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Arroyo V de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 12755, August 14, 1997
Arroyo V de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 12755, August 14, 1997
Arroyo V de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 12755, August 14, 1997
Information | Reference
Case Title:
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, Arroyo vs. De Venecia
vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE *
G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY
R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO
respondents.
B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
Citation: 277 SCRA 268
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
Less...
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
Docket Number: G.R. No. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
127255 respondents.
Counsel: Azcuna, Yorac,
Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene
A.V. Saguisag, Cesar A. Sevilla & Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;
Associates Legislative Rules of Procedure; The cases, both in the Philippines
and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
Ponente/Other Opinion:
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
ROMERO
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
Dispositive Portion:
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
WHEREFORE, the petition for provision or the rights of private individuals.·It is clear from
certiorari and prohibition is the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
DISMISSED. the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
Citation Ref: 199 SCRA 692 | procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements
177 SCRA 668 | 16 SCRA 379 | 241 for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do
SCRA 681 | 27 SCRA 131 | 34 Phil. not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
729 | 78 Phil. 1 | 109 Phil. 863 | 7 maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
SCRA 347 | 191 SCRA 452 | 235 Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
SCRA 630 | 56 SCRA 714 | 25 SCRA of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were
754 | 227 SCRA 703 | 42 SCRA 448 adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that „each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings‰ and that for
|
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this
contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,
Search Result the constitutional provision that „each House may determine the
rules of its proceed-ings‰ was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference
by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review. But the cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals.
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
277
278
279
MENDOZA, J.:
_______________________
1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66-68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of
November 21, 1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6,
par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
280
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put
to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate.
He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and
281
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shall state the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the
Secretary General before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn
any time before its approval.
4 Rule XVI, §97. Recognition of Member.·When two or more
members rise at the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member
who is to speak first.
5 Rule XX, §121. Definition.·Questions of privilege are those
283
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284
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7 Rollo, p. 228.
8 Id., p. 229.
285
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286
12
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was
stated thus: „The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.‰
13
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, it was held: „The provision
that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it
is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.‰
14
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated: „The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but
a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United
__________________
287
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288
289
_____________________
290
__________________
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971).
21 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA
692, 701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v.
Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).
291
292
order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying „Is there any objection?‰ and
nobody objects, then the Chair announces „The bill is approved
on second reading.‰ If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I
believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
__________________
27 Id., §16(4).
293
28
dent. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of
the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays
had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium
to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate29
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21,
1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
_____________________
28Id., §27(1).
29Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963);
294
____________________
295
___________________
(1953).
35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p.
16.
36 Ibid.
296
The truth is that many have been carried away with the
righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
40
government.
__________________
297
____________________________
(1891).
298
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yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26[2]); (2)
the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of onefifth of the
members present (Id., §16 [4]); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a
bill over the PresidentÊs veto (Id., §27 (1); and (4) the PresidentÊs
objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44
299
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____________________
300
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
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301
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formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or
that certain provisions of a state had been ÂsmuggledÊ in the printing of
the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule. No claim is here made that the
Âenrolled billÊ rule is absolute. In fact in one case we Âwent behindÊ an enrolled bill
and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the
Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee ÂsurreptitiouslyÊ inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of
the bill. To disregard the Âenrolled billÊ rule in such cases would be to disregard
the respect due the other two departments of our government.‰
3 Id., at p. 675: „Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
302
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303
___________________
304
PUNO, J.:
305
„x x x
„The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings.‰ It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
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1 144 US 1 (1891).
2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in
violation of House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber
but not voting would be „counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business.‰
306
„x x x
„3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator
voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time
within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the
President to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion
to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table
without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not
be returned by the Secretary to the President until the
expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider
the same, or
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3 286 US 6 (1932).
307
308
„x x x
„x x x the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of
at least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that Âat
least that number must have been actually and physically
present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen
members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing
some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was
raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority
did not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this
case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal
provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as
many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the
afternoon session . . . .‰
_________________
4 338 US 89 (1948).
309
„x x x
„Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary
legislative business is of course none of our concern, and by the
same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a
matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect
the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether they have been
followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is
competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish
its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the
charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in
fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the
facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which
defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years.
An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged
shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the
crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a
competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee
must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial courtÊs
charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were Âactually and physically
presentÊ a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by
a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a
quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This
not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of
the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent
is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the
instrument of criminal conviction.‰
„x x x
„Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the CommitteeÊs practice leads
witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a
copy of the CommitteeÊs rules, which must be distributed to
every witness under Rule XVII, the witnessÊ reasonable
expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports
to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon
those rules, simply because the witness was deceived by the
CommitteeÊs appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee
prepared the groundwork for prosecution in
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311
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6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
312
„x x x
„The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.‰
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political
question defense in national security cases. To a great
degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the
shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government „x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.‰ In Tolentino v.
7
Secretary of Finance, I posited the following postulates:
„x x x
„Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
____________________
313
Âx x x
Âx x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
314
II
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8 Supra.
9 BlackÊs Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
316
10
courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. In England,
the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale
that „an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the
highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon
earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the
same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that
it requires11 the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation.
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the
modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill
unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance
12
with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
___________________
[1897].
11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex
317
xxx
„The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited
in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
_________________
318
17
Wren „if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of
the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount
of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in
its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law.‰ The conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals
and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if
not fraud. These justifications for the enrolled bill theory
have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary
18
of Finance, and its companion cases, Mr. Justice Regalado
cited some of the leading American cases which discussed
the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the enrolled
bill theory, viz.:
„x x x
„Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that „(u)nder
the Âenrolled bill ruleÊ by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as
to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to
furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by
the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the
bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when
it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such
provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was
said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic
Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
___________________
ÂThis Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals
speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not
conclusive.Ê
320
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which
a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial
opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear
error and urgent reasons Âfor neither justice nor wisdom requires a court
to go from one doubtful rule to another,Ê and whether or not the evils of
the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can
possibly result from a change.Ê
321
322
„x x x
„Hence, Âurea formaldehydeÊ is clearly a finished product
which is patently distinct and different from ÂureaÊ and
Âformaldehyde,Ê as separate articles used in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin known as Âurea formaldehyde.Ê Petitioner
contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction ÂandÊ between the term ÂureaÊ and
Âformaldehyde,Ê and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt ÂureaÊ and ÂformaldehydeÊ separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
Âurea formaldehyde,Ê not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill·which uses the
______________________
323
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324
„x x x
„PetitionerÊs argument that the attestation of the presiding
offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a billÊs due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for
his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is
merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
„[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President.‰ In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in
the State Constitution, said that the same „makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has Âpassed both housesÊ will satisfy the
constitutional requirement.‰
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have been validly made, would only
mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect
the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs
the issue. It would limit the courtÊs inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon
the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been
duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
325
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326
ÂTo inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.Ê
327
„x x x
„Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled
copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its
due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its
approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a
statute had been ÂsmuggledÊ in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to
depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the Âenrolled billÊ rule is absolute.
In fact in one case we Âwent behindÊ an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of
a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact
that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so
____________________
25Supra.
26Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno
dissented.
328
329
III
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
330
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