PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc.

, 51 SCRA 189
FACTS:

March 2, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise of their constitutional
right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of
the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by
the workers in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)

On March 3, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon where
PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company because the union has
no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE
amounting to an illegal strike.

On March 3, 1969, Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969

The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation since they
gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the company.

Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees

September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration was dismissed.

ISSUE:

W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition

HELD:

Yes. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.

In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and
in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
GR. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION of DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON
Vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.

FACTS: Petitioner TECSON was hired by Respondent GLAXO as a medical representative.

TECSON signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company.

TECSON married BETTSY, an employee of ASTRA, a competitor of GLAXO.

Even before they got married, TECSON received several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with BETTSY might engender.

Because of the marriage, it gave rise to a conflict of interest, which the supervisor reminded
TECSON that he and BETTSY should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs.
TECSON requested time to comply.

GLAXO then decided to transfer TECSON to another area, making TECSON to ask for
reconsideration but his request was denied and that he must comply with the transfer order.
TECSON refused to do so.

Because of the parties failed to resolve the issue, they submitted the matter for voluntary
arbitration. GLAXO offered TECSON separation pay but the latter declined the offer.

The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its decision declaring GLAXOs
policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies as valid, and affirming GLAXOs right to transfer TECSON to another sales territory.

TECSON filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition,
affirming the decision of the NCMB and that GLAXOs policy is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.

ISSUE: Whether GLAXOs policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with
employes of competitor companies is a valid exercise of management prerogative

RULING: Yes. GLAXO only aimes to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company
will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

On Equal Protection, it is clear that GLAXO does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free
to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company
merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may
Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol
G.R. No 164774
Facts:

Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products having a anti-nepotism
employment policy that which is:

1. New Applicatns will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company
2. In case of 2 of our employees developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.

Respondents are all regular employees of the said company. Both Simbol and Comia resigned pursuant
to the policy promulgated and upon the advice of Ongsitco, the manager of Personnel and
Administration Department. They allege that they did not resign voluntarily but rather are compelled to
resign in view of an illegal company policy. Estrella offer a different version of her dismissal. She got
pregnant by a co-worker which she later on discovered that is not separated. She severed her
relationship to avoid dismissal. She met an accident and was advised by the doctor to recuperate for 21
days but when she returned to work, she was denied entry , a memorandum was handed to her stating
a dismissal for immoral conduct. She resigned in exchange for her 13th month pay.

Respondents later filed a complain for unfair labor practice

Issue:

Whether or not not the company policy is reasonable and constitutional?

Ruling:

Petitioners sole contention that the company did not just want to have 2 or more of its employees
related between 3rd degree by affinity and or consanguinity is lame. It is evidently not the valid
reasonable business necessity required by the law.

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the
job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. Upholding this without valid justification will
allow the employer to create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and
the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

On April 21, 1969 an ordinance (640) was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan,
PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN
THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC
EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN
BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR
TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID
TICKET.

Aggrieved by the effect of the ordinance, petitioners Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel
managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional, void
and unenforceable on the ground that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power because it
violated the due process clause of the Constitution, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right
of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners were bound under a contract with the
film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

On the other hand, respondent City of Butuan claimed that the said ordinance was reasonable and necessary
because it would lessen the economic burden of parents whose minor children were lured by the attractive
nuisance being maintained by the petitioners, thus, a valid exercise of its police power as delegated to it under
the general welfare clause, therefore constitutional.

The CFI ruled in favor of the city of Butuan, which declared the said ordinance a valid exercise of police
power thus constitutional. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not ORDINANCE 640 was a valid exercise of police power on the ground that is was
reasonable and necessary?

HELD: NO

The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.22 The
evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out
the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made
to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but
it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. The ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly
oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting
to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may
not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.33 A
police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon
the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights.34 The right of the owner to fix a price
at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
protection of the due process clause.""

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and declaring Ordinance
No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORA BLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in
his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

FACTS :

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and
the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in
the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that,
since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to
the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of
the check, n ot the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a
debt under the threat of penal sanction.

ISSUE :

Whether or not Batas Pambansa 22 or the Bouncing Check Law has contravened the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt?

RULING :

BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the l aw is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. Checks have become
widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be
perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly
diminished. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila
Facts:

On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following
provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
Prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
Usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 of 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
Making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
Cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance complies with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held:
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. As such limitation cannot
be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be
made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon
the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989
Del Rosario vs Bengzon
Facts:
On March 15, 1989, the full text of Republic Act No. 6675 was published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on March 30,
1989, fifteen (15) days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. The
Generics Act requires that all government health agencies and their personnel shall use
generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and
administering of drugs and medicines. Petitioners, officers of Philippine Medical
Association argued that theres an unequal treatment of government practitioners and
those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic
terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug
below the generic name. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the said statute and
petitioned for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, having the public interest involved, the court decided to treat it as a
petition for prohibition instead. Petitioners argued that the Act favors private sector and
giving the act of prescribing the correct medicine a duty of the salesgirl. The court says
that it is just a misrepresentation of the Act. The salesgirl at the drugstore counter
merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or
brands that have the same generic name and their prices.

Issue:
Whether the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the
government.

Held:
Yes, the Generics Act is constitutional. Theres no constitutional infirmity, it implements
the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or
words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand
name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and
the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-
name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
GR. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ
Vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS

FACTS: The MUNICIPALITY OF BOCAUE, BULACAN made an Ordinance (Ordinance No. 84, Series of
1975) for the prohibition and closure of Night Clubs, any place or establishment selling to the
public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. In which it also included
Cabarets, where dancing is permitted to the public and where professional hostesses or
hospitality girls and professional dancers are employed.

Petitioners filed two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. (1) That the Ordinance is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit; and (2) That the Ordinance is violative of the petitioners right to due process and equal
protection of the law.

Petitioners alleged the following:

1) They had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue, Bulacan.
2) They had invested large sums of money in their businesses already.
3) That their night clubs are well-lighted clubs;
4) That they do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out
with customers
5) That their girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and those who are found
to be infected with veneral disease are not allowed to work;
6) That the crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of
Bulacan.

The lower court dismissed the petition and upholding the constitutionality and validity of the
Ordinance No 84.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 84 was a valid police power

RULING: No.

The Municipal Council is granted police power which can enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality.

According to Justice Moreland, an Ordinance is valid, unless it contravenes the Fundamental

Law of the land, or ulness it is against the public policy, or is unreasonable, oppresive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of cmmon right. The Ordinance passed must be reasonable
exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid.

Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances

MMDA v. Bel-Air
G.R. No. 135962

Facts:

Bel-Air Village Association received from petitioner, MMDA, a notice requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street (private road inside Bel-Air) to public vehicular traffic. And on the same day, respondent
was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenuye
would be demolished.

Respondent instituted against petitioner before RTC for injunction and issuance of a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

After due hearing the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction so the respondent
questioned the denial before the CA. CA rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street and cause the demolition of the perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider but was denied hence this recourse.

Issue:

Whether or not the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?

Ruling:

Police power cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
It is lodged primarily in the National Legislature which may delegate the power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporation or local government
units.

Powers of MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in RA no 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.

MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. Chairman
of the MMDA is nor an official elected by the people but appointed by the President and should perform
duties as may be assigned to him. This emphasized the administrative character of the MMDA, hence, its
proposed opening is illegal and CA did not err in so ruling.