1 - E&P Economics - Environment +contracts FL (RGE)

You might also like

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 68

E&P projects Economics

1 - E&P Industry environment

2 - Contractual and fiscal frameworks of E&P activities

3 - Investment profitability studies for E&P projects


Frdrique LANG

EG
Exploration & Production Industry
environment
Frdrique LANG

EG
Fundamentals of the Exploration & Production Industry

HIGHLY INTERNATIONAL

HIGHLY RISKY
Exploration is Risky by nature. Prices are highly uncertain

HIGHLY CAPITALISTIC
80% of the Total Investments of the Oil & Gas Industry

LONG PAY OUT TIME SPAN


Many years are required between Discovery & First Oil
Production Profiles typically over 10/15 years

HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

INCREASINGLY HIGH COSTS, DEPENDENT ON REGIONAL & RESERVOIR CONDITIONS


Offshore/Onshore, Weather, Geology, Depth and Type of Reservoirs,

2010 - IFP Training


HIGHLY TECHNICAL & TECHNOLOGY DEPENDENT
3D-4D Seismic, Horizontal & Multidrain Drilling, Polyphasic Pumping, Subsea, Deepwater,

Mars 2001 A101* 3


EG - CFEP - September 2011 3
Proven Oil & Gas Reserves

Gtoe
180 Ratio gas reserves / crude reserves 100%

160

Crude oil reserves


140

120 Natural gas reserves

100 80% years


50%
80 R/P gas 80

60 60

40 40

20 20

2010 - IFP Training


R/P crude oil
0 0
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08

Source : BP Statistical Review


EG - CFEP - September 2011 4
World conventional crude oil proven reserves
World crude oil reserves: 1383 billion barrels (Gb)
189 billion tons (Gt) (01/01/2011)

9%
1% CIS
5%
Europe 126 Gb
North America 13 Gb 26 years
74 Gb 9 years
55%
15 years
10%

Africa 3%
17% 132 Gb
36 years Asia-Oceania
45 Gb
South and Central Am Middle-East 15 years

2010 - IFP Training


239 Gb 753 Gb
94 years 82 years

Source : BP Stat Review


EG - CFEP - September 2011 5
World crude oil production
World production: 82 Million barrels per day (Mbbl/d)
3.9 billion tons (Gt) (2010)

17%

17%

5%
CIS
Europe 14 Mbbl/d
North America 4 Mbbl/d (~25 qualities)
14 Mbbl/d (~70 qualities)
(~35 qualities)
30%
12%
10%
9%
Africa
Asia-Oceania
South and Central America 10 Mbbl/d 8 Mbbl/d
(~90 qualities)
7 Mbbl/d (~70 qualities)

2010 - IFP Training


(~70 qualities)
Middle-East
25 Mbbl/d
(~50 qualities)

Source : BP Stat Review


EG - CFEP - September 2011 6
Natural gas proven reserves
World natural gas proven reserves: 187 100 Gm3
168 Gtoe (01/01/2011)

31%
CIS
2% 58500 Gm3
5% 77 years
North America Europe
9900 Gm3 4400 Gm3
17 years 41%
12 years

8%
4%
Africa 9%
14700 Gm3
Central and South Am 71 years Asia-Oceania

2010 - IFP Training


7400 Gm3 16200 Gm3
46 years 33 years
Middle East
75800 Gm3
>100 years
Source : BP Stat Review
EG - CFEP - September 2011 7
Natural gas marketed production
World natural gas marketed production: 3193 Gm3 = 2.9 Gtoe (2010)

26%
24% CIS
758 Gm3
9%

Europe
281 Gm3
North America
826 Gm3 14%
15%
7%

Africa
5% Middle East
209 Gm3 Asia-Oceania
461 Gm3
South and Central America 493 Gm3
161 Gm3

2010 - IFP Training


Source : BP Stat Review
EG - CFEP - September 2011 8
Main Players on the Oil Market - 2010
Country Company Crude oil % of world
production (1000 bbl/day) production

Saudi Arabia S. ARAMCO 9.7 11.8


Iran NIOC 4.2 5.1
Venezuela PDVSA 3.2 3.9
Mexico PEMEX 2.9 3.5
Chine CNPC 2.8 3.4
BP 2.5 3.1
Kuwait KPC 2.5 3.0
Iraq INOC 2.5 3.0
EXXON MOBIL 2.4 2.9
Russia ROSNEFT 2.2 2.6
Brazil PETROBRAS 2.1 2.6
CHEVRON 1.9 2.3
Algeria SONATRACH 1.7 2.0
RD SHELL 1.7 2.0
CONOCOPHILIPPS 1.6 2.0
LUKOIL 1.6 1.9
UAE ADNOC 1.4 1.7

2010 - IFP Training


TOTAL 1.4 1.7
Nigeria NNPC 1.2 1.5
Libya Libya NOC 1.2 1.5

Source : BPSR August - PIW december 2010 Total of 20 50. 7 61.7


March 2011
EG - CFEP - September 2011 9
Main Players on the Gas Market - 2010
Country Company Production World Production
(Mm3/day) %

Russia GAZPROM 1 264 14.4


Iran NIOC 360 4.1
EXXONMOBIL 263 3.0
BP 240 2.7
RD SHELL 240 2.7
Algeria SONATRACH 208 2.4
Saudi Arabia SAUDI ARAMCO 207 2.4
China CNPC 202 2.3
Qatar QP 176 2.0
Malaysia PETRONAS 175 2.0
Uzbekistan UZBEKNEFTGAS 154 1.7
CONOCOPHILLIPS 146 1.7
CHEVRON 141 1.6
TOTAL 139 1.6
Mexico PEMEX 127 1.5
STATOIL 126 1.4
ENI 124 1.4

2010 - IFP Training


Venezuela PDVSA 115 1.3
Russia NOVATECH 89 1.0
Egypt EGPC 86 9.8

Source : BPSR August 2011 - PIW December 2010


March 2011
Total of 20 4 582 52
EG - CFEP - September 2011 10
Crude oil price

140 $/b

130

120

110
eco
100 crisis
Katrina
Rita
90
huriccanes

80
Staff attacks in S. Arabia
70 OPEC disturbances in Irak, Nigeria
quotas
60
Iraq
Iran/Iraq Kuwait events
50 war crisis
Netback
Nationalization contracts OPEC
40 of oil fields 11 th
sept. Quotas
OPEC
30 domination 3rd OIL
SHOCK
20 2nd OIL SHOCK
Iranian

2010 - IFP Training


OPEC Agreement Mexico,
10 revolution
1st OIL SHOCK Quotas Venezuela, Saudi Arabia
Yom Kippur war Asian crisis
0
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

Source : Platt's
S 402*16 May 2011
EG - CFEP - September 2011 11
Investment in exploration-production

600 G$ $/b 100

90
500
Invest. out of North 80

Invest. in North Am 70
400
60

300 Crude oil 50


price
40
200
30

20
100
10

2010 - IFP Training


0 0
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Source : IFP, Chase Manhattan Bank


A321*26(1) March 2011
EG - CFEP - September 2011 12
Share of the Upstream Activity in the IOCs Global Earnings
EXXON MOBIL, SHELL, CHEVRON, BP, TOTAL
Net Earnings Upstream / Company Net Earnings
83%
140 000 M$

120 000

100 000 71% 74%

72%

80 000
90%
67%

60 000 77%
60%

90%
40 000
53%
64% 64% 59%
60%
54% 67% 61% 48%

2010 - IFP Training


20 000 45% 52% 48%

0
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

EG - CFEP - September 2011 14


Critical decision points along the E&P chain
Critical Decision Point
Go into the Permit or not?
Field ECONOMICS
Development
Exploration
Appraisal

CONTRACT
Critical Decision Point
Additional Development, Yes or No?
Preliminary
ECONOMICS
Conceptual

Pre-
Project
PROJECT Production Profile
INVESTMENT
DECISION
Field
Abandonment
1-3 y 3-4 y 3-4 y > 20 y Field Operations
Time

2010 - IFP Training


Discovery First Oil End
ECONOMICS
Site restored
Critical Decision Point
Launch Development or not?
EG - EAM
CFEP Mod
- September
1 - Analyse
2011conomique de lE&P - Avril 2011 15
E&P projects Economics
1 - E&P Industry environment

2 - Contractual and fiscal frameworks of E&P activities

3 - Investment profitability studies for E&P projects


Frdrique LANG

EG
Contractual and fiscal frameworks of
exploration-production activities
Frdrique LANG

EG
Fundamentals and Stakes

Principles of Concession Contracts

Principles of Production Sharing Contracts (PSC)

Principles of Service Contracts

Principles of Joint Operating Agreements (JOA)

2010 - IFP Training


EG 18
Fundamentals and Stakes

2010 - IFP Training


EG 19
Objectives of the major players in the upstream sector

STATE

Promote activity to valorize its


natural resources. INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANY

Get access to reserves and


productions.
Maximize income while allowing
investors to draw a return. Make profit and remunerate a
UPSTREAM
risk capital.
CONTRACT
Take part in the decision process
Ensure supervision and control at all stages of the projects.
while avoiding red tape.
Valorize its research programs
and know-how.

2010 - IFP Training


Acquire expertise by know-how
and technology transfer.

EG 20
Hydrocarbons ownership (before and after extraction)

General rule

Whatever the type of fiscal regime and contractual


frameworks (excluding the US regime), the host country still
the owner of its underground natural resources.

The host country gives only an authorization to explore and,


if successful, to exploit the hydrocarbons, with an entitlement
to the production for cost reimbursement plus a margin.

2010 - IFP Training


EG 21
Oil contracts awarding procedure

Negotiations
Legislation does not specify all conditions applicable to an oil agreement.
A company negotiates the terms of an oil agreement, related to a free area.

International invitation to tender (exploration rounds)


In accordance with the Hydrocarbon Law in force, the State opens blocks and
fixes the conditions of the invitation to tender.
A model contract is provided with blank terms to fill in.

Transfer of interest on fields


An international invitation to tender (bidding) is the usual rule.

2010 - IFP Training


The model contract must fit the specificity of a discovery already made or a
field already in the production phase.

EG 22
General structure of an exploration-production contract

OBJECT

Defines the rights and obligations of parties concerning


the oil and gas activities covered by the exploration-production contract for a
specified period.
UPSTREAM
CONTRACT DEFINITIONS

PROVISIONS
technical, operational, economic,
General Articles fiscal and financial, general
Parties
Cession and Transfers ANNEXES
Sanctions Accounting procedure
Force majeure Work programme
Contractual area (map)

2010 - IFP Training


Differences and Arbitration Bank or parent-company guarantee
Governing Law

EG 23
Key areas in contract building

Some standard key provisions in contract building

Duration and surrender

Work commitment

Commerciality

2010 - IFP Training


EG 24
Key areas in contract building

Duration and surrender provisions

The duration of the right to explore for hydrocarbons normally ranges from
three to six years.

The exploration phase is divided into a number of periods (two or three),


each having the related work obligation.

A portion of exploration area is usually surrendered to the host country.

This relinquishment is made typically in two or three steps (for example 25%

2010 - IFP Training


every two years).

EG 25
Key areas in contract building

Work commitment

The work commitment generally refers to the acquisition of seismic data with an
option to drill an exploration well.

Generally measured in kilometres of Seismic data to be acquired and number of


exploration wells to be drilled within a specified time limit.

On the expiry of exploration period, if no commercial discovery is made, the

2010 - IFP Training


contract automatically expires.

EG 26
Key areas in contract building

Commerciality

In case of commercial discovery, the contractor must prove to the host Government
that a the development will be economic for both parties.

Commerciality is usually based on a predetermined Government gross take (taxation


of oil and gas activities).

The Government agreement to commerciality marks the end of exploration phase


and start of development phase.

2010 - IFP Training


The duration of exploitation period vary according to the countrys petroleum law,
generally it ranges from 20 to 25 years, which can be extended.

EG 27
Stakes in the upstream sector

Global International Market with High Competition

SUPPLY DEMAND
Opportunities offered by States Opportunities selected by
International Oil Companies

Oil contracts are designed and negotiated according to the countrys hydrocarbon law, the
attractiveness of the basin to explore and the oil market situation.

UPSTREAM
CONTRACTS

2010 - IFP Training


Satisfactory level of exploration-production activity ensured only within
a Fair and Stable Fiscal and Contractual Framework
WIN-WIN SITUATION
EG 28
Sharing the economic rent

At the center of the Host Countries - Oil Companies relationship,


the concept of the sharing of the oil rent
RENT = REVENUES TECHNICAL COSTS

STATE
RENT
PRODUCTION OIL
TECHNICAL COMPANY
COSTS

Sub-Contractors

2010 - IFP Training


The main point of any oil contract is to define the sharing methodology.

EG 29
Sharing the rent / a project full cycle evaluation

Governments Net Cash Flows (M$) Gvt. Take


If the Gvt (NOC)
invests in the fields development

Participation Fiscal Regime

Because the Gvt.


is the owner of the resources

Projects Value
Oil Companys Net Cash Flows (M$) for the Oil Company

2010 - IFP Training


Total Rent (M$) =
Price * Fields Reserves Capital Expenditures Operating Expenses
EG 30
Different Types of Contracts

CONCESSION

Delegation of Mining Rights in exchange of


Royalties and Taxes

STATE PETROLEUM
PRODUCTION COMPANIES
or
SHARING CONTRACT
NATIONAL or
Delegation of Operations in exchange of
COMPANY access to oil JV

2010 - IFP Training


SERVICE CONTRACTS
Increasing State
Control Delegation of Operations in exchange of cash

EG - Strategic Business Acumen for Oil & Gas Executives 31


Principles of Concession Contracts
(Royalty Tax system)

2010 - IFP Training


EG 32
Concession contract

State assigns its rights to explore and exploit underground resources to the
International Oil Company.

International Oil Company (Licensee or Contractor)

undertakes and finances the exploration at its own risk

if the exploration is successful, it decides on development and production


within the framework of the country's petroleum law

owns the production (hydrocarbons at the surface)

owns all the facilities financed

2010 - IFP Training


pays royalties and taxes to the State

Octobre 1999
EG 33
Concession contract

State Participation
can be inserted in the contract (NOC) with the terms
defined in an "Association Agreement ".

State revenue sources

bonuses (Paid in cash after finalization of negotiation and contract


signing)

surface rental ($/km)

royalty on production

petroleum income tax

2010 - IFP Training


special petroleum tax

EG 34
Concessionary / barrel and rent split

ROYALTY

Petroleum Rent
STATE INCOME
TAX

MARGIN
CONTRACTOR

CONTRACTOR CAPEX

2010 - IFP Training


OPEX

EG 35
Concession / example

Concession System Flow Diagram


Barrel and Rent Split / Full Cycle
Gross Revenue
$50,00
Company Share Government Share
Royalty
15,00%
Net Revenue

$6,00 Deductions
Assumed Costs Capex and Opex
Taxable Income

Special Petroleum Tax


65%
Net Income After-SPT
Petroleum Income Tax
30%

Net Income After-Tax

Division of Gross Revenues

2010 - IFP Training


BARREL SPLIT
Division of Net Cash Flow
Petroleum Rent

TAKE
EG 36
Principles of Production Sharing
Agreements

2010 - IFP Training


EG 38
History and background from concession to production
sharing contracts
First Production Sharing Contract was signed in 1966 between

the Indonesian National Oil Company (Pertamina) and IIAPCO.


Basic features:

Many aspects of the government/contractor relationship may be negotiated but


some are fixed.

The basic structure is effectively predetermined by the petroleum law

Model PSC are put forward by the host government as basis for bidding and
negotiation

Mining title remains the property of Pertamina

2010 - IFP Training


Pertamina held management control

Pertamina approved work and budgets

EG 39
History and background from concession to production
sharing contracts
Contract is based on production sharing

Contractor provided finance and took the risks.

After allowance of 40% of annual production for cost oil recovery, the remaining
production (60%) is shared between Pertamina and the contractor.

All equipment bought and imported by contractor became property of Pertamina.

These contract features are still popular with Governments.

2010 - IFP Training


EG 40
Production sharing contract

State keeps its mining rights or delegates its rights to the National Oil Company that
contracts an International Oil Company to exploit the reserves.

International Oil Company (Contractor)

Undertakes and finances the exploration at its own risk.


After the decision to develop the reservoir it undertakes and finances
development and production :
is reimbursed for its expenses by a share of production called Cost Oil.
is remunerated for the risks taken and the services offered by a share of
the remaining production (after cost oil has been deducted) called profit oil.

National Oil Company owns the facilities and may take part in the development

2010 - IFP Training


phase.

Octobre 1999 A 412*41


EG 41
Production sharing contract

State Participation
can be inserted in the contract (NOC) with the terms
defined in an "Association Agreement ".

State revenue sources


Bonuses (Paid in cash after finalization of negotiation and contract
signing)
royalty on production
a share of profit oil

2010 - IFP Training


petroleum tax

EG 42
Cost recovery and profit sharing

STATE FUNDS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY


=
RECOVERABLE COSTS (Cost Recovery Oil)

PROFIT
COST
OIL
STOP
PRODUCTION

COMPANY
EXCESS OIL

COST
OIL
RECOVERABLE
COST

YEAR N YEAR N + 1 YEAR N + N

2010 - IFP Training


IF RECOVERABLE COSTS > COST STOP EXCESS COST OIL MAY BE
Sub-Contractors PSC IS SATURATED - ADDED TO THE PROFIT OIL

SURPLUS IS CARRIED FORWAD - OR SHARED DIFFERENTLY


EG 43
Production sharing and cost recovery

Revenues sales

EXPLO
COST STOP
DEV DEPRECIATION

OPEX
EXPLO OPEX
DEV

2010 - IFP Training


Expenses

EG 44
Production sharing and cost recovery

Revenues sales
PROFIT OIL STATE

PROFIT OIL CONTRACTOR


COST STOP
DEPRECIATION EXP+DEV

OPEX
EXPLO OPEX
DEV

2010 - IFP Training


PROFIT OIL
CONTRACTOR ACCESS TO OIL
Expenses COST OIL

EG 45
Production sharing contract
Cost recovery methods
the contractor has the right to be refunded for its costs (paid in advance) by having a
fraction of the production (cost oil).
the maximum limit of the production assigned to the recovery of the oil costs (cost stop)
varies according to the countries or the contracts.
the balance of the not yet recovered oil costs is recoverable the following years according to
the same principle.

Profit Oil Sharing Methods

at the beginning a single profit oil sharing rate was fixed in the contract whatever the
characteristics of the discovery were.

progressive sharing rate according to sliding scales were introduced. First, the sliding scales
refer to physical parameters (daily or cumulated production).

2010 - IFP Training


finally, a new mechanism of profit oil sharing based on the rate of return and another
profitability ratios were introduced in the contract rather than physical parameters (daily or
cumulated production).

EG 46
Examples of sliding scales sharing

Contractor State
Production State
Rate of Return (%) Profit Oil (%)
(000 b/d) Profit Oil (%)

<15 40
<15 30
15-20 50
15-30 40
20-25 60
30-50 50
25-30 70
50-70 60
>30 80
70-100 70
>100 80 State
R-Factor Profit Oil (%)

<1 30
1-1.5 40
1.5-2 50
2-2.5 60

2010 - IFP Training


>2.5 80

EG 47
Production sharing / barrel and rent split

ROYALTY
Petroleum Rent
PROFIT OIL STATE
STATE

PROFIT OIL
CONTRACTOR

CAPEX CONTRACTOR

OPEX

2010 - IFP Training


EG 48
Production sharing / example

Barrel and Rent Split / Full Cycle


Gross Revenue
$50,00
Company Share Government Share
Royalty
15%

$6,00 Costs Oil Recovery


Incurred Costs Capex + Opex

35% Profit Oil Split 65%

Petroleum Income Tax


30%
Net Income After-Tax

Division of Gross Revenues

BARREL SPLIT

2010 - IFP Training


Division of Net Cash Flow

Economic Rent
$44,00
TAKE
EG 49
Different methods of Profit Oil taxation

Tax (if any) deemed Tax on Investors


Profit Oil Tax on overall Profit Oil
included in State
(ex. Angola) (ex. Nigeria)
Profit Oil

PROFIT OIL PROFIT OIL


TAX
STATE STATE

PROFIT OIL PROFIT OIL


STATE TAX
INVESTOR

PROFIT OIL PROFIT OIL TAX OIL


INVESTOR INVESTOR

COST OIL COST OIL COST OIL

2010 - IFP Training


ROYALTY ROYALTY ROYALTY

EG 51
Production sharing (before and after tax) / example

SHARING AFTER-TAX SHARING BEFORE-TAX


VALUE OF PRODUCTION 100 VALUE OF PRODUCTION 100
EXPLORATION COSTS (5) EXPLORATION COSTS (5)
DEVELOPMENT COSTS (20) DEVELOPMENT COSTS (20)
OPERATING COSTS (20) OPERATING COSTS (20)
COST OIL 45 COST OIL 45
PROFIT OIL 55 PROFIT OIL 55
NET SHARING BEFORE-TAX SHARING
65% STATE 30% STATE
35% COMPANY 70% COMPANY
RENT = REVENUES COSTS TAX (50 %) (..)
- - - .. = ..

2010 - IFP Training


NET PROFIT OIL COMPANY
STATE
COMPANY (.) NET PROFIT OIL STATE
(.) %
%
EG 52
Typical terms of exploration-production contracts

DURATION
Exploration Phase 6 to 10 years (2 or 3 periods)
Production Phase 20 to 25 years

RELINQUISHMENT 25% of surface

ROYALTY 0% to 20%

COST STOP 35-40% to 70-80%

INCOME TAX around 35%

DEPRECIATION 5 years linear

2010 - IFP Training


STATE PARTICIPATION from 10% to 60%

EG 54
Principles of Service Contracts

2010 - IFP Training


EG 55
Risk-service contracts

The contractor provides all the capital required for the exploration and
development of petroleum resources.

If the exploration efforts are successful, the contractor is allowed to recover


its costs from the revenue generated by the sales of Oil/gas.

In addition, the contractor is paid a fee based on percentage of the


remaining revenues which can be or not subject to taxes.

The government remains the holder of the hydrocarbon produced.

The term risk implies that if the contractor is not successful in finding oil/gas,
all his costs of exploration are to his account with no liability to the host
government.

2010 - IFP Training


There is little difference between the risk-service contract and PSC. The
difference lies in how payments are made to the contractor (kind or cash)

EG 56
Iranian buyback contract

Risk-Service Contract
Contractor does not receive a mining title, nor have access to oil.
Reimbursement and remuneration of the contractor is made over a limited period.

International Oil Company (Contractor)


conducts and finances the development, then transfers operations and know-how
to NIOC who is the owner of facilities and production.
reimbursement + remuneration = repayment oil .
buys back (without paying) part of the production as entitlement to this
repayment oil through a long-term export oil sales agreement with the State.
receives and takes freely the oil corresponding to the repayment oil over the
duration of the buyback contract.

2010 - IFP Training


Fundamental difference between the buyback contract and the production sharing contract :
the Contractors access to oil is not direct, but through an oil purchase/sales agreement.

EG 57
Technical assistance contracts

Service contracts without risk (Technical Service Agreement ):


International Oil Company (Contractor)

does not take any risk and does not finance work directly.

receives a remuneration (fee), more or less related to the results, for the
services provided.

the State commits to ensure a minimal revenue ($/barrel) to the contractor


regardless of the crude oil sale price.
Technical assistance contracts relate primarily to old fields exploitation work and
sometimes to development work.
Some technical assistance contracts allow the International Oil Company to purchase
part of the production.

2010 - IFP Training


The International Oil Company is generally subjected to the General Tax Law.

EG 58
Example of worldwide global oil rent sharing

The Ireland, the United States (deep


offshore) and the United Kingdom have a
liberal oil regime.

By contrast the OPEC countries have a


radical fiscal regime.

Between the two fiscal regimes, there is


an entire spectrum of possible taxation
system.

For comparison purposes, the type of


contracts (concession, PSC or service) is not

2010 - IFP Training


significant But its the total
government take which made the
difference

EG 59
From concession to Production Sharing Agreement

The success of the Production Sharing Agreements in the 70s and the strong move from
concession to this kind of contracts is driven by the reinforcement of State control over
hydrocarbon activities.

the State (directly or through its National Oil Company) remains the
holder of the mining rights, and therefore the holder of the production.

the State calls upon the technical skill and financial means of the
International Oil Company, but remains the owner of a significant part of
the production through the concept of production sharing.

2010 - IFP Training


the highest degree of control the State can theoretically exert.

EG 60
Joint Operating Agreements

2010 - IFP Training


EG 61
Need for a Joint Operating Agreement

Petroleum exploration involves


considerable risk and large capital commitments.

While the risk decreases progressively as a petroleum project enters the


development and production phases,
capital commitments remain high.

Because of the risk and large capital commitments, few companies undertake
petroleum exploration, development and production alone.

2010 - IFP Training


Companies team up to undertake the activities as a joint venture.

EG 62
Joint ventures

In the international petroleum industry, a joint venture describes the relationship


between two or more parties who undertake joint activity in the form of a
partnership .

The rights and obligations of the partners are set out in the joint venture
agreement.

A joint venture is not a form of oil and gas agreement.

A joint venture is a form of association or partnership


between several companies, or between one or more companies

2010 - IFP Training


and a host government or its national oil company
for the purpose of operating an oil and gas venture jointly.

EG 63
Association agreement principles

The JOA defines the provisions which govern


the relationship of all the joint venture partners in great detail.

Operating committee decides work programs and budgets according to a


majority vote.

Oil operations are led by an Operator (who can be an "operating company"


created by the partners).

Partners pay the cash calls prepared by the Operator to cover the
expenditures to be made within the framework of the work programs.

2010 - IFP Training


Each partner has the right and the obligation, to take and market a share
of the production in proportion to its participating interest.

EG 64
Association agreement principles

The JV formula corresponds to a sharing of costs and production


according to each associate participating interest, not a sharing of
income.

Each associate is separately subject to taxation.

Particular provisions are designed to define the rights, advantages and


obligations applying to the State as a partner (participation date,

2010 - IFP Training


financing, etc.)

EG 65
Motivations for State participation

to have access to an additional share of production,

to increase the State oil incomes by having a direct participation in


the operations profits against the financing of a share of the costs,

to get knowledge of oil activities practices by participating in the


work programs and budgets decision-making process,

in the short term, to obtain a better control of the oil operations and
expenditure, and

in the long term, to take in hand, at least partially, the exploitation of

2010 - IFP Training


the national hydrocarbons resources by becoming oil operator.

EG 66
Main developments in the contractual framework

Reinforcement of States control.

Strong move, starting in the 70s, from Concessions to PSCs.

Modern concession regimes adopting control tools brought by PSCs.

Gvt. Take in the petroleum rent:


increase in the 70s and stability in first half of the 80s,
reduction from mid 80s to encourage investments ,
increase again in the past few years just before the crisis.

With higher volatility of prices, more flexibility in contracts.

Greater complexity of provisions relating to the oil rent sharing.

2010 - IFP Training


More precise definitions of exploration commitments.

Specific provisions relating to natural gas exploitation.


EG 67
2010 - IFP Training
68
Appendices

EG
Comparison of fundamental features of upstream
contracts
PRODUCTION SHARING CONCESSION

ROYALTY ROYALTY

Petroleum Rent
Petroleum Rent

PROFIT OIL
STATE INCOME
STATE TAX

PROFIT OIL MARGIN


CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR

CAPEX CONTRACTOR CAPEX

OPEX OPEx

2010 - IFP Training


The State is always the owner of the hydrocarbons reserves underground,
and the International Oil Company supports all the financial risks and supplies
the funds, the equipment, the know-how and the necessary personnel.
EG 69
Comparison of fundamental features of patrimonial contracts
Identical or similar articles in modern upstream contracts
Duration
Termination / Cancellation
Exploration Phase
(duration, surface and relinquishment)

Exploration Work and Expenditure Obligations


Appraisal of a Discovery
Commercial Discovery and Production Phase
(development plan, marginal or not commercial discoveries, natural gas, production levels, unitisation)

Annual Work Programs and Budgets


Rights and Obligations of the Company
(compliance with the general rules for carrying out operations, responsibility, compensation)

2010 - IFP Training


Inspection, Information, Reports and Confidentiality

EG 70
Comparison of fundamental features of patrimonial contracts

Identical or similar articles in modern upstream contracts


Hydrocarbons Price Determination
Consolidation Rules
Imports/Exports Regime
Transfers of Funds, Exchange Control, Local Accounts
Domestic Market Obligations
Book-keeping, Accounts, Audits
Personnel and Training
Assignment and Transfer of Rights
State Participation

2010 - IFP Training


Force Majeure, Arbitration
Other Provisions
(applicable law, notifications, renunciation, etc.)
EG 71
Comparison of fundamental features of patrimonial
contracts

Concession Production Sharing Service Iranian Buy Back


State State State State
assigns its rights to retains title to retains title to retains title to
hydrocarbons to the hydrocarbons reserves hydrocarbons reserves hydrocarbons reserves
international oil company owns all facilities and production and production
receives royalties (cash / has overall management owns all facilities owns all facilities
oil) and taxes control has overall management specifies scope of work
receives profit oil, with control sets cost and
royalties and taxes remuneration upfront

International Oil Co. International Oil Co. International Oil Co. International Oil Co.
takes exploration risk takes exploration risk takes exploration risk pays development costs
pays development costs pays development costs pays development costs performs work specified
has operational has operational shares operational gives operational
management management management management to NIOC
owns all facilities is entitled to a share of recovers costs and is recovers costs and is
owns all the production the production (cost oil paid for services (cash / oil paid for services (oil
plus a share of profit oil) through a sales contract) through a sales contract)

2010 - IFP Training


EG 72

You might also like