The Geopolitical Imagination and the Enframing of Development Theory

Author(s): David Slater

Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1993),
pp. 419-437
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the
Institute of British Geographers)
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 419

The geopolitical imagination and the enframing

of development theory
DAVID SLATER
AssociateProfessorof Social Geography,InteruniversityCentrefor LatinAmericanResearchand
Documentation(CEDLA),Keizersgracht 395-397, 1016EKAmsterdam,The Netherlands

RevisedMS received9 June 1993

ABSTRACT
It is argued that all the major conceptualizationsof developmentin the post-war period contain and express a
geopoliticalimaginationwhich has had a conditioningeffect on the enframingof the meaningsand relationsof
development.The Occidentaldeploymentof modernizationtheory for the developing countriesreflecteda will to
geopoliticalpower.It provideda discursivelegitimationfor a whole seriesof practicalinterventionsand penetrations
that sought to subordinateand assimilatethe ThirdWorld Other. In a connectedbut far from identicalmanner,
neo-liberalreadingsof developmentin the 1980s have accompaniedandbeen inspiredby rapidlychanginggeopolitical
conditions.Similarly,it is arguedthat on the other side of the North-Southdivide the radicaldependencia
perspective
of the 1960s and early 1970s cannotbe separatedfroma seriesof geopoliticalevents such as the CubanRevolution,
nor fromthe perceivedneed on the partof criticalLatinAmericanintellectualsto confrontandchallengethe relevance
of modernizationtheoryfor the periphery.Finally,it is suggestedthatin any attemptto rethinkdevelopmentfor global
times the natureof our geopoliticalimaginationmust be a key element,just as the theorizationof the geo-politicalis
equallyrelevantfor developmenttheoristsand politicalgeographers.

KEYWORDS:Universalism,Ethnocentrism,
Occidentalgaze, Dependencia,
Democracy,State

GEOPOLITICS AND NORTH-SOUTH 'geopolitics' or 'imperialism' to mark a central

RELATIONS
In the wake of the disintegration of the Second
World and the sudden evaporation of the erstwhile
'Soviet threat', a new spectre is haunting the West.
Visions of unruly, unpredictable and destabilizing
regimes and religions of a non-Western world
increasingly appear to occupy and perturb the
Occidental gaze. During the same moment, ex-
ponents of a more criticalpersuasion are placing on
to the agenda the moral question of North-South
relations. H6sle (1992, 229), for example, suggests
'the increasing gap between First and Third Worlds
raises some of the most difficult moral questions of
the modem world', and similarly,Arrighi (1991, 40)
writes, 'the increasing inequality of the global dis-
tribution of income is ... rapidly becoming the
central issue of our times'.
Along a potentially connected analytical track, a
variety of critical scholars invoke the name of
Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. N.S. 18: 419-437 (1993) ISSN: 0020-2754
feature of contemporary global power. Mohanty
(1992, 88), for instance, writes of the USA of the
1990s as a geopolitical power 'seemingly
unbounded in its effects' and of the logics of
imperialism and modernity sharing a common
notion of 'space as territory'. Or, in other previous
instances, a differentiationhas been drawn between
global capitalism (exploitation in economics) and
nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics).1
Going further, it can be argued that across a broad
spectrum of intellectual enquiry, through literary
theory, cultural studies, political and philosophical
investigation, social and anthropological research,
feminist theory, international relations and political
geography, one can discern a growing focus on
issues of space and power, in which questions of
inside and outside, global and local,
de-territorializationand re-territorialization,connec-
tions and separations punctuate the emerging
debates. Interspersed through these discussions, we
Printed in Great Britain
420 DAVID SLATER
can locate an expanding interest in a critical geo-
politics. In the domain of international relations the
work of, inter alia, Ashley (1987), Der Derian and
Shapiro (1989) and Walker (1993), has shown the
fertile possibilities of deploying post-structuralist
and post-moder thought in new attempts to
re-conceptualize the spatiality of political power. In
a not dissimilar vein, recent contributions from a
number of political geographers (Dalby, 1988 and
1991; O Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Corbridge,
1993) have begun to emphasize the openings
offered by a more discourse-orientated approach to
global aspects of the geopolitics of power.2
Despite the existence of differences in concep-
tual and thematic emphasis, the above-mentioned
literature is generally characterized by a double
tendency. First, there is a strong inclination to
equate the analysis of geopolitics with the inter-
national or global, including the question of
nation-state formations and relations. Secondly,
although certainly not in all cases, there seems to
be a predisposition to associate geopolitics with
the ways in which a whole community of state
bureaucrats,leaders and foreign-policy experts, the
'intellectuals of statecraft', spatially represent inter-
national politics. This twin tendency can lead us to
pose two interwoven questions: (a) in the first
place, is it sufficient to constitute the analytical
field of a geopolitics on the level of international
or global relations, and (b) to what extent can we
accept the notion of a centred subjectivityfor the
analysis of geopolitics? In other words, can
we indicate a variety of interconnected analytical
levels for geopolitics and also is it possible to
identify a heterogeneity of geopolitical imagin-
ations with contrasting capacities for deployment?
In attempting to answer both these questions, the
analytical context is formed by what I shall refer
to as the enframing of development theory across
the North-South divide.
The questions I am posing here could take us into
a very extended discussion. My objective, therefore,
is to attempt to clarify certain general issues of
geopolitical analysis before dealing in some detail
with continuities and discontinuities in the forma-
tion and deployment of development theory. By
effecting an encounter between geopolitics and the
constitution of development theory, the intention is
to shed some further light on the ways in which
development theory has been enframed, since in
many critical accounts of the emergence of ideas on
development, the geopolitics of global power has
not infrequently remained unexplored. Similarly, it
can be argued that in the growing literature on
geopolitical analysis, including the more critical
currents,the nature of North-South relations and, in
particular, the representation of societal develop-
ment in the South, have tended to receive less
attention than might have been expected given the
increasing importance attached to globalization. In
this sense, therefore, it is to be hoped that such a
critical encounter might help to stimulate new
questions in two fields of enquiry as well as
generating a dialogue which could be mutually
beneficial.
In its most basic form my first question on
geopolitics concerns the object of analysis. Tradi-
tionally, this might have been taken to be a series of
states conceived of as living organisms capable of
growth and development.3 Such an approach has
found recent application in the writings of the Latin
American military but, in these cases (primarily in
the Southern Cone) owing to the difficulties of
territorial acquisition, the geopolitical strategy has
been transformed from conquest of physical space
into that of political space, while still preserving the
organic concept of the state.4
On a broader canvas, the object of geopolitical
reflection, as brought into being by the practitioners
of statecraft in the United States, has been the
changing constellation of global political forces. The
terrain of analysis and of potential intervention has
neither been restricted to one part of the globe, nor
to an interpretationof the 'global' as constitutive of
a level that is essentially 'above' or 'over' (the
notion, for example, of superimposition). It has
rather been conceived in terms of an imbrication of
spheres, or an interlocking of 'global', 'national',
'regional' and 'local'.5
Although very differentfrom both the theoretical
and political starting points, there is a criticalFrench
current which, not entirely unlike the above-
mentioned practitioners of statecraft, has also
emphasized the importance of seeing geopolitics in
terms of both the external and the internal.Thus, in
a special issue of H rodoteon geopolitics in Africa,
Foucher (1987), Lacoste (1987) and associated
authors have put on to the agenda the changing
territorialityof political power insideAfrican states.6
Similarly inside Brazil, the relations between space
and power in the context of the colonization of the
Amazon region, for example, have also been con-
sidered as an inherent component of geopolitics
(Becker, 1982).7
 Thegeopolitical and theenframing
imagination
What I want to argue here, therefore, is that
when we pose the question of how we might best
characterize the terrain of a geopolitical analysis, it
will be necessary to keep in mind the differential
imbrication of transnational, national and regional/
local political spheres. Secondly and crucially, since
the ways of seeing and interpreting the terrain or
object of analysis vary, often quite dramatically,
some clarificationof the approach to be adopted is
required. Faced with a related requirement, Ashley
(1987) has developed what he refers to, after
Foucault, as a genealogical approach to an analysis
of geopolitical space. For my perspective on the
enframing of development theory, I shall derive
support from those contemporary currentsof critical
thought that are enabling us to re-structuremany of
the questions of social and political analysis as well
as to destabilize the apparent solidity of the official
discourses of development. It is my contention that
all the major conceptualizations of development
in the post-war period contain and express a geo-
political imagination which has had a condition-
ing effect on the enframing of the meanings and
relations of development.
Thus, I shall argue that the Occidental enframing
and deployment of modernization theory for the
so-called developing countries was a reflection of a
will to spatial power. It provided a discursive
legitimation for a whole series of practical interven-
tions and penetrations that sought to subordinate,
contain and assimilate the Third World as other. In
a connected but far from identical manner, neo-
liberal readings of development in the 1980s have
accompanied and been inspired by rapidly changing
geopolitical conditions. Similarly, in a previous
period and on the other side of the North-South
divide, the radical dependenciaperspective of the
1960s and early 1970s cannot be separated either
from the geopolitical impact of the Cuban Revol-
ution, or from the perceived need on the part of
critical Latin American intellectuals to confront and
challenge the relevance of modernization theory at
the periphery. Finally, in any treatment of the
possible new horizons for 'critical development
theory', one of the key dimensions will be formed
by a questioning geopolitical imagination. My own
perspective may be seen as forming one possible
pathway within what is broadly referred to as
critical geopolitics wherein post-structuralist and
post-marxist reflections can help us move forward. I
shall return to these questions at the end of the
article.8
theory
of development 421
WAVES OF WESTERN DEVELOPMENT
THEORY
Modernization,Euro-Americanism and the Three
Worlds of Development
It is important to remember that it was the Enlight-
enment that created the language in which concepts
of the 'modem' first came to be defined. In Enlight-
enment discourse, the West was the model, the
prototype and the gauge of social progress. It was
Western progress, civilization, rationality, thought
and development that were proclaimed. Equally,
however, these projections were intimately related
to the discursive couplets of 'civilized versus bar-
baric nations', of 'peoples with history and those
without', which were reflections of the need to
create an opposed non-West other so as to cement
a positive identity for the West itself. It is in this
sense then that 'the West' is much more an idea
than a fact of geography.9 Further,not only is the
rise of the West a global story, but also, as Hall
(1992, 291) puts it, the 'discourse of the West about
the Rest' has been and continues to be deeply
implicated in practice.
This was particularly evident in the Western
construction of the idea of modernization, during
the early post-War period. The development of the
modernization paradigm, based as it was on a
dichotomous view of 'modern' and 'traditional'
societies, or West and non-West, took place in a
world characterizedby a new and expanding threat
- Communism. In 1947, President Truman drew up
a picture of two antagonistic 'ways of life'."0On the
one hand there was freedom and liberty and on
the other terror and oppression. The West, led by
the United States, defined the former and the
Communist world the latter. Truman concluded
it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resistingattemptedsubjugation
by armedminoritiesor by outsidepressures.(Ambrose,
1988, 78)
Two years later, a related policy statement helped
to define the place of the 'underdeveloped areas' in
the projection of US power. Truman's'FairDeal' for
the world embraced a bold new programme 'for
making the benefit of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas'. The poverty
of more than half the people of the world was
viewed as a 'handicapand a threatboth to them and
to more prosperousareas' (emphasis added). Truman
422 DAVIDSLATER
went on to propose that 'what we envisage is a
common program of development based on the
concepts of democratic fair dealing' (quoted in
Escobar, 1993). Subsequently, and in close affinity
with the Truman doctrine, a group of experts
convened by the United Nations designed a
programme for the economic development of
underdeveloped countries. This programme, whilst
affirming the Western vision of development, also
recognized that the developmental transition for the
non-West, the underdeveloped countries, would not
be an entirely smooth one. The authors wrote that
there is a sense in which rapideconomicprogressis
impossible without painful adjustments;[emphasis
added]... ancientphilosophieshave to be scrapped;
old social institutionshave to disintegrate;bonds of
caste,creedand racehave to burst;and largenumbers
of personswho cannotkeep up with progresshave to
have theirexpectationsof a comfortablelife frustrated.
(UnitedNations, 1951)11
This report, as Escobar (1993, 2) emphasizes, ad-
vocated a total restructuring of underdeveloped
societies and reflected an emerging will to convert
two-thirds of the world to the Western 'way of life'.
In an associated manner whereby, a decade or so
later, a connection was made between the Cold War
and development, an eminent North American
geographer suggested that the
way in whichthe underdeveloped nationsaretaughtto
develop,and assistedin developingtheirgeographical
space to supporttheirburgeoningpopulations
would be a crucial factor in the waging of the Cold
War and the preservation of the Western way of life
(Ackerman, 1962, 297) [emphasis added].
From these examples, it can be argued that the
knowledge which a discourse produces constitutes a
modality of power which is exercised over those
who are known as the other, the non-West. Further-
more, when that knowledge is deployed in practice,
those who are so known will be subject, or more
exactly subjected, to it. Moreover, the political will
that fuels such a knowledge has great difficulty in
accepting difference as autonomy; there is a pro-
found fear of 'the shadowy outside' which must be
made safe through penetration and assimilation;
Ashley (1987, 423) defines one vital vector of such
a will as 'the geopolitical domestication of global
political space'. By the same token, when, within a
structured ensemble of meanings, definitions about
the other are made, they are made to stick. And
always one of the crucial objectives of resistance
discourses is to deconstruct and displace those
subordinating definitions of the other.
Occidental inscriptions of 'development' were
further elaborated within the frame of moderniz-
ation theory which traversed an extensive field of
enquiry. As is well known, within this theoretical
configuration, the societies of the West were
characterized as being modern, advanced, the
centres of scientific and technical progress, as ef-
ficient, democratic, rational and free. In terms of the
Western polity, there was a stress on the posited
combination of:
(a) a high degree of structuraldifferentiation;
(b) a secularized political culture with a pragmatic
attitude towards 'ideological movements', and
(c) an autonomy of sub-systems within the system
as a whole, referringin particularto the notion of an
enabling pluralism of groups and associations.
Not surprisingly, it was further conveyed that
rational and analytical secularizationhad reached its
zenith in the political cultures of Britain and above
all the United States. In his cogent interrogation of
these and related expressions of modernization
theory in political science, Cruise O'Brien (1979,
53-4) presciently remarked that not only did the
idealized versions of modernity have an American
face, but that
this ideal type is in effect the end of history, the
terminalstationat which the passengersto moderniz-
ation can finallyget out and stretchtheirlegs.
During the 1950s and beyond, political modernity
was couched in terms of representative democracy.
And, since the realization of the democratic ideal
had reached its highest point in the United States,
the modernization process for the less advanced
nations was to be understood as one of 'transition'
in which backwardpolities would increasingly come
to resemble the American model. Hence, as one key
protagonist of political modernization, Gabriel
Almond, expressed it
in the new andmodernizingnationsof Asia,Africaand
Latin America,the processes of enlightenmentand
democratizationwill have theirinevitableway.12
Writing at a similar time, another North American
political scientist, Apter, celebrated modernization
as a special kind of hope which
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory
embodied ... all the past revolutions of history and all
the supreme human desires; indeed, the desire for
reachesaroundthe world.(Apter,1987,
modernization
54)
But the modernizing societies - countries such as
Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania and India - were
seen as almost all populist and 'predemocratic'.For
Apter (1987), 'such systems require both sympathy
and understanding', but, in addition,
allows us
to approachsuch societiesas predemocratic
to view certain institutionsof coercion as perhaps
necessary to the organizationand integrationof a
modernizingcommunity.
Already in this passage there is an early indication
of the rising concern for political order.
From the 1950s through to the mid-1960s there
was much emphasis in the work of political scien-
tists such as Almond and Apter on the combination
of industrialization, technological advancement
and the diffusion of Western democratic ideals,
practices and institutional arrangements. However,
by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the emphasis
had shifted to one of political order and stability.
This emerging focus was expressed in the work of
Huntington, Pool and Pye. Pool, for example, in
a well-known passage published in 1967, wrote
that
orderdependson somehow compellingnewly mobil-
ised strata to return to a measureof passivity and
defeatismfromwhich they have been arousedby the
process of modernisation.(quoted in Higgott, 1983,
19)13
Huntington, in his classic text on political order,
distanced himself from the earlierunilinearistvisions
of modernization and stressed the significance of
breakdowns and dislocations in the political tran-
sition to development. In the mid-1960s, he argued
that not only does social and economic moderniz-
ation generate political instability, but the degree of
instability is related to the speed of modernization.
He also pointed to the fact that within 'traditional
polities', it was the areas undergoing modernization
rather than those which remained traditional that
were the 'centres of violence and extremism'
(Huntington, 1968, 45). He concluded, after a
sharp appraisal of Leninism and revolution, that
political organization was crucial for stability and
liberty;
423
the vacuumof power and authoritywhich exists in
so many modernizingcountriesmay be filledtempor-
arilyby charismaticleadershipor by militaryforce,. . .
but it can be filled permanentlyonly by political
organization ...; in the modernizing world he controls
the futurewho organizesits politics.(Huntington,op.
cit., 461)
In Huntington's text, the portrayal of the Second
World exhibited a certain characteristicduality. The
Soviet Union was no longer seen as a 'mystery
wrapped up in an enigma' but rather as a world
endowed with a certain rationality, as expressed in
the scientific, technological and military achieve-
ments of Soviet development since the 1920s.
Nevertheless, its political system was subjected to
fierce criticism for its totalitarianism, its lack of
freedom, and its ideological/Communist founda-
tions. In this context it was generally argued that
the absence of political freedom and the continuance
of state repression would eventually lead to the
overall debilitation of the Soviet system. Moreover,
the posited expansionist drive of Soviet totalitarian-
ism was represented as a threat to the 'free world' in
general and to the vulnerable societies of the
non-Western world in particular.14
The change of emphasis from the transference of
democratic ideals and the values of the Western
Enlightenment to problems involved in maintaining
political order and stability was closely related to a
further clarification of geopolitical thinking in the
United States. From the early 1960s, particularlyin
the aftermath of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba in 1961, the National Security Council of
the United States came to approve a grand strategy
toward the peripheralsocieties of the South. Within
this strategy, confronting internal disorder and in-
surgency in the developing, modernizing world was
viewed as essential. Even more than under previous
administrations,it became the purpose of the US to
ensure that 'developing nations evolve in a way that
affords a congenial world environment'.15 Under
the new Kennedy administration, all the relevant
agencies, such as the State and Defense depart-
ments, the CIA and the Agency for International
Development met frequently to analyse what Kolko
(1988, 130) reminds us were officially defined as the
'problems of development and internal defense'. At
this time programmes of counter-insurgency were
initiated and Washington's military modernization
strategy for the Third World began to be put in
place. Already by 1962 a National Security Council
document stated
424 DAVID SLATER
it is US policy, when it is in the US interest,to make ruraldevelopment amounted to only $172.5 million,
the local militaryand police advocatesof democracy 181 per cent of its total lending, whereas by 1981
and agents for carrying forward the development it had risen to $3-8 billion, or 31 per cent of its
process. (Kolko, 1988, 133)16
Whilst it is true, as Cruise O'Brien (1979) showed in
his seminal article on the politics of modernization,
that there was an erosion of the democratic ideal
and a gradual shift towards a concentration on
problems of order and stability in the modernizing
world, it is equally important to bear in mind that
orthodox Western visions of democracy did not
wither away. Rather, in a context where the exigen-
cies of order and defence against the threat of
Communism acquired a higher profile, democracy
for the traditional polity was conceived of in much
more circumscribedforms.
Neo-Liberalismand developmentunderWesterneyes
Between the late 1960s and the onset of a new
wave of Western development theory in the 1980s,
between a phase characterizedby the waning of the
modernization paradigm and the resurgence of a
highly confident economic liberalism, there was an
unstable transition period. In the sphere of political
science, the 1970s saw a growing concern with
specific questions of public policy, and a greater
interest in the connections between politics and
economics (Higgott, 1983, 21-30). Defeat in
Vietnam, the continuing vitality of resistance move-
ments in the non-Western world and a growing
realization of the shortcomings of modernization
theory,17 nurtured a greater awareness of the need
for more empirically-based knowledge of Third
World societies (including their ruralperipheries),as
well as for more aid to counter the challenges posed
by poverty and backwardness.
In a landmarkspeech, delivered before the Board
of Governors of the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund at their annual meeting in
1973, former US Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara argued for a greater concentration of
World Bank resources on helping to alleviate the
problems of the developing world's rural poor.
Following the McNamara speech, a series of sector
policy papers on rural development, basic edu-
cation, basic health and low-cost housing were
produced by the World Bank's Development
Research Center. The reorientation towards anti-
poverty programmes was dramatically reflected in
changes in the Bank's lending activities for devel-
opment. In 1968 Bank lending for agriculture and
lending (Ayres, 1985, 5).8
However, as Escobar (1991, 664) argues
the new focus on 'the ruralpoor' was more the result
of increasingradicalismin the countrysideand of the
demiseof modernization theoriesthanof a realchange
in the thinkingof the WorldBank.
In the mid-1970s, whilst the World Bank began
to emphasize poverty-oriented and basic needs
approaches, the US Agency for InternationalDevel-
opment (AID) called for a more community-centred
approach designed to deal with the basic human
needs of the poor and especially 'the poorest of the
poor'. In addition, US AID came to insist on the
design of grassroots participatory approaches that
would encourage the active participation of the
poor themselves (Escobar, ibid.). But for such
programmes to be effective, empirically-based
knowledge and understanding of rural communities
were deemed essential and, as a consequence, a
growing number of social scientists, especially
anthropologists, came to find a role in organizations
such as the US AID.19
By the end of the 1970s, an increasing number of
Third World societies were burdened with growing
debt problems;for example, from 1970 to the end of
1980 their foreign debt had increased dramatically
from 67-7 billion US dollars to 438-7 billion (World
Bank, 1981a, 57). In 1980 the World Bank of-
ficially approved what became known as 'structural
adjustment lending', that is
lendingdesignedto supportmajorchangesin policies
and institutionsof developing countriesthat would
reducetheircurrent-accountdeficitsto more manage-
ableproportionsin the mediumtermwhilemaintaining
the maximumfeasible development effort. (World
Bank, 1981b, 69)
The argument might have sounded quite technical
but as it was developed and extended it became
clear that the implications were far-reaching.
On the institutional front, it was made clear that
structural adjustment lending by the Bank was
complementary to support for adjustment pro-
grammes provided by the International Monetary
Fund. This required, as was stated in the Bank's
1981 Annual Report, 'the development of pro-
cedures for ensuring closer collaboration between
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory 425
the staffs of the two institutions ...' (World Bank, tions of the state, such as the provision of social and
1981b, 70). For the World Bank, structural adjust- physical infrastructure,and the creation of 'space for
ment was closely connected to the stipulated need private initiative through a shift in the boundary
for policy and institutional changes within develop- between the public and private sectors' (ibid.).21
ing countries. In many cases such policy changes Looking back on the 1980s, the Bank took the
were designed to correct 'biases in incentive sys- view that 'adjustment policies help most poor
tems that deter exports and promote uneconomical people - at least in the medium term', although it
import substitution'; in other instances institutional was acknowledged that economic reform pro-
changes were related to grammes could cause 'temporary welfare declines
for some' (World Bank, op. cit., 69). In the related
reformsof the public-sectorinstitutionsresponsiblefor Development Report for 1992, a similarly up-beat,
agriculturaldevelopment... improvementin the ef- almost Panglossian view was offered for the future.
ficiency of state economic enterprises,or improve- Now
ments in support to nontraditionalexports. (World
Bank,1981b, ibid.) with near unanimityon the central importanceof
marketsandhumanresourceinvestmentsfor successful
In surveying progress along these lines, the Bank
development,the comingdecadesoffergreatprospects
somewhat laconically observed for progress. . . . within the next generation,wide-
spread poverty could be eliminated.(World Bank,
the difficultythatgovernmentsfindin gainingpolitical 1992b, 178)
acceptancefor the adoption and implementationof
structural-adjustment programshas been andcontinues As is known, the World Bank has not been deploy-
to be the single most importantobstacle to rapid
ing a strategy for development in isolation from
progress by the Bank with structural-adjustmentother International Organizations. Apart from the
assistance.(WorldBank,1981b, ibid.)
IMF, the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank (IDB),
which is charged with responsibility for Latin
At the beginning of the 1980s, the World Bank
America, has also been active in drawing up neo-
re-asserted the cardinal importance of economic
liberal policies for development. In its 1991 Report
growth. It was argued that there was already on Latin four 'strategic directions' are
sufficient evidence to indicate that 'economic America,
contributes to the alleviation of suggested for future change and reform. In the first
growth generally
poverty' and that, in a more general sense, 'human place, emphasis is given to the importance of
outward orientation and integration.
development depends on economic growth to pro- Reforms are needed to hemispheric
vide the resources for expanding productive open up Latin American
economies to greater international competition
employment and basic services' (World Bank, at the same time, proposals for greater market
1981a, 67 and 97). As the decade came to a close while,
integration within Latin America should be encour-
private sector development was becoming increas- as envisaged in the Enterprisefor the Americas
in
ingly significant20 shaping the Bank's strategies aged
for development. Initiative, launched by former US President George
In its Annual Report for 1992, the Bank noted Bush. NAFTA (the North American Free Trade
that two out of every three operations included Area) is accorded an overall welcome since all
are set to benefit.22
components that explicitly supported private sector parties from the standpoint of the Inter-
Secondly,
development, an increase of 40 per cent from four American Bank (IDB), Latin America
years earlier. In the promotion of private-sector Development
three crucial tasks were has to modernize through private sector develop-
development, distinguished: ment. This is
the creation of an explained in terms of the fact that the
public sector is seen as being involved in the
affirmativebusinessenvironment,restructuringof the 'process of closing down or privatizing most of its
public sector, and the developmentof the financial public enterprises'(IDB, 1991, 13). In addition, there
sector for entrepreneurialactivities. (World Bank, is a connection to the underlying belief in the
1992a, 61) general superiority of the private over the public,
which is seen as especially relevant for strategies of
Public-sector restructuring was seen as involving modernization and development. The priority given
both the improvement of efficiency in critical func- to private sector development goes together with
426 DAVID SLATER
the identification of a variety of required reforms - What is clearly reflected in the various positions
financial, labour and regulatory.23 Next, what is expressed in the above documents is the revival of
referred to as 'public sector reform' calls for a an economic liberalism that is couched in terms of
reduction in the size of government, cutbacks on market-orientated development strategies, a mini-
public expenditures and the development of a mal state, free trade, financialdiscipline, comparative
minimal technocratic state. The process of privatiz- advantages and prosperity through economic
ation and acceleration of the 'deregulation and growth. These are not new ideas.25 Classical liber-
debureaucratization of the economy' is seen as alism, for example, rested on a view of society in
'complementary to the dual strategy of greater which certain fundamental areas of life were
outward orientation and stronger emphasis on de-politicized, notably religion and economics.
private sector development' (IDB, 1991, 14). Religious toleration and a market economy made
Finally, a fourth strategy relates to what is belief and the pursuit of wealth 'private' matters.
referred to as 'human resource development'. Looking at market economics as a political project,
Because it is anticipated that the process of outward Przeworski (1986, 219) has argued of the early
orientation and modernization of the economy 'will 1980s that, for the first time for several decades, the
encounter critical obstacles on the human resource Right
side', it is argued that 'improvements in education
and health need to be a top priority during the has an historical project of its own: to free ac-
1990s' (IDB, 1991, 17). The problems associated cumulationfrom all the fetters imposed upon it by
with poverty are also touched on - although no democracy.
mention is made of the increase in poverty in Latin
America during the 1980s24 and the view is In this context, market economics became a self-
expressed that in the long term the solution to the legitimating process - a political project in itself, in
poverty problem which any effective political regulation over the
economy was rejected. It was deemed necessary to
lies in the improvementof professionalskills,which rethink and restructure the public sector but the
will allow an increasingnumberof people to partici-
private sector was to be protected from public
pate in the process of economicdevelopmentand to control and involvement.
sharein the fruitsof progress.(18)
As ostensible examples of the success of the
market-orientatedstrategy of development, the East
To complete this very brief but illustrative review of
Asian model is frequently cited; for instance, the
the official discourse on contemporary develop-
OECD Report for 1992 asserts that from 1983
ment, one may turn to the recent OECD (1992) onward the 'East Asian economies
enjoyed boom
report on development cooperation. In a section on years based on market-oriented,
outward-looking
privatization, which summarized a two-day review (OECD, 1992, 35). What is glossed over is
on the subject organized by the Development policies'
the historical fact that in the cases of Taiwan and
Assistance Committee (DAC) in the early part of
South Korea the state played an indispensable role
1992, many of the ideas referred to above are again in
to be found. Notions of deregulation, of the pro- developing an industrializationprocess. It was the
state that led the market rather than the other way
vision of an 'enabling environment' for the private
around. Even in the cases of Singapore and, more
sector and of 'macroeconomic stability' are inter-
especially, of Hong Kong (where the state, through
spersed through the text. A key concluding rec- its ownership of land and massive investment in
ommendation on the private sector/public sector intervened in the economy), it
balance was that progress has resulted from actions housing, directly
would be highly misleading to assume that it was
'that foster competitive markets, private initiative, sector development that
and investment in physical and human capital'. independent private
explained rapid economic change.26
Therefore, In contrast to the historical reality of a strong
in the dynamic processes of East Asian indus-
donors ... should limit investmentsin public enter- state
trialization, the official protagonists of today's
prisesandfocusinstitutionalsupporton areasthathelp
foster competition and the private sector and that development doctrine equate the idea of a strong
improvea government'sabilityto providebasicsocial Third World state with inefficiency, waste, corrup-
services.(OECD,1992, 20) tion and centralism. On the other hand, a minimal
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory
state - a lean, fit, streamlined centre of political
authority, effectively nurturing an 'enabling en-
vironment' for private enterprise, providing social
services, and training new generations of human
capital - is seen as the desirable junior partner to an
expanding private sector.
Permeating all discussions of social and economic
development, of the public sector/private sector
balance, of poverty and welfare, of science and
education, of trade balances and financial flows, of
recommendations for governmental policy, and so
on, there exists a deeply-rooted belief that all things
'economic' have been purified of the political.
Market mechanisms and rationally-operating indi-
viduals, dynamic entrepreneurs and efficient inter-
national investors, sound policies and effective
actions, help to constitute solid building blocks for
the official language of development. The overall
objective is to place an unruly set of contestable
orientations and approaches to development under
the control of a settled system of understandings
and priorities - a particularregime of truth.
The statements, conceptual priorities, lines of
classification and the meanings that guide are all
characterized by a politics of forgetting, which is
vital in the construction of a new truth. It is as if the
societies of the South have never experienced
previous waves of capitalist penetration and mod-
ernization, as if their economies have never been
open to the world market, as if the post-War
diffusion of modernization theory had never
occurred. It is as if, in the historical annals of real
development, progress is set to begin with struc-
tural adjustment. Moreover, an image has been
created that what went before was detrimental to
the 'body economic' of the developing countries.
The existence of a malaise, most clearly embodied in
the debt crisis, required a long-term strategy for
cure, including, where deemed appropriate, shock-
therapy, rehabilitation, infusions, donors, special
treatment for debt-distress, relief measures, support
against adjustment fatigue and, always, continual
monitoring.
The monitoring and supervision belong to a
sense of mission and a belief in the need for
tutelage. The World Bank reminds us, for instance,
that adjustment lending has been part of the 'land-
scape of the developing world for over a decade',
and a few countries 'have clearly graduated' (in this
case, Chile and Thailand), whilst others 'are on the
road to graduation' (World Bank, 1992a, 68). The
firm belief in the need to instruct and guide the
427
'developing other' is, of course, one more reflection
of a much broader ethos of Occidental supremacy.
Nor can we assume that the tutelage is applied only
in the economic sphere.
More recently there has been a notable shift or,
more accurately, an extension of the terrain on
which development strategy is to be pursued and
implemented. In its 1992 report on Development
Cooperation, the OECD notes that the subject of
participatory development and good governance is
receiving priority attention and that support is
needed for developing countries going through
their 'democratic transition' (OECD, 1992, 6).
Developing this argument further,the Report notes
that what is required is a general framework for
establishing key characteristicsof good governance
within which support for the strengthening of
judiciary systems, election monitoring, adminis-
trative decentralization and ethnic relations, and
protection of minorities, conflict resolution and
demobilization are all key features (OECD, 1992, 7).
Fundamentalto this new approach is the priority
given to building institutional and economic capac-
ities in the developing countries. In fact, it is
commented that 'the key to mastering development
and other global challenges' lies precisely in this
task of construction for the developing countries.
Equally, it is argued that policy makers in the West
are finding that
solutions to the domestic problemsfor which they
have responsibilityare increasinglyassociatedwith
the economic and institutionalfunctioningof other
societies;.. . this createsnew scope for mutualunder-
standingand synergy among policy makersin donor
goverments as they tackle developmentas part of
achievinga global agenda.[emphasisadded] (OECD,
1992, 49)
The OECD report echoes and emphasizes related
World Bank orientations. In the early part of 1992,
the Bank organized a workshop on participatory
development and has come to recognize, so we are
informed, the key role of intermediaryorganizations
in development. Thus in Africa, for example, there
is an increasing association with local NGOs in the
design and implementation of the Bank's assisted
projects; for instance, in 1991 forty-four were in
partnership with NGOs compared to only seven
each year in the period 1973-87 (Landell-Mills,
1992, 565). In his article on governance, cultural
change and empowerment in Africa, which follows
428 DAVIDSLATER
the World Bank lead, Landell-Mills avers that civil to graduate into mature development. Knowledge
society will be has to be diffused to and institutionalized within the
developing countries. For example, in its discussion
strengthened by the economic liberalizationand of education in Latin America, the IDB advises the
privatizationmeasuresthattypicallyforma key partof reader that most universities in this part of the
the on-going structuraladjustmentsbeing undertaken South have been concerned
in most countries.(567) 'largely with repro-
ducing knowledge as opposed to producing it'
(IDB, 1991, 17). In other words, they have not
Apparently, giving high priority to education, pub- been
lic management reform, privatization, the informal capable of generating their own knowledge
and, therefore, have had to transmit or reproduce
sector and lighter fiscal controls 'are consistent with
the goal of strengthening civil society' (565). knowledge coming in from outside.28
Within the field of aid and development, inter-
With the new orientation in official thinking on
national organizations endowed with financial
development, it is clear that the former concen- and donorresponsibilities and driven by
tration on essentially economic issues is being capabilities
adherence to a particularway of constituting knowl-
widened to establish what is in a very real sense an
edge, social practices, forms of subjectivity and
all-encompassing agenda. Whereas in the past, dur-
power relations, need, if they are to be seen as
ing the first wave of orthodox Western theory, one effective, to be able to instil and to internalize their
encountered important notions of 'political order',
norms, values and ways of thinking into the recipient
now we read of the growing significance of 'good
other. This is done through discursive persuasion
governance'. Yesterday, there was a 'Communist and external inducement. Of the former,
threat' helping to cement into place rights of dialogue
on the basis of an already constituted agenda is
enforcement and rituals of order, whereas today the
central. The OECD for example highlights
will to global power can rest more confidently on
the presumed superiority of the West's develop- the importanceof expandeddialoguewith the devel-
ment project - markets, good governance and oping countrieson the complex issues surrounding
rational, achieving individuals. This is the future political transition,improvedgovernanceand econ-
for the developing world if it is able to learn omic reforms... solid progress has been made ...
effectively.27 [and]encouragingly,the dialogue indicatesthat the
Just under twenty years ago, Castoriadis, in developingcountriesthemselves - especiallyin Africa
a critical essay on the orthodox vision of devel- and Latin America - are taking the lead in supporting
wrote to this if change. [emphasis added] (OECD, 1992, 9)
opment that, according orthodoxy,
the countries of the Third World were to 'be
Of the latter, varying forms of conditionality are
developed' they would have to undergo a 'total crucial. The
transformation';he went on, politics of financial aid and supervision
through the IMF and World Bank have been dis-
to
the West had to assertnot that it had discoveredthe cussed in detail by Payer (1991).29 The power
trick of producingmore cheaply and more quickly monitor, discipline and intervene in the economy of
more commodities,but that it had discoveredtheway the other generates profound effects, and the lan-
of life appropriateto all humansociety. (Castoriadis, guage of expert omniscience helps to camouflage
1991, 181) and also legitimate this disciplinary power.
I alluded above to the parallel between 'political
In the current debates on the politics of multi- order' and 'good governance'. Similarly it is pos-
culturalism,on questions of identity and difference, sible to discern key emphases on modernization and
and on the varied modalities of Western universal- democracy in both waves of Western development
ism and ethnocentrism, the connection with the theory. In this context then, there is a sense of
deployment of Occidental development doctrine is continuity. Equally, however (and leaving aside the
not always brought out. It has to be said here that, significant question of the varied content of these
as with modernization theory, the neo-liberal dis- terms as between the two waves of theory), there is
course of the contemporary era bears within it a at least one crucial difference.In terms of the public
supreme belief in the universal applicability and sector/private sector balance, neo-liberal ideas break
rationality of the Western development project. The with the previous sense of the need for some kind of
Third World other has to be instructed and helped public/private articulation in the economy and set
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory 429
down a quite new agenda which consistently and philosophers, such as the Mexican Zea (1970)
assertively privileges the private. This is not to argued that in 'our America' the evolution of
suggest that modernization theorists were advo- analytical thought had its own specificities and
cates of state enterprises and nationalization, but complexities and it belonged on no such subordi-
neither were they the brash champions of privatiza- nating continuum. The counter-position to the
tion and market economics. They were, however, Western development canon was that Latin
advocates of capitalist modernization and democ- America not only had the right to independence but
racy through processes of geopolitical diffusion and also the right of recognition.
adoption. At this juncture, the dependentistas
entered, Thirdly, within the modernization paradigm, rela-
left of stage. tions between the West and non-West, and between
the already modernized societies and the traditional
societies of the periphery, were contextualized as
THE SOUTH THEORIZES BACK
being essentially beneficial for the developing
In going back to certain elements of the dependency world. The criticalreply was that the reality of these
perspective I want to recover some notions which relations showed that the impact on the Third
are still relevant to our time. Whilst there is a World was fundamentally negative. Through sla-
politics of forgetting, there is also a politics of very, colonialism and imperialism, the relations
memory. between First and Third Worlds were characterized
Development specialists in the North frequently as being exploitative and oppressive and conducive
assume that in terms of the history of ideas, radical of poverty and underdevelopment. Of course, these
views on dependency and underdevelopment, ideas were not only expressed in Latin America.
though perhaps vividly inscribed,remain rooted in a Fanon, for example, underlined the crucial cultural
fading past. In Latin America, since the first critical dimensions of colonial domination in Africa, noting
incursions of dependenciathinking, a very varied and
rich literature has been developed on, inter alia, the povertyof the people,nationaloppressionand the
issues of state and democracy, poverty, welfare and inhibition of culture are one and the same thing.
the informal sector, social movements, women's (Fanon, 1967, 191)
struggles and power, environmental change, politi-
cal culture, and modernity and post-modernity. More recently, the Kenyan writer Nguigi (1985,
Whilst in this other America, the critical pathways 118) has appropriately observed that economic and
have been extended and diversified, dependency political control can never be effective without
thought has not been rejected but rather situated in mental control:
its time as a necessary and fruitful critique of both
modernization theory and the erstwhile strategies of to controla people'scultureis to controlits tools of
the Communist parties of Latin America. Together self-definitionin relationshipto others.
with all its limitations and shortcomings, it is
generally seen as an important part of the critical In the Latin America of approximately two decades
intellectual heritage of post-war Latin America.30 ago, theoretical analyses of marginalization and the
With a view to our previous consideration of the combination of external economic integration with
two waves of Western development theory, I want internal disintegration provided an alternative series
to summarize three of the original propositions of starting points for further conceptual and empiri-
emanating out of the dependency literature.31 cal enquiry (Nun, 1969; Quijano, 1974; Sunkel,
First, it was emphasized that within moderniza- 1972).32 Today, new studies of marginality and
tion theory the characterizationof the 'developing informalization are being developed, more in rela-
world' was little more than a caricature. Third tion to issues of democracy, social movements and
World societies were not given any history of their violence (Camacho, 1990; Tironi, 1990) and the
own; their history began only with their contact context is quite different.Nevertheless, in terms of a
with the West. Secondly, following a linear view of critical ethic and a counter narrative to the tradi-
development, the already modernized societies were tional canon of development thinking, there is a
presented as offering a horizon, a future for the clear connecting line.
traditional society which, by adopting Western Furthermore,the spirit of critical enquiry is still
innovations, could eventually modernize. Critical very much alive as Castells and Lasera (1989), for
430 DAVIDSLATER
example, show in their article on 'La nueva was a key body of alternative critical thought. The
dependencia'.In the context of an examination of West might believe that it had a 'Manifest Destiny'
technological change and socio-economic restruc- to transmit and implant its way of life across the
turing, they argue that the worsening social and globe, but the ethnocentric presumption inscribed in
economic situation in Latin America originates in its discourse of development was now challenged,
the combination of new and old forms of depen- interrupted and destabilized. However, as we have
dency; new in relation to the technological revol- seen, it was not long before the non-West came
ution as a moving force of the new system of under the impact of a second wave of development
production and old in terms of financialdependence truth.
and the imposition of policies of austerity by
foreign capital. A similar position is taken by Kay CRITICAL PATHWAYS FOR GLOBAL
(1989). From his discussion of Latin American TIMES
theories of development and underdevelopment
and, indeed, from even a cursory analysis of the Under the influence of a somewhat melancholic
present state of North-South relations, it can be sentiment, it has been suggested that in our new
ascertained that the reality of financial dependence times, critical development theory lies in ruins. For
has hardly declined. Moreover, with the new others, development itself is the antithesis of
deployment of political conditionalities and the democracy, a kind of 'elastic prison'. In times of
call for Western-style democracy, other forms of perplexity and disenchantment, of the dissolution
dependence are already being installed. of meta-narratives, of living what can seem like a
The objective of my argument here is not to continuous present - in all these moments of being,
draw a veil over the deficiencies of the dependency there is a sense in which the future is immanently
persuasion including the relative absence of a theor- precarious and fragile. Must every horizon exist
etical analysis of international relations; the often only as mirage; are we living a time of perpetual
over-generalized portrayal of the state-society deconstruction, or are there interstices and margins
nexus; the tendency toward class essentialism; and in which forms of reconstruction might emerge and
the presence, in some texts, of terminal abstractions grow? How do we think the social and the political
employed to capture fluid processes.33 Instead, I without revolution, beyond the traditional Marxist
want to suggest that in a geopolitical conjuncture paradigm with its old certitudes and informed truth
characterized by the Cuban Revolution, the estab- of capital and class?34How do we think develop-
lishment by the United States of an Alliance for ment critically, in a world of limits and uncertain
Progress, the persistence of foreign penetration survival?
(military, political, cultural),the increasing evidence In a world where the relations of power that
of financial, technological and cultural forms of undermine the conditions for a sustainable develop-
dependence, and the diffusion of a theory which ment are themselves sustained, what does
purported to legitimize and rationalize a new colon- 'sustainability'mean? Connolly (1988, 1), reflecting
ization of the imagination, an intellectual/political on the order of modernity, suggests that perhaps
movement emerged which argued, wrote and theor- 'modernity is the epoch in which the destruction of
ized back. This was the significance of dependencia. the world followed the collective attempt to master
The facts that associated modes of reflection it'. The prevalence of master discourses on devel-
emerged in other parts of the South during the same opment and the environment has been the focus of
years and that the ideas of the Latin American much feminist critique (Moghadam, 1992; Tickner,
writers spread to other parts of the Third World 1993) and it is certainly the case that moderniz-
expressed the depth of the challenge. In the encom- ation, neo-liberalism, dependency and Marxism
passing context of North-South relations, the have, overall, tended to move within the orbit of
dependency writers constructed and deployed a androcentrism.
geopolitical imagination which sought to prioritize There is, perhaps, in some of the new critical
the objectives of autonomy and difference and to literature a trend towards greater prudence, and
break the subordinating effects of metropolis- attention to what the other is thinking and saying.
satellite relations. To the Western mind inculcated The bearers of master discourses are no longer
in the Cartesian tradition, 'dependency' seemed assured of an attentive and accepting audience. But
little more than a vague discontent, but in fact it perhaps also there is a need for adventure, for what
 Thegeopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory
Nietzsche (1983) referred to as the plasticity of
human potential, the capacity to transform and
incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to
replace what has been lost, to recreate broken
moulds. The new social movements have expressed
this sense of plasticity, renewing amidst the ruins,
living beyond the ghosts of old paradigms.
In our new more global times where do we locate
our frame of meaning and analysis and how do we
develop new geopolitical imaginations? One pos-
sible entrance can be found in the contemporary
discussion of globalization. Let us take as an
example a recent article by Held (1991). Held
suggests that the meaning and place of democracy
have to be rethought in relation to a series of
overlapping local, regional and global structuresand
processes. Globalization has at least three main
consequences (p. 222);
(a) the way processes of economic, political, legal
and military interconnectedness are changing the
nature of the sovereign state from above;
(b) the manner in which 'local and regional
nationalisms' are eroding the nation-state from
below; and
(c) the way global interconnectedness creates
chains of interlocking political decisions and out-
comes among states and their citizens which in turn
impact on national political systems.
There is here an interesting geopolitical imagination
at work.
First,we have the idea of global connectivity, the
increasing need to link the differentlevels or spheres
of problems and issues; secondly we have the place
of the nation-state, as a two-way nodal point of
power, conflict and dissonance and, thirdly, placed
in a broader frame, we have the importance of social
movements and political culture. The terrain of our
geopolitical analysis, therefore, can be constituted
by the intermingling of global relations, nation-
states and local and regional movements and op-
positions. Our imagination can be focused on
questions of the nature of identities, difference and
justice at all levels but increasingly in a global frame.
Within the more specific territorial setting of par-
ticular peripheral societies, the analysis of democ-
racy and emancipation can be given its required
spatiality. The struggle for democracy has its local
and regional domains so that in the debate on the
possible meanings of democracy, territorialityenters
as a crucial component. Democracy has its horizon-
tality. Also, and within a global frame, the need to
431
extend the principles of democratization and
accountability to the major institutions of world
development, within which the voices of the South
must receive their legitimate representation in
decision-making processes, has to form part of a
critical geopolitical imagination. Such an imagin-
ation can help us subvert the traditional frames of
meaning and practice which have constituted
North-South relations for so long.
Within the approach sketched out above, impor-
tance is attached to broadening the terrain of
geopolitical analysis and of connecting that ampli-
fication to North-South relations. However, there
still remains a deeper theoretical question concern-
ing the status of the political in this kind of analysis.
In the first place, I would argue that there can be no
effective single-shot fixed function for the political.
It is not desirable to assume that the political can be
separated off as a 'level' apart, differentiatedfrom an
economic and an ideological level. Very often the
political has been circumscribedwithin the domain
of the state, against which a civil society must
organize its institutional and interactive mechanisms
of defence. Similarly,it is common to encounter the
assumption of a binary division between the realm
of the political (bounded within the state and
including political parties) and the domain of the
social (framedaround the family, religion, education,
the citizen, group relations, civic associations, move-
ments and so on). In dissolving this binary split,
as the post-Marxist would transcend the base-
superstructuredivision or a post-structuralistwould
subvert any idea of a pre-supposed separation
between institutions and discourse, we can suggest,
after Lefort (1988), that any discussion of the
political confronts us with a crucial ambiguity. This
ambiguity resides in the fact that it is possible to
talk both of the political and of politics.
Political sociologists and scientists acquire their
object of knowledge by delineating political facts
which they regard as particular and separate from
other specific facts such as the economic, the juridi-
cal, the aesthetic, the scientific or the purely social.
In this context, modern societies are characterized,
inter alia, by the delimitation of a domain of
institutions, relations and activities which appears to
be political, as distinct from other domains which
appear to be economic, juridical,religious and so on.
However, the problem here is that the very fact that
something we call politics should have been demar-
cated within social life at a given historical moment
has in itself a primal political meaning. Lefort (1988,
432 DAVID SLATER
217) defines this originary meaning as the political,
suggesting that this term refers to the principles that
generate different forms of society. Rather than
accepting the social as given, Lefort stresses the
necessity of investigating the principles of interal-
ization which account for both the specific modes of
differentiation and articulation between classes,
groups and social ranks, as well as the specific
modes of discrimination between economic, juridi-
cal, aesthetic and religious markerswhich condition
the experience of the social. In a slightly more
complex formulation,it is argued that the political is
revealed in a double movement whereby the mode
of institution of society appears and at the same
time is obscured. It appears in the ways in which the
process whereby
society is ordered and unified across its divisions
becomes visible, . . . it is obscured in the sense that the
locus of politics (the locus in which partiescompete
and in which a generalagency of power takes shape
andis reproduced) becomesdefinedas particular,
while
the principlewhichgeneratesthe overallconfiguration
is concealed.(Lefort,1988, 11)
Hence, revealing what is concealed - examining the
underlying generative principles that govern
the 'temporal and spatial configuration of society'
(218) - constitutes for Lefort a key aim of political
theory.
Before situating these ideas in a specifically
geo-political frame, I want to make one observation.
With reference to the thesis that the political is
rooted in the principles governing the development
of society, it needs to be emphasized that the
temporal and spatial dimensions of these principles
are quite crucial for any effective analysis. As
regards the temporal dimension, when the socially-
given is questioned and referred back to the initial
act that led to its constitution, the unstable sense of
the given can be reactivated. This de-sedimentation
of the social can be seen as a continuing process
which reveals what Laclau (1990, 213) calls the
political essence of the social. Expressed more
concretely we can argue that what is and what is
not political at any moment changes with the
emergence of new questions, posed by new modes
of subjectivity - for example, the personal is politi-
cal. Nevertheless, the political does not eliminate
the social conditions from which its question was
born; gender relations, religious belief, environmen-
tal degradation and regionalism may become politi-
cal at certain moments but they are not only
political. This suggests, therefore, that in the analy-
sis of the principles which govern the constitution
of society there may be a foundational meaning
which Lefort, for example, traces back to the French
Revolution and the idea of a historical break in the
political grounding of the social. Equally, however,
through the emergence of new modes of subjec-
tivity and new points of refusal and resistance,
the challenging of the content of specific social
forms can also reveal, through the process of
de-sedimentation, a more dynamic formulation of
the political.
If we now return to our context of the geopoliti-
cal imagination and development theory, the first
point that needs to be made concerns the impor-
tance of making a related distinction between geo-
politics and the geopolitical.Aspects of the former
were previously discussed and, after the above
consideration of the political, we are now in a
position to suggest what might be meant by the
geo-political. Although Lefort refers to the 'spatial
configuration of society', no furtherdevelopment of
this conceptual orientation is offered. There are two
points that can be made. First, the generative
principles that govern the constitution of a society
must have a territorialgrounding and the way the
principles themselves emerge, as during the French
Revolution, cannot be divorced from the territorial-
ity of the political forces that are in conflict.
Secondly, and more directly relevant to the context
of North-South relations, in the peripheralcountries
of the South, the international dimension has been
quite fundamental. For the societies of Latin
America, Africa and Asia the principles governing
the constitution of their mode of social being were
deeply moulded by external penetration. The
phenomenon of colonialism, for example, repre-
sented the imposition and installation of principles
of the political that violated the bond between
national sovereignty and the constitution of social
being. In this sense then the geopolitical for these
other societies has been grounded in the violation
of their right to bear their own principles of social
being. Furthermore,as the history of this century
shows, the end of colonialism has not signified the
demise of such violations.
This approach to the geopolitical is embedded in
the imbrication of the external and the internal, but
we can also think the geopolitical in relation to
changing modes of territorial subjectivity within
peripheral societies. The ways in which insurgent
ethnic-regional identities have been emerging,
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory
whereby the meanings invested in particularinternal
regions or territories have acquired a refusing,
challenging dimension to the encompassing author-
ity of the central state, define another form of the
geopolitical.35 Similarly, the struggles for the terri-
torialization of democracy and the installation of
regional governments express a challenge to the
socially and spatially given.
In both components of the geopolitical men-
tioned above, one relating more to the interlocking
of the external and the internal and the second to
the more specifically internal, we can posit a clear
connection to our previous thoughts on develop-
ment and power. Clearly, in both waves of Western
development theory there has been a belief in the
superiority of the Occidental model and a general
acceptance of the supposedly beneficial impact of
the West's will to geopolitical power over the
non-West. In contradistinction, dependency think-
ing called into question the geopolitical principles
governing the varying modalities of the West's
impact within the societies of Latin America. As far
as the more particularly internal component of the
geopolitical is concerned, the new forms of ethnic-
regional identity and the struggles for a territorializ-
ation of democracy provide an emerging frame for
rethinking development along the lines of popular
empowerment and a more enabling politics of social
justice.
Finally, it may be suggested that future theoriz-
ations of development need to give greater priority
to the challenge of geopolitics, whilst political
geographers might give greater attention to the
relevance of the North-South divide for today's
politics of spatial power. At the same time, and in
the way in which feminist writers have used the
term 'politics of location', new imaginations will
need to include more self-reflexivity for the writer
who imagines since, across the interface between
development studies and political geography, the
decolonization of the imagination is as critical as is
the need for critique.
NOTES
1. This differentiation is to be found in Spivak (1988,
279). Althoughpositing a relationshipbetween glo-
bal capitalismand dominationin geopolitics,in her
critiqueof Foucaultand Deleuze,Spivakemphasizes
the continuingvalidity and vitality of the Marxist
analysis of the international division of labour and
distances herself from what she argues to be their
underprivileging of global (economic) power.
433
2. Of coursegeopoliticalanalysishas a longerandmuch
more chequeredhistory,which it is not the purpose
of this article to pursue;for a recent overview of
many of the relevantthemes,see Taylor(ed.),1993.
3. In the work of Rodolf Kjellen,for example, the
organicmetaphorwas furtherextendedinto the claim
that states were conscious, rational entities with
interests, prejudices and an instinct for self-
preservation.Fora detailedconsiderationof Kjellen's
work,see Holdar(1992).
4. Foran overviewof some of the most centralfeatures
of this 'genre' of geopolitical strategy, see Child
(1979) and Pion-Berlin(1989).For a specifictext see
Augusto Pinochet's(1968) Geopoltica.
5. In the contextof what I referto as the interlockingof
spheres,therearea numberof contentiousissues.Der
Derian (1990), for instance,has argued that when
analysingsimulation,speedandsurveillance, chronol-
ogy can be elevatedover geography,and pace over
space in their political effects. Here, Der Derian
follows Virilio, noting that we can think of 'geo-
politics' being displaced by 'chronopolitics'(Der
Derian,297). Now whilst this might be possible in
certain kinds of discussions concerning war and
intelligence questions, it is much less relevant in
issues pertainingto Gramscian'wars of position'.
Herethe intricateintertwiningof territorialidentities
and contesting social forces requires an analysis
which prioritizes the politics of territoriality,an
analysis which is grounded in space as well as
situated in time. Furthermore,I would argue that
Virilio's(1986) treatmentof speed and politics is
primarilyconcernedwith nuclearstrategy and mili-
tary technology,in which a certainreadingof geo-
graphicallocalizationand its positedloss of strategic
value is unduly generalized.In the protracteddis-
cursive war for people's minds, knowledge of and
powerover particular spacesand territoriesremainsa
crucialvector of (inter)nationalpolitics.We do have
to remember,however, that Virilio'soriginalFrench
text was written in 1977.
6. In the English language literature, the recent contri-
butions of Sidaway (1991, 1992) on Mozambique
also draw the reader's attention to the significance of
the internal in geopolitical formulations.
7. However, in the Brazilian case, one can also find
interpretations of geopolitics that prioritize the exter-
nal dimension; see, for example, Martinez (1980) and
Vesentini (1987).
8. On other occasions I have gone into more detail on
the post-modern, development and the politics of
difference across the North-South divide; see, for
instance, Slater 1992a, 1992b and 1993.
9. It is worth noting here that in the case of military
intervention in the Southern Cone and, specifically in
relation to state terror in Argentina, defence of the
'West' as a mythical construction, was an important
434 DAVID SLATER
element of the junta's overall discourse. One Admiral
commented, 'the West today is a state of the soul, no
longer tied to geography', and another posited, 'the
West is for us a process of development more than a
geographical location' - see Graziano (1992, 123 and
271).
10. The continuance of what we might call the geo-
politics of 'ways of life' found expression in the
work of highly influential geographers. In the early
sixties, for example, in a discussion of the Cold
War, Ackerman (1962, 296) wrote, 'we are fighting
for the adherence of nations and social groups to a
way of life on which we believe the future of
mankind depends'. At the same time, Cuba and
North Vietnam were described by Ackerman as
'geographical losses', so that decisive positions in
the Cold War 'must be measured ultimately in the
coinage of geography'.
11. I am particularly grateful to Arturo Escobar for
communicating this reference - see Escobar (1993).
12. This is a 1970 citation taken from the influentialwork
of Gabriel Almond who was Chair (1954-63) of the
American SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics
- see Cruise O'Brien, 1979.
13. Similarly, one of Pool's colleagues, Lucien Pye, a
founder of counter-insurgency, and Almond's succes-
sor as Chair of the SSRC Committee on Comparative
Politics, wrote in 1966 of the importance of 'protect-
ing a traditional society politically and militarily from
the calculated attempts by well organized enemies of
freedom to use violence to gain totalitarian control of
vulnerable societies' - quoted in Cruise O'Brien
(1979, 62). Pye's statement clearly echoed the Tru-
man doctrine.
14. As one critic noted in the mid-1980s, certainly not
without justification, since the late 1940s the 'depic-
tion of the international scene as one of chronic threat
has colored the thinking of governments of the
US and its NATO allies ever since' (Horesh, 1985,
504).
15. This statement is taken from a National Security
Council paper, referred to by Kolko (1988, 130), in
his well-documented study of US strategy towards
the Third World in the post-war period.
16. It should also be remembered that the strategy being
developed was closely linked to the role played by
a number of key social science advisors. W. W.
Rostow, for example, who argued that Communism
was an 'international disease' of the transition to
modernization, was highly influential in the policy
circles of the time (Kolko, 1988, 130-3).
17. I shall return to the deficiencies of the modernization
approach in the section on dependenciaperspectives.
18. It ought not to be forgotten, however, that most of
the Bank'slending continued to be orientated toward
large-scale projects to promote economic growth
but now, for the first time, key resources were
devoted to programmes targeting the ruraland urban
poor.
19. For example, while in 1974 the number of anthro-
pologists working on a full-time basis for US AID
was one, the number had grown to 22 by mid-1977
and to at least 50 by mid-1980. In addition, the
number of anthropologists working for other govern-
mental development bodies also increased substan-
tially in this period (see Escobar, 1991, 665).
20. At the beginning of 1988, the World Bank set up the
Private Sector Development Review Group to stimu-
late initiatives for the further extension and strength-
ening of the private sector in developing countries.
As was noted in 1989, 'the World Bank Group has
long emphasized the advantages of market discipline
and private initiative in promoting efficient
development' (World Bank, 1989, v).
21. The following examples are given: in Argentina, a
$325 million Bank loan, approved in 1992, was to
support reforms which are to include a reduction of
about 20 per cent in federal employment and a
reversal of wage compressions from 3:1 to over
10:1. Other related operations were approved for
Madagascar, Mauritania and Pakistan; further, struc-
tural adjustment operations in Bolivia, Bulgaria,
Burundi,India, the Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Peru and Romania all had public-sector restructuring
components (see World Bank, 1992a, 62).
22. Mexico and the United States are seen to have
complementary economies and, through NAFTA, the
access of US firms to Mexico's low-cost production
conditions will be improved whilst Mexican com-
panies will benefit from an 'infusion of technology',
'the disparity in per capita income levels between
Mexico and its northern neighbours would narrow
rapidly, and the excess supply of labor in Mexico
would be absorbed locally' (see IDB, 1991, 11).
23. For instance, investment should be encouraged to
flow to those activities with the highest expected
economic return; workers should be encouraged to
move to occupations and sectors in which they are
most productive and hiring and firing procedures
should be reasonably flexible; private entrepreneur-
ship should be facilitated by eliminating bureaucratic
and legal impediments, and price controls and sub-
sidies should be phased out - all these recommen-
dations and others are to be found in IDB (1991, 14).
24. For example, as the data collected by ECLAC show,
from 1980 to 1989 the percentage of the Latin
American population living in poverty increased from
41 per cent to 44 per cent (see United Nations,
ECLAC, 1991, 66).
25. In a related article, I have briefly explored some
features of the history of these ideas (see Slater,
1993). For a recent and useful discussion of the
political sources of privatization in Latin America and
Western Europe, see Schami (1992).
 The geopoliticalimaginationand the enframingof developmenttheory 435
26. For a detailed analysis of the Taiwanese case see, and 1993). I am not advocating an anti-Marxist
for example, Amsden (1985) and for an excellent perspective, since there are still many relevant orien-
review of some recent analyses of East Asian tations within Marxism seen in its fullest scope and
industrialization see Henderson (1992). this is especially the case for the lineage going back
27. In a recent intervention in the debate on the political to Gramsci.
conditionalities of aid in Africa, Barya (1993) makes 35. For one recent account of such a phenomenon in
a number of relevant propositions noting the Colombia, see Findji's (1992) interesting essay.
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