February 24, 2016

G.R. No. 187417

CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner,

vs.
BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions dated July 22,
20082 and February 24, 20093 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 02373-MIN, which dismissed the petition
filed by petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz (Cadiz) on the following grounds: (1) incomplete statement of material dates;
(2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's Professional Tax Receipt
(PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) official receipts.

Antecedent Facts

Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her
indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and Unethical
Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the
suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.

Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of
Wages and Damages with prayer for Reinstatement.4

Ruling of the Labor Tribunals

In its Decision5 dated April 12, 2007, the LA found that Cadiz's indefinite suspension amounted to a constructive
dismissal; nevertheless, the LA ruled that Cadiz was not illegally dismissed as there was just cause for her dismissal, that
is, she engaged in premarital sexual relations with her boyfriend resulting in a pregnancy out of wedlock. 6 The LA further
stated that her "immoral conduct x x x [was] magnified as serious misconduct not only by her getting pregnant as a result
thereof before and without marriage, but more than that, also by the fact that Brent is an institution of the Episcopal
Church in the Philippines operating both a hospital and college where [Cadiz] was employed." 7 The LA also ruled that she
was not entitled to reinstatement "at least until she marries her boyfriend," to backwages and vacation/sick leave pay.
Brent, however, manifested that it was willing to pay her 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering [Brent] to pay [Cadiz] 13th month pay in the sum of Seven
Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy & 11/100 Pesos (P7,970.11).

All other charges and claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

Cadiz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA decision in its
Resolution9 dated December 10, 2007. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution10 dated February 29, 2008, Cadiz elevated her case to the CA on petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling of the CA

The CA, however, dismissed her petition outright due to technical defects in the petition: (1) incomplete statement of
material dates; (2) failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP
official receipts. 11 Cadiz sought reconsideration of the assailed CA Resolution dated July 22, 2008 but it was denied in
the assailed Resolution dated February 24, 2009. 12 The CA further ruled that "a perusal of the petition will reveal that
public respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction x x x holding
[Cadiz's] dismissal from employment valid." 13
Hence, the present petition.

Cadiz argues that -

THE HONORABLE [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT [CADIZ'S] IMPREGNATION
OUTSIDE OF WEDLOCK IS A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF [CADIZ'S] EMPLOYMENT 14

II

THE [NLRC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISMISSAL OF [CADIZ] ON THE
GROUND THAT THE INDEFINITE SUSPENSION WAS VALID AND REQUIRED [CADIZ] TO FIRST ENTER INTO
MARRIAGE BEFORE SHE CAN BE ADMITTED BACK TO HER EMPLOYMENT 15

III

RESPONDENT [NLRC] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED [CADIZ'S] CLAIM FOR
BACKWAGES, ALLOWANCES, SICK LEAVE PAY, MATERNITY PAY AND MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES 16

IV

THE [CA] MISPLACED APPLICATION OF THE MATERIAL DATA RULE RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE APPEAL17

Cadiz contends, among others, that getting pregnant outside of wedlock is not grossly immoral, especially when both
partners do not have any legal impediment to marry. Cadiz surmises that the reason for her suspension was not because
of her relationship with her then boyfriend but because of the resulting pregnancy. Cadiz also lambasts Brent's condition
for her reinstatement - that she gets married to her boyfriend - saying that this violates the stipulation against marriage
under Article 136 of the Labor Code. Finally, Cadiz contends that there was substantial compliance with the rules of
procedure, and the CA should not have dismissed the petition. 18

Brent, meanwhile, adopts and reiterates its position before the LA and the NLRC that Cadiz's arguments are irrational and
out of context. Brent argues, among others, that for Cadiz to limit acts of immorality only to extra-marital affairs is to
"change the norms, beliefs, teachings and practices of BRENT as a Church institution of the x x x Episcopal Church in the
Philippines." 19

Ruling of the Court

Ordinarily, the Court will simply gloss over the arguments raised by Cadiz, given that the main matter dealt with by the CA
were the infirmities found in the petition and which caused the dismissal of her case before it. In view, however, of the
significance of the issues involved in Cadiz's dismissal from employment, the Court will resolve the petition including the
substantial grounds raised herein.

The issue to be resolved is whether the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that: (1) Cadiz's petition is dismissible on
ground of technical deficiencies; and (2) the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding her dismissal
from employment.

Rules of procedure are mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice

In dismissing outright Cadiz's petition, the CA found the following defects: (1) incomplete statement of material dates; (2)
failure to attach registry receipts; and (3) failure to indicate the place of issue of counsel's PTR and IBP official receipts.

Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states the contents of a petition filed with the CA under Rule 65, viz, "the petition
shall x x x indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was
received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received." The rationale for this is to enable the CA to determine whether the petition was filed within the period fixed in
the rules. 20 Cadiz's failure to state the date of receipt of the copy of the NLRC decision, however, is not fatal to her case
since the more important material date which must be duly alleged in a petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of
denial of the motion for reconsideration,21 which she has duly complied with. 22

The CA also dismissed the petition for failure to attach the registry receipt in the affidavit of service. 23 Cadiz points out, on
the other hand, that the registry receipt number was indicated in the petition and this constitutes substantial compliance
with the requirement. What the rule requires, however, is that the registry receipt must be appended to the paper being
served.24 Clearly, mere indication of the registry receipt numbers will not suffice. In fact, the absence of the registry
receipts amounts to lack of proof of service.25 Nevertheless, despite this defect, the Court finds that the ends of
substantial justice would be better served by relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure. 26 With regard to
counsel's failure to indicate the place where the IBP and PTR receipts were issued, there was substantial compliance with
the requirement since it was indicated in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, as correctly argued by
Cadiz's lawyer. 27

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that rules of procedure are designed to secure substantial justice. These are
mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and if their strict and rigid application would frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, then it must be avoided.28

Immorality as a just cause for

termination of employment

Both the LA and the NLRC upheld Cadiz's dismissal as one attended with just cause. The LA, while ruling that Cadiz's
indefinite suspension was tantamount to a constructive dismissal, nevertheless found that there was just cause for her
dismissal. According to the LA, "there was just cause therefor, consisting in her engaging in premarital sexual relations
with Carl Cadiz, allegedly her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock." 29 The LA deemed said act to
be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent's rules and which likewise constituted serious misconduct
under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code. The LA also opined that since Cadiz was Brent's Human Resource Officer in
charge of implementing its rules against immoral conduct, she should have been the "epitome of proper conduct." 30 The
LA ruled:

[Cadiz's] immoral conduct by having premarital sexual relations with her alleged boy friend, a former Brent worker and her
co-employee, is magnified as serious misconduct not only by her getting pregnant as a result thereof before and without
marriage, but more than that, also by the fact that Brent is an institution of the Episcopal Church in the Philippines x x x
committed to "developing competent and dedicated professionals x x x and in providing excellent medical and other health
services to the community for the Glory of God and Service to Humanity." x x x As if these were not enough, [Cadiz] was
Brent's Human Resource Officer charged with, among others, implementing the rules of Brent against immoral conduct,
including premarital sexual relations, or fornication x x x. She should have been the epitome of proper conduct, but
miserably failed. She herself engaged in premarital sexual relations, which surely scandalized the Brent community.xx x. 31

The NLRC, for its part, sustained the LA's conclusion.

The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the labor tribunals' conclusions.

Admittedly, one of the grounds for disciplinary action under Brent's policies is immorality, which is punishable by dismissal
at first offense.32 Brent's Policy Manual provides:

CATEGORY IV

In accordance with Republic Act No. 1052,33 the following are just cause for terminating an employment of an employee
without a definite period:

xxxx

2. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work, such as, but not limited to the following:

xxxx
b. Commission of immoral conduct or indecency within the company premises, such as an act of lasciviousness or any act
which is sinful and vulgar in nature.

c. Immora1ity, concubinage, bigamy. 34

Its Employee's Manual of Policies, meanwhile, enumerates "[a]cts of immorality such as scandalous behaviour, acts of
lasciviousness against any person (patient, visitors, co-workers) within hospital premises"35 as a ground for discipline and
discharge. Brent also relied on Section 94 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS), which lists
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a cause for terminating employment. 36

Thus, the question that must be resolved is whether Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting
pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality. To resolve this, the Court makes reference to the recently promulgated
case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB. 37

Leus involved the same personal circumstances as the case at bench, albeit the employer was a Catholic and sectarian
educational institution and the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus (Leus ), worked as an assistant to the school's Director of
the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. Leus was dismissed from employment by the school for having
borne a child out of wedlock. The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct;
and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society
generally considers moral and respectable.

In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz's dismissal are straightforward - she was employed as a human
resources officer in an educational and medical institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she and her
boyfriend at that time were both single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into pregnancy. The
labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or immoral conduct. They also sweepingly concluded that
as Human Resource Officer, Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion "surely
scandalized the Brent community."38

The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent's Policy Manual
and Employee's Manual of Policies do not define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for
disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as a form of illicit
relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz's acts fell under such classification, thus constituting immorality. 39

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious. 40 Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in accordance with the prevailing
norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does not
conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as
immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards. More importantly, there must
be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered
disgraceful or immoral.41

The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of immorality.
Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she
committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008.42 Aside from these, the labor
tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion" "scandalized the Brent community" is speculative, at most, and
there is no proof adduced by Brent to support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent admitted that it came to know of
Cadiz's "situation" only when her pregnancy became manifest.43 Brent also conceded that "[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl
R. Cadiz were just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, there was no knowledge or evidence by [Brent] that
they were engaged also in premarital sex."44 This only goes to show that Cadiz did not flaunt her premarital relations with
her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful circumstances. As declared in Leus, "there is no
law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in
the Constitution. "45 The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious
standard of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing such
religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the employer to abide by
the same. 46
Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the MRPS because the Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital sexual relations
between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct
under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS."47

Marriage as a condition for

reinstatement

The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of
work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees."48 In
this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to
be reinstated. According to Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations
that would subvert the sacrament of marriage."49

Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and promoting equal opportunity in employment. No less than the
1987 Constitution mandates that the "State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all."50 The Labor Code of the
Philippines, meanwhile, provides:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

With particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women51 protects women against
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to choose freely a spouse and
to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. 52

Weighed against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.
There is no rhyme or reason for it.1wphi1 It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and deprives her of the freedom
to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and inalienable right. 53 While a marriage or
no-marriage qualification may be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," Brent must prove two factors
necessitating its imposition, viz: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation
of the job involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. 54 Brent has not shown the presence of neither of
these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.

Given the foregoing, Cadiz, therefore, is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay should be awarded as an alternative and as a form of
financial assistance. 55 In the computation of separation pay, the Court stresses that it should not go beyond the date
an employee was deemed to have been actually separated from employment, or beyond the date when
reinstatement was rendered impossible.56 In this case, the records do not show whether Cadiz already severed her
employment with Brent or whether she is gainfully employed elsewhere; thus, the computation of separation pay shall be
pegged based on the findings that she was employed on August 16, 2002, on her own admission in her complaint that
she was dismissed on November 17, 2006, and that she was earning a salary of P9,108.70 per month, 57 which shall then
be computed at a rate of one (1) month salary for every year of service,58 as follows:

Monthly salary P9,108.70

multiplied by number of years x
in service (Aug 02 to Nov 06) 4

P36,434.80

The Court also finds that Cadiz is only entitled to limited backwages. Generally, the computation of backwages is
reckoned from the date of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement. 59 In case separation pay is ordered in lieu of
reinstatement or reinstatement is waived by the employee, backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the
finality of the decision ordering separation pay. 60 Jurisprudence further clarified that the period for computing the
backwages during the period of appeal should end on the date that a higher court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of
illegal dismissal. 61 If applied in Cadiz's case, then the computation of backwages should be from November 17, 2006,
which was the time of her illegal dismissal, until the date of promulgation of this decision. Nevertheless, the Court has also
recognized that the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy
management. 62 The Court notes that at the time of Cadiz's indefinite suspension from employment, Leus was yet to be
decided by the Court. Moreover, Brent was acting in good faith and on its honest belief that Cadiz's pregnancy out of
wedlock constituted immorality. Thus, fairness and equity dictate that the award of backwages shall only be equivalent to
one (1) year or P109,304.40, computed as follows:

Monthly salary P9,108.70

multiplied by one year x
or 12 months 12

P109,304.40

Finally, with regard to Cadiz's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, the Court finds the same without merit. A finding
of illegal dismissal, by itself, does not establish bad faith to entitle an employee to moral damages. 63Absent clear and
convincing evidence showing that Cadiz's dismissal from Brent's employ had been carried out in an arbitrary, capricious
and malicious manner, moral and exemplary damages cannot be awarded. The Court nevertheless grants the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, Cadiz having been forced to litigate in
order to seek redress of her grievances.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 22, 2008 and February 24, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02373-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED finding petitioner
Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz to have been dismissed without just cause.

Respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. is hereby ORDERED TO PAY petitioner Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz:

(1) One Hundred Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four Pesos and 40/100 (Pl 09,304.40) as backwages;

(2) Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and 80/100 (P36,434.80) as separation pay; and

(3) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.

The monetary awards granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA
Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz
St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
and copy of the marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10,
2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.31
 The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law. 37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. 42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license
was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts
and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed
a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total
of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion
for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and
asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally
then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.
The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from
the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for
decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification
dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License
Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-
07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with
Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of
a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley
who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part
of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase
"married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to
prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin
and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig,
Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633,
194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioners
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for
lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of
Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case,
all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence
on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was
no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of
bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common
and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial
court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of
witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were
at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to
present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally
was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked
this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to"
her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed
that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of
the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by
the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which
also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and
void from the beginning."21Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial courts
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of
the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued
refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing
the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the
case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
 January 13, 2016

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If
they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of
the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision 4 of Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy. 7 The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to
GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage
has all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior
to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in
Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]"11She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. 13 "After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"15 with his college
girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norbertos revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed
with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married
man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also
warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.20
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18,
2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated
September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced.
Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. 27 He presents as evidence a Certification28 from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of
marriagethe marriage licensethe prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that
requirement.30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his
acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norbertos prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the
marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was
not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and
that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should
be convicted of bigamy.33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioners first
marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved
through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did
nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not
present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the
municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioners claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to
Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioners first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This
was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988.35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines36 govern the validity of his first marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void
from the beginning:37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisitethe marriage licenseis issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.38 The marriage license represents the states "involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available
in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of
MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioners first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his
first wife, Gina.43 The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of
petitioners first marriage.44This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence
of any record of the marriage[.]"45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.47As part of
its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license .
. . does not appear from [the local civil registrars] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." 49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not
issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves
a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to
Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the
cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence
presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be
found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found
is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses
may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit
is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario.51 In Cario, the marriage contract between Santiago
Cario and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number. 52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified
that it has no record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cario and Susan Nicdao.53This court declared Santiago
Carios first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily
signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was
celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7)
years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented.
In other words, petitioners belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The
prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second
or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to
discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus,
pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. 55 There is no evidence to show that
the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to
whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There
is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether
there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil
registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrars function without the context just discussed
can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not
mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by
petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil
registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be
applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is
not a far-fetched conclusionalthough this is not always the casethat a well-connected accused will use all means, fair
or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the
discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but
which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of the
bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer
to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the
trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioners first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains
liable for bigamy. Petitioners first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of
Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage
is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first." 60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisiteusually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void." 61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner
insists.62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G.
Eduardo on December 4, 1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice
without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged.1wphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the
minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65
The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision
correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years; 67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period
within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10
years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the minimum
and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]"68 we
lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is,
thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A.
Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil
Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of
Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight
of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which
is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00
o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much
less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the
pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the
required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances
exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern
Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;

x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a
marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is
no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and
that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a
marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of
this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and
80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho
and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a
marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled
that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER
THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING

PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A
NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and
respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law
and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the
perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the
issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into
these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.
However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a
question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained
by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification
of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they
presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt
should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional
policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar,
that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has
been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such
validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the
Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license.
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section,
where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However,
she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the
CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not
affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was
issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v.
Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage
license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the
absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The
Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,27 this Court considered the marriage of
the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record
of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan,
Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. 32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code
clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under
the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No.
464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.