RULE 79 #1
He is a resident of Davao City, and thus if b)
G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO
CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Regino
Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO
CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA
CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY
BASA, respondents.
Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for petitioner.
Wenceslao B. Rosales for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for
Mindanao, filed a petition entitled, “In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased ReginoiCanonoy, Petition
for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzales,
Petitioner” with the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City, praying that he be appointed as judicial administrator
of the estate of the deceased ReginoCanonoy.
Judge Echavez Jr. issued an order setting the hearing on
the petition and directing the hearing on the petition and
directing that said order be published and copies of the
same be sent by registered mail or personal delivery to
each of all known heirs of the deceased.
The heirs of the deceased opposed the issuance of letters
of administration filed by Gonzales based on the following
grounds:
1. Gonzales is a “complete stranger to the intestate
estate” of the deceased;
2. He is not even a creditor of the estate but a
mere employee of an alleged creditor (Shell
Philippines, Inc.) and so “he would not be able to
properly and effectively protect the interest of
the estate in case of conflicts”; and
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
3.
The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
appointed as administrator of the estate, the
bulk of which is located in Butuan City, “he
would not be able to perform his duties
efficiently”.
The heirs instead propose and pray that
BonifacioCanonoy, one of the deceased’s sons, be
appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and
that the corresponding letters of administration be issued
in his favour. The trial court, after due hearing, appointed
BonifacioCanonoy as administrator of the estate of the
deceased.
Petitioner Shell filed its claim against the estate of the
deceased. Upon joinder of the issues on the said claim, the
trial court set the pre-trial. The administrator filed a
Motion to Dismiss the claim alleging that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature
thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzales, is
not the “interested person” as contemplated by Rule 79,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Shell countered
the motion, contending that the interest of Mr. Gonzales
in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be
alleged in the petition.
Respondent Judge granted the motion and dismissed the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdictional facts that need to be
stated in a petition for letter of administration under Rule
79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court include the specific
assertion that the petitioner therein is an “interested
person”
Ruling:
No. Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration
– A petition for letters of administration must be files by
an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
a) The jurisdictional facts;
and the names and residences of the creditors,
of the decedent;
c) The probable value and character of the
property of the estate;
d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance
of letters of administration.
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the
testator, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in
such province. These facts are amply enumerated in the
petition filed by Mr. Gonzales.
Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of
administration is an interested person does not fall within
the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. A Motion to
Dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of
legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, the Court defined an “interested
party” as one who would be benefitted by the estate, such
as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not
merely indirect or contingent. As an exemption, an
objection to a petition for letters of administration on that
ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.
Private respondents’ failure to move for a dismissal
amounted to a waiver of the abovementioned ground.
Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides that:
“A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall
include all objections then available, and all objections not
so included shall be deemed waived.”
By proposing that BonifacioCanonoy be appointed as
administrator instead of Mr. Gonzales, private
respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of
the petition by the latter. There can be no dispute that the
trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case.
RULE 79 #2
CASE DIGESTS Page 1 of 8
G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC
BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY
SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and
ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila.
On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion
for writ of possession over five (5) — vehicles registered
under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be
conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's
father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The
motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private
respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in
order to preserve the assets of her late husband. On the
same day, the lower court issued an order setting for
hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy
sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the
expense of the private respondent.
On May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-
Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman”
which was granted by the lower court. Also in another
order, the lower court acted on the motion for assistance
which authorized Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose
B. Flora together with some military men and/or
policemen to assist private respondent in preserving the
subject estate.
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the
later order. The petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs
Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties.
The petitioner contends that such order is a patent nullity,
the respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the petition for
the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was
not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive
weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner
also stresses that the appointment of a special
administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for having
been made without giving petitioner and other parties an
opportunity to oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special
administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate
in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the said deceased person even before the probate court
causes notice to be served upon all interested parties?
RULING: NO
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate
estate by the private respondent since the petition had
alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the
deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de
Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof.
— When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the
known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an
interest in the estate, in the manner provided in
sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court
must cause notice through publication of the petition after
it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring
all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so
that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the
world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment
on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no
notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court has been given to persons believed to have an
interest in the estate of the deceased person; the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and
should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person
may be deprived of his right to property without due
process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void
and subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores,
supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be
given by the probate court before it acted on the motions
of the private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor,
and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the
estate of Manolito de Guzman.
The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
interest in the preservation of the estate as the private
respondent who happens to be the widow of deceased
Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as
mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the
records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the
appointment of an administrator was deferred at least
until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment
of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the
assets of an estate justify a court's immediately taking
some kind of temporary action even without the required
notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The need
CASE DIGESTS Page 2 of 8
for the proper notice even for the appointment of a
special administrator is apparent from the circumstances
of this case.
The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for
the preservation of the estate was limited to properties
not claimed by third parties. If certain properties are
already in the possession of the applicant for special
administratrix and are not claimed by other persons, we
see no need to hurry up and take special action to
preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took
advantage of the questioned order to seize by force,
properties found in the residence of the petitioner which
he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the
estate of the deceased person.
RULE 79 #3
GR. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962
ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL
DIZON, J.
Facts:
Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales.
Her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of First
Instance of said province a verified petition for the
issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the
estate of the deceased. Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving
spouse, and in representation of the minors Jesus,
Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of
interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor
thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V.
Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant —
and their legally adopted minor children named Jesus,
Concepcion, and Catherine. In opposing the motion to
dismiss, petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the
petition should be considered in determining its
sufficiency. After hearing on the motion, the Court issued
the order of dismissal: that the herein petitioner is
obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and
that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the
ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially
among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
the case.
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
Issue:
w/n petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of
deceased Maria V. Lindayag?
Held:
It is manifested from the facts that Petitioner is not an
heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material
and direct interest in her estate. According to Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person". An
interested party is defined in this connection as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it
is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well
as special proceedings, the interest required in order that
a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect. Petitioner's interest in the
estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed,
through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving
spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by
him and by three legally adopted children — thus
excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the
hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was
introduced in support thereof which, according to the
lower court, established that said deceased was survived
not only by her husband but by three legally adopted
children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all
surnamed Lindayag.
RULE 79 #4
San Luis Vs. San Luis
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s
dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no
children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December
17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article
26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of
administration over Felicisimo’s estate.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down
the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
CASE DIGESTS Page 3 of 8
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. –
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An “interested person” has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then
she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
CASE DIGEST 5: RULE 79 - OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITION AND CONTEST FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES
PHILLIPS, G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000, MENDOZA,
J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• DR. ARTURO DE SANTOS, Filipino and a resident of
Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch, Makati, alleging that he had
no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and
that COPIES OF SAID WILL were in the custody of the
named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips. A COPY OF THE WILL was annexed to the petition
for probate.
• RTC issued an order granting the petition and allowing
the will. The COURT found that the PETITIONER has
substantially established the material allegations
contained in his petition. Shortly after the probate of his
will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
• On April 3, 1996, PETITIONER OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II
filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only
child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he
was a creditor of the testator. PETITIONER thus prayed for
the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name.
• On the other hand, PRIVATE RESPONDENT PACITA DE
LOS REYES PHILLIPS, the designated executrix of the will,
filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with
Branch 61, but later moved to withdraw her motion, which
was granted. Afterwhich, private respondent refiled a
petition for the same purpose with the RTC.
• JUDGE SALVADOR ABAD SANTOs of Branch 65 issued an
order, appointing private respondent as special
administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate. PETITIONER
sought to intervene and to set aside the appointment of
private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated
that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest
of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the
existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that
the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before
Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private
respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's
estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the
special administrator of the estate; and that PETITIONER
should be given letters of administration for the estate of
Dr. De Santos.
• On November 4, 1996, JUDGE ABAD SANTOS granted
petitioner's motion for intervention. PRIVATE
RESPONDENT moved for a reconsideration but her motion
was denied by the trial court. The COURT OF APPEALS set
aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner
had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
• Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by
private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of
CASE DIGESTS Page 4 of 8
kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
material and direct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of
the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and
oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
filed by the respondent. NO
RULING:
• RULE 79, SECTION 1 provides: OPPOSITION TO ISSUANCE
OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. SIMULTANEOUS PETITION
FOR ADMINISTRATION. — ANY PERSON INTERESTED IN A
WILL may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of them, and the COURT, after
hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of
such grounds. A PETITION may, at the SAME TIME, be filed
for letters of administration with the will annexed.
• ***Under this provision, it has been held that an
"INTERESTED PERSON" is one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.
• ***Even if PETITIONER IS THE NEAREST NEXT OF KIN OF
DR. DE SANTOS, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that ONE WHO HAS NO COMPULSORY OR
FORCED HEIRS may dispose of his entire estate by will.
Thus, ART. 842 OF THE CIVIL CODE provides: One who has
NO COMPULSORY HEIRS may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed. One who HAS COMPULSORY HEIRS
may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of
said heirs.
• PETITIONER, AS NEPHEW OF THE TESTATOR, is not a
compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in
the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he
is a creditor of the deceased. Since the TESTATOR
INSTITUTED OR NAMED AN EXECUTOR IN HIS WILL, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: ***The CHOICE
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
OF HIS EXECUTOR is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence,
one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the
disposal of his estate. The CURTAILMENT OF THIS RIGHT
may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
(CITED IN THE BOOK OF FESTIN, PAGE 78)
• Only if the APPOINTED EXECUTOR is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the COURT
appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
• Hence, the PRIVATE RESPONDENT herein is not an heir
or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As
the ONLY AND NEAREST COLLATERAL RELATIVE OF THE
DECEDENT, he can inherit from the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the DECEDENT HAS LEFT A WILL which has
already been probated and disposes of all his properties
the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His INTEREST IN THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE is,
therefore, not direct or immediate.
CASE DIGEST 6: RULE 79 - OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITION AND CONTEST FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. ANASTACIO C. RUFON, As Presiding
Judge of Branch 52, of the Regional Trial Court, Sixth
Judicial Region, sitting at Bacolod City, and JOHNNY K. H.
UY, G.R. No. 167979, March 15, 2006, YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• JOSE K.C. UY (Deceased) died intestate on August 20,
1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his
five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-
Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and WILSON S. UY (PETITIONER).
• On February 18, 1997, SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 97-
241 was instituted and Lilia Hofileña was appointed as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
PETITIONER moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia
Hofileña as special administrator with prayer that letters
of administration be issued to him instead.
• JUDGE RAMON B. POSADAS revoked Lilia Hofileña’s
appointment as special administrator and denied her
petition to be appointed as regular administrator.
Meanwhile, LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were granted
to petitioner, who took his oath of office as administrator
on June 23, 1998.
• On February 17, 1999, JOHNNY K. H. UY (PRIVATE
RESPONDENT) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he
be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of
petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor
of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that
should be included in the estate.
• The TRIAL COURT initially denied private respondent’s
motion to intervene, but on March 16, 2000, it
reconsidered its earlier order and appointed private
respondent as co-administrator of the estate. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied. The TRIAL COURT
found that private respondent substantially complied with
the order directing him to bring into the estate properties
owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not
subject of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed
the alleged properties suspected to be concealed,
embezzled or conveyed away by the persons named
therein. Thus, it found no cogent reason to remove private
respondent as co-administrator. CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
• PETITIONER asserts that his appointment as a regular
administrator is already final, unassailable or res judicata;
that the INFERIOR COURT has no authority to re-open the
issue of the appointment of an administrator without
removing the incumbent administrator; that PRIVATE
RESPONDENT is not only alien to the estate, but has a
conflict of interest with it; that the trial court’s
appointment of private respondent as co-administrator
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction.
CASE DIGESTS Page 5 of 8
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co-
administrator to the estate of the deceased. NO
RULING:
• The MAIN FUNCTION OF A PROBATE COURT is to settle
and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either
summarily or through the process of administration. In the
case at bar, the TRIAL COURT granted letters of
administration to petitioner and thereafter to private
respondent as co-administrator.
• Under SECTION 6, RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, the
preference to whom letters of administration may be
granted are as follows: SEC. 6. WHEN AND TO WHOM
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION GRANTED. – If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, ADMINISTRATION SHALL BE
GRANTED: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is
no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
• ***In the instant case, the ORDER OF PREFERENCE was
not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing
petitioner, IT APPOINTED PRIVATE RESPONDENT, a
CREDITOR, as co-administrator since the estate was
sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time
attending to it alone. In fact, PETITIONER did not submit
any report regarding the estate under his administration.
• ***A CO-ADMINISTRATOR performs all the functions and
duties and exercises all the powers of a regular
administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. The PRACTICE OF APPOINTING CO-
ADMINISTRATORS in estate proceedings is not prohibited.
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, this Court reaffirmed that
jurisprudence allows the APPOINTMENT OF CO-
ADMINISTRATORS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, to
wit: Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence,
the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for
various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented
in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3)
where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate
and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when
a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires
to have another competent person associated with him in
the office.
• Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot
re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator
without removing the incumbent administrator is
erroneous. In PROBATE PROCEEDINGS, considerable
latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or
revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are
pending in the same court and timely applications or
motions for such modifications or revocations are made by
the interested parties. In the instant case, the ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED has not yet been settled and the case is still
within the jurisdiction of the court.
CASE DIGEST 7: RULE 79 - OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITION AND CONTEST FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
VICTORIA C. TAYAG vs. FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR,
G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008, TINGA, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• RESPONDENT FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
the estate of Ismael Tayag. RESPONDENT alleged that she
is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late
Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The DECEDENT was
married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two
allegedly did not have any children of their own.
• On 7 September 2000, ISMAEL TAYAG died intestate,
leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are in
the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which
the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the
settlement of the decedent’s estate. PETITIONER allegedly
promised to give respondent and her brothers
₱100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the
sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the
amount she promised.
• RESPONDENT further averred that on 20 November
2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5
September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag
declaring the properties to be the paraphernal properties
of petitioner. The LATTER allegedly intends to dispose of
these properties to the respondent’s and her brothers’
prejudice.
• PETITIONER opposed the petition, asserting that she
purchased the properties subject of the petition using her
own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got
married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973,
and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag,
who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true
that she is planning to sell the properties. PETITIONER
prayed for the dismissal of the suit because respondent
failed to state a cause of action.
• In a Motion, PETITIONER reiterated her sole ownership
of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of
title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is
necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged
and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father.
• The Court denied the petition, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. CA ruled, in essence, that the
ALLEGATION THAT RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD suffices for a cause of action, without need to state
that she had been recognized and acknowledged as such.
However, RESPONDENT still has to prove her allegation
and, correspondingly, petitioner has the right to refute the
allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.
CASE DIGESTS Page 6 of 8
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a
cause of action considering that respondent merely
alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent, without stating that she had been
acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. YES
RULING:
• ***RULE 79 OF THE RULES OF COURT provides that a
PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION must be filed by an interested person. In
Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the Court defined an INTERESTED
PARTY as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. This INTEREST, furthermore, must be
material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.
• ***Hence, where the RIGHT OF THE PERSON FILING A
PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION is dependent on a fact which has not
been established or worse, can no longer be established,
SUCH CONTINGENT INTEREST does not make her an
interested party. Here lies the complication in the case
which the appellate court had not discussed, although its
disposition of the case is correct.
• Essentially, the PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The RIGHT OF
RESPONDENT TO MAINTAIN SUCH A SUIT is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be
established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.
• RESPONDENT in this case had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had
been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her
deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her
petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses.
There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is
actually one to compel recognition which had already
been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether
indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain
the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary
acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration
• We find, therefore, that the ALLEGATION THAT
RESPONDENT IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE
DECEDENT suffices even without further stating that she
has been so recognized or acknowledged. A MOTION TO
DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION in the complaint hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged therein. Assuming the fact
alleged to be true, i.e., that RESPONDENT IS THE
DECEDENT’S ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, her interest in the
estate as such would definitely be material and direct. The
APPELLATE COURT was, therefore, correct in allowing the
proceedings to continue, ruling that, "RESPONDENT still
has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the PETITIONER
has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings."
CASE DIGEST 8: RULE 79 - OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. PETITION AND CONTEST FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth
Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, G.R. No. 178933,
September 16, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of
estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death,
her SURVIVING SPOUSE, RICARDO SILVERIO, SR., filed an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
• DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE, RICARDO
SILVERIO, JR. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On
November 22, 2004, EDMUNDO S. SILVERIO also filed a
comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the
appointment of a new administrator.
• The RTC issued an Order granting the petition and
removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the
estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new
administrator. On January 26, 2005, NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
• On February 4, 2005, RICARDO SILVERIO JR. filed an
Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to
Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without
Authority from this Honorable Court. RTC then issued an
Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005
and denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the
order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of
the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia
S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia,
Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order. Notably, the RTC also recalled its
previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio
and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
• RICARDO SILVERIO, JR. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC. In the same order, the RTC
also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate
estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate
taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon.
Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
• On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order
ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8,
2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on
Appeal, PRIVATE RESPONDENT filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December
12, 2005. This ORDER was received by private respondent
on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her
Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Omnibus Order dated May 31,
2005 is an interlocutory order. YES
RULING:
• The SUBJECT PROPERTY is part of an estate and subject
to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus,
CASE DIGESTS Page 7 of 8
relevant to note that in RULE 84, SEC. 2 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, the ADMINISTRATOR may only deliver properties
of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court.
Similarly, under RULE 90, SEC. 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
the PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE SHALL ONLY BE
DISTRIBUTED after the payment of the debts, funeral
charges, and other expenses against the estate, EXCEPT
when authorized by the Court.

• Verily, once an ACTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF AN

ESTATE IS FILED WITH THE COURT, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And
NOT EVEN THE ADMINISTRATOR may take possession of
any property that is part of the estate without the prior
authority of the Court.

• In the instant case, the PURPORTED AUTHORITY OF

NELIA SILVERIO-DEE, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate
court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the
specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. As such, the MAY 31, 2005 ORDER OF THE RTC
must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not
subject to an appeal.

• Thus, PRIVATE RESPONDENT employed the wrong mode

of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence,
for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case
should have been dismissed.
NOTE: The ruling of the case discussed only about Rule 84
and 90 of the Rules of Court; No discussion related to
Rule 79 (the case is listed under said rule)

Special Proceedings: Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testementary. Petition and Contest for Letters Administration CASE DIGESTS Page 8 of 8