20 Military Art and Science

MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

IMPROVING THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
PROCESS AS A PRE-REQUISITE TO
INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Lucian-Marius IVA NOV

Appli cation School for Defense Infantry, Bucharest

ABSTRACT
The stu dy o f th e most resounding inte lligenc e services’ fa ilure s
ove r the last century stresses that the ma in ca uses that have led to
fa ilure are the analysts’ inca pacity to in terpret correc tly the ava ilab le
data and in telligence , and their inability to fin d the n ecessary
arguments to pe rsua de the end-u ser/de cisio n-maker of the tren d of
so me eve nts and of the major imp lication s of such developmen ts. As
one can e asily notic e, bo th causes are rela ted to the inte lligenc e
ana lysis pro cess, wh ich is in d ica tive of the la tter’s impor tan ce in
carrying ou t intelligence servic e missions a nd, implicitly, of how
critic al it is to improv e th is activity.

Keywords: management, intelligence, analysis, improvem ent, efficiency

1. Remarks on Intel ligence Analysis
Related Acti viti es in the Current Context
The errors made in t he management
of i ntelligence-related act ivi ties, resulti ng i n
t heir fai lure to prevent t he terrorist st rikes
on Sept ember 11, 2001, and in t he
unj usti fi ed entry of Ameri can troops i n
Iraq, have cal led t he Washi ngton polit ical
decision-makers’ attention to t he necessit y
of reformi ng the US i ntelli gence agencies;
al so, t hey have t riggered vigorous acti on
wit hin the NATO st ates’ intelligence
com muni ty, aim ed at im provi ng the whol e
activity – of i ntel ligence anal ysis, i n
particular, as it has proved to be the mai n
cause of the failures recorded [1].
The st udy of the most resoundi ng
i ntel ligence services ’ failures over the last
century st resses t hat t he mai n causes that
have led t o failure have been the analysts’
incapacit y t o interpret correctly the
avai labl e data and i ntelligence, and t heir
inability to find the necessary argument s to
persuade the end-user/deci sion-maker of t he
trend of some events and of t he m ajor
im pli cati ons of such developm ents. As one
can easi ly notice, bot h caus es are relat ed to
the intelligence analysi s process, whi ch is
indi cative of the lat ter’s importance i n
carrying out i ntelli gence s ervices’ mis sions
and, i mplicitly, of how criti cal i t is to
im prove that activity.
The experi ence acquired over t he
recent decades and, above all, the fai lures
recorded i n the int elligence acti vity have
outlined the i dea t hat, despite the fact that
col lecting t he int elligence seem s to be the
most import ant and di fficul t stage in the

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 Military Art and Science
i ntel ligence-relat ed cycl e, in actual fact it is
t he correct interpret ati on of availabl e dat a
and i ntelli gence and formul ati ng opinions
for t he deci sion-makers, i.e. t he analysis is
t he one t hat m akes the di fference between
success and failure i n the intelligence
activity [2].
The September 11 events back i n
2001 and the flawed assess ments as to t he
Iraqi nucl ear potential have reconfirm ed
t hat intelligence servi ces failures did not
arise from t he int elligence col lect ing stage,
but from t he analysis of avail able data and
i ntel ligence.
Al though a good m any of t he
i ntel ligence experts hold t hat fail ures are
unavoi dable in t hat acti vit y, t he previousl y
des cribed two inst ances come t o
em phasize, by thei r ensuing consequences,
not only that flaws i n int elligence anal ysis-
relat ed acti vities impact upon t he whol e
i ntel ligence service, but als o that t he
i ntel ligence community has a huge
responsibility in defending t he country’s
securit y i nterests.
Des pite the si gnificant increase in
dat a and i ntelligence sources over the last
decade, wit h a subst anti al cont ribution of
t he technical ones to t he intelligence share
t hat shoul d have result ed in an i ncreas ed
reliability of intel li gence products, t he
analyti cal process has actually grown more
com plex than before.
An impressi ve amount of int elligence
coming from the mass-m edia has added up t o
t he new sources. On Jul y 1, 2009, the Internet
num bered som e 22.89 billion web-pages, thus
t urning t he open sources int o t he most
important source of data and int elligence.
Under this avalanche of i ntelligence
gat hered from m ass-media, it has become a
real chal lenge t o produce an amount of
i ntel ligence anal ysis l iabl e to provide t he
val ue-added intelli gence needed by
cus tomers wit h unrestri cted acces s to open
sources, and thus t o come to j ustify t he
expenditures i ncurred by the respecti ve
services’ acti vity.
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The analyst’s work has becom e
increasi ngly complicat ed, as it impl ies
processing and unders tanding impressive
am ounts of data and int elligence whi ch ar e
more often t han not i ncompl ete and
conflicting, t hus l eading to severe
weari ness of personnel and, against t his
background, keeping the m argin of
int elligence products error up.
At the same tim e, easy access t o the
Int ernet, to open sources, generally
speaking, enables certain government al or
non-government al actors to s et loose flawed
int elligence on the “ market” to serve certai n
purpos es. Thi s fact cal ls for t he analys ts’
bei ng capable of dis tinguishing bet ween
real and fl awed int elligence aim ed at
propagating cert ain i deas and/or t ri ggering
som e t argets’ respons es.
The pre-conditi on t o improve the
int elligence analys is activity i s to size up
the structures concerned in processi ng data
and intelli gence in keeping wi th the amount
of prim ary intelligence received and wit h
the intelligence products to provide.
In t he context of exponentially growing
am ount of avail able data and intelligence, on
the one hand, and pers onnel-rel ated
constraints derivi ng from financial
restrictions, on t he other hand, the analysts
“suffocate” from monitori ng current events
and proces sing rel evant dat a and intelligence,
since they have too little ti me left for medium
– and l ong-term anal yses, whi ch are t he m ain
products li able to grant val ue-added
intelligence and a basi s for pertinent st rat egic
deci sions t o the customers.
As a matter of fact, there is a vi cious
ci rcle created by the marked growth of t he
am ount of data and int elligence needed t o
undergo anal ysis per tim e unit, while more
often than not the num ber of specialized
personnel is scant; the l ack of suffi cient
time t o process available data and
int elligence ensues i n shallowness of
int elligence anal ysis and paves the way for
overlooking relevant aspect s, result ing in
faulty judgm ent.
 22
The lack of time or the necessi ty t o
work under the strain of t ime bri ngs about
conditi ons that are likel y to prompt flawed
j udgment and t he impossibility of usi ng
i ntelligence analysis techniques that requi re a
l onger time reserve. Against that background,
t he l oss of som e skills of the anal ysts
becomes apparent and the lack of accuracy of
i ntelligence products is rather high.
Further on, t here foll ow several
opi nions on the course of acti on that might
m ake for an improved i ntelligence analysis
process, wi th a posi ti ve im pact upon t he
effi ciency of m ili tary int elligence services’
i ntel ligence activity.
2. Training Mili tary Anal ysts
The analyst is one of the most
i mport ant and, at the same time, sensiti ve
com ponents in any int ell igence analysis
process.
Upgrading t he traini ng quality of t he
personnel hol ding positions i n structures
concerned i n working out intelligence
products stands for a ‘sine qua non’
condi ti on in increasi ng the efficiency of t he
whole milit ary i ntel li gence activi ty.
Increas ing the anal ysts’ competence i s a
di rect factor in improving the quali ty of t he
work he does, based above all on reducing
t he judgm ent errors ari sing all along dat a
and int elligence processing.
The natural cons equence of thi s idea
i s t he necessit y to train mil it ary analysts t o
become profes sional s.
There should be a sound
understandi ng of the fact t hat traini ng a
proficient analyst is not a probl em t o be
sol ved by s imply trans ferring a capabl e
m ilitary t o an int elligence analysis
departm ent, or by ‘a course of lect ures or
t wo”, but that it requi res a careful selection,
followed by hi s training on a soli d basis
provided by academic educat ion, and by hi s
ongoi ng upgrading all al ong his work i n
t his fi eld.
In fact, the best opti on would be that
t he anal ysts (especi all y thos e who occupy
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Military Art and Science
top management positions and are involved
in strategi c int elligence anal ysis) compl ete
his st udies with a master’s degree and l ater
a doct orat e in t he fi eld of intelli gence or
related to it, li able to support hi s work.
Consi dering the s pecifics of m ilitary
int elligence, it would be i deal for t he
personnel envisaged for int ell igence
anal ysis structures t o have a mi litary
traini ng and, when neces sary,
speciali zations in his civil li fe.
Anyway, when sel ecti ng future
anal ysts, whet her they are graduates o f
mili tary or civi lian educat ional ins tituti ons,
a m ini mal set of t heir personalit y features
must be considered, ot herwise t heir
education and traini ng, and ultim atel y t heir
evol ution in t he fi eld of int ell igence
anal ysis i s im possi ble. Therefore, am ong
the skills required of a future mi litary
anal yst are: analytical thinking, good
net working and communi cati on capabi li ty,
working in team or i ndividually.
The abil ity to learn foreign languages
is an asset.
As far as skills are concerned, the
following ones are necessary: the abilit y to
dis cern between important and unim portant,
sound PC operat ion knowl edge, to mas ter at
least one for eign l anguage, apart from the
Engli sh, whi ch is compul sory.
The characteristi cs of the candidat e t o
int elligence analysis act ivities should be the
following: limitl ess curiosi ty, high sel f-
motivation, craving for knowl edge, passion
for sol ving problems that require thi nking,
high concent ration capacit y and i ntellectual
exertion under time pressure, developed
distri buti ve attention.
Consi dering the analyst’s work
speci fi cs, candi dates to thi s line of work ar e
required t o possess a s olid general
education, wit h a very well developed
section of milit ary and s ocial sciences.
As soon as the candi date has been
accepted in the mil it ary intelli gence servi ce,
he em barks on a long process, stretching
from his degree st udies t hrough training
 Military Art and Science 23

courses ai med at fi lling management
positi ons, during which his t rai ning as an
i ntel ligence officer t akes place, to be
followed, lat er, by his s pecializing i n
i ntel ligence analysi s. Actually, educati on
and t rai ning of the personnel i nvolved i n
i ntel ligence anal ysis is aimed at changi ng
abi lities int o skills required by t heir li ne of
work, at im provi ng and enhanci ng the
domain-specific skills, at devel oping t heir
characterist ics, at consol idat ing, expanding
and specializing their knowledge.
The s kills an analyst should possess
are given in figure no. 1.

ANALIST
CO MPETENT

Permanent Mission in
Misiune permanent?
the Target S tate
în statul ?int?
SKILLS KNOW LEDGE : CS
CHARACTERISTI

Ɣ Communica tion Ɣ Target s tate • Ɣ Communicative

• Comunicare
Ɣ Rational thinking Ɣ Intelligence cu lture Ɣ Curiou s
• Curios
• Gândire
Ɣ Team rawor?ional?
k Ɣ Sta te’s policy Ɣ Self/motiv ated
• Aut omotivat
• Ɣ P C în echip? Ɣ Customer ’s Ɣ Deve loped sense of
•observation
Sim?deobserva ?ie
• Ɣ Critical thinking requ ri ements
• Ɣ Solid general Ɣ Analy tica l resources dezvolt at to
Ɣ Resistance
critic? •pro
•education general? Dornic
longed de
physica l and
Ɣ Eng lish + cou ntry ’s mental?
cunoa exer
teretion
language Ɣ Creative
• Rezi
• Limba stentlaefort
englez?
Ɣ Fluency +
in speech ?i psihi creader
Ɣ Passionate
fizic
and wr??rii+....
limba iting . • Creativ
• Exprimare u?oar? • Cititorpasi onat
( ?i scris)

CANDID ATES – ANALYS TS

Fig. 1 The Skill s Anal ysts Shoul d Possess

Apart from the elem ents given i n
Illus tration 1, it must be poi nted out that
es pecial ly as far as s tates of parti cular
i nterest are concerned, i .e. thos e who pose,
i n one way or anot her, a pot enti al threat t o
nat ional securit y, masteri ng t he l anguage of
t he sai d state is mandatory to analysts, as it
i s the sole tool to hel p them become real
connoi sseurs of t hat area. Otherwi se,
correct underst anding of event s, processes
and developments i n the target-state is by
al l means im paired by the way they ar e
perceived by the intelligence gat hering
st ructures of the m ilitary int ell igence
service, as well as by the nati onal m ass-
media or expert vi sion i n the count ry in

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 24
whose l anguage dat a and i ntelligence
underlying the anal ysis have been
com pil ed. That does not mean that anal ysts
shoul d not know as many foreign languages
as pos sibl e, t hat can hel p them shape a
“round” picture of the problem under
analysis.
Moreover, t o gain a deep-goi ng
knowledge of the real ities in a t arget -st ate it
i s vit al for the analyst to be granted t he
poss ibilit y of getti ng acquai nted wit h that
count ry ei ther by vis iting it repeatedl y, or
by carrying out s ome dipl omat ic missions.
Certai nly, the educati on and traini ng
process, as wel l as the concrete work done
by analyst s wit hin t he i ntelligence analysis
st ruct ures of mi litary intelli gence services
m akes it possible to rank them by t heir
abi li ty to compi le descript ive-explicati ve
i ntel ligence products m eant for t acti cal-
operati ve or interpret ati ve-predictive-level
cus tomers, to the benefi t of t he mi litary-
pol itical t op managem ent. The onl y
problem left is that all along t he int ense,
relent less work carri ed on withi n t he
i ntel ligence analysis structures wit h t he
m ilitary int elligence servi ces, personal
per formance of the analyst s should be taken
i nto account when distri buti ng t asks.
3. Impl ementing Modern Intelligence
Analysis Methods
The i ncreased awareness of t he fact
t hat fail ures i n int ell igence acti vities have
occurred due to cognitive errors makes it
i mperative to improve t he analysts’ way of
t hinking, in order t o ensure t he accuracy
required with int elligence products.
One st ep to be t aken in support of
improved intelligence analysis work is t o
impl ement modern methods of int ell igence
analysis and show cauti on i n using traditional
t echniques bas ed upon l ogical processing of
available data and int elligence.
The reference books m enti on that t he
i ntel ligence com munity anal ysts have over
200 i ntelligence analysis met hods available.
Nevertheless, the classi cal m ethod is still
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Military Art and Science
widespread: as many dat a and int elligence as
possible are gathered from sources deemed
trust worthy, then they are processed i n the
time availabl e and j udgments are i ssued on
the issue under considerat ion, with a view to
obtaini ng t he intelli gence product i n the m ost
concise form.
The current context characterized by
unparall eled s ecurity environm ent
com plexity, and t he huge amount of biased
inform ati on, addi ng up the objective limits of
human thought, im pose the crit ical need for
finding and operating with t echniques m ost
appropriate for the specifics of a mi litary
intelligence service, aimed at ensuri ng a
ri gorous and rational analysis process.
By bringing struct ural techniques, also
called alt ernatives, int o int elligence analysis,
implying an ext ended approach, a l arge range
of cogniti ve chall enges impai ring the analysts’
judgment quality can be at least limited, if not
avoi ded altogether.
Thus, t he anal yses become more
objecti ve, and there appears the possi bilit y to
confront argum ents wit h conj ecture, point ers
on the developm ent trends of a given
situation or process can be singled out.
In fact, structural t echniques are
ai med at reducing the intuiti ve charact er o f
anal yses by m onitoring the way anal ysts are
reasoning in order to reach certai n
concl usions.
Nat urall y, hence it should not ensue
that the use of s truct ural anal ysis m ethods is
a panacea agai nst judgment errors and
failures of t he int elligence services , as they
are m erel y techniques whereby an i ncreas ed
accuracy of j udgment is ens ured and, on
that basis, i ncreasingl y ri gorous int ell igence
products are provided to cust omers.
According to the s pecifics and purpose
to which they are being used in the i ntelligence
analysis process, they fall under t hree
cat egories, namel y: diagnost ics techniques,
competitive techniques, and imaginative
techniques [3].
Given the import ance of impl ementing
struct ural anal ysis techniques aim ed at
 Military Art and Science
i ncreas ed effici ency of i ntel ligence analysis, a
few of them are furt her bri efly descri bed:
Di agnosti cs Techniques:
Key Assumpti ons Check i s a
t echnique t hat impli es drawing up a l ist
i ncludi ng all t he hypotheses the anal ysts
hol ds true, and on whi ch basi s they are
subs tant iat ing their es timates. This
t echnique is mainly used at the beginni ng of
t he intelligence analysi s, and checking i s
resumed along the int elligence analysis
process, which ensues in a l esser poss ibilit y
t hat judgm ents be m ade based on fal se
as sumpt ions.
Quali ty of Information Check i s
ai med at est abli shing the degree of accuracy
and veraci ty of the intelligence the analyst
bui lds up his j udgment on. To this effect,
t he trustwort hines s of the sources t hat have
fed the intelli gence shoul d undergo
analysis. In the case of HUM INT sources,
accent is l aid on anal yzing i n what context
t he i ntel ligence was deli vered, t he
m otivations underl ying t he delivery of t he
said i ntelli gence, and as for t echnical
sources, checking i s done for possibl e
errors arisen during their proces sing [4].
The I ndicators of change t echnique
implies drawi ng up a list including the
observabl e events and their trends, thus
m aking it possibl e t o confirm some processes
under way, in keepi ng wi th the analyst’s
es timat e. That techni que is used to foll ow up
an event over tim e and is very useful , as it
can provide a tim ely highlight of
developments different from those foreseen.
Analys is of Competing Hypotheses
i s one of the m ost used techni ques, that has
proved hi ghly effi cient i n anal yzing a
si gnificant am ount of dat a and intelli gence.
It im pli es building up a mat rix of
hypot heses and confronting them wi th t he
availabl e information, thus m aking for a
col lective anal ysis. Thi s i s the reason why it
i s recomm ended for team work.
Concur rent Techniques :
The Devil’s Advocate i s an anal ysis
t echnique recomm ended for use t o check
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25
som e analys es concl usions concerni ng
is sues of parti cular im portance t o deci sion-
makers. In pract ice, t his technique i s m eant
for singl ing out weakness es in the
judgm ents yi eldi ng certai n estim ates of
anal yst teams.
The Team A – Team B Techni que
proves useful whenever at l east two
concurrent vi ews come forth. Given t he
high costs of thi s technique, i t i s necessary
to revi se t he availabl e int elligence, as well
as to draw up new docum ents, to highlight
the vari ance between t he t wo versi ons; t his
technique is us ed onl y in such cases, when
the deci sions at stake are of criti cal
im port ance.
H igh Impact – Low Pr obability is a
technique that can be employed to highlight
the m ajor impact that events vi ewed as
im probabl e can have upon the costumer. In
practice, this t echnique i s aimed at
preventing the cust omer’s being caught
unawares in case of l ess probable event s,
which, should they occur, however, the
im pact on the custom er’s i nterests would be
a maj or one.
Imagi native Techni ques:
Brai nstorming is a wi despread
technique ai med at boost ing thinking and
finding new i deas t o serve the purpose. It
can be em ployed as a creati vit y cat alyst in
al l other analysis techniques.
Brainstormi ng provi des the
condi tions necessary to foster new i deas,
unaffect ed by the analys ts’ organized way
of t hinking, thus ensuring a quasi-
com prehensi ve approach of the iss ue under
consi derat ion.
Outsi de-In Thinki ng is a t echnique
recommended for use at the inceptive stage
of some intel li gence products, in order t o
highlight the outer forces li able to im pact
upon t he development of a parti cular
situation. Thi s technique impli es drawi ng
up two list s covering the fact ors t hat can
have an i mpact on the t rend of the situation
under considerati on. The fi rst one lists the
factors im pacti ng on the sit uati on but those
 26
can be subj ect to a mi nimal action exert ed
on t hem by external forces (global izat ion,
gl obal econom y, Internet a.o.), while t he
second one includes t he factors t hat may be
subj ect t o t he im pact of various act ors.
Subsequently, the way those fact ors might
have an impact on the s aid si tuat ion are
analyzed and then, based on t he avai labl e
i ntel ligence, t he probabilit y and scale of
t heir action’s i mpact on the lat ter are
checked.
The Red Team is an analysis
t echnique aimed at findi ng out t he way a
forei gn leader or a decis ion-m aking group
m ight respond t o a certain sit uati on. This
t echnique requires t he anal ysts to “s tep i n
t he shoes” of t he respect ive leader or group,
m eaning by that their local environment
and personal it y. For a higher effi ciency of
t his techni que, anal ysts that had operated in
t he respect ive count ry are brought in –
peopl e t hat know the populat ion’s
l anguage, culture and mentalities and, if
poss ible, that bel ong t o the same ethnics.
Al ternative Futures Analysis i s an
analysis t echnique aimed at findi ng
sol uti ons for hi ghly com plex s ituations, as
t heir possibl e devel opments are very
uncertai n. In pract ice, this t echnique is
m eant for sit uati ons where avai labl e
i ntel ligence leaves no room to formul ati on
of argument-subst anti ated hypotheses and it
i s necessary to find out t heir possibl e
development s.
4. The Importance of Analyst-to-
Customer Relationship
St rengt hening the relationshi p
bet ween anal ysts and the end-users of
i ntel ligence product s is anot her st ep
conducive t o improved anal ysis.
The current conditi ons of t he securit y
situation, charact erized by an
unprecedent ed com plexit y have determi ned
an ongoi ng growth of the number of t he
end-users of t he int elligence product s
yi elded by mil itary i ntelli gence servi ces.
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Military Art and Science
Along this li ne, on the one hand, t he
int elligence offer has been forced int o
adapt ing to t he new clients, and, on the
other hand, the need for a bett er nuanced
dialogue between provider and cust omer
has appeared as a driving engine for s uch
adapt ing to their demands.
There are two m ain st ages in the
int elligence cycle, where the parti es –
Military Intelli gence and the Custom ers –
must col laborate cl osely: it is during the
formul ation of call s for intelli gence, and
after the di ssemination of int ell igence
products. In the first case, the provider m ust
em bark on a di alogue wi th the custom er, in
order t o come to an exact understandi ng of
the int elligence needs of the latt er, whil e in
the second case, a feed-back as accurate as
possi ble on t he intelligence product offer ed
is needed – whether it s receipt was t imely,
to what extent it has mat ched the
cust omer’s needs, whether it has proved
operational i n action – t hus m aking for an
increased qualit y of t he product s. Should
the cust omer express his dis satisfacti on
with the quality of an i ntelligence product,
the provider is to determine the causes of
the said dissatis faction as accuratel y as
possi ble and bas ed on his dial ogue wit h the
cust omer, and take urgent steps to remedy
them.
It i s true that in many cases,
especial ly in the relat ionshi ps with high
ranking cus tomers, it i s i mpossible to get a
timel y feed-back, but even i n such cases
act ion is to be t aken i n order to have a clear
picture of t he extent to whi ch int ell igence
products m eet the decisi on-makers’
dem ands.
It goes without sayi ng that the
provi der-to-customer rel ati onship may get
ent angled and im pair the communication
bet ween t he parti es, causing a negative
im pact upon the whole intelli gence cycle,
when t he mi litary int elligence est imates do
not match the custom er’ s.
Alt hough one might think t hat the
provi der’s missi on is over as soon as the
 Military Art and Science
i ntel ligence product has been disseminated,
i t i s m ost important that, whenever special
situations are li kely to occur, military
i ntel ligence represent ati ves shoul d invol ve
t hemselves directl y in presenting to t he
pol itical decis ion-m akers the parti cular
situations that are li kely to result i n
development s impacting on national
i nterests. The direct purpose of such acti on
i s to make the cus tomers understand t he
es sence of the problem s and t he necessit y
t hat some act ion be t aken.
Al ong with the ideas above, t he
dem arche aim ed at i mprovi ng t he
i ntel ligence analysis withi n military
i ntel ligence services i s als o support ed by
bui lding up a system devised t o check
i ntel ligence products for qual ity, bas ed
upon point ers objectively indicati ng t he
degree of certai nty of t he conclusions
formul ated.
At t he sam e time, t he ti mel y
i mplement ati on of the “ less ons learned”
whil e runni ng t heir own current acti vity, or
during the acti vities run by ot her services
bel onging t o the National or foreign
i ntel ligence comm unit y is likel y to make
for quickly adapti ng i ntelligence analysi s t o
t he dem ands of the new securit y
envi ronment, as well as to provi de
i ntel ligence product s for the pol itical and
m ilitary decision-makers, enabli ng them t o
subs tant iat e t heir decisions.
Last, but not least, given t he
particular im portance of i ntelligence
analysis all al ong the int elligence cycle,
apart from the previousl y mentioned effort s
action is needed t o change the current view
wit h the int ell igence comm unit y, accordi ng
t o whi ch int ell igence collecting structures
are most i mportant, comi ng as an
acknowl edgement of the decisive part of
i ntel ligence analysis in prevent ing strategi c
surpris es. Such an approach is likely t o
boost both the i ntel li gence st ruct ures’
activity by upgrading the presti ge of t he
analyst li ne of work, and the incom ing flow
REVISTA ACADEMIEI FORċELOR TERESTRE NR. 1 (61)/2011
27
of experi enced offi cers wis hing t o work i n
this fi eld.
To conclude, it i s worth emphas izi ng
that t his paper on – “ Improvi ng the
Int ell igence Analys is Process as a
Prerequisite t o Increasi ng the Efficiency of
Mi litary Intelli gence Ser vices ” is i ntended
as a m odest signal as to t he m ajor
im port ance of i mprovi ng the int ell igence
anal ysis process withi n the general efforts
ai med at reshaping milit ary int ell igence
services in order t o enabl e them to
success fully face the traditi onal threats, but
above al l – the t ransnational ones,
multi pli ed by gl obali zation. Improved
int elligence anal ysis and, consequent ly,
higher qual it y of intelli gence products
addressing t he political and mi litary
leadershi p stands , by all means for a
desi derat um of all mili tary int ell igence
services . The st eps t o be taken to this effect,
as present ed i n this present article is but a
sm all part of the action call ed for i n order
that officers operating i n int ell igence
anal ysis structures become competent,
efficient and moti vated in thei r highly
responsibl e work.
REFE RENCES
[1] Broadly speaking, int elligence
anal ysis i s the process whereby pri mary
(unprocessed) dat a and int ell igence
obtained from di fferent sources are bei ng
est im ated and turned int o int ell igence
products (Notes, i nformat ive document s,
bull eti ns a.o.) of a descript ive, expli cative,
int erpretat ive or predictive nat ure,
addressing t he political and mi litary
leadershi p.
[2] The int elligence act ivity i s a
cycl ic process made up of several recurrent
and strongly interlinked st ages, whereby
pri mary data and i ntelli gence are gaini ng
added value and a new t rans form ed
subst anti al int elligence product is obtained.
The main st ages of the i ntelligence cycle
are as foll ows: the demands and needs for
 28 Military Art and Science

i ntel ligence, planni ng and m anagem ent, BIBLI OGRAPHY

gat heri ng processi ng, anal ysis and
production, dissemination.
[3] US Government . A tradecraft
Primer: Struct ured Analytic Techniques for
Improving Intelligence Anal ysis, 2007.
[4] HUMINT (Hum an Intel ligence
st ands for int elligence obtained from hum an
sources. Human s ources are the most
effi cient in gat heri ng data and intelligence
t hat fai led to be obt ained by ot her means .
[1] Cl ark, Robert. M. Int elligence
Analys is. A Target -Centric Approach,
Washi ngton DC, CQ Press, 2007.
[2] US Government. A t radecraft
Primer: Structur ed Analytic Techniques for
Improvi ng Intelligence Analysis, 2007.
[3] Lisa Kri zan. Int elligence
Essent ial s f or Ever yone: Joint Mi litary
College Occasi onal Paper Number Six
Washi ngton DC, J oint Military Coll ege,
1999.

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REVISTA ACADEMIEI FORċELOR TERESTRE NR. 1 (61)/2011

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