ARISTC ’$ ON THE SOUL, (DE ANIMA) ‘Translation with Commentaries ‘and Glossary by HIPPOCRATES G. APOSTLEAll ight reserved prt of bak may be reper wld nay om Sitchin tcuding photcopying and recording by nay hy rm he yb een ge ‘eal sem, witout peso in writ Copyright © 1981 by H. G, Apostle Library of Congress catalog card number: 81-8648) Manufactured in the United States of America cl. ISBN 0-9602870-8-6 ‘pa, ISBN 0-9602870-9-4Strife vdxos For Empedocles, a principle which causes things to separate from each other. 984b27-985a10. subject iroxeiuevov A subject is relative to an attribute belonging to that subject. For example, color belongs to a body and sickness belongs toan animal, and color and sickness are attributes belonging, respec- tively, to a body and an animal, which are subjects. substance ovcia Men and trees and chairs are examples of substances, and they exist as separate things, and all attributes belong to sub- stances. 2a11-4b19. Some immaterial things, too, exist as separate things or are separable from other things, e.g., God and man’s active intellect. substance ovsia The substance of a thing is the nature as form of that thing, and it is applicable to all categories. For example, the sub- stance of a triangle is to be a three-sided figure, and the substance of an animal is its soul. succession épetiis ‘ syllogism ovdAoyiouos An expression, verbal or written or in thought, in(sometimes) become, v. yiyvesBar See “generation”. beginning apxn See “principle”. be in eumapxe being, n. dv, mpéyua Synonyms: “thing”, “that which exists”, “fact”, belief bx0Amfus The term is generic. It is an affection or thought about what is or what is not the case. Its species are “knowledge”, “opin- ion”, “prudence”, and their contraries. 426b24-7. belong imapxev The term is wider in meaning than the term “be predicable of”. 48a40-49a10. blend, n. yigis A union of bodies, readily adaptable in shape, which have acted upon and so altered each other; for example, a union of coffee and cream, not of salt and pepper. 827a30-328b32. body capaindi tS ea ad kt, a a n itself a principle of motion or of rest; e.g, Hentinalggarl a 5 Og. als, earth, and water exist by nature. 192b8-198al. by virtue of See “in virtue of”. can, v. é€vdexeo80r That which may or may not be or com ay ma’ e to be. Syn: carpentry TEKTOVIKN category xatnyopia Any one of the highest ten genera of things. 1b25-7, 83b13-7, 103b20-3, 225b5-7, 1017a22-7, 1032a14-5, 1068a8-9. cause alriov, aitia Syn: “reason”. 94a20-b26, 194b16-5b30, 983a24-32, 1013a24-1014a25. chance thing 7x9” chance avroparov A moving cause W ble or indefinite. 195b31-198a18. vi a8 ohn Thisis @ generic term, and its species are change HET! Bi a ee ac oeriinadd the kinds of motion are ck oa hich is accidental and hence varia- “generation”, 0"(On The Soul The soul isthe cause and the principle ofa living body. Now the terms ‘ause” and “principle” have many senses, and, similarly, the soul isa cause In the three specified senses of “cause fortis cause asa source of motion, and as a final cause, and as the substance af an animate body* Clearly, it isa cause asthe substance (ofan animate body} for the cause of the existence of each thing the substance of that thing, existence in living things s life, and the cause and principle fin living things) ste soul: Further, the formula ofthat which exists potentially ists actuality." TLis evident that the soul i a cause as final cause bo. For just as the intellect acts for the sake of something, s0 does nature, and nature’ end i animals the soul and [is an end] according to their nature fo case of animals 50 in the case of plants, {natural bois] eit forthe sake oftheir soul." And, fas already state), "that forthe sake of which” has two Senses: (a) that whichis done, and (b) that for which 8 i done Finally, the soul salsa cause as source of motion with respect place bt such power doesnot exis inal living things, Alteration and growth, to, xs [in Ivng things] by viet of their soul: for sensation thought to be $ Speciesof alteration, and no thing without soul ean have sensations, Similar Temarks apply to growth and deterioration: for no thing can by ts nature Grow or deteriorate without taking in food, and no thing can be nourished Unless it shares in life TEmpedocles did not speak rightly when he added tat the roots of plants grow downwards because the ert (i them) according tot nature travels arom arards, and thatthe (branches) grow upwards because fre {im ther sovording to its nature] travels upwards, Fist, he didnot grasp the terms Ap and "down rightly, for up and down are not the same forall things ‘arthey are for the universe ifthe organs of the body are to be called “the aoe different” according to their functions, then heads are to animals armots are to trees!" Further, wha iit that holds tgether the earth and the fre {in an animal] which tend to travel in contrary directions? They ‘would part from eachother, unless there were something to prevent separa- tion; but if there is something, this would be the soul and [also] the cause of growing and of taking in food." Some' are of the opinion that Gre’s nature is without qualification the ‘cause of food and of growth; for, according to them, fire alone of all the bodies or elements appears to nourish tse and to grow. And in view of this, fone might come to the belief that it is fire that pecforms the function of (causing growth and nourishment in bth plants and animals. Now fire isin ‘way a joint cause; however, it is not the cause without qualification is rather the soul which isthe cause. For the growth of fire proceeds ly, as long as there is fuel to be burned, but a thing which is ‘by nature of all (the elements] has a limit and a [certain] ratio [of 2» 25 416cussed in On Philosophy, a lost work. can, © Olen. 7, For example, Socrates is numerically one and is mortal. and wh dies he leaves behind his children, each of which is not Socrates bp as Socrates, So Socrates partakes of the eternal and the e can, ie., through his descendants. Aivine xample, a man’s soul is his substance, and this is the cause oj; existence, which is his life. ‘ 10. What is the point of this statement? According to Hicks, the sou\ the actuality of what exists potentially in living things, that actuality is , formula, hence the soul is a formula, Does this conclusion suggest that (o acquire knowledge of living things we must start from the soul’s formula or definition as a principle and a cause? If so, the previous sentence speaks of the soul as a cause qua a thing, this sentence speaks of the soul as a cause qua known. 11, Nature, taken as a process (1014b16-7), has an end, which is a final ‘cause, and that end in the generation of living things is the soul of that whieh exists potentially and is in the process of becoming. The embryo in an animal finally acquires a form, and this is the soul of the animal at birth;