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Watkins, Ideal Types and Historical Explanation-Weber
Watkins, Ideal Types and Historical Explanation-Weber
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2 HolisticandIndividualistic
IdealTypes
It is only decentto begina discussionof idealtypesby considering
Weber'sviews; but he held two successiveconceptionsof what an
idealtypeshouldbe anddo, without,I think,realisingwhatimportant
differences lay betweenthem.
His earlierversionis set out in an articletranslated underthe title
'" Objectivity"in SocialScienceand SocialPolicy.' At thistime
(1904) Weberbelievedthatthe socialscientistshouldnot tryto imitate
the naturalscientist'sprocedureof systematically subsumingobserva-
tion-statements and low order theoriesundermore comprehensive
laws. The socialscientistshouldfirstdecidefromwhatpointof view
to approachhistory. Having decided,say, to treat its economic
aspect,he shouldthen selectfrom this some uniqueconfigurationof
activitiesand institutions,such as 'the rise of capitalism.'Then he
shouldpin down and describeits components. His final taskis to
drawin thecausallinesbetweenthesecomponents, imputing'concrete
effectsto concretecauses.'2
This programmecould never be carriedout; 'in any actual
economicsystemso manyfactorsareat work simultaneously thatthe
effectof a singlefactorby itselfcanneverbe known,for its tracesare
soon lost sight of.' 3 Andseparate factscannotbe linkedtogetheras
causesandeffectswith no referenceto generallaws. However,I will
not pressthesecriticismsof a methodologicalpositionwhich Weber
tacitlyabandoned later.
To assistthe socialscientistin this task of explainingparticular
eventsby relatingthemto theirparticular antecedents, Weberproposed
his first versionof the ideal type. This was to be constructedby
abstracting the outstandingfeaturesfrom some (moreor less clearly
demarcated) historicalcomplex,andby organising theseintoa coherent
word-picture. The idealityof sucha typelies in its and
simplification
aloofnessfrom detail: it will be freefromthe detailedcomplexityof
predictionsof futurelevels would undoubtedlybe upsetby unforeseeable,world-wide
disturbingfactors,the effectsof any of which might be cumulative.
Hence, the problem of social predictionraisesquestionsnot raisedby the problem
of historicalexplanation ; and this paperis not concernedwith the former.
1 Max Weber, The
Methodology of theSocialSciences,trans.and ed. E. A. Shils and
H. A. Finch, Illinois, I949, ch. 2
2 Op. cit. p. 79
" Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics,trans.T. W. Hutchison, London,
1950, p. 39
23
3 Historical
Explanation
I shallconsiderthreelevelsof historicalexplanation
: (I)colligation
(whereidealtypesplayno significantrole) ; (II)explanationin prin-
ciple (which is the field par excellencefor ideal types); and (III)
explanation in detail(whereideal are
types mostlyconstructed adhoc,
andrenderedincreasinglyrealisticuntilthey becomeempiricalrecon-
structions).2
(I) Colligation.The term 'colligation' has been revivedby Mr
Walsh3 to denotea procedurewhich is important,not becauseit is
methodologically powerful,but becausemost 'literary' historiansdo
in fact useit when history. It
they write,for example,constitutional
means'explainingan event by tracingits intrinsicrelationsto other
eventsand locatingit in its historicalcontext.'4 Thuswe begin to
understand why a bill was enactedin May 1640 condemningStrafford
to deathwhen we learnof suchmattersas : his autocraticpowerin
Ireland; Parliament's fearof the IrisharmyandPym'sruthlessness as
J. E. Meade.
1 owe thisexampleto Professor
21
understandthat ProfessorF. A. Hayekalso drawsa distinctionbetweenex-
plainingin principleand explainingin detail,but thathe wishesto distinguishan
explanationof why, say,a pricerose,froma quantitative of the amount
explanation
by which it rose; whereasI wish to distinguishbetweenexplanationsin terms
of typical etc.,andexplanations
dispositions, andpersonal
in termsof thecharacteristics
of
idiosyncrasies the principalactors
concerned.
3 SeeW. H. Walsh,An Introduction toPhilosophyof History,London,1951,ch. 3,
53 4Op. cit.p. 59
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