Estrada v Arroyo ISSUE(S):

1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

FACTS:
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against 3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, 4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and
publicity.
were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to
the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against RULING:
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as
the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel 1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution,
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on
May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
EDSA I EDSA II
constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office
in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and
exercise of people power of freedom of
his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
speech and freedom of assemblyto
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the office
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
government. of the President.
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
of his office. the new government that resulted from it intra constitutional and the resignation of
cannot be the subject of judicial review the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.

1
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed
to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted
as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release
containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or
omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its
support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83
declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine,
even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a
co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
2
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed
footing as any trespasser. thedecision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority
to openNeptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State
that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system,
the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street
easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did
to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally,
the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
the capacity toexercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police
power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000] the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said
herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic servicesin
act that grants MMDA police power.
Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street
coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised
metropolitan area.
that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and
Kalayaan Avenuewould be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of
the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA
Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the

3
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that
the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of
training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other
related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated
the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for
employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without
due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist
Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of
the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary
International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the
civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying
petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but
it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was
issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded
that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.
ISSUE
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power
RULING
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise
of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct
afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your
property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be
within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly
much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the
mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various
trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass
rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice
their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted
deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as
professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.
City of Manila vs Laguio
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L.
Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council).
4
MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the
said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did
not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null
and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated
power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection
of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
5
rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the
due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for
the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will
not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be
used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone
be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance
per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication
and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as
daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions
of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right
to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically
occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.
6
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property,
and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is
apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for
use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.
Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know
them. The police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this
particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the
city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the
instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.
A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located
outside the area.
7
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims
to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women
have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only
power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the
power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation
and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said
that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not
per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter
to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had
already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial
area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot,
dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry
with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in
conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property
rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in
its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may
attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is
therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
MMDA V. GARIN
Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.
Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA
and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent
addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the
return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to
be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with
application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
8
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and
therefore unlimited fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein
respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly
exercise police power.
HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government
Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation
or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter
itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of
the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec.
5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations
of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature,
and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement
of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136
and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in
Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly
licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations
to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose."
White Light Corp Vs City of Manila
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila
City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance
9
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more
than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground
that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The
respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment,
as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade
could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also,
they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality
of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right
to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still
allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the
State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common
thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond
the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances.
All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This
could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban
on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
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extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power
as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use
of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall
within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar,
then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they
were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to
the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell
within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only
to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
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Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing
the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would
have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily
be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging
their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
Republic vs Castellvi
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis.
When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused.
She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959,
however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the
land in question.
Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947
or 1959.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as
of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private
property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it
must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be
devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
foreminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that
the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi
property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid
must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint
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foreminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the
Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent
right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate
time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the
day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The
Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for
the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises
from law independent of contract.
Manosca vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an
application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was
born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through
the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use.
REPUBLIC VS GINGOYON (481 SCRA 457)
Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
3) was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the countrys show
window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies.
Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex
way back it has not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable
economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in
the international community. In the first case that reached this Court, Agan
v. PIATCO,the contracts which the Government had with the contractor
were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case
now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the
contractor for the terminal complex it built. We decide the case on the
basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Courts 2004
Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law. The present
controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in
Agan v. PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision
nullified the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal
III entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and
the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the
amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized
PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession
period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that
Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the
requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and
that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the
promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been
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built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was
silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the
nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. PIATCO
and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the
reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the
Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). However,
the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to
refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the
construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings
in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO,
despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal
into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several
rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that
arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber
of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the
Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies.
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a Complaint for
expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with
an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special
raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the
issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate
possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also
declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.0012 (3
Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the
NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was
raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge
Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the
Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a
writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to take or enter upon
the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v.
Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting
that [t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the
assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines,
an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their
complaint. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession.
According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over
the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the
4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted
that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed
that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as An
Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had
amended Rule 67 in many respects.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant
expropriation case and not Rule 67.
Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without
violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does
not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in
turn violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there
must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the
Government may take over the property.
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It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of
deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in cases
involving national government infrastructure projects.
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was
made pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or
development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are
now wholly or partly implemented by the private sector. Under the build-
operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes
the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility.
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely
recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation
to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact
that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first
place is a concession on its part of PIATCOs ownership. Indeed, if no such
right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the
Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment
proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the
nature of these facilities should now be determined.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to
which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and
divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must
be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause
of the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular
distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto,
yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant
treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the
improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership
independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken
from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of
improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of
loss as the owner of land seized through similar means. Equal protection
demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For
purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the
buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment
between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection
clause.
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that laws application in
this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation
would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike
in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just
compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such
payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably
requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner
before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974
guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures
the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered
value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to
the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one
which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004
Resolution.
Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep.
Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.
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