EN BANC

[A.M. No. 2440-CFI : July 25, 1981.]

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:

It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
take umbrage on the portion of the opinion of respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella in the
course of acquitting the defendants accused of Triple Rape. Thus: "it will also be observed that
Florencio Ola was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979,
to August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife
Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Her husband Florencio
Ola and her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced to become members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers of the Iglesia
ni Cristo as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of this action. Her
husband and in-laws are now members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded
that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz,
Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its
member of his/her problem." 1 There was absolutely no need for the last sentence therein being
included. Respondent judge was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a
member of the bench. While the offending portion of such opinion is not impressed with such
gravity, disciplinary action nonetheless is warranted.
As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova, adopting the memorandum of
Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza: "Respondent judge, in his comment dated
January 20, 1981, alleged that the charges made against him by herein complainant are unfair
and unfounded as the decision rendered by him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting the
three cranad(3) accused of Triple Rape, was prepared by him in the honest conviction that the
evidence adduced at the trial of said case was not sufficiently clear to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further contended that the statements
complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the statement of the complainant witness cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact
that she had always been accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo
and numerous members of the sect." 2 There was a reply on the part of complainant, Teofilo
Ramos, Sr. who, according to the report, "claimed that the statement made by the herein
respondent judge that the complaining witness had always been accompanied in court during the
trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of said sect, was uncalled for
and intended to further malign the Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt
respondent judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of the law. He also claimed that the
inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim in the said criminal case were minor matters
that did not disprove the commission of the crime of rape by the members of the police authorities
as well as their identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said inconsistencies the fact
that the victim is a simple and unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil intent had
been shown at the trial which had impelled said victim to point an accusing finger against the
three cranad(3) accused in the subject criminal case." 3 In the state of the record, it was submitted
in such report that "on the basis of the pleadings and other documents of record, respondent
judge's liability or lack of it can already be determined without need of further investigation.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to refer this case to a Justice of the Court of
Appeals for investigation. This Court, in the case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay, held that 'cumbersome,
time-consuming procedure of investigation need not be resorted to if the allegations in the
complaint, the comments thereon, and the documents presented provide ample basis for a
resolution of the complainant's charges.'" 4
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could
offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as
understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity.
It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be
acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could
have that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to mind. It is to be
expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts would
certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one, much
less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory
sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a
religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the
fundamental law. 6 No adverse implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes without
saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to
maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression
to its views is equally deserving of protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note
be taken that not all members of the bench are possessed of such an extensive vocabulary in the
English language that the misuse of a word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe
character. While under the circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion that
censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority that an admonition would suffice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in
the use of language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to
the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to
pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded.
The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter
referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill
of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section

12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of
the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body

to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an
officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's
avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress
in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire
to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams,
70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration
in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established
by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him
to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and
not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name
of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty.
It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed.
It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted
to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.

Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY. Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering
evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had
no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the
court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court.
By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because
this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.
Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:

Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings of the parties.

Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants)
in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981,
while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When
complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was
unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying
to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of
making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment
was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation
at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her
and immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for
a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there
l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional
Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark
"bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the
first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R.
No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by
complainants own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not
entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper
words.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to

observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt
with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON

and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 74376 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
GONZALVEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 76394 December 22,1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.

G.R. No. 78182 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY, and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.

G.R. No. 82281 December 22, 1988

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Sangco, Anastacio, Castaneda & Duran Law Office for petitioners & private intervenors-
petitioners.

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for intervenor-petitioner Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. Renato L.
Dela Fuente for respondent Ayala Corporation.

G.R. No. L-74376:

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.

Sergio L. Guadiz for private respondents.

G.R. No. L-76394:

Raul S. Sison Law Offices for petitioner.

Gruba, Tanlimco Lamso and Apuhin Law Offices for respondents.

G.R. No. L-78182:

Funk & Associates for petitioners.

Tee Tomas & Associates for respondents.

G.R. No. L-82281:

Funk & Associates for petitioner.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Associates for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before the Court are five consolidated petitions, 1 docketed as G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281 hereof, in the nature of appeals (by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court) from five decisions of the Court of Appeals, denying specific performance and damages.

The proceedings were commenced at the first instance by Jose Sangalang, joined by his wife
Lutgarda Sangalang, both residents of No. 110 Jupiter Street, Makati, Metro Manila (G.R. No.
71169) to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon property, specifically the
Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant to stipulations embodied in the
deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages. Later, the Sangalangs were joined by
Felix Gaston, a resident of No. 64 Jupiter Street of the same municipality, and by Mr. and Mrs.
Jose and Alicia Briones, both of No. 66 Jupiter Street. Pending further proceedings, the Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), an incorporated homeowners' association, entered its
appearance as plaintiff-in-intervention.

BAVA itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific performance
and damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' (See G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and
82281.)

ANTECEDENTS FACTS

I. G.R. No. 71169

The facts are stated in the decision appealed from. We quote:

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(1) Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J.
Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west
up to Zodiac Street in the east, When Bel-Air Village was planned, this block
between Reposo and Zodiac Streets adjoining Buendia Avenue in front of the
village was designated as a commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, p. 10, Feb. 12,
1982).

(2) Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the
1950s by Makati Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC),
which in 1968 was merged with appellant Ayala Corporation.

(3) Appellees-spouses Sangalang reside at No. 11O Jupiter Street between

Makati Avenue and Reposo Street; appellees-spouses Gaston reside at No. 64
Jupiter Street between Makati Avenue and Zodiac Street; appellees-spouses
Briones reside at No. 66 Jupiter Street also between Makati Avenue and Zodiac
Street; while appellee Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
BAVA) is the homeowners' association in Bel-Air Village which takes care of the
sanitation, security, traffic regulations and general welfare of the village.

(4) The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston
and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were
all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed
Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. The pertinent provisions in
said Deed Restrictions, which are common to all lot owners in Bel-Air Village, are
as follows:

I-BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION

The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be and is

automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules
and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation,
security and the general welfare of the community.

The association will also provide for and collect assessments, which will
constitute as a lien on the property junior only to liens of the government for
taxes and to voluntary mortgages for sufficient consideration entered into in good
faith.

II-USE OF LOTS

Subject to such amendments and additional restrictions, reservations, servitudes,

etc., as the Bel- Air Association may from time to time adopt and prescribe, this
lot is subject to the following restrictions:

a. This lot/s shall not be subdivided. However, three or more lots may be
consolidated and subdivided into a lesser number of lots provided that none of
the resulting lots be smaller in area than the smallest lot before the consolidation
and that the consolidation and subdivision plan be duly approved by the
governing body of the Bel-Air Association.
b. This lot/s shall only be used for residential purposes.

c. Only one single family house may be constructed on a single lot, although
separate servants' quarters or garage may be built.

d. Commercial or advertising signs shall not be placed, constructed, or erected

on this lot. Name plates and professional signs of homeowners are permitted so
long as they do not exceed 80 x 40 centimeters in size.

e. No cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, ducks, geese, roosters or rabbits shall be

maintained in the lot, except that pets may be maintained but must be controlled
in accordance with the rulings of the Association. The term "pets' includes
chickens not in commercial quantities.

f. The property is subject to an easement of two (2) meters within the lot and
adjacent to the rear and sides thereof not fronting a street for the purpose of
drainage, sewage, water and other public facilities as may be necessary and
desirable; and the owner, lessee or his representative shall permit access thereto
by authorized representatives of the Bel-Air Association or public utility entities
for the purposes for which the easement is created.

g. This lot shall not be used for any immoral or illegal trade or activity.

h. The owner and/or lessee of this lot/s shall at all times keep the grass cut and
trimmed to reduce the fire hazard of the property.

xxx xxx xxx

VI-TERM OF RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing restrictions shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15,
1957, unless sooner cancelled in its entirety by two thirds vote of members in
good standing of the Bel-Air Association. However, the Association may, from
time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions or parts
thereof by majority rule.

VII--ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing restrictions may be enjoined and/or enforced by court action by the
Bel-Air Association, or by the Makati Development Corporation or its assigns, or
by any registered owner of land within the boundaries of the Bel-Air Subdivision
(Sub-division plan PSD-49226 and Lot 7-B, Psd-47848) or by any member in
good standing of the Bel-Air association." (Exh. 1 -b; Exh. 22, Annex "B").
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4- 6)

(5) When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-

interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and
Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was
still undeveloped. Access, therefore, to Bel-Air Village was opened to all kinds of
people and even animals. So in 1966, although it was not part of the original
plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along Jupiter
Street. In 1970, the fence or wall was partly destroyed by typhoon "Yoling." The
destroyed portions were subsequently rebuilt by the appellant. (Copuyoc TSN,
pp. 31-34, Feb. 12, 1982). When Jupiter Street was widened in 1972 by 3.5
meters, the fence or wall had to be destroyed. Upon request of BAVA, the wall
was rebuilt inside the boundary of the commercial block. (Copuyoc TSN, pp.
4447, Feb. 12,1982).

(6) When the appellant finally decided to subdivide and sell the lots in the
commercial block between Buendia and Jupiter, BAVA wrote the appellant on
May 9, 1972, requesting for confirmation on the use of the commercial lots. The
appellant replied on May 16, 1972, informing BAVA of the restrictions intended to
be imposed in the sale and use of the lots. Among these restrictions are: that the
building shall have a set back of 19 meters; and that with respect to vehicular
traffic along Buendia Avenue, entrance only will be allowed, and along Jupiter
Street and side streets, both entrance and exit will be allowed.

(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall
subdivide and sell the commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia
Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to Zodiac Street. Appellant also
informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon the
commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the
development and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special
membership in BAVA of the commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed
restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed. The proposed deed
restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street,
the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every
seventy five (75) meters of office space in the building and the limitation of
vehicular traffic along Buendia to entrance only, but allowing both vehicular
entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and any side street.

In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant
and informed the latter that the application for special membership of the
commercial lot owners in BAVA would be submitted to BAVA's board of
governors for decision.

(8) On September 25, 1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it
was finally decided that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots
shall be increased from 12.5 meters to 15 meters. Appellant further informed
BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in
said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22, 1973, BAVA
wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had
assessed the appellant, as special member of the association, the amount of
P40,795.00 (based on 81,590 square meters at P.50 per square meter)
representing the membership dues to the commercial lot owners for the year
1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of
governors had already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on
January 31, 1973 informed BAVA that due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the
area of the lots which were accepted by the Association as members was
 reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding dues at P.50 per
square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was
remitted by the appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting
membership dues from the owners of the commercial lots as special members of
the Association. As a matter of fact, the dues were increased several times. In
1980, the commercial lot owners were already being charged dues at the rate of
P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At this rate, the
total membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178. 00
annually based on the total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial lots.

(9) Meantime, on April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its
ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this
Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18-A).

Thus, Chapter III, Article 1, Section 3.03, par. F. of the Ordinance provides:

F. Bel-Air Village area, as bounded on the N by Polaris and Mercedes streets

and on the NE by Estrella Street; on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
and on the SW by the center line of Jupiter Street. Then bounded on the N by the
abandoned MRR Pasig Line; on the E by Makati Avenue; on the S by the center
line of Jupiter Street and on the W by the center line of Reposo Street." (Exh. 18-
A)

Similarly, the Buendia Avenue Extension area was classified as Administrative

Office Zone with its boundary in the North-North East Extending also up to the
center line of Jupiter Street (Exh. 18b).

Thus, Chapter III, Article I, Section 3.05, par. C. of the Ordinance provides:

C. The Buendia Avenue Extension areas, as bounded on the N-NE by the center
line of Jupiter Street, on the SE by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue; on the SW by
Buendia Avenue and on the NW by the center line of Reposo Street, then on the
NE by Malugay Street; on the SE by Buendia Avenue and on the W by Ayala
Avenue Extension." (Exh. 18-B)

The Residential Zone and the Administrative Office Zone, therefore, have a
common boundary along the center line of Jupiter Street.

The above zoning under Ordinance No. 81 of Makati was later followed under the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region adopted by
the Metro Manila Commission as Ordinance 81 -01 on March 14, 1981 (Exh. 19).
However, under this ordinance, Bel-Air Village is simply bounded in the South-
Southeast by Jupiter Street-not anymore up to the center line of Jupiter Street
(Exh. B). Likewise, the blockdeep strip along the northwest side of Buendia
Avenue Extension from Reposo to EDSA was classified as a High Intensity
Commercial Zone (Exh. 19-c).

Thus, the Zoning District Boundaries -Makati, in Annex B of the Ordinance provides:
R-I-Low Intensity Residential

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4. Bel-Air 1, 3, 4

Bounded on the North -- J.P. Rizal and Amapola St.

South - Rockwell

Northwest - P. Burgos

Southeast - Jupiter

Southwest - Epifanio de los Santos Ave. (EDSA)

5. Bel-Air 2

Bounded on the Northwest - J.P. Rizal

Southwest - Makati Avenue

South --- Jupiter

Southeast -- Pasig Line

East - South Avenue" (Exh. 19-b)

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C-3-High Intensity Commercial Zone

2. A block deep strip along the northwest side of Buendia Ave. Ext. from Reposo
to EDSA." (Exh, 19-c)

Under the above zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common

boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.

(10) Meanwhile, in 1972, BAVA had installed gates at strategic locations across
Jupiter Street which were manned and operated by its own security guards who
were employed to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads
and streets of the village. (Villavicencio, TSN, pp, 22-25, Oct. 30, 1980; BAVA
Petition, par. 11, Exh. 17).

Then, on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote BAVA
directing that, in the interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic
congestion, the following streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public
use:
Amapola Street - from Estrella Street to Mercedes Street

Amapola Street -junction of Palma Street gate going to J. Villena Street

Mercedes Street -- from EDSA to Imelda Avenue and Amapola junction

Zodiac Street - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue

Jupiter Street -- from Zodiac Street to Reposo Street connecting Metropolitan

Avenue to Pasong Tamo and V. Cruz Extension intersection

Neptune Street - from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street Orbit Street - from F.
Zobel-Candelaria intersection to Jupiter Street

Paseo de Roxas - from Mercedes Street to Buendia Avenue (Exh. 17, Annex A,
BAVA Petition)

On February 10, 1977, BAVA wrote the Mayor of Makati, expressing the concern
of the residents about the opening of the streets to the general public, and
requesting specifically the indefinite postponement of the plan to open Jupiter
Street to public vehicles. (Exh. 17, Annex B, BAVA Petition).

However, BAVA voluntarily opened to the public Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac,

Neptune and Paseo de Roxas streets. (Exh. 17-A, Answer of Makati par. 3-7).

Later, on June 17,1977, the Barangay Captain of Bel-Air Village was advised by
the Office of the Mayor that, in accordance with the agreement entered into
during the meeting on January 28, 1 977, the Municipal Engineer and the Station
Commander of the Makati Police were ordered to open for public use Jupiter
Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Accordingly, he was requested to
advise the village residents of the necessity of the opening of the street in the
interest of public welfare. (Exh. 17, Annex E, BAVA Petition).

Then, on June 10, 1977, the Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed
to BAVA advised the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire
portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street (Exh. 17, BAVA
Petition, par. 14).

Finally, on August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly
opened, destroyed and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of
Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences located/constructed
at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of
Jupiter Street to public traffic. (Exh. 17, BAVA Petition, pars. 16 and 17).

(11) Before the gates were-removed, there was no parking problem or traffic
problem in Jupiter Street, because Jupiter Street was not allowed to be used by
the general public (Villavicencio, TSN, pp. 24-25, Oct. 30, 1980). However, with
the opening of Zodiac Street from Estrella Street to Jupiter Street and also the
opening to the public of the entire length of Jupiter Street, there was a
tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing along Jupiter Street coming
from EDSA to Estrella Street, then to Zodiac Street to Jupiter Street, and along
the entire length of Jupiter Street to its other end at Reposo Street. (Villavicencio,
TSN, pp. 30-32, Oct. 30, 1980).

In the meantime, the purchasers of the commercial lots between Jupiter Street
and Buendia Avenue extension had started constructing their respective
buildings in 1974-1975. They demolished the portions of the fence or wall
standing within the boundary of their lots. Many of the owners constructed their
own fences or walls in lieu of the wall and they employed their own security
guards. (TSN, p. 83, Feb. 20,1981; TSN, pp. 53-54; 72-74, March 20,1981; TSN,
pp. 54-55, July 23, 1981).

(12) Then, on January 27, 1978, appellant donated the entire Jupiter Street from
Metropolitan Avenue to Zodiac Street to BAVA (Exh. 7)- However, even before
1978, the Makati Police and the security force of BAVA were already the ones
regulating the traffic along Jupiter Street after the gates were opened in 1977.
Sancianco TSN, pp. 26-30, Oct. 2,1981).

In October, 1979, the fence at the corner of Orbit and Neptune Streets was
opened and removed (BAVA Petition, par. 22, Exh. 17). The opening of the
whole stretch of Orbit Street from J.P. Rizal Avenue up to Imelda Avenue and
later to Jupiter Street was agreed to at the conference attended by the President
of BAVA in the office of the Station Commander of Makati, subject to certain
conditions, to wit:

That, maintenance of Orbit St. up to Jupiter St. shall be shouldered by the

Municipality of Makati.

That, street lights will be installed and maintenance of the same along Orbit St.
from J.P. Rizal Ave. up to Jupiter St. shall be undertaken by the Municipality.

That for the security of the residents of San Miguel Village and Bel-Air Village, as
a result of the opening of Orbit Street, police outposts shall be constructed by the
Municipality of Makati to be headed by personnel of Station No. 4, in close
coordination with the Security Guards of San Miguel Village and Bel-Air Village."
(CF. Exh. 3 to Counter-Affidavit, of Station Commander, Ruperto Acle p. 253,
records)" (Order, Civil Case No. 34948, Exh. 17-c).

(13) Thus, with the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic,
the different residential lots located in the northern side of Jupiter Street ceased
to be used for purely residential purposes. They became, for all purposes,
commercial in character.

(14) Subsequently, on October 29, 1979, the plaintiffs-appellees Jose D.

Sangalang and Lutgarda D. Sangalang brought the present action for damages
against the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of
contract and on tort or quasi-delict A supplemental complaint was later filed by
said appellees seeking to augment the reliefs prayed for in the original complaint
because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of the
case. Claiming to be similarly situated as the plaintiffs-appellees, the spouses
Felix C. Gaston and Dolores R. Gaston, Jose V. Briones and Alicia R. Briones,
and the homeowners' association (BAVA) intervened in the case.

(15) After trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig,
Metro Manila, rendered a decision in favor of the appellees the dispositive portion
of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby accordingly rendered as follows:

ON PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs-spouses Sangalang the following

damages:

1. The sum of P500,000.00 as actual and consequential damages;

2. The sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5. The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENORS FELIX and DOLORES GASTON'S COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Felix and Dolores Gaston, the
following damages:

1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages:

4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5 The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENORS JOSE and ALICIA BRIONES' COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay to the spouses Jose and Alicia Briones, the following
damages:

1 . The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2 The sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

 3 The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4 The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

5 The costs of suit.

ON INTERVENOR BAVA'S COMPLAINT:

Defendant is ordered to pay intervenor BAVA, the following damages:

1. The sum of P400,000.00 as consequential damages;

2. The sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

4. The costs of suit.

The above damages awarded to the plaintiffs and intervenors shall bear legal
interest from the filing of the complaint.

Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at its

original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the
east, at its own expense, within SIX (6) MONTHS from finality of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 400-401) 2

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals 3 rendered a reversal, and disposed as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the decision appealed from as not supported by the

facts and the law on the matter, the same is hereby SET ASIDE and another one
entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause of action. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 4

II. G.R. No. 74376

This petition was similarly brought by BAVA to enforce the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the
deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation. The petitioner originally brought the complaint
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, 5 principally for specific performance, plaintiff [now,
petitioner] alleging that the defendant [now, private respondent] Tenorio allowed defendant
[Tenorio's co-private respondent] Gonzalves to occupy and convert the house at 50 Jupiter
Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila, into a restaurant, without its knowledge and
consent, and in violation of the deed restrictions which provide that the lot and building thereon
must be used only for residential purposes upon which the prayed for main relief was for 'the
defendants to permanently refrain from using the premises as commercial and to comply with
the terms of the Deed Restrictions." 6 The trial court dismissed the complaint on a procedural
ground, i.e., pendency of an Identical action, Civil Case No. 32346, entitled "Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. v. Jesus Tenorio." The Court of Appeals 7 affirmed, and held, in addition, that
Jupiter Street "is classified as High density commercial (C-3) zone as per Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 for National Capital Region," 8 following its own ruling in AC-G.R.
No. 66649, entitled "Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. vs. Hy-Land Realty & Development
Corporation, et al."

III. G.R. No. 76394

xxxxxxxxx

Defendants-spouses Eduardo V. Romualdez, Jr. and Buena Tioseco are the

owners of a house and lot located at 108 Jupiter St., Makati, Metro Manila as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 332394 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal. The fact is undisputed that at the time the defendants acquired the subject
house and lot, several restrictions were already annotated on the reverse side of
their title; however, for purposes of this appeal we shall quote hereunder only the
pertinent ones, to wit:

(b,) This lot/shall be used only for residential purposes.

xxxxxxxxx

IV. Term of Restriction

The foregoing restriction(s) shall remain in force for fifty years from January 15,
1957, unless sooner cancelled in its entirety by two-thirds vote of the members in
good standing of the Bel-Air Association. However, the Association may from
time to time, add new ones, amend or abolish particular restrictions or parts
thereof by majority rule.

During the early part of 1979, plaintiff noted that certain renovations and
constructions were being made by the defendants on the subject premises, for
which reason the defendants were advised to inform the plaintiff of the kind of
construction that was going on. Because the defendants failed to comply with the
request of the plaintiff, the latter's chief security officer visited the subject
premises on March 23, 1979 and found out that the defendants were putting up a
bake and coffee shop, which fact was confirmed by defendant Mrs. Romualdez
herself. Thereafter, the plaintiff reminded defendants that they were violating the
deed restriction. Despite said reminder, the defendants proceeded with the
construction of the bake shop. Consequently, plaintiff sent defendants a letter
dated April 30, 1979 warning them that if they will not desist from using the
premises in question for commercial purposes, they will be sued for violations of
the deed restrictions.

Despite the warning, the defendants proceeded with the construction of their
bake shop. 9
xxxxxxxxx

The trial court 10 adjudged in favor of BAVA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 11 reversed, on the
strength of its holding in AC-G.R. No. 66649 earlier referred to.

BAVA then elevated the matter to the Court by a petition for review on certiorari. The
Court 12 initially denied the petition "for lack of merit, it appearing that the conclusions of the
respondent Court of Appeals that private respondents' bake and coffee shop lies within a
commercial zone and that said private respondents are released from their obligations to
maintain the lot known as 108 Jupiter Street for residential purposes by virtue of Ordinance No.
81 of the Municipality of Makati and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, are in accord with law and jurisprudence," 13 for which BAVA
sought a reconsideration. Pending resolution, the case was referred to the Second Division of
this Court, 14 and thereafter, to the Court En Banc en consulta. 15 Per our Resolution, dated April
29, 1988, we consolidated this case with G.R. Nos. 74376 and 82281. 16

IV. G.R. No. 78182.

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The case stemmed from the leasing by defendant Dolores Filley of her building
and lot situated at No. 205 Reposo Street, Bel-Air Village Makati, Metro Manila to
her co-defendant, the advertising firm J. Romero and Associates, in alleged
violation of deed restrictions which stipulated that Filley's lot could only be used
for residential purposes. Plaintiff sought judgment from the lower court ordering
the defendants to "permanently refrain" from using the premises in question "as
commercial" and to comply with the terms of the deed restrictions.

After the proper proceedings, the court granted the plaintiff the sought for relief
with the additional imposition of exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00. The trial court gave emphasis to the restrictive
clauses contained in Filley's deed of sale from the plaintiff, which made the
conversion of the building into a commercial one a violation.

Defendants now seek review and reversal on three (3) assignments of errors, namely:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE REGULATIONS

PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IN MAKATI AND THE
MINISTRY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENT'S CHANGING THE CHARACTER OF
THE AREAS IN QUESTION HAD RENDERED THE RESTRICTIVE EASEMENT
ON THE TITLE OF THE APPELLANTS VACATED.

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT BECAUSE THE APPELLEE(S)

HAD ALLOWED THE USE OF THE PROPERTY WITHIN THE VILLAGE FOR
NON- RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES, IT IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM ENFORCING
THE RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE.
 III.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE EXISTED A BILATERAL

CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THAT SINCE APPELLEE HAD
NOT PERFORMED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT THE
APPELLANT IN TURN WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO ANNOTATE THE
RESTRICTIVE PROHIBITIONS ON THE BACK OF THE TITLE.

Appellants anchor their appeal on the proposition that the Bel-Air Village area,
contrary to plaintiff- appellee's pretension of being a strictly residential zone, is in
fact commercial and characterize the restrictions contained in appellant Filley's
deed of sale from the appellee as completely outmoded, which have lost all
relevance to the present-day realities in Makati, now the premier business hub of
the nation, where there is a proliferation of numerous commercial enterprises
established through the years, in fact even within the heart of so-called
"residential" villages. Thus, it may be said that appellants base their position on
the inexorable march of progress which has rendered at naught the continued
efficacy of the restrictions. Appellant on the other hand, relies on a rigid
interpretation of the contractual stipulations agreed upon with appellant Filley, in
effect arguing that the restrictions are valid ad infinitum.

The lower court quite properly found that other commercial establishments exist
in the same area (in fact, on the same street) but ignored it just the same and
said-

The fact that defendants were able to prove the existence of several commercial
establishments inside the village does not exempt them from liability for violating
some of the restrictions evidently choosing to accord primacy to contractual
stipulation. 17

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The Court of Appeals 18 overturned the lower court, 19 likewise based on AC-G.R. No. 66649.
The respondent Court observed also that J. Romero & Associates had been given authority to
open a commercial office by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

V. G.R. No. 82281

The facts of this case have been based on stipulation. We quote:

COMES NOW, the Parties, assisted by their respective counsel and to this
Honorable Court, respectfully enter into the following stipulations of facts, to wit:

1. The parties admit the personal circumstances of each other as well as their
capacities to sue and be sued.

2. The parties admit that plaintiff BAVA for short) is the legally constituted
homeowners' association in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila.
 3. The parties admit that defendant Violets Moncal is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with a residential house constructed thereon situated at No. 104
Jupiter Street, Bel-Air Village, Makati, Metro Manila; that as such lot owner, she
is a member of the plaintiff association.

4. The parties admit that defendant Majal Development Corporation (Majal for
short) is the lessee of defendant Moncal's house and lot located at No. 104
Jupiter Street.

5. The parties admit that a deed restrictions is annotated on the title of defendant
Moncal, which provides, among others, that the lot in question must be used only
for residential purposes;' that at time Moncal purchased her aforesaid lot in 1959
said deed restrictions was already annotated in the said title.

6. The parties admit that when Moncal leased her subject property to Majal, she
did not secure the consent of BAVA to lease the said house and lot to the
present lessee.

7. The parties admit that along Jupiter Street and on the same side where
Moncal's property is located, there are restaurants, clinics placement or
employment agencies and other commercial or business establishments. These
establishments, however, were sued by BAVA in the proper court.

8. The parties admit that at the time Moncal purchased the subject property from
the Makati Development Corporation, there was a perimeter wall, running along
Jupiter Street, which wall was constructed by the subdivision owner; that at that
time the gates of the entrances to Jupiter Street were closed to public traffic. In
short, the entire length of Jupiter which was inside the perimeter wall was not
then open to public traffic

9. The parties admit that subsequent thereto, Ayala tore down the perimeter wall
to give way to the commercial building fronting Buendia Avenue (now Gil J. Puyat
Avenue).

10. The parties admit that on August 12, 1977, the Mayor of Makati forcibly
opened and removed the street gates constructed on Jupiter Street and Reposo
Street, thereby opening said streets to the public.

11. The parties admit plaintiffs letters of October 10, 23 and 31, 1984; as well as
defendants' letters-reply dated October 17 and 29, 1984. 20

xxxxxxxxx

The trial court 21 dismissed the petitioner's complaint, a dismissal affirmed on

appeal, 22 According to the appellate court, the opening of Jupiter Street to human and vehicular
traffic, and the commercialization of the Municipality of Makati in general, were circumstances
that had made compliance by Moncal with the aforesaid "deed restrictions" "extremely difficult
and unreasonable," 23 a development that had excused compliance altogether under Article
1267 of the Civil Code.
 VI. The cases before the Court; the Court's decision.

In brief, G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the "deed restrictions"
in question against specific residents (private respondents in the petitions) of Jupiter Street and
with respect to G.R. No. 78182, Reposo Street. The private respondents are alleged to have
converted their residences into commercial establishments (a restaurant in G.R. No. 74376, a
bakery and coffee shop in G.R. No. 76394, an advertising firm in G.R. No. 78182; and a
construction company, apparently, in G.R. No. 82281) in violation of the said restrictions. 24

Their mother case, G. R. No. 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the vendor itself,
Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the
perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had therefore closed its commercial section from the
residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of
Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored.

As We indicated, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five appeals on the basis primarily of its
ruling in AC-G.R. No. 66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation,
et al.," in which the appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same 'deed restrictions"
as a result of Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as
well as Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for
residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid
as a legitimate exercise of police power.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on Ordinance Nos. 81. and 8101 is now assailed in these
petitions, particularly the Sangalang, et al. petition.

Aside from this fundamental issue, the petitioners likewise raise procedural questions. G.R. No.
71169, the mother case, begins with one.

1. G.R. No. 71169

In this petition, the following questions are specifically put to the Court:

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court reverse the decision of the trial
court on issues which were neither raised by AYALA in its Answers either to the
Complaint or Supplemental Complaint nor specifically assigned as one of the
alleged errors on appeal? 25

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court arbitrarily ignore the decisive
findings of fact of the trial court, even if uncontradicted and/or documented, and
premised mainly on its own unsupported conclusions totally reverse the trial
court's decision? 26

May the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court disregard the trial court's
documented findings that respondent Ayala for its own self-interest and
commercial purposes contrived in bad faith to do away with the Jupiter Street
perimeter wall it put up three times which wall was really intended to separate the
residential from the commercial areas and thereby insure the privacy and
 security of Bel Air Village pursuant to respondent Ayala's express continuing
representation and/or covenant to do so? 27

a.

The first question represents an attack on the appellate court's reliance on Ordinances Nos. 81
and 81-01, a matter not supposedly taken up at the trial or assigned as an error on appeal. As a
rule, the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) may determine only such
questions as have been properly raised to it, yet, this is not an inflexible rule of procedure. In
Hernandez v. Andal, 28 it was stated that "an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to
assign it as error." 29

In Baquiran v. Court of Appeals, 30 we referred to the " modern trend of procedure . . .

according] the courts broad discretionary power" 31 and in which we allowed consideration of
matters "having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the
lower court ignore[d]. 32 And in Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 33 we permitted the
consideration of a 'patent error' of the trial court by the Court of Appeals under Section 7, of
Rule 51, of the Rules of Court, 34 although such an error had not been raised in the brief. But
what we note is the fact that the Ayala Corporation did raise the zoning measures as affirmative
defenses, first in its answers 35 and second, in its brief, 36 and submitted at the trial as
exhibits. 37 There is accordingly no cause for complaint on the part of the petitioners for Ayala's
violation of the Rules. But while there was reason for the consideration, on appeal, of the said
zoning ordinances in question, this Court nevertheless finds as inaccurate the Court of Appeals'
holding that such measures, had "in effect, [made] Jupiter Street ... a street which could be used
not only for residential purposes," 38 and that "[It lost its character as a street for the exclusive
benefit of those residing in Bel-Air Village completely." 39

Among other things, there is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 8 1-01 that
Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial
section. And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the
residential or commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects. Thus,
the Bel-Air Village Association's articles of incorporation state that Bel-Air Village is 'bounded on
the NE., from Amapola St., to de los Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE from Extrella St., to
Pedestrian Lane by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by
Jupiter Street

. . . . 40 Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village
residents.

We come to the perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of Jupiter Street the
destruction of which opened the street to the public. The petitioners contend that the opening of
the thoroughfare had opened, in turn, the floodgates to the commercialization of Bel-Air Village.
The wall, so they allege, was designed precisely to protect the peace and privacy of Bel-Air
Village residents from the din and uproar of mercantile pursuits, and that the Ayala Corporation
had committed itself to maintain it. It was the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as we said, that
Ayala's liability therefor, if one existed, had been overtaken by the passage of Ordinances Nos.
81 and 82-01, opening Jupiter Street to commerce.
It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by
the authorities of Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records
themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air
Village Association itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the
use by both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore,
for the exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat,
in favor of both, as distinguished from the general public.

When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the
purpose of physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it was put up
to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of the security in the area, 41 and as the
Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill " 42 a view we find acceptable in the premises. For it
cannot be denied that at that time, the commercial area was vacant, "open for [sic] animals and
people to have access to Bel-Air Village." 43 There was hence a necessity for a wall.

In any case, we find the petitioners' theory, that maintaining the wall was a matter of a
contractual obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. The records do not establish
the existence of such a purported commitment. For one, the subdivision plans submitted did not
mention anything about it. For another, there is nothing in the "deed restrictions" that would
point to any covenant regarding the construction of a wall. There is no representation or promise
whatsoever therein to that effect.

With the construction of the commercial buildings in 1974, the reason for which the wall was
built- to secure Bel-Air Village from interlopers had naturally ceased to exist. The buildings
themselves had provided formidable curtains of security for the residents. It should be noted
that the commercial lot buyers themselves were forced to demolish parts of the wall to gain
access to Jupiter Street, which they had after all equal right to use.

In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did not
make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it. The records, on the contrary,
will show that the Bel-Air Village Association had been informed, at the very outset, about the
impending use of Jupiter Street by commercial lot buyers. We quote:

xxxxxxxxx

1. Exh. I of appellee, the memorandum of Mr. Carmelo Caluag, President of

BAVA, dated May 10, 1972, informing the BAVA Board of Governors and Barrio
Council members about the future use of Jupiter Street by the lot owners fronting
Buendia Avenue. The use of Jupiter Street by the owners of the commercial lots
would necessarily require the demolition of the wall along the commercial block
adjoining Jupiter Street.

2. Exh. J of appellee, the minutes of the joint meeting of BAVA Board of

Governors and the Bel-Air Barrio Council where the matter that "Buendia lot
owners will have equal rights to use Jupiter Street," and that Ayala's "plans about
the sale of lots and use of Jupiter Street" were precisely taken up. This confirms
that from the start BAVA was informed that the commercial lot owners will use
Jupiter Street and that necessarily the wall along Jupiter Street would be
demolished.
 3. Exh. 10, the letter of Mr. Demetrio Copuyoc to the President of BAVA, dated
May 16, 1972, expressly stating that vehicular entrance and exit to the
commercial lots would be allowed along Jupiter and side streets.

4. Exhs. 27, 27-A, 27-B, the letter of Atty. Salvador J. Lorayes dated June 30,
1972, with enclosed copy of proposed restriction for the commercial lots to
BAVA. He proposed restriction again expressly stated that "Vehicular entrances
and exits are allowed thru Jupiter and any side streets."

5. Exh. L of appellee, the minutes of the meeting of the members of BAVA, dated
August 26, 1972, where it is stated "Recently, Ayala Corporation informed the
Board that the lots fronting Buendia Avenue will soon be offered for sale, and that
future lot owners will be given equal rights to use Jupiter Street as well as
members of the Association."

6. Exh. 25, the letter of Atty. Lorayes dated September 25, 1972, informing BAVA
of the widening of Jupiter Street by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in said
street to benefit both the residents of Bel-Air and the future owners of the
commercial lots. 44

The petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Demetrio Copuyoc, Ayala's
manager, to build a "[f]ence along Jupiter with gate for entrance and/or exit 45 as evidence of
Ayala's alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial
sections. It should be observed that the fence referred to included a "gate for entrance and or
exit" which would have defeated the purpose of a wall, in the sense the petitioners would put in
one, that is to say, an impenetrable barrier. But as Ayala would point out subsequently, the
proposed fence was not constructed because it had become unnecessary when the commercial
lot owners commenced constructions thereon.

Be that as it may, the Court cannot visualize any purported obligation by Ayala Corporation to
keep the wall on the strength of this supposed promise alone. If truly Ayala promised anything
assuming that Capuyoc was authorized to bind the corporation with a promise it would have
been with respect to the fence. It would not have established the pre-existing obligation alleged
with respect to the wall.

Obligations arise, among other things, from contract. 46 If Ayala, then, were bound by an
obligation, it would have been pursuant to a contract. A contract, however, is characterized by a
"meeting of minds between two persons . 47As a consensual relation, it must be shown to exist
as a fact, clearly and convincingly. But it cannot be inferred from a mishmash of circumstances
alone disclosing some kind of an "understanding," when especially, those disparate
circumstances are not themselves incompatible with contentions that no accord had existed or
had been reached. 48

The petitioners cannot simply assume that the wall was there for the purpose with which they
now give it, by the bare coincidence that it had divided the residential block from the commercial
section of Bel-Air. The burden of proof rests with them to show that it had indeed been built
precisely for that objective, a proof that must satisfy the requirements of our rules of evidence. It
cannot be made to stand on the strength of plain inferences.

b.
This likewise answers the petitioners' second query, whether or not the Court of Appeals had
"arbitrarily ignore(d) the decisive findings of the trial court."49 i.e., findings pointing to alleged
acts performed by the Ayala Corporation proving its commitment to maintain the wall abovesaid.
Specifically, the petitioners refer to, among other things: (1) Ayala's alleged announcement to
Bel- Air Village Association members that "[the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street will not be
demolished," 50 (2) Ayala's alleged commitment "during the pendency of the case in the trial
court" to restore the wall; (3) alleged assurances by Copuyoc that the wall will not be removed;
(4) alleged contrivances by the corporation to make the association admit as members the
commercial lot buyers which provided them equal access to Jupiter Street; and (5) Ayala's
donation to the association of Jupiter Street for "private use" of Bel-Air residents. 51

682 (1903), where it was held that "whether the plaintiffs services were solicited or whether they
were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted
and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to
the rendition of services." (At 686.) In that case, the defendant had enormously benefitted from
the services that entitled the plaintiff to compensation on the theory that no one may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another (Solutio indebiti) The facts of this case differ.

As we stated, the Ayala Corporation's alleged conduct prior to or during the proceedings below
are not necessarily at war with claims that no commitment had been in fact made.

With respect to Ayala's alleged announcement before the association, the Court does not agree
that Ayala had categorically assumed as an obligation to maintain the wall "perpetually," i.e.,
until the year 2007 (the expiration date under the "deed restrictions.") There is nothing in its
statement that would bare any commitment. In connection with the conference between the
parties "during the pendency" of the trial, it is to be noted that the Ayala Corporation denies
having warranted the restoration of the said wall therein. What, on the other hand, appears in
the records is the fact that Ayala did make that promise, but provided that the Mayor allowed it.
It turned out, however, that the Mayor balked at the Idea. 52 But assuming that Ayala did
promise to rebuild the wall (in that conference), it does not seem to us that it did consequently
promise to maintain it in perpetuity.

It is unfair to say, as the trial court did, that the Ayala had "contrived to make future commercial
lot owners special members of BAVA and thereby acquire equal right with the regular members
thereof to use Jupiter Street 53 since, as we stated, the commercial lot buyers have the right, in
any event, to make use of Jupiter Street, whether or not they are members of the association. It
is not their memberships that give them the right to use it. They share that right with Bel-Air
residents from the outset.

The objective of making the commercial lot owners special members of the Bel-Air Village
Association was not to accord them equal access to Jupiter Street and inferentially, to give them
the right to knock down the perimeter wall. It was, rather, to regulate the use of the street owing
precisely to the "planned" nature of Ayala's development project, and real estate development in
general, and this could best be done by placing the commercial lot owners under the
association's jurisdiction.

Moreover, Ayala's overtures with the association concerning the membership of commercial lot
buyers therein have been shown to be neither perfidious nor unethical nor devious
(paraphrasing the lower court). We quote anew:
 xxxxxxxxx

(7) On June 30, 1972, appellant informed BAVA that in a few months it shall
subdivide and sell the commercial lots bordering the north side of Buendia
Avenue Extension from Reposo Street up to Zodiac Street. Appellant also
informed BAVA that it had taken all precautions and will impose upon the
commercial lot owners deed restrictions which will harmonize and blend with the
development and welfare of Bel-Air Village. Appellant further applied for special
membership in BAVA of the commercial lot owners. A copy of the deed
restrictions for the commercial lots was also enclosed. The proposed deed
restrictions shall include the 19 meter set back of buildings from Jupiter Street,
the requirement for parking space within the lot of one (1) parking slot for every
seventy five (75) meters of office space in the building and the limitation of
vehicular traffic along Buendia to entrance only, but allowing both vehicular
entrance and vehicular exit through Jupiter Street and any side street.

In its letter of July 10, 1972, BAVA acknowledged the above letter of appellant and informed the
latter that the application for special membership of the commercial lot owners in BAVA would
be submitted to BAVA's board of governors for decision.

(8) On September 25,1972, appellant notified BAVA that, after a careful study, it
was finally decided that the height limitation of buildings on the commercial lots
shall be increased from 12.5 meters to 15 meters. Appellant further informed
BAVA that Jupiter Street shall be widened by 3.5 meters to improve traffic flow in
said street. BAVA did not reply to said letter, but on January 22, 1973, BAVA
wrote a letter to the appellant informing the latter that the Association had
assessed the appellant, as special member of the association, the amount of
P40,795.00 (based on 81,590 square meters at P.50 per square meter)
representing the membership dues of the commercial lot owners for the year
1973, and requested the appellant to remit the amount which its board of
governors had already included in its current budget. In reply, appellant on
January 31, 1973 informed BAVA that due to the widening of Jupiter Street, the
area of the lots which were accepted by the Association as members was
reduced to 76,726 square meters. Thus, the corresponding due at P.50 per
square meter should be reduced to P38,363.00. This amount, therefore, was
remitted by the appellant to BAVA. Since then, the latter has been collecting
membership dues from the owners of the commercial lots as special members of
the Association. As a matter of fact, the dues were increased several times. In
1980, the commercial lot owners were already being charged dues at the rate of
P3.00 per square meter. (Domingo, TSN, p. 36, March 19, 1980). At this rate, the
total membership dues of the commercial lot owners amount to P230,178.00
annually based on the total area of 76,726 square meters of the commercial
lots. 54

xxxxxxxxx

The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter Street) to leave
Jupiter Street for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the very provisions of the deed.
We quote:
 xxxxxxxxx

IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the DONEE
subject to the condition that the property will be used as a street for the use of
the members of the DONEE, their families, personnel, guests, domestic help
and, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public,
and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be used as such,
ownership thereof shall automatically revert to the DONOR. The DONEE shall
always have Reposo Street, Makati Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the
use of the general public. It is also understood that the DONOR shall continue
the maintenance of the street at its expense for a period of three years from date
hereof." (Deed of Donation, p. 6, Exh. 7) 55

xxxxxxxxx

The donation, on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it.

The Court cannot then say, accepting the veracity of the petitioners' facts" enumerated above,
that the Ayala Corporation may be held liable for specific performance of a demandable
obligation, let alone damages.

The Court adds that Ayala can hardly be held responsible for the alleged deterioration of "living
and environmental conditions" 56 of the Bel-Air area, as a consequence of "Ayala's authorized
demolition of the Jupiter perimeter wall in 1974-1975. " 57 We agree with Ayala that until 1976,
"there was peace and quiet" at Jupiter Street, as the petitioners' (Sangalang, Gaston, and
Briones) complaints admit. Hence, the degeneration of peace and order in Bel-Air cannot be
ascribed to the destruction of the wall in 1974 and 1975.

What Ayala submits as the real cause was the opening of Jupiter Street to vehicular traffic in
1977., 58 But this was upon orders of the Mayor, and for which the homeowners' association had
precisely filed suit (Civil Case No. 34998) 59 to contest the act of the Mayor.

c.

This likewise disposes of the third question presented. The petitioners' reliance on Ayala's
alleged conduct (proving its alleged commitment), so we have ruled, is not well-taken. Ayala's
alleged acts do not, by themselves, reflect a commitment to maintain the wall in dispute. It
cannot be therefore said that the Court of Appeals "arbitrarily ignore(d]" 60 the lower court's
findings. Precisely, it is the duty of the appellate court to review the findings of the trial judge, be
they of fact or law. 61 It is not bound by the conclusions of the judge, for which reason it makes
its own findings and arrives at its own conclusions. Unless a grave abuse of discretion may be
imputed to it, it may accept or reject the lower tribunal's determinations and rely solely on the
records.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Court of Appeals' holding that the Ayala Corporation, in its
dealings with the petitioners, the Bel-Air Village Association in particular, had "acted with justice,
gave the appellees [petitioners] their due and observed honesty and good faith." 62 "Therefore,
under both Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, the appellant [Ayala] cannot be held liable for
damages." 63
 2. G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, & 82281

Our decision also resolves, quite anticlimactically, these companion cases. But we do so for
various other reasons. In the Sangalang case, we absolve the Ayala Corporation primarily
owing to our finding that it is not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public.
Insofar as these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not
only because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements based on
the "deed restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial (C-3)
zone, 64 pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on
the strength alone of the said "deed restrictions.

In view thereof, we find no need in resolving the questions raised as to procedure, since this
disposition is sufficient to resolve these cases.

It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in
question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly,
they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding
demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the
legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said
to be the "law between the contracting parties, 65 but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 66 Above all, it cannot be raised as a
deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. In Ortigas & Co.,
Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 67 we are told:

xxxxxxxxx

2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.'
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers"
and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. As this
Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengson in Philippine Long Distance
Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power 'is elastic and must be responsive
to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life.' We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs.
The Court of agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not see why
public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be
made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."
 Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of High way 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote
the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area,
especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only
front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about
the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and
the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality
of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly,
justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 68

xxxxxxxxx

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. The
petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed "non-
impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or
arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that
connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No pronouncement as to

costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., on leave.

Paras, J., Took no part;

Feliciano, J., Took no part;

Padilla, J., Took no part;

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion
filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1One of the grounds for such a
motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on
Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The
denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants,
was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was likewise noted that the
prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his
designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal
of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused
that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance.
This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to
comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the
assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at
present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the
bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a
case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only
did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to
require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order
of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he
instituted this certiorari proceeding.3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw
as counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly
committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of
Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which
reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of
October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case
without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the
prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the
government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused
assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that
the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The
defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and
September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon
petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this
case is hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded
that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the
government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in
such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to
the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on
Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma
to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes
in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such
belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal
of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is
required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v.
Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental
postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting
standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of
justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is
not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he
has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a
lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless,
what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in
the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11reiterated such a
view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such
counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional
ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The
accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For,
indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of
social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension
that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the
welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered
nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in
these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether
he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more
emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence."16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task
entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election
registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not likely at
present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be
assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to
erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The
admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are
times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26364 May 29, 1968

MARIANO A. ALBERT, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BR. VI), UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO.,
INC., and JOSE M. ARUEGO, respondents.

Uy, Artiaga and Antonio M. Molina for petitioner.

Aruego, Mamaril and Associates Law Office for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This case is a veritable legal marathon. Originally docketed in 1949, within a span of 19 years,
the legal dispute has come to this Court four times:

(1) L-9300, promulgated April 18, 1958;

(2) L-15275, promulgated October 24, 1960;

(3) L-18350, dismissed May 17, 1961; and

(4) L-19118, promulgated January 30, 1965 (Resolution of Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration denied on June 16, 1965).

The present petition for certiorari is the fifth. The time is long past when courts of justice must
write finis to this case. For,

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.1

The factual setting necessary to a clear understanding of the instant petition for certiorari needs
to be restated. Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of contract.
Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator,
was substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff
was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from judicial demand.

From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in L-15275 was to be executed,
the corporate existence of university Publishing Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for
granted, and was not then put in issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila
issued on July 22, 1961 an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a
new problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of the City of
Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf and as
President of University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that no such entity
exists. A verification made at the Securities and Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On
July 31, 1961, said Commission issued a certification "that the records of this Commission do
not show the registration of UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or
partnership." 2 This triggered a verified petition in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the
issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the
judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the
case.

All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University Publishing Company,
Inc.

Instead of informing the lower court that it had in its possession copies of its certificate of
registration, its articles of incorporation, its by-laws and all other paper materials to its disputed
corporate existence, University Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11,
1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and Associates (the
law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered plaintiffs petition for execution as
against Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is not a party
to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.3

Respondent court, presided over by His Honor, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, on September 9,
1961, came up with an order, which reads thus:

It appearing that Jose M. Aruego against whom the judgment rendered herein is sought
to be enforced is not a party to this case, plaintiff's motion filed on August 10, 1961 is
hereby denied.4

Plaintiff appealed to this Court on this sole issue: "The lower court erred in denying the plaintiff-
appellant's petition praying that the judgment rendered against the alleged corporation, the
above-named defendant-appellee, be executed against the personal assets and properties of
Jose M. Aruego, the real party to this case."

In an extended opinion written by Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon, this Court in L-19118, on
January 30, 1965, resolved the issue as follows:

The fact of non-registration of University Publishing Co., Inc. in the Securities and
Exchange Commission has not been disputed. Defendant would only raise the point that
"University Publishing Co., Inc." and not Jose M. Aruego, is the party defendant; thereby
assuming that "University Publishing Co., Inc." is an existing corporation with an
independent juridical personality. Precisely, however, on account of the non-registration
it cannot be considered a corporation, not even a corporation de facto (Hall vs. Piccio,
86 Phil. 603). It has therefore no personality separate from Jose M. Aruego; it cannot be
sued independently.

The corporation-by-estoppel doctrine has not been invoked. At any rate, the same is
inapplicable here. Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced not only the
plaintiff but even the court to believe in such representation. He signed the contract as
"President" of "University Publishing Co., Inc.," stating that this was 'a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,' and obviously misled plaintiff
(Mariano A. Albert) into believing the same. One who has induced another to act upon
his wilful misrepresentation that a corporation was duly organized and existing under the
law, cannot thereafter set up against his victim the principle of corporation by estoppel
(Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, 56 O.G. 3609).

"University Publishing Co., Inc." purported to come to court, answering the complaint
and litigating upon the merits. But as stated, "University Publishing Co., Inc." has no
independent personality; it is just a name. Jose M. Aruego was, in reality, the one who
answered and litigated, through his own law firm as counsel. He was in fact, if not in
name, the defendant.

Even with regard to corporations duly organized and existing under the law, we have in
many a case pierced the veil of corporate fiction to administer the ends of justice.
(Arnold vs. Willits & Patterson, Ltd., 44 Phil. 634; Koppel (Phil.), Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil.
496; La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La
Campana, 93 Phil. 160; Marvel Building Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376; Madrigal
Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, L-8431, Oct. 30, 1958; Laguna Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
S.S.S., L-14606, April 28, 1960; McConnel vs. C.A., L-10510, Mar. 17, 1961; Liddell &
Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-9687, June 30, 1961; Palacio vs. Fely
Transportation Co., L-15121, August 31, 1962). And in Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, supra, p.
3073, we ruled: "A person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which
has no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes personally
liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such agent." Had Jose M.
Aruego been named as party defendant instead of, or together, with, "University
Publishing Co., Inc." there would be no room for debate as to his personal liability. Since
he was not so named, the matters of "day in court" and "due process" have arisen.

In this connection, it must be realized that parties to a suit are "persons who have a right
to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses,
and to appeal from a decision" (67 C.J.S. 887) and Aruego was, in reality, the person
who had and exercised these rights. Clearly then, Aruego had his day in court as the
real defendant; and due process of law has been substantially observed.

By "due process of law" we mean "a law which hears before it condemns; which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.... (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518,
581); or, as this Court has said, "Due process of law" contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person or property."
(Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32). (Sicat vs. Reyes, L-11023, Dec. 14, 1956.)
And it may not be amiss to mention here also that the "due process" clause of the
Constitution is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying
undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite,
but none the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil.
315, 321-322:

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled

and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
 and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities.

The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-
existent principal was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he was the one who
reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial payments of the
consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the suit
in question; and that in the litigation he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the
ends of justice, responsibility under the judgment falls on him.

We need hardly state that should there be persons who under the law are liable to
Aruego for reimbursement or contribution with respect to the payment he makes under
the judgment in question, he may, of course, proceed against them through proper
remedial measures.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of
carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M.
Aruego.

It is to be observed that even as this case was elevated to this Court in L-19118, University
Publishing Company, Inc. or its president and counsel chose to withhold pertinent documents
and papers in its possession and control. But when the foregoing judgment came, the University
Publishing Company, Inc., in its motion for reconsideration thereof, asked that it be afforded
opportunity to prove its corporate existence. It submitted with that motion for reconsideration, its
certificate of registration, articles of incorporation, by-laws, and a certificate of reconstitution of
records issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was procured only from the
Securities and Exchange Commissioner on April 1, 1965 after the decision in L-19118 was
promulgated.

Jose M. Aruego, the president and counsel of University Publishing Company, Inc., for the first
time appeared in propria persona before this Court as a "member of the Philippine Bar, private
citizen." He pointedly stated that he did not submit to the jurisdiction of this Court. He wanted,
though, that his side of the case be heard. He formally joined hands with University Publishing
Company, Inc. on the plea of due process in his favor. He insisted that he was not a party to this
litigation.

The resolution of this Court, on June 16, 1965, extensively dwelt on the due process plea of
Jose M. Aruego, thus:

It may be worth noting again that Jose M. Aruego started the negotiation which
culminated in the contract between the parties, signing said contract as president of
University Publishing Co., Inc. Likewise he was the one who made partial payments up
to the amount of P7,000.00 for and in behalf of University Publishing Co., Inc. He also
appeared not only as a witness but as a lawyer, signing some pleadings or motions in
defense of University Publishing Co., Inc., although in other instances it is one of his
associates or member of his law firm who did so. Known is the fact that even a duly
existing corporation can only move and act through natural persons. In this case it was
Jose M. Aruego who moved and acted as or for University Publishing Co., Inc.
It is elemental that the courts can only decide the merits of a given suit according to the
records that are in the case. It is true that in the two previous cases decided by this
Court, the first, awarding damages (L-9300), the second, clarifying the amount of
P15,000.00 awarded as such (L-15275), the corporate existence of University Publishing
Co., Inc. as a legal entity was merely taken for granted.

However, when the said issue was squarely presented before the court, and University
Publishing Co., Inc., chose to keep the courts in the dark by withholding pertinent
documents and papers in its possession and control, Court had to decide the points
raised according to the records of the case and whatever related matters necessarily
included therein. Hence, as a consequence of the certification of the Securities and
Exchange Commission that its records 'do not show the registration of University
Publishing Co., Inc., either as a corporation or partnership' this Court concluded that by
virtue of its non-registration it cannot be considered a corporation. We further said that it
has therefore no personality separate from Jose M. Aruego and that Aruego was in
reality the one who answered and litigated through his own law firm as counsel. Stated
otherwise, we found that Aruego was in fact, if not in name, the defendant (Decision, p.
6). Indeed, the judge of the court of first instance wrote in his decision thus: "Defendant
Aruego (all along the judge who pens this decision considered that the defendant here is
the president of the University Publishing Co., Inc. since it was he who really made the
contract with Justice Albert)." (Decision of CFI, p. 9, quoted in plaintiff-appellant's brief,
p. 10). And this portion of the decision made by the court a quo was never questioned by
the defendant.

The above statement made by the court a quo in its decision compelled this Court to
carefully examine the facts surrounding the dispute starting from the time of the
negotiation of the business proposition, followed by the signing of the contract;
considered the benefits received; took into account the partial payments made, the
litigation conducted, the decisions rendered and the appeals undertaken. After thus
considering the facts and circumstances, keeping in mind that even with regard to
corporations shown as duly registered and existing, we have in many a case pierced the
veil of corporate fiction to administer the ends of justice, (Arnold vs. Willits & Patterson,
Ltd., 44 Phil. 634; Koppel (Phil.), Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496; La Campana Coffee
Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, 93 Phil. 160; Marvel
Building Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376; Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs Ogilvie, L-
8431, Oct. 30, 1958; Laguna Transportation Co., Inc. vs. S.S.S., L-14606, April 28,
1960; McConnel vs. C.A., L-10510, Mar. 17, 1961; Liddell & Co., Inc., vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, L-9687, June 30, 1961: Palacio vs. Fely Transportation Co., L-15121,
August 31, 1962) we held Aruego personally responsible for his acts on behalf of
University Publishing Co., Inc.

Defendant would reply that in all those cases where the Court pierced the veil of
corporate fiction the officials held liable were made party defendants. As stated,
defendant-appellee could not even pretend to possess corporate fiction in view of its
non-registration per the evidence so that from the start Aruego was the real
defendant. Since the purpose of formally impleading a party is to assure him a day in
court, once the protective mantle of due process of law has in fact been accorded a
litigant, whatever the imperfection in form, the real litigant may be held liable as a party.
Jose M. Aruego definitely had his day in court, and due process of law was enjoyed by
him as a matter of fact as revealed by the records of the case. (Decision, p. 6).
 The dispositive portion of the decision the reconsideration of which is being sought is the
following: "Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the
case remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the
purpose of carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc.
and/or Jose M. Aruego."

According to several cases a litigant is not allowed to speculate on the decision the court
may render in the case. (Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, 45 O.G. 4457
(Resolution); Arnault vs. Nazareno, L-3820, Resolution of August 9, 1950; Howden vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, L-19392, April 14, 1965). The University Publishing Co.,
Inc. speculated on a favorable decision based on the issue that Jose M. Aruego not
being a formal party defendant in this case a writ of execution against him was not in
order. It therefore preferred to suppress vital documents under its possession and
control rather than to rebut the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission that according to its records University Publishing Co., Inc. was not
registered. If the lower court's order is sustained, collection of damages becomes
problematical. If a new suit is filed against Aruego, prescription might be considered as
effective defense, aside from the prospect of another ten years of pending litigation.
Such are the possible reasons for adopting the position of speculation of our decision.
Our ruling appeared to be unfavorable to such speculation. It was only after the receipt
of the adverse decision promulgated by this Court that University Publishing Co., Inc.
disclosed its registration papers. For purposes of this case only and according to its
particular facts and circumstances, we rule that in view of the late disclosure of said
papers by the University Publishing Co., Inc., the same can no longer be considered at
this stage of the proceedings.1vvphi1.nt

And on the issue of whether or not the certificate of registration, the articles of incorporation, the
by-laws and the certificate of the reconstitution of the records proffered by the University
Publishing Company, Inc. should be admitted, this Court, in the said resolution of the motion for
reconsideration, in part said:

Defendant-appellee could have presented the foregoing papers before the lower court to
counter the evidence of non-registration, but defendant-appellee did not do so. It could
have reconstituted its records at that stage of the proceedings, instead of only on April 1,
1965, after decision herein was promulgated.

xxx xxx xxx

As far as this case is concerned, therefore, University Publishing Co., Inc. must be
deemed as unregistered, since by defendant-appellee's choice the record shows it to be
so. Defendant-appellee apparently sought to delay the execution by remaining
unregistered per the certification of the Securities and Exchange Commission. It was
only when execution was to be carried out, anyway, against it and/or its president and
almost 19 years after the approval of the law authorizing reconstitution that it
reconstituted its records to show its registration, thereby once more attempting to delay
the payment of plaintiff's claim, long since adjudged meritorious. Deciding, therefore, as
we must, this particular case on its record as submitted by the parties, defendant-
appellee's proffered evidence of its corporate existence cannot at this stage be
considered to alter the decision reached herein. This is not to preclude in future cases
 the consideration of properly submitted evidence as to defendant-appellee's corporate
existence.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration and for leave to file original papers not in
the record, is hereby denied.

1wph1.t

Armed with the aforementioned decision and resolution of this Court in L-19118, petitioner
returned to the lower court on July 28, 1965 with a motion for execution and approval of the bill
of costs and asking specifically for the issuance of the corresponding writ against Aruego to
satisfy the judgment.

On July 30, 1965, Aruego moved to intervene with an opposition in intervention to the motion for
execution. Alleging that the judgment of this Court in L-19118 dated January 30, 1965, which
reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of
carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M.
Aruego.

should be construed in the sense that "the supplementary proceedings mentioned in the
aforequoted dispositive portion of the Supreme Court Decision means no other than a
proceeding to show cause why the judgment should be carried into effect against either the
University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego, as the case may be" and that until such
supplementary proceedings was had petitioner could ask for the execution of the judgment
against Jose M. Aruego as a matter of course, Aruego falls back on his averment (made in his
manifestation already ruled out by this Court in L-19118) that he had never been a party to the
case and that the judgment sought to be executed was solely against University Publishing
Company, Inc.

On February 21, 1966, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, upon consideration of this motion for
execution and for approval of the bill of costs, the opposition thereto by Aruego, and the reply to
the opposition, granted the motion for execution and directed that a writ of execution "be issued
accordingly".

Aruego came back with a motion for reconsideration, adamant in his resolve that he would not
pay as he was not a party to the suit. This was opposed by plaintiff.

On March 5, 1966, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel reconsidered his order of February 21, 1966, and
denied the motion for a writ of execution against Jose M. Aruego upon the ground that "said
Jose M. Aruego has never been a party to the case and that the judgment sought to be
executed is not against him."

On April 4, 1966, it was petitioner's turn to file a motion for reconsideration for the reason that
the question of whether or not an order of execution could issue against Aruego had already
been resolved by this Court in its final judgment in L-19118.
On April 20, 1966, Jose M. Aruego opposed the motion for reconsideration and prayed for
supplementary proceedings to allow him as intervenor to present evidence in support thereof,
alleging that the execution of the judgment against him was not sanctioned by law and
procedure and that had intervenor been impleaded or given his day in court, he could have
easily proven the legitimate and due existence of the University Publishing Company, Inc. as a
bona fide corporation. He attached thereto the very same articles of incorporation, certificate of
registration, by-laws and certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
reconstitution of its records documents which were rejected by this Court in its resolution of
June 16, 1965 in L-19118.

On April 28, 1966, petitioner filed his reply to Aruego's opposition upon the ground that these
are matters concluded in the decision and resolution of this Court, and that respondent court
cannot admit said documents without going against this Court's clear mandate.

Resolution on plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was, by Judge Gaudencio Cloribel's order of
May 20, 1966, held in abeyance until the termination of the supplementary proceedings, which
the court thereupon granted, to allow Aruego to present evidence in support of his opposition to
the motion for reconsideration.

On May 28, 1966, Aruego presented in evidence the documents heretofore mentioned, and in
addition, the certificate dated February 17, 1965 signed by a majority of the directors of the
University Publishing Company, Inc. declaring that the corporation still exists and that the
articles of incorporation have not been amended or modified.

On July 13, 1966, notwithstanding plaintiff's opposition to the admission of the documents just
mentioned, and his claim that the matter involved in the execution had long been finished and
decided by this Court, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel denied plaintiff's motion for execution.

Hence, this petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus.

1. When this case was elevated to this Court for the fourth time in L-19118, we made it
abundantly clear in the decision therein rendered and in the resolution issued thereafter, that the
judgment rendered against University Publishing Company, Inc. could and should be enforced
against respondent Jose M. Aruego. Our language in the dispositive portion is clear. It reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded ordering the lower court to hold supplementary proceedings for the purpose of
carrying the judgment into effect against University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M.
Aruego.

The judgment does not contemplate of any proceeding other than for the purpose of carrying
into effect the judgment against University Publishing Company, Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego
which is the proceeding on execution. It does not admit of any other interpretation such as that
which is advocated by Aruego that such proceeding "is to show cause why the judgment should
be carried into effect against either the University Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego."
Indeed, the issue of whether or not the judgment rendered against University Publishing
Company, Inc. could be enforced against Jose M. Aruego had already been definitely decided in
that case, L-19118. Even worse, all the arguments and evidence presented by Aruego before
the respondent court resulting in the orders that gave rise to the present proceedings had been
previously adduced before this Court and decided adversely against him in the January decision
and the June resolution of 1965 in L-19118. There can be no clearer case for the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment to apply. Thus, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings brought by
the Manila Underwriters Insurance Co., Inc. against Judge Bienvenido A. Tan, L-17445,
November 27, 1964, this Court ruled:

On August 15, 1960, respondent Borja filed another motion in the same case asking the
court to require petitioner again to show cause why it should not be made liable under its
bond, and thereafter to issue a writ of execution against it. Petitioner opposed the motion
on the ground that our decision in G.R. No. L-12256 had finally disposed of the issue
raised therein. Despite this, the respondent judge, on August 30, 1960 issued an order
citing petitioner to appear before it and show cause why it should not be held liable
under its bond, and on September 10 of the same year, his honor also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order. Thereupon, the present action was
filed.

Upon the undisputed facts stated heretofore, it appears abundantly clear that the
respondent judge seriously erred in issuing the orders complained of. The question of
whether petitioner could still be held liable upon its bond must be deemed finally settled
by our decision in G.R. No. L-12256, and any attempt to hold petitioner liable upon the
bond already mentioned must necessarily be deemed as an improper attempt to reopen
a case already finally adjudicated.

WHEREFORE, the orders complained of are hereby declared void and of no legal force
and effect. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on October 26, 1960 is
hereby made final. Costs against respondent Borja.

The liability of Aruego has been established so plainly in the decision and resolution in L-19118
that there could not be any quibbling as to the import of the words there used. Case L-19118
was brought into being because precisely Judge Cloribel ruled that execution could not be
issued against Jose M. Aruego upon the ground, so he said in his appealed order, that Aruego
was not a party to the action. This Court there reversed Judge Gaudencio Cloribel.

In the circumstances of this case, we are constrained to articulate a number of possibilities: that
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel either (1) did not read our decision in L-19118, January 30, 1965, and
our resolution in the same case promulgated on June 16, 1965; or (2) having read, did not
comprehend their import; or (3) having read and understood, wantonly ignored them. It is the
thinking of this Court, however, that Judge Gaudencio Cloribel simply shunted aside our
decision and resolution. He could not have overlooked the fact that it was his own order of
September 9, 1961 denying execution because Aruego is not a party to this case which
was appealed to this Court. That very question of whether execution should issue against
Aruego was squarely presented and as squarely resolved in the affirmative by this Court in L-
19118. That Gaudencio Cloribel should have insisted in his opinion after his attention to this
Court's decision and resolution adverse thereto had been repeatedly called by plaintiff, is an act
which deserves unsympathetic and unqualified condemnation.

Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our
system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings. 5 Judge Gaudencio Cloribel should have known that "[a] becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."6

So it is, that in Martiniano P. Vivo vs. Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, et al., L-23239, November 23,
1966 (18 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 713, 726), this Court stressed the need for trial judges
to take cognizance of the rulings of the Supreme Court. We there reproduced the following
from People vs. Santos, 56 O.G. 3546, 3552-3552, viz.:

Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases,
that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of
reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather
than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that
it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that
any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a
sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if
despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then
he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly
avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he
has only one legal way to do that.7

We rule that because of the foregoing circumstances, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel acted with
grave abuse of discretion. And certiorari lies. 8

2. We now come to the cry of injustice proffered by respondent Jose M. Aruego. Even upon a
cursory examination of his gripe, his position at once loses leverage; the potency of his
arguments vanishes.

As we look in retrospect at the facts, we find that it was Aruego who executed the contract as
president of the University Publishing Company, Inc. He is a lawyer. At the time he executed the
contract with plaintiff, he should have known that the possibility existed that the records of the
corporation had been destroyed. For, it is a matter of public knowledge that buildings which kept
public records in the City of Manila had been razed by fire during the last war. He should have
at least inquired whether the records of the corporation in the Securities and Exchange
Commission had been saved. Of course, he knew and should have known that persons dealing
with corporations are wont to look to records of the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the existence or non-existence thereof. In this particular case, from the documents he himself
presented in the court below (after he had knowledge of the fact that admission thereof was
denied by this Court in L-19118), he is practically the corporation itself. Because out of the
capital stock of P2,000.00, he subscribed to P1,600.00, and out of the paid subscription of
P500.00, he contributed the sum of P450.00, leaving but P50.00 to be spread amongst the
minor stockholders.

This case was filed and concluded as against the corporation. When finally, plaintiff's counsel
and the Sheriff came to him as president (and incidentally counsel) of University Publishing
Company, Inc. for execution of that judgment, he sought to stave off satisfaction thereof. Then,
plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff came to know that the corporation did not legally exist. Aruego
could have very easily caused the corporation to pay. Or did he think that the corporation could
evade payment, since the records of the corporation in the Securities and Exchange
Commission had not yet been reconstituted? The resultant effect is that after long years of
ligation, plaintiff is still left holding the bag. As this Court noted in L-19118, it would be too late
for the plaintiff to file suit against Aruego personally. For, by then prescription has set in.

Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics is a constant reminder to the members of the Bar that
the conduct of a lawyer before the court "should be characterized by candor and fairness"; and
it is "unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts ... in the
presentation of causes." When the question of whether execution should issue against Jose M.
Aruego, a member of the Bar, did emerge before the lower court in the proceedings for
execution of the judgment, candor and fairness should have impelled him to tell the court that
the representation of counsel for plaintiff that University Publishing Company, Inc. is not a
corporation, was not true, and that the corporation had the papers and documents to show
otherwise. He should not have kept this fact under wraps for so long a time while the execution
proceedings were still with the lower court and before judgment on the appeal taken by plaintiff
in L-19118. He has failed in these. Literally, he laid an ambush. It was only after he realized that
this Court considered him as the real party in interest that he presented the fact of corporate
existence to this Court to overturn the decision rendered in L-19118. Where a party "has taken a
position with regard to procedure, which has been acted or relied on by his adversary or by the
court," he must be held to be in estoppel "from taking an inconsistent position respecting the
same matter in the same proceeding, to his adversary's prejudice." 9

This is not the first time that this Court has ordered the execution of a judgment against a
person who was not formally named as party defendant in the action. In a series of cases,
substantial in number, 10 this Court's stand has been consistent that the judgment for payment
of back salaries of officers entitled to reinstatement may, in effect, be enforced against the city
or municipality, although not by name impleaded in the suit. Reasons therefore are concretely
expressed in Mangubat vs. Osmea, supra, in this wise:

The necessity of making the City a respondent herein is based upon its right to defend
itself, as demanded by the requirements of due process. However, these requirement
have been substantially complied with in the case at bar. The parties herein have
handled the case, and the same was heard and decided in the lower court, as if the City
had been named respondent in the pleadings. The officer required by law "to cause to
be defended all suits against the City", namely, its mayor (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act
No. 58), is respondent in his official capacity. The officer charged with the duty to
represent the City "in all civil cases wherein the city ... is a party" to wit, its city
attorney (Sec. 17, Commonwealth Act No. 58) is counsel for respondents herein. In
addition thereto, the auditor, the treasurer and even the municipal board of the City of
Cebu, are parties respondents.

There is no reason to believe that these officers and the City Mayor would have exerted
greater efforts than those already displayed by them, in protesting the interests of the
City of Cebu, were it formally a respondent herein. Indeed, it is only logical to expect
that, having been individually named as respondents, said officers must have taken as
much concern, if not more, in warding off petitioners' claim. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we would be subordinating the substance to the form if the action
for mandamus insofar as the claim for back salaries is concerned were either
dismissed or remanded to the lower court, for the corresponding amendment of the
pleadings and a repetition of the proceedings held for the last five (5) years, in order to
reach the same decision rendered by the lower court and the same conclusions set forth
in this decision, as regards the substantive rights of the parties. It is our considered
 opinion, therefore, that the ends of justice and equity would be served best if the
inclusion of the City of Cebu, as one of the respondents herein, were considered a mere
formality and deemed effected, as if a formal amendment of the pleadings had been
made.

A recent case, whose factual situation has great relevance to the present, is Torres vs. Caluag,
L-20906, July 30, 1966. There, petitioner Torres was not a party defendant in a suit to recover
possession of land instituted against defendant Conocido who declared that he was a mere
tenant of Torres. Judgment was rendered against Conocido, and a writ of execution was issued
ejecting Torres from the property. On writ of certiorari and prohibition to this Court to nullify the
writ of execution aforesaid, we pronounced that when petitioner Torres testified in the court
below, she had her day in court and had laid squarely before said court the issue of ownership.
We then explicitly stated that the fact that petitioner was not formally made a party defendant is
a mere technicality that does not serve the interest of justice.

In the end, we find it pertinent to quote from the early case of Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245,
271, thus:

... The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is truly an
extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extra-ordinary
cases cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further
steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result
whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final
judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing,
protecting nobody, a judicial pretention, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is
only to avoid such results as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an
appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.

For the reasons given, the petition for certiorari and mandamus prayed for herein is hereby
granted; and

(a) The orders of Judge Gaudencio Cloribel of March 5, May 20, and July 13, 1966 are
hereby set aside and declared null and void; and

(b) The Court a quo is hereby directed forthwith to issue a writ of execution against
respondent University Publishing Company, Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego.

Treble costs shall be paid by respondent Jose M. Aruego. So ordered.

1wph1.t

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.