Ine, W. 1940. Mathematical logic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1974. The roots of reference. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 1976. Qlantifiers and propositional attitudes. In Sociocultural dimensions of language use, M. Sanches and B. Blount (eds.), pp. 163-76.
Ine, W. 1940. Mathematical logic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1974. The roots of reference. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 1976. Qlantifiers and propositional attitudes. In Sociocultural dimensions of language use, M. Sanches and B. Blount (eds.), pp. 163-76.
Ine, W. 1940. Mathematical logic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1974. The roots of reference. La Salle, IL: Open Court. 1976. Qlantifiers and propositional attitudes. In Sociocultural dimensions of language use, M. Sanches and B. Blount (eds.), pp. 163-76.
Reflexive language -
Reported speech and metapragmatics
Edited by
Jobn A. Lucy
Department of Anthropology
University of Pennsyloania
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS32 John A. Lucy
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2
Metapragmatic discourse and
metapragmatic function
MICHAEL SILVERS
TEIN
‘The aim here is to clarify the nature of what have come to be called in the literature,
following Silverstein (1976: 48-51), METAPRAGMATIC phenomena, In particular, the
aim is to clarify the distinction between metapragmatic FUNCTIONS of two semiotic
types and between such metapragmatic functions and metapragmatic DISCOURSE.
‘Signs functioning metapragmatically have pragmatic phenomena ~ indexical sign
phenomena ~ as their semiotic objects; they thus have an inherently “framing,” oF
““regimenting,” or “stipulative” character with respect to indexical phenomena. In
this way, as illustrated in the accompanying chapters, the metapragmatic-pragmatic
‘nexus lies atthe intersection of specific theoretical concerns with one or another facet
of the total linguistic fact. Let me point out some of these concerns.
First, there isthe line of focus on the language-metalanguage relationship, coming
out of the logico-linguistc tradition of analytic philosophy and formal syntax. Here,
ive assume that there is some language in the usual sense, ic., some grammatically
conforming system of expression-types, tokens of which refer-to some universe of
referents and predicate-about some universe of states-of-affars, and thatthe vbjects
of reference-and-predication happen to be themselves grammatically conforming
expressions of some language, called, by virtue of this, the OBJECT LANGUAGE of
metalinguistic usage. (The expression-types that are used to refer-to/predicate-about
the object language belong, of course, to the METALANGUAGE.)
‘Once we look somewhat more carefully at the various structural and semiotic-
functional characteristics of natural languages as empirically studied, we see that the
‘general concept ofa metalanguage fora natural language needs refinement in ways that
‘make clear distinctions such as: (language) structure and (language) use; (structural)
form and (structural) value/meaning; (form) type and (form) token; etc. for bork
object language and metalanguage. For, in our empirical work, as demonstrated
in this volume, relationships or mappings across any and all of these facets of
metalanguage and object language —even where these are formally continuous
the same”) in denotational structure — constitute the subsleties of theoretical
import. In particular, understanding what is involved in a metalanguage of/for the
indexical facet of language-in-use, as this line of focus would construe the problem, is3 Michael Silverstein
just one —as we shall term it below ~“‘denotationally explicit” realization of the
possibilities.
'A second line of focus in the literature is on the so-called functional analysis of
language structure and use (see Nichols 1984). Since we purport here to discuss
metapragmatic functions, we should situate both the presupposed concept of
functionality and the relationship of meta-pragmatic to (mere) pragmatic functions
respect to this ongoing “functionalist” project.
‘Common to these other self-styled“ functional” views of language has been a focus
on language-in-use, ie., a processual or dynamic matrix — whether in communi-
cational oF cognitive-informational terms — for describing and explaining linguistic
form. Studies have ranged over institutional and historical, micro- and macro~scale
approaches. Frequently reductive in character, such instrumentalist views of language
seek to “contextualize” linguistic forms (types and tokens) to (typical or actual)
contexts-of-use as agentively employed or deployed speaker’s means of affecting/
effecting certain ends or Functional purposes. As such, however, and in contrast tothe
semiotic functionalism here assumed (see Mertz and Parmentier 1985; Silverstein
1985, 1987), the varieties of reductive instrumentalism so applied suffer from all ofthe
faults that have been leveled against ordinary language philosophy (see Gellner 1959;
Searle 1969: Ch. 8; Ziff 1967), against Malinowskian or Raddliffe-Brownian
functionalism in social anthropology (Sablins 1976: Chs. 1-3; Geertz 19738), and
against functionalist accounts of syntactic phenomena in linguistics (see, for example,
‘Newmeyer 1983: Ch. 2; Chomsky 1975: Chs. 1-2; Sadock 1985). And, in the face of
such critiques, the questions remain, what construal of “function(s)" and of
‘specifically metapragmatic function(s) is compatible with what we must conclude is
the sui generis aspect of linguistic structure modeled by grammar, on the one hand,
‘and, on the other, how can we nonreductively understand language use as its own
‘order of phenomenon, for example, as being a realtime laying down or “inseribing”
fof rExr, 8 formal order distinct feom grammatical form in every essential characteristic.
We should, in fact, go further, and assert that understanding the metaprag~
imatic-pragmatic semiotic-functional nexus is central to seeing one’s way 10 a
rronreductive and compatible theory of language use in productive dialogue with
grammatical formalism,
“Thirdly, we can see in the problem of metapragmatic phenomena a line of focus on
the relationship between language, conceived of either structurally or “functionally,”
‘and social action in the sense of sociocultural“ praxis” (and note here the etymological
connection with (meta)pragmatics), by the way!). To be sure, using language is 2
sociocultural practice, asthe “ethnography of speaking” tradition (see Bauman and
Sherzer 1989, and references there) has documented, all attempts at a “universal
pragmatics” (eg., Habermas 1979, Grice 1989 [1967], Brown and Levinson 1987
[1978] notwithstanding. And further, using language in a socioculturally under
standable way is, in a sense, the very medium, sometimes the exclusive medium, of
‘what are called enactable socal relations among people in groups and societies.
‘But beyond both of these truisms, at issue here in particular is how usefully to
conceptualize a nonmetaphorical relationship between linguistic textuality (charac
Metaprogmatic discourse and metapragmatic function 35
terized above as a transcribable formal order) and what is comprehended under the
rubric of sociocultural praxis — the contextually-situated, interactional establishment,
‘maintenance, and renewal (transformation) of social relations in societies. Sometimes
discussed under the emblem of the “ model of the text” (Ricoeur 1981 [1971]; Geertz
1973b; Geertz 1983: 30-3) and sometimes in terms of rules/structures vs. strategies/
‘events (Bourdieu 1977, 1982), the nonmetaphorical identity or distinctness depends
‘on clarifying what is involved in the “ inscriptional” processes of linguistic textuality.
'As we shall see, this is tantamount to understanding the metapragmatic-pragmatic
‘There is, fourth, a line of focus on the role of language in the achievement of
“voicing” (Bakhtin /Vologinov 1973 [1929], Bakhtin 1981) in characterization,
performance, and participatory reception of literary and other fashioned yerbal
(textual) material In such aesthetically heightened textual form, we are concerned
‘with how reported or evoked or even presupposed structures of participation in events
of language use (events of making text) are immanent in the authoritativeness of
stance, perspective, or “footing” (Goffman 1979) in verbal art, toa degree perhaps
even greater than in everyday —or at least residually non-genred ~ language use
‘Success in reporting, evoking, presupposing, etc. such structures of participation in
‘making text, seemingly perfectible accomplishments of literary artistry as inflected by
(or, modulo) genre, determine a work's evidentiary value along lines of verisimilitude
and fantasy, its appeals to/for identification with characters denoted and implied, and
hence its overall evocation ofa fictive universe locatable with respect to its audience's.
‘Trying to make these concepts precise in structural and functional terms again draws
us into confronting central questions about the metapragmatics-pragmatics nexus.
In particular, stylistic achievements of “voiced,” perspectival or de-*voiced,”
antiperspectival textualization of representational (hence, referential-and-predica-
tional) language seem centrally to depend on mappings across a number of alignments
of metapragmatic-pragmatic relationship. Insofar as text represents events, par-
ticularly events of using language, the text is explicitly a metapragmatic discourse
about such events. Insofar as it is a text, itis lid down in discursive practice (with an
indexical or pragmatic dimension) that is organized (effectively regimented or
‘metapragmatically dominated) according to what kind or type it is at every moment
cconstruable as, whether through explicit metapragmatic discursive appeal or
otherwise, Mediated by @ semiotic-functional category of forms called peIcrics
(indexical denotational forms, which occur in every natural language), discursive
cevent-roles are identified and differentiated across these two (of more) metapragmatic—
pragmatic strata, 0 as to implicate a framework in which inhabitable event-worlds —
and hence inhabitable roles ~ relate one to another in characteristic and ultimately
sgenre-determining ways. To understand this more fully, we shall have to develop
some technical machinery for metapragmatics.»
Text, context, and (meta)semiosis
In order to differentiate metapragmatic function(s) and metapragmatics asa realm of
discourse, we must first have recourse to a sketch of the pragmatics of textuality. In
pragmatics, by our understanding, we encompass the totality of indexical relationships
between occurrent signal forms and their contexts of occurrence, regardless of whether
such contexts are other occurrent signal forms (what is generally termed the cO-TEXT
from the perspective of some occurrent signal form) or not specifically such (whence
the general, nondifferentiated use of the term CoNTEXT as inclusive of co-text, as well
as in contradistinction to it). Any indexical signal form, in occurring (a contingent,
realtime, historical happening, with possible causal consequentiality), hovers between
two contractible relationships to its “contextual” surround: the signal form as
‘occurring cither PRESUPPOSES (hence, indexes) something about its context-of-
‘occurrence, or ENTAILS ["“CREATES"] (and hence indexes) something about its context-
of-occurrence, these co-present dimensions of indexicality being sometimes seen as
essential properties of the signs themselves, “appropriateness-to-context-of-oc-
currence” and ‘effectiveness-in-context-of-occurrence.”
‘Seen this way, every indexical sign, or, to be more precise, every sign insofar as it
signals indexically (whatever other semiotic modalities it may be involved in) serves as
the point-from-which, or semiotic origin of, a presuppositional entailing projection of
‘whatever is to be understood as context. There is no necessary connection between,
nor even necessary coherence of, the various indexical projections-of-context logically
implied by the semiotic fact of indexicality associable with any collection of signal
forms; each occurrent signal form indexes its own context-of-occurrence, and that is
all that we know by purely indexical (pragmatic) semiosis.
But DIscURSIVE INTERACTION — to name the social happening that language use
indexically constitutes ~ does, indeed, seem to have a coherence as a dynamic event
that maps presupposed cause onto entailed effect. And this coherence seems to require
‘modeling in terms of realtime durational phases during which the discursive~
eractional “work” is accomplished in the medium of indexical signaling (which, it
should be recalled, is nothing more than the signal-form-centered projection of
presupposed entailed context). That i, the “event”” model of discursive interaction,
‘with whatever internal serial stages and hierarchical relationships, is already a meta~
pragmatic representation of the facts of indexicality, attributing to them a COHESIVE
[STRUCTURE that orders discursive interaction as some INTERACTIONAL TEXT with event
‘relevant sequentality, accomplishable or achievable purposivity, ete.
‘To achieve or accomplish the laying down of (at least one) interactional text in and
by discursive interaction thus requires that in addition tothe paired indexical semiotic
functions of presupposition and entailment, the functional modality of pragmatics that
discursive interaction literally consists of, there be simultaneously in play another
functional modality, that of metapragmatics ~ here, the metapragmatic function of
‘occurring sign-forms ~ that at least implicitly models the indexical-sign-in-context
relationships as event-segments of interactional text. Without a metapragmatic
Metapragmatie discourse and metapragmatic function 37
function simultaneously in play with whatever pragmatic function(s) there may be in
discursive interaction, there is no passiility of interactional coherence, since there is
no framework of structure ~ here, interactional text structure in which indexical
origins or centerings are relatable one to another as aggregated contributions to some
segmentable, accomplishable event(s). In effect, metapragmatic function serves to
regiment indexicals into interpretable event(s) of such-and-such type that the use of
language in interaction constitutes (consists of). Understanding discursive interaction
as events of such-and-such type is precisely having a model of interactional text.
‘Two remarks are in order at this point, one relating to the uniqueness and
determinacy of interactional text-indexicality relationships, the other to the role of
referting-and-predicating in all this. To be sure, these will be both dealt with in
srreater depth in what follows; but it is important to see these points immediately so
as not to be misled by unintended though invited inferences.
(On the first point, it wll be seen that there is no unique interactional text (model
‘of what is happening over some experienceable duration of discursive interaction) for
‘every indexical form oF configuration of such. Nor, moreover, does a particular
interactional text uniquely determine what indexicals function in (or, since we are
talking in terms of mappings, “ under") it as those relevant to accomplishing the event
it models. Even two human participants in a discursive interaction can be mutually
responsive according to distinct perspectival interactional texts that are, nevertheless,
relevant toa realtime and psychological account of "what is happening.” Our claim
hhas been that there must be at least one interactional text in terms of which indexicality
‘can have event-coherence at any point in discursive interaction, and hence, for
‘coherence to obtain, there must be at least one structure of organization of indexical
signal-forms under a metapragmatic regimentation, even if only implicitly.
‘Referring-and-predicating in the usual construal of these are, from this point of
view, purposively accomplishable or achievable event-types central to which is a
special kind of mapping that we will term here the DENOTATIONAL TEXT. Such a text,
which many theorists tend to identify (incorrectly) with interactional text, has a
seeming concreteness to the extent that referring-and-predicating are understood as,
the central, or even exclusive, purposive functions of discursive interaction (ef. most
information-processing or logical views of the coherence of discursive interaction).
(Of course, denotational text is merely the hierarchically and serially structured
textual model of discursive interaction under the mapping requirement — the
‘metapragmatic rogimentation ~ that every indexical be referrable to a text-sentence
(Lyons 1977: 29f,) that corresponds to some syntactic structure of denotationally
evaluated morphosyntactic form. Note that text-sentences are event-segments of a
textual model that regiments the phases of discursive interaction into serial scopes of
structure at least partly accounted for by grammar in the usual construal. Insofar as
denotational text does, indeed, play a role in interactional text ~ in any number of
ways, as we discuss below ~ the “what we say” (ie, refer-to and predicate-about) is
related to the “ what we do” (accomplish gua interactional event(s), though logically
the denotational text is but one model of discursive coherence. Denotational textual
properties, including the co-textual structure of denotational sign-forms (the “ poetic3 Michael Silverstein
function” [Jakobson 1960] of Praguean theory in pragmatic terms), the existence of
various classes of metapragmatic descriptors morphosyntactically generable in text-
sentences, deixis, etc~all these can and do play a role under proper conditions of
‘mapping of denotational text into interactional text, but the two takes" on discursive
interaction should be seen definitionally in their distinctness.
‘Such disclaimers or warnings made, we should be prepared to confront the more
sticular cases of metapragmatic function in relation to the discursive pragmatics
they repent inthe Ht of fenealdnension of semis anton. We should Be
able tose, then, that sructural elements of INHERENTLY metapragmatic value as they
Contribute to denotational text may or may not be central tothe interactional text of
the discursive interaction in which they occur. We should also be able to sec that the
setapragmatic- pragmatic relationship is a relativistic concept necessary to which is 2
proper understanding of what we shall term the FUNCTIONAL STRATUM at which this
felationship grounds the indesicality proper toa particular interactional text. And we
should also beable tose tat interactional text, of whatever scope of encompassment
and hence event-inclusiveness, is always being made, remade, transformed, re-
formed, etc. in the realtime processes of discursive interaction, being a projection
(Chrough metapragmatic functional means) from the indexical here-and-nov, though
such interactional text is the model of the very interpretability of that discursive
interaction. Text as artifact whether written, printed, or otherwise registered in
transcriptional form ~is only the merest suggestion of denotational text, interactional
text, and hence, ofcourse, of discursive interaction. But the discursive interactional
accomplishment of using a text-atifact in some -denotationaltextual or even
interational-textual event(s) presents, albeit in terms ofthe problem of “reading” the
text (ie, text-artifact), al of the problems of any discursive interaction, particularly
‘complex in the way of functional lamination of strata of metapragmatic-pragmatic
regimentation,
‘Three dimensions of contrast
In considering the range of functional relationships we would want to include as
metapragmatic-pragmatic in nature, there appear to be three fundamental axes of
‘comparison that take into account our assumptions and goals here. Assuming that the
functional relationship arises in and with respect to the discursive-interaction—
interactional-text nexus, having differentiated interactional from denotational text, we
‘would want to take account of where the natural metapragmatic life of language goes
fon, as it were, Wishing ultimately to be able to show that explicit metapragmatic
discourse is a multiple phenomenon with respect to the metapragmatic-pragmatic
functional relationship, we want to be able (0 locate the several senses in terms of
intersecting and superposed functional planes and strata.
[All this, it seems to me, requires frst that we distinguish metafunctions according
to their OBJECT OF META-SEMHOSIS (if we may coin this goneral term), so that
Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function 39
METAPRAGMATICS specifically depends on there being 2 metafunctional-functional
relationship (semiotically speaking) that specifically and differentially relates to the
pragmatic (indexical) dimension of language (or any other pragmatic semiosis). For
‘our purposes here, diametrically opposed is METASEMANTICS, which depends on there
‘being metafunctional-functional relationship for the STRUCTURAL-sSENSE-determining
principles of language expressions, insofar as they have any. Metasemantics is implied
in the attempts to map linguistic structure into denotational text, insofar as the later
is composed of text-sentences, It isa very special metapragmatics, with all kinds of
special structural and functional assumptions, from the point of view of interactional
text more generally.
‘Next, we must contrast degrees and kinds of DeNOTATIONAL EXPLICITINESS of signals
functioning metapragmatically with respect to some pragmatic semiosis. The pole of
‘complete denotational explicitness would involve a systematic grammatical structure
Capable of grounding metapragmatic expressions to the level of sentences in the usual
‘way, and realizable in metapragmatic denotational text, that i, text that refers-to and
predicates-about pragmatic phenomena. Observe that such denotational text is still
‘only problematically related to the interactional text of the discursive interaction in
which it may be used. And observe further that natural languages generally have only
partially explicit metapragmatics at best, in the guise of metapragmatic lexical items
and characteristic grammatical combinatorics involving them that do not suffice to
‘map onto complete text-sentences of denotational text, but map onto text-sentence
partials, such as lexical heads of predicate phrases, relative-tense,relative-person, and
similar grammatical markers, et.
‘At the very opposite extreme from full denotational expicitness is metapragma
regimentation of pragmatic semiosis that is signaled fully 1MPLICITLY, ie, without the
utilization, in this particular functional relationship determining some interactional
text, of any denotationally explicit sign-forms. Since we are dealing withthe particular
fanctional relationship of some metapragmatics particular to an interactional text of
some sort, we must note that it is not merely the fat that some explicit metapragmatic
form(s) occur(s) in a denotational text-segment under a particular interactional-textual
segment that is at issue; the question is, what effectively regiments the pragmatics in
the interactional text-segment determined by the metapragmatic signal forms? It can
be, for example, a thoroughgoing “poetic” co-textuality of maximal density,
independent of, or at 2 higher functional stratum of metapragmatic-pragmatic
relationship than, any explicit machinery occurring as part of a denotatinal tex.
‘We should thus distinguish between INHERENTLY METAPRAGMATIC semanticorefer-
ential forms, lexicon and structural clements, the denotational values of
which qua constituents of any grammatical expressions in which they occur
characterize pragmatic facts of one sort or another, and denotational explicitness in the
retapragmatic-pragmatic functional relationship germane to some interactional-
textual segment. The former type of signs, e8., DEICTICS (indexical-denotationals)
such as English J, you, here (: there), this: that), now (: then) and their equivalents in
all languages, et., denote by virtue of coding a characterization computible in terms of
pragmatic facts about contextualized use of a token of the form, which facts they40 Michael Silverstein
presuppose/entail in particular ways on each use. They can thus always contribute to
Genotational text in a particular way. In any particular interactional text, however,
they may not figure among the latter, denotationally explicit machinery in the instance
(the nonregimenting role of deixs in many rituals comes immediately to mind).
"The third characteristic ofthe metapragmaticpragmatic functional relationship i
vivo to be treated below is the PRAGMATIC CALIBRATION of the metapragmatic sign~
‘event and the event of regimented pragmatics within some framework or “space” of
epistemic possibilities. These range, importantly, over what we might term — partially
borrowing Whort’s (19566 [1938]: 113ff) terminology for (epistemic) ‘status’
categories of “assertion” in Hopi~ the REFLEXIVE, the REPORTIVE, and the NOMIC
‘alibrations, The first calibration is constituted by a non-differentiable coincidence of
‘metapragmatic sign-event (in its pragmatic order) and regimented pragmatic sign~
event; it is self-regimented in and as interactional text-segment, The second is
Constituted by some commonalty of pragmatic contextualization of the two sign~
events, asymptotically approaching coincidence; regimenting and regimented text-
‘segments are comparably contextualized in one or more respects, determining a
common framework for identifying them as events. The third calibration is, in
‘essence, the absence of calibration in either of the two preceding senses; regimented
pragmatics stipulatively does not belong to the epistemic realm of (mere) sign-
Eventhood of the sort experienceable inthe event of metapragmatic signal occurrence.
‘Since the dimension of calibration is a consequence of the indexical semiosis
inherent in the oceurrence of metapragmatic signs in relation tothe indexical semiosis
‘uch signs regiment, it highlights an important fact; being events, metapragmatically
functioning interactional text-segments themselves have a pragmatic dimension.
Hence, this dimension, too, implies a metapragmatics. And so forth, up what are at
feast in theory indefinitely many metapragmatic-to-pragmatic relational strata of
functional semiosis, yielding another possibility for multiple interactional-textual
“readings” of any given discursive interaction. In practice, only a certain complexity
suffices to exhaust strategic/interpretive regimentation in realtime.
Let me take up each of these dimensions of metapragmatic-pragmatic functional
‘relationship in order.
The object of meta-semiosis
“The most important distinction here, as noted above, is between metasemantics
and metapragmatics, based on a particular construal of the distinction between
SEMANTICS and PRAGMATICS (see Silverstein 1976, 1985). At fist, it might appear that
the metafunctions are parallel one to the other, corresponding as does semantics to
pragmatics. This, however, i not at all the case, because of the nature of semantics and
pragmatics as distinct semiotic modalities each with its own consistent characteristics.
“There is a wider and a narrower construal of the term semantics, where the wider
encompasses all of the denotationally centered, referential-and-(modalized-)predi-
tational meaningfulness ofa sign system such as language (functioning in laying down.
ddenotational text, as we observed earlier). The wider construal seems to take over the
“Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function 41
notion from logical syntax, applying it to expressions of a natural language as well
Pragmatics then becomes the special subpart of semantics that deals with those
tic” effects deriving from the contextual conditions under which a code such
as language is used in laying down denotational text. The preponderance of so-called
linguistic or philosophical pragmatics is based on this construal ofthe relationship of
semantics to pragmatics.
Charles Morris? (1938) rather incoherent differentiation of semantics from
pragmatics, as both equal and distinet components ofthe tripartite realm of semisis
“symtactis, semantics, pragmatics ~and at the same time realms hierarchically
presupposing one another ~ pragmatics presupposing semantics presupposing syn
tics ~ instructively illustrates some ofthe dficultes ofthis construal of the two realms
at issue. And Bar-Hille’s (1954) focus on “indexieal expressions as the esence of
Pragmatics centers the problem on finding a special, contextuilly dependent
(Genotational) meaning of what would be unproblematic and othervise regularly
interpretable syntactically well-formed expressions. Pragmatics as a realm ofsemiosis
is here again merely the problematic subpart of giving a semantic account of
syntactically well-formed expressions. Austinian (cf 1975 1962)), Gricean (ef. 198%
[1967], 1989 (1957), and similar accounts of so-called pragmatics are compatible
and, 2s some probing will show, equally incoherent programs of attempting t0
supplement the “literal” oF semantic interpretation of presupposedly autonomous
logical or natural syntactic expressions.
By contrast, once we understand that (denotational) “meaning” is a complex,
multifactorial reading of semiotic functionality centered on reference-and-prediction
in denotational text, and once we seck to identify the essential commitments of
logically inspired linguistic semantics from such a semiotic perspective, the distinction
between semantics and pragmatics, and thercupon that between metasemantis and
rmetapragmatics, becomes sharply drawn. (See Putnam 1975 for the beginnings of a
critique from a philosophical perspective; and compare the critique in the movement
Within disciplinary linguistics called “yencrative. semanties” ~Newmeyer 1980
nocwithstanding ~ for its awareness of the incoherence ofthe then-dominant views.)
‘Semantics can be coherently understood asthe semiotic realm of sense. (se Lyons
1968: 427-9, 443-4; 1977: 197-206), that abstractable constancy in denotatonal
capacity of grammatically constructed expressions that corresponds to~ ie can be
Cconsequentially mapped from ~ the formal organization of grammar, co the degre of
delicacy to which we can abstract from denotational-textual events of language use
such a formal organization of Knguistic expression-types called sentences” and their
constituents, When we try to give the ‘‘meaning” of a word or expression, we
generally intend some characterization at least centering on its “sense” as here
Lnderstood ~ even though without a knowledge of post-Saussurean linguistic theory
‘we would not understand the foundational role of grammatical systematicity in
Cstablishing the sense of expressions. By contrast, in the realm of pragmatics, we ae
very much concerned with actual events of language use and with such generalization
‘over and about them as can be achieved, In the particular usage here adopted,
pragmatics is thus the semiotic realm of indexical meaning, including botha
ihe Silverstein
strategy ; analyzer: interpretation <= consequentiality) as occurring in some ever-
moving durational phase the point of origin of which is the here-and-now. Hence,
third, we are drawing the comparison between formulator and analyzer roles as
perspectivally similar in relation to discursive interaction, for both of which finding
the interactional text in discursive interaction /engaging in or with discursive
interaction via interactional text constitute paired opposites of directionality. From
the experience of tokens engaged with in this fashion, we develop characteristic
[patterns of INTERACTIONAL STYLE and of INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE which seem to be
‘prerequisites of both roles, that of formulator and that of analyzer. And we can sce that
virtuosity, connoisseurship, and other evaluative characteristics may inhere in such
style and perspective as it suoceeds in processual achievement,
‘Unimately, such dialectic engagement with individual or even aggregate discursive
interactional happenings is an individual matter. But it seems to rest on a more
abstract sense in which there is a dialectic between pragmatics and metapragmatics,
‘namely the socal institutional level of semiotic processes operating in societal real
again as two directional moments of the relationship, pragmatics-to-metapragmaties
‘and metapragmatics-to-pragmatics.
‘While it is exceedingly complex a topic to contemplate, there is one aspect that
might be considered for exemplification of what such an abstract level of dialectic
might involve. Using the terms of the functional analysis laid out here, we shift our
concern from the individual or aggregated actual events of discursive interaction, and
contemplate instead properties of pragmatic (indexical) regularities ofa language-norm
encoded in it, ic. the PRAGMATIC CATEGORIES of a linguistic system. And we ask, for
4 system of such pragmatic categories, what properties of such a system qua semiotic,
in the context of the linguistic system, determine something about the metapragmaties
associated with it (normatively)? In particular, we might ask what properties of
pragmatic signs determine that their tokens are regimentable by a metapragmatics of
such-and-such kind? For example, what properties of pragmatic categories make it
more vs. less likely that there is associable at a lowest stratum with respect to them a
strongly explicit metapragmatics (one that emerges from a functional register)? And,
does having a strongly explicit metapragmatic register determine something about the
lowest stratum regimentation accomplishable thercby? (Note that the same kinds of,
‘questions can be posed about any of the classificitory dimensions across the
metapragmatic-pragmatic nexus.)
‘There has, in fact, been some exploration of the relationship between pragmatic
categories’ projectibility in metapragmatic forms and the semiotic type of the
pragmatic categories involved (see Silverstein 1981, Briggs 1986, Hanks 1990).
Strongly explicit metapragmatics, where the metapragmatic functional register
temerges in denotational text (hence segmentable as denotational text-sentences),
associable with pragmatic categories of particular semiotic type: such categories are
highly presupposing of some contextual state-of-affairs in each token use, a opposed
Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function 55
to highly entaiting; such categories are denotationally loclizable in referentsl-and-
predicational grammatical organization along the Whorfian dimension of over £0
overt (Whorf 1956 [1937}: 88-93), even though they may Fonction semiotcally in
romdenorational indexicality; and, in the quintessential case, such categories are
inherently metapragmatic. By thes criteria a pragmatic sign that marks the state-of-
affairs of its context of occurrence merely, that is expressed in an isolable and
seructually continuous formal surface clement ofthe grammatical structure ofa text-
Sentence (rot, stem, affix, word, clit, continuous phrase, et.) and that denotes as
well as indexes, and'in fact denotes that which it indexes (presupposes), is the very
Titles of pragmatic signs to be regimentable by a strongly explicit metapragmatics
for example the lexicon of performative verb-stems in a language. At the very
opposite extreme, itis unlikely that an explicit metapragmatcs will regiment highly
entailing pragmatic sigs formally and functionally totally autonomous from structures
of denotational entextualizaton.
“There is much work to be done in looking a the way this particular relationship,
pragmatic categories projecting 4 likelihood of strongly explicit metapragmatic
Fegimentaton, interacts withthe other dimensions of our schema, fr example, ifsuch
regimentation is differently projectble in repotive, reflexive, and nomic calibrational
relationships between pragmatic and metapragmatic semiotic functions. There are
data in he accompanying chapters that speak to such issues, and they shouldbe looked
2 from this typological point of view.
From the perspective of the converse moment in the dialectic proces, explicit
smetapragmatie registers instantiated in metapragmatic discourse encapsulate ideolo-
es of language use and play an obvious role inthe insiutinalization of discursive
mechanisms of society. There is an implicit consciousness" of the power of semiotic
mechanisms such as language centered on such strongly explicit metapragmatics,
Awhich is aways residually available atthe lowest stratum of metapragmatic-pragmatic
relationship, ‘The existence of such soothes the “interested” and thereby “voiced”
intuition oriented to control of entextualization. And this, inspite of the wlimately
dialectic nature of the semiotic procesics involved at both soxil-institutional and
tmicro-contextual, individual degrees of abstraction.
Acknowledgments
1am grateful to Gregory Urban, who posed one of the central questions diseussed
above, the nature of the distinction between metapragmatic discourse and metaprag-
matic function, while we were preparing for the conference sessions. The Center for
Psychosocial Studies, in the persons of its Chairman, Bernard Weissbourd, and its
Director, Benjamin Lee, were then, and have been since, the epitome of en-
ccouragement for the overall and the specific project. I thank them and the other
participants, and single out our ~ by now ~ long-suffering editor, John A. Lucy, to
whom, in the order of group process, the buck was passed. At numerous places, the
text-artfact ~ and, with luck, the denotational text ~ have benefited from queries and56 Michel Silverstein
suggestions of the editor, the copy-editor Julia Harding, and John B, Haviland, for
which T am most grateful
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PART II
The relation of form and function in
reflexive language