CASE/PROVISION/DOCTRINE PARTIES/FACTS
ISSUE:
FACTS: Crisostomo G. Concepcion (Concepcion) owned LCT-
Josephine, a vessel registered with the Philippine Coast
Guard. Concepcion and the Philippine Trigon Shipyard
Corporation (PTSC), represented by Roland, entered into a
"Contract of Agreement," wherein the latter would charter LCT-
Josephine. PTSC/Roland sub-chartered LCT-Josephine to
Trigon Shipping Lines (TSL), a single proprietorship owned by
Rolands father, Agustin de la Torre (Agustin). TSL, this time
represented by Roland per Agustins Special Power of
Attorney, sub-chartered LCT-Josephine to Ramon Larrazabal
(Larrazabal) for the transport of cargo consisting of sand and
gravel to Leyte. The LCT-Josephine with its cargo of sand and
gravel arrived at Philpos, Isabel, Leyte. The vessel was
beached near the NDC Wharf. With the vessels ramp already
lowered, the unloading of the vessels cargo began with the
use of Larrazabals payloader. While the payloader was on the
deck of the LCT-Josephine scooping a load of the cargo, the
vessels ramp started to move downward, the vessel tilted and
DELA TORRE VS. CA
sea water rushed in. Shortly thereafter, LCT-Josephine sank.
Concepcion demanded that PTSC/ Roland refloat LCT-
Josephine. The latter assured Concepcion that negotiations
were underway for the refloating of his vessel. Unfortunately,
this did not materialize.
For this reason, Concepcion was constrained to institute a
complaint for "Sum of Money and Damages" against PTSC
and Roland before the RTC. PTSC and Roland filed their
answer together with a third-party complaint against Agustin.
Agustin, in turn, filed his answer plus a fourth-party complaint
against Larrazabal. The latter filed his answer and
counterclaim but was subsequently declared in default by the
RTC. Eventually, the fourth-party complaint against Larrazabal
was dismissed when the RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Concepcion. The appellate court, in agreement with the
findings of the RTC, affirmed its decision in toto.
ISSUE/HELD
(1) W/N the Code of Commerce is applicable, more specifically, the
Limited Liability Rule;
(2) W/N the petitioners are solidarily liable.
No. The said rule has been explained to be that of the real and hypothecary
doctrine in maritime law where the shipowner or ship agents liability is held
as merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss
thereof results in its extinction.
In this jurisdiction, this rule is provided in three articles of the Code of
Commerce.
-Article 837 specifically applies to cases involving collision which is a
necessary consequence of the right to abandon the vessel given to the
shipowner or ship agent under the first provision Article 587.
Similarly, Article 590 is a reiteration of Article 587, only this time the
situation is that the vessel is co-owned by several persons. Obviously, the
forerunner of the Limited Liability Rule under the Code of Commerce is
Article 587.
Now, the latter is quite clear on which indemnities may be confined or
restricted to the value of the vessel pursuant to the said Rule, and these are
the "indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the
conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the
vessel." Thus, what is contemplated is the liability to third persons who may
have dealt with the shipowner, the agent or even the charterer in case of
demise or bareboat charter. The only person who could avail of this is the
shipowner, Concepcion. He is the very person whom the Limited Liability
Rule has been conceived to protect.
The petitioners cannot invoke this as a defense. The shipowners or agents
liability is merely coextensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total
loss thereof results in its extinction. The total destruction of the vessel
extinguishes maritime liens because there is no longer any res to which it
can attach. This doctrine is based on the real and hypothecary nature of
maritime law which has its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime
trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable
hazards and perils. To offset against these adverse conditions and to
encourage shipbuilding and maritime commerce, it was deemed necessary
to confine the liability of the owner or agent arising from the operation of a
ship to the vessel, equipment, and freight, or insurance, if any. The
charterer of a vessel, under the conditions stipulated in the charter party in
question, is the owner pro hac vice of the ship and takes upon himself the
responsibilities of the owner. Therefore, even if the contract is for a
bareboat or demise charter where possession, free administration and even
TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 1
 navigation are temporarily surrendered to the charterer, dominion over the
vessel remains with the shipowner. Ergo, the charterer or the sub-charterer,
whose rights cannot rise above that of the former, can never set up the
Limited Liability Rule against the very owner of the vessel. In the present
case, the charterer and the sub-charterer through their respective contracts
of agreement/charter parties, obtained the use and service of the entire
LCT-Josephine. The vessel was likewise manned by the charterer and later
by the sub-charterers people. With the complete and exclusive
relinquishment of possession, command and navigation of the vessel, the
charterer and later the sub-charterer became the vessels owner pro hac
vice. Now, and in the absence of any showing that the vessel or any part
thereof was commercially offered for use to the public, the above
agreements/charter parties are that of a private carriage where the rights of
the contracting parties are primarily defined and governed by the
stipulations in their contract. Thus, Roland, who, in his personal capacity,
entered into the Preliminary Agreement with Concepcion for the dry-docking
and repair of LCT-Josephine, is liable under Article 1189 of the New Civil
Code. There is no denying that the vessel was not returned to Concepcion
after the repairs because of the provision in the Preliminary Agreement that
the same "should" be used by Roland for the first two years. Before the
vessel could be returned, it was lost due to the negligence of Agustin to
whom Roland chose to sub-charter or sublet the vessel.

Agustin, on the other hand, who was the sub-charterer or sub-lessee of

LCT-Josephine, is liable under Article 1651 of the New Civil Code. Although
he was never privy to the contract between PTSC and Concepcion, he
remained bound to preserve the chartered vessel for the latter. Despite his
non-inclusion in the complaint of Concepcion, it was deemed amended so
as to include him because, despite or in the absence of that formality of
amending the complaint to include him, he still had his day in court as he
was in fact impleaded as a third-party defendant by his own son, Roland
the very same person who represented him in the Contract of Agreement
with Larrazabal. Clearly, the petitioners, to whom the possession of LCT
Josephine had been entrusted as early as the time when it was dry-docked
for repairs, were obliged to insure the same. Unfortunately, they failed to do
so in clear contravention of their respective agreements. Certainly, they
should now all answer for the loss of the vessel.

Negros Navigation VS Court of Appeals

(GR NO. 110398) 7 November 1997

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 2

Petition: Review for certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Regional Trial Courts award of
damages to private respondents for the death of relatives which resulted from the sinking of petitioners passenger sea vessel.
Petitioner: Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Ramon Miranda, Sps. Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Pertinent Principle/Concept of StatCon: Stare Decisis

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1980, Ramon Miranda, one of the private respondents in this case purchased four special tickets (Numbers 74411,
74412, 74413 and 74414) from the petitioner for his wife, children and niece who were then bound to leave for Bacolod City to attend
a family reunion.

On 22 April 1980, private respondents aforementioned relatives boarded M/V Don Juan of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., that was
leaving Manila at 1:00 PM. As expected, said vessel sailed on time. However, on the evening of 22 April, petitioners vessel collided
with the M/T Tacloban City- an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). Obviously, several passengers perished in the sea tragedy. Some bodies were found, and some,
including the relatives of private respondents were never found.

Knowing the ill-fate of the M/V Don Juan, private respondents, namely Garcia and Sps de la Victoria filed a complaint against the
Negros Navigation, the PNOC, and the PNOC/STC. Private respondents sought for damages for the death of their relatives namely
Ardita de la Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon Miranda Jr., and Elfreda de la Victoria.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents, and asked petitioners, including PNOC and PNOC/STC to pay the
moral damages sought by Garcia and Sps. de la Victoria. And upon review by the Court Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
RTCs decision with several modification.

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 3

ISSUES:

Several issues were raised in this case. However, for the sake of having a discourse on the abovementioned principle/concept of
Statutory Construction, we shall focus on the issue of whether or not the ruling in the Mecenas VS CA, finding the crew members
of petitioners to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duty, is binding in this case.
HELD:

Yes. The courts adherence to the Mecenas Case1 is dictated by the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled).

The petitioners assail the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas Case, arguing that although the same case arose out of the
same incident as that involved in the Mecenas, THE PARTIES ARE DIFFERENT AND TRIALS WERE CONDUCTED SEPARATELY.
Furthermore they contend that the decision in this case must be based on the allegations, the defenses pleaded and evidence adduced
stated on the records of the case.

The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The Supreme Court stated that although the merits of the individual claims against the
petitioner are different in both cases, there remains a similarity which is material in the decision of the court vis--vis the case at hand,
i.e. the cause of the sinking of its ship on 22 April 1980 and the liabilities (of petitioner) for such accident.

DOCTRINE

STARE DECISIS
o Stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturbed what has been settled).

1 The Mecenas Case is another case arising from the incident that occurred on 22 April 1980.

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 4

 o Under the principle of Stare Decisis, it is required that past decisions of the court be followed in the adjudication of
cases.
o A ruling of the supreme court as to the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent cases INVOLVING
SIMILAR QUESTIONS.
o The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same.
If facts are dissimilar, then the aforementioned principle does not apply.
o Purpose of this principle is to have stability in the law.

The doctrine of stare decisis applies in this case. It is a rule that a ruling of the court as to the construction of a law should be followed
in subsequent cases INVOLVING SIMILAR QUESTIONS. Although the personal circumstances and claims of Mecenas, and Miranda
and de la Victoria are different as contended by the petitioner, the two cases raised similar question/issue, i.e. on the damages
for which the petitioner was liable due to the sinking of its ship.

FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)

REGALADO; October 1, 1998

NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and Gavino solidarily liable

FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
(FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of
the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing
of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov,
beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. - When the vessel

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 5

reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the
vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on
the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. - After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not
take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority.
Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of
P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine
Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage
district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and
foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.

- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by
the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel
shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved
from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize damage.

The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or
negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse
against said Master

Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the
light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 6

 f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out
his order.

- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:

Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it
anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his
instructions.

xxx xxx xxx

Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such
vessels.

ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent

HELD
YES.

- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the
moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an
expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to
perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the
vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand
the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs
testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted
the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was
seeing and hearing.
- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 7

- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several
causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that
such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted
from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury
are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable
as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. - There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

TRANSPO CASE SUMMARY | 8