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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

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2007 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007
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Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was so Weak 5b. GRANT NUMBER

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2007014369

RAN
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
CHAPTER ONE

................................................. 5

CHAPTER TWO

....................... 7

5
8
8
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

CHAPTER THREE

1-''''''''''''''''' Were

60

CHAPTER FIVE
Poor Motivation
77
77
80

86
87
 Contents

00

CHAPTER SIX
,-,,-,,on.uv. . Forces an

5
8

CHAPTER SEVEN
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
..
..
..
..

ix
x Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Summary
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Summary
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

an
Summary
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
 Summary

to mount
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Summary xix
xxi
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

route

RPG
2 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
 Introduction

..
..
..
4 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

..
..
 Introduction 5

..
6 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

..
..

..

..
7
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

less

(2004), p.
4 (2004), pp. 16.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 9

(2004), p. 16.
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

1982-1991.

?he
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations

(2004), p. 8.
13 (2004), p. 8.
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

18 (2004), p.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations

20 (2002), p. 86.
p.
14 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004), pp. 70-71.

p.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 5

AI the

27 (2004), p. 1l.
28 (2004), p. 19.
29 (2004), p. 19.
6 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2002a), pp. 186-193.

375,000 60,000 f"DUHe"
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 17

p.42).
34 (2004), p. 42.
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2002), pp. 10-12.

p.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 19

38 (2004), p. 49.
(2004), p.
40 rhe he had rhe
Coli (2003).

42

43 2004, p. 196.
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations

48

49 (2006), p. 16.
22 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), p. 8, (2004), pp. 49.

(2003), p. 8.
(2004), p. 11.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 23

(2004), p. 11.

(2003), p. AI.
24 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

"58

2005, p. 1.
GO (2004), p. 11.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 25

64

" ?he
26 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

" ?he New York

68 10, 1991, p.
 Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 27

7I (2004), p.
72 (2004), p. 6I.
73 (2004), pp.
28 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

74 1441 UC'_CHH)Cl 20,

2002.
Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations 29
(2006), pp.
32 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004), p. 12.
 Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses

to

7 (2004), p. 11.
34 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses 35
36 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

"' ....,T ..... on

16 (2006a), p. 409.
 Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses 37

19 the
(2001), pp. 71-75.
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004).
(2006a), p. 177.

" ?he New York

Saddam's Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses 39
(2003), p.

41
42 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

0300Z.
Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 43

to

the

(2004), p.
44 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

7 (2006), pp. 80-81.

exhausted." Mohammed
off. Mohammed
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 45

Forces Were Cities

..

..

..
46 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 47

(2004), pp. 99-101.

48 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

the

18 (2004), pp. 99-101.

19 (2004), p. 402.
Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 49
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed
52 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

28 Coil (2003), p. AI.

11,

(2006), p. 3I.
The Post the him the
the
Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 53

(2004).
54 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003).
(2003).
Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 55
56 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), pp. 1 12.

40 (2003).
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 57

41 (2004), p.
42 (2004), p.
43 (2003), p. 1.
44 (2003), p. 1.
58 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

2004.)
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 59

48 (2003), p. 1.
rhe lUUl- n;"H)Jl he had

(2004).
60 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

Awareness Was
Poor

p.Al).
(2003), p. AI.
Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 61

(2004), p.
62 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004).
(2004).
(2004), p.
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 63

..

..

..

(2004).
GO (2004), p.
64 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

..

..

..

61 (2006), pp. 130-131.

(2004), p.
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 65

66 (2004), pp. 434-436 500-50l.

(2004), pp. 212, 248, 301,
68 Welsh (2004), (2003), p. 12.
66 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004).

72 (2004), p.
Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 67

the
68 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 69
70 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

81 Wallace (2004).
82 Wallace (2004).
 Iraq's Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 71

83 Biddle (2003).
84 Biddle (2003).
72 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

86 Wallace (2004).
(Rer.), ?he
 Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 73

88

88 (2003).
89 Wah (2003).
74 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

91 (2002), p. 181.
 Iraq's Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed and Executed 75

9G (2003), p. AI.
97 the " Air Force lVItl!!";",,,e, 2004,
p.
98 the still killed
40
76 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
FIVE

77
78 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

?he ~TUUfUfUf

(2003), p. AI.
4

(2003), p. 1.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 79

(2004), p.
9 (2004), p.
10 (2004).
II (2003), p. 1.
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

as

(2004), p.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

13 "145 150 Fled, (UK), filed

14,
14 (2003), p. Al.
(2003), pp. 1 12.
82 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

Old the " ?he New

17 (2003), pp. 1 12.

18 (2003), p. Al.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 83

19 (2003), p. AI.
20 (2004), p.
84 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

..

..

..

(2003), p.
(2003), p.
(2003), p. AI.
24 (2003), p.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 85

..

..

(2003), p. AI.
26 (2003), p. I.
27 (2003a).
86 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

29 (2003), p.
(2003), pp.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 87

(2002).
34 (2003), p.
88 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 89

to

(2003), p. 1l.
Wah (2003).
90 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

II-T1rCAI"Y on

40 (2003), p. 8.
41 (2003), p. 1.
42 (2003), p. AI.
43 (2003), p. 1. (2003), p. AI.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 91

44

45

47 (2003), pp.
92 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

48 (2003), p. 40.

(2006), p.
(2006), p.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 93

(2006), pp. 125-126.

(2006), pp. 128-129.
(2006), p. 126.
(2006), pp. 127-128.
Wah (2003).
94 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003).
(2003).
60 Wah (2003).

61 (2003), p.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 95

(2003), p. 12.

(2003), p. 12.
64 (2003), p. 12.
96 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), p.
66 (2003), p.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 97

"67

68 (2003a).
(2006), pp.
70 Welsh (2004).
98 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense 99
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

79 (2003).
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

85 (2004), p. 1
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

88 (2003).
89 (2003).
90 (2006a), pp. 408,418, 43l.
91 (2003).
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

92 (2004).
104 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

9G
Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), p. 12.
101 Tell " ?he New York
12,2004.

(2006), p. 126. (2006a), p.

Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

(2003), p. 12.
(2004).
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003).
108Pisk (2003).
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

(2003), p. 1.

III (2003), p. AI.

 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), p. AI.
(2003), p. 12.
114 (2003).
(2003), p. 1.
 Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the Iraqi Defense

117 (2003), p.
118
(2003), p. 1.
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

121
(2003), p. 1.

(2003), p.
(2004), pp.
 14 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2003), p.
(2003), pp.
4 (2003), pp.
(2003), pp. 190-193.
 Superior Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Advantage 5

7 (2004), p.
(2003), p. 40.
 6 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

9 (2004).
 Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Advantage 17

II (2004).

13 (2004).
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

14 (2004).
(2004).
 Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Advantage 19

18
(2003).
19 (2004).
20 Wallace (2004).
Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004).
 Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an Advantage

(2004).
24 (2003), p. 1.
a
124 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
 Concluding Observations

7 (2002a), pp. 155

 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

9 (2002), pp.
10 (2002), pp. 152-177.
 Concluding Observations 127

13 163-165.
14 (2004).
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2004).
16

17 Wallace (2004).
 Concluding Observations 29

Was Fortunate As He

18 (2004).
 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

20 (2004), p.
 Concluding Observations

p.Al.

the the 2004,

p. (8).

(2003).
132 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

Invasion Promote
 Concluding Observations

..
134 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

..

145).

(2004), p.
 Concluding Observations 135

34 (2004), p. 18.
136 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

(2006a), pp. 460-462 465-470.

Wallace (2004).
Concluding Observations 137
138 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

the

43 Todd
2003, p. 217.
 Concluding Observations 39

secure

2003, A29).
140 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Concluding Observations 141
142 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Concluding Observations 143

one
145
146 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

" me

" me New York

CFLCC-See
 Bibliography 147

" me New York

148 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

" me New York

Bibliography 149
50 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

" me New York

" me New York

me
Bibliography

" me

" me New York

52 Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak