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SOLIVEN, petitioner VS.

JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent


167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit
DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is
LIFTED.
RATIO:
Background of the first issue
MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by
the Secretary of Justice
MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing
counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of
arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine
the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of
probable cause.
Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing
her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And
there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of
the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling
effect on press freedom.
-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
chilling effect point.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With
regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom,
Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now
rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. United States v. Bustos
No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position
that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. People v. Perfecto

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