republic, the Court held that intervention is time-barred since it was already on appeal and intervention may be allowed only before or during trial. As for the differing dates on the 2
parties OCT 994, (CLT: Apr 19, 1917(date of issuance); Hi-Grade: May 3, 1917 (date received for transcription)), the Court held that Hi-Grades title is the genuine one, since,
under Decree No 36455, the reckoning date of the date of registration is the date when the mother title was received for transcription. SC also affirmed the CA that CLT failed to
prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the registration procedures at the time it was prepared. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own title, CLT attacked Hi-Grades
titles. However, CLT failed to establish the chain of titles linking its TCT No. T- 177013 to the mother title, OCT No. 994. As opposed to CLTs evidence on the alleged infirmities
in Hi-Grades titles, Hi-Grade presented muniments of title, tax declarations or realty tax payments, on the subject properties.

DOCTRINE: Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of
the court to assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support.

Intervention is only allowed before or during trial; And intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.

A title can only have one (1) date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same property. The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the titles
transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds.

Any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.

Ma. Regina Peralta v. Judge Omelio (RTC Davao City) / Romualdo Mendoza v. Judge Omelio / Atty. Cruzabra v. Judge Omelio (2013) Per Curiam.

FACTS:
These are three consolidated administrative complaints brought against Judge Omelio of RTC Davao City.

ONLY the third case, Cruzabra v. Omelio is relevant:

(1) Cruzabra is the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Davao City.
(2) A special proceeding for reconstitution of title was filed by Helen Denila with the RTC wherein Judge Omelio was the presiding Judge.
(3) The special proceeding was filed despite the fact that the SC had already ruled against the reconstitution in a prior case Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v.
Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.
(4) Despite this ruling, Judge Omelio granted the petition of Helen Denila.

14
 (5) OSG and Cruzabra attempted various legal procedures to reverse the decision. Cruzabra also refused to reconstitute the titles as ordered and was eventually charged for
indirect contempt by Judge Omelio.
(6) An administrative investigation was conducted with the following findings:
a. The first two cases to be dismissed for lack of merit.
b. Cruzabra v. Omelio Investigating judge found that Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law; recommendation that he be dismissed from service
and forfeiture of his benefits.

ISSUE: WON Judge Omelio was guiltly of gross ignorance of the law. (YES)

SC: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Should have taken judicial notice of prior decision.
(1) Rule 129, Section 1 prior SC decisions fall under official acts of judicial departments of the Phillippines
(2) Decisions of courts form part of the legal system and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with
law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate (citing Petran Development Inc v. CA).
(3) The Supreme Court had already ruled against reconstitution of titles in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.
(4) Judge Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to take judicial notice of this prior decision of a superior court (as well as reversing a prior inhibition
and taking cognizance of the motion for indirect contempt).
(5) Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Edgar T. Barroso Vs. Hon. Judge George E. Omelio, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, et al.
GR no. 194767; 10/14/2015; Peralta, J

SUMMARY:

Barroso filed a complaint, which included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment with the RTC-Br 16 for sum of money, damages, and attorneys fees against Dennis Li.
The RTC granted Barrosos application for a Writ of Attachment and approved the corresponding attachment bond. Li filed a counter-attachment bond issued by Travellers Insurance
& Surety Corporation. Barroso also filed a Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreement. The RTC issued a Judgment on the motion. However, Li failed to pay the sums of
money as provided for, causing the petitioner to file a Motion for Execution. The RTC-Br 16 issued a Writ of Execution against Li, which was returned by the Sheriff unsatisfied.

An Alias Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009 was issued against both Li and Travellers based on the counterbond it issued in favor of the former, and pursuant to said writ, Sheriff
Anggot served a Demand Letter on Travellers. In a letter to Sheriff Anggot, Travellers asked for a period of seven (7) days within which to validate the counterbond and, thereafter,
for its representative to discuss the matter with complainant, herein petitioner. Travellers, however, did not appear before the RTC-Br 16 but filed a separate case for Declaration of
Nullity, Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Damages, which was raffled off to RTC-Br 14.

The RTC-Br. 14 issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, saying that the evidence the counter-attachment bond is fake has yet to be proven by the
petitioner [Travellers] in the proper forum. Till then, said judicial officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their judicial duties. Barrosos motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

Barroso, while acknowledging that the CA has jurisdiction over this petition, filed the petition with the SC, justifying his immediate resort to the SC by pointing out that the
respondent Judges conduct shows his gross ignorance of the law, and any other remedy under the ordinary course of law would not be speedy and adequate. The SC granted the
petition.

DOCTRINE:

Hierarchy of Courts
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by the Court. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that
are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner. However, in the same case, it was acknowledged that for exceptionally compelling reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to act on special civil
actions for certiorari filed directly with it.

Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-Interference

"No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city,
having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.

A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (petitioner) v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Jose L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), Manuel H. NIETO, JR., Ferdinand E. MARCOS
(substituted by his heirs), Imelda MARCOS, Ferdinand MARCOS, JR., Juan PONCE ENRILE, and Potenciano ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs) (respondent)
J. Brion December 16, 2011 No. 152375
Doctrine A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in
such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Summary This petition focuses on the admissibility of the Bane Deposition in the main case filed by the PCGG against respondents concerning the alleged ill-gotten
shares of stocks in ETPI. Petitioner insists on the admissibility of the Bane deposition in the main civil case as it has been already considered admissible in
an incidental case. The Court disagrees with petitioner invoking both Rules on Civil Procedure and the Rules on Evidence. However, pertinent to Profs
syllabus is the issue on the nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 Resolution of petitioners Motion to admit the Bane deposition whether it is an
interlocutory or a final order. On this issue, the Court ruled that the 1998 Resolution is merely interlocutory. Hence, the 3 rd Motion for MR is proper as the
Rules only prohibit the filing of a 2nd MR based on a judgment or final order.
Facts This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the 2002 Resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan denying the petitioners Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer
of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)(3rd Motion)

Civil CaseNo. 0009 present case

July 22, 1987: The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Governance) filed a complaint against respondents Africa, Marcoses, JPE, and
Ilusorio for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan; petitioner alleged that the latter illegally
manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)
Civil Case No. 0130
Aug 1991: The PCGG issued Orders directing Africa to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising
voting rights on sequestered shares, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating in its
management
In response, Africa filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan docket as Civil Case 0130.
The present respondents were not made parties in Civil Case No. 0130

15
 During the pendency of CC 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan to issue an order for the calling and holding of ETPI annual
stockholders meeting; the Sandiganbayan granted Africas motion
PCGG Petition: PCGG filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (docketed as GR 107789) assailing the resolution of and
imputing grave abuse on the Sandiganbayan; the Court enjoined Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution
Civil Case No. 0130 and No. 0009 were consolidated
Urgent Petition of PCGG and the Bane Deposition
During the pendency of PCGGs Petition, PCGG filed a Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for the Sole
Purpose of Increasing ETPIs Authorized Capital Stock before the Court, which referred the same to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence and immediate resolution
The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (old Rules of Court), the petitioner offered the deposition of the former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI
Maurice Bane without leave of court and as a matter of right for the resolution of the Urgent Petition. The purpose of his deposition is 1) to
identify and testify on the facts in his affidavit, 2) prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner, 3) establish the prima facie factual
foundation for the sequestration of ETPIs Class A stock in support of the Urgent Petition. The Bane Deposition was taken before Consul
General Ernesto Castro of the Ph Embassy in London, England
The petitioner stated that the Bane deposition will be used in evidence in the main case of Civil Case 0009
The Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition in favor of the PCGG
Africas petition: In assailing this resolution by the SB, Africa filed before the Court a petition for certiorari docketed as GR No. 147214; the
Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan failed to apply the two-tiered test to properly determine the validity of the stockholders meeting and the
votes cast therein, and thus, remanded the petition to the latter to receive evidence in determining whether 1) there is a prima facie evidence
showing that the sequestered shares are ill-gotten, 2) propriety of the stockholders meeting, 3) amendment of ETPI Articles of Incorporation
solely to increase its authorized capital stock
Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
1st Motion: During the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition in the main case Civil Case No. 0009; this was DENIED by
the Sandiganbayan in its 1998 Resolution on the ground that the Maurice Bane, according to petitioner, was not available for cross-examination
by the respondent
Petitioner did not question the 1998 Resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on Dec 14, 1999 without including the Bane
deposition in its offered exhibits.
2nd Motion: Petitioner then tried to rectify this mistake on Feb. 21, 2000 by filing an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice praying
for the reopening of the case for trial for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence limited only to the Bane deposition
In its 2000 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan again denied the motion as its admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits and
not governed under Rule 129 on Judicial Notice
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000 Resolution but was denied by the Sandiganbayan
3rd Motion: Petitioner filed its 3rd motion for the admission of the Bane deposition but was again denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground
that the resolution already attained finality when petitioner failed to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period to be reckoned at the time of when the 1998 Resolution was rendered
Hence, this petition

Ratio/Issues
I. Whether the 1998 Resolution is final or interlocutory in nature [INTERLOCUTORY]

(1) The petitioner argues that the 1998 Resolution is merely an interlocutory order, so its failure to question this resolution could not have
rendered it final so long as the main case is still pending. The Court agrees with the petitioner.

Judgment or Final Order Interlocutory Order

Order disposes of the action or proceeding completely or
terminates a particular stage of the same action
Leaves nothing else to be done but to enforce the decision
The remedy available is appeal
Merely resolves incidental matters
Leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of
the case
Basically provisional in its application
May be modified or rescinded by the court before final
judgment
The remedy is petition for certiorari under Rule 65

(2) The Sandiganbayan issued the 1998 Resolution at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence and
did not resolve the merits of the case
(3) Also, because an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits, the court has
the power to modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment
(4) Hence, the failure of petitioner to file an MR or appeal challenging the denial by the Sandiganbayan of its motion to admit the Bane
Deposition could not have attained finality until the case is resolved on the merits

II. Whether the 3rd motion was prohibited by the Rules [NO]
(1) The Court agrees with the petitioner that the 3 rd motion(actually 2nd) for reconsideration of the 1998 Resolution is NOT prohibited
because under Section 5, Rule 37 of the RoC, the proscription against a second MR is directed against a judgment or final order, which
is not the nature of the said resolution as discussed above

III. Whether the petitioner erred in not filing a petition for certiorari within 60 days upon notice of the 1998 Resolution [NO]
(1) On the premise that the 1998 Resolution is indeed interlocutory, the respondents argue that the petitioner should have challenged the
order by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 within 60-days to be reckoned from the petitioners knowledge of the resolution
(2) The Court disagrees with the respondents because a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed
interlocutory order. Section 1, Rule 65 of the RoC requires that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party.
(3) Because the petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its evidence when it filed its 1st Motion, it would be premature to use
the extraordinary remedy if certiorari to question the admission of the Bane deposition
(4) The case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and this remedy could not be reckoned from the denial of petitioners
1st motion. After the denial of its 1st motion, the plain remedy for the petitioner is to move for reconsideration in order to introduce and
assert the introduction of the Bane deposition.

IV. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ in ruling on the finality of its 1998 Resolution [NO grave abuse but it was
legally erroneous]
(1) The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan erred on a question of law in its ruling but this did not amount to grave abuse. It was only an
error of judgment or an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.
(2) The petitioner admitted that it failed to include the Bane deposition due to oversight before closing and resting its case. After making
this categorical judicial admissions, the Court said that petitioner cannot insist on introducing evidence out of the usual order

16
 (3) According to the Court, petitioner should have questioned on certiorari the denial by the Sandiganbayan of its 2 nd motion regarding the
reopening of the case instead of filing a 3rd motion and allowing the 60-day reglementary period under Section 4, Rule 65 to lapse

V. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and
admitting the Bane deposition [YES]
(1) Section 5, Rule 30, RoC provides the basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence. Under this rule, the evidence
cannot be given piecemeal in order to protect the other party from injurious surprises during the trial
(2) The Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case because the respondents had not yet
presented their evidence, thus, would not have been prejudiced by the reopening of the case. The refusal therefore by the Sandiganbayan
of the motion to reopen is a refusal to undertake a positive duty mandated by the circumstances

VI. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the Rules of Evidence [NO]
(1) Petitioner argues that in light of the consolidation of the Civil Cases No. 0009 and 0130, the Bane deposition is admissible even without
complying with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130, RoC, but the Court disagrees.
The consolidation of these cases was at most merely a consolidation for trial and not a complete merger of the incident case
with the main case
Also, the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130. The former is an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution, and damages while the latter is a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder
involving the internal corporate squabble. Imposing the effects of actual consolidation will result in an outright disregard of
the right to due process
(2) Petitioner: Section 4, Rule 23, RoC must prevail over Section 47, Rule 130, RoC, the former providing for circumstances when
depositions may be used in the trial or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding
Court: Rule 23 readily rejects petitioners claim as it impliedly refers to Rule 130 before deposition may be used in
evidence. Under Section 4, Rule 23, RoC, a party making use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action must
comply with its subparagraphs (a) to (d) and with the rules on evidence as a condition for admissibility
Hence, in determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, both provisions must be observed
Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or
the deponent in the prior proceeding before a former testimony or deposition may be admissible
(3) Both Rules 23 and 130 provide that a former testimony or deposition may be admissible provided that the witness or deponent is
deceased or unable to testify. The inability to testify pertains to physical inability and covers absence from jurisdiction, which is the
excuse provided by the petitioner for not presenting Bane in open court
BUT resort to deposition based on this ground will not always be upheld
Court: Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition
should be rejected in evidence
(4) Petitioner: Respondents waived their right to cross-examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite
notice
Court: The prior notice cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130. The Sandiganbayan
considered Bane deposition in the Civil Case 0130 based on the fact that Africa was a party to that case
The petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity between the then opponent Africa and the present
opponents the respondents. Although their shares were sequestered all the same, it does not mean that their rights and
obligations as stockholders have been integrated
Hence, the petitioner cannot assume that the failure of respondents to attend the deposition-taking amounted to a waiver of
their right to cross-examine Bane in relation to the main case

VII. Whether petitioner can rely on the principle of judicial notice for the admissibility of the Bane deposition [NO]
(1) What is judicial notice? It is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts
are already known to them; this concept is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
(2) Petitioner: Evidence offered in any of the children cases e.g. Civil Case 0130 is admissible as evidence in the parent case No. 0009
because this relationship warrants the taking of judicial notice
(3) The Court strongly disagrees because 1) each incidental case involves a single proceeding or an exception to the rule which proscribes
the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, and 2) the petitioner as the party-litigant has the duty
to establish evidence in support of the relief it seeks before the court and not the other way around by simply relying on the lineage of
cases

Held Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit:

1) Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 3rd motion to admit the deposition of Bane was a legal error that did not amount to GADALEJ
2) Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case at the petitioners instance was tainted with GADALEJ
3) Despite the GADALEJ, the petition must ultimately because the Bane deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence
Prepared by: Kim Dela Cruz [Civil Procedure | Prof Cruz]

NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. vs SANGGUNIANG BRGY., BRGY. SUN VALLEY

Facts
Respondent Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued a Resolution to petitioner New Sun Valley Homeowners Association (NSVHAI) directing it to open Rosemallow
and Aster Streets to private vehicles and pedestrian traffic at all hours daily except from 11 p.m to 5 a.m.

NSVHAI, represented by its President Marita Cortez, filed a petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with a prayer for issuance of TRO with the RTC,
arguing that the resolution would disrupt the residents' safety, health and well-being, that it would destroy the roads and drainage system on said streets (as these were not designed to
withstand heavy traffic), and that there are other ways to ease traffic flow anyway, such as strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations, and the presence of traffic enforcers on
all traffic choke points. In its Amended Petition, NSVHAI also claimed that respondent had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets as such can only be
ordered through an ordinance.

BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of court jurisdiction
over the subject matter, alleging that the subject streets are of the public domain and are thus owned by the local government. It was granted, prompting petitioner to appeal the case
before the Supreme Court.

Issue
w/n the CA erred in dismissing the case by making findings of fact not supported by evidence of record

Held
NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the case of the petitioners

Ratio

17
Burden of Proof
Being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on the petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads. It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence, relying on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

In this case, NSVHAI did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership over Rosemallow and Aster streets (closing the roads, collecting fees from delivery vans passing
through, etc). On the other hand, the local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under Section 219 of the Local Government Code. However,
since Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to the City Government of Paranaque, they have since then taken the nature of public
roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Section 21 of the LGC thus does not apply in this
case.

Judicial Notice
Moreover, NSVHAI wants the court to take judicial knowledge that criminal activities like robbery and kidnapping are becoming daily fares in Philippine society. However, Rule
129 provides that:

Rule 129

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a)

The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.

As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief
instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. In this case, It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed,
this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the
requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because
the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paranaque.

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC., (2011)

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
1. On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50
kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine
Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and
Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
2. On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic
corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage
area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the bags
was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.
3. On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On
December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and
hardening of the contents.
4. On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.
5. On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before RTC of Manila for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services,
and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.
6. RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate
cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC emphasized that despite the
admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioners stevedores
continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the spillage.The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its
stevedores under Articles 2176 and 2180 paragraph (4) of the Civil Code. The CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE (TOPICAL): WON the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners
liability.

HOLDING: Judicial notice does not apply.

1. Petitioner claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA.
Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.
2. Respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial notice. And even if it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.
3. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an
official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management
Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

AS TO THE LIABILITY: The petition was DENIED. Asian Terminals is liable.

From the nature of the damage caused to the shipment, i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see that the
damage caused was due to the negligence of ATIs stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling
their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with insufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and causing the contents to cake or harden.

9
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

18
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Doctrine: Geographical divisions are subject to mandatory judicial notice. A new barrio being previously part of another barrio is a geographical division which is a matter
subject of mandatory judicial notice.
FACTS:
B.E. San Diego filed an accion publiciana (recovery of possession, who has a better right to possession) against Jovita Matias over a parcel of land located in Malabon. In her
Answer, Matias said that the property she is occupying is different from the property that B.E. San Diego seeks to recover.
She claimed that the property she is now occupying is located in Barrio Catmon while the property B.E. San Diego is seeking to recover is located in Barrio Tinajeros as shown in the
transfer certificate of title (TCT) it presented.
RTC took judicial notice of the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros, and declared B.E. San Diego as the rightful owner of the subject property. CA
however reversed the RTC and said that the discrepancy in the location is significant, and RTC should have required an expert witness from concerned government agency to resolve
the said discrepancy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of an expert witness is necessary to explain the discrepancy in the location of the subject property
HELD:
No. Expert witness testimony is not necessary.
RATIO:
The RTC has authority to declare that the discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. This is a matter subject of mandatory judicial
notice. Geographical division is among matters that courts should take judicial notice of as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon, it is likely that, indeed, the two barrios previously formed one geographical unit.
Sufficient evidence also exists to support this conclusion. The TCT of B.E. San Diego identifies the property as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 in Barrio Tinajeros. B.E. San Diegos tax
declaration identifies it too as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 but located in Barrio Catmon. It is clear though that both title and the tax declaration share the same boundaries to identify the
property. The trial court judge can very well ascertain the facts to resolve the discrepancy and dispense with the need for the testimony of an expert witness.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Bersamin August 18, 2015 GR No 213847
Doctrine Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the
public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Facts On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3,
2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issues/Ratio
I. Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong. (YES)

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure10.

General rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.

As provided in Sec. 5 of Rule 114 11 Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial
discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

10
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

11
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

19
 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.

II. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk. (YES)

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to
avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in
decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It
acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

Holding Court GRANTS the petition. ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by Sandiganbayan. ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of Enrile upon posting a cash bond of P1M.
Dissent Leonen

Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court
has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues that [Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his
prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor were these grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.

Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.

Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to wit:

[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on
the presence or absence of human compassion.

xxx

Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia,
or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those
accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...

Procedure for granting bail

Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:

It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving
bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the
trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not
applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix
Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion based on prematurity.

20
 Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to
develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail.

The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the certification of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales,
stating that the Petitioner was suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:

Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our
rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose main
purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.

xxx

The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to
determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed
by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.

Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated upon
This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a substantially different version of the opinion, one which did not use
humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail is
a matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian considerations as the
basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity.

The majority opinion offers no guidance

The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have
similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege can be granted to
those of advanced age only. The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical
conditions.

There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.

Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced

The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its
increased emphasis on international law. As applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.

Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not the accused
was a flight risk.

http://the-exiled-prince.blogspot.com/2015/08/enrile-vs-sandiganbayan.html

EMERITU C. BARUT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014, J. Bersamin)

FACTS
1. Barut (a guard of Philippine National Construction Corporation) was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the RTC of Muntinlupa City
2. Background:
SPO4 Vicente Ucag was on board a passenger jeepney (driven by his brother) on the SLEX, coming from Laguna and going back to Metro Manila. His wife and
16-yr old son Vincent were riding an owner-type jeep driven by Rico Villas on the same route.
When the jeep driven by Villas exited at the Sucat interchange ahead of Ucags jeepney, PNCC guards Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas. They informed him that
his vehicle had no headlights, asked for his license, and issued him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket.
The jeepney carrying Ucag then stopped where Villas jeep had parked. Ucag and co-passenger Fabiano alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire
what the matter was. Ucag then requested the return of Villas license upon being apprised, but Ancheta refused.
Argument ensued. Later, Ucag turned around to avoid further argument, which irked Ancheta. Ancheta then suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired
it several times. Ucag was hit on both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta.
Vicente Ucag (son), upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, rushed towards Ucag (his father). Before he could reach his father, Barut fired at Vincent in the chest.
Vicente was rushed to the Paranaque Medical Center. He died during the emergency surgery.
3. Baruts contentions:
the extrajudicial statement that Villas gave at about 1:00pm of September 25 1995 (a day after the fatal shooting of Vincent), in which he declared not having seen
Barut fire a gun, is inconsistent with Villas court testimony on June 10 1996; this manifested that he was not clear and convincing because he never pointed out
who [had] really shot Vincent Ucag.
o Question during direct examination: What was the reason if you know why he (Vicente Ucag) was weak?
o Villas answer: Maybe he was hit
Such inconsistency gave rise to the doubt as to who really shot and killed the victim
4. CA:
Villas and Fabiano clearly and consistently testified that Barut was the person who shot Vincent, and Baruts bare denial of firing at Vincent did not prevail over
their positive and categorical identification of him as the perpetrator
the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas extrajudicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been offered
and admitted as evidence by either side. Only evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be considered. In any event, the supposed
contradiction between the extrajudicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
5. Barut seeks review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorari

RULING: CA ruling affirmed.

1. Findings of fact by the RTC are accorded great respect especially when affirmed by the CA
RTC judge has personal and direct observation of the witnesses manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused
2. CAs negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-judicial sworn statement was in accord with rules and jurisprudence
Sec. 34, Rule 132 (Rules of Court): the RTC, as the trial court, could consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; the offering party must specify the
purpose for which the evidence was being offered
o Purpose: to ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law (to timely object to the evidence as well as to properly counter the impact of
evidence not formally offered)
o Candido v. CA: xxx a formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial xxx
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed upon the concurrence of two requisites:
(a) The evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded
(b) The evidence was incorporated in the records of the case

21
 Furthermore, the rule has no application where:
(a) The court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, or
(b) where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court; or
(c) where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.

Dela Llana v Biong

Action: Petition for review under Rule 45 of ROC
(Note: Relevant to Section is the question on Judicial Notice)
FACTS:
Petitioner Dra. dela Llana was on front passenger seat while Juan dela Llana was driving along North Ave.
Dump truck carrying sand and gravel rammed into their rear. They were bumped by driver Joel Primero, employed by Rebecca Biong.
Dra. dela Llana started feeling pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder deteriorating her health after a month. It was soon found out she had an injury caused by
compression of nerve running to her left arm and hand.
o Underwent surgery but it incapacitated her from practice of her profession.
Petitioner demanded compensation from Respondent Biong. But respondent refused payment. Petitioner filed for damages in RTC.
Petitioner presented her Medical Certificate for suffering whiplash injury as evidence.
Respondent presented Testimonial evidence of herself, Joel and licensed driver-mechanic Alberto Marcelo.
RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner holding the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving.
CA reversed RTC ruling saying Petitioner failed to establish reasonable connection bet. vehicular accident and whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence citing Nutrimix
Feeds Corp v CA.
o CA declared courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Arguments:
o Petitioner
Stressed that Nutrimix ruling involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code on hidden defects and no evidence was shown to
connect the poisonous animal feeds sold to respondents.
Preponderance of evidence is shown in 1) pictures of damaged car 2) medical certificate 3) petitioners testimony since she is a medical surgeon.
Judicial Notice should be rendered to the causation of whiplash injury from accident since such is a matter of common knowledge.
o Respondent
Argues that Petitioner does not offer substantial merit to Courts consideration
ISSUE: Whether or not Joel's reckless driving is the proximate cause of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury?
HELD: No. Petitioner failed to establish preponderance of evidence.
RATIO:
o Petitioner should establish preponderance of evidence on the quasi-delict case (Art 2176 of Civil Code)
o It is required that Petitioner show chain of causation between the reckless driving and the whiplash injury in order for presumption to arise.
He who alleges has burden of proving allegation by preponderance of evidence. Burden falls on the Petitioner.
o Petitioner failed to adduce the evidentiary facts by which the ultimate fact can be adduced.
1) Picture of the damaged car only demonstrated the impact of the collision. But it did not establish result of whiplash.
2) Medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence.
CA should have not considered it as documentary evidence since RTC did not admit it.
Said medical certificate is has no Probative Value for being hearsay since it is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
knowledge of another person not in the witness stand.
3) Petitioner's opinion that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative value.
She serves as an ordinary witness and not an expert witness.
Opinion of ordinary witness may be received: (a) identity of persons he has adequate knowledge (b) handwriting he has familiarity (c)
sanity of person sufficiently acquainted
Expert witness may be received on special knowledge, skill, experience or training. Yet, courts do not immediately accord probative
value to an expert testimony.
Testimony of Petitioner on whiplash effect cannot be given probative value since she serves as not as an expert witness.
o IN REGARD to the Judicial Notice on whiplash injuries caused by vehicular accidents.
Courts cannot take judicial notice on such because 1) not public knowledge 2) not capable of unquestionable demonstration 3) not known to judges
on their judicial functions (Sec 3 of Rule 129 ROC)
Court has no expertise in the field of medicine contrary to Petitioners claim. She failed to render testimonial/ documentary evidence in the Trial
Court.

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (from UST Law Review)

Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means to achieve ones goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is
sufficient to deny a party registration and accreditation.
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) fled its Petition for Registration with the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by
its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means
to achieve their goals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means
HELD:
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on
record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are
of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code,
specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of
judicially cognizable facts.
That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and recent jurisprudence. The
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be Denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through Violence shall be entitled to
accreditation.
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with Violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives
were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of Former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and The supposed sale of
arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP To resign. To achieve these goals,
22
 MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, March in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant Explosives in the building. These brash
methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence. The
COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a Manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for
resorting to violence or Threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The
power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups
to participate in the elections is purely administrative in Character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in Nature.
In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members
of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether
MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political party. Accreditation as a political party is not a right
but only a privilege given to groups who have Qualified and met the requirements provided by law.
Note worthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favour of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can
no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration
SPS LATIP vs CHUA

FACTS:

- Respondent Rosalie Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building in Baclaran.

- In 2001, she filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against the Sps. Latip. She attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles of the
building.

- A year after the commencement of the lease and with the Sps. Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding
payment of back rentals and should they fail

- In their Answer, the Sps. Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing
payment to Rosalie of the total amount of 2.5M.

- Sps. Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over 2 cubicles in the building. According to them, the immediate payment of
2.5M would be used to finish the construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

- In December 1999, as soon as the 2 cubicles were finished, Sps. Latip occupied them without waiting for completion of the other 5 stalls.

MTC: in favor of Rosalie and asked them to vacate the premises

RTC: ruled in favor of Sps. Latip, did not give credence to the contract of lease
- lacked the signature of Ferdinand Chua, etc.
- signature of Sps. Latip
- the specific dates on the term of the contract
- exact date of execution of the document
- provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts
- As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of 2.5M was simply goodwill payment by the prospective leases, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot
this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence in this regard.

CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC
- found that the alleged defects of the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective
- On the issue of WON the 2.5M was goodwill payment, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran (also bolstered by the statement of the
other occupants)

ISSUES/HELD: WON taking judicial notice of goodwill payments is proper NO

RATIO:

- Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 129 declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary.

- State Prosecutors v. Muro is also instructive:

o The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
on the subject should be prompty resolved in the negative.

o Requisites:
1. Matter must be one of common and general knowledge
2. It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain
3. It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court

o Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court.

- reiterates the requisite of notoriety

- Things of common knowledge of which courts could take judicial notice may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.

- Here, RTC specifically ruled that apart from the bare allegation, Rosalie produced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of 2.5M simply constituted the
payment of goodwill money.

- Here, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence. Apparently, only that division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to
pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.

- DISPOSITIVE: Liable to pay unpaid rentals minus 2.5M payment.

23