FACT FINDING POWER
The trial court erred in substituting its
G.R. No. L-17821 November 29, 1963
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY
MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMIN YONZON,defendants-appellants.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for plaintiffs-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-
appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch X), in its Civil Case No.
41639, enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications from causing the removal of certain
dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and
Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province
of Pampanga, covered by T.C.T. No. 15905.
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents
of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, complaining that
appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking
that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and
hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable
waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959,
ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove
five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the
Secretary would order their removal at the expense of
the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the
respondent filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due
hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now
the subject of the present appeal.
The respondents-appellants, Florencio Moreno,
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
Benjamin Yonzon, investigator, question the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and attribute to it the
following errors:
1. The trial court erred in holding in effect, that
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional:
2. The trial court erred in receiving
evidence de novo at the trial of the case;
3.
judgment for that of defendant Secretary of
Public Works and Communications and in
reversing the latter's finding that the stream in
question is a navigable river which was
illegally closed by plaintiffs;
4. The trial court erred in holding that the
Sapang Bulati is a private stream; and
5. The lower court erred in not holding that
plaintiffs should first exhaust administrative
remedy before filing the instant petition.
The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court
below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass
upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public
and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and
whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act 2056 provides:
Section 1. Any provision or provisions of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction or building of dams, dikes or any
other works which encroaches into any public
navigable river, stream, coastal waters and
any other navigable public waters or
waterways as well as the construction or
building of dams, dikes or any other works in
areas declared as communal fishing grounds,
shall be ordered removed as public nuisances
or a prohibited constructions as herein
provided: Provided, however, That the
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications may authorize the
construction of any such work when public
interest or safety so requires or when it is
absolutely necessary for the protection of
private property.
Section 2. When it is found by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, after due
notice and hearing, that any dam, dike or any
other works now existing or may there after be
constructed encroaches into any public
navigable waters, or that they are constructed
in areas declared as communal fishing
grounds, he shall have the authority to order
the removal of any such works and shall give
the party concerned a period not to exceed
 thirty days for the removal of the
same: Provided, That fishpond constructions
or works on communal fishing grounds
introduced in good faith before the areas we
proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be
exempted from the provisions of this Act,
provided such constructions or works do not
obstruct or impede the free passage of any
navigable river, stream, or would not cause
inundations of agricultural areas: Provided,
further, That should the party concerned fail to
comply with the order of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications within the
period so stated in the order, such removal
shall be effected by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications at the expense of
the said party within ten days following the
expiration of the period given the party
concerned: Provided, furthermore, That the
investigation and hearing to be conducted by
the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications under this section shall be
terminated and decided by him within a period
which shall not exceed ninety days from the
time he shall have been notified in writing or a
written complaint shall have been filed with
him by any interested party apprising him of
the existence of a dam, dike or any other
works that encroaches into any other public
navigable river, stream, coastal waters or any
other public navigable waters or waterways
and in areas declared as communal fishing
grounds: Provided, still furthermore, That the
failure on the part of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications without justifiable
or valid reason to terminate and decide a case
or effect the removal of any such works, as
provided for in this section, shall constitute an
offense punishable under section three of this
Act: And provided, finally, That the removal of
any such works shall not impair fishponds
completed or about to be completed which do
not encroach or obstruct any public navigable
river or stream and/or which would not cause
inundations of agricultural areas and which
have been constructed in good faith before
the area was declared communal fishing
grounds.
The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary,
are not tenable. It will be noted that the Act (R.A.
2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon
public streams, constructions that no private person
was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of
navigable streams is public property, and ownership
thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession
(Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power
under the Act necessarily involves the determination
of some questions of fact, such as the existence of
the stream and its previous navigable character; but
these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are
merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted
by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are
clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive
officials provided the party affected is given
opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
It thus appears that the delegation by
Congress to executive or administrative
agencies of functions of judicial, or at least,
quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the
exercise by such agencies of their executive
or administrative powers, is not in violation of
the Separation of Powers so far as that
principle is recognized by the Federal
Constitution nor is it in violation of due
process of law. (3 Willoughby on the Const. of
the U.S., pp. 1654-1655)
The mere fact that an officer is required by law
to inquire the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact
that these acts may affect private, rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial
officers the power to declare the existence of
facts which call into operation its provisions,
and similarly may grant to commissioners and
other subordinate officer, power to ascertain
and determine appropriate facts as a basis for
procedure in the enforcement of particular
laws. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec.
235)
s. 237. Powers to determine cases within
Statute. — One important class of cases in
which discretion may properly be vested in
administrative officers, which class is almost
an operation of the general rule relating to the
ascertainment of facts, consists of those
cases in which a general rule or prohibition is
laid down and power is vested in an executive
officer to determine when particular cases do
or do not fall within such rule or prohibition.
Power exercised under such statutes, calling
for the exercise of judgment in the execution
of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature
within the sense prohibited by the
 Constitution. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec.
237, p. 952)
A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases"
upholding the constitutionality of the U.S. River and
Harbor Act of March 3, 1899, that empowered (sec.
18) the Secretary of War to take action, after hearing,
for the removal or alteration of bridges unreasonably
obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue
delegation of power, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
Congress thereby declared that whenever the
Secretary of War should find any bridge
theretofore or thereafter constructed over any
of the navigable waterways of the United
States to be an unreasonable obstruction to
the free navigation of such waters on account
of insufficient height, width of span, or
otherwise, it should be the duty of the
Secretary, after hearing the parties
concerned, to take action looking to the
removal or alteration of the bridge, so as to
render navigation through or under it
reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed. As
this court repeatedly has held, this is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative or
judicial power to the Secretary. Union Bridge
Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385, 51
L. ed. 523, 533, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367;
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States,
216 U.S. 177, 192,54 L. ed. 435, 441, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 356; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 194. 205, 55 L. ed. 699, 703,
31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603. The statute itself
prescribes the general rule applicable to all
navigable waters, and merely charged the
Secretary of War with the duty of ascertaining
in each case, upon notice to the parties
concerned, whether the particular bridge
came within the general rule. Of course, the
Secretary's finding must be based upon the
conditions as they exist at the time he acts.
But the law imposing this duty upon him
speaks from the time of its enactment.
(Louisville Bridge Co. v. U.S., 61 L. ed. 395).
(Emphasis supplied)
Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as
nuisances of properties of great value can not be
done except through court proceedings; but these
rulings refer to summary abatements without previous
hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us
where the law provides, and the investigator actually
held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and
the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy
that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the
unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams,
and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.
It may not be amiss to state that the power of the
Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear
public streams free from unauthorized encroachments
and obstructions was granted as far back as Act 3208
of the old Philippine Legislature, and has been upheld
by this Court (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, supra;
Meneses vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647). We do
not believe that the absence of an express appeal to
the courts under the present Republic Act 2056 is a
substantial difference, so far as the Constitution is
concerned, for it is a well-known rule that due process
does not have to be judicial process; and moreover,
the judicial review of the Secretary's decision would
always remain, even if not expressly granted,
whenever his act violates the law or the Constitution,
or imports abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
The argument that the action of the Secretary
amounts to a confiscation of private property leads us
directly to the issue of fact whether a navigable
portion of the Bulati creek had once traversed the
registered lot of the appellees Lovina and connected
with Manampil creek that borders said lot on the
northwest before it was closed by Jose de Leon,
Lovina's predecessor. The Secretary of Public Works
has found from the evidence before him that,
originally, the sapang (creek) Bulati flowed across the
property in question, and connected the Nasi river
with sapangManampil; that in 1926 or thereabouts,
the Bulati creek was 2 meters deep at high tide and
1/2 meter deep at low tide, and the people used it as
fishing grounds and as a communication way,
navigating along its length in bancas; that former
registered owner, Jose de Jesus, closed about meters
of the course of the sapang Bulati that lay within the
lot in question by constructing dams or dikes at both
sides and converting the lot into a fishpond.
The appellees, on the other hand, rely on the 1916
registration plan of the property (Exh. C), showing it to
be merely bounded by the Bulati creek on the
southeast, as well as on the testimony introduced at
the hearing of prohibition case (over the objection of
the Government counsel) that the Bulati creek did not
enter the property.
The Court of First Instance found that "according to
the location plan, Exhibit "C", the "Bulati creek, on
which dikes and dams in question were constructed
was a mere estero and could not be considered a
navigable stream then." It is not explained how such
fact could appear solely from the plan Exhibit "C" (no
other proof being referred to), unless indeed the court
below so concluded from the fact that in said plan the
Bulati creek does not appear to run within the
registered lot. The conclusion of lower court is not
supported by its premises, because by law, the
issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title
navigable streams (which are fluvial highways) within
registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-
existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had
been expressly delimited in the registration plan (Act
496, sec. 39 cf. Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil.
449; Meneses Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647), so that
delimitation of their course may be made even after
the decree of registration has become final. In the
present case, in truth the very plan of the appellees,
Exhibit "C", shows parallel reentrant lines, around its
point 65 and between points 44 and that indicate the
existence of a stream connecting the sapangBulati on
the southeast and the sapang Manampil on the
northwest, and which the surveyor apparently failed
delimit for some undisclosed reason. That the stream
was the prolongation of the sapang Bulati, that
formerly flow across the registered lot, is also shown
by the fact that appellees' plan Exhibit "C", the
westward continuation the Bulati creek (west of point
65), which bounds the registered lot, is labelled "Etero
Mabao". The plan thus corroborates the previously
summarized testimony laid before investigator
Yonzon and relied upon by the Secretary in his
administrative decision. Even more, appellees' own
caretaker, Yambao, showed investigator Yonzon the
old course of the Bulati within the fishpond itself; and
this evidence is, likewise, confirmed by the cross-
section profile of the ground near the dams in
question (See plan Annex "AA" of Yonzon's Report),
where the old channel of the creek is clearly
discernible. To be sure, appellees contend that they
were not shown this plan; but in their evidence before
the court of first instance, they never attempted, or
offered, to prove that said plan is incorrect.
That the creek was navigable in fact before it was
closed was also testified to by the government
witnesses, whose version is corroborated as we have
seen.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of
fact in executive decisions in matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in
the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of
discretion (Com. of Customs vs. Valencia, 54 O.G.
3505), none of which has been shown to exist in this
case, we agree with appellant that the court below
erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary
of Public Works.
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by
new evidence not laid down before him, for that would
be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and to
substitute for the discretion and judgment of the
Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to
whom the statute had entrusted the case. It is
immaterial that the present action should be one for
prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari, in
either event the case must be resolved upon the
evidence submitted to the Secretary, since a judicial
review of executive decisions does not import a
trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether
the executive findings are not in violation of the
constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or
imposition, and whether they find reasonable support
in the evidence.1 Here, the proof preponderates in
favor of the Secretary's decision.
Nevertheless, we, agree with appellees that they can
not be charged with failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, for the Secretary's decision is that of the
President, in the absence of disapproval (Villena vs.
Secretary of the interior, 67 Phil. 451).
Finally, there being a possibility that when they
purchased the property in question the appellees
Lovina were not informed of the illegal closure of the
Bulati creek, their action, if any, against their vendor,
should be, and is hereby, reserved.
In resume, we rule:
(1) That Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an
unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary
of Public Works;
(2) That absence of any mention of a navigable
stream within a property covered by Torrens title does
not confer title to it nor preclude a subsequent
investigation and determination of its existence;
(3) That the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public
Works under Republic Act No. 2056 should be
respected in the absence of illegality, error of law,
fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings are
supported by substantial evidence submitted to him.
(4) That ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed
is not acquirable by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and the writs of injunction issued therein are
annulled and set aside. Costs against appellees
Lovina.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
G.R. No. 128305 March 28, 2005
FELINO QUIAMBAO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL
APPELLATE BOARD, Represented by its
CHAIRMAN FEDERICO S. COMANDANTE and
MEMBERS, ATTYS. ROBERTO T. AGAGON and
ADELAIDA T. AGUILOS of the NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, RAUL S. IMPERIAL, Police Chief,
Philippine National Police and ESPIE S / L
CATOLICO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition assails the Resolution1 dated 10 January
1997 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision2dated 25 October 1993 and
the Resolution3 dated 27 December 1993 of National
Appellate Board (Board), Third Division, National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The Board’s ruling
in turn, which likewise affirmed the Decision4 dated 31
October 1992 of Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy
Director General dismissing PO3 Felino Quiambao
from the police service.
The operative facts of the case follow:
On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening,
Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along Capulong
Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the
whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin Garais who
left the house the day before. After having asked her
neighbors and bystanders to no avail, an old woman
told her that a certain policeman was looking for her
as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the
area as directed by the old woman but there she was
allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3 Felino
Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), Western Police District Command, and
five (5) other persons. Quiambao and his companions
forcibly took Catolico’s handbag and carried away its
contents consisting of precious assorted
merchandise, jewelry and other personal items worth
approximately Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00).
Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his
owner-type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit
portion of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slapped
her on the face several times and warned her not to
look anymore for her housemaid.5
In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn
statement on 24 June 1991 with the PNP Inspectorate
Division, accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with
robbery-holdup and mauling committed on 22
December 1990.6 The complaint was corroborated by
Grace Commendador who witnessed the actual
incident and confirmed the statement of Catolico.7
On 22 August 1991, Catolico filed another
administrative complaint with the Office of the Hearing
Officer at NAPOLCOM, Western Police District,
Manila, charging petitioner with grave misconduct for
the same incident which occurred on 22 December
1990.8 An investigation was conducted on this
administrative charge by the Office of the Hearing
Officer of NAPOLCOM. On 30 March 1993, the case
was forwarded to the City of Manila’s People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) for adjudication.9
The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an
investigation on the charges filed. On 31 October
1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer
(SDHO) recommended the dismissal of petitioner.
This recommendation was approved by Acting PNP
Chief and Police Deputy Director General, Raul S.
Imperial (Acting PNP Chief).10
Petitioner appealed the 31 October 1992 resolution to
the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the
NAPOLCOM. On 25 October 1993, the Third Division
of the NAB, rendered a decision affirming the
dismissal of petitioner from police service.11 The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied in a Resolution dated 27 December 1993.12But
it was only on 23 September 1996 when petitioner
received a certified xerox copy of the Resolution of
the NAB denying his petition for reconsideration.13
On 7 October 1996, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals.14 On 10 January
1997, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
review for lack of merit.
The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state
all the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the reglementary period provided by law as it
failed to state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December
1993, denying his motion for reconsideration of NAB’s
decision dated 25 October 1993. It found out that
NAB’s decision dated 25 October 1993 was received
by petitioner on 22 November 1993, and on 2
December 1993, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. The said motion, however, was
denied on 27 December 1993, but according to the
appellate court, petitioner did not disclose the date
when he received such denial. The fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals started to run from such date.15
Further, the appellate court ruled that the issue of
which administrative disciplinary authority had
jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only
for the first time before it. He did not raise it before the
SDHO nor before the NAB. More importantly, it found
that the PNP Inspectorate Division had original,
exclusive and summary jurisdiction over the instant
case, and that NAB did not commit any reversible
error in deciding the appealed case without
a priori pronouncement as to which among the
disciplinary authorities under Republic Act No. 6975
had jurisdiction over the case.16 It also added that
NAB’s not having all the records requested by
petitioner after it had rendered its decision did not
necessarily mean that it did not have such documents
at the time it rendered its decision.17Petitioner’s claim
was further belied by the fact that Catolico was able to
obtain certified true copies of the relevant documents
which the PNP Chief transmitted to the NAPOLCOM.
Additionally, the appellate court found that a perusal
of the annexes to the comment of Catolico would
readily show that NAB resolved petitioner’s case
based on substantial evidence appearing on the
record before it.18 It observed that petitioner’s claim
that his case was decided on the basis of an
incomplete record was merely an afterthought. Said
defense was not raised by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration of NAB’s decision dated 25 October
1993.19 Likewise, petitioner was not denied due
process as he was afforded reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit his evidence before the
SDHO and to appeal to NAB the decision of the
Acting PNP Chief dismissing him from the police
service, the Court of Appeals ruled.20
On 27 January 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration followed by the filing of his Motion for
Reconsideration on 17 February 1997. On the same
day, the appellate court issued a Resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time. On 5 March
1997, it issued a resolution stating that the Motion for
Reconsideration was merely "NOTED,"
the Resolution dated 10 January 1997 being already
final.21Hence, the instant judicial recourse.
The primordial thrust of the petition seeks the reversal
of the decisions and resolutions of Acting PNP Chief,
the NAB and the Court of Appeals, all upholding the
validity of the dismissal of petitioner from police
service, and his corresponding reinstatement in the
police service.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred and
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition is
not meritorious.22 He specifically assigns the following
as errors which need to be rectified, to wit: (1) that the
appellate court ruled that petition did not state the
date when petitioner received a copy of
the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 to
determine if it was filed within the reglementary
period;23 (2) that the appellate court sustained the
findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB without
first resolving and/or giving a reason why it was the
Acting PNP Chief and neither the NAPOLCOM
Hearing Officer nor the PLEB that had the power to
hear and decide the case;24 (3) that the appellate
court sustained, through misapprehension of facts
and/or contrary to evidence, the decision of NAB
which was not based on the complete records of the
case;25 (4) that the appellate court ruled that the
petition was not meritorious and sustained the
findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB
although such findings were arrived at without a
hearing and absent substantial evidence;26 (5) that the
appellate court’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration was based on purely technical
considerations;27 and (6) that the appellate court had
been passive to Catolico’s surreptitious introduction
into the records of the case evidentiary documents of
which petitioner was not furnished and to the latter’s
prejudice.28
The petition is not imbued with merit.
Readily glaring upon examination of the petition filed
by petitioner is its title "Petition for Review
on Certiorari."29 The title would immediately lead us to
conclude that the petition is primarily anchored on
Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under this mode of appeal, only questions of law may
be entertained by this Court and factual issues raised
are beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues
raised by petitioner in the petition are fundamentally
factual in nature which are inappropriate for
resolution via the mode of review he availed of.
However, a perusal of issues in the petition would
indicate that the petition is actually anchored on Rule
65 as the issues principally sought to assail the
resolution rendered by the appellate court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.30
Nonetheless, even assuming that the petition was
brought under Rule 65, the petition would still not lie
as the implausibility of the grounds on which the
petition rests are convincingly manifest and the grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction as the core of this mode of review is
strikingly wanting.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
an excess, or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.31 In certiorariproceedings under
Rule 65, questions of fact are not generally permitted,
the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not
the respondent tribunal had acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.32 These grounds under Rule 65 are not
attendant in the instant case. Even if we take this
case as so exceptional as to permit a factual review,
the petition at bar fails to persuade us to rule in favor
of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in holding that the petition was not
meritorious since the petition filed with the appellate
court did not state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December
1993 to determine if the petition was indeed filed
within the reglementary period. There is reason basis
for such contention.
The petition with the appellate court by petitioner
substantially complied with Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-9533. The pertinent portion of the
circular reads,
SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. – The
petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues
involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with
certified true copies of such material portions
of the record as are referred to therein and
other supporting papers; and (d) contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in Revised Circular No. 28-91. The
petition shall state the specific material
dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein.34
The records reveal that the petition filed with the
Court of Appeals by petitioner provides the following,
18. On December 27, 1993, respondent
National Appellate Board rendered its
Resolution denying the motion in this manner:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on this instant
petition, the same is hereby denied.
A certified xerox copy thereof, duly
RECEIVED BY PETITIONER ON
SEPTEMBER 23, 1996 is hereto attached
as ANNEX "M."35
A reading of the foregoing allegation, however,
disclosed the fact that on 27 December 1993, NAB
rendered a resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous
as it is unnatural that the purported resolution was
received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, we
are inclined to sustain petitioner’s assertion for the
same is supported by the certified xerox copy of the
resolution36 and the evidence is bereft of any showing
that will warrant a contrary conclusion. Thus, the
aforecited allegation substantially complied with the
requirements under Section 6. The appellate court
believed that petitioner had already been served with
a copy of the resolution prior to 23 September
1996.37 Such a conclusion, however, is bereft of any
evidentiary basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It
is noteworthy that the date when petitioner received
NAB’s resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration is material in determining when the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals starts to
run.38
The failure to specifically state in the petition on
material dates such as the date when the resolution
or order denying a motion for reconsideration was
received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule
43.39 But the scenario is not present in the case at bar
for the aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition filed
with the appellate court reflected the date when
petitioner actually received the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration, which is 23 September
1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted
and applied so as not to frustrate substantial justice
that this Court seeks to achieve.
Now, on substantial issues rather than on mere
technicality. The pivotal questions posed in this
petition are whether the Acting Chief of the PNP had
authority to conduct summary dismissal proceedings
over members of the PNP and whether the summary
dismissal of petitioner was sufficiently established by
the evidence on record.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which
took effect on 1 January 1991, defines the structural
components, powers and functions of the PNP as the
citizens’ guardian of peace and order and enforcer of
the law. The statute likewise delineates the
procedural framework in pursuing administrative
complaints against erring members of the police
organization. Section 41 of the law enumerates the
authorities to which a complaint against an erring
member of the PNP may be filed, thus;
Section 41. (a) Citizen’s Complaints. – Any
complaint by an individual person against any
member of the PNP shall be brought before
the following:
(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is
punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension or
forfeiture of salary, or any combination
thereof, for a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
days;
(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where
the offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits,
suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any
combination thereof, for a period of not less
than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty
(30) days;
(3) People’s Law Enforcement Board, as
created under Section 43 hereof, where the
offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits,
suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any
combination thereof, for a period exceeding
thirty (30) days; or by dismissal. . . .
(Emphasis added)40
It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP
member which would warrant dismissal from service
is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However,
Section 41 should be read in conjunction with Section
42 of the same statute which reads, thus:
Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the
PNP Chief and Regional Directors. -
The Chief of the PNP and regional
directors, after due notice and summary
hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss
any respondent PNP member in any of the
following cases:
(a) When the charge is serious and the
evidence of guilt is strong;
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has
been repeatedly charged and there are
reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty
of the charges; and
(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. (Emphasis
ours)
Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are
vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring
PNP members if any of the causes for summary
dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant.
Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is not only
the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by
the PNP Chief and regional directors. This shared
power is likewise evident in Section 45.
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The
disciplinary action imposed upon a member of
the PNP shall be final and executory:
Provided, That a disciplinary action
imposed by the regional director or by the
PLEB involving demotion or dismissal
from the service may be appealed to the
regional appellate board within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the notice of
decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of
the PNP involving demotion or dismissal
may be appealed to the National Appellate
Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, That the
regional or National Appellate Board, as the
case may be, shall decide the appeal within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the
regional appellate board to act on the appeal
within said period shall render the decision
final and executory without prejudice,
however, to the filing of an appeal by either
party with the Secretary. (Emphasis ours)
Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining
authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall
acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case
although other disciplining authority has concurrent
jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41
explicitly declares this point.
(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction – A complaint or a
charge filed against a PNP member shall
be heard and decided exclusively by the
disciplining authority who has acquired
original jurisdiction over the case and
notwithstanding the existence of
concurrent jurisdiction as regards the
offense; Provided, That offenses which carry
higher penalties referred to a disciplinary
authority shall be referred to the appropriate
authority which has jurisdiction over the
offense. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional
directors have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed against members of the
PNP which may warrant dismissal from service.
This Court in Summary Dismissal Board and the
Regional Appellate Board, PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City
v. Torcita41recognized the authority of both the
Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional
Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, to
act on twelve (12) administrative complaints filed
against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, even though the
controversy occurred in 1994, after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 6975. The Court further declared that R.A.
No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of
the PNP Chief and regional directors, among others in
cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer."
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the
rules and regulations in the conduct of summary
dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members
and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer
under Section 3(c), Rule II, as follows:
Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers
to any behavior or action of a PNP member,
irrespective of rank, done in his official
capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise
disgracing himself as a PNP member,
seriously compromise his character and
standing as a gentleman in such a manner as
to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral
character; it may also refer to acts or behavior
of any PNP member in an unofficial or private
capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing
himself personally as a gentleman, seriously
compromises his position as a PNP member
and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to
remain as a member of the organization.42
The same Memorandum Circular also defines the
phrase "serious charge" as a ground for summary
dismissal of PNP members. This includes charges for
commission of heinous crimes and those committed
by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein PNP
members are involved, gunrunning, illegal
logging, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave
trade, illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling,
piracy, drug trafficking, falsification of land title and
other government forms, large scale swindling, film
piracy, counterfeiting, and bank frauds. Clearly, the
robbery-holdup and mauling incident which occurred
on 22 December 1990 fall under the summary
dismissal power of PNP Chief and regional directors.
In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct
against petitioner was first filed by Catolico before the
PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991.
However, another case was filed by Catolico with the
Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, on
22 August 1991. The charges filed with the PNP
Inspectorate Division were investigated, and on 31
October 1992, the SDHO recommended the dismissal
of petitioner which was approved by the Acting PNP
Chief. Petitioner appealed the case to the NAB which
affirmed the decision of the Acting PNP Chief. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus, in
accordance with paragraph (c) of Section 41, the PNP
Inspectorate Division had acquired exclusive original
jurisdiction over the complaint of Catolico to the
exclusion of other investigating body. It is as if the
second complaint filed by Catolico with the Office of
the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, had not been
filed.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting
PNP Chief and the NAB were bereft of jurisdiction to
rule on the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at
the earliest opportunity, neither raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction before the PNP Inspectorate
Division nor with the NAB but only before the
appellate court.43 Despite the existence of a
jurisprudential rule44 that jurisdictional question may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, an
equitable exceptional rule has also been laid down by
this Court bars a party from raising jurisdictional
question on ground of laches or estoppel.45 Although
the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the action, a party may be estopped from
raising such questions if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that
the judgment or order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him.46
Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in
affirming the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the
NAB, which was arrived at without hearing and
substantial evidence. We are not persuaded.
Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges
together with copies of affidavits and other
attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing
of an answer, together with supporting documents. It
is true that consistent with its summary nature, the
duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of
conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
statements may take the place of oral testimonies of
witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to
material and relevant matters, and prolonged
arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be
entertained.47
Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was the SDHO and the NAB as affirmed by the Court of
approved by the Acting PNP Chief whose decision Appeals are undoubtedly beyond review and
was affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB conclusive upon this Court, they being triers of facts.
was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The The congruence in their conclusion forecloses any
unanimity in their conclusions cannot just be possibility of reversible error or misappreciation of
disregarded and their factual determinations are facts. Such being the case, we cannot but affirm their
conclusive upon this Court for the records show that common conclusion as petitioner failed to advance
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to substantial and convincing evidence and arguments
defend his side, as he filed position papers to that will merit the reversal of prior decisions on the
substantiate his defense and arguments and even case.
filed motions for reconsideration to set aside adverse
decisions rendered against him. This opportunity to Finally, petitioner also argues that the appellate court
defend himself was more than sufficient to comply erred in being passive to Catolico’s surreptitious
with due process requirements in administrative introduction into the records of the case evidentiary
proceedings documents of which petitioner was not furnished and
to the latter’s prejudice. Sad to say, the matter is a
Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not factual one which is outside the ambit of this mode of
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound review. Besides, this issue was not even raised in the
discretion of the government agency entrusted with motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the
the regulation of activities coming under the special Court of Appeals.55
and technical training and knowledge of such agency.
Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision of
adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the the Court of Appeals dated 10 January 1997
authority to take judicial notice of facts within their AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
special competence.48
SO ORDERED.
The instant case filed by Catolico is an administrative
case for grave misconduct against petitioner for the
alleged robbery-holdup and mauling incident that took
place on 22 December 1990. In resolving
administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is not
indispensable to dispense justice to the parties. The
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote
full adversarial proceedings.49 Submission of position
papers may be sufficient for as long as the parties
thereto are given the opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one’s side or opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.50 This constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.51 It
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in the courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.52

In administrative proceedings, only substantial

evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion is required.53 Thus, findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by the Supreme Court, if
supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of
their expertise on the specific matters under their
consideration.54 Thus, factual determinations made by
G.R. No. 158455 June 28, 2005
SHERWILL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SITIO STO. NIÑO RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC.
and/or NILDA DEVILLERES, and the LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 205, dismissing Civil Action
No. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia and forum
shopping.
Petitioner Sherwill Development Corporation is the
registered owner of two parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 1319182 consisting of 8,774 square meters,
while Lot 86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is
covered by TCT No. 131919.3 Both lots form part of
the Muntinlupa Estate, while the titles thereon were
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on
September 24, 1913.
On October 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a
Complaint4 for quieting of title against respondents
Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc. (SSNRAI),
Nilda Devilleres, and the Lands Management Bureau
(LMB). The petitioner made the following allegations
in its complaint:
6. Since petitioner acquired subject two (2)
lots in 1984, it has dutifully paid realty taxes
thereon. A copy of its latest tax-payment
receipt is attached as Annex "E."
7. In the late 1960s and the 1970s, and up to
the 1980s, unauthorized persons, without the
prior knowledge and consent of petitioner
and/or Mr. Lipio, by force, stealth and
strategy, unlawfully entered and occupied the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 131918 and
131919. Among said unauthorized persons
are members and officers of SSNRAI,
Devilleres included;
8. Said LMB Case No. 7-98 is the first step of
respondents to disturb and/or cast clouds on
TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919, as in fact they
are disturbing and casting clouds over said
titles. From all indications, LMB is set to
recommend to the Philippine Government,
[through] the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the "nullification" of TCT Nos. 131918
and 131919 and/or the reversion thereof to
the Philippine Government, despite the fact
that the latter, sometime in 1927 or
thereabout, sold and/or disposed of subject
lots, then covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 684, pursuant to Act No. 1120
and other pertinent laws. Petitioner is the third
or fourth transferee and buyer in good faith of
the lots in question. Certainly, its titles (TCT
Nos. 131918 and 131919) have long become
indefeasible and conclusive, considering that
indefeasibility and conclusiveness of titles
accrue one year after the issuance thereof.5
As part of its prayer for relief, the petitioner prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering
the LMB to cease and desist from proceeding with the
hearings in LMB Case No. 7-98, a case pending
before it where petitioner’s titles to the subject lots
were being questioned by the respondents SSNRAI
and Nilda Devilleres. Thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays for
the following:
(a) The immediate issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against LMB, ordering it
to cease and desist from hearing or continuing
its hearing of LMB Case No. 7-98; thereafter,
after due hearing, the issuance of another
order making said injunction permanent; and
(b) The quieting of title of TCT Nos. 131918
and 131919, and the complete removal of any
and all clouds thereon, and the accompanying
declaration that said titles are indefeasible and
conclusive against the whole world, as in fact
they are.
Petitioner further prays for other reliefs which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to grant.6
The trial court set the hearing of the prayer of the writ
of preliminary injunction at 8:30 a.m. of November 22,
2002.7On November 6, 2002, the private respondents,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the petition
on the following grounds:
(a) THE PETITION ITSELF IS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE AS THE CERTIFICATE OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING DID NOT
SPECIFY AND/OR DISCLOSE THE
PENDENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU
CASE NO. 7-98;
 (b) PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM-
SHOPPING; and
(c) THERE IS ANOTHER ACTION PENDING
BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVING THE
SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND FOR THE
SAME CAUSE.
In its opposition to the motion to dismiss, the
petitioner averred that contrary to the private
respondents’ allegations, it did disclose the pendency
of LMB Case No. 7-98 in paragraph 3 of its petition, to
wit:
3. Said LMB Case No. 7-98 was filed on May 5, 1995
and is, at present, being heard by [the] LMB thru
Hearing Officer Rogelio C. Mandar, the same Special
Investigator-Designate who, on Feb. 12, 1998, wrote
the LMB Director thru the Chief, Legal Division,
recommending "that an order be issued directing the
Surveys Divisions of this Office or its duly-authorized
representatives to conduct verification and relocation
survey" of subject lots. In effect, Atty. Mandar as such
Hearing Officer has already prejudged the case in
favor of SSNRAI. A copy of the petition filed
by SSNRAI (minus annexes) is attached as Annex
"B," and that of Atty. Mandar’s letter consisting of
seven (7) pages (minus annexes), as Annex "C;"9
According to the petitioner, there was no identity of
actions and reliefs sought in the two cases. The
petitioner pointed out that in LMB Case No. 7-98, the
private respondents (as the petitioners therein) sought
the declaration of the nullity of the said titles issued in
its favor, on their claim that their issuance was "highly
irregular and erroneous," and that the subject
properties were not disposed of in accordance with
Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands
Act. On the other hand, in SP Civil Action No. 02-237,
the petitioner’s right of action was based on the
private respondents’ act of disturbing and casting
clouds over TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919,
considering that such titles have long become
indefeasible and conclusive.
The motion to dismiss filed by the private respondents
was submitted for resolution on November 15, 2002.10
In its Order11 dated February 24, 2003, the trial court
dismissed the petition on the grounds of litis
pendencia and forum shopping. In so ruling, the trial
court made the following ratiocination:
As alleged in the petition filed with the LMB itself,
quoted elsewhere in this order, and as shown in the
copy of said petition attached to this petition, herein
petitioner is respondent therein and herein private
respondents are petitioners there. The element of
identity of parties is therefore present. The cause of
action and reliefs sought in the two sets of cases are,
likewise, identical. The ultimate issue involved in both
is who between the parties has a better right to the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919
which are alleged in the LMB case to originally
constitute a portion of the Muntinlupa Friar Lands
Estate titled in the name of the government. As to the
third requirement that the result of the first action is
determinative of the second, it is true here inasmuch
as the Lands Management Bureau, public respondent
herein before which the case earlier filed is pending,
absorbed the functions and powers of the Bureau of
Lands (abolished by Executive Order No. 131) and is
mandated by law to implement the provisions of the
Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141) which governs
the administration and disposition of lands commonly
known as "friar lands," so an earlier recourse to it
would be an exercise of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, regardless of which party is
successful.
It is clear from the petition that what the petitioner
wants is for this court to enjoin public respondent from
proceeding with the case before it and take over the
same which it cannot and should not do.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the
grounds of litis pendencia and forum shopping. No
cost.
SO ORDERED.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied in an Order13 dated May
29, 2003.
Hence, the present petition, on the following question
of law: whether or not the grounds of litis
pendentia and forum shopping insofar as SP Civil
Action No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable. The
petitioner puts forth the following arguments:
1. THE GROUNDS OF "LITIS PENDENCIA AND
FORUM SHOPPING" RELIED UPON BY THE
COURT A QUO IN DISMISSING SP. CIVIL ACTION
NO. 02-237 AND DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE SHAKY AT BEST.
IN FACT, THEY ARE NON-EXISTENT.14
2. MOREOVER, AS ALREADY RAISED BY
PETITIONER IN ITS REPLIES TO RESPONDENTS’
COMMENTS ON ITS AFORESAID MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, LMB HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO TRY LMB CASE NO. 7-98 INASMUCH AS
CASES LIKE THIS FALL UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS.15
To bolster its pose that no forum shopping and litis
pendentia exist, the petitioner invokes the ruling of the
Court in Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. NLRC, et
al.,16 averring that when a party does not pursue
simultaneous remedies in fora, there is no forum
shopping. The petitioner reiterates that the issue and
the causes of action in LMB Case No. 7-98 and SP
Civil Action No. 02-237 are different. It points out that
it certainly is not "a party against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum";
neither has it instituted "two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause." The
petitioner further insists that the LMB has no
jurisdiction to try LMB Case No. 7-98; it is the regional
trial courts that have original jurisdiction in such
cases. The petitioner points out that the private
respondents failed to file an action for nullification of
TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919 within the one-year
period from the date of issuance of the subject titles
and are, therefore, barred from questioning the said
titles. The petitioner further points out that the
certificates of title under the Torrens system of
registration cannot be collaterally attacked. The
petitioner concludes that the trial court should not
have dismissed SP Civil Action No. 02-237, but
instead should have given it due course.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part,
points out that the parties in both cases are identical.
It further points out that LMB Case No. 7-98 was filed
as early as 1995, and that the petitioner subsequently
initiated SP Civil Action No. 02-237 obviously to
preempt the outcome of the case before the Lands
Management Bureau. Hence, the trial court correctly
dismissed SP Civil Action No. 02-237 on the ground
of litis pendentia.
The OSG further contends that the determination of
whether there was a violation of the Friar Lands Act,
the very issue raised in the two cases, is well within
the authority of the LMB to investigate, it being the
agency of the government charged with administrative
control over Friar Land Estates under Commonwealth
Act No. 2550. As such, according to the OSG, the
LMB has primary jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The OSG points out that the petitioner’s resort to the
courts is premature, considering that the LMB has
primary jurisdiction over the matter.
The OSG, likewise, avers that the petitioner is guilty
of violating Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on
certification against forum shopping. It points out that
the petitioner’s representative, Roland Leslie V. Lipio,
certified under oath that the petitioner "had no
knowledge of any action pending before any tribunal
or agency." It further points out that it cannot be said
that the petitioner was unaware of LMB Case No. 7-
98, since it even filed an Answer therein on July 31,
1995. To justify the dismissal of the case, the OSG
cites the ruling of the Court in Republic v. Carmel
Development, Inc.17
The Ruling of the Court
At the outset, the Court notes that the petitioner
assails an order of dismissal issued by the RTC, with
direct recourse to this Court. It must be stressed that
in so doing, the petitioner violated an established
policy, one that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.18 There is, after
all, a hierarchy of courts which is determinative of the
venue of appeals.19 This rule may be relaxed only for
special and important reasons clearly and specifically
set out in the petition.20 The petitioner should thus
have filed its petition first before the Court of Appeals,
conformably with this principle of hierarchy of courts.
The Court notes that the petitioner failed to
satisfactorily explain its failure to comply with or its
non-observance of judicial hierarchy.
Even upon the merits of the case, the petition at bar is
still destined to fail for the following additional
reasons:
First. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, at this
instance, it is the courts which should defer the
exercise of jurisdiction on the matter. Jurisdiction
having been correctly assumed by the Director of
Lands over the parties’ conflicting claims, the case
should, in accordance with law, remain there for final
adjudication.21 After all, the Director of Lands, who is
the officer charged with carrying out the provisions of
the Public Land Act, has control over the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other form of
concession or disposition and management of the
public lands, and his finding and decision as to
questions of fact, when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources), is conclusive.22
The power and authority of the Director of Lands were
discussed in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines v. De Guzman.23 According to the Court,
the Director of Lands does not lose authority over the
land even upon the issuance of an original certificate
of title over the same. Thus:
… The authority of the Director of Lands to investigate
conflicts over public lands is derived from Section 91
of the Public Land Act. In fact, it is not merely his right
but his specific duty to conduct investigations of
alleged fraud in securing patents and the
corresponding titles thereto. While title issued on the
basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially
secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such
title had been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had
been committed in securing such title, in order that
the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by
the Government.24
As a rule then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude
upon matters properly falling within the powers of the
LMB.25
On the petitioner’s claim that its titles to the subject
lots have been rendered indefeasible, the
pronouncement of the Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals26 is instructive:
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land
Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of
a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible
as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous
decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been
emphasized by our holding that not even the
Government can file an action for annulment, but at
the same time, it has been made clear that an action
for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor
General, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. It is also to the public interest that one
who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public
land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and
the State should, therefore, have an even existing
authority, thru its duly-authorized officers, to inquire
into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the
Solicitor General or any other officer who may be
authorized by law, may file the corresponding action
for the reversion of the land involved to the public
domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other
qualified persons in accordance with law. In other
words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously
public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director
of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the
purpose of such investigation is to determine whether
or not fraud had been committed in securing such title
in order that the appropriate action for reversion may
be filed by the Government.27
Second. The OSG correctly invoked the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, the courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.28 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view. And in such cases, the court cannot arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence,29 in this
case, the LMB.
Third. The trial court correctly ruled that the
petitioner’s action was barred by the pendency of the
proceedings before the LMB. For litis pendencia to lie,
the following requisites must be satisfied:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both
cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for;
3. The relief must be founded on the same
facts and the same basis; and
4. Identity of the two preceding particulars
should be such that any judgment, which may
be rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata on the action under
consideration.30
To the Court’s mind, these requisites are present in
the instant case. For one, the parties in the LMB case
and in SP Civil Action No. 02-237 are the same.
There is, likewise, identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for. The petition filed by the private
respondents SSNRAI and its President Devilleres
before the LMB alleged that the lots in question had
been the subject of "double titling"; on the other hand,
the petition with prayer for preliminary injunction filed
before the RTC sought the declaration from the court
that TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919, in the name of the
petitioner, are indefeasible and conclusive as against
the whole world. The resolution of the foregoing issue
would likewise require the presentation of evidence
from the parties. Verily, the conclusion in one
proceeding would amount to the adjudication of the
merits on the other – that is, a favorable ruling from
the LMB would have virtually removed any and all
existing "clouds" from the petitioner’s titles to the
subject property; in the same vein, a declaration of
the indefeasibility of TCT Nos. 131918 and 131919
would preempt any ruling of the LMB on the matter.
Indeed, the underlying principle of litis pendentia is
the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter
and for the same cause of action. This theory is
founded on the public policy that the same subject
matter should not be the subject of controversy in
court more than once in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the
stability of the rights and status of persons.31 The RTC
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205, recognized this
doctrine when it dismissed SP Civil Action No. 02-237
to avoid the possibility of two contradictory decisions
on the question of the validity of the subject titles.

In any case, should the petitioner disagree with the

ruling of the LMB, it is not precluded from taking the
matter up to with the courts of law.

Fourth. To determine whether a party violated the rule

against forum shopping, the test applied is whether
the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether
a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.32 Considering our pronouncement
that the requisites of litis pendentia barred the filing of
SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly
dismissed the same on the additional ground of forum
shopping.

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition

is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205,
dismissing SP Civil Action No. 02-237 on the ground
of litis pendentia and forum shopping, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
415 Phil. 645
CASTRO v. SECRETARY
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedy is not an iron-clad rule. There are instances
when it may be pierced and judicial action may be
resorted to immediately.
The present case is one illustration.
Sought to be set aside in this petition for review on
certiorari are the: (a) Decision[1] dated November 20,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu
dismissing Gualberto Castro's petition for mandamus;
and b) Order[2] dated January 5, 1998 denying his
motion for reconsideration.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for
disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner
Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central
School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he has an illicit
affair with Gutang's wife, petitioner's co-teacher at the
same school.
After hearing or on August 28, 1984, the DECS Regional
Office VII, through Assistant Superintendent Francisco
B. Concillo, rendered a decision declaring petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. He was meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service.[3] The DECS Central Office
affirmed Concillo's decision in an Indorsement dated
March 25, 1986.[4]
On July 21, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. Instead of resolving the motion, the
DECS Central Office directed the School Division of Cebu
to comment on the motion.[5] The School Division
Superintendent recommended that the motion be
resolved favorably. However, the recommendation was
opposed by the DECS Region VII.[6]
Thereafter, in his letters dated November 5, 1988 and
July 19,1990, petitioner asked the incumbent DECS
Secretary to resolve his motion for reconsideration. But
his letters remained unheeded, thus, on October 4,
1995, petitioner filed with the DECS Central Office a
"Motion for Review Setting Aside/Modifying the
Decision of Regional Director of DECS Region VII."[7]
DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria (respondent) referred the
motion to the Regional Director of Region VII for
comment. On January 3, 1996, Regional Director Eladio
C. Dioko issued a 2nd Indorsement sustaining the
decision of Assistant Superintendent Concillo, thus:
"This Office sustains former Director Concillo's decision
that respondent Castro is guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct but posits the belief that the proper
penalty as provided by law be meted out for him. In the
Honorable Secretary is vested by law the power to
review, reaffirm, modify or reverse decisions of a lower
office.[8]
In his 3rd Indorsement dated March 6, 1996,
respondent Secretary denied petitioner' s motion for
review.[9]
Thrice thwarted, petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60,
Barili, Cebu, imploring that judgment be rendered
ordering respondent Secretary or anyone who may
have assumed the duties and functions of his office (1)
to reduce his penalty from dismissal to one (1) year
suspension; 2) to consider the one (1) year suspension
as already served considering that he has been out of
the service for more than ten (10) years; 3) to reinstate
him to his former position; and 4) to pay is back
salaries.[10] On November 20, 1997, the trial court
rendered the herein assailed decision dismissing the
petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It ruled that petitioner should
have appealed to the Civil Service Commission before
coming to court, thus:
"Considering that the Civil Service Commission has the
power to review on appeal the orders or acts of
respondent, petitioner has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies implies absence of cause of
action. Where a remedy is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before recourse can be made to the courts. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.
(Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 42, 227 SCRA
271).
Mandamus - If appeal or some other equally adequate
remedy is still available in the ordinary course of law,
the action for MANDAMUS would be improper.
Sherman Vs. Horilleno, 57 Phil. 13; Fajardo Vs. Llorente,
6 Phil, 426; Paquio Vs. Del Rosario, 46 Phil. 59; Manalo
v. Paredes, 47,938; Castro Revilla Vs. Garduno, 53 Phil.
934; Rural Transit Co. Vs. Teodoro, 57 Phil. 11.
Special Civil Actions against administrative officers
should not be entertained if superior administrative
officers could grant relief. Cecilio vs. Belmonte, 48 Phil.
243, 255.
From the facts it is clear that the penalty of dismissal
from the service was erroneously imposed upon
petitioner. However, certiorari is the remedy to correct
errors of judgment which are grave and arbitrary and
not mandamus.
Mandamus will not lie to order the reinstatement of the
petitioner in his former position as Elementary Grades
Teacher as it was not yet established that he is entitled
to or has legal right to the office.
In the case of Manalo vs. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, the
petitioner's claim for "backwages" could be the
appropriate subject of an ordinary civil action as
mandamus applies when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bench, the Court after a judicious study
and analysis on the case, has no other alternative than
to DENY the present petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner insists that, "when the question to be settled
is purely a question of law, he may go directly to the
proper court so that he can have proper redress." For its
part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends
that petitioner's adequate remedy was to appeal the
decision of respondent Secretary to the Civil Service
Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 292. Since petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, his petition must be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. Also, the OSG argues that
the remedy of mandamus to compel payment of back
salary does not lie unless petitioner's right thereto is
well defined. This is based on the general proposition
that a public official is not entitled to any compensation
if he has not rendered any service.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled
that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a
cause of action,[12] which is one of the grounds allowed
by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint.[13]
The doctrine is not absolute. There are instances when
it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be
validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: 1) When the question raised is purely
legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3)
when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when
there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when
the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is
involved; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.[14]
Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are
administrative remedies available to petitioner.[15] But
where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant
need not exhaust all administrative remedies before
such judicial relief can be sought.[16] In Cortes v.
Bartolome,[17] a case involving a petition for
mandamus, we ruled that "while it may be that non-
judicial remedies could have been available to
respondent in that he could have appealed to the then
Secretary of Local Government and Community
Development and thereafter to the Civil Service
Commission, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when
the question is purely legal." This is because issues of
law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative
officer would only be an exercise in futility.[18]
Thus, in the ultimate, the resolution of this case hinges
on whether or not the following is a question of law or a
question of fact - Is dismissal from the service the
proper penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct?
It is settled that for a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them. And the distinction is well known. There is a
question of law when the doubt or differences arise as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a
question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as
to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.[19]
In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the
administrative finding of his guilt for the offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is settled and final
insofar as he is concerned. What petitioner only
impugns is the correctness of the penalty of "dismissal
from the service." He is convinced that the proper
penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is only suspension from the service.
Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure question of law.
We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and
we will be able to determine whether the penalty of
dismissal is in order.
We find for petitioner.
Petitioner has all the reasons to seek the aid of this
Court since it has been clearly established by evidence
that he is a first time offender. Section 23, Rule XIV of
the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (Otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws)[20]
provides:
"Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light
depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of
said acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding
penalties:
xxx xxx
(o) Disgraceful and immoral conduct <1st Offense,
Suspension for six (6) months and one day (1) day to
one (1) year; 2nd Offense, Dismissal.>"
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the proper
penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is only suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. In fact, this has been the
consistent ruling of this Court. In Aquino v. Navarro,[21]
a secondary guidance councelor in a public high school,
was merely suspended for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. In Burgos v. Aquino,[22] the Court suspended
a court stenographer for six months for maintaining
illicit relations with the complainant's husband and for
perjury in not disclosing in her personal information
sheet she has a daughter as a result of that relationship.
Similarly, in Nalupta Jr. v. Tapec,[23] a deputy sheriff
was suspended for six months and one day for having a
relationship with a woman other than his wife by whom
he has two children. Thus:
The act of respondent of having illicit relations with
Consolacion Inocencio is considered disgraceful and
immoral conduct within the purview of Section 36 (b)
(5) of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, for which
respondent may be subjected to disciplinary action.
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil
Service Commission has categorized disgraceful and
immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty
of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day shall be
imposed for the first offense, while the penalty of
dismissal is imposed for the second offense. (Emphasis
supplied)
Inasmuch as the present charge of immorality against
respondent constitutes the first charge of this nature,
the Court shall at this instance suspend respondent for
six (6) months and one (1) day.
Again, in the 1997 case of Ecube-Badel v. Badel,[24] we
imposed the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
without pay against respondent David Badel for his first
offense of immorality.
It is worthy to note that even DECS Regional Director
Eladio C. Dioko stated in his 2nd Indorsement dated
January 3, 1996, that while he sustains Director
Concillo's decision, "the proper penalty as provided by
law (should) be meted out for him." The Regional Trial
Court also echoed the same sentiment, thus:
"From the facts, it is clear that the penalty of dismissal
from the service was erroneously imposed upon
petitioner. However, certiorari is the remedy to correct
errors of judgment which are grave and arbitrary and
not mandamus."
Anent petitioner's prayer for the payment of back
salaries, we find it to be without legal basis.
The issue regarding payment of back salaries during the suspension to have been fully served. He must,
period that a member of the civil service is out of work therefore, be REINSTATED to office immediately.
but subsequently ordered reinstated is settled in our
jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to
the period when an employee is not allowed to work SO ORDERED.
may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges.
However, if the employee is not completely exenorated
of the charges [25] such as when the penalty of
dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not
be entitled to the payment of his back salaries. In Yacia
v. City of Baguio,[26] the decision of the Commissioner
of Civil Service ordering the dismissal of a government
employee on the ground of dishonesty was immediately
executed pending appeal. But, on appeal, the Civil
Service Board of Appeals modified that penalty of
dismissal to a fine equivalent to six months pay. This
Court ruled that the employee's claim for back wages,
for the period during which he was not allowed to work
because of the execution of the decision of the
Commissioner, should be denied.

The general proposition is that a public official is not

entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any
service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioner did
not work during the period for which he is now claiming
salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to
order the payment of such salaries.[27]

Thus, we reduce the penalty of dismissal imposed upon

petitioner to suspension for a period of one year
without pay. Considering that he has been out of the
service for quite a long time, we feel he has been
sufficiently punished for his offense. We, therefore,
order his reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Regional Trial Court's Decision dated November 20,
1997 and Order dated January 5, 1998 are SET ASIDE.
The penalty of dismissal imposed upon petitioner is
reduced to one (1) year suspension from office without
pay. In view of the length of time petitioner has been
out of the service, we consider the penalty of
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-
in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director
(RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in
his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, may an action
for replevin prosper to recover a movable property
which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of
the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented
before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May
19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria
de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May
23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which
to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to
submit the required explanation. On June 22,
1989,1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan
of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705
as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private
respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated
June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however,
denied in a subsequent order of July 12,
1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents' statement in their letter dated
June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary."3 Pending resolution however of the
appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case
4031, was filed by the private respondents against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Cagayan,5 which issued a writ ordering the return of
the truck to private respondents.6 Petitioner Layugan
and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989.7 Their motion for reconsideration
having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the
respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial
court's order ruling that the question involved is purely
a legal question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the
Resolution dated September 27, 1993,10 the prayer for
the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand,
would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1)
due process was violated because they were not
given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no
authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized
in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records
and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of
the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is
in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently
held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be
sought, The premature invocation of court's
intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack
of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity
and convenience will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However,
we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine
is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due
process,13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,14 (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned,16 (5) when there
is irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,19 (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is
a private land in land case proceedings,21 (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the
denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the
order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private
respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as
they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The
letter, reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does
not merit your favorable action, then
this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the
Secretary.24
It was easy to perceive then that the private
respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review
and disposition of their case. By appealing to him,
they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and
plain remedy still available and open to them in the
ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now,
without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by
filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief
during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of
forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function,
the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed
by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which
is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by
private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.25 In Felipe
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary,26 which was reiterated in the recent case of
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this
Court held:
Thus, while the administration
grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming
 under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in
effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated. However, considering the circumstances
prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these
assertions of private respondents to be without merit.
First, they argued that there was violation of due
process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This
contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard.28 One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and practicable
than oral argument, through pleadings.29 In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.30 Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration,31 as in the
instant case, when private respondents were
undisputedly given the opportunity to present their
side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated
June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an
order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we ruled that
:
The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a same in accordance with pertinent
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent
illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because
the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have
no power to perform these acts under the law. They
insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the
confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments, implemen
ts and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go
along with private respondents' thinking not only
because the aforequoted provision apparently does
not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be
the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large
extent, due to the fact that private respondents'
interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts
the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces
the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted
herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of
the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation.
In all cases of violation of this Code or
other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative,
may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the
laws, regulations and policies on the
matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to
dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act
of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government.
The only limitation is that it should be made "in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must
be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose
projected in the statute.33 Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should
be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.34 In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor
General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to
make forestry laws "more responsive
to present situations and realities" and
in view of the "urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country,"
that the government opted to add
Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct
from criminal proceedings. More than
anything else, it is intended to
supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry
laws through criminal actions. The
preamble of EO 277-the law that
added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:
responsive to present
situations and
realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-
A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR to confiscate, not only
"conveyances," but forest products as
well. On the other hand, confiscation
of forest products by the "court" in a
criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under
Section 68, then Section 68-A would
have no Purpose at all. Simply put,
Section 68-A would not have provided
any solution to the problem perceived
in EO 277, supra.35

"WHEREAS, there is Private respondents, likewise, contend that the

an urgency to seizure was illegal because the petitioners
conserve the themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989
remaining forest of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of
resources of the private respondents was not used in the commission
country for the benefit of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to
and welfare of the and received by the counsel of private respondents,
present and future reads in part, viz.:
generations of
Filipinos; . . . while it is true that the truck of your
client was not used by her in the
WHEREAS, our forest commission of the crime, we uphold
resources may be your claim that the truck owner is not
effectively conserved liable for the crime and in no case
and protected through could a criminal case be filed against
the vigilant her as provided under Article 309 and
enforcement and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36
implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and We observed that private respondents misread the
regulations; content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is
WHEREAS, the contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that
implementation of our the truck "was not used in the commission of the
forestry laws suffers crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the
from technical crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action
difficulties, due to be filed against the owner thereof for violation of
certain inadequacies in Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
the penal provisions of Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the
the Revised Forestry truck was being used in the commission of another
Code of the crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
Philippines; and amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12,
1989, petitioners pointed out:
WHEREAS, to
overcome this . . . However, under Section 68 of P.D.
difficulties, there is a 705 as amended and further amended
need to penalize by Executive Order No. 277
certain acts more specifically provides for the
 confiscation of the conveyance used
in the transport of forest products not
covered by the required legal
documents. She may not have been
involved in the cutting and gathering of
the product in question but the fact
that she accepted the goods for a fee
or fare the same is therefor liable. . .37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is
no crime defined and punishable under Section 68
other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners
admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private
respondents could not be charged for theft as
provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private
respondents could not have committed an act
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree.
For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision
of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the
aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein,
thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other products
without license. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, or
remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from
alienable and disposable public lands,
or from private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit, shall be guilty
of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code . . .
(Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting,
gathering and/or
collecting timber or
other forest products
without license. — Any
person who
shall cut, gather, collec
t, remove timber or
other forest products
from any forest land, or
timber from alienable
or disposable public
land, or from private
land, without any
authority, or
possess timber or
other forest products
without the legal
documents as required
under existing forest
laws and regulations,
shall be punished with
the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised
Penal Code . . .
(Emphasis ours;
Section 1, E.O. No.
277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as
amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277
amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided
for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and
inserted the words "shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit
for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by
them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower
court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case
and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return
of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent
prior to one's recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents'
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the
lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for
replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to
be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal
chattels that are unlawfully detained.39 "To detain" is
defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody,"40 and WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the
it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14,
exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the
pretense of authority or right; this, without manual Restraining Order promulgated on September 27,
seizing of the property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of
of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with
that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he utmost dispatch.
is entitled to the possession of property, that the
property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, SO ORDERED.
alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not
been taken for tax assessment, or seized under
execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property.42 Private respondents miserably failed to
convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the
subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be
noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners
because it was transporting forest products without
the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as
the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representatives of the conveyances used
in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently,
the continued possession or detention of the truck by
the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding
is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention
exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a

procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation
and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section
8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the
said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of
the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and

decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of
any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision
shall be final and executory after the
lapse of thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the
President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966. The Decision of the Department
Head may not be reviewed by the
courts except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition.
G.R. No. L-16969 April 30, 1966
R. MARINO CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., defendant-appellee.
Rosauro L. Alvarez, for plaintiff-appellant.
G. B. Guevara, R. P. Guevara and E. S. Tipon, for
defendant-appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a suit for damage commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, where plaintiff asked for half
a million pesos and defendant, on his counterclaim,
for one and a half million. After trial the court
dismissed the complaint and awarded P1,000.00 to
defendant. Plaintiff appealed directly to Us in view of
the amount claimed by him.
During the time pertinent to this case defendant was
Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines. On
January 13, 1949 Corpus was appointed Economist in
the Department of Economic Research of said bank.
Thereafter he received promotions in position and
salary. By 1954 he was Director of the Department of
Loans and Credit and Rural Banks Administration. On
December 15, 1954 a number of employee of the
bank filed an administrative complaint against him.
Upon their petition he was suspended from office on
February 8, 1955. After investigation he was found
guilty on five counts and upon recommendation of the
Governor was penalized with suspension without pay
from February 8, 1955 to August 30, 1955, the date
the Monetary Board of the bank rendered its decision.
On August 31, 1955 Corpus received a letter from
Cuaderno informing him that be had been "reinstated
in the service of the bank" with the designation of
"Technical Assistant to the Governor." On January 17,
1956 he was appointed Special Assistant to the
Governor, in charge of the Export Department.
On March 7, 1958 several of his co-employees in the
same department filed an administrative complaint
against him, alleging a number of acts of
misfeasance. The Monetary Board, upon
recommendation of the Governor, suspended him on
March 18.
On March 25, 1958 Corpus instituted the present
action, alleging that his suspension was unwarranted
and had been brought about by Cuaderno's malicious
machinations. The latter's counterclaim, after the
denials and special defenses in his answer, alleged
that the complaint had been filed maliciously and that
plaintiff had committed libel against him.
On May 5, 1959, while this case was still pending in
the lower court, the three-man committee created to
investigate the 1958 administrative charges against
plaintiff reported to the Monetary Board that if found
no basis to recommend disciplinary action against him
and therefore urged that he be reinstated. But on July
20, 1959 the Monetary Board resolved that:
After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of
the report of the aforesaid fact-finding
committee, and representations of both
complainants and respondent, through their
respective counsel; and, further, after a
thorough review of the service record of the
respondent, particularly the various cases
presented against him, object of Monetary
Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30,
1955, which all involve fitness, discipline, etc.
of respondent; and moreover, upon formal
statement of the Governor that he has lost
confidence in the respondent as Special
Assistant to the Governor and in charge of the
Export Department (such position being
primarily confidential and highly technical in
nature), the Monetary Board finds that the
continuance of the respondent in the service
of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the
best interest of the Central Bank and,
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the
respondent, Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned
as of the date of his suspension.
On March 22, 1960 the lower court rendered the
decision appealed from, absolving Cuaderno from
liability but ordering Corpus to pay damages, as
aforesaid, the allegation of libel having been duly
proven.
Appellant now avers that the lower court erred in
holding (1) that appellee is not liable for damages for
illegally causing his suspension and eventual
removal; and (2) that appellant had committed libel
against appellee.
In connection with the first issue it is pertinent to state
that the question of legality of appellant's removal by
resolution of the Monetary Board of July 20, 1959 has
been decided by Us in another case (G.R. No. L-
23721, March 31, 1965). We found there that he had
been removed not for any of the charges in the
administrative complaint against him in 1958 —
charges as to which no specific findings were made
by the Monetary Board — but by reason of loss of
confidence by the Governor of the Bank; and held that
loss of confidence alone is not a sufficient and
legitimate cause for removal even if the position
involved, as in appellant's case, belongs to the
category of policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical positions referred to in the
Constitution. In that case, therefore, We ordered
appellant's reinstatement in the service.
The question here now is whether appellant's removal
was the result of malicious machinations on the part
of appellee, as alleged in the complaint. Appellant
starts by saying that Cuaderno harbored a feeling of
professional jealousy against him because he was a
much solicited guest speaker on economic matters —
a subject appellee considered his forte; and that on
one occasion, during a hearing in Congress, appellant
gave testimony contrary to that which appellee had
given, thus putting the latter in a bad light.
Resentment according to appellant was followed by
overt acts, thus: Appellee induced a number of bank
employees to file the administrative complaints of
1955 and 1958. The 1955 complaint was dated
January 20, but as early as January 11 appellee saw
to it that an investigating committee was created by
the Monetary Board. And before appellant was given
a chance to explain his side he was suspended, upon
appellee's recommendation, on February 8, 1955.
Appellant was not given a chance to read the charges
against him except during the trial of the instant case.
After the investigation appellant received a letter from
appellee, informing him of his reinstatement, but
without mentioning the fact that he had been found
guilty and given the penalty of suspension without
pay. Appellee even congratulated him on his
exoneration. To completely convince appellant of this,
appellee ordered the preparation of the "back salary"
check corresponding to appellant's period of
suspension, only to have the check cancelled later on.
After the second administrative complaint was filed in
1958 appellee hastily convened an extraordinary
meeting of the Monetary Board in order to magnify the
false charges against appellant although appellee
knew that the meeting was violative of the Central
Bank charter, because the object of the meeting, as
aforesaid, was not stated in the call, and the object
actually stated did not justify an extraordinary meeting
at all. To lull appellant into a false sense of security,
appellee simply notified him, by letters, to prepare
comments on the administrative charges, leading him
to believe that he had all the time to do so, but
afterwards appellee suddenly changed his tactics and
directed the secretary of the Monetary Board to
demand that appellant answer the charges as soon
as possible. And on March 18, 1958 appellee
informed appellant that he had been suspended
effective that day. The corresponding letters and
notices were delivered to appellant at his house by
the bank's security guards, who were in uniform and
fully armed — a manner of delivery that proved
humiliating to appellant.
We first take up the question of appellant's removal
from office as a result of the administrative complaint
filed against him in 1958. The removal was embodied
in a resolution of the Monetary Board, upon appellee's
recommendation as Governor of the Bank. The
procedure adopted was in accordance with the
provision of the bank charter that the Monetary Board
shall "on the recommendation of the Governor,
appoint, fix the remunerations, and remove all officers
and employees of the Central Bank." (Section 14,
R.A. 265.) Under this provision the Board has the
power to adopt or reject the recommendation. The
decisive action belonged to the Board, not to
appellee.
In speaking of the action of the Board, this Court said
in G.R. No. L-23721, supra: "we do not believe that in
opining that the position of Corpus was one
dependent on confidence, the defendant Monetary
Board necessarily acted with vindictiveness or
wantonness, and not in the exercise of honest
judgment."
The record does not show that it was appellee who
instigated either or both of the administrative cases
against appellant. The 1955 complaint was filed by
ten bank employees, while the one in 1958 was filed
by eighteen of appellant's subordinates in his
department — persons who would naturally be
expected to feel greater loyalty to appellant, their
immediate superior, than to appellee. None of the
complainants in the first group were in the second
group. No acts are attributed to appellee from which it
may be inferred that he convinced all or a large
number of them to file the charges.
Appellant stresses the fact that in the first
administrative case, even before the complainants
filed their complaint of January 20, 1955 the Monetary
Board had already created an investigating
committee, based on "papers presented by the
Governor." The resolution to that effect was passed
January 11, 1955. The evidence shows, however, that
the complainants charged appellant as early as
December 15, 1954, reiterated their complaint on the
following December 26, and again on January 3,
1955. The complaint of January 20, 1955 was only a
more formal and detailed narration of the charges.
In any event, some of the charges were
substantiated. True, appellant was absolved of
negligence in the performance of official duties and
dishonesty, but he was found guilty on five other
counts, namely: (1) physical maltreatment of a co-
employee; (2) use of insulting language; (3)
oppressive treatment of subordinates; (4)
promulgation of unreasonable office regulations; and
(5) defiance to the Monetary Board. Under the
circumstances, malice can hardly be imputed to
anybody in the formulation of those charges.
Appellant says it was only during the trial of the
present case that he read a copy of the 1955
administrative complaint against him. We are hard put
to believe this. One who is thus charged, and
suspended by reason thereof, would lose no time
finding out what the charges are. And after the
administrative investigations had been terminated and
appellant received a letter informing him of his
restoration to office, he would want to know whether
he had been exonerated or not. The fact is that he
requested appellee to intercede for him in convincing
the members of the Monetary Board to amend the
resolution imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension without pay — a fact which certainly does
not jibe with his alleged ignorance of the charges of
which he had been found guilty.
Contrary to appellant's claim, it was not appellee who
was responsible for the cancellation of the check
covering the period of his suspension. In fact appellee
was the one who had the check prepared on
September 6, 1955, just before he left on a trip to
Istanbul; but as appellant himself stated in a letter-
complaint he sent to the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee the check "was subsequently
cancelled upon orders of Acting Deputy Governor
Castillo on the strength of the Monetary Board
resolution which was prepared after Governor
Cuaderno's departure on September 6th." This is
confirmed by appellant's witness, Jose Carmona, who
was Chief Accountant of the Central Bank at the time.
Neither was appellee responsible for appellant's
preventive suspension in connection with the two
administrative cases against him. The pertinent
resolution of the Monetary Board shows that it
suspended appellant (in 1955) "after being appraised
(sic) of the findings and observations of the
Committee created on January 11, 1955 on the
matter at its present stage." The Board was then
acting on complainants' petition dated January 3,
1955, precisely urging appellant's suspension.
Likewise it appears that in the 1958 administrative
case the complainants filed, on March 12 of that year,
a motion for the immediate suspension or relief from
office of appellant; and (to quote from the
corresponding resolution) "after a lengthy and mature
deliberation on the matter and upon the
recommendation of the Governor, the Board, by
unanimous vote, decided to suspend from office
effective today, March 18, 1958, Mr. R. Marino
Corpus." Both acts of suspension were by the
Monetary Board, not by appellee. If appellee
recommended suspension, he did so in the
performance of his duty as he saw it and not in
pursuance of an insidious scheme against appellant.
Concerning the alleged humiliating manner in which
the communications from the Monetary Board were
served upon appellant, we fail to see how appellee
may be held responsible. The bank's security guards
who delivered them may have been in uniform and
armed at the time, but it does not appear that they did
anything to call the public's attention to the import of
the messages they were carrying. If they acted in an
oppressive and high-handed manner, it is they and
not appellee who should be made to answer.
Appellant says that after appellee had lulled him into a
false sense of security in connection with the 1958
case, the latter suddenly pressed him to file his
answer without first furnishing him a copy of the
complaint. The record fails to substantiate this
grievance. The complaint was filed on March 7, 1958.
Appellant received a letter from Deputy Governor
Castillo asking him to appear at the Central Bank at 9
in the evening of March 10, 1958, to furnish the
Monetary Board with certain information. According to
appellant, when he went to the meeting hall as
directed he found nobody there except the Board
Secretary, Attorney Filomeno Sta. Ana. In the
afternoon of March 14, 1958 appellant received a
letter from Sta. Ana asking him to answer the
charges. Appellant apparently did not reply to the
letter. Then on March 17, 1958 Sta. Ana, upon
appellee's instructions, again sent appellant a
memorandum asking him to submit his answer
without delay. Instead of answering the charges, or
asking for a copy thereof if he did not have a copy, as
he now claims, appellant had his subordinate,
Orlando Villanueva, write a letter on March 18, 1958,
telling Sta. Ana that "Mr. Corpus has instructed me to
inform you that his lawyer, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez
(Roseller Lim and Rosauro Alvarez Law Offices) is
now sick with flu and is asking for time." Considering
that appellant had engaged a lawyer to defend him,
his allegation of ignorance of the charges deserves
scant credit.
All that may be said about appellee's actuations is
that he lost confidence in appellant in view of the
charges filed against him in 1958; and although they
were not substantiated, appellee believed in good
faith that such loss of confidence was sufficient
reason to recommend appellant's removal.
We come now to the question of libel, which is the
subject of appellee's counterclaim. The statements for
which appellee seeks damages from appellant
appeared in the March 21, 1958 issue of The Manila
Chronicle, as follows:
CORPUS TALKS OF "INTRIGUER "
A suspended Central Bank official yesterday
said that a high-ranking CB official, who was
dismissed for malversation from the Philippine
National Bank before the war, intrigued and
instigated the filing of charges against him.
In an interview, R. Marino Corpus, who was
suspended the other day as special assistant
to the CB governor and head of the CB export
department asserted that the "intriguer" was
"dismissed from the PNB when my father,
Judge Rafael Corpus, was president of the
bank.
Corpus was suspended on the basis of an
administrative complaint filed by 18 of the 78
employees of the CB export department.
In a previous interview, Corpus preferred not
to comment on his suspension beyond saying
that "time will tell who instigated the charges,
and why."
Yesterday, Corpus called for the ouster of the
CB official he was referring to, averring that
this official was automatically disqualified by
the CB charter from holding a position in the
Bank which calls for "high moral integrity."
When this story hits the streets, the CB official
who will be cussing me and will be pushing
hard to have me disqualified from the CB will
be the one who instigated the charges against
me, Corpus added. "He will stop at nothing to
run me down, because now that he is
exposed, he is automatically disqualified by
the charter of the bank from holding a position
which calls for high moral integrity."
Recalling how this CB official was dismissed
from the PNB before the war, Corpus said the
man was discovered "milking" a sugar
central.
1äwphï1.ñët
The suspended CB official added that
President Quezon ordered this official's
dismissal because he felt that the moment he
(Mr. Quezon) was convinced a government
official holding a position of trust was unfit to
remain in public service, out he would go.
ASK THEM
Pressed for the identification of the official he
was referring to, Corpus said the following
would be in a position to reveal who the
person was: CB Governor Miguel Cuaderno,
who was assistant general manager of the
PNB then; CB legal counsel Natalio Balboa,
who was in the PNB legal department; CB
chief accountant Jose Carmona, who was
also in the PNB accounting department, and
others like Primitivo Lovina, president of the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines;
PNB President Arsenio Jison, Manuel
Marquez, president of the Commercial Bank
and Trust Company, and Alfonso Calalang,
President of the Bankers Association of the
Philippines.
In disclaiming liability, appellant points out that in the
aforequoted news item it does not appear that he was
speaking of appellee.
In order to maintain a libel suit it is essential that the
victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772,
November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that
he be named (91 A.L.R. 1161). It is enough if by
intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the
publication contains matters of description or
reference to facts and circumstances from which
others reading the article may know the plaintiff was
intended, or if he is pointed out by extraneous
circumstances so that persons knowing him could and
did understand that he was the person referred to.
While no name is mentioned in appellant's defamatory
statements, the following circumstances mentioned
therein make the object ascertainable: (1) the person
in question was a high ranking Central Bank official;
(2) he was formerly an official of the Philippine
National Bank, and at the time had something to do
with sugar centrals; (3) his identity is known by the
persons named therein; and (4) he was the one who
instigated the aforementioned charges against
appellant.
All these circumstances point to appellee. It is
established by the evidence that at least two other
persons who read the article readily realized that it
referred to appellee. Asked how he immediately
arrived at such a conclusion, Manuel Marquez
explained that "there is a paragraph in the article
which says that this CB official was dismissed from
the PNB before the war, Corpus said the man was
discovered milking a sugar central;" and that "the only
official who is at present in the Central Bank and who
was with the Philippine National Bank prior to the
establishment of the Central Bank, who, to my
knowledge, was in some way or another connected
with the Sugar Central was Governor Miguel
Cuaderno." Aside from appellee, two Central Bank
officials who were also with the Philippine National
Bank were Natalio Balboa, who was in the legal
department thereof, and Jose Carmona, who was in
the auditing department. Balboa testified that he knew
the article was about appellee for the following relating to him. Here, more than one third person
reasons: identified appellee as the object of the libel.

Because, as I said, the first paragraph of the Appellee has not appealed from the decision of the
article it refers to "Intriguer" and I know no lower court and therefore his prayer that the amount
other, Mr. Corpus is referring to "intriguer" to of damages awarded to him be increased must be
Mr. Cuaderno because I know that he was denied..
trying to prevail on Mr. Cuaderno to stop the
administrative investigation against Mr. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
Corpus, when he failed to prevail on Mr. against plaintiff-appellant.
Cuaderno because the other employees are
pressing the complaint and the complaint was
submitted to the Monetary Board, and he
made the conclusion that it was Mr. Cuaderno
as the intriguer, that is the first part of it. The
second part of it is that he was dismissed from
the Philippine National Bank by President
Quezon. President Quezon will not dismiss
any official of the Philippine National Bank
other than the President, Vice-President,
General Manager, and Assistant Manager. He
would not dismiss the other executive officials
or the legal counsel or others, it must be the
Philippine National Bank Board of Directors.
The third of it is that milking a sugar central,
there is no other person connected with the
sugar central but Mr. Cuaderno, with the
Bataan Sugar Central. I was connected as
Secretary of the Ma-ao Sugar Central and
there was no complaint and we only met once
a month, so, all those there and my opinion
was not based on one single item of the
article, it was all those three and the rest of
the article may be.

Appellant pointed particularly to Marquez and Balboa

as among the persons who could identify the Central
Bank official he was speaking of, and both declared
that the article referred to appellee. Furthermore, five
days after he gave the press interview, appellant
instituted the present action wherein he accused
appellee of having instigated the administrative
charges against him — a fact which obviously proves
that he was speaking of appellee when he made the
derogatory statement complained of.

In view of the evidence just considered, We cannot

apply here the rule in Kunkle vs. Cablenews-
American, 42 Phil. 757, relied upon by appellant, that
the publication of a matter of a defamatory nature in a
newspaper, without naming or accurately describing
the person to whom the reprobated acts are
attributed, will not give rise to a civil action for
damages at the instance of a person claiming to be
the injured party, unless it appears that the
description of the person referred to in the defamatory
publication was sufficiently clear that at least one third
person would have understood the description as