Name: Amsal Shahbaz

Roll No: 0802-BH-PS-2015

Submitted To: Madam Sadia Rafique

ASSIGNMENT TOPIC

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS
Contents
INTRODUCTION:.........................................................................................................................3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:....................................................................................................... 3

EARLIER ACTION OF US:.............................................................................................................4

SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN CUBA:............................................................................ 5

MISSILES REPORTED AND COUNTER PREPERATIONS:............................................................... 6

DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING:........................................................................................................ 6

CRISIS END:.................................................................................................................................7

AFTERMATH OF CRISIS:.............................................................................................................. 7

ANALYSIS.....................................................................................................................................9

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................10

BIBILOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................12
INTRODUCTION:
In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear war
over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. For 13 tense days, a fragile peace hung by
only a thread as the US instituted a naval blockade of Cuba to turn back Soviet ships. The
crisis was ended when the Soviet Union agreed in a secret negotiation to remove its nuclear
weapons from Cuba in exchange for a US agreement to remove its nuclear weapons from
Turkey six months later. The time lag was insisted upon by the US so that it would not look to
the world like the US had engaged in a quid pro quo regarding the missiles in Cuba.

The crisis resulted in the creation of a Hotline Agreement between the US and Soviet Union
that would allow for instantaneous communications between the leaders of the two
countries. The Cuban Missile Crisis stands today as a constant reminder of the immense
danger that is ever present in the Nuclear Age. Subsequent meetings among key decision
makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis have shown how many misperceptions there were during
the tense period of the crisis, and how fortunate the world was to have escaped a dreadful
nuclear holocaust between the two "superpower" states.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
On October 14, 1962, a U-2 spy plane flying over Cuba discovered nuclear missile sites under
construction. These missiles would have been capable of quickly reaching the United States.
President Kennedy convened a small group of senior officials to debate the crisis. Known as
ExComm, they met almost continuously for the next two weeks. The group was split
between those who wanted a military solution, such as an invasion or air strikes, and those
who sought a diplomatic solution to remove the missiles.

Eight days later, Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba and all U.S. military forces to
DEFCON 3. ICBMs were prepared for launch, Polaris submarines were dispatched, and B-52
bombers were placed on alert. The world watched as tensions between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union increased. Khrushchev put Warsaw Pact forces on alert. Later, U.S. forces were
placed on DEFCON 2.
Reconnaissance flights by U-2s continued over Cuba, while U.S. and Soviet officials
exchanged words of warning.

Finally, on October 28, Khrushchev announced that they were withdrawing the missiles from
Cuba. In the spring of 1963, the U.S. quietly removed the missiles from Turkey that equally
threatened the Soviet Union. This crisis is regarded as the closest the world has come to a
nuclear exchange. Soon after this incident, the famous "hotline" was installed between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union to help resolve future conflicts. It was later learned that the
missiles on Cuba were operational and were armed with nuclear warheads.

Soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis, negotiations were renewed regarding a Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT).

EARLIER ACTION OF US:

The U.S. was concerned about an expansion of communism, and a Latin America country
openly allying with the Soviet Union was regarded by it as unacceptable since the end
of World War 2, and the start of the Cold War. Such an involvement would also directly defy
the Monroe Doctrine, a U.S. policy limiting U.S. involvement in European colonies and
European affairs but holding that the Western Hemisphere was in the U.S. sphere of
influence.

The Kennedy administration had been publicly embarrassed by the failed Bays of Pig
Invasion in April 1961, which had been launched under President John F. Kennedy by CIA-
trained forces of Cuban missiles. Afterward, former President Dwight Eisenhower told
Kennedy that "the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that
they would otherwise not do. The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one
Soviet adviser wrote, "too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis
situations... too intelligent and too weak. U.S covert operations against Cuba continued in
1961 with the unsuccessful Operation Mongoose.

In addition, Khrushchev's impression of Kennedy's weaknesses was confirmed by the

President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly to the building of the Berlin
Wall. Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, "I know
for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong background, nor does he have the courage to
stand up to a serious challenge." He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy "would
make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree.

In January 1962, US Army General Edward Lansdale described plans to overthrow the Cuban
government in a top-secret report (partially declassified 1989), addressed to Kennedy and
officials involved with Operation Mongoose. CIA agents or "pathfinders" from the Special
Activision Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization,
including radio broadcasts. In February 1962, the US launched an embargo against Cuba, and
Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of
the Cuban government, mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September.
"Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime" would occur in the first two weeks of
October.

SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN CUBA:

Khrushchev planned the deployment in May 1962 and by late July over sixty Soviet ships
were en route to Cuba, some already carrying military material. Director of the CIA John
McCone, was told by French intelligence that the Soviets were planning to place missiles in
Cuba, therefore he warned President Kennedy. However, the President together with the
Attorney General; the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence concluded that the
Soviet Union would try such a thing!

Kennedy's administration team had received repeated claims from Soviet diplomats that
there were no missiles in Cuba and that no plans had been made to deploy any and that
they were not interested in starting an international crisis.

It was a U-2 flight in late august 1962 that photographed surface to air missile sites being
constructed. On September 4, 1962 Kennedy told congress that there were no offensive
missiles in Cuba.

September 8, 1962 saw the first consignment of SS-4 MRBMs unloaded in Havana, with a
second shipload arriving on September 16. The Cuban population noticed what was
happening and hundreds of reports reached Miami, all of which were considered false by US
intelligence.

The missiles were not discovered by the US until a U-2 flight photographed images showing
the construction of an SS-4 site near San Cristobal. These photographs were shown to
Kennedy on 16 October 1962. Within days the U-2 flights had discovered four sites were
operational.

Initially the US government kept the information secret, only telling a small number of key
officials. The United Kingdom was not informed until October 21. President Kennedy
announced the discovery of the installations in a televised address on October 22. He
proclaimed that any nuclear attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet
Union, and America would respond accordingly.

Kennedy placed a naval quarantine on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments arriving
there. International law dictated that the word quarantine was used rather than blockade.
Establishing a blockade would have been classed as an act of war and war had not been
declared between the US and Cuba.

MISSILES REPORTED AND COUNTER PREPERATIONS:

The United States learned in July 1962 that the Soviet Union had begun missile shipments to
Cuba. By August 29 new military constructions and the presence of Soviet technicians had
been reported by U.S. U-2 spy plane flying over the island, and on October 14 the presence
of a ballistic missile on a launching site was reported.

DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING:
On 22 November 1962, during a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan was forced to use the
dark arts of diplomacy to convince Castro that despite Moscow's best intentions, it would be
in breach of an unpublished Soviet law (which didn't actually exist) to transfer the missiles
permanently into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent.
Finally after Mikoyan's trump card, Castro was forced to give way and - much to the relief of
Khrushchev and the whole Soviet government - the tactical nuclear weapons were finally
crated and returned by sea back to the Soviet Union during December 1962.

This story has illuminated a chapter in history that has been partially closed for the past 50
years.

But it leaves us with a great respect for Mikoyan and his ability to judge and eventually
contain an extremely dangerous situation which could have affected many millions of
people.

CRISIS END:
The Cuban Missile crisis ends as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agrees to remove Russian
missiles from Cuba in exchange for a promise from the United States to respect Cubas
territorial sovereignty. This ended nearly two weeks of anxiety and tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union that came close to provoking a nuclear conflict. The
consequences of the crisis were many and varied. Relations between Cuba and the Soviet
Union were on shaky ground for some time after Khrushchevs removal of the missiles, as
Fidel Castro accused the Russians of backing down from the Americans and deserting the
Cuban revolution. European allies of the United States were also angered, not because of
the U.S. stance during the crisis, but because the Kennedy administration kept them virtually
in the dark about negotiations that might have led to an atomic war.

Inside the Soviet Union, hard-liners were appalled at Khrushchevs withdrawal of the
weapons. Two years later, in 1964, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin pushed him from
power and proceeded to lead the Soviet Union on a massive military build-up. There was
perhaps one positive aspect of the crisis. Having gone to the edge of what President
Kennedy referred to as the abyss of destruction, cooler heads in both nations initiated
steps to begin some control over nuclear weapons. Less than a year after the crisis ended,
the United States and Soviet Union signed an agreement to end aboveground testing; in
1968, both nations signed a non-proliferation treaty.
AFTERMATH OF CRISIS:
In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was determined to counter wars
of liberation before they could be exploited by emerging nationalist leaders.

Vietnam was an important supplier of rice, rubber, tungsten, and tin, and the US wanted
both the Chinese and the Russians to know that America would not tolerate wars of
liberation in areas considered vital to its national interest. Vietnam was a good example.

Overall Americas involvement in Indo-China allowed the Soviet Union to catch its breath and
regroup.

Interestingly, as the US escalated the war to contain communism, conflict with the Kremlin
diminished, and a period of dtente emerged.

Kruschev thought that detente was made possible by the Soviet attainment of nuclear
retaliatory capability and subsequent strategic parity.

The US, on the other hand, pursued detente in the hope that the Soviets (as the largest
supplier of military goods to North Vietnam) might be able to press for peace. Economic
assistance was even offered to Moscow if the Kremlin would cooperate in Vietnam, and
agree to arms limitation.

On the other hand, Vietnam was only one of many revolutions in the less developed world
and, as such, should not be examined in isolation.

Meanwhile, Kennedys theories of development created problems for Americas staunch ally,
the Shah of Iran, when it was determined that the foreign policy of the United States will no
longer be concerned solely with the external relations of states: the evolution of their
domestic life has become a direct and legitimate concern.

Kennedy insisted that American strategic and economic interests in the region required that
the shah broaden the Iranian governments internal base and reduce corruption.

As an indication of the administrations seriousness, and despite Irans Cold War support for
the United States, the US cut off $30 million in loans and grants pending internal social and
economic reform. Subsequent change was coupled with a steady upgrading of Irans military
establishment as the armed forces were given a central role in social change, a policy linked
to theories of modernization and development then in vogue.

Aid levels were also threatened in Taiwan where the US insisted on accelerated economic
development.

A 19-Point Program of Economic and Financial Reform was implemented in 1960

emphasizing the maintenance and expansion of economic sectors most critical for warfare.

In contrast to Iran, the program was so successful that it set the stage for export-led growth;
moreover, economic assistance to the island was terminated in 1965 when the country was
perceived to have attained its own capability for self-sustained expansion.

Reform was rewarded by a 1969 loan to build a factory to co-produce military helicopters
with Bell Helicopter Company along with an agreement with the Northrop Aircraft Company
to co-produce F-5E fighter planes.

ANALYSIS
The Cuban missile crisis became one of the tensest episodes in cold war history. it was the
first-time relations were pushed all the way to the brink, causing each side to decide
carefully what to do. with the fear of a nuclear war, one must ask the question why
Khrushchev did something this dangerous. Khrushchev knew the risks and dangers of putting
missiles in Cuba and didnt even attempt to conceal the missiles in Cuba. it was as if he
wanted the us to know what his plans with the missiles were. there are many reasons to why
Khrushchev probably did something so risky. Khrushchev saw Cuba as a communist country
geographically close to the us and decided to help Castro against us influence. the missiles,
Khrushchev claimed were merely there to scare the us away from attacking Cuba. in
addition, Khrushchev saw the missiles as a bargaining means, by which he would be able to
get concessions in return for removing the missiles.

Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to make the first move. he wanted to see what Kennedy would
do in a tense situation like this.

the initial American response to the situation was disbelief over the danger Khrushchev had
initiated. it was heard at an ExCom meeting - I must say I dont really see the rationality of
the soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to
this country.

it was clear however that the us government would not tolerate soviet missiles in Cuba and
would do all they can to remove it. Robert Kennedy states that the soviets should
understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them. (thirteen days:
a memoir of the Cuban missile crisis).

the soviets too were in a difficult position as what to do next. Khrushchev was quoted as
saying "I found myself in the difficult position of having to decide on a course of action which
would answer the American threat, but which would also avoid war. any fool can start a war,
and once he's done so, even the wisest of men are helpless to stop it-- especially if its a
nuclear war."

the missiles in Cuba had a major impact on the cold war. it was a very precarious decision by
the soviets who even thought it would lead to war. the missiles more importantly had a
global implication. not only would the us be at risk but the entire world would be in danger if
a nuclear weapon exploded.

Cuba was at risk, if the Americans attacked and were ready to fight back. the American
threat to Cuba caused more superpower confrontation which could have lead to a nuclear
war capable of causing total devastation.

the slightest spark or false move by either side could have triggered a nuclear catastroph
said general Anatoly Gribkov, chief of missile operations in Cuba.

furthermore, the entire course of the cold war was changed after the crisis. after reaching
such a high point in conflict, the sides agreed to many things including a test ban treaty
causing a period of dtente and co-operation.

CONCLUSION
The Cuban missile crisis was handled well by both sides. Khrushchev realizing the dangers of
war was too great, turned back his ships avoiding nuclear disaster. We were eyeball to
eyeball and the other side blinked Dean Rusk US Secretary of State.
Deals between the two countries were made and Missiles in Cuba were to be exchanged
with missiles in turkey and the US could never invade Cuba.

The Cuban missile crisis opened communication between the two sides. Both superpowers
realized they had come so close to nuclear war because of lack of communication.
Therefore, a hotline to the Kremlin and the white house was put to further improve
relations.

However, Khrushchev being the one to back down was seen as weak and therefore lost his
position in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchevs strategy was very risky and almost caused a nuclear war, but many historians
differ as to whether or not he was justified in placing missiles in Cuba.
 BIBILOGRAPHY
Len Scott; R. Gerald Hughes (2015). The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal.
Reappraisal Taylor &
Francis. p. 17.

Franklin, Jane (1997). Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History. Melbourne:
Ocean Press.

Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. p. 92.

The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khruschev, and the Missiles of
November". The national security archives. October 10, 2012.