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Skinner, B. F. (1935) - The Generic Nature of The Concepts of Stimulus and Response PDF
Skinner, B. F. (1935) - The Generic Nature of The Concepts of Stimulus and Response PDF
To cite this article: B. F. Skinner (1935) The Generic Nature of the Concepts of
Stimulus and Response, The Journal of General Psychology, 12:1, 40-65, DOI:
10.1080/00221309.1935.9920087
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T H E GENERIC NATURE OF T H E CONCEPTS OF
S T I M U L U S AND RESPONSE*
From the Biological Laboratories of Harward University
B. F. SKINNER^
I
In the description of behavior it is usually assumed that both be-
havior and environment may be broken into parts, which may be
referred to by name, and that these parts will retain their identity
from experiment to experiment. If this assumption were not in
some sense justified a science of behavior would be impossible; but
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I11
1. O n e fact that seems to be sufficiently well established is that
there are defining properties. Nothing we have considered of the
importance of non-defining properties modifies this in the least, nor
are we prejudging the present issue, since a property may be taken,
as we have seen, to define either one reflex or a class of reflexes. A
defining property appears on the side of the response in the first
step toward what is called the discovery of a reflex. Some aspect of
behavior is observed to occur repeatedly under general stimulation,
and we assign a name to it that specifies (perhaps not explicitly) a
defining property. O u r control over the response is almost exclu-
sively of this sort-specification. W e have the refusal of all re-
sponses not falling within the class we have set up. Since we are
completely free in this first choice, it is easy to select a wrong
defining property, but the following steps cannot then be taken
successfully. When a defining property has been decided upon, the
stimuli that elicit responses possessing it are discovered by explora-
tion. O n e stimulus may be enough to demonstrate the sort of
correlation sought for, but (either deliberately or through lack of
control) the properties are usually varied in later elicitations and
other members of the class thus added. Subsequently the defining
GENERIC NATURE OF S T I M U L U S A N D RESPONSE 49
entities.
Part of the difficulty of definition that we encounter in dealing
with a single defining property (point 1 above) may disappear in the
partially restricted preparation. Usually the first restrictions are de-
signed to protect the defining property by excluding extreme cases.
They clarify the definition and add weight to the expressed correla-
tion with a stimulustlass. In general, as we progressively restrict,
our description comes to include more and more of the two events
and is consequently so much the more successful. A t the same time
a greater and greater restriction of the stimulus-class is demanded,
so that the increase in the validity and completeness of the cor-
relation is paid for with added experimental effort.
3. O u r third fact is induction, which it is now possible for us to
demonstrate without raising the question of a unit. W e have seen
that it is possible to obtain various kinds of entities within a single
class through the restriction of non-defining properties and that many
of these may exist at the same time. They are experimentally real
and operable, and there can be shown between two given examples
some degree of mutual influence of the sort we have already ex-
amined. A change taking place in one of them is found to have
taken place also in the other. T h e only important rule of induction
that we need to note is that the extent of the mutual influence is a
function of the degree to which the entities possess their non-defining
properties in common. W e shall not review other information in
any detail. T h e literature is very large, especially if we include
(as we rightfully may) all work on discrimination. I t is an im-
portant field of analysis, although its relation to the problem of the
definition of a reflex has usually not been made clear.
52 B. F. SKINNER
V
T h e generic nature of stimulus and response is in no sense a
justification for the broader terms of the popular vocabulary. W e
may lay it down as a general rule that no property is a valid
defining property of a class until its experimental reality has been
demonstrated. This excludes a great many terms commonly brought
into the description of behavior. For example, suppose that it be
casually observed that a child hides when confronted with a dog.
Then it may be said, in an uncritical extension of the terminology
of the reflex, that the dog is a stimulus and hiding a response. It
is obvious at once that the word “hiding” does not refer to a unique
set of movements nor “dog” to a unique set of stimulating forces.
In order to make these terms validly descriptive of behavior it is
necessary to define the classes to which they refer. It must be shown
what properties of a stimulus give it a place in the class “dog” and
what property of a response makes it an instance of “hiding.” ( I t
will not be enough to dignify the popular vocabulary by appealing
to essential properties of “dogness” and “hidingness” and to suppose
them intuitively known.) T h e resulting classes will meanwhile have
been shown to be correlated experimentally, but it ought also to be
shown that secondary changes in the correlation are lawful. It is
not at all certain that the properties we should thus find to be sig-
nificant are those now supposedly referred to by the words “dog”
GENERIC NATURE OF STIMULUS AND RESPONSE 59
REFERENCES
For the definition of a reflex as a correlation of a rtimulur
and a response and the resulting interpretation of its laws, see:
1. SKINNER,B. F. The concept of the reflex in the description of be-
havior. J. G n . Psychol., 1931, I, 427458,
to which the present paper may be regarded a8 a sequel. For
the experimental demonstration of orderly changes in the
strength of the reflex “pressing a lever,” see:
2. - . Drive and reflex strength 11. J . Ccn. Psychol., 1932, 6, 38-48.
3. - On the rate of formation of a conditioned reflex. 1. Gm.
Psychdl., 1932, I , 274-286.
4. -. On the rate of extinction of a conditioned reflex. J. Gen. Ply-
ChoI., 1933, 8, 114-129.
-.
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zwischen allen Eigenschaften des Reizes und der Antwort. Einige Eigen-
achaften sind belanglos. Die wichtigen Eigenschaften werden daher zur
Definierung der Klassen genommen, und der Reflex wird als eine Kor-
relation von generischen Begriffen betrachtet. Die Alternative dieser An-
sicht ist, dass jede mogliche Korrelation eines bestimmten Reizes und einer
bestimmten Antwort eine Einheit fur sich ist. Ein Argument gegen diese
Alternative, das haufig zur Unterstiitzung der Ansicht der “Gleichwertig-
keit der Reize” sngeboten wird, ist unvollkommen. Ein besserer Beweis
der generischen Ansicht beruht auf den Nebengesetzen des Reflexes. Wenn
glatte Kurven in Nebenanderungen erhalten werden konnen, wahrend der
Reiz und die Antwort in ihrer Zusammensetzung beziiglich gegebener
Eigenschaften variieren, durfen diese Eigenschaften rechtmassig als nicht-
definierend angesehen werden. In den gegebenen Beispielen aber konnen
die nichtdefinierenden Eigenschaften auf verschiedene Weisen als nicht
ganz unwesentlich gezeigt werden. Dieser Mangel gibt der alternativen
Ansicht mehr Ansehen, aber das Mittel, um die Beweise fur die generische
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