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426 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Tiu vs. Arriesgado
426 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Tiu vs. Arriesgado
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* SECOND DIVISION.
427
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429
and highways. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter
and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) on our
highways and buses, the very size and power of which seem to
inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code
explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in
cases of quasidelicts if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Solidary Liability; In
case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are
jointly and severally liable for damages. The same rule of
liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the
negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle,
thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company,
its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the
vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured
passenger or the latters heirs. The basis of this allocation of
liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus: Nor
should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus
owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner
and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasidelict. As early as
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trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m.,
March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with
plate number PBP724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was
cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also
bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya,
Daanbantayan, Cebu. Among its passengers were the
Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado,
who were seated at the right side of the bus, about three (3)
or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw5
the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away.
He applied the
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6Exhibit G, Records, p. 8.
7TSN, 23 January 1989, pp. 713; Exhibit B.
8Records, p. 2
9 Id., at pp. 23.
432
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The petitioners,
11
for their part, filed a ThirdParty
Complaint on August 21, 1987 against the following:
respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.
(PPSII), petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin
Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and
respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They
alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill
climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It
was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted
manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed.
Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the brakes and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck headon, but
despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical
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10 Id., at p. 5.
11 Id., at pp. 3539.
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434
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15
SO ORDERED.
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16 Id., at p. 308.
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ARRIESGADO
19
OR TO PETITIONER WILLIAM
TIU.
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At the outset, 20
it must be stressed that this Court is not a
trier of facts. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
final and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court,
except when the 21lower court and the CA arrived at diverse
factual findings. The petitioners in this case assail the
finding of both the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed before
the bus owned by petitioner Tiu collided with respondent
Condors stalled truck. This is clearly one of fact, not
reviewable
22
by the Court in a petition for review under Rule
45.
On this ground alone, the petition is destined to fail.
However, considering that novel questions of law are
likewise involved, the Court resolves to examine and rule
on the merits of the case.
Petitioner Laspias
Was negligent in driving
The Illfated bus
In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspias
claimed that he was traversing the twolane road at
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of only forty (40) to23fifty (50)
kilometers per hour before the incident occurred. He also
admitted that he saw the truck which was parked 24in an
oblique position at about 25 meters before impact, and
tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. However,
even in the absence 25 of expert evidence, the damage
sustained by the truck itself supports the finding of both
the trial
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440
court and the appellate court, that the D Rough Rider bus
driven by petitioner Laspias was traveling at a fast pace.
Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters,
petitioner Laspias had more than enough time to swerve
to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus
was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As
found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that
petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed, since
at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the accident, there were no
oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner
Laspias could have swerved to the left lane with proper 26
clearance, and, thus, could have avoided the truck.
Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted him to
apply the breaks to avert the impending disaster which he
must have foreseen when he caught sight of the stalled
truck. As we had occasion to reiterate:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all
his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not
from instinct, then through fear of recurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts
which no one would have performed except through culpable
abandon. Otherwise, his own person, rights and property, and
those of his fellow beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
27
danger and injury.
a vantage position to see the cargo truck ahead which was parked
and he could just easily have avoided hitting and bumping the
same by maneuvering to the left without hitting the said cargo
truck. Besides, it is (sic) shown that there was still much room or
space for the Rough Rider to pass at the left lane of the said na
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26 CA Rollo, p. 79.
27 Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918), cited in People v. De los Santos, 355
SCRA 415, 430 (2001).
441
tional highway even if the cargo truck had occupied the entire
right lane thereof. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would
proceed to pass through the left lane it would fall into a canal
considering that there was much space for it to pass without
hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left lane of said
national highway. The records, further, showed that there was no
incoming vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway
which would have prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving
to its left in order to avoid hitting and bumping the parked cargo
truck. But the evidence showed that the Rough Rider instead of
swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway
plowed directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at
its rear portion; and thus, the (sic) causing damages not only to
28
herein plaintiff but to the cargo truck as well.
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within
30
the assured clear distance ahead.
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28 Records, p. 307.
29 Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law, cited in McKee v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517, 541 (1992).
30 Emphasis supplied.
31 Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 147 (2000).
442
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32Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
33 Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
34 Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in articles 1733 and 1755.
35 TSN, 23 January 1989, p. 8 (Arriesgado).
36 Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356 (2000).
37 Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75 (2003).
443
The Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance
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Is Inapplicable in the
Case at Bar
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last
clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground 43
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been
negligent provided that the
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444
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445
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to
consider that respondent Pedrano was also negligent in
leaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights
or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that
such failure created the presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, respondent Condor, in supervising his
employees47properly and adequately. As we ruled in Poblete
v. Fabros:
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446
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1. That all powers, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in
their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting
of a triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at
least 5 cm. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty
(30) minutes or more on any street or highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the
warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away
to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, disabled or parked.
3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle
owner to procure from any source and present at registration of his vehicle,
one pair of reflectorized triangular early warning device, as described
herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.
447
The Liability of
Respondent PPSII
as Insurer
The trial court in this case did not rule on the liability of
respondent PPSII, while the appellate court ruled that, as
no evidence was presented against it, the insurance
company is not liable.
A perusal of the records will show that when the
petitioners filed the ThirdParty Complaint against
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SCHEDULED VEHICLE
MODEL MAKE TYPE OF COLOR BLT FILE
BODY NO.
Isuzu Forward Bus blue mixed
PLATE SERIAL/CHASSIS MOTOR AUTHORIZED UNLADEN
NO. NO. SER450 NO. CAPACITY 50 WEIGHT
PBP 1584124 677836 6 Cyls. Kgs.
724
SECTION 1/11 *LIMITS OF LIABILITY PREMIUMS
PAID
A. THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY P50,000.00
52
B. PASSENGER Per Person Per Accident P540.00
LIABILITY
P12,000.00 P50,000
53
In its Answer to the ThirdParty Complaint, the
respondent PPSII admitted the existence of the contract of
insurance, in view of its failure to specifically deny the
same as required
54
under then Section 8(a), Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
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51 Records, p. 41.
52 Ibid.
53 Id., at pp. 5462.
54 Now Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, and the epitaph now reads, How to contest such documents.
448
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449
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58 Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA
494 (1998).
59See Perla Campania de Seguros, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA
741 (1990).
60Annexes 1 to 6 (Answer to the Thirdparty Complaint), Records,
pp. 5762.
450
Damages to be
Awarded
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 in favor of respondent Arriesgado. The
award of exemplary damages by way of example or
64
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64
correction of the public good, is likewise in order. As65the
Court ratiocinated in Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado:
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61 Shafer v. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, 167 SCRA 386 (1988).
62 308 SCRA 559 (1999).
63 Id., at pp. 569570.
64 Article 2229, Civil Code.
65 Supra.
451
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the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to
the injured passenger or the latters heirs. The basis of this
allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,
thus:
Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner]
springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of
other vehicle] arises from quasidelict. As early as 1913, we already ruled
in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was
riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the
owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the
69
circumstances they are liable on quasidelict.
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452
SO ORDERED.
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o0o
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