Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary G.R. No.

159085 February 3, 2004

FACTS:

July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion"
& General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to
return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion,
only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and
promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized
classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human
rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and
legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the
Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there
exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of
the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional
anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation
or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated
any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose
rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers,
such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2),
Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted,
illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution;
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation;
questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not
the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper
RULING:

1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing.
Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez " petitioner has
not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner
is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they
seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that
Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti,
they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions
have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court,
even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy"
requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS,
though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring
suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the
doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this
particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on
giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of
the proclamation of the state of rebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question,
otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one
such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state
of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However,
as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not
required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the
Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and
foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive
power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers',
Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers
are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on
executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the
presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos
v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of
the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation.
However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for
being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could
not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities
may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra,
majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64
In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion
whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a
valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the
report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has
attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the
imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The
petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
De Castro v. JBC G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
Facts:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on
May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and
published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine
Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the
names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which
the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES:

W/N the petitioners have legal standing?

W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?

W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?

W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by
the JBC?

RULING:

Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.

Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to
its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

There is a justiciable issue

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of
the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of
which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not
yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing
President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the
next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.

The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.

PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A
VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court:

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and
manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome
powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the
Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true
recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt
with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII.

Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it
cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to
impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on
the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a
clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the
President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger
negative language.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article
VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given
the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that
the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the
JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the
Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on
March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx
appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured
that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application
to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then
submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of
Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern
the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only
to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the
Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the
Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and
cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the
same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30,
2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent
President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the
context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days
mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief
Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every
situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May,
letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential
elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on
May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the
full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at
least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days
and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in
no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is
safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to
come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that
is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme
Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have
previously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of
the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion
in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear
legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because
it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined
by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Pormento vs Estrada G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of
Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private
respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010
elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a persons second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.
No live conflict of legal rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.7 No specific
relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy in the case filed.

RULLING:

Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a
persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy
to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered
to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus,
any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful
or practical purpose.

Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

IBP VS. ZAMORA G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000

FACTS:

As the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, dated 25 January 2000,
required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor
General submitted his Comment.

The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from
the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.

(2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.

RULLING:

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to
raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the Constitution.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged.13 The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.14 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. In the
case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is
too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
SENATE VS EXECUIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006

FACTS:

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues
of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-
called Gloria Gate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.