24. PT&T vs NLRC G.R. No.

118978 decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that

May 23, 1997
Gallo
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a
woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the
individual as an intangible and inalienable right.
What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment
of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring
that marriage as a trivial matter to which it
supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T
says it gives its blessings to its female employees
contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves
and other benefits it would consequently respond
for and which obviously it would have wanted to
avoid
If that employee confesses such fact of marriage,
there will be no sanction; but if such employee
conceals the same instead of proceeding to the
confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of
reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true
management policy or that we are being regaled
with responsible advocacy.
FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period
from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever
for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was
again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina
F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10,
1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to
join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated
in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor,
Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in
the memorandum, was a reminder about the
companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had
already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had
been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status
can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the
protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female
employee. It is recognized that company is free to
regulate manpower and employment from hiring to
firing, according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all
women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de
Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women
are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the
nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice
a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions
stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy,
depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status,
a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution
and ultimately, family as the foundation of the
nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for
order but also imperatively required.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that
they may deem convenient, the same should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may
even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
25. Duncan Association vs. Glaxo
G.R. No. 162994, September 19, 2005
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v.
National Labor Relations
Commission, which involved a complaint
[32]
filed by a medical representative against
his employer drug company for illegal
dismissal for allegedly terminating his
employment when he refused to accept
his reassignment to a new area, the Court
upheld the right of the drug company to
transfer or reassign its employee in
accordance with its operational demands
and requirements. The ruling of the Court
therein, quoted hereunder, also finds
application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug
salesman or medical representative is
expected to travel. He should anticipate
reassignment according to the demands of
their business. It would be a poor drug
corporation which cannot even assign its
representatives or detail men to new markets
calling for opening or expansion or to areas
where the need for pushing its products is
great. More so if such reassignments are part
of the employment contrac
Right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. The prohibition against personal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the
company. In laying down the assailed company
policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company
will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
They also argue that Tecson was constructively
dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the
Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered
a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from
attending seminars and training sessions for
medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited
from promoting respondents products which were
competing with Astras products
Facts: Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25,
1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as
a medical representative. He was assigned to market
Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an
employment contract, wherein he agreed, among
others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies;
and if management found that such relationship posed
a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
On September 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an
employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra
Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The
relationship, including the subsequent marriage,
dismayed Glaxo. On January 1999, Tecson's superiors
informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise
to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with
Tecson adverting to his wife's possible resignation from
Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to
retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet
no resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson
applied for a transfer to Glaxo's milk division, but his
application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-
movement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999,
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his
transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance
Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to
comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the Natl. Conciliation and
Mediation Board ruled that Glaxos policy was
valid. Glaxo's policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was
assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
1. WON Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in
not holding that said policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;
2. WON Tecson was constructively dismissed.
Ruling:
1. No. The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the
policy imposed by Glaxo Company, upon signing the
contract; he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said
policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships
w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships. After Tecson married Bettsy,
Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict. Glaxo
even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its
employ because of his satisfactory performance and
suggested that his wife would be the one to resign
instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated
requests for more time to resolve the conflict of
interest. When the problem could not be resolved
after several years of waiting, Glaxo was
constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area
different from that handled by his wife for Astra.
2. No. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson
from employment but only reassigned him to
another area where his home province, Agusan del
Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer,
Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons
family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion
of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
26. STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS SIMBOL
Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign
voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of
an illegal company policy
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and
attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned
company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136
of the Labor Code. They also contended that they
were dismissed due to their union membership.
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are
not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject
to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of
legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
These courts also find the no-spouse employment
policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the
general perception that spouses in the same
workplace might adversely affect the business.28 They
hold that the absence of such a bona fide
occupational qualification29 invalidates a rule
denying employment to one spouse due to the current
employment of the other spouse in the same
office.30 Thus, they rule that unless the employer can
prove that the reasonable demands of the business
require a distinction based on marital status and there
is no better available or acceptable policy which
would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee
based on the identity of the employees spouse.31 This
is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception. JUSTIFIES THE NO
SPOUSE RULE, IT SHOULD BE STRICLTY
CONSTRUED
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the
employer must prove two factors: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that
there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the
job.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in
the case at bar.
Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not
just want to have two (2) or more of its employees
related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity"38 is lame.
No showing that the relationship could be detrimental
to its business operations. The failure of petitioners to
prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees
right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based
upon stereotypes of married persons working together
in one company.40
Facts: Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a
corporation engaged in trading. Ronaldo D. Simbol
(Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E.
Estrella (Estrella) were all regular employees of the
company. Simbol was employed by the company and he
met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company,
whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco
advised the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a
company policy promulgated in 1995:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in
case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of
relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic],
one male and another female) developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and
then decided to get married, one of them should resign
to preserve the policy stated above.
Simbol resigned on pursuant to the company policy. The
same happened to Comia. Estrella met Luisito Zuiga
(Zuiga) also a co-worker. Zuiga, a married man, got
Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign. The respondents each signed a Release
and Confirmation Agreement. They stated that they
have no money and property accountabilities in the
company and that they release the latter of any claim or
demand of whatever nature.
Issue:
Whether the policy of the employer banning
spouses from working in the same company violates the
rights of the employee under the Constitution and the
Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Ruling:
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor
Code which provides: Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for
an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
It is true that the policy of petitioners
prohibiting close relatives from working in the same
company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism
employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to
prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their
status as a relative, rather than upon their ability. These
policies focus upon the potential employment problems
arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited
towards relatives.
These courts also find the no-spouse
employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to
present any evidence of business necessity other than
the general perception that spouses in the same
workplace might adversely affect the business. They
hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to
one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless
the employer can prove that the reasonable demands
of the business require a distinction based on marital
status and there is no better available or acceptable
policy which would better accomplish the business
purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an
employee based on the identity of the employees
spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide
occupational qualification justifies an employers no-
spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and
narrowly by these state courts. There must be a
compelling business necessity for which no alternative
exists other than the discriminatory practice.To justify a
bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must
prove two factors: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity
in the case at bar. Petitioners sole contention that "the
company did not just want to have two (2) or more of
its employees related between the third degree by
affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second
paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first
paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the
valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.
27. Rolando Rivera vs. Solidbank Corporation
G.R. No.163269. April 19, 2006
Gallo
Facts: Petitioner Rolando Rivera had been working for
Solidbank Corporation since July 1977. He was initially
employed as an Audit Clerk, then as Credit Investigator,
Senior Clerk, Assistant Accountant, and Assistant
Manager. Prior to his retirement, he became the
Manager of the Credit Investigation and Appraisal
Division of the Consumers Banking Group. In the
meantime, Rivera and his brother-in-law put up a
poultry business in Cavite.
In December 1994, Solidbank offered two retirement
programs to its employees: (a) the Ordinary Retirement
Program (ORP), under which an employee would
receive 85% of his monthly basic salary multiplied by
the number of years in service; and (b) the Special
Retirement Program (SRP), under which a retiring
employee would receive 250% of the gross monthly
salary multiplied by the number of years in service.
Since Rivera was only 45 years old, he was not qualified
for retirement under the ORP. Under the SRP, he was
entitled to receive P1,045,258.95 by way of benefits.
Deciding to devote his time and attention to his poultry
business in Cavite, Rivera applied for retirement under
the SRP. Subsequently, Solidbank required Rivera to
sign an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which
was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged
receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and
retirement benefits and promised that [he] would not,
at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or
indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to
the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or
subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers,
directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-
interest and will not disclose any information
concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or
operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind.
On May 1 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation
employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation
and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group.
Upon discovering this, Solidbank First Vice-President for
Human Resources Division (HRD) wrote a letter
informing Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking
and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits
he received in consideration of the SRP within five days
from receipt; otherwise, appropriate legal action would
be taken against him.
When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded
within the given period, Solidbank filed a complaint.
Petitioner avers that the prohibition incorporated in the
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim barring him as retiree
from engaging directly or indirectly in any unlawful
activity and disclosing any information concerning the
business of respondent bank, as well as the
employment ban contained in the Undertaking he
executed, is oppressive, unreasonable, cruel and
inhuman because of its overbreath.
Rivera stressed that, being a former bank
employee, it was the only kind of work he
knew. The ban was, in fact, practically
absolute since it applied to all financial
institutions for one year from February 28,
1995. He pointed out that he could not
work in any other company because he did
not have the qualifications, especially
considering his age. Moreover, after one
year from February 28, 1995, he would no
longer have any marketable skill, because
by then, it would have been rendered
obsolete by non-use and rapid technological
advances. He insisted
that the ban was not necessary to protect
the interest of Solidbank, as, in the first
place, he had no access to any secret
information which, if revealed would be
prejudicial to Solidbanks interest. In any
case, he was not one to reveal whatever
knowledge or information he may have
acquired during his employment with said
bank. RTC and CA ruled that the agreement
was not unreasonable.
The rulings of the trial court ( rendered
summary judgment and thereby foreclosed
the presentation of evidence by the parties
to prove whether the restrictive covenant is
reasonable or not.) and the appellate court
are incorrect.
Issue: Whether or not the post-retirement competitive
employment ban is reasonable.
One (1) year from February 28, 1995
Ruling: On the face of the Undertaking, the post-
retirement competitive employment ban
unreasonable because it has no geographical limits;
respondent is barred from accepting any kind of
employment in any competitive bank within (1yr) the
proscribed period. Although the period of one year may
appear reasonable, the matter of whether the
restriction is reasonable or unreasonable cannot be
ascertained with finality solely from the terms and
conditions of the Undertaking, or even in tandem with
the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
Thus, in determining whether the contract
is reasonable or not, the trial court should
consider the following factors: (a) whether
the covenant protects a legitimate business
interest of the employer; (b) whether the
covenant creates an undue burden on the
employee; (c) whether the covenant is
injurious to the public welfare; (d) whether
the time and territorial limitations
contained in the covenant are reasonable;
and (e) whether the restraint is reasonable
from the standpoint of public policy.
In cases where an employee assails a
contract containing a provision prohibiting
him or her from accepting competitive
employment as against public policy, the
employer has to adduce evidence to prove
that the restriction is reasonable and not
greater than necessary to protect the
employers legitimate business
[54]
interests. The restraint may not be
unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing the
employees legitimate efforts to earn a
livelihood and must be reasonable in light
of sound public policy.[55]
Thus, the court must have before it
evidence relating to the legitimate interests
of the employer which might be protected in
terms of time, space and the types of activity
proscribed.[60]
is
Consideration must be given to the
employees right to earn a living and to his
ability to determine with certainty the area
within which his employment ban is
restituted. A provision on territorial
limitation is necessary to guide an employee
of what constitutes as violation of a
restrictive covenant and whether the
geographic scope is co-extensive with that in
which the employer is doing business. In
considering a territorial restriction, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case
must be considered.
The Court reiterates that the determination of
reasonableness is made on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case.
Consideration must be given to the employees right to
earn a living and to his ability to determine with
certainty the area within which his employment ban is
restituted. A provision on territorial limitation is
necessary to guide an employee of what constitutes as
violation of a restrictive covenant and whether the
geographic scope is co-extensive with that in which the
employer is doing business. In considering a territorial
restriction, the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case must be considered.
We have reviewed the Undertaking which respondent
impelled petitioner to sign, and find that in case of
failure to comply with the promise not to accept
competitive employment within one year from February
28, 1995, respondent will have a cause of action against
petitioner for "protection in the courts of law." The
words "cause of action for protection in the courts of
law" are so broad and comprehensive, that they may
also include a cause of action for prohibitory and
mandatory injunction against petitioner, specific
performance plus damages, or a damage suit (for
actual, moral and/or exemplary damages), all inclusive
of the restitution of the P963,619.28 which petitioner
received from respondent. The Undertaking and the
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim do not provide for the
automatic forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received
under the SRP upon his breach of said deeds.
On the assumption that the competitive employment
ban in the Undertaking is valid, petitioner is not
automatically entitled to return the P963,619.28 he
received from respondent. To reiterate, the terms of
the Undertaking clearly state that any breach by
petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to a
cause of action for protection in the courts of law; as
such, restitution of the P963,619.28 will not follow as a
matter of course. Respondent is still burdened to prove
its entitlement to the aforesaid amount by producing
the best evidence of which its case is susceptible.
28. Yrasuegui vs. PAL
G.R. No. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008
Facts: Complainant was an international flight steward
who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to
the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner
Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight
steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five
feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame. The
proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual[1] of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to
1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4,
1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the companys weight
standards, prompting another leave without pay
from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner
was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight
problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay
from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209
pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty
effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally
requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report
for weight checks on several
dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services
of the company physician should he wish to do so. He
was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3,
1989.[2]
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent
weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead
of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds,
which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his
off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator
Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his
residence to check on the
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given
him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of
the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such
time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite
that, he was given one more month to comply with the
weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report
for weight check on different dates. He was reminded
that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory
compliance with the weight standards.[5]
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight
checks, although he was seen submitting his passport
for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally
warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given
another set of weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner
ignored the directive and did not report for weight
checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to
explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.[7]
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30,
1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still
way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from
petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for
leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219
pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205
pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served
petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight
requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge within which to file his answer and
submit controverting evidence.[8]
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held
that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable.[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed
weight standards.[39] It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.[40
Issue: Was the dismissal valid?
. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal
under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the
bona fide occupational qualification defense.
In order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employees
position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these
standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose
express terms require the element of willfulness in
order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet
the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground
that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and
is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Ruling: SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation
pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the
employee as an act of social justice or based on equity.
This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character. The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the
context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. [v] Voluntariness basically means that the
just cause is solely attributable to the employee without
any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized
just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job.
BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance
Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail
The Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or
the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contains
provisions similar to BFOQ.
Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether
an employment policy is justified.
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to
the performance of the job;
(2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of that work related purpose
and
(3) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that
in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and
 (2) that there is factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company

policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is
valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. The weight
standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public
policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers it transports. The primary
objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at
all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on
their ability to care for the passengers when something
goes wrong.

Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just

cause
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally
dismissed employee as an act social justice, or based
on equity. Provided the dismissal:
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of
the employee.
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-
half (1/2) months pay for every year of service.