Media Discourse and Public Opinion On Nuclear Power: A Constructionist

Media Discourse and Public Opinion
on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist

Approach'L
WilliamA. Gamson
Boston College
AndreModigliani
UniversityofMichigan
Media discourseand public opinionare treatedas two parallelsys-

tems of constructing meaning.This paper explorestheirrelation-
ship by analyzingthe discourseon nuclearpower in fourgeneral
audiencemedia: televisionnews coverage,newsmagazineaccounts,
editorialcartoons,and syndicatedopinioncolumns.The analysis
traces the careers of differentinterpretivepackages on nuclear
powerfrom1945to thepresent.This media discourse,it is argued,
is an essentialcontextforunderstandingthe formationof public
opinionon nuclearpower. More specifically,it helpsto accountfor
such surveyresultsas the decline in supportfor nuclear power
beforeThreeMile Island, a reboundaftera burstofmediapublicity
has died out, the gap betweengeneralsupportfornuclearpower
and supportfora plant in one's own community, and the changed
relationshipof age to supportfornuclearpower from1950 to the
present.
Atomsforpeace. Your friend,the atom. Electricitytoo cheap to meter.

Dr. Spock is worried.The Clamshell Alliance. The China Syndrome.
Images ofcoolingtowersat ThreeMile Island. Chernobylis everywhere.
These are nuggetsfroma publicdiscourseon nuclearpowerthatmostof
us instantlyrecognize.
Nuclear power, like every policy issue, has a culture.There is an
ongoingdiscoursethat evolves and changesover time,providinginter-
1 The researchreported
herehas beensupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundation
grantsSES-801642and SES-8309343.We hadhelpfulcomments onearlierdrafts
from
WilliamHoynes,Elihu Katz, SharonKurtz,CharlotteRyan, Howard Schuman,
David Stuart,and theanonymous reviewers.Requestsforreprintsshouldbe sentto
WilliamA. Gamson,Department ofSociology,BostonCollege,ChestnutHill,Massa-
chusetts02167.
? 1989byThe University
ofChicago.All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/90/9501-0001$01
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
pretationsand meaningsforrelevantevents.An archivistmightcatalog

the metaphors,catchphrases,visual images, moral appeals, and other
symbolicdevices thatcharacterizethisdiscourse.The catalog would be
organized,ofcourse,sincetheelementsare clustered;we encounterthem
not as individualitemsbut as interpretive packages.
On mostpolicyissues, thereare competingpackages available in this
culture.Indeed, one can view policyissuesas, in part,a symboliccontest
over which interpretation will prevail. This culturalsystemhas a logic
and dynamicof its own. Packages ebb and flowin prominenceand are
constantly revisedand updatedto accommodatenew events.The process
by which this issue cultureis produced and changed needs to be ac-
countedforin itsown right,regardlessofanyclaimsthatone mightmake
about its causal effecton public opinion.
Parallel to thisculturallevel is a cognitiveone of individualsmaking
sense of the same issue. Individualsbringtheirown lifehistories,social
interactions,and psychologicalpredispositionsto the process of con-
structingmeaning; they approach an issue with some anticipatory
schema,albeitsometimeswitha verytentativeone. Most publicopinion
studiesfocuson theaggregateoutcomesofthisprocess-that is, attitudes
forand against particularpolicies-and on how such attitudeschange
overtime.The findingssuggestwhichschemataare sharedand therela-
tive popularityof different competitors.
Both levels of analysisinvolvethe social construction of meaning.By
examiningdiscourseand public opinionas parallelsystems,we deliber-
atelyavoid makingcertaincausal assumptions.We do not,in thispaper,
argue that changesin media discoursecause changesin public opinion.
Each systeminteractswith the other: media discourseis part of the
processby which individualsconstructmeaning,and public opinionis
partof theprocessby whichjournalistsand otherculturalentrepreneurs
develop and crystallizemeaningin public discourse.
A full explorationof this interactionbetween media discourseand
opinionformationrequiresan analysisof both systemsover several is-
sues. In thispaper, our attemptis moremodest:to show how changing
media discourseon nuclearpowerprovidesan essentialcontextforinter-
pretinga varietyofsurveyresultson nuclearpower.But ourargumenton
how mediadiscourseand publicopinioninteractwillnotbe clearwithout
a fullerexplicationof our underlying model.
The Nature of Media Discourse

Public discourseis carriedon in manydifferent forums.Ratherthan a
singlepublicdiscourse,it is moreusefulto thinkofa setofdiscoursesthat
interactin complexways. On an issue such as nuclearpower,thereis the

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specialist'sdiscourseusingjournalsand otherprintmedia aimedat those

whose professionallives involve themin the issue. There is the largely
oral discourseused by officialswho are directlyinvolved in decision-
makingroles on the issue and by thosewho attemptto influencethem.
Thereis thechallengerdiscourse,providingpackagesthatare intendedto
mobilizetheiraudiencesforsome formof collectiveaction.
Generalaudience media, then,are onlysome of theforumsforpublic
discourseon an issue. If one is interestedin predictingpolicyoutcomes,
theyare not necessarilythe mostimportantforums.But if one is inter-
estedin public opinion,thenmedia discoursedominatesthe largerissue
culture,bothreflecting it and contributing to itscreation.Journalists
may
draw theirideas and languagefromany or all of the otherforums,fre-
quentlyparaphrasingor quotingtheirsources. At the same time,they
contributetheirown framesand inventtheirown clevercatchphrases,
drawingon a popular culturethattheyshare withtheiraudience.
The media, in thismodel,servea complexrole. They are, on the one
hand, partof the processby whichissue culturesare produced.Because
theirrole is believedto be so centralin framingissues forthe attentive
public,theyare also, to quote Gurevitchand Levy (1985,p. 19),"a siteon
whichvarioussocial groups,institutions, and ideologiesstruggleoverthe
definition and construction of social reality."Generalaudiencemedia are
nottheonlyforumsforpublicdiscourse,but,sincetheyconstantly make
available suggestedmeaningsand are the most accessible in a media-
saturatedsocietysuch as the UnitedStates,theircontentcan be used as
the mostimportantindicatorof the generalissue culture.
Media packages.-We suggestedearlierthat media discoursecan be
conceivedof as a set of interpretive packages that give meaningto an
issue. A packagehas an internalstructure. At itscoreis a centralorganiz-
ingidea, orframe,formakingsenseofrelevantevents,suggesting whatis
at issue. "Media frames,"Gitlin(1980, p. 7) writes,"largelyunspoken
and unacknowledged,organizetheworldbothforjournalistswho report
it and, in some importantdegree,forus who relyon theirreports."This
frametypicallyimpliesa rangeof positions,ratherthanany singleone,
allowingfora degreeof controversy amongthosewho share a common
frame.Finally,a package offersa numberof different condensingsym-
bols that suggestthe core frameand positionsin shorthand,makingit
possibleto displaythe package as a whole witha deftmetaphor,catch-
phrase,or othersymbolicdevice.2
2 We distinguishframing devicesthatsuggesthow to thinkabouttheissueand rea-
soningdevicesthatjustifywhatshouldbe doneaboutit. The fiveframing devicesare
(1) metaphors,(2) exemplars(i.e., historical examplesfromwhichlessonsare drawn),
(3) catchphrases,
(4) depictions, and (5) visualimages(e.g.,icons).The threereasoning
devicesare(1) roots(i.e., a causal analysis),(2) consequences
(i.e., a particular
typeof

To illustrate,considera package about the use of nuclearpower to

one we label progress:3
generateelectricity,
If theelectricchairhad beeninvented beforetheelectric light,wouldwe
stillbe usingkerosene lamps?Therehas alwaysbeenresistance totechno-
logicalprogress bynervousNellieswhosee onlytheproblems and ignore
thebenefits. Resistancetonuclearenergydevelopment is thelatestversion
of thisirrationalfearof progressand change,theexpression of modern
pastoralistsandnuclearLuddites.Certainly nuclearenergy developmentis
notfreeofproblems, butproblems canbe solved,as thehistory oftechno-
logicalprogressshows.Thefailure todevelopnuclearpowerwillretard our
economic growth andmakeus renegeon ourobligation tothepoorandto
future Ifcoercive
generations. utopiansprevent usfrom moving aheadnow
withnuclearenergy, thenextgenerationis likelytobe sittingaroundinthe
darkblaming theutilities
fornotdoingsomething thisgeneration'sofficials
wouldnotletthemdo.
This package framesthe nuclearpower issue in termsof the society's
commitment to technologicaldevelopmentand economicgrowth.Frames
shouldnotbe confusedwithpositionsforor againstsomepolicymeasure.
While this package is clearlypronuclear,thereis ample room fordis-
agreementwithinthe overallframe-for example,on what typeof reac-
tors should be built. Not everydisagreementis a framedisagreement;
differences between(say) Republicansand Democratsor "liberals"and
"conservatives" on manyissuesmayreflect a sharedframe.Nor can every
package be identifiedwith a clear-cutpolicy position.On almost any
issue,thereare packages thatare betterdescribedas ambivalentthanas
pro or con.
Packages, if theyare to remainviable, have the task of constructing
meaning over time, incorporatingnew events into their interpretive
frames.In effect,theycontaina storyline or, to use Bennett's(1975)
term,a scenario.The progresspackage,forexample,mustbe able to deal
withtheaccidentsat ThreeMile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl,providing
themwitha meaningthat is plausibleand consistentwiththe frame.If
and (3) appeals to principle(i.e., a set of moralclaims).A packagecan be

effect),
summarized matrixthatstatestheframe,therangeofpositions,
in a signature and the
eightdifferenttypesofsignature elementsthatsuggestthiscorein a condensedman-
ner.For a fullerpresentationofthispartofthemodel,see Gamsonand Lasch (1983).
3 We followtheconvention ofpresenting packagesas indentedquotations,although
theyare in fact a combinationof paraphrasingand directquotes frommultiple
sources.The acid testof a statement of a packageshouldbe its acceptanceby an
advocatethatthestatement is a fairone. We attempt tomeetthistestbyrelyingon the
languageofadvocatesand sponsors,derivingit fromtheirpamphlets and otherwrit-
ings.In thisinstance,we paraphraseor quotematerialsfromtheAtomicIndustrial
Forum,theEdison ElectricInstitute, theCommittee on EnergyAwareness,and the
pronuclear writings ofneoconservatives (see Nisbet1979;McCracken1977,1979).

Nuclear Power
the eventis not one thatthe scenariopredictsor expects,thisonlychal-

lengestheingenuityand supplenessof theskillfulculturalentrepreneur.
How does one account for the developmentof this package and its
competitorsover time and especiallyfor theirrelativeprominencein
media discourse?Our model treatsthe contentof the discourseas the
outcome of a value-added process. As an illustrationof this concept,
considerthe exampleof automobileproduction.Each stage-the mining
of ironore, smelting,tempering,shaping,assembling,painting,deliver-
ing, selling-adds its value to the final product. Furthermore,these
stagesmay be thoughtof as determinants that,in combination,specify
thefinaloutcome.In thissense,they"explain"or accountforwhateverit
is thatis finallyproduced.4
The productionof issue culturescan be thoughtof as such a process.
The modelpostulatesthreebroadclassesofdeterminants thatcombineto
produceparticularpackage careers:culturalresonances,sponsoractivi-
ties, and media practices.
A. Cultural resonances:Not all symbolsare equally potent.Certain
packages have a natural advantage because theirideas and language
resonatewithlargerculturalthemes.Resonancesincreasetheappeal ofa
package;theymake it appear naturaland familiar.Those who respondto
the largerculturalthemewill findit easierto respondto a package with
the same sonorities.Snow and Benford(1988) make a similarpointin
discussingthe"narrativefidelity" ofa frame.Some frames"resonatewith
culturalnarrations,thatis, withthestories,myths,and folktalesthatare
part and parcel of one's culturalheritage."5
The progresspackage benefitsby its resonanceswitha largercultural
themeof technologicalprogress.Few would question the appeal of a
"technofix" fora wide varietyof problemsin Americansociety.As Wil-
liamswritesin commenting on Americanvalues, " 'Efficient'
is a wordof
highpraisein a societythathas longemphasizedadaptability,technologi-
cal innovation,economicexpansion,up-to-dateness, practicality,expe-
diency,'gettingthingsdone' "(1960, p. 428). The inventoris a central
4 The economicmodelofvalueaddedhas beenusedmostprominently

in sociology
by
Smelser(1963)in his TheoryofCollectiveBehavior.In spiteof theinfluence of this
work,thegenerallinearmodelso dominatesthethinking ofmostAmericansociolo-
giststhattheyfinditdifficult
tothinkinvalue-addedterms,immediately attemptingto
translatesuchmodelsintothelanguageofdependent and independentvariables.But
itis confusing
ratherthanhelpfultothinkofan automobile as thedependentvariable,
whilemining,smelting, painting,and deliveryare consideredindependentvariables.
5 Theyalso use theterm"frame resonance,"but to referto thelinkbetweenculture
and cognition-i.e.,to connectthecontent ofa frameand theresponseofan audience
member.In contrast, we use theterms"culturalresonance" and "narrative
fidelity"
to
linkdifferent
partsoftheculturalsystem-i.e.,to connectsymbolson a specific issue
withmoreenduringculturalthemes.

culturalhero-embodied in the mythsabout Benjamin Franklinand

Thomas Edison. Masteryover natureis the way to progress:good old
Americaningenuityand know-how.
It is usefulto thinkofthemesdialectically.Thereis no themewithouta
countertheme. The themeis conventionaland normative;the counter-
themeis adversarialand contentious.But both are rootedin American
culture,and bothcan be importantin assessingthe outcomeof any spe-
cificsymboliccontest.
Americanculturealso containsa countertheme thatis skepticalof, or
even hostileto, technology.To quote Emerson,"Thingsare in thesaddle
and ridemankind."Harmonywithnatureratherthanmasteryover it is
stressed.We live on a "small planet." Our technology mustbe appropri-
ate and in properscale. There is an ecosystemto maintain,and themore
we tryto controlnaturethroughour technology, themorewe disruptits
naturalorderand threatenthe qualityof our lives. Thoreau at Walden
Pond is also part of the Americanculturalheritage.
Much of popularculturefeaturesthecountertheme: Chaplin'sModern
Times, Huxley's Brave New World,and Kubrick's2001 and countless
otherfilmsabout technologygone mad and out of control,a Franken-
stein'smonsterabout to turnon its creator.If progressbenefitsby its
resonancewiththetheme,two ofitscompetitors, runawayand softpaths
(discussedbelow), draw muchof theirsymbolismfromdifferent partsof
the countertheme.
Since culturalthemesremainconstant,it maybe unclearhow theycan
help us to explain changes in the ebb and flow of packages in media
discourse.Resonancesare theearlieststagein thevalue-addedprocess.A
package'sresonances,we argue,facilitatetheworkofsponsorsbytuning
theears ofjournaliststo itssymbolism.They add prominence to packages
by amplifying the effectof sponsoractivitiesand media practices.
B. Sponsoractivities:Much of the changingcultureof an issue is the
productof enterprise.Packages frequently have sponsors,interestedin
promotingtheircareers.Sponsorshipis morethan merelyadvocacy,in-
volvingsuch tangibleactivitiesas speechmaking,interviewswithjour-
nalists,advertising,articleand pamphletwriting,and thefilingof legal
briefsto promotea preferred package.
These sponsorsare usuallyorganizations,employingprofessionalspe-
cialistswhose dailyjobs bringthemintocontactwithjournalists.Their
jobs breed sophisticationabout the news needs of the media and the
normsand habitsof workingjournalists.Indeed, manyof theseprofes-
sionals began as journalistsbeforemovingto public relationsjobs. As
Sigal (1973, p. 75) pointsout, professional
sponsorsadjust "theirthinking
to newsmen'sconventions.They talk the same language."
The sponsorof a package is typicallyan agentwho is promoting some

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collectiveratherthan personalagenda. These agentsfrequently draw on

theresourcesof an organizationto preparematerialsin a formthatlends
itselfto readyuse. Condensingsymbolsis thejournalist'sstock-in-trade.
Smartsourcesare well aware of thejournalist'sfancyforthe apt catch-
phraseand providesuitableones to suggestthe frametheywant.
For nuclearpower,as on mostissues,publicofficialsare oftenimpor-
tant sponsors.The AtomicEnergyCommissionand its successoragen-
cies,theNuclearRegulatoryCommissionand theDepartmentofEnergy,
have been importantsponsorsoftheprogresspackage. Theirefforts have
been supplementedby industrygroups such as the AtomicIndustrial
Forum, the Edison Electric Institute,and the Committeeon Energy
Awareness.A neoconservative advocacynetworkhas helpedto articulate
and spread thispackage throughitsjournals.
Social movementorganizationsare also importantsponsorsin this
framingprocess.Snow and Benford(1988, p. 198) pointout theirroleas
"signifying agents"thatare activelyengagedin the productionof mean-
ing: "They frame . . . relevant events and conditions in ways that are
intendedto mobilizepotentialadherentsand constituents, to garnerby-
standersupport,and to demobilizeantagonists."
Major sponsorsof antinuclearpackages includeenvironmental groups
suchas FriendsoftheEarth,consumerprotection groupssuchas Critical
Mass, professional groupssuchas theUnionofConcernedScientists,and
direct-actiongroupssuch as the ClamshellAlliance. Gamson (1988) ar-
gues that the antinuclearmovement-througha combinationof direct
action and more conventionalpoliticalaction-so changed media dis-
coursethatthe accidentsat TMI and Chernobylweregivensignificantly
differentframesthan theywould have receivedin an earlierdiscourse
context.
C. Media practices:That sponsorsare activedoes notimplythatjour-
nalistsare passive. Journalists'
workingnormsand practicesadd consid-
erable value to the process. A numberof studentsof Americannews
organizationshave argued that journalistsunconsciouslygive official
packagesthebenefitofthedoubt. In somecases, officialassumptionsare
taken for granted,but even when theyare challengedby sponsorsof
alternativepackages,itis thesecompetitors thatbear theburdenofproof.
A weakerformofthisargumentis thatjournalistsmakeofficialpackages
the startingpointfordiscussingan issue.
Various observershave notedhow subtlyand unconsciously thispro-
cess operates.Halberstam(1979, p. 414) describeshow WalterCronkite's
concernwithavoidingcontroversy led to his acceptanceof the assump-
tions underlyingofficialpackages: "To him, editorializingwas going
againstthe government.He had littleawareness,nor did his employers
want him to, of the editorializing
whichhe did automaticallyby uncon-

sciouslygoingalong withthe government's position."In additionto this

tendencyto fall into officialdefinitionsof an issue, journalistsare espe-
cially likelyto have routinerelationshipswith officialsponsors.Most
Americanreportingis the productof ongoingnews routines.6
Other media normsand practicesin the United States-particularly
the balance norm-favor certainrivals to the officialpackage. In news
accounts,interpretation is generallyprovidedthroughquotations,and
balance is providedby quotingspokespersonswithcompetingviews. In
the commentaryprovided by syndicatedcolumnistsand cartoonists,
normsof balance generallyprevailat the aggregatelevel. Whilean indi-
vidual columnistis not expectedto providemore than one package, a
rangeof "liberal"and "conservative"commentators are used to observe
thisnorm.
The balance normis, of course,a vague one, and the practicesthatit
givesriseto favorcertainpackages over others.Organizedoppositionto
officialviews is a necessaryconditionfor activatingthe norm,which,
once invoked, encouragesthe tendencyto reduce controversy to two
competingpositions-an officialone and (ifthereis one) the alternative
sponsoredby the mostvestedmemberof the polity.In manycases, the
criticsmay share the same unstated,commonframeas officials.
The balance norm,however,is rarelyinterpreted to includechallenger
packages, even when no otheralternativeis available. Tuchman (1974,
p. 112) argues that balance in televisionnews "means in practicethat
RepublicansmayrebutDemocratsand vice versa,"but that"supposedly
illegitimatechallengers"are rarelyofferedthe opportunityto criticize
governmentstatements.Instead, she suggests,reporterssearch for an
"establishment critic"or fora " 'responsiblespokesman'whomtheyhave
themselvescreatedor promotedto a positionof prominence."
But challengerscan have an importantindirecteffecton media dis-
course.Theirown preferred packagesmaybe ignored,buttheycreatethe
conditionsfor more establishedcriticsto gain media prominence.On
nuclearpower,as Gamson (1988, p. 235) puts it, "When demonstrators
are arrestedat Seabrook,phonesringat the Union of ConcernedScien-
tists."
6 Sigal(1973)examinedover1,000storiesfromtheNew YorkTimesand theWashing-
tonPost and classifiedthechannelsby whichtheinformation reachedthereporter.
Routinechannelsincludedofficialproceedings,pressreleases,pressconferences, and
scheduledofficialevents.Informalchannelsincludedbackgroundbriefings, leaks,
nongovernmental proceedings, and reportsfromothernews organizations. Finally,
enterprisechannelsincludedinterviews conductedat thereporter's initiative,
spon-
taneouseventsthat a reporterobservedfirsthand, independent research,and the
own conclusionsor analysis.He foundthatonlyaboutone-quarter
reporter's of the
storiescame fromenterprise channels,whileroutinechannelsaccountedforalmost
60%.

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In sum,packagessucceedin media discoursethrougha combinationof

culturalresonances,sponsoractivities,and a successfulfitwith media
normsand practices. Public opinion influencesthis process indirectly
throughjournalists'beliefs,sometimesinaccurate,about what the audi-
ence is thinking.Many journalistsstraddlethe boundarybetweenpro-
ducersand consumersof meaning.These journalists-editorialwriters,
cartoonists,opinioncolumnists,and the like-are not engaged in con-
structingaccounts of raw happenings.They observe and react to the
same mediaaccounts,alreadypartlyframedand presentedin a contextof
meaning,thatare available to otherreadersand viewers.In theircom-
mentaryon an issue, theyfrequently attemptto articulateand crystallize
a set of responsesthattheyhope or assume will be sharedby theirinvis-
ible audience.
The Nature of Public Opinion

"Is thereanyoneout therenot thinkingabout thisnightmareof the nu-
clearage, talkingabout it, learningfromit?"beganNBC's Tom Brokaw
in one of his daily updates on the Chernobylnuclearaccident.How do
ordinarycitizenscome to understanda complexissue such as nuclear
power?On manyissues, people encounterrelevantphenomenadirectly
ratherthanthroughmass-mediaaccounts.Theytryto understandevents
in lightof what touchestheirlives. But fewof us have experienceswith
nuclearpower.
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur's "dependencytheory"(1976, 1982) sug-
geststhattheroleofthemediain theprocessofconstructing meaningwill
varyfromissue to issue. On some issues, the audience has littleexperi-
ence by whichto judge media-generated imagesand meanings;concern-
ingotherissues,theyhave a greatdeal. The media-dependency hypothe-
sis suggeststhatthe relativeimportanceof media discoursedependson
how readily available meaning-generating experiencesare in people's
everydaylives.
Even in theapparentlylimitingcase of nuclearpower,however,there
are morerelevantexperiencesthan one mightthink.Take the issue of
evacuation plans in the event of nuclear accidents.In Boston, forex-
ample,virtuallyeveryoneis aware ofhow a singleautomobileaccidenton
the centralarterycan paralyzetrafficin and out of the cityforhours.
They can bringthistypeof practicalknowledgeto bear in evaluatingthe
realismof nuclear evacuation plans.7 Even concerningnuclear power,
then,media dependencyis farfromcomplete.
7 Thisexampleis drawnfromresearchin progress

in whichwe construct
peergroups
to discussnuclearpowerand otherissues.

However dependentthe audience may be on media discourse,they

activelyuse itto constructmeaningand are notsimplya passiveobjecton
whichthe media work theirmagic. Swidler(1986, p. 273) invitesus to
thinkof culture"as a 'tool kit' of symbols,stories,rituals,and world-
views, whichpeople may use in varyingconfigurations to solve different
kindsof problems."The problemin thiscase is to make sense of public
affairs.Media discourse,we argue,providesmanyof theessentialtools.
Note thatthismodelof therelationshipofmedia discourseand public
opinion does not argue that media discoursecauses public opinionto
change. But if packages and theirelementsare essentialtools, thenit
makesa considerabledifference thatsomeare morereadilyavailable than
others.Making senseof theworldrequiresan effort, and thosetoolsthat
are developed, spotlighted,and made readilyaccessiblehave a higher
probabilityof beingused.
THE NUCLEAR POWER DISCOURSE

Our analysisfocuseson nationalmedia discourseand, morespecifically,
on televisionnetworknews,majornewsmagazineaccounts,editorialcar-
toons,and syndicatedcolumns.We take all relevantmaterialon nuclear
powerduringthelimitedtimeperiodsthatwe sample. This includesthe
networkeveningnewsbroadcastson ABC, CBS, and NBC; Time,News-
week, and U.S. News and WorldReport;and a "saturation"sample of
editorialcartoonsand syndicatedopinioncolumnns thatincludesvirtually
all thosepublishedduringthe sample periods.
The cartoonsand opinioncolumnsare drawnfroma sampleof the 10
daily newspapersin each offiveregions.We calculate
largest-circulation
how close we are to saturationby examiningeach wave of fivenewspa-
pers and calculatingthe percentageof new entriesthat theyyield. We
defineour setas completewhentheindexofnew entriesis below 20% for
two successivewaves. For example,the last 10 newspaperswe sampled
in 1953yielded29 columnsbut onlytwo thatwerenotalreadyincluded.
We use our media sample as an indicatorof the issue culturethat
people draw on to constructmeaning.We do not,of course,assumethat
people have watchedall threetelevisionnetworksor read the50 newspa-
persfromwhichwe draw our cartoonsand opinioncolumns.But we do
assume that the nationalissue culturethatour media sample reflectsis
accessibleto thosewho tryto makesenseofnuclearpower,eitherdirectly
throughnationalmedia or throughlocal media and personalconversa-
tionsabout the issue.
Ideally, we would want a continuousrecordof media discourse,with
no time gaps. But we also want a recordthat transcendsthe idiosyn-
10

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crasiesof a given medium.Together,theserequirements presentover-

whelmingpracticalobstacles,and some compromisesare necessary.
Our timesamplingfocuseson what Chilton(1987) calls "criticaldis-
coursemoments,"whichmakethecultureofan issuevisible.Theystimu-
late commentary in themedia by sponsorsand journalists.Withcontinu-
ing issues such as nuclear power, journalistslook for"pegs"-that is,
topical eventsthat providean opportunity forbroader,morelong-term
coverageand commentary. These pegsprovideus witha way ofidentify-
ing thosetimeperiodsin whichissue packages are especiallylikelyto be
displayed.
The eventswe sampletypicallycreatesomeperturbation. Sponsorsfeel
called upon to reasserttheirpreferredpackagesand to interpret thelatest
developmentin lightof them.This increasestheefficiency of our search
by focusingour efforts on periodswhen commentary is especiallydense.
But by samplingin thisfashion,we end up witha small seriesof snap-
shotsof media discourseat irregularintervalsinsteadof a movie,which
we would prefer.The analysisbelow necessarilyreflectsthislimitation.
Part of our presentationis based on a systematiccontentanalysisthat
uses standardcodingand reliability techniques.For this,we used a three-
digit code that breaks packages down into specificidea elements.For
example,withintheprogresspackage, thecode providessuch categories
as "Underdevelopednationscan especiallybenefitfrompeacefuluses of
nuclearenergy,""Nuclear power is necessaryformaintainingeconomic
growthand our way of life,"and "Nuclear power opponentsare afraid
of change." The coder looks fora specificidea such as one of the above
ratherthanmakinga globaljudgmenton whichpackageitrepresents. Of
course,sincethefirstdigitgroupssubcodesbytheoverallpackage,coders
findthe package distinctionsusefulin knowingwhere to search. Two
independentcoderswere used on a sample of material,and distinctions
among code categorieswere not maintainedwheneverthe reliability
failedto reach 80%.8
Some of our analysis,especiallyof visual imagery,is morequalitative
and interpretive. Here we attemptto presentenoughrichtextualmaterial
so thatreaderscan formtheirown independent judgmentson thevalidity
of our argument.Wheneverpossible, we draw on otheranalystswho
have examinedsome aspect of nucleardiscourse.Since the storyis fre-
quentlyin thedetails,thisnecessarilyimpliesa largenumberofconcrete
illustrationsand a somewhatlengthypresentation.
8
Fora copyofthecompletecodeused,writetothefirstauthor.Further detailson the
sampling,compiling,
and codingprocessand thereliabilities
involvedarepresented in
Gamsonand Modigliani(1987,pp. 171-74).
11

1. The Age of Dualism: From Hiroshimathroughthe 1960s

The cultureof nuclearpower has been indeliblymarkedby Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Public awarenessbeginswiththeimagesofsudden,enor-
mous destruction,symbolizedin the risingmushroomcloud of a nuclear
bombblast. Even whendiscoursefocuseson theuse ofnuclearreactorsto
produce electricity,the afterimageof the bomb is never far fromthe
surface.
Boyer'srichanalysisof Americannucleardiscoursefrom1945 to 1950
showshow rapidlytheseimagesofunlimiteddestruction becamecentral.
H. V. Kaltenborn,in his NBC eveningnews broadcastreporting on the
firstatomicbomb,toldhisradioaudiencethat"For all we know,we have
createda Frankenstein!We mustassumethatwiththepassage of onlya
littletime,an improvedformof the new weapon we use todaycan be
turnedagainstus" (Boyer 1985,p. 5). Lifemagazine,withover5 million
circulation,devotedmuchofitsAugust20, 1945,issueto thebomb,with
full-pagephotographsof the toweringmushroomclouds over Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The languagethataccompaniedthesefrightening images
was equally ferocious.Today, fearsof extinction,as Boyerpointsout,
"seem so familiaras to be almosttrite,but it is importantto recognize
how quicklyAmericansbegan to articulatethem"(1985, p. 15).
The progresspackage on nuclearenergy,describedabove, was just as
quick offthe mark. A dualism about nuclearenergyis part of its core.
Boyer pointsto the either/or structureof so manypost-Hiroshimapro-
nouncements:"Either civilizationwould vanish in a cataclysmicholo-
caust,or theatomicfuturewould be unimaginably bright"(1985,p. 125).
"We face the prospecteitherof destructionon a scale which dwarfs
anythingthus far reported,"said the New YorkTimesin an editoriala
day afterHiroshima,"or of a goldenera of social change whichwould
satisfythe mostromanticutopian."A PhilipWyliearticlein the Septem-
ber 1945Collier'swas titled"Deliveranceor Doom." By September1945,
Dwight Macdonald was already calling such a view an "officialplati-
tude": "The officialplatitudeabout AtomicFission is that it can be a
Force for Good (production)or a Force for Evil (war), and that the
problemis simplyhow to use its Good ratherthanits Bad potentialities"
(Macdonald 1945, p. 58).
Boyerarguesthatthe faithexpressedin theatom'speacetimepromise
was "part of the process by which the nation muted its awarenessof
Hiroshimaand Nagasaki and of even morefrightening futureprospects"
(1985, p. 127). Not onlywas it an "anodyneto terror,"but it also helped
to assuage any lingeringdiscomfortover the destructionthat America
had alreadywroughtwith the fearsomeatom. A peace-lovingAmerica
shouldembracethechallengeof makingtheatom"a benevolentservant"
12

Nuclear Power
to produceforhumankind"morecomforts,moreleisure,betterhealth,
moreofreal freedom[and] a muchhappierlife"(Waymack1947,p. 214).
AtomicEnergyCommission(AEC) chairmanLewis Strausscontributed
a phrasethatbecame a permanentpartof theissue culturewhenhe told
the National Associationof Science Writersin 1954 that "It is not too
much to expect that our childrenwill enjoy in theirhomes electrical
energytoo cheap to meter."
Not all thediscoursethatBoyerreviewswas equallyoptimistic.There
were certainlycautiousskepticschallengingthe utopianclaims. But this
is a debate withina frame,a disagreement overhow fastand how easily
the promiseof nuclear energywill be realized. As long as the issue is
framedas a choicebetweenatomsforwar and atomsforpeace, it is hard
to see who could be againstnuclearpowerdevelopment.
Nuclear dualismremainedessentiallyunchallengedforthe nextquar-
tercentury.On December 8, 1953, PresidentEisenhoweraddressedthe
United Nations on nuclearpower, presentingwhat media discoursela-
beled his "atomsforpeace" speech.In it, he proposedto make American
nuclear technologyavailable to an internationalagencythat would at-
temptto develop peacefuluses of nuclearenergy.
We sampledmedia materialforthetwo weeksaftertheUN speechand
fora similarperiodin February1956,followingtheissuanceofa citizens
committeereporton the futureof nuclear energy.9The Eisenhower
speech came at the heightof the Cold War and in the midst of the
McCarthyera. Much of the discoursethatfollowedfocusedless on nu-
clear power and more on how Eisenhower'scleverone-upmanshiphad
embarrassedan obstructionist and militaristic
Soviet Union. Neverthe-
less, we were able to identify21 columns, 16 cartoons,and 4 news-
magazineaccountsthatdid addressthe issue of nuclearpowerper se.10
The progresspackage remainsunchallengedthroughout thissampleof
materials.The either/or structureof nucleardualism is stronglyrepre-
sented.The dominantmetaphoris a road thatbranchesintotwo alterna-
tive paths-one leading to the developmentof weapons of destruction,
theotherto the eradicationof humanmisery.Again, thereare optimists
and cautiousskepticswho warn thatthe technologicalproblemsin tap-
9 The reportwas issuedbya specialpanelofnineprominent citizensappointedbythe

Congressional JointCommittee on AtomicEnergy.It depicteda futurein "whichthe
nationwouldadd immeasurably to itsmaterialresources,
extenditsatomicbountyto
thebackwardand improvethephysicalwell-being ofpeopleseverywhere." Unfortu-
nately,thereportstimulatedverylittlemediacommentary; our 1950ssampleis over-
whelmingly composedofitemsfromthe 1953discourse.
10 No television
was availablefortheseearlyperiods.The Vanderbilt TelevisionAr-
chivebeganrecording theeveningnews broadcastsof thethreemajornetworks on
August5, 1968.
13

ping this energysource for human betterment are formidableand far

fromsolved. But no oppositionto nuclear power developmentis pre-
sented,and no alternativepackage is ever offered.
In thelate 1950sand early1960s,a movementagainsttheatmospheric
testingof nuclearweapons called publicattentionto thelong-rangedan-
gersof radiation.Milk, "nature'smostnearlyperfectfood,"as thedairy
industryput it, was foundto containstrontium 90. A famousSANE ad
warnedthe public that"Dr. Spock is worried."
Some of thisincreasedawarenessabout radiationdangersspilledover
intoconcernabout nuclearreactors.Local controversies developedover
the licensingof some of them,includingthe Enrico Fermi reactornear
Detroit.But thesecontroversies remainedlocal and largelydisappeared
afterthe LimitedTest Ban Treatyof 1963 ended atmospherictestingof
weapons and radiationconcernsreceded.By themid-1960s,the nuclear
energyindustry was enjoyinga wave ofnew ordersand no publicopposi-
tion.
One measureofthedominanceoftheprogresspackageat thistimewas
the lack of attentionpaid to a serious nuclear accident at the Fermi
reactoroutside Detroitin the fall of 1966. On October 5, the cooling
systemfailed and the fuel core underwenta partial meltdown."1The
automaticshutdown,or "scram,"systemfailedto operate,and, alerted
by alarmssignalingthe leak of radiationintothe containment building,
operatorsshuttheplantdown manually.As faras we know,therewas no
radiationleak intotheatmosphere,but theshutdowndid notremovethe
major dangerof a disastroussecondaryaccidentduringthefollowingsix
months,when people triedto figureout what had happenedand to re-
move the damaged fuel. Fuller (1975) likens the process to "look[ing]
insidea gasolinetank witha lightedmatch."Duringthedangerperiod,
plans forthe evacuationof a millionor morepeople were discussedby
officialsbut deemed impracticaland unnecessary.By almostany reck-
oning,the Fermi accidentwas extremely serious.
Local journalistsand officialswerenotified thatsomethingwas wrong,
but therethe storysat, unreported.More thanfiveweeks afterthe acci-
dent,theNew YorkTimescarrieda storyon whatitlabeleda "mishap"at
theFermireactor.12 There was nothingin theleastalarmingin theTimes
account. WalkerCisler,the presidentof DetroitEdison and theleading
forcebehindtheconstruction oftheFermireactor,was quotedas saying,
"If all goes well, we could startagain shortlyafterthefirstoftheyear."13
11 We relyhereon thedetailedaccountoftheFermiaccidentby Fuller(1975).

12The New YorkTimes,November13, 1966.
13 The breederreactorat Fermiwas eventuallyabandoned,althougha conventional
lightwaterreactor(Fermi2) was laterbuiltnextto it.
14

Nuclear Power
A GeneralElectricofficialclassifiedwhat happenedas "a minorpertur-

bation,"and a reassuringreportfromtheAtomicIndustrialForumwas
duly noted.
No criticof nuclearpowerwas quoted in the belatedTimesreporton
theFermiaccident.Indeed, it would have takengreatenterprise to have
found such a criticin 1966. In effect,therewas no significantanti-
nuclear-powerdiscourseduringthis era.14 Nuclear power was, in gen-
eral, a nonissue.Progressremainedthe dominantpackage, so takenfor
grantedin the littlepublic discoursethatexistedthatit requiredno ex-
plicitdefense.
2. The Rise of an AntinuclearDiscourse:The 1970sto TMI

By thetimeoftheThreeMile Island accidentin 1979,mediadiscourseon
nuclear power reflectedan issue culturein flux.Progresswas stillthe
mostprominentpackage, but its earlierhegemonyhad been destroyed.
The much-touted"energycrisis"of the 1970s stimulatedthe articula-
tion of a second major pronuclearpackage, energyindependence.This
package drew a pronuclearmeaningfromtheArab oil embargoof 1973:
The lessonis howdependence onforeign sourcesforvitallyneededenergy
can maketheUnitedStatesvulnerable topolitical
blackmail. Nuclearen-
ergymustbe understood in thecontext of thislargerproblem ofenergy
independence. To achieveindependence, we mustdevelopand useevery
practicalalternative
energy sourceto imported oil, including
nuclearen-
ergy.Nuclearenergy, plusdomestic oil,naturalgas,andcoal,remainthe
onlypracticalalternatives
to a dangerous and humiliatingdependence on
foreignand, particularly,
MiddleEasternsources.Theseforeign sources
are unstableand unreliableand arelikelyto makeunacceptable political
demands.Do we wantto be dependent on thewhimsof Arabsheiks?
Ultimately,independenceis thecornerstone ofourfreedom.
This additionto the pronucleararsenalwas morethanoffsetby other
developmentsthatstimulatedthe riseof an antinucleardiscourse.First,
nucleardualismhad been seriouslyerodedeven amongmanykeepersof
the faith.Withthe advent of the Carteradministration,proliferation
of
nuclearweapons became a presidentialpriorityissue. To deal withthe
problem,Cartertriedto promotestronger
proliferation international
con-
trolover the spread of nucleartechnology,
includingreactortechnology.
Althougha strongsupporterof nuclear power generally,he turned
againstthe breederreactorlestthe plutoniumit producedbe divertedto
weapons use. Atomsforpeace and atomsforwar no longerappearedto
14
FromAugust5, 1968,through theendof 1969,therewas onlyone 15-second
item
onnuclearpoweron thetelevision
eveningnewsprograms ofthethreemajornetworks
(see Media Institute1979).
15

be suchseparatepaths. Subliminalmushroomcloudshad begunto gather

over even officialdiscourseon the issue.
More important,the dualism was being underminedbecause of the
safetyissue. If a seriousaccidentthatreleaseslargeamountsofradiation
intothe atmosphereis possibleat a nuclearreactor,thenthedestructive
potentialof thisawesome energyis not confinedto bombs.
A broad coalitionof anti-nuclear-power groupsraisedthe safetyissue
but as partof a numberof different packages. The environmental wing,
epitomizedby Friendsof the Earth, offereda softpathspackage:
Splitwood,notatoms.Nuclearenergypresents us witha fundamental
choiceaboutwhatkindofsociety we wishtobe. Do we wishtocontinue a
way of lifethatis wasteful of energy,relieson highlycentralized
tech-
nologies,and is insensitiveto ecologicalconsequences?
Or do we wantto
becomea society morein harmony withitsnaturalenvironment?
Nuclearenergy relieson thewrongkindoftechnology-centralized and
dangerous inthelongruntotheearth'secology. Weneedtopursuealterna-
tive,softpaths.We shouldchangeourwayoflifeto conserve energy as
muchas possibleandtodevelopsourcesofenergy thatareecologically
safe
andrenewable, andthatlendthemselves todecentralized
production-for
example,sun,wind,and water.Smallis beautiful.'5
Other groups,epitomizedby the Ralph Nader organizationCritical
Mass, offereda morepopulist,anticorporatepackage, publicaccounta-
bility:
If Exxonownedthesun,wouldwe have solarenergy? The rootof the
problemis theorganization
ofnuclearproduction byprofit-makingcorpo-
rations,
whichminimizes accountability
andcontrolbythepublic.Spokes-
menforthenuclearindustry aremotivated to protect
theirowneconomic
interests,
notthepublicinterest.One cannotrelyon whattheysay.Com-
panyofficials
are frequently
dishonest,greedy,and arrogant.Whokilled
KarenSilkwood?
Thenuclearindustry andeconomic
hasuseditspolitical powertounder-
minetheseriousexploration
ofenergy alternatives. whoare
Publicofficials,
supposedtomonitor oftheindustry,
theactivities areall toooften
captives
ofit.Theyfunctionmoretoprotect theindustrythantoprotectthepublic.
Finally,the antinuclearmovement,throughorganizationssuch as the
Union of ConcernedScientists,offereda more pragmatic,cost-benefit
package,notcosteffective. A liturgyofunsolvedproblemsand delaysare
cited,leading to the conclusionthat:
Whenonecompares thecostsandbenefitsofnuclearenergy withthealter-
itmakesa poorshowing.
natives, Nuclearpower,through faultin
nobody's
to keeppouring
has turnedoutto be a lemon,anditis foolish
particular,
15See Lovins(1977)fora particularly

influential
articulation
ofthispackage.
16

Nuclear Power
thecontinued
goodmoneyafterbad bysupporting ofnuclear
development
energy.
Media coverageofnuclearpoweracceleratedrapidlyin themid-1970s.

The Media Institutestudy(1979) of networktelevisionnews reveals a
burstofcoverageat thetimeofEarthDay in 1970,followedby verylittle
through1974. Coverage thentripledin 1975 and doubled again thefol-
lowingyear. Except fora temporarydecrease in 1978, it continuedto
increaseup to thetimeof TMI. In thefirstthreemonthsof 1979, before
TMI, the networksran 26 storiesrelatedto nuclearpower.
We sampled two two-weekperiodsin the 1970s. The first,in 1973,
followeda major energyspeech by Nixon. Occurringin the midstof
Watergate,it drew littlecommentaryand yielded only threeopinion
columns.The secondperiod,in 1977,coincidedwithtwoevents:Carter's
efforts at gaininginternationalsupportforcontrolling the spread of nu-
cleartechnology and thearrestand detentionfortwo weeksofmorethan
1,400 antinucleardemonstrators who occupied the site wherethe Sea-
brook, New Hampshire,nuclear reactorwas being constructed.This
sample produced fifteentelevisionsegments,two newsmagazineac-
counts,six cartoons,and an additionalfiveopinioncolumns.
Our media samplesrepresenttwo different formsof discourse.Televi-
sion and newsmagazinespresentaccountsratherthan explicitcommen-
tary. The accounts, of course, tell a storyand framethe information
presented,particularlyin the headings,leads, and closings.Numerous
interpretive commentsare sprinkledthroughtheaccountsin theformof
quotationsfromsourcesor, in thecase of television,excerptsfrominter-
views. Cartoonsand opinioncolumnsare billedas commentary and are
freerof such constraints.They are especiallyusefulsincetheirpackages
are moreexplicitand easier to extract.
Television.-All thetelevisioncoveragecenterson thecollectiveaction
by the ClamshellAlliance at Seabrook and its aftermath.New Hamp-
shireGovernorMeldrimThomsonblessedthe"Clam" witha majorsocial
controlerror.The 1,414 demonstrators who were arrestedwere not, as
expected,releasedon theirown recognizance.Instead,theywerecharged
withcriminaltrespassand asked to post bail rangingfrom$100 to $500,
whichtheyrefused.They werethenheld in fivenationalguardarmories
for 12 days, creatinga continuingnationaltelevisionstory.Each of the
networksran segmentson fivedifferent days,althoughsometimesmerely
a shortupdate.
The televisionstoryis about a dyadic conflictbetween Governor
Thomsonand his allies and the ClamshellAllianceover whetheror not
theSeabrookreactorwill be completed.The centralquestionin thisstory
17

is of who will win, and, hence, thereis verylittledirectcommentary

aboutnuclearpower.But thecoveragedoes addressone centralissuethat
dividespackages: What kind of people are againstnuclearpower?
For a deaf televisionviewer,theanswerwould seemto be peoplewho
wear backpacksand play frisbee.All threenetworksfeaturetheseimages
in morethanone segment.One sees beardsand longhair,bandanas,"no
nuke" buttons,and people playingguitarsand doing needlepoint.Out-
side the courthouse,afterthe demonstrators have been released,we see
happyfamilyreunions,withmanychildren.
These visual images do not have a fixedmeaning.People approach
themwith some anticipatoryschema. A progresssympathizermay see
frivolousflowerchildrenand environmental extremistswho look as if
they will not be happy until they turn the White House into a bird
sanctuary.A softpathsviewermaysee loving,caring,earthypeoplewho
are sociallyintegratedand concernedabout oursharedenvironment. But
thesetwo are the onlypackages thatreallysuggestan interpretation of
theseimages,and thosewho use neitherare likelyto be especiallysuscep-
tibleto the meaningssuggestedby the accompanyingwords.
Here there are networkdifferences.The CBS and NBC coverage
leaves theworkto theviewer,but ABC offersitsown interpretation and
itsuggestsa progresspackage. We are toldthattheseare thesame kindof
people who were involvedin antiwardemonstrations, "demonstratorsin
search of a cause." The networkallows two membersof the Clam to
speak forthemselves,quotingtheirdetermination to win whileignoring
theirreasons("We have to stopit at any cost"). Such quotationsfitnicely
withthe dyadic conflictframe,but no package on nuclearpoweris dis-
played. No interviewsor quotes fromthe protesters were used by NBC.
Only CBS made any attemptto presentthe demonstrators' frame.In
introducingits May 2 segment,it reportedthatthe ClamshellAlliance
opposed the plant because "theysay it is dangerousand a threatto the
coastal marinelife."In a latersegment,we hear Harvey Wasserman,a
spokesmanforthegroup,claimtheantinuclearmovementas an antiwar
movement:"We are fightingthe war that is being waged against the
environment and our health."Later, in the same segment,the threatto
marinelife is mentionedalong with safetyconcernsas reasonsforthe
protest.Beyondthesethreeutterances,threegeneralexpressionsofdeter-
minationbydemonstrators are quoted,butno otherantinuclearpackages
are suggested.16
16 We shouldnote,outoffairness to thenetworks,thattheMedia Institute
examined
"outsidesources"quotedin 10yearsofcoveragebeforeTMI. Theyfoundthatantinu-
clearsourcesreceivedconsiderably moreairtimethanpronuclearones.The Unionof
ConcernedScientistsfinishedfirstbya widemargin(with6:18). RalphNader(3:34)
18

Nuclear Power
Newsmagazines.-Time and Newsweekran storieson Seabrook,again

witha dyadicconflictframeand littlecommentary about nuclearpower
per se. The demonstrators are presentedrelativelysympathetically.Both
magazines mentiontheircommitmentto nonviolence,and Newsweek
adds theirexclusionof drugs,weapons, and fighting. The photographs
reinforcethe televisionimages of backpackers;Newsweekcalls them
scruffyand mentions frisbee playing, guitar playing, and reading
Thoreau. Environmentalconcernsand thethreatto marinelifeare men-
tionedbutnotelaborated.Timealso quotesthepublisheroftheManches-
ter UnionLeader, WilliamLoeb, who likenedthe Clam to "Nazi storm
troopersunderHitler,"but characterizeshimin a discrediting way as an
"abrasive conservative."
A numberof antinuclearmovementspokespersonsare quoted,includ-
ingHarvey Wasserman,Ralph Nader, and representatives fromFriends
oftheEarth,theSierraClub, and theNational ResourcesDefenseCoun-
cil. But none of the selectedquotes suggesta frameon nuclearpower;
instead, they focus exclusivelyon the strategyof direct action and
whetherthedemonstrators will succeed.The Newsweekstory,in particu-
lar,leaves theimpressionofinternaldivisionamongmovementorganiza-
tions.
There is a largelyimplicitprogressframe,reflectedin the fullsepara-
tionof the controversy fromconcernsabout nuclearweapons (a dualism
thatwas largelyacceptedby theClam as well) and by statements in both
magazinessuggestingthe necessityand inevitability of nuclearpoweras
an energysource. No antinuclearpackage is displayedbeyondthe faint
hintof softpaths impliedby the mentionof safetyand environmental
concerns.
Cartoons.-None ofthesevencartoonscommenton Seabrookas such.
Three focuson Carter'sefforts to controlthe spread of nucleartechnol-
ogy,two on the failureof some nuclearplantsto accountforall of their
plutoniumand enricheduranium,17 one on the administration's energy
plans in general,and one on the safetyissue. There is no progressin this
set,but theydo notall suggestan antinuclearpackage. Four oftheseven
edgedouttheAtomicIndustrialForum(3:26) forsecondplace.Thisfinding shouldbe

temperedby two observations: (1) officialsources,such as the NuclearRegulatory
Commission, who are notincludedin thisanalysis,oftenpresenta pronuclear pack-
age, and (2) criticsmay be quotedwithouttheirpackageson nuclearpowerbeing
displayed,as theSeabrookcoveragedemonstrates.
17 Publicity
overthemysterious 1974deathof KarenSilkwoodhad broughtto light
thattheKerr-McGee fuelprocessingplantin Oklahomawheresheworkedwas unable
to accountfor40 poundsof plutonium.
19

suggesta new package, runaway,whose positionon nuclear power is

fatalisticor resignedmorethan opposed:
We didnotunderstand whatwe weregetting intowithnuclearpower.We
thought wecouldharness ittomaintainourstandard ofliving.Nowweare
committed to it and willsooneror laterhaveto paya priceofunknown
dimension.We haveunleashed itbutwe nolongercancontrol it.Nuclear
poweris a powerful geniethatwe havesummoned andarenowunableto
forcebackintoitsbottle;a Frankenstein's monster thatmightturnon its
creator.Nuclearpoweris a timebomb,waiting toexplode.Nuclearenergy
is notsimplyoneamongseveralalternative energy sourcesbutsomething
moreelemental. It defiesa cost-benefit
analysis.Radiationis invisible
and
onemaybe exposedwithout knowingit;itsharmful effectsmaynotshow
up rightawaybutmaystrikesuddenly and lethallyat somelaterpoint.
Radiationcan creategrotesque mutants.In a religiousversion,humans
havedaredtoplayGodintampering withthefundamental forcesofnature
and theuniverse. He whosowsthewind,reapsthewhirlwind.
Runaway has an antinuclearflavor,to be sure,but thegallowshumor
bywhichitis frequently expressedsuggestsresignation and fatalismmore
thanopposition."Grinand bear it" is morethemessagethan"No nukes."
Once the genieis out of the bottle,it is too late. Not surprisingly,runa-
way,unlikeall theearlierpackages,has no organizedsponsorattempting
tofurther impliedinfourofthesevencartoons.
itscareer.But itis strongly
Two of the seven cartoonsexpressan anticorporate themesuggesting
thepublic accountabilitypackage. The strikingthingabout thiscartoon
set,comparedwithtelevisionand newsmagazineaccounts,is theimplicit
rejectionof nucleardualism in six of the seven. They are about nuclear
powerand not weapons, but nuclearpowerplantsare themselvesa time
bomb.
Opinion columns.-The eightcolumnsoffera sharp contrastto the
cartoons.Here thereis a strongdualism, sometimesquite explicit,al-
thoughthe separationbetweenatomsforpeace and atomsforwar is no
longeras simple as in the 1950s. There is a dilemma,James Reston
suggests,over "how to develop nuclearpowerforpeacefulpurposesand
at the same timerestrainits developmentas an instrument of war." The
columnsaddress generalenergyproblemsand Carter'sefforts to control
nuclear proliferation in a contextthat fullyaccepts the necessityand
inevitabilityof nuclearpower development.The issue is not whetherto
go ahead withnuclearpowerbut how fastand in whatways. Four ofthe
eightcolumnsalso emphasizeenergyindependenceas a strongsecondary
theme.
Only one column focuseson the Seabrook action, linkingthe Clam
with the 1960s images of antiwar protestors-scruffy beards, longish
hair,and bralesswomen.Some ofthem"reallydon'tknowwhattheyare
protesting"writesJeremiahMurphy, "and-far worse-don't care."
20

Nuclear Power
There is only one faintsuggestionin the entireset of columnsof any

antinuclearpackage or even of the fatalisticrunaway.18
This reviewof media discoursebeforeTMI providesa mixedpicture.
Withthe exceptionof cartoons,thereis virtuallyno displayof any anti-
nuclearpackage, but the confident dualismof an earlierera has become
uneasyat best.Progressis represented in theacceptanceofnuclearpower
developmentas necessaryand inevitable.But thediscourseclearlyrecog-
nizes it as controversial,
even if one can gain onlya vague awarenessof
how nuclearopponentsthinkabout the issue.
The editorialcartoonistspresenta verydifferent picture-one in which
thethemesofrunawayand public accountabilityare dominant.Perhaps
theirgreaterdistancefromactivesponsorsand thedebunkinginherentin
theirmediummakes themmoreresistantto the officialpackage. In any
event,theypresagethepackages thatwill come intogeneralprominence
onlyafterTMI.
The apogee ofantinucleardiscoursein theeffecton popularconscious-
ness came with the release, a few scant weeks beforeTMI, of a major
Hollywood film,The China Syndrome.The filmnumberedamong its
starsJane Fonda, an actressso closelyidentifiedwith the antinuclear
movementthatpronucleargroupsused heras a symbolofit. The themes
emphasizedby the filmsuggestthe public accountabilityand runaway
packages,but itsmostimportantachievementwas to providea concrete,
vivid image of how a disastrousnuclear accident could happen. Of
course,it was just a movie.
3. Life ImitatesArt: From TMI to Chernobyl

As eventsunfold,each packagemustofferan interpretation thatis consis-
tentwithitsstoryline. Althoughit is alwayspossibleto do this,theresult
is sometimeslabored,particularlyifthe eventis, fromthestandpointof
the package, unexpected.Consider how the progresspackage handles
TMI and Chernobyl:
TMI showedthatthesafety systems workedeveninthefaceofa string of
improbableerrors.A totalcoremeltdown was prevented,
andmostofthe
radiation
releasedneverbreached thecontainment building.
Furthermore,
we learnedfromthe experience and have improved safetyevenmore.
Chernobylhasequallysanguine lessons.It showsthewisdomoftheAmeri-
cannuclearindustryin buildinglargefortified
containmentstructures
as a
safetyprecaution.Nuclearreactorsin the UnitedStateshave multiple
18 RichardStrout, indiscussing
othercountries'
distrust ofCarter'smotivesintrying
to
curtailbreederreactors,has themwondering whethertheUnitedStatesis "trying to
createa capitalistic
monopoly ofnuclearfuelforitself."Ourcodersincludedthisunder
thepublicaccountability categoryon corporategreed.
21

protectivebarriers,
called"defense in depth."American nuclearreactors
cannotbe comparedwiththeirSovietcounterparts anymorethantheir
political
systemsarecomparable. Furthermore, eveninthismostseriousof
accidents,itturnsoutthatinitialclaimsofthousandskilledreflected
mere
hysteria,eggedon byantinuclear activists.
Events, as theFermiaccidentillustrates,do notspeak forthemselves.
By 1979,a progressinterpretation was forcedto competewithothersthat
were sayingthat a seriousnuclear accidentcould and probablywould
happen. No complicatedinterpretation is necessaryfora prophecyful-
filled.
We sampledthemediafortwoweeksafterbothTMI and Chernobyl. 19
Our TMI sample yielded 53 televisionsegments,6 newsmagazineac-
counts,71 cartoons,and 56 opinioncolumns.The accounts,as we noted
above, are less explicitin theirframingof nuclearpoweras such. Their
storieson TMI centeron two centralquestions:(1) What is it like to be
livingnextto TMI? Since thereare manyotherreactors,thereis a more
generalquestionimpliedhere:What is it like to be livingnear a nuclear
reactorthathas had an accident?(2) Is the situationat TMI undercon-
trol?Again, thereis a more generalstory,especiallyas the immediate
TMI crisissubsides:Is thistechnologyundercontrol?
Television.-The situationat TMI was a continuingstorythatdomi-
natedthecoverageof all threenetworksduringthesampleperiod.Visu-
ally, we were treatedto repeatedaerial shotsof thereactorsite,making
the special shape of a nuclearcoolingtowera familiarvisual symbolfor
thefirsttime.The use ofthisicon by cartoonistsbeganwithTMI, where
it frequently took on an ominoustone.
Nimmo and Combs (1985) suggestthat ABC in particularused the
coolingtowersas visual reinforcement fora runawaypackage thatper-
meated its coverage and providedits centralstoryline: "In the gothic
romance,thethreatto peace, tranquility, and happinessis embodiedin a
forbidding structureoverlookingthe community of simplefolk. . . . Dr.
Frankenstein'scastle in Transylvania,in a bucolic countrysideabove a
quaintvillage,is theclassicsetting."They arguethatABC's footageand
camera angles played on such imagery,"especiallyon days when ABC
correspondents did stand-upreportswiththeplant'smassivecoolingtow-
ers,envelopedin mist,loomingin thebackground.... Aerialshots,too,
captureda technologicalintruderin a ruralsetting"(pp. 69-70).
There is rare use of the mushroomcloud symbol.The Media Institute
study(1979) foundonlyfourinstancesofitsuse in themorethan 10-year
periodit covered-including theTMI periodin our sample. We foundit
19The Chernobylsamplesincludeonlytelevisionand newsmagazine
accounts.The
assemblyof cartoonsand opinioncolumnsinvolvesa muchmorecomplicated
data-
gathering
process-beyondourresourcesat thatstageoftheresearch.
22

Nuclear Power
onlytwicein our sample,but, in addition,two of thethreenetworksran

an AtomicEnergyCommissionfilmof bomb testsin the late 1950s in
Nevada.20 The filmshowshousesbeingobliteratedin an awesomeblast,
followedbythefamiliarrisingmushroomcloud. Directimagesofnuclear
destruction are rare,but highfrequencymay be unnecessaryforeffectif
the associationis alreadypresentin the schemataof manyviewersand
the imagesare sufficiently vivid and evocative.
Sevenyearslater,withtheaccidentat Chernobyl,nuclearpoweragain
dominatedthe televisioneveningnews. All threenetworksran nightly
storiesfortheentireperiodofour two-weeksample.Visually,therewere
manyrepeatsof imageryfromTMI coveragebut withseveralnew addi-
tions.The moststriking new imageinvolvedfrequentfootageofradiation
detectorsbeing used to check people and food. There were 15 different
instancesof such visual remindersof the invisibledanger theme,well
distributedamong the threenetworks.In addition, all threeshowed
Americanor European antinuclearprotestors, witha totalof eightsuch
instances.The protestors'signs remindedviewersthat "Chernobylcan
happen here" or "Chernobylis everywhere."Radiation, in television
graphics,is almostinvariablyred-often in the formof a pulsatingred
dotto show an untamedreactoror a spreadingredstreakto represent the
flowof fallout.Of the 12 occasions on which such graphicswere em-
ployed,onlyonce was anothercolorused (in thiscase, white).
For both events, thereis much visual fillerof littleinterestfor the
framingof nuclearpower. There are manytalkingheads, didacticsum-
mariesofpointsbeingmade by announcersand interviewees, and graph-
ics to illustratea technicaldiscourseon nuclearreactors.
On theaudio, two themesin particulardominatethe accounts:official
confusionand thescary,invisibleeffects ofnuclearradiation.As theyare
developed,thesethemesgive a powerfulboostto therunawayand public
accountability packages. Therewere,in thiscoverage,99 utterancesthat
expressedidea elementscentralto a package on nuclearpower. Figure 1
shows the distribution amongthe set of six.
The once dominantprogresshas shrunkto a mere18% and frequently
has a grudgingand defensivetone. For example,NBC quotes Secretary
of EnergyJames SchlesingerconcedingthatTMI was an "unfortunate
occurrenceand the reactionto it will not be beneficial,save thatit may
permitus to betterunderstandsome of theplantoperationsand thatthe
NRC will be able to institutemeasuresthatwill reducerisks."'21
20 Thisfilmwas peggedtocoverageofcongressional on chargesthattheU.S.

hearings
government had lied to local residentsin Nevada aboutthe dangersof radioactive
falloutfromitsatomictests.
21 NBC News, March30, 1979.
23

60
50
40
PERCENTAGE 3 0
20
Progress Energy Devil's Runaway Public NotCost Soft Paths

Independence Bargain Accountability Effective
PACKAGE
* TMI PERIOD N= TJ
CHERNOBYL PERIOD N=74
FIG. 1. -Nuclear power packages in televisionutterances
Nimmoand Combs (1985) suggestthatprogressmaystillbe prominent

at a moreaggregatelevel, but onlyin CBS's coverage. Its formula,re-
peated in each nightlyupdate,is a warningofdangerand an explanation
thatshows the natureof the problemand of officialsmanagingit. "Ex-
perts,""scientists,""officials,"or "technicians"are shownto be dealing
withthedangerand its consequencesas besttheycan in a difficult situa-
tion. The generalstoryline of CBS, Nimmo and Combs suggest,is "an
adventure tale in the tradition of 'disaster averted' movies. . . . In such
dramas,responsiblepeople take concertedactionto bringan unfortunate
situationundercontrol"(p. 68).
The two most prominentpackages are clearlyrunawayand public
accountability,with38% and 35%, respectively. The formeris displayed
primarilythroughtwo centralideas, whichtogetheraccountforalmost
three-fourths of its total:(a) theoverconfidencetheme:officialsin charge
ofnuclearenergymaythinktheyhave it undercontrolbut theyreallydo
not, and (b) the hiddendangertheme:radiationeffectsare invisibleand
delayed,so thatone may notknow thetrueharmdone untilmanyyears
later.
The interpretation of officialconfusionis less benign in the public
accountabilitypackage. The emphasishereis less on self-deception and
moreon deliberatemisleadingof the public by the nuclearindustry.We
distinguishhere a weak and a strongformof the package. The strong
version,which includesabout 30% of its total, suggeststhatprofitsare
emphasizedat theexpenseofpublicsafety,thatgovernment regulationis
ineffectivebecause public officialsfunctionas promotersof theindustry,
or thatindustry interests workagainstprovidingfullprotection and infor-
mationto thepublic. The weak versionsuggestsmerelysomeculpability
by company managers,with negative consequencesfor the public or
24

Nuclear Power
consumers.No analysisof reasons forsuch culpabilityis suggestedbe-

yondgeneralincompetence,stupidity,laxness,or overconcern withpub-
lic image.
The almost total absence of energyindependence,not cost effective,
and softpaths is quite striking.All thesepackages,althoughdiffering in
theirconclusions,framenuclearpowerin termsofa broaderenergyissue,
comparingit withalternativesources.Implicitly,televisioncoverageem-
phasizestheuniquenessof thissourceand thosefeaturesthatmake com-
parisondifficultor impossible.
The coverage of TMI saw the emergenceof a new frameforunder-
standingnuclearpower,characterizing it as a Faustian devil's bargain:
So nuclearpowerturnsoutto be a bargainwiththedevil.Thereareclear
suchas inexhaustible
benefits electricity
andan energy
supplythatdoesnot
dependonthewhimsofOPEC. Butsoonerorlater,therewillbe a terrible
priceto pay. We aredamnedifwe do and damnedifwe don't.Andthe
deeperwe getin,theharderitis to getout.
Devil's bargainis a package that conflatespronuclearpackages with

runaway.It is a thoroughly ambivalentpackage-both forand against
nuclearpower. Figure 1, which uses utterancesas a unit,does not do
justice to the prominenceof this package because it is morefrequently
expressedby combinationsof utterancesin thesame rhetoricalsequence.
When pronuclearclaims and runawayelementsoccur sequentially,for
example,one mightargue that it has been implicitlyinvoked.This se-
quence in factoccurredin fiveof the 18 televisionsegmentswiththree
or morecodable utterances,and the framewas made explicitin a sixth
segment.
The Chernobylcoverageproducedan additional74 utterancesimply-
ing a core frameon nuclear power. As figure1 indicates,thereis an
apparentcomeback forprogress,which reboundsto 38%. Almosttwo-
thirdsof theseprogressutterances,though,are represented by the claim
thatAmericanreactorshave safetyfeatures-such as reinforced contain-
mentstructures-thatwere lackingin the Chernobylreactor,makinga
similaraccidentunlikelyor impossible.Another14% of themconsistof
claims,mostlyemanatingfromSoviet sources,thattheAmericanmedia
wereexaggerating theseriousnessoftheChernobylaccident.Onlyonceis
progressexpressedin a clearlypositiveway throughan assertionof the
benefitsof nuclearpower.
Runawayremainstheleadingpackage,withmanyimagesofwhatDan
Rathercalled the"nuclearnightmareof a reactorgonewild." It is repre-
sentedin claimsthat,in spiteofsomedifferences in reactortechnology, a
Chernobylcouldoccurhere,and in imagesofa spreading"silentkiller"-
an invisiblecloud of radioactivefallout.Public accountabilityis dis-
25

50
40
30
PERCENTAGE
20
Progress Energy Devil's Runaway Public NotCost Soft Paths

PACKAGE
* TMI PERIOD N= 10ii
CHERNOBYL PERIOD N=51
FIG. 2.-Nuclear powerpackagesin newsmagazine

utterances
playedmainlybyinvokingcomparisonwithearlierofficialdissemblingin
the United States at the timeof Three Mile Island. The devil's bargain
frameis never made explicit,but the sequence of a claimed benefitfor
nuclear power juxtaposed with runawayimageryoccurs in two of the
nine segmentswiththreeor morecodable utterances.
Newsmagazines.-The patternhereis quitesimilar.Figure2 showsthe
distribution of 103 utterancesdisplayingcentralideas in one or moreof
our six packages.Progressdoes somewhatbetterin quantity,but,as with
television,it is a beleagueredfaiththatis expressed.Time,forexample,
quotes Alvin Weinberg,introducing him as a nuclearadvocate and pro-
nuclearauthorwho believes that the alternativesto this sourceare "so
crummythatwe probablyshouldin a cautiousway continuethisnuclear
enterprise. butit has evolvedquitea bitfrom"too
"22 This is stillprogress,
cheap to meter."
Runaway is by far the most prominentpackage, but some cautionis
necessaryin interpreting this.More thantwo-thirds oftheutterancesthat
evoke it focuson theoverconfidence themethatthedevelopersofnuclear
powerhave overestimatedtheircontroland do notknow as muchabout
what theyare doing as theyhave led us to believe.
Public accountabilitydrops offin quantityfromits televisionpromi-
nence, but when it is displayed,the strongformof it is presentedmore
fully,accountingfor almost half the coded utterances(comparedwith
one-thirdof televisiondisplaysof thispackage). Newsweek,forexample,
quotesJane Fonda: "We can neverbe safe in the hands of utilityexecu-
tives whose financialinterestsrequirethemto hide the truthfromthe
public."
22 Time, April 9, 1979, p. 20.
26

Nuclear Power
70
60
50
40-
PERCENTAGE
30
20
10
0
Progress Energy Devil's Runaway Public NotCost SoftPaths
PACKAGE
FIG. 3.-Nuclear powerpackagesin cartoons,

TMI period(N = 67)
The prominenceofdevil'sbargainis, again, underratedby usingutter-

ances as a unit.Both Time and Newsweekmake it explicittwice,and all
three display it implicitlyby juxtaposingclaimed benefitsof nuclear
power with runawaythemes.The remainingpackages have verylow
prominencein newsmagazinediscourse.
Figure 2 also shows the package scores for coverage of Chernobyl.
Runaway leads with almosthalf of the codable utterances,and, again,
progressis displayeddefensively,mainlyby comparisonsof the safety
of Soviet and Americannuclear power plants that malignthe former.
Devil's bargainis again expressedboth implicitlyand explicitlyin two
of the threemagazineaccounts.
Cartoons.-While runawayfareswell in accounts,it receivesitsfullest
expressionin cartoons,where it dominatesthe discourse.As figure3
indicates,morethan two-thirds of the cartoonsexpressit in one way or
another.There are two ideas in particularthataccountforalmosthalfof
the runawaycartoons.
The firstis well illustratedbytheDon Wrightcartoon(fig.4). The joke
is on thosewho thinktheyhave thistechnology undercontrol.The audi-
ence can see thattheydo not, but the "nucleocrats"are themselvesuna-
ware and foolishlyoverconfident. The second idea is expressedthrough
gallows humorabout nasty nuclear surprises,as in the Larry Wright
cartoon(fig.5). We suggestthatsuchhumorexpressesthefatalismthatis
at thecoreofthispackage-the acceptanceofnuclearpoweras an inevi-
table, uncontrollablefact of life combinedwith anxietyabout the un-
knowabledisastersthat may springfromit. Gallows humor,as Hodge
and Mansfieldsuggest(1985, p. 210), is a way of"distancingtheunthink-
able so that it can be turnedon its head, and subjectedto a sense of
control.
"23
23 A caveatabouttheseresultsis in order.We madetwoimportant

codingdecisions
27

FIG. 4.-Cartoon byDon Wright

(BostonHerald American,April6, 1979)
>~~~~~~~~~D
IR0_
10 WMl4Y
lABOOFTS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I CF1g
R rleWAC
FIG. (DetroitNews, April8, 1979)

5.-Cartoon byLarryWright
Progress appears onlyfourtimes(6%) and always in the same form-

throughmockingthe overreactionof antinuclearhysterics.Figure6 ex-
pressestheidea mostclearly,suggestingthatpeople who oppose nuclear
energyare likethosewho would have opposedtheinventionoftheox cart
in prehistoric
times.
Opinioncolumns.-Figure 7 showsthepercentageofcolumnsin which
thatmayhave led to underestimatingthepublicaccountabilitypackage.Therewere

sixcartoonsplayingon thecoincidence
ofTheChinaSyndrome andTMI. Wherethere
was no explicitemphasison corporate
culpability,
we have treatedtheseas runaway.
Therewerealso fivecartoonsdepictingoverconfident nuclearofficials
but withthe
deliberateness
oftheirdeceptionleftambiguous.Again,we endedup including these
as partofrunawayratherthanpublicaccountability.
28

Nuclear Power
fapL '-
~~~~~~~~~~~~U
FIG. 6.-Cartoon byJeffMacNelly(ChicagoTribune,April10, 1979).(Re-

printedbypermissionoftheTribuneCompanySyndicates,Inc.)
each package was displayed.24 A fullerrangeof packagesis displayedin

thisdiscoursethan in the othermedia samples-every package registers
at least 10%. Furthermore, packages are morerichlyelaboratedin this
sample, not merelysuggestedby a passingcommentor briefquote.
Progressdoes slightlybetterhere than in the othersamples but also
encountersa good deal of mockeryas its rivalsare presented.ArtBuch-
wald, for example, bemoans the selfishnessof many Americansliving
near nuclearplants,who are unwillingto make sacrificesso thatother
people, hundredsof milesaway, can be assuredthat"theirtoastersand
electriccoffeemakerswill work. . .. Unfortunately,
theycan'tappreciate
thatwithanyformof electricity and it's impossibleto
thereis a tradeoff,
have cheap nuclear power withouta few noxiousgases, an occasional
hydrogenbubble, a meltdownand possiblyan explosionwhich could
make one or two statesuninhabitablefor50 or a hundredyears."Buch-
wald assures us thathis own views on nuclearpower depend on which
way thewindis blowing.Whenit is away fromWashington,D.C., he is
pronuke,but on morningswhen the wind is blowingfromTMI, he tells
his wife,"I thinkJane Fonda is right."125
displaymorethanone packageto balanceor evaluateargu-

frequently
24 Columnists
in fig.4 add up to morethan100%.
mentsproand con. Hence,thepercentages
25 Buchwald'scolumn,"As theWindBlows,"appearedin newspapers on April10,
1979.
29

40
20
PERCENTAGE
10
0 4
Progress Energy Devil's Bargain Runaway Public NotCost SoftPaths
Independence Accountability Effective
PACKAGE
FIG. 7.-Nuclear power packages in opinioncolumns,TMI period(N = 56).

Percentagestotalmorethan 100% because some columnsdisplaymorethanone
package.
The softpaths package is morefrequently and fullydisplayedin this

samplethananywhereelse, appearingin a positiveway in one-seventh of
the columns. It generallytakes the formof advocatinga major effort
at conservationand the developmentof soft-pathenergyalternatives,
sometimescombinedwith belittlingcommentson Americanaddiction
to energy-consuming gadgetry.
Overall.-The picturethat emergesis a newly dominantrunaway
package. The pronuclearprogressis stilla prominent contender,but it is
beleagueredand defensive,a farcryfromthe 1950sversion.Most impor-
tant forunderstandingpublic opinion,the dominantpackage in media
discourseis fatalistic.When its impressivetotalsare combinedwiththe
thoroughly ambivalentdevil'sbargain,it is clearthatanyoverallcharac-
terizationof media discourseas pro- or anti-nuclear-power necessarily
obscuresthiscentralfact.
SURVEY DATA ON NUCLEAR POWER

Questionshave been asked about nuclearpower on sample surveysfor
manyyears,and thereare a numberof usefulreviewsofthismaterial.26
We selectherecertainresultsthat,we argue,can be fullyunderstoodonly
in the contextof media discourseon the issue.
1. Questionshave been asked concerningnuclearpowerin generalas
well as about a plant'sbeingbuiltnearby.As one would expect,thereare
consistentlyhigherlevelsof oppositionto buildinga nuclearpowerplant
near one's own communitythan to nuclearpower developmentin gen-
eral. This discrepancysuggeststhe nimbypositionon nuclear power:
"OK, but not in my backyard." Substantialchange in the percentage
26See esp. Mazur (1988); Nealey,Melber,and Rankin(1983);Mitchell(1980);and

Freudenberg and Baxter(1983).
30

Nuclear Power
sayingtheysupportor oppose local plantsresultsfromslightchangesin

questionwording,makingit difficult to estimatethe exact size of this
group,but it appears to be at least 15% and is probablymuchhigher.
2. On the questionof oppositionto a local plant, a substantialshift
occurredeven beforethe accidentat TMI. In 1971, only25% were op-
posed to thebuildingof a nuclearplantin theircommunities.27 By 1978,
beforeTMI, oppositionto local nuclearfacilitieshad jumped to 45% and
actually exceeded supportfor the firsttime. By 1980, oppositionhad
grownto 63% while supportfora local plant had droppedto only25%
(comparedwith57% in 1971). Finally,a 1986 Gallup poll conductedfor
Newsweekin the aftermathof Chernobylshows oppositionto a local
plantreaching70%.28 The trendtowardincreasingoppositionbeforethe
TMI accident is less clear when people were asked about supporting
nuclearpower developmentin general.
3. At firstblush,one mightthinkthatTMI was a watershedeventthat
destroyedpublic confidencein nuclearpower. From February1979,just
beforeThree Mile Island, to April 1979, just afterTMI, oppositionto
nuclearpower rose by 14% while supportfell by 11%. Mazur's (1981)
analysis,however,shows a rapid recoveryto previouslevelsof support.
Yes, therewas a sharptemporary increasein oppositionto nuclearpower
withthefloodof publicityabout the TMI accident,but whenthe media
spotlightwas turnedoff,publicopinionreboundedalmostimmediately to
pre-TMI levels. Even moreimpressive,thesame reboundingeffectwas
replicatedat the release of the KemenyCommissionreporton the acci-
dentsix monthslater.Again, therewas a sharpincreasein media cover-
age, accompaniedby a sharp drop in supportfornuclearpower. And,
again, therewas the same reboundto previouslevels once the media
spotlightwas turnedoff.
The rebound,however,is neverquite complete.When publicopinion
is viewed over a 15-yearperiodbeginningin theearly1970s,TMI looks
like littlemore than a small blip, which slightlyaccelerateda secular
trendagainstnuclearpower.
4. There is a strikingreversalin the relationshipof age to supportfor
nuclearpower.Back in 1950,Fisheretal. (1951, p. 76) foundthat"youn-
27 Twenty yearsearlier,Fisher,Metzner,and Darsky(1951)askedpeopleabout"the

establishmentof an atomicplantneartheirresidence"and gottheidenticalresultof
25% opposed.The authorsof thisearlystudyshowunusualprescience, notingthat
favorableattitudestowardnuclearpowerreston a thinfaith:"Iftherewereanysortof
evidencethatnoteventheexpertsquiteunderstand or couldcontrolthistremendous
source of energy, . . . attitudes might sharply incline to the negative. . . . In all
likelihood,it wouldtake but one highlydramaticand well publicizedevent. . . to
upsetthefaith"(p. 102).
28
Newsweek,May 12, 1986,p. 30.
31

gerrespondentsare definitely
morepositivein theiracceptanceofatomic
energyand thispositivereactiondecreaseswithage." By the 1970s,this
resulthad been largelyreversed.In surveystaken between 1975 and
1980,generaloppositionto nuclearpoweraveraged40% in the 18-25 age
group,droppingto 37% forthe 26-35 groupand to about 30% forthose
over 36.29
5. One finalresultworthnotingis thatthosewho have reviewedmulti-
ple surveyshave notedthesensitivity of responsesto smalldifferences
in
question wording and the contextof the question in the interview
(Freudenbergand Baxter 1983; Nealey et al. 1983; Mitchell1980). It is
notclearwhetherthisvolatilityis reallyhigherthanon otherissues,butit
struckthese observersas significant when theyattemptedto distillthe
resultsof manydifferentsurveys.
Interpretation
How does our analysisofmedia discourseprovidea necessarycontextfor
understanding thesesurveyresults?Imaginea memberofthepublic,old
enoughto rememberHiroshimaand theage ofnucleardualism,trying to
make senseoftheissue ofnuclearpower.Let us assume,further, thatthe
issuehas onlymoderateto low salienceforourhypothetical citizenexcept
on thoseoccasionswhen it is givenhighpriority in the media.
Back in the 1950s, she would almost certainlyhave used a progress
schema30to understandnuclear power; no otherframewas available.
Untilthemid-1970s,she would have had littlereasonto thinkabout the
issueat all. We can reasonablyassumethat,whenshe encountered media
discourse,her anticipatoryschema remainedprogress.
At thispoint,herpersonalexposureto theissue culturethrougheither
the media or otherdiscourses,her enduringpredispositions, and her in-
terpersonalinteractions would all have playeda rolein the modification
ofherworkingschemaon nuclearpower.Many pathswerepossible,but
the natureof the media discoursesuggeststhat certainones were espe-
ciallylikely.
In the mid-1970s,the discourseoverwhelmingly acceptedthe inevita-
bilityand societalcommitment to nuclearpowerdevelopment,but there
was, at thesame time,a significant erosionofnucleardualismcombined
29Surveysgoingback to the 1950sshow a largeand consistent gendergap, with

womenmuchmoreopposedto nuclearpower.The explanationforthisalmostcer-
insightful
tainlylies outsidemediadiscourse.Nelkin(1981)has a particularly treat-
mentoftheissues.
30 Schemaand packageare parallelconcepts.We use "schema"whenreferring to the
and packagewhenreferring
levelof individualcognition to theculturalor discourse
level.
32

Nuclear Power
withpublic controversy about the safetyof nuclearreactors.In cartoon

discourse,in particular,progresswas supplantedby runawayand public
accountability,a harbingerof theirgeneralprominenceafterTMI.
We would hypothesize thatmanyolderpeopleduringthisperiodbegan
to conflatetheirpronuclearprogressschema with runawaythemesto
producesome versionof the ambivalentdevil's bargain.3'Clear antinu-
clear packages are rarelyencounteredin thenationalmedia we sampled
duringthisperiod. Withoutsome independentexposureto otherforums
ofdiscourse,it is difficult
to see how someonewould arriveat one of our
antinuclearschemata.
The media discoursestimulatedbyTMI, we hypothesize, accelerateda
shiftfromprogressto runawayand devil's bargainas the mostpopular
schemataamongtheattentivepublic.Displaysoftheold faith,whenthey
occurred,emphasizedthe necessityand inevitability of nuclearpower-
idea elementsthat can be incorporatedinto these alternatives.At the
same time,the themeof a technologyout of control,defyingits alleged
masters,was repeatedagain and again. Images of false confidenceand
apparentdeceptionby the nuclearmanagersabounded. Gallows humor
about mutants,hidden radiation,and nuclear catastrophesdominated
thecartoonsample, and the same themescame up moresoberlyin opin-
ion columnsas well.
Membersof thepublicwho paid attentiononlyafterTMI shouldhave
encounteredthisstreamof media discoursein a different way. Not hav-
ing participatedin the issue culture when progressdominated,they
should have been more likely to adopt an unambivalentantinuclear
schema. Hence, we would expectless outrightoppositionand moream-
bivalence among people who became politicallyconscious beforethe
1970s.
AfterTMI, we suspectthatthe majorityof thosewho appear to sup-
portnuclearpowerwere, in fact,ambivalent.The behavioralpsycholo-
gist'sapproach-avoidanceconflictis the prototype.When foodis associ-
ated witha severeelectricshock,theratis bothattractedand repelledby
thesame object. In thecase ofnuclearpower,it is notmerelya matterof
recognizingargumentson both sides but of experiencingsimultaneous
tendenciesto approach and avoid it.
Some proportionof thosewho were alreadyambivalentat thetimeof
TMI would have shiftedto an antinuclearschema,particularly not cost
effectiveor public accountability.Soft paths was rarelydisplayed in
31 Weare talkinghereabout thosemembersof thepublicwho had someminimal
awarenessof theissue. For manypeople(perhapsa majority)beforeTMI, nuclear
powerhad insufficient
salienceforthemto makeanyeffort to makesenseofit. And
evensinceChernobyl, whenthesizeofthisinattentive
grouphas undoubtedly
become
smaller,oneshouldnotassumethateveryone has a working
schemaon nuclearpower.
33

media discourseexceptin theattentuatedformof generalenvironmental

and conservationconcernsand interestin thesolar energyalternative.A
person would have had to move beyond national media discourseto
encounterthispackage in a fullydevelopedform.
Media discourseafterChernobylreinforced bothtendencies:frompro-
nuclearprogressto the fatalismofrunawayor theambivalenceof devil's
bargain,and fromambivalenceto outrightopposition.Today, we sus-
pect, a pure progressschema is rare among the public; the significant
divisionthatremainsis betweenthosewho continueto accepttheneces-
sityor inevitabilityof nuclearpower,inherentin thedevil'sbargainand
runawaypackages, and those who unambivalentlyoppose it, weaving
fragmentsof the available discourse into some overall antinuclear
schema.
These speculationsabout public thinkingon nuclearpower are very
difficultto testdirectlywithexistingsurveydata. Considerthedilemma
thata typicalsurveyquestionon nuclearpowerpresentsto respondents
with a devil's bargainschema: "In general,do you favoror oppose the
buildingof more nuclear plants in the United States?" How does one
respondif one believesthatnuclearpoweris a necessaryfactof lifebut
that sooneror later therewill be an enormousprice to pay? Does one
answerfavor,oppose, or notsure?Anyofthesealternativesis consistent
witha devil's bargainschema.
Nevertheless,the surveyresultscitedabove provideindirectevidence
forthe argument.For someonewith a devil's bargainschema,general
supportcombinedwith local oppositionprovidesa neat solutionto the
dilemmaof what to do about nuclearpower: the nimbyposition.If the
nuclearplant is not too close, the avoidance valence is less pronounced
and nuclearpower becomesa moreattractiveobject.
We do not argue thatpeople will come to the nimbypositionthrough
seeingit advocatedin media discourseand adoptingit. On thecontrary,
one would be hard put to findit, since it is not openlyespousedby any
spokespersonforthegovernment, nuclearindustry, or antinuclearmove-
ment. But media discourseincreasinglysupportsthe conflateddevil's
bargainpackage,bothdirectlyand byoffering runawayon topofdecades
of uncontestedprogress.
Widespreadambivalencecan also accountforthetemporary declinein
apparent support for nuclear power during momentsof peak media
coverage,followedby a partialreboundto formerlevelswhenthemedia
attentionsubsides.Whenthemedia discoursegivesthedangersa tempo-
raryimminence,theforceoftheavoidancevectorincreasesand ambiva-
lence is temporarily resolvedas opposition.When media attentionturns
elsewhere,the balance of forcesis restoredforthosewho retainan am-
bivalentschema.
34

Nuclear Power
The evidenceforchange in how age influencesoppositionto nuclear

power adds furthersupportto our argument.In an earlierera, young
people wereleast opposed to nuclearpowerbecause theywereespecially
susceptibleto theappeal oftheprogresspackage. Today, havingbecome
middle-aged,theyretainthelong-term influenceofthisdiscourseand are
morelikelyto be ambivalentthan opposed. Young people today,never
havingexperiencedthe era in whichprogressreignedunchallenged,are
morelikelyto be opposed ratherthan ambivalent.
Our model also suggestsan interpretationof why thereshould be so
muchvolatilityofresponsewithslightchangesin questionwordings.The
ifnotimpossible,foran ambivalentrespondentto
questionsare difficult,
answer. Of course,such volatilitymay simplymean the absence of any
stable schema ratherthan a stable and conflictingone. But it is, at a
minimum,consistentwithambivalence.
Finally,thereis somemoredirectevidenceon widespreadambivalence
in two surveysreviewedby Nealey et al. (1983). In one, conductedin
October 1979, respondentswere asked independently about both"bene-
fits"and "harmfulconsequences"frombuildingmore nuclear power
plants.If we countthe37% who could thinkofno benefitsas antinuclear
and the22% who could thinkof no harmfulconsequencesas pronuclear,
thisgives us an estimateof 41%.32
Anothersurveyin July 1979 yielded a similarestimate.All respon-
dents, regardlessof attitude,were asked what theysaw as the major
advantages and disadvantagesof nuclear power. This formyieldeda
slightlyhigherantinuclearpercentage,with 42% unable to name any
advantageand only14% unableto nameanydisadvantage.This leaves a
balance of 44% who were ambivalent.
CONCLUSION
We have argued here that public opinionabout nuclearpower can be
understoodonly by rootingit in an issue culturethat is reflectedand
shapedby generalaudiencemedia. The conventionalmethodofassessing
public opinionthroughresponsesto surveyquestionswithfixedcatego-
ries has two major drawbacksforour constructionist model, makingit
difficultto testour argumentdirectly.First,it obscuresambivalenceand
disguisesthepresenceof schematathatproduceno clear-cutpositionfor
or against. Second, it blurs the distinctionbetweenpeople withnonat-
32This questionwas asked onlyof the 91% who had "ever heardor read about
controversies
over nuclearpowerplants."Ambivalence,as we indicatedabove, is
morethansimplyknowingarguments on bothsides. Hence,suchfigures
shouldbe
regardedas crudeestimates
ofupperlimitson thenumberofthosewhoare ambiva-
lent.
35

titudes-that is, with no workingschema on an issue-and thosewith

schematathatdo not fitcomfortably in a pro or anti category.
One of the major lessonsof the 1964 Conversearticle"The Natureof
Belief Systemsin Mass Publics" was to warn against the tendencyto
imposeelitedichotomiessuch as "liberal"and "conservative"on a mass
publicwhose beliefsare notorganizedby suchdimensions.Similarly,the
ofthepublicinto"hawks"and "doves" concerning
classification Vietnam
war attitudesmade it difficult
to identifythosewhoseschemaled themto
a "win or get out" position.This lesson is ignoredso easily,we submit,
because of a methodologicaltraditionthat assumes the task is to array
relevantpublicson a pro-condimension.
By framingissues forpeople throughthe questionasked and the pre-
coded responsecategoriesoffered, themethodassumesa sharedframeon
nuclearpower.But a constructionist modelbeginsbycallingthisassump-
tion intoquestionand examiningit. A properconstructionist methodol-
ogy forassessingpublic opinionmustdo more to make the underlying
schematavisiblein some fashion,preferably by allowingus a glimpseof
the thinkingprocessinvolved.33Only by methodsthatelicitmoreof the
interpretiveprocesswill we be able to see the extentto whichdifferent
media packages have becomepartofthepublic'stoolkitin makingsense
of the worldof public affairs.
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37


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Media Discourse and Public Opinion

on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist

Media discourseand public opinionare treatedas two parallelsys-

Atomsforpeace. Your friend,the atom. Electricitytoo cheap to meter.

AJS Volume 95 Number 1 (July1989): 1-37

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pretationsand meaningsforrelevantevents.An archivistmightcatalog

The Nature of Media Discourse

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specialist'sdiscourseusingjournalsand otherprintmedia aimedat those

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

To illustrate,considera package about the use of nuclearpower to

and (3) appeals to principle(i.e., a set of moralclaims).A packagecan be

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

the eventis not one thatthe scenariopredictsor expects,thisonlychal-

4 The economicmodelofvalueaddedhas beenusedmostprominently

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

culturalhero-embodied in the mythsabout Benjamin Franklinand

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

collectiveratherthan personalagenda. These agentsfrequently draw on

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

sciouslygoingalong withthe government's position."In additionto this

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

In sum,packagessucceedin media discoursethrougha combinationof

The Nature of Public Opinion

7 Thisexampleis drawnfromresearchin progress

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However dependentthe audience may be on media discourse,they

THE NUCLEAR POWER DISCOURSE

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crasiesof a given medium.Together,theserequirements presentover-

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

1. The Age of Dualism: From Hiroshimathroughthe 1960s

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

9 The reportwas issuedbya specialpanelofnineprominent citizensappointedbythe

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ping this energysource for human betterment are formidableand far

11 We relyhereon thedetailedaccountoftheFermiaccidentby Fuller(1975).

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

A GeneralElectricofficialclassifiedwhat happenedas "a minorpertur-

2. The Rise of an AntinuclearDiscourse:The 1970sto TMI

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be suchseparatepaths. Subliminalmushroomcloudshad begunto gather

15See Lovins(1977)fora particularly

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

Media coverageofnuclearpoweracceleratedrapidlyin themid-1970s.

This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

is of who will win, and, hence, thereis verylittledirectcommentary

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Newsmagazines.-Time and Newsweekran storieson Seabrook,again

edgedouttheAtomicIndustrialForum(3:26) forsecondplace.Thisfinding shouldbe

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suggesta new package, runaway,whose positionon nuclear power is

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There is only one faintsuggestionin the entireset of columnsof any

3. Life ImitatesArt: From TMI to Chernobyl

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This content downloaded from 132.174.254.159 on November 21, 2016 14:41:08 PM

onlytwicein our sample,but, in addition,two of thethreenetworksran

20 Thisfilmwas peggedtocoverageofcongressional on chargesthattheU.S.

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Progress Energy Devil's Runaway Public NotCost Soft Paths

FIG. 1. -Nuclear power packages in televisionutterances