Collapses in Tunnelling PDF

Master Thesis
Collapses in Tunnelling
Written by
Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Timo Seidenfuß
Register No. 870003
Lausanne 2006
Master Degree
Foundation Engineering and Tunnelling
Stuttgart, Germany
Timo Seidenfuß Collapses in Tunnelling Page 2
Administrated by
Fachhochschule Stuttgart – Hochschule für Technik

STUTTGART UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES,
And
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne - EPFL

SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY LAUSANNE,
And
Association Internationale des Travaux En Souterrain - AITES

INTERNATIONAL TUNNELLING ASSOCIATION - ITA
Persons in charge:
Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Fritz Grübl,

Professor for Tunnelling at the Stuttgart University of Applied Science, Director of PSP Consulting Engineers and
tacs GmbH, Munich, and ITA-AITES-Executive Council Member
Prof. Jian Zhao,

Professor for Tunnelling and Rock Mechanics at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL),
School of Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering (ENAC)
Prof. Andre P Assis,

Visiting Professor for Tunnelling at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Professor for
Tunnelling at the FT University of Brasilia / Brazil and Past President of ITA-AITES
Declaration of Confidentiality
The author of this declaration hereby confirms with name and signature, that information
which are acquired by during the making and evaluation of this thesis to the societies
Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, Chemin du Clossel 15 Case postale, CH-1020 Renens
Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel ILF – PSP - Tecton, WT2/LT26/TF3,
Bahnbegleitstrasse Chorherrn - Klein Staasdorf, A-3430 Chorherrn
will be handled confidentially.
18-07-2006
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Date
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Signature
Declaration according to §16 (5) StPRO 1995
I hereby declare,
that I have written this thesis without any help from others and without the use of docu-
ments and aids other than those stated above,
that I have mentioned all used sources and that I have cited them correctly according to
established academic citation rules,
that I shall not pass on any copies of this thesis to any third parties without indispensable
consent, with the exception of fellow students or persons who have provided me with es-
sential information for this thesis, to whom I may pass on copies of this thesis after the
procedure has been concluded
Erklärung gemäss § 16 (5) StPRO 1995
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Master Thesis selbständig verfasst habe. Außer
den genannten Hilfsmitteln und Unterlagen habe ich keine weiteren Hilfsmittel in Anspruch
genommen.
18-07-2006
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Date
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Signature
Preface and Acknowledgement
The research work presented in this thesis was carried out at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Lausanne (EPFL), also headquarters of the ITA, at the Stuttgart University of
Applied Science, and on the construction site of the Wienerwald Railway Tunnel.
Many people have in different ways contributed with information or assistance to this re-
search work. It is not possible to mention all of you, and therefore I herewith express my
gratitude for your support. I will, however, specially thank:
Professor Jian Zhao, Professor Andre P Assis and Professor Fritz Grübl, my supervisors. It
has been rewarding to work under your committed supervision, and I am grateful for your
support and for showing such a deep interest in the work. Your continuous concern, support
and suggestions have been very valuable for completion of this thesis.
Furthermore, I am profoundly grateful for contribution with invaluable advice, support and
information to:
The Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), School of Architecture, Civil
and Environmental Engineering (ENAC), in particular Federica Sandrone, Rosa Ana Me-
nendez and Stefano Nepa,
Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, in particular Filippo Gaj and Fabio Soares,
Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel, consisting of ILF Consulting Engineers Inns-
bruck, PSP Consulting Engineers Munich and TECTON Consult Vienna, in particular Rein-
hold Pavel, site manager of the project, and Andreas Bilak, consultant for geology and hy-
drology on the Wienerwald Railway project.
Finally I express my gratitude to the Knödler-Decker-Foundation of the Stuttgart University of

Applied Science for approval of a scholarship and for financial assistance.
Lausanne, July 2006
Timo Seidenfuß
Abstract
Unfortunately, tunnel constructions and tunnelling are often affected by hazards and inci-
dents, in particular by collapses. Hence this Master Thesis work was drawn up to review and
explain the main aspects related to tunnel collapses, to identify hazards and evaluate their
risks, and to make a compilation of the subject “collapses” showing categories and occur-
rences of collapses as well as causes and mechanisms in order to understand and learn
from them.
In this case, collapse is taken to mean a sudden, uncontrolled release of the ground resulting
in the loss of most or all of the cross-section of a tunnel or a substantial fall of material. Fur-
ther there are many different categories of collapses differing in location, extent, effects, con-
sequences, causes and mechanisms. In detail, there are daylight collapses, which affect not
only underground constructions, but also reach to the surface and may damage infrastruc-
ture and buildings, underground collapses such as face collapse, roof caving and side-wall
caving, and some other (specific) types like water inrush, rock burst and portal collapses.
On the basis of an extensive literature search supplemented by information from different

sources a survey on tunnel collapses during the last 70 years shows the record of incidents
and collapses throughout the world, reports on tunnel projects which were struck by col-
lapses, gives the literature reference, outlines the circumstances of the incident and gives the
consequences of failure, where known. It is thought to be the most comprehensive catalogue
of tunnel collapses so far published.
Afterwards there has been carried out a demonstration and analyse of different causes of
collapses, which are split up into seven principal types of causes:
Unpredicted ground conditions, which are not the same as unpredictable or unforeseeable
and which have given rise to the need to adopt special tunnelling practices or remedial
measures. For example, there are risky geological conditions like faults, joints, Karts for-
mations, sand lenses etc.
Mistakes in the course of planning and specification, which are related to poor design and
engineering decisions on construction and technological matters, disparity between the
calculated arrangements of the tunnel structures and nonobservance of the requirements
stipulated in the specifications, faulty ground classification system leading to inappropriate
support, inadequate specification of construction materials and of tolerances on profiles or
levels etc.
Calculation or numerical mistakes, which arise both during design and construction,
Mistakes at the construction stage, which are resumed to a poor quality of tunnelling, use
of defective materials and tools, violation of design variables, specification requirements,
Lining not constructed to specified thickness, insufficient shotcrete strength and thickness,
causing a decrease in the resistance of the permanent lining, belated placing of the
means of support, thus increasing the unsupported length of the tunnel and reducing the
bearing reserves etc.
Management and control mistakes
Interruptions and breaks
Mistakes in communication and organisation
Subsequent to this analyse of causes it can be identified and explained a number of general-
ised collapse mechanisms. But first of all, aspects concerning rock and soil mechanics as
well as stability of the tunnel face have to be taken into account. By way of summarizing
these mechanisms there are deformations and ground displacements, which are often the
preliminary stages of collapses, burst mechanisms, blow-out failure, chimney caving mecha-
nisms, rock fall in the area of the unsupported length, failure of lining before or after ring clo-
sure, and squeezing and swelling ground behaviour.
Main item of this Master Thesis work are two case studies about collapses illustrated by the
construction of Line M2 of the Lausanne metro and by construction of the Wienerwald Rail-
way Tunnel. A spectacular daylight collapse affected tunnelling of the Lausanne metro
whereas construction of the Wienerwald Tunnel was disturbed and obstructed by several
incidents such as water inrush, face collapse, roof caving and heading hurrying on ahead of
the driving.
With regard to the first case study, Line M2 of the Lausanne metro, it is obvious that the col-
lapse was triggered by a pocket in a glacial moraine filled with water. The geological accident
occurred at this point where measures did not predict any existence of a water-bearing stra-
tum in the moraine layer. Nevertheless, the cave-in did not give rise to exposed damages on
the surface. On account of the fact that the case is under investigation at this stage, there are
no official causes for the daylight collapse until now and the collapse could be due to one of
the causes or due to a combination of several causes, including for example unforeseeable
geological features, deficiency in planning and designing, as well as in proper construction
management, and others.
Concerning incidents during construction of the Wienerwald Tunnel several collapses took
place at the eastern section as well as at the western section. The geology of the eastern
section consists mostly of the Flysch zone which is a rhythmical alternating sequence of
sedimentary rocks and comprises both competent and incompetent layers of various rocks
resulting in rapid alternating conditions concerning both properties of material and strength of
rock. Because of decompaction due to fissure water and ground pressure a spectacular wa-
ter inrush released breaking down of the concrete shell and reinforcement as well as defor-
mation of the lattice girder, and led finally to collapse of the side wall.
The report on the collapses at the western section focuses on two collapses at the start of
driving and on two collapses during the course. On account of the geological situation the
collapses could be released by several mechanisms such as encountering of systems of torn
interfaces or quasi-turning in a standing position of the cutting wheel. Nevertheless, it can be
established that three different categories of collapses or rather failures occurred:
Face hurrying on ahead of the driving,
Instabilities of the roof and the face,
Cave-ins of roof and side walls without instability of the face.
Exposing of reasons as well as drawing of conclusions is conducted in the light of the Ger-
man so-called 5-M method. Among other things it can be said that every start-up process of
an excavation by driving is usually the most critical situation in the course of the whole driv-
ing concerning both geological aspects and human and mechanically aspects, and that the
rounded off construction of the start-up gallery is favourable to cave-in of the roof.
In order to summary and close this abstract collapses can be seldom attributed to one single
reason. Usually, the collapse resulted from a coincidence of several unfavourable circum-
stances. In several cases, it was found that the combination of unexpected geological influ-
ences and faulty execution caused the collapse.
Table of contents
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... 9
TABLE OF FIGURES...................................................................................... 12
TABLE OF TABLES ....................................................................................... 15
1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 16
1.1 Preliminary remarks ................................................................................................ 16
1.2 Background .............................................................................................................. 16
1.3 Objective and scope of this Thesis........................................................................ 19
1.4 Organization of the Thesis...................................................................................... 19
2 CATEGORIES OF COLLAPSES ............................................................. 20

2.1 Daylight collapse ..................................................................................................... 20
2.2 Underground collapse............................................................................................. 22

2.2.1 Roof collapse ...................................................................................................................................... 22
2.2.2 Stope .................................................................................................................................................. 23
2.2.3 Side-wall caving .................................................................................................................................. 23
2.2.4 Heading hurrying on ahead of the driving (“Vorauseilende Ortsbrust”) ............................................... 24
2.3 Rock burst ................................................................................................................ 24
2.4 Ingress of water / Inrush of water........................................................................... 26
2.5 Portal collapses ....................................................................................................... 27
3 SURVEY ON TUNNEL COLLAPSES DURING THE LAST 70 YEARS.. 28

3.1 Record of incidents and collapses in tunnelling .................................................. 28
3.2 Interpretations and conclusions on the survey .................................................... 78

3.2.1 Categories of collapses....................................................................................................................... 79
3.2.2 Causes of collapses............................................................................................................................ 80
3.2.3 Excavation methods affected by collapses ......................................................................................... 81
4 POTENTIAL CAUSES OF COLLAPSES................................................. 82

4.1 Unpredicted geological causes .............................................................................. 82
4.1.1 Rock alteration .................................................................................................................................... 82
4.1.2 High rock stress .................................................................................................................................. 82
4.1.3 Faults .................................................................................................................................................. 83
4.1.4 Joints .................................................................................................................................................. 86
4.1.5 Folded rock masses............................................................................................................................ 87
4.1.6 Running ground .................................................................................................................................. 89
4.1.7 Groundwater aspects.......................................................................................................................... 89
4.1.8 Lenses of water .................................................................................................................................. 90
4.1.9 Lenses of sand ................................................................................................................................... 91
4.1.10 Karst formations ............................................................................................................................. 91
4.1.11 Squeezing ground conditions ......................................................................................................... 92
4.1.12 Swelling ground conditions ............................................................................................................ 92
4.1.13 Shrinking ground conditions ........................................................................................................... 93
4.1.14 Sloping ground surface conditions ................................................................................................. 93
4.1.15 Rock temperatures......................................................................................................................... 93
4.2 Mistakes in the course of planning and specification.......................................... 94
4.3 Calculation or numerical mistakes......................................................................... 97

4.3.1 Rock fracture ...................................................................................................................................... 97
4.3.2 Size effects ......................................................................................................................................... 98
4.3.3 Zone of influence of an excavation ..................................................................................................... 98
4.4 Mistakes during construction of a tunnel.............................................................. 99
4.5 Management and control mistakes ...................................................................... 100
4.6 Interruptions and breaks....................................................................................... 101
4.7 Mistakes in communication and organisation .................................................... 101
5 FAILURE MECHANISMS ....................................................................... 102

5.1 Aspects concerning rock and soil mechanics.................................................... 102
5.1.1 Failure criteria ................................................................................................................................... 102
5.1.2 Failure due to low tensile strength .................................................................................................... 104
5.1.3 Rock cavity roof collapse .................................................................................................................. 104
5.1.4 Microcollapses .................................................................................................................................. 104
5.2 Deformations and ground displacements – preliminary stages of collapses . 105
5.3 Burst mechanisms................................................................................................. 107
5.4 Blow-out failure...................................................................................................... 108
5.5 Chimney caving mechanisms............................................................................... 109
5.6 Stand-up time – Stability of the tunnel face ........................................................ 111
5.7 Rock fall in the area of the unsupported length ................................................. 116
5.8 Failure of lining before or after ring closure ....................................................... 117
5.9 Squeezing and swelling ground behaviour......................................................... 121

6 CASE STUDY NO.1: LAUSANNE METRO M2 ..................................... 122

6.1 System and project................................................................................................ 122
6.2 Excavation method ................................................................................................ 124
6.3 Exceptional challenges ......................................................................................... 126
6.4 Geology and hydrology......................................................................................... 129
6.5 Daylight collapse of Saint-Laurent....................................................................... 131

6.5.1 Description of the collapse and its consequences ............................................................................ 131
6.5.2 Reports on the incident ..................................................................................................................... 135
6.5.3 Summary and conclusions................................................................................................................ 138
7 CASE STUDY NO.2: WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL................... 139

7.1 System and project................................................................................................ 139
7.2 Eastern section ...................................................................................................... 140

7.2.1 Description of construction and methods .......................................................................................... 140
7.2.2 Description of geology ...................................................................................................................... 141
7.2.3 Difficulties due to water inrushes ...................................................................................................... 142
7.3 Western section ..................................................................................................... 145

7.3.1 Description of construction and methods .......................................................................................... 145
7.3.2 Description of geology ...................................................................................................................... 148
7.3.3 Report on disruptions of driving due to collapses ............................................................................. 149
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................................................... 163
REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 165
INTERNET REFERENCES ........................................................................... 172
APPENDIX .................................................................................................... 175

Table of figures
FIG. 1: A CITY BUS THAT HAD PLUNGED INTO A COLLAPSED SUBWAY TUNNEL IN MUNICH, GERMANY, SITS UPRIGHT IN A
WATER-FILLED HOLE IN 1994. [HTTP://WWW.MUNICHRE.COM/PUBLICATIONS; HTTP://WWW.ITA-AITES.ORG] ...... 20
FIG. 2: SUBSIDENCE CAUSED BY A COLLAPSED TUNNEL [HTTP://WWW.MUNICHRE.COM/PUBLICATIONS]....................... 21

FIG. 3: THE COLLAPSE OF THE RETAINING WALL LED TO A 30M DEEP HOLE OPENING UP ACROSS NICOLL HIGHWAY
ADJACENT TO THE TUNNEL WORKS [HTTP://WWW.TUNNELSONLINE.INFO/] ..................................................... 21
FIG. 4: TUNNELERS IN A HUGE VOID AT THE TUNNEL ROOF TRIGGERED BY CAVING IN OF COMPETENT ROCK
[REHM, 2005] ....................................................................................................................................... 22
FIG. 5: BROKEN DOWN ROCK ON THE INVERT OF A MECHANICALLY DRIVING [REHM, 2005]........................................ 22
FIG. 6: SIDE-WALL CAVING IN THE DIVERSION TUNNEL OF THE QUEIMADO POWER PLANT IN BRAZIL [ASSIS, 2002] ..... 23
FIG. 7: ROCK BURST DAMAGE IN THE LUCKY FRIDAY MINE. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT BOTH RIBS, AS WELL AS THE
OVERHEAD SAND FILL, WERE DAMAGED IN THIS EVENT [WHITE & WHYATT, 1998] ......................................... 25
FIG. 8: WATER INRUSH DURING CONSTRUCTION OF THE EASTERN SECTION OF THE WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL
[JOINT VENTURE ÖBA, 2006]................................................................................................................. 26
FIG. 9: COLLAPSE OF THE ROOF IN THE RANGE OF THE PORTAL [ASSIS].................................................................. 27
FIG. 10: NORMAL FAULT [WHITTAKER AND FRITH, 1990] ........................................................................................ 83
FIG. 11: REVERSE FAULT [WHITTAKER AND FRITH, 1990]....................................................................................... 83
FIG. 12: STRIKE [WHITTAKER AND FRITH, 1990].................................................................................................... 83
FIG. 13: DUCTILE SHEAR ZONE AT DEPTH PASSING UPWARDS THROUGH A BRITTLE-DUCTILE SHEAR ZONE INTO
A BRITTLE FAULT [RAMSAY, AND HUBER, 1987]......................................................................................... 84
FIG. 14: TYPICAL GEOMETRIC FEATURES OF HORST (H) AND GRABEN (G) STRUCTURES PRODUCED BY THE
ACTIVITY OF CONJUGATE NORMAL FAULT SYSTEMS [RAMSAY AND HUBER, 1987] .......................................... 84
FIG. 15: STRUCTURAL FEATURES ARISING FROM CHANGES IN THE HINGE LINE PLUNGES OF FOLDS
[RAMSAY AND HUBER, 1987] .................................................................................................................. 87
FIG. 16: DIFFERENT TYPES OF FOLDING: A) SINGLE COMPETENT LAYER, B) DISHARMONIC FOLDING, C) HARMONIC
FOLDING, D) POLYHARMONIC FOLDING (RAMSAY AND HUBER, 1987)........................................................... 88
FIG. 17: STRESSES IN THE ROCK SURROUNDING A CAVITY [SOWERS, 1996] ........................................................... 104
FIG. 18: AIR BALANCE IN TUNNEL [MEGAW AND BARTLETT, 1981] ......................................................................... 108
FIG. 19: WEAKNESS IN CROWN [HSE, 1999] ...................................................................................................... 110
FIG. 20: INSUFFICIENT COVER TO OVERLAYING PERMEABLE WATER BEARING STRATA [HSE, 1999] ........................... 110
FIG. 21: TUNNEL TAPPING AN ANCIENT RIVER BED [WHITTAKER AND FRITH, 1990] .................................................. 110
FIG. 22: INSUFFICIENT COVER TO SURFACE [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999] ............................................. 111
FIG. 23: DIFFERENT TYPES OF FAILURES: A) BENCH FAILURE, B) CROWN FAILURE, C) FULL FACE FAILURE,
D) LOCAL FACE FAILURE [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999]............................................................ 111
FIG. 24: FAILURE MECHANISM A) [LECA & DORMIEUX, 1990] ................................................................................ 113
FIG. 25: FAILURE MECHANISM B) [LECA & DORMIEUX, 1990] ................................................................................ 113
FIG. 26: FAILURE MECHANISM C) [LECA & DORMIEUX, 1990] ................................................................................ 113
FIG. 27: TYPICAL TBM PROBLEMS IN FAULTED ROCK WITH VERY SHORT STAND-UP TIME [BARTON, 2000] ................. 116
FIG. 28: BEARING FAILURE OF ARCH FOOTINGS [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999]........................................ 118
FIG. 29: FAILURE DUE TO HORIZONTAL MOVEMENT OF ARCH FOOTING [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999] ........ 118
FIG. 30: FAILURE OF SIDE GALLERY WALL [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999] ................................................ 119
FIG. 31: SHEAR FAILURE [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999] ....................................................................... 120
FIG. 32: DIFFERENT TYPES OF FAILURE MECHANISMS: A) COMPRESSION FAILURE; B) PUNCHING FAILURE;
C) AND D) COMBINED BENDING AND THRUST [HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, 1999]................................ 120
FIG. 33: HEAVING GROUND [WHITTAKER & FRITH, 1990] ..................................................................................... 121
FIG. 34: EXTRUSION INTO THE TUNNEL [WHITTAKER & FRITH, 1990] ..................................................................... 121
FIG. 35: HEAVING AND SWELLING GROUND EFFECTS [WHITTAKER & FRITH, 1990] .................................................. 121
FIG. 36: PROJET M2 - METRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY [METRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] ....................................... 122
FIG. 37: UPGRADED SECTION BETWEEN FLON AND OUCHY [SEIDENFUSS, 2006] .................................................... 123
FIG. 38: EICKHOFF ROADHEADER ET 380 [HTTP://WWW.TUNNELSONLINE.INFO/] ..................................................... 125
FIG. 39: PILLAR OF BESSIÈRES BRIDGE [SEIDENFUSS, 2006] ............................................................................... 126
FIG. 40: CONSTRUCTION PROCESS OF SIDEWALL GALERIES [SEIDENFUSS, 2006].................................................... 127
FIG. 41: PARALLEL SIDE WALL GALLERIES OF THE LANGALLERIE TUNNEL [SEIDENFUSS, 2006].................................. 128
FIG. 42: CARTES GEOLOGIQUES SUISSE 1:25000 [ATLAS GEOLOGIQUE DE LA SUISSE, FEUILLE: 1243 LAUSANNE] ... 130
FIG. 43: MAP OF LOT 1200 [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] ...................................................................... 131
FIG. 44: INGRESS OF SOIL MIXED WITH WATER [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2005] ............................................ 133
FIG. 45: CRATER OF SAINT-LAURENT PLACE [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2005] .............................................. 133
FIG. 46: SOIL CONDITIONS IN THE FINAL DESIGN DOCUMENTS [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA] ................................. 134
FIG. 47: REAL SOIL CONDITIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA] .......................................... 134
FIG. 48: CRATER IN THE WINE SHOP OF COOP CITY CENTRE [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2005]........................ 135
FIG. 49: NEW ROUTE BETWEEN VIENNA AND ST. PÖLTEN [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] .... 139
FIG. 50: EASTERN SECTION [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] .............................................. 140
FIG. 51: GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EASTERN SECTION
[JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL].......................................................................... 141
FIG. 52: DIFFERENT ROCK STRENGTHS WITHIN ONE GROUND TYPE
FIG. 53: RAPID CHANGE OF GROUND TYPES [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] ....................... 142
FIG. 54: MIXED-FACE CONDITIONS [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] .................................... 142
FIG. 55: COURSE OF THE SIDE-WALL COLLAPSE DUE TO WATER INRUSH [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA, 2006]...................... 143
FIG. 56: WESTERN SECTION [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] ............................................. 145
FIG. 57: HARD ROCK SHIELD MACHINE WIENERWALD TUNNEL
FIG. 58: CUTTER HEAD WWT [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL, 2005] ................................. 146
FIG. 59: GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WESTERN SECTION
FIG. 60: BELT CONVEYOR, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL, 2005] ........ 150
FIG. 61: DISPLAY OF THE BELT SCALE [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] ................................ 150
FIG. 62: GEOLOGICAL SITUATION DURING CONSTRUCTION OF THE START-UP GALLERY
FIG. 63: GEOLOGICAL SITUATION AFTER THE 2ND COLLAPSE [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] 153
FIG. 64: GEOLOGICAL SITUATION AFTER THE 3RD COLLAPSE [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] 154
FIG. 65: GEOLOGY AT THE CONSTRUCTION OF RING NO.765 [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] 155
FIG. 66: CAVE-IN OF ROOF AND SIDE WALLS [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] ....................... 156
FIG. 67: INSPECTION OF THE CUTTER HEAD [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL] ........................ 158
FIG. 68: COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND THEORETICAL AMOUNT OF EXCAVATED MATERIAL AT RING NO.765
FIG. 69: MAP OF LAUSANNE [HTTP://MAP.SEARCH.CH, 2006] ............................................................................... 186
FIG. 70: CARTES GEOLOGIQUES SUISSE 1:25000 [ATLAS GEOLOGIQUE DE LA SUISSE, FEUILLE: 1243 LAUSANNE] ... 187
FIG. 71: LEGEND OF GEOLOGY MAP 1 [ESQUISSE TECTONIQUE, ATLAS GEOLOGIQUE DE LA SUISSE,
FEUILLE: 1243 LAUSANNE] ................................................................................................................... 188
FIG. 72: LEGEND OF GEOLOGY MAP 2 [ESQUISSE TECTONIQUE, ATLAS GEOLOGIQUE DE LA SUISSE,
FEUILLE: 1243 LAUSANNE] ................................................................................................................... 189
FIG. 73: MEASUREMENTS AFTER THE COLLAPSE, PHASE 1 [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] .......................... 190
FIG. 77: PLAN OF AFFECTED REDEVELOPMENT AREA [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] .................................. 192
FIG. 78: WORKING DRAWING OF PIPE SCREEN [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] ............................................ 192
FIG. 79: LONGITUDINAL SECTION OF PIPE SCREEN [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] ...................................... 193
FIG. 80: CROSS SECTION OF THE „NEW“FACE [MÉTRO LAUSANNE-OUCHY SA, 2006] ............................................. 193
FIG. 81: GENERAL PLAN OF THE PROJECT [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL, 2006] ................ 194
Table of tables
TABLE 1: DATE, LOCATION AND NAME OF PROJECT AS WELL AS CATEGORIES OF COLLAPSES ........................................ 28
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION AND REPORTS ON INCIDENTS AS WELL AS POTENTIAL CAUSES ................................................. 45
TABLE 3: EXCAVATION METHODS, GROUND CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES AS WELL AS
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ..................................................................................................................... 62
TABLE 4: CIRCULAR CHART: CATEGORIES OF COLLAPSES ......................................................................................... 79

TABLE 5: CIRCULAR CHART: CAUSES OF COLLAPSES ............................................................................................... 80
TABLE 6: CIRCULAR CHART: EXCAVATION METHODS AFFECTED BY COLLAPSES ........................................................... 81
TABLE 7: INCREASE OF SETTLEMENT [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL]................................... 155
TABLE 8: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND THEORETICAL AMOUNTS [JOINT VENTURE ÖBA]................................ 161
TABLE. A 1: RECORD OF INCIDENTS AND COLLAPSES IN TUNNELLING 1 ........................................................................ 176

TABLE. A 10:RECORD OF INCIDENTS AND COLLAPSES IN TUNNELLING 10 ...................................................................... 185
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminary remarks
The necessity for tunnels and the benefits they bring cannot be overestimated. Tunnels im-
prove connections and shorten lifelines. During the last years, the huge demand of under-
ground structures has been consolidated in all countries around the world. The utilisation of
underground space for storage, power and water treatment plants, civil defence and other
activities is often a must in view of limited space, safe operation, environmental protection
and energy saving.
The fact is that underground structures may have enormous economic impact and appear as
the most suitable solution for improving the quality of life in any urban environment, in all
corners of the globe.
However, the construction of tunnels is risky. Hazards are multiple and can never be ex-
cluded. Accidents have great visibility and all efforts have to be done to avoid or minimise
their consequences. So, elements of uncertainty need to be understood and controlled. One
effective way to do so is to identify hazards, evaluate their risks and also learn from previous
one.
1.2 Background
"Tunnel construction is one of the riskiest insurance fields. When an accident occurs, it often
reaches catastrophic proportions.” (Gallagher, 2005)
It is easy to understand why insurance managers start to sweat when they hear the words
"tunnel construction": claims are enormous and can sometimes surpass the originally esti-
mated contract value of a project. The severity of accidents and the importance of their con-
sequences on the further construction process, in terms of costs, additional delays, and loss
of public image are huge.
The impact of hazards in tunnelling has been brought to the forefront of attention in recent
years following some tragic accidents in different parts of the world. The number of incidents
has increased recently, too. This might be attributable to a number of factors, such as:
Tunnelling is increasingly in more demanding environments,
Methods are being used by those unfamiliar with the technique,
Hazards are not being adequately identified, managed and controlled,
There is over-confidence in some methods,
There is more open reporting of failures,
When you finally decide to tunnel, you will probably be in a hurry.
In addition the accidents in the tunnels under construction are of particular danger. While the
construction is on, there is a certain probability of failure such as sudden rock fall at the work-
ing face, deformation and collapse of the support, and water and ground inflows. Every acci-
dent is an uncontrolled event that can lead to heavy consequences. With reference to Isaks-
son (2002) tunnel collapses are examples of undesirable events related to physical condi-
tions. Clearly, the undesirable events that may occur depend on the tunnelling method used.
The frequency of emergency situations during tunnelling and the gravity of the accidents are
higher than in other branches of civil construction because of the specific conditions of un-
derground works.
For most other types of construction projects the knowledge about the construction material
is relatively high. The material properties such as compressive or tensile strength for con-
struction materials like concrete or steel often show limited variations. The largest uncertainty
in construction-material properties is for most project types restricted to the foundation mate-
rial. A tunnel structure is not only founded on the ground as buildings are, but the ground
itself is the major construction material for the whole structure. A tunnel is also loaded and
supported by the surrounding soil or rock mass. Due to the complicated nature of geological
conditions there is always a variation in important factors like the content of fines or boulders,
or in rock characteristics like the number of joint sets and joint conditions. As the number of
pre-investigations is often limited due to a lack of time and money, there is some subjective
interpretation of the results from the investigations, which makes it difficult to make a reliable
prediction of the geological conditions
Tunnel failures have been generally referred to as the result of deficient or misapplied knowl-
edge of causes and effects which give rise to an unanticipated event of disastrous conse-
quences with adverse effects on the safety aspects of the underground structure. Types of
tunnel failures can differ quite markedly from physical collapse to explosion and inrush of
water. Physical damage of the tunnel is not necessarily always a feature of a tunnel failure.
For example, situations where explosions have occurred within tunnels and caused damage
and loss of human life, did not necessarily result in tunnel collapse.
In this case, collapse is taken to mean a sudden, uncontrolled release of the ground resulting
in the loss of most or all of the cross-section of a tunnel or a substantial fall of material (HSE,
1999). Furthermore it can be said that collapses can occur at every step of the construction
process. And as well collapses affect mechanised means just as much than conventional
means. Since the fact that a shield protects against cave-ins of the tunnel wall does not
mean that shield heading is free of difficulties. Problems can appear when it encounters
weak zones filled with soft soil. The cutterhead can jam due to accumulated or blocky muck.
If the shield retracts to remove the problems at the face, then more soil or blocks can col-
lapse into the resulting cavity.
At present, the construction of tunnels has become a highly complex process. It includes
considerations of various natures such as geology, geotechnique, organisation of the works,
and economy. Above all, the safety of the workers and the users must be warranted as well
as the serviceability of the tunnel on a long term.
In discussing safety provisions, it has to keep two facts in mind. First, accidents are not inevi-
table. Second, accidents are extremely costly, and so accident prevention makes sound
economic sense. Therefore, causes of accidents or rather collapses have to be recognized
and programs, rules, regulations and guidelines are to be established in order to reduce ac-
cidents. Reducing the number and severity of accidents reduces many costs in addition to
insurance and other items obviously affected by accidents.
1.3 Objective and scope of this Thesis
In this sense the objective of this thesis is to review the main aspects related to tunnel col-
lapses. It is necessary or rather indispensable to have a compilation of the subject “col-
lapses” showing categories and occurrences of collapses as well as causes and mecha-
nisms in order to understand and learn from them, and finally avoid or at least reduce them in
future. Further this thesis is to identify collapses and analyse their risks.
The following chapters deal with documentation and analysis of collapses in tunnelling. A
number of examples of different tunnel constructions affected by collapses show and de-
scribe different categories of collapses, their origin, their consequences and their circum-
stances. Concluding two exemplary case studies are to illustrate these matters in detail.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis contains 8 chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the subject and presents
objectives and scopes of the study. In Chapter 2, there are definitions of different categories
of collapses. A detailed survey on tunnel collapses in the last 70 years is conducted in Chap-
ter 3. Based on this table there is an interpretation of these incidents regarding categories
and causes. Afterwards, a number of potential causes of collapses are named and explained
in Chapter 4 which is divided up into seven subtitles. The mentioned causes are stated ex-
pressly without reference to examples because of the high potential for conflicts with regard
to different points of view, disagreements, claims for damages etc. In Chapter 5, there is a
compilation of various mechanisms of failure of tunnel constructions or rather collapses de-
pending on which category of collapse occurred or which cause was responsible. Two case
studies concerning collapses and cave-ins are performed in Chapter 6 and 7. They have
been carried out in collaboration and conformity with the authority of the clients, and describe
the circumstances and conditions of the projects which lead finally to incidents such as day-
light collapse, roof caving, water inrush etc. Moreover they are also to make clear how to
approach such difficult matters and to deal with such subjects. Finally, conclusions and rec-
ommendations are given in Chapter 8.
2 Categories of collapses
With a view to describing of collapses or conducting a survey on collapses it is practical to

subdivide them into different categories. They can be arranged according to following factors:
place, extent, effects, consequences, causes, mechanisms etc. In this case there are five
different categories as follows: daylight collapse, underground collapse, rock burst, inrush of
water and portal collapse. They are explained subsequently in particular.
2.1 Daylight collapse
The most sensational and spectacular category of collapse is undoubtedly named daylight
collapse. In this case the ground is unravelled to the surface, mainly due to erosion by un-
derground water, although it may not have been possible to see into the tunnel itself from the
edge of the crater at the ground surface. Propagation of the failure to the surface can be ex-
tremely quick, as shows the example given in the figure below (Fig. 1), where a tramway
passing by at that time was trapped in the sinkhole, killing four people and injuring 27 people.
Fig. 1: A city bus that had plunged into a collapsed subway tunnel in Munich, Germany, sits upright in a
water-filled hole in 1994. [http://www.munichre.com/publications; http://www.ita-aites.org]
Setting a further example of a notorious daylight collapse there was an accident with serious
consequences during the construction of an underground line in the South Korean city of
Taegu (Fig. 2). Following the failure of a diaphragm wall, part of a station excavation pit
caved in, burying a bus under the debris. Three passengers were killed and the driver of the
bus was seriously injured. Neighbouring buildings also suffered considerable damage. The
cause of the loss was found to be a loading case not taken into account in the design phase,
which resulted from unforeseen subsoil conditions (Munich Re Group, 2004). Sharp varia-
tions in the groundwater level set previously unexplored gravel and sand banks in motion.
These triggered the loading case that caused the loss, and which the diaphragm wall had not
been designed to withstand.
Fig. 2: Subsidence caused by a collapsed tunnel, as shown here in Taegu in South Korea, can lead to
cracks appearing in building or even to the collapse of whole sections of the street
[http://www.munichre.com/publications]
Illustrated by the incident at the Nicoll Highway MRT station worksite (Fig. 3) the great extent
of a daylight collapse can be demonstrated. Four construction workers have been killed and
three more injured following the collapse of a retaining wall during open cut tunnelling works
on Singapore's 33 km long Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Circle Line. The collapse has led to a
30 m deep hole opening across six lanes of Nicoll Highway over an area estimated to be
150 m long (T&T, 2004).
Fig. 3: The collapse of the retaining wall led to a 30m deep hole opening up across Nicoll Highway adja-
cent to the tunnel works [http://www.tunnelsonline.info/]
2.2 Underground collapse
This category contains collapses which occur in tunnels under construction and affect tun-
nelers and machines without reaching surface. They are divided up into roof collapse, stope,
side-wall caving and heading hurrying on ahead of the driving, and are named subsequently
in detail.
2.2.1 Roof collapse
This category of collapse describes usually the process of breaking down and caving in of
competent or loose rock at the tunnel roof. The following figures show effects of roof collapse
on a driving coped with by a gripper TBM.
Fig. 4: Tunnelers in a huge void at the tunnel roof triggered by caving in of competent rock [Rehm, 2005]
Fig. 5: Broken down rock on the invert of a mechanically driving [Rehm, 2005]
2.2.2 Stope
This is a special mining term for a narrow roof fall in rock as defined by Sowers (1996). It
means a local progressive upward roof collapse in thick but fractured rock strata. The blocks
forming the new roof above the fall are loosened by the fall resulting in successive rock falls
and progressive loosening of the roof above. That is how a quite vertical opening called
stope is created. In a tunnel, the process develops naturally, even threatening structures on
the surface, if the stope propagates sufficiently upward.
2.2.3 Side-wall caving
Breaking and caving in of the side walls of a tunnel is dubbed side-wall caving. It takes place
often in conjunction with roof caving. The following picture shows a side-wall caving during
construction of the diversion tunnel of the Queimado Power Plant in Brazil. With reference to
Andre Assis the accident happened in 2002. The cave was filled with stone, arranged by
hand, and afterwards shotcreted.
Fig. 6: Side-wall caving in the diversion tunnel of the Queimado Power Plant in Brazil [Assis, 2002]
2.2.4 Heading hurrying on ahead of the driving (“Vorauseilende Ortsbrust”)
This special term means the collapse of the face during milling and cutting as well as during
standstill or disruptions affecting the area of several meters in advance of the heading. It con-
tains caving of the roof as well as caving of the side walls. Normally this manifestation occurs
only by using the mechanised mean. On account of its occurrence in front of the cutter head
it is not often to find pictures or figures of this category of collapse.
2.3 Rock burst
Rock burst is a term used to describe rock failures ranging in magnitude from the explosion
of small fragments of rock from underground excavation faces or side walls to sudden col-
lapse of a large section of a tunnel or an excavation. Therefore a burst is defined as a sud-
den and violent explosion of rock in or around an excavation. Failure is normally associated
with high stress and brittle or brittle-elastic materials.
The occurrence of rock bursts in deep mining tunnels (Fig. 7) is well known and requires spe-
cial precautions during construction and adoption of appropriate support measures. Basi-
cally, the most common form of rock burst manifestation is the sudden ejection into the exca-
vation of fractured and detached rocks from the tunnel periphery due to a rapid strain relief
process. Invariably production is disrupted, and entry closure will result. Rock bursts may
have damaging effects on rock surrounding other openings, as well as on rock within the
vicinity of tunnelling.
The severity and frequency of rock bursts usually increase with depth. The cause of this in-
crease is attributed to the increased weight of the overburden strata, and correspondingly,
the increasing stress in the rock with the depth. However, depth is not the only factor that can
contribute to rock bursts. Bursts have been reported in excavations under only 300 m of
cover (Haramy, 1989). Generally, bursts in shallow excavations occur seldom and are not as
severe. In most deep underground excavations which are prone to bursts the depth at which
bursts are first experienced is usually below 600 m, in most instances, they become a seri-
ous problem after 900 m. However, it indicates that site-specific conditions other than depth
are also important factors.
Other forms of rock burst manifestation are known. They are essentially associated with the
high concentration of rock stress due to tectonic or other geologically related form of causa-
tion. Rock bursts in non-mining tunnels are a relatively rare occurrence, which are undoubt-
edly due to the decreased depth below the surface by comparison to those mining situations
which encounter such problems. There are some geological conditions, however, which may
not be necessarily deep but exhibit proneness to rock bursts by virtue of being severely tec-
tonically contorted and disturbed, or have been subjected to igneous intrusive action.
Fig. 7: Rock burst damage in the Lucky Friday Mine. It is to be noted that both ribs, as well as the over-
head sand fill, were damaged in this event [White & Whyatt, 1998]
2.4 Ingress of water / Inrush of water
Water inflows (Fig. 8) cause various degrees of difficulty in tunnels. Much depends on pre-
paredness, and on whether or not discontinuity and fault infillings are washed out in the
process. This may cause exaggerated overbreak and chimney formation, an unsafe working
environment and require setting of steel.
The ingress of water in underground excavations may derive from diverse geologic and man-
made conditions. Groundwater inflow influences the construction procedure, tunnel stability,
and the environment, extremely leading to daylight collapse. Heading inflows occur when a
water-bearing zone is penetrated during tunnelling.
Water inrush can be critical, especially if the tunnel is headed downhill or starting from a
shaft. The stability of face and walls may be compromised by the high erosive powers of high
pressure water inflows, or by insufficient shear strength causing the tunnel wall to fail due to
shearing or buckling of low friction layers. This failure can occur despite or rather because of
the delaying effect of the presence of a TBM-shield.
It is often that ingress of water is the preliminary stage of another category of collapse. That
is also to say that both daylight and underground collapses are released by water inrush.
Fig. 8: Water inrush during construction of the Eastern section of the Wienerwald Railway Tunnel [Joint
Venture ÖBA, 2006]
2.5 Portal collapses
The portal areas frequently represent some of the most problematic points during the exca-
vation of a tunnel. In fact, some problems are concentrated in the portals, especially those
deriving from the geologic nature of the ground, lack of confinement in the immediate over-
burden, and rock mass discontinuities.
Several factors, for example the direction of excavation, the morphology of the site, the geo-
mechanical characteristics of the terrain etc. influence the portal problems. While it is highly
desirable that the location selected for the portal be in fresh rock with cover of the same or-
der as tunnel width and height, environmental constraints or other relevant considerations
will sometimes dictate that the portal be located where there is low cover, weathered rock, or
even soil. Where rock is exposed, the preconstruction of a reinforced concrete portal struc-
ture will still be of substantial assistance.
Fig. 9: Collapse of the roof in the range of the portal [Assis]1
1
Year of publication is unknown!
3 Survey on tunnel collapses during the last 70 years
Following there has been undertaken an extensive literature search supplemented by infor-
mation from different sources in order to establish the record of incidents and collapses
throughout the world. Not all failures have been reported and therefore the list is an incom-
plete record. The entire survey without description and reports on incidents and conse-
quences can be viewed in the appendix, Table 1-11.
3.1 Record of incidents and collapses in tunnelling
The following table No. 1 comprises tunnelling projects sorted according to date which were
affected by different categories of collapses.
Table 1: Date, location and name of project as well as categories of collapses
No Date Location Project Category of collapse
Los Angeles, MWD Hollywood Tunnel

1 1940 - 1941 water inrush
United States water supply
Los Angeles, La Cienega - San Fernando water inrush,

2 1954 - 1956
United States Valley Sewer Tunnel sinkhole to surface
Eucumbene-Snowy Tunnel,
Snowy Mountain,
3 1969 Snowy Mountain rockfall
Australia
Scheme
4 Tasmania Lemonthyme Tunnel rockfall
5 Canada A. Kemano Tunnel, BC rockfall
Metropolitan Water District

Los Angeles, water inrush,
6 1970 - 1975 San Fernando Tunnel
United States sinkhole
water supply
Los Angeles, LACFCD

7 1972 - 1976 roof caving
United States Sacatella Tunnel
Paris,
8 1973, October Rail tunnel "cantilever" collapse
France
Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo metro, North-South cone of settlement at

9 1981, December
Brazil link surface
Dilizhan tunnel,
Dilizhan, roof caving,
10 1983, June Transcaucasian Railway,
USSR face collapse
case 1
Dilizhan tunnel,
Dilizhan,
11 1983, July Transcaucasian Railway, face collapse
USSR
case 2
Santana,
12 1983 Santana Underground Railway daylight collapse
Brazil
Landrücken,
13 1984, November Landrücken Rail Tunnel roof caving
Germany
Bochum,
14 1984 Bochum Metro daylight collapse
Germany
Kodarsky tunnel,
15 1984 USSR face collapse
Baikal-Amur Line
Richthof,
16 1985, January Richthof Rail Tunnel daylight collapse
Germany
Kaiserau,
17 1985, August Kaiserau Rail Tunnel collapse of the bench
Germany
Bochum, daylight collapse,

18 1985 Bochum Metro
Germany roof caving
Krieberg, completed lining

19 1986, February Krieberg Rail Tunnel
Germany collapse
Munich, Munich Metro, water inrush,

20 1987 (before)
Germany case 1 daylight collapse
Munich, Munich Metro,

21 1987 (before) daylight collapse
Germany case 2

Germany case 3

Germany case 4

Germany case 5

25 1987 (before) blowout
Germany case 6
Quito, Papallacta,
26 1988, September roof caving
Ecuador water transfer tunnel
27 1988 Germany Michaels Tunnel roof caving
Brugg, Habsburgtunnel,
28 1988 - 1994 daylight collapse
Switzerland National Highway A3
Karawanken,
29 1989, January Karawanken Road Tunnel roof caving
Austria/Slovenia
North Outfall
Los Angeles,
30 1989 Replacement Sewer Tunnel sinkholes
United States
(NORS)
Delémont, Mont Russelin Tunnel, face collapse,

31 1989 - 1995
Switzerland National Highway A16 water inrush
North Outfall
Los Angeles,
32 1990 - 1991 Replacement Sewer Tunnel sinkhole
United States
(NORS)
face collapse,
Bern,
33 1990 - 1992 Grauholz Tunnel settlements at the
Switzerland
surface
Kwachon,
34 1991, September Kwachon Metro Tunnel daylight collapse
Korea
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
35 1991, November Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 1
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
36 1991, November Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 2
Toulon, Motorway Link Tunnel

37 1991 ?
France A57-A50
Athens, daylight collapse,

38 1991 - 2000 Metro Tunnel Line 2
Greece roof caving
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
39 1992, February Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 3
Lambach,
40 1992, June Lambach Rail Tunnel daylight collapse
Austria
Yamagata,
41 1992 Funagata Road Tunnel ?
Japan
Severomuisk railway tunnel, water inrush,

42 1992 USSR
Baikal-Amur Line face collapse
Mysovy tunnel,
43 USSR Baikal-Amur Line, face collapse
case 1
Mysovy tunnel,
44 USSR Baikal-Amur Line, face collapse
case 2
Seoul Metro,
Seoul, face collapse,
45 1993, January Phase 2,
Korea daylight collapse
case 4
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
46 1993, February Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 5
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
47 1993, March Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 6
Seoul Metro,
Seoul,
48 1993, March Phase 2, daylight collapse
Korea
case 7
Taipei,
49 1993, March Chungho Road Tunnel roof caving
Taiwan
Sao Paulo, Road Tunnel at Avienda Santo face collapse,

50 1993, November
Brazil Amaro collapse of drain
Tuscany,
51 1993 Road tunnel "Poggio Fornello" ?
Italy
Schaffhausen, Fäsenstaub Tunnel,

52 1993 roof caving
Switzerland National Highway A4
pressure shaft,
Sion/Valais,
53 1993 - 1998 hydraulic power plant roof caving
Switzerland
Cleuson-Dixence
Sao Paulo,
54 1994, April Carvalho Pinto Road Tunnel roof caving
Brazil
Montemor, Montemor Road Tunnel,

55 1994, July daylight collapse
Portugal case 1
Montemor, Montemor Road Tunnel,

56 1994, August daylight collapse
Portugal case 2
Leoben,
57 1994, August Galgenberg Tunnel rock burst
Austria
Munich,
58 1994, September Munich Metro daylight collapse
Germany
London, Heathrow Express Link

59 1994, October sinkholes
United Kingdom Airport Tunnel
Hsuehshan Tunnel,
Taipei, water inrush,
60 1994 - 1995 Taipei-Ilan
Taiwan ground collapse
Expressway
Klosters, Vereina Tunnel, face collapse,

61 1994 - 1997
Switzerland Central Section roof caving
Basel, settlements,
62 1994 - 2000 Adler Railway Tunnel
Switzerland daylight collapse
Oenzberg
Bolken,
63 1994 - 2000 rail tunnel, ground collapse
Switzerland
Bahn 2000
Los Angeles, Hollywood section, water inrush,

64 1995
United States LA Metro extension sinkhole
Hokkaido,
65 1996, February Toyohama tunnel cave-in
Japan
Asikkala, Päijänne Tunnel –

66 1998, February
Finland water supply
Ruhr, drainage and controll gallery,

67 1998 overbreaks
Germany Ennepe dam
water inrush,
Frasnadello,
68 1998 San Pellegrino road tunnel ground collapse,
Italy
rock burst
Flims, Flims Bypass, water inrush,

69 1998
Switzerland tunnel Flimserstein roof caving
Sogn and Fjordane, rock burst,

70 1999, June Laerdal Tunnel
Norway face collapse
east-west alignement
Umiray-Angat,
71 1999, November of the Umiray-Angat roof caving
Philippines
Transbasin main tunnel
Hull,
72 1999, November Hull flow transfer tunnel roof caving
United Kingdom
Bolu, Bolu Tunnel,

73 1999, November roof caving
Turkey Anatolian Motorway Link
Tala/Chukha Dzongkhag,
74 1999 Tala Hydroelectric Project face collapse
Bhutan
1999 - 2000, Strood/Kent,

75 Strood Railway Tunnel sinkhole
December - June United Kingdom
Shenzhen, Dongjiang-Shenzhen
76 2000, January roof caving
China Water Supply Scheme
Taegu,
77 2000, January Taegu Metro daylight collapse
South Korea
Lisbon, Blue Line (Linha Azul), water inrush,

78 2000, June
Portugal Pontinha - Amadora Este roof caving
2000 - 2001, Octo- Porto,

79 Porto Metro Light Rail project roof caving
ber - January Portugal
Washington DC, Washington DC's Dulles

80 2000, November roof caving
United States airport tunnel
Portsmouth,
81 2000 Havant Flow Transfer Tunnel water inrush
United Kingdom
Paderborn,
82 2000 Egge Railway Tunnel water inrush
Germany
Yuncan,
83 2001, March Yuncan Hydroelectric Project water inrush
Peru
Istanbul, Istanbul Metro,

84 2001, September daylight collapse
Turkey phase 2
Lang Co, settlement,

85 2001 Haivan Pass Tunnel
Vietnam roof caving
Sissach,
86 2002, February Chienberg tunnel daylight collapse
Switzerland
Gotthard Base Tunnel,

Faido, Southern section,
87 2002, April roof caving
Switzerland Multifunctional Station
Faido (MFS)
Rotterdam,
88 2002, June New Caland tunnel
Netherlands
Hokou tunnel,
Taoyuan,
89 2002, December Taiwan High Speed roof caving
Taiwan
Rail Link
Lötschberg Base Tunnel,

St German,
90 2002 Southern section, settlement
Switzerland
Raron portal
Vienna,
91 2002 Lainzer railroad tunnel face collapses
Austria
Chüebalm
Iseltwald,
92 2003, January road tunnel, roof caving
Switzerland
Motorway A8
Contract 240
East London,
93 2003, February of the Channel Tunnel daylight collapse
United Kingdom
Rail Link
Paris,
94 2003, February Metro Line 14 daylight collapse
France
Segovia,
95 2003, June Guadarrama rail tunnels ground collapse
Spain
Shanghai,
96 2003, July Metro Line 4 water inrush
China
Liyama rail tunnel,

Hokoriku, water inrush,
97 2003, September Hokuriku Shinkansen
Japan daylight collapse
railway project
Lübeck, roof caving,

98 2003 Lübeck Herren Tunnel
Germany rock burst
Guangzhou, Guangzhou's Metro

99 2004, April
China Line 3
100 2004, April Singapore Mass Rapid Transit Circle Line daylight collapse
Tehri/Uttaranchal, Tehri Hydro

101 2004, August roof caving
India Development Project
Sydney,
102 2004, November Lane Cove road tunnel daylight collapse
Australia
Barcelona,
103 2005, January Line 5 daylight collapse
Spain
Lausanne,
104 2005, February Metro 2 daylight collapse
Switzerland
Kunming,
105 2005, May Yunnan rail tunnel roof caving
China
Gerrards Cross,
106 2005, June Tesco tunnel daylight collapse
United Kingdom
Karahnjukar, Karahnjukar
107 2005, August roof caving
Iceland hydropower project
Guangfu Tunnel,
Meizhou,
108 2005, October Tianjin-Shantou roof caving
China
Expressway
Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung
109 2005, December daylight collapse
Taiwan Mass Rapid Transit
roof caving,
face collapse,
Vienna,
110 2005 Wienerwaldtunnel heading hurrying on
Austria
ahead of the driving,
water inrush
In many cases tunnel incidents or rather collapses are still object of explorations as well as
being dealt with by experts and insurance company because these incidents are often ac-
companied by different and opposite points of view. So clients and contractors come to blows
with each other. Claims are enormous and the importance of their consequences on the fur-
ther construction process, in terms of costs, additional delays, and loss of public image is
vast. Thus there are often no conclusions drawn by experts or official causes judged by court
for a long time. Therefore much sensitivity is demanded in approaching these delicate sub-
jects. As referring to some journalistic or Web sources no responsibility is accepted for the
correctness of this information.
Table 2: Description and reports on incidents as well as potential causes
No Incidents, reports and causes
1 Water inflow of 2271 l/min
A substantial groundwater inflow occurred at several locations (greater than 378.5 l/min at 7 locations)
2 with a maximum water inflow for the entire tunnel of 3028 l/min. The heavy ground pressure in the To-
panga Formation shale caused a sinkhole to surface in the wet, muddy Young Alluvium.
The tunnel entered service in 1965 and after a period of only four years the water flowing through had
reduced to 40% of normal. The tunnel was drained and found to contain three major rockfall zones.
3
The cause of the failure was attributed to erosion of soft material associated with rock seams and faulting
being affected by fluctuation of hydrostatic pressures.
The tunnel had been in service for five months when a major rockfall occurred at approximately 1.6 km
from the downstream portal. The area was affected by faulting which contained 0.3-0.6 m of crushed
4
phyllite. The rockfall zone extended over 20 m along the tunnel whilst the cavern was around 23 m high
above the tunnel crown. Approximately 2,100 m³ of rock debris accumulated in the tunnel.
The tunnel failure occurred after two years in service. The main rockfall took place at a fault zone
containing mylonite and gouge. It appeared to have been caused by changes in hydrostatic pressure
during pumping which gave rise to erosion at a fault zone and led to tunnel collapse where the gunited
5
section was too thin for adequate support. The resulting collapse cavern extended 20 m along the tunnel
and 43 m above the crown. 20,000 m³ of rock debris were deposited along the 850 m of tunnel with a
main obstruction occurring under the cavern.
A substantial water inflow of 5299 l/min happened and slowed the rate of advance to 18.30 m per day.
6 The caving resulted from thousands of gallons of water in Old Alluvium
which created a sinkhole of 3.05 m diameter.
An encountered 6.40 m diameter abandoned auger hole chimneyed up to within 1.80 m of surface
7
but it did not daylight to surface. Afterwards it was filled with pea gravel from the surface.
Longitudinal "cantilever" collapse of the heading took place in advance

8
of the first section of completed ring.
A sudden serious instability appeared during construction of the tunnel. Certainly no collapse happened,
but a cone of settlement developed on the surface with a max. value of 120 mm and 6 m diameter. Sup-
9 port consisted of 200 mm shotcrete lining and the tunnel was excavated below 8 m overburden. Both the
change of ground conditions within face and the change from drained to undrained conditions
are likely to have affected the stability.
While driving the tunnel, a rock fall from the face and the roof took place there
10
with about 270 m³ of the rock fall-out.
While finishing the work in the third deck, with a seemingly stable condition at the face, the front part of the
three decks had a sudden fall. Two miners were completely covered with the earth at their work stations.
11
The collapse was caused by the existence of local coaly and clay shales layers, weakened to a great
extent by oblique slip surfaces and fissures damped with water.
A collapse progressed to street level where cave-in depth was 80 cm.

12
Six houses were demolished, but no casualties were recorded.
The 11 km tunnel runs through various caving-in erosion ground features of tubular or chimney like forms.
Total of 47 such zones were encountered. First point of failure was shearing of the base of the crown and
13
walls due to overload. Both the collapse was due to failure of the temporary invert to the crown section
and due to structural failure of the partial completed lining.
A daylight collapse happened within 30 minutes. The ground movement involved 300 m³ in urban and
street area. The collapse put down to redistribution of load from front excavation. The crown advance
14 shortened afterwards. On the one hand the collapse was due to general excessive settlement or conver-
gence on the other hand it was due to the crown excavation
being too far in advance of the closure of the ring.
During driving a 120-m section, there was a collapse at the working face. The tunnel was embedded in
permafrost and highly jointing rocks. Just after the development of the heading, once the surrounding soil
15
attained a positive temperature, it began to spill behind the bracing. This resulted in formation of cavities.
The subsequent falls of flakings affected dynamically the board bracing, breaking it.
A tunnel collapse occurred with a surface crater of 11 m diameter and 6 m in depth.

16 It took three months to excavate the collapsed material.
The cave-in is likely caused by unstable natural ground at the excavated face.
An almost daylight collapse took place 100 m in from portal with full heading and
bench under 25 m cover. The collapse of the bench occurred during excavation in the direction to the
centre of the tunnel and propagated in the longitudinal direction. It was caused by a slit which was made
17
to construct the ramp and which rendered the temporary invert of the calotte ineffective.
Between 3000 - 4000 m³ rock and soil filled the tunnel void, creating a 20 m wide and up to 5 m deep
crater at the ground surface.
A cavity of 30 m³ formed under a road as a result of ground collapse into tunnel.

18 Fissuring and water are blamed for ground instability at the face.
Reason for collapse is probable the unstable natural ground at the excavated face.
The tunnel was constructed with two side drifts and top crown section. A collapse of partially completed
lining adjacent to the face thought to be due to local overstressing due to sand lenses and water followed
19 by a progressive collapse of crown and two drift tunnels backwards for 55 m causing very substantial
surface damage in the rural area. The collapse was due to structural failure of the partial completed lining,
for example due to local overstressing or rock joint movements
The competent cover immediately outside the shaft was not 1.5 m as planned
20 but inadequate 80 cm and upper waterlogged strata broke through.
Thus a full collapse to surface occurred caused by inundation and flooding of shaft.
A cave-in (30 m³) to surface happened to the tunnel with five metre overburden.
21
The collapse was in part due to omission of distance spacers between the crown arches.
A 300 m³ collapse to street surface occurred as a result of local thinning of competent overburden
and led to face failure. Water level was above the tunnel.
22
Test boring vertically upwards behind the face at the first ring revealed adequate cover. An excavator was
buried.
A collapse to street surface took place as a result of local thinning of competent marl cover
23
over the tunnel. Erosion feature encountered and water logged material flowed into the tunnel.
A collapse appeared at street level. Local thinning of marl cover was anticipated and the waterlogged
24 ground above was being treated by the formation of an arch of frozen ground. However due to poor con-
struction there was an unintended gap of unfrozen ground through which the cave-in occurred.
One tunnel under 0.95 bar caused blowout (40 m³) into the unpressurized tunnel 40 m away.
The loss of air to the second tunnel put stability of the first tunnel at risk and caused fears of settlement to
25
station immediately above the first tunnel.
The restoration of air pressure prevented to further damage.
The TBM had bored 5 km when a huge collapse of 1,200 m³ of ground occurred.
26 The contractors set about mining around both sides of the TBM and erecting steel sets as a canopy over
the machine. As a precaution, drill and blast was started from the exit portal.
A collapse happened during pilot tunnel enlargement due to change in ground conditions which had been
predicted to be a problem.
27
It seems that the support conditions for the strong rock were continued unmodified in the weaker ground.
Lack of supervision and predictions were to blame for it.
28 Two daylight collapses occurred. Further details are unknown.
A huge collapse involving 4,000 m³ of material took place in the hard rock tunnel.
The combination of very high water pressures (up to 36 bar) and loose broken rock in fault zone caused a
29
reduction in shear strength.
The post Christmas break factor led to collapse before ring completion.
A sinkhole measuring 6.10 m diameter and 4.88 m deep happened on LAX property.
30
Subsequently seven smaller sinkholes were encountered.
The progress of the drive was halted after about ten metres because of subsidence caused by incoming
water associated with the molasse.
Furthermore, the TBM cut into a major karst causing also major problems
by dealing with the 200 to 1,000 l/s of water inrush.
31
Moreover, an unstable or collapsing cutting face and a trapped shield occurred
when traversing the marls of the anticline.
The overbreak in front of the head reached 5 to 6 m and sometimes risky human intervention was
necessary in front of the head of the TBM.
32 A sinkhole developed to surface during pseudo-earth pressure balance operation
Various problems such as collapse of the face and settlements at the surface
of the ground in shape of craters led to a low average advance rate.
The face collapse occurred when the bentonite slurry was pumped out, so that the upper part of the face
was supported by overpressure.
The reason for the collapse was a combination of three factors:
33
the thin layer of overburden, partially cohesionless soil in layers, and changing the face support from
bentonite to air.
A further collapse occurred, blocking the cutter head during an attempt
to return to hydraulic support after changing the cutters.
Stabilisation of soil was necessary in order to continue the excavation.
The collapse of the subway tunnel construction took place in soft ground forming a huge crater at the
surface. According to a newspaper report the construction company revealed that the large scale collapse
34 occurred as the clays which had been trapped between the soil and the weathered rock were washed
away by rain and the supports within the tunnel gave way. Tragically four workers were trapped but suc-
cessfully rescued unhurt 26 hours later
While constructing Line 5, several cave-in collapses took place in the central urban area in Seoul, which
resulted in huge property losses to adjacent areas and project delay. Interesting features on failure me-
chanisms were indicated by the analysis of collapse cases (collapsed immediately after blasting; inflow of
groundwater with soil; thin rock cover or mixed face ground condition; started at the tunnel shoulder while
35
excavating upper half of the tunnel).
The first daylight collapse occurred up to ground surface (20 m long x 15 m wide x 4 m deep) which in-
volved the embankment of a river. Because of that a gas main was fractured.
The collapse was due to unstable natural ground at the excavated face.
A substantial cave-in (28 m diameter) collapsed three buildings and caused fracture of communications,
water, gas and sewerage.
36 It was due to "sliding failure" rock movements along joint planes at the unsupported face.
A newspaper report blames changing ground conditions and that bore holes were only taken at 100 m
intervals.
The project has been a long story, plagued by innumerable difficulties. Work was halted seven months
37
after a collapse and there was a long delay before tunnelling could resume.
The TBMs ran into a large number of problems, particularly with overbreak voids
forming above the cutter head.
Because of this, the particularly difficult final section of tunnel to Dafni was excavated
using an open face shield.
38 In many cases the ground collapsed, with propagation of the soil failure forwards and above the head or
backwards.
There were as many as 450 incidents of overbreak of more than 1 m by 500 mm by 2 m, with in some
cases a 'ravelling' of the ground and formation of larger caverns, "usually conical in shape and several
metres high". In the most extreme cases, overbreak extended to the surface.
While excavating with road header soil and water flowed into the tunnel area through an old investigation
39 drilling hole. The collapse was due to the unstable excavated front face incorporating a man-made feature
such as the old borehole. A crater 6 m in depth and 4 m in width appeared at ground level.
The failure was due to local weakness of bench in spite of forewarning of which had been given by differ-
40
ential movement of crown abutments one month earlier.
The collapse was caused by water and loose ground. The face consisted of sand and gravel. The col-
41 lapses at portals are usually associated with weak ground
and/or water on the outside of the shaft construction.
Pilot TBMs were plagued by huge and sudden flush inflows of water mixed with sand and rubble that
42
clogged and jammed the cutterheads.
A high-grade jointing of the ground mass and the used tunnelling procedure with a shield-shutter led to
repeated local-size rock outbursts along the whole length of the crown. All fall-outs took place right after
blasting at the face surface and mainly with deepening a stope up to 2-3 m. The attempt to increase the
43
stope led to a rock inrush of about 150 m³ with two anchors pulled out and four anchors broken. The in-
rush was caused by faulty rigidity and density of anchorage as well as an insufficient support of the rein-
forcement resulting in its extraction.
The rock fall occurred in a section supported with flanged arches and wooden bracing. The extension of
the collapsed section was almost 20 m, a crown height attained 11 m.
44
A zone of intense schist formation, soil crumpling up to the gruss and gravel with clay layers caused the
rock fall.
A face and daylight collapse to street level was due to ground inflow combined
45
with high ground water pressure
A daylight collapse happened when weathered rock failed at face and groundwater and material flowed
into leading to the loss of a construction plant. Lessons learnt from the collapse cases included both tech-
nical and non-technical considerations.
In technical aspects, the potential sources of failures would be insufficient site investigation, inappropriate
46 NATM application, negligence of the impact of ground water inflow, no stability analysis and no considera-
tion in blasting effect.
In non-technical aspects, the factors that significantly affect the integrity of construction would be no feed
backing procedure in technical review system, over-demand of skilled workers due to construction boom
and inappropriate construction management.
47 A daylight collapse in weathered rock in the crown area involved rock movements along the joints.
48 A daylight collapse occurred in residual clay in the bench area where there was shear failure.
The collapse said to be because of 'bad ground conditions'.

49 About 100 m tunnel were involved and collapsed area took two years to repair.
The collapse was due to unstable natural ground at the excavated face.
A face collapse led to the collapse of drain filling the tunnel with water which then piped over to the other
tunnel with a sinkhole in between.
50 The tunnel runs under very low overburden through "fissured hard clay". The crown was too far in ad-
vance reducing safety level and resulting in unstable convergence measurements. Both the collapse was
a result of excessive convergence and of unstable natural ground at the excavated face.
Severe asymmetrical deformations of crown excavation were due to poor geomechanical rock conditions.
51
In addition a low overburden of 25 m covered the tunnel.
The shield drive turned out to be inflexible in the Fäsenstaub, where a non-cohesive fine sand layer up to
4.0 m thick was encountered unexpectedly in the crown zone.
52 In spite of grouting with micro-cement, it was not possible to stabilise this layer.
Settlement of up to 17 mm occurred due to the changed geological conditions,
which led to major damage to two buildings.
The TBM was blocked several times when crossing especially tricky areas of mylonite rock.
53
Large scale primary works and drainage had to be carried out to cross these areas.
Precise 48 people were captured and 8 died when the tunnel collapsed.
54 Cracks appeared and subsequent investigation discovered gaps between primary and secondary linings.
Repairs involved removing areas of secondary lining and replacing it.
One collapse concerned the 6 m high, 19.5 m upper heading in the north tunnel with 20 m overburden. A
45 m section of the tunnel collapsed creating a 20 m diameter surface crater. The collapse appeared
55
sudden and unexpected. It was said that the collapse was influenced by a leaking small water main above
the tunnel construction which created a saturated clay layer.
This collapse concerned pilot drive causing a 5 m diameter surface crater.

56
It has likely been directly linked to the other collapse.
The tunnel runs through a heavily faulted area. Lining incorporates 'deformation slots' to cope with
57 squeezing rock. A rock outburst from face occurred 'suddenly' and with no early warning. The collapse
volume estimated as 700 m³. Following investigations did not uncover any construction defects.
Shortly after the heading work began, thrusts occurred on one of the faces. The miners were unable to
bring the considerable inrushes of water and material under control
and evacuated the tunnel after a short time.
At the surface, near to a crossroads, a large subsidence crater appeared which quickly filled with ground-
water. Cover to tunnel was thought to be adequate but it thinned locally and its water and gravels fell into
58 tunnel. A bus waiting at the crossroads was unable to escape as the ground opened up beneath it, and it
plunged backwards into the crater. One worker on surface and several bus passengers could not be
saved and were drowned.
In the course of the excavation work, the thickness of the layer of marl separating the two groundwater-
bearing layers of gravel was found to be far less than had been assumed at the planning stage.
Sandfilled cracks in the marl allowed water through, and it was this that had caused the disaster.
The collapse affected three tunnels at Central Terminal Area which were being worked on at the time. The
concourse tunnel had been excavated and lined. During the night shift, it became obvious to those on site
that there was serious distress in the various tunnel linings and the stability of the three-tunnel system was
out of control. There were extensive and worsening cracking and spalling, severe damage and movement
59
in particular to the invert of the concourse tunnel. Three collapses occurred over a number of days and the
buildings over the tunnels slowly collapsed and were demolished.
First of all, cracks were discovered in the shotcrete shell of one of the three headings, followed by spalling
of the concrete over a large area and subsidence craters at the surface.
Hence serious ground collapses with groundwater ingress took place periodically during tunnel construc-
tion. There were 13 stopp ages for the TBM section and 8 collapses for the drill and blast section in the
pilot tunnel excavation. In the eastbound main tunnel excavation, 28 collapses occurred. Meanwhile, in
the westbound main tunnel excavation, the boring machine was badly damaged in a major ground col-
lapse with a huge groundwater surge of 750 liters per second.
60 As a result, the TBM was aborted and conventional drill and blast was then employed. Unfortunately, 11
men lost their lives in the past 13 years. Most of this damage was attributable to defective grouting blocks
adjoining the diaphragm walls of the shafts and station excavation pits. These blocks should in fact have
ensured that the TBMs entered and left the shafts and pits safely. Because of inadequate grouting quality
and foreign bodies in the subsoil (old tree stumps, metal objects), the sealing blocks were leaky, allowing
water and material to enter through the diaphragm walls and leading to the collapse.
During driving the section with heavily tectonised rocks, there were cave-ins on more
than one occasion both above and in front of the cutterhead.
61
Indeed the TBM became jammed at certain spots.
Therefore, the TBM drive was extremely time-consumping.
At the northern cut-and-cover section along a part of about 130 m settlements suddenly appeared, short
time after the tunnel section had been constructed,
with a subsidence velocity of approximate 1 cm per month.
These settlements are attributed to dissolving processes of salt at the top of the "Mittlerer Muschelkalk" by
groundwater flow. The central section is positioned predominantly in swelling rock formations. 1,095 m of
the central section are laying in the Gypsum Keuper formation, where anhydrite may generate very high
62
swelling pressures when getting into contact with water. The shale rock in these shear zones was strongly
fractured and waterbearing. This led to instable situations ahead of the cutter face with three cave-ins that
propagated to the surface.
At the same time the soft and fractured marls became sticky with ground water. The muck stuck to the
loading pockets and clogged the openings due to compaction and drying out induced by heat. The hin-
drance and manual cleaning led to low advance rates.
The tunnel, a railway connection between Bern and Zurich, is a two-mile-long, double track project.
63 Coping with a ground collapse, a bearing failure, or an under-spec separation plant
would alone make life very difficult, but this project had all three.
Contractors were realigning the tunnel by cutting out 20 segments and replacing them when they noticed
a pocket of saturation. The situation rapidly deteriorated, resulting in an inflow of mud and water which
64
produced a sinkhole in Hollywood Boulevard measuring 20 m wide and 18 m deep. The contractor poured
3,000 m³ of concrete slurry into the hole.
A landslide occurred on a snowy mountain on the west coast of Hokkaido. A part of the landslide was an
immense boulder, approx. 70 m long and 30 m thick, which struck the tunnel where it enters the mountain.
About 40 m of the tunnel extended outside the mountain. The large rock slid down the mountain and hit
65 this exposed portion of the tunnel. When the boulder hit the tunnel portal, the cave-in trapped a bus and
car. 22 people were killed in this disaster. According to claims of the victims the collapse was caused by
construction defects and poor maintenance, adding that officials exacerbated the problems by chossing
the wrong location for the portals.
A serious collapse occurred, possibly caused by the presence of "swelling clay" in the overhead strata,
and almost completely blocked the tunnel, threatening the Helsinki district potable water supply to over
66
one million people. The tunnel was completed in 1982. Some areas are shotcrete lined. Distance to the
vicinity of the collapse from the closest access, which was downstream, was estimated to be 3,000 m.
Considerable overbreaks caused by fault zone. As part of a dam rehabilitation program undertaken by the
67 German government, the dam has been renovated and equipped with modern instrumentation. The reno-
vation work included construction of a drainage tunnel within the dam.
When going through the thrust zone, the instability developed blocking the TBM head, thus causing a
serious delay to project completion. The instability occurred with a sudden inflow of rock blocks, clay and
water into the pilot tunnel, which was excavated two years in advance of the main tunnel excavation. The
68
TBM was stuck by the ground above, making it impossible to continue with face advance. Water was
percolating through the thrust zone with flow rate ranging from 6.6 l/s minimum to 10 l/s maximum. As a
consequence of the ground collapse, the water flow rate increased from the initial 1-2 l/s.
69 Water ingresses and roof caving occurred. Further details are unknown.
The tunnel suffered rock burst over much of its route. The scheduled breakthrough has been delayed
because of a 18 m long, up to 10 m deep tunnel collapse at the face. A fall of rock 10 km from the Aurland
70 portal was grouted in place and remined. Approximately 1,200 m³ of collapsed material filled the exca-
vated area. Due to adverse rock conditions there are high stresses, which have necessitiated the applica-
tion of heavy support with rockbolts and fibre reinforced shotcrete.
The first cave-in or collapse at the TBM cutterhead occurred at chainage 4,330 m at a fault zone that
affected 44 m of tunnel. The cutterhead was totally buried under mylonitic debris from a collapse zone for
71 8-10 m above and ahead of the face.
The second cave-in came when the TBM cutterhead entered a fault zone in a while limestone at an area
of low cover.
The collapse occurred in an alluvial valley which represented the worst ground conditions on the project.
The collapse initiated close to Shaft T3 in a completed section of the tunnel. No immediate cause for the
collapse was apparent. A leak occurred in the crown when a train passed and a subsequent invert leak
started on the left side bringing in sand, which bubbled like a lava flow with clear water and brown sand.
To summarize, two primary factors in combination led to collapse, fine sand under considerable pressure
72 adjacent to the tunnel combined with a leak through the lining large enough to allow fine sand to wash into
the tunnel. The leaks are most likely to have been caused by movement of the tunnel relative to Shaft T3,
which lead to opening up the circle joints and shearing between adjacent rings causing local structural
failure around the gasket. The movement was most likely attributable to compression of the peat above
the crown, caused by the upward buoyant pressure of the tunnel combined with loosening of the ground
by shaft sinking/tunnelling and dewatering of the peat layer by a leak into the tunnel or shaft.
A disastrous earthquake rocked the area round the town of Düzce (to the northwest of Bolu) and caused
the collapse of a fairly long section of the tunnel. The collapses occurred in a section of tunnel passing
through a clay and weak rock zone where a temporary shotcrete lining system was in place, and about 50
73 to 75 m beyond a structurally complete tunnel lining system. One mm wide longitudinal and radial cracks
were observed in the structurally complete reinforced concrete lining. The tunnel had been designed to
withstand the relevant seismic loads encountered to date, but could not withstand the enormous horizontal
accelerations. The seismic design for the tunnel was based on experience and judgement.
Because of geological problems the commisioning of the plant has been delayed and the cost estimates
have been revised. The project required 22.25 km x 50 m² headrace tunnel, 2 x 992 m long pressure
shafts, a 2.2 km x 60 m² tailrace tunnel and an underground powerhouse. Around 80% of the strata were
adjudged 'poor' or 'very poor', which caused considerable tunnelling delays. Blockages in inclined and
74
vertical pressure shafts delayed completion. The excavation from 6 km mark to 11 km mark had to deal
with a 15 m long face collapse when it intersected an aquifer 122 m from the portal. Geologists described
the conditions as the worst for tunneling that had been met anywhere in the world. The excavation of the
tunnel took about 20 months, which in normal condition would have taken only about two months.
The tunnel was originally constructed between 1818 and 1825 as part of the Thames Medway Canal, and
subsequently converted to a two-track railway by infilling the canal. Three collapses have afflicted the
tunnel and its shafts resulting in a derailment and the imposition of a speed restriction. Subsequent repairs
were followed a day later by a further collapse. In June a large hole appeared on farmland around the
75 entrance to a shaft into the tunnel. The depressions in gardens of houses just off the tunnel line are 50
mm to 80 mm deep. They are within 20 m of a second of the seven shafts into the tunnel. Engineers will
want to determine why collapse areas seem to be extremly wet in a normally dry chalk area. Numerous
chalk falls have been recorded since 1957. Eight houses above the railway tunnel have been evacuated in
the latest of a series of problems affecting the nineteenth-century structure.
Five tunnellers were killed and two injured after a tunnel collapse. The cave-in occurred about 50 m from
76 the entrance to the 3.7 km tunnel. The men were buried by about 30 m³ of rock and debris. The incident
happened a day after a similar cave-in in the city, although nobody was hurt in that event.
A sector for the Taegu subway under construction collapsed, and the part of the city's main roads con-
necting the line under construction was closed. Following the failure of a diaphragm wall, part of a station
excavation pit caved in, burying a bus under the debris. Three passengers were killed and neighbouring
77 buildings also suffered considerable damage. The cause of the loss was found to be a loading case not
taken into account in the design phase, which resulted from unforeseen subsoil conditions. Sharp varia-
tions in the groundwater level set previously unexplored gravel and sand banks in motion. These triggered
the loading case that caused the loss, and which the diaphragm wall had not been designed to withstand.
During the construction of the station, situated halfway the tunnel, a part of the tunnel collapsed and floo-
ded. Tunnelling was stopped further to heavy water ingress and mud leakage causing subsidence to the
78 surface. To avoid liquefaction and further settlements, the tunnel was deliberately flooded. In September,
a 150 m long, 65 cm deep crack has been discovered along the invert by divers as well as cracks on the
walls and uneveness of the segmental lining.
The tunnel construction for Line C was interrupted by three major collapses. In order to overcome these
initial difficulties, which led to nine months of TBM stoppage, a new integrated team approach was adop-
ted in 2001 for both the design and construction phases. The weathered granite locally exhibits a metast-
79 able structure, which can accentuate the potential for collapse, depending on the high porosity and re-
duced cohesive strength of the loosed/leached residual soil. Consequently, the ground tends to follow an
elastic-brittle-plastic behaviour, leading to sudden, unforeseeable failures at the surface with practically no
warning if the tunnel face is not properly supported or if uncontrolled over-excavation is allowed.
A part of the pedestrian tunnel under construction caved in trapping a worker in the rubble. The miner lost
his life when the tunnel heading collapsed. Immediate rescue efforts were hampered by the continued
instability of the collapsed zone. Under a cover of less than a tunnel diameter (about 4.5 m) excavation
was designed as a controlled sequence of topheading, bench and invert with the topheading divided into
two side wall drifts and excavated in staggered rounds. The topheadings were being completed before
80
starting the bench and invert. According to NATM design details, each 1 m - 1.6 m round of the tophead-
ing drifts was being preceded with systematic spiling. The investigators say there were "deteriorating soil
conditions" and three soil "falloffs" during the week before the tunnel collapsed. The state citations also
say that an NATM engineer was required on site until at least four weeks after the concrete lining work
was finished, but was apparently not on site during the entire month of October.
The failure happened after 7.8 km of the 8 km long, 2.9 m i.d. tunnel had been completed. A 15 ring sec-
tion of lining cracked and deformed, letting water into the tunnel.
The tunnel was lined with smooth bore precast concrete segmental linings comprising tapered six plate
81
trapezoidal fully gasketted rings with an invert level of between 21-29 m below ground. Deformation of the
lining was so severe that it needed replacing. The incident occurred during a shift while the TBM crew
were on a break and no work was in progress.
The geology proved far more troublesome than expected. The face stability in the crown area was feared
to be endangered because it was considered that the paleosoil layer which runs some 4-10 m above the
crown might be defect. This implies a potential collapse of the groundwater head. Unexpectedly a severe
cave-in occurred consisting of some 300 m³ of scree and slurry material reaching to the ground surface
some 40 m above the tunnel roof. The cave-in was initiated by a water ingress of approx. 300 l/s which
82
later reduced to about 10 l/s. In spite of an extensive geotechnical site investigation programme con-
ducted for the tunnel, some unforeseen geotechnical problems have adversely effected tunnelling pro-
gress. These included the previous hardly detectable distribution of Karst intensity of the local Muschel-
kalk, severe groundwater discharge at locations in the northern tunnel section and long-term settlements
caused by time dependant Lias claystone in the southern tunnel section.
The project comprises two small concrete dams and intakes two TBM-driven headrace tunnels, a 574 m
inclined penstock creating a gross head of 452 m, a subsurface powerhouse cavern and a switchyard. An
unexpected and dramatic collapse caused by a massive inrush of water and an unidentified fault zone
buried one of the two TBMs engaged on the job. The TBM had come to rest beneath the overhang of a
83 very obliquely inclined fault and that water pressure building up directly overhead and swelling clay push-
ing up through the invert triggered the collapse. Water ingress of up to 120 l/s and under 40-60 bar pres-
sure was measured coming from the collapsed zone and a mass of soft clay material burst up through the
invert as gouge crashed in from the face and down from the crown to completely bury the TBM to the last
gantry of the backup.
During the second construction phase of the Istanbul Metro a tunnel excavation collapsed beneath a two-
story boarding-house which also collapsed into the resultant cavity. Five people died as a consequence
and a number of people in the building were injured. An unforeseen well has been cited as the cause of
the collapse on the 5.2 km long phase 2 of the metro. The main tunnel was being excavated as a 36 m²
84
multiple drift. Under the hotel, the profile was being expanded to 100 m² to accomodate a switch tunnel
area for the single track system. The unidentified well, 1.5 m above the switch tunnel crown collapsed
sending soaked clay and water filled fine sand into the tunnel, triggering complete cave in of the above
ground.
A large settlement started when the tunnel face had been advanced 14 m from the portal caused by water
seepage and disturbance of the approach road. Settlement increased according to the tunnel excavation
and maximum velocity of settlement at tunnel crown reached at 44 mm/day, and a small collapse continu-
ously occurred at the tunnel face. Driving had only progressed approximately 30 m from the southern
85 portal in the soft ground section of the main tunnel when a major collapse occurred during the installation
of a further pipe screen. From the initial breakout at the portal until the 30 m point was reached, the
ground water encountered in the tunnel face had increased considerably. This led initially to a small loss
of ground above the tunnel face that rapidly chimneyed upwards, with a large quantity of sand and boul-
ders filling the excavation, to form a crater in the portal slope. The collapse caused no injuries.
The 2.3 km long, 10.2 m i.d. tunnel partially collapsed during construction when Triassic marls and anhy-
drite fell in over a section of approximately 40 m. Over a thousand cubic metres of ground is reported to
have entered the bored tunnel. A crater formed on the surface of Chienberg Hill, some 30 m above the
tunnel alignement measuring 25 m across and 6 m deep. According to an expert the cave-in occurred
86
because the 20 cm thick shotcrete lining failed. The crown was then no longer able to resist the pressure
after the rock had initially appeared to be stable. As the shotcrete lining was in place for some 3 to 4
months, it was neglected to properly secure the lower half of the tunnel immediately given substantial
lengths of advance.
A partial collapse occurred in the cross cavern vault, leaving a cavity about eight metres high. Despite the
prediction of exploratory drill cores, a fault zone was encountered.
87 Timely completion of the MFS is critical to the project's success. Following a collapse whilst drill and blast-
ing the area's construction cross cavern, it was discovered that the MFS' northern tunnel branch (and
widest cross-section) sat right over a major unforeseen fault zone.
The tunnel consists of two tubes, each with two lanes plus an emergency lane. The entrances to the tun-
nel are on either side of the Caland Canal. The tunnel itself is constructed from six tubular elements,
which were not being constructed on site, but in a dockyard, where two elements can be built at once. The
88 tunnel is 23 metres below ground level at its deepest point. Traffic came to a standstill when the construc-
tion of the new Caland tunnel under the Caland canal caused a 5 m section of road to collapse. Piling
along the north wall of the canal developed cracks just above the water line, allowing earth to leak out.
This undermined the nearby road.
Two tunnel collapses have hindered operations on the THSRL. The geology along the alignement has
been well-documented, with excessive hydrostatic conditions carefully monitored in some tunnels.
89 One of these collapses occurred in Tunnel TO8 that affected approximately 50 m of tunnel.
There was little warning.
However, the crew was evacuated 45 minutes prior to failure and thus, no injuries or loss of equipment.
An extensive settlement has damaged the village situated above the tunnel's southerly portal at Raron.
The settlement reached a maximum 183 mm and has affected some 40 buildings. The settlement was
caused when the excavated tunnel became a natural drain for the water table directly above the aligne-
90
ment. The settlement and building damage was due to dessication and shrinkage of the underlying sedi-
ments following the groundwater drainage and was not connected to vibrations from the drill and blast
method of tunnel advance.
91 Several face collapses occurred. Further details are unknown.

A rock fall perforated a rock-shed of the highway A8. The 150 m³ rock collapse closed the 1.3 km long
tunnel. Although a protective gallery had been constructed over the entrance of the tunnel, the amount of
92
rock that fell onto the highway was far greater than design limits, and crashed through the roof, extending
10 m - 15 m inside the tunnel.
Some residents had to be evacuated from their houses when a 10 m wide, 7 m deep sinkhole appeared in
their gardens over the top of a section of the second part of the Channel Tunnel Rail link. Engineers who
had investigated the subsidence felt that the subsidence was likely to be tunnel related, but that the size of
the hole suggested that there were some other underground opening which had been disturbed by the
93
TBM working on this section. It is believed that the tunnel may have intersected one or more disused
wells, causing the collapse. This incident came less than a week after a road collapsed when an articu-
lated lorry reversed into Maryland Works, approximately 100 m from the hole.Engineers investigating the
collapses do not believe the two are connected.
A subsidence caused the collapse of a playground in a school located in Auguste-Perret Street. A volume
of 3,000 m³ was swallowed forming a 15 m deep 400 m² hole in the playground and a loud noise compa-
rable to a blast was heard by local residents. The subsidence appeared on the Bibliotheque Francois
Mitterand-Olympiades section of Line 14. The vault in this zone consists of a limestone layer, which acts
as a temporary slab, under a cover of around ten metres of soil. The limestone suddenly cracked and the
94
hole appeared. The last topographical measurements did not show abnormalities. Officials explained the
collapse was totally unpredictable. There have been three reasons put forward to explain what happened.
The limestone has proved to be more friable than expected. Secondly, the place of the collapse is where a
15 m wide, 145 m long maintenance workshop is being dug at a depth of 10 m and pressure is higher
than in the tunnels. Lastly, reinforcement of the underground works opening had yet to be undertaken.
The route crosses the Sierra di Guadarrama with a long and deep tunnel under the Manzanare national
park. A ground collapse affected one of the two TBM-excavated tunnels in the north end of the tunnels.
The collapse was 8 m diameter in its widest part and about 8 m in depth. It developed from the excavation
95
front, as the 9.5 m diameter TBM was performing a slight over-excavation in order to reduce convergence
movements in a zone where the tunnel crown is only 17 m from the surface.The affected zone was imme-
diately backfilled and ground stabilisation treatment began after the backfill completion.
Cross-passage being constructed on Shanghai's Metro Line 4 collapsed, causing an eight storey building
to collapse. The collapse happened at the point where the line runs under the Huangpu river. It was re-
ported that floodwater and building material poured into the construction site. Tunnel collapse coincided
with the rainy season. Officials from three construction companies were found guilty of improper manage-
ment and inadequate emergency response measures in the collapse during construction of the cross-river
96
subway tunnel. They were accused of failing to take remedial action in response to technical problems in
the equipment used to build the tunnel. Flaws in the engineering plan as well as inappropriate on-site
management and engineering supervision allegedly contributed to the collapse. The cause of the loss was
identified as being the failure of the ground-freezing unit that had been installed to protect the excavation
work for the cross passage.
Two cave-ins occurred, which caused earth to flow into the tunnel. Three workers were buried by a third
cave-in, as they were piling up sand bags to prevent further inflows. The excavation was being performed
97
by full-face excavation with a short bench so as to keep loosening of the ground to a minimum. A crater 20
m deep, 70 m i.d. opened up above the 22.2. km long tunnel, injuring three workers.
During driving operations in the southern tube numerous incidents occurred. A number of stone banks had
to be penetrated. In some cases, boulders that had spilled out of the face had to be recovered manually
98 by divers. Damage to the cutting wheel was established after approximately 60 tm, which was caused by
characteristic stone banks. As driving operations progressed on two occasions torn off tools were recov-
ered in addition to damage occurring to a grill.
A high iron frame immediately collapsed after the earth sank in the construction site, resulting in damage
to machinery and the tilting of a residential building. Initial reports suggest that recent heavy rainfall could
99
have been a contributory factor. A special task force has been established to help further investigate the
case.
A section of tunnel being built for the Circle Line collapsed, apparently when a retaining wall used in the
tunnel's construction gave way. The incident occurred at the Nicoll Highway MRT station worksite. The
collapse has led to a 30 m deep hole opening across six lanes of Nicoll Highway over an area estimated
to be 150 m long. Series of events led to a tragedy: the diaphragm wall and the waling led to the failure of
100
the waler strutting and the inability of the overall retaining wall system to meet the redistributed loads as
the strutting failed. This led to the catastrophic collapse of a section of the wall. Four construction workers
have been killed and three more injured following the collapse of a retaining wall during open cut tunnel-
ling works.
The sudden collapse of a tunnel that killed nearly 30 people delayed the project for an indefinite period.
Collapse occurred as part of the works for the Tehri Hydro Development Project. Workers were trapped
when debris fell on them while they were believed to be working on Tunnel 3 of the scheme. Reinforce-
101
ment and guniting works was underway when accumulated water from heavy rainfall is said to have dis-
lodged debris. The incident took place within a week after sudden rise in waters of Bhagirati river that
submerged several parts of old Tehri town.
The tunnel experienced a partial structural collapse during construction left one apartment building hang-
ing over a 10 m wide, 10 m deep hole. The tunnel section, close to a planned exit ramp, was being exca-
102 vated by roadheaders at the time of the collapse. Factors blamed for the collapse included the presence
and alignement of a low-strength dolerite dyke, orthogonal jointing associated with the dyke, and the pre-
sence of faults, which in conjunction with the dyke and the jointing created unstable ground.
A sinkhole associated with tunnel works for Barcelona's Line 5 extension caused the collapse of buildings
and the evacuation of 1,000 people. Two blocks of flats had to be demolished due to damage caused by
the sinkhole 20 m wide and roughly 30 m deep. Critics assert that the Metro tunnel was excavated without
103 having performed a geological study of the terrain and that a method rejected as unsafe by the Madrid
autonomous region was used. According to the engineer responsible for the geotechnical studies for Line
5 the excavations were the main causes of the tunnel collapse. It appears that the excavations weakened
the foundations of the tunnel walls.
104 To be subject of a separate report!
Emergency crews rescued 12 tunnelers after they were trapped for six days
105 by a cave-in on a 1.6 km long rail tunnel.
The reports did not say what caused the tunnel collapse.
Partial collapse of a rail tunnel under construction over a live railway line has caused chaos.
A 30 m section of arch had collapsed onto the track approximately 80 m from the south entrance to the
tunnel leaving spoil up to 6 m deep on the track.
The cause of the accident is still being subject to an investigation, but initial views are
106
that the loading sequence used in the construction of the tunnel was the major factor that caused the
collapse. 29 damaged segments of the tunnel have been removed from the site.
8,000 tonnes of fill from the colapsed area and a further 7,000 tonnes from the sides of the collapse have
been taken away.
A collapse almost caused the TBM cutterhead to lose rotation

due to the horizontal pressure of the collapsing muckpile.
107
The difficult ground conditions and high water inflows continued to plague the effort.
One of the TBMs remained stuck due to faults in the rock.
Twelve workers were trapped in a collapsed highway tunnel for 34 hours.

The accident happened when a 10-metre-long section of the under-construction Guangfu Tunnel
108 suddenly collapsed, 463 metres from the entrance and 80 metres from where the victims were working,
cutting them off from the outside world.
The cause of the accident is being investigated.
The underground tunnel collapsed under a major throughfare in the city, causing the avenue and also a
major road tunnel, which was built a long time before the metro and unrelated to the metro project, above
the metro tunnel and below the road to collapse. Tunnellers hit an underground water course about 33 m
below ground and close to the Orange Line's planned Cultural Centre station. The resulting collapse cre-
109
ated a 50 m long, 30 m wide and 10 m deep crater at the busy intersection of Chungcheng and Tashun
roads. Another collapse created a 3 m deep crater that was 7 m long and 5 m wide. The corporation at-
tributed the incident to a lack of tunnel support after the shield tunnel boring machine had excavated that
section of tunnel two days earlier.
Remark:
The projects No.104 “Lausanne Metro M2” and No.110 “Wienerwald Railway Tunnel” are to
be subject of separate reports which are constituent part of Chapter 6 and 7. Therefore there
is no information or detail in this table concerning these two cases. Nevertheless, they are
considered in the subsequent interpretations and conclusions on the survey.
Table 3: Excavation methods, ground conditions and consequences as well as sources of information
Excavation Source of
No Ground condition Consequences
method information
conglomerate sandstone, Eisenstein et al.

1 Drill and Blast
shale and basalt (1995)
conglomerate sandstone,
Eisenstein et al.
2 Drill and Blast shale granite, basalt and
(1995)
Young Alluvium
The remedial works involved erection of

3 steel ribs at the edges of the choked Jacobs (1975)
zone on each side of the fall.
The remedial measures consisted of

redriving the tunnel through the fall
area, erecting steel arch supports fol-
lowed by placing poured concrete along
4 phyllite Jacobs (1975)
the damaged length of the tunnel. The
cavities overlying the repaired section
were filled with gravel and concrete
pumped into the cavern area.
The main remedial works involved firstly

establishing a timber bulkhead across
the tunnel upstream of the cavern and
filling the space behind the bulkhead
mylonite and
5 with tunnel muck over which was placed Jacobs (1975)
gouge
backfill material. This was followed by
the placing of concrete over the entire
cavern area above the tunnel in order to
provide a protective arch.
Restart and completed without incident

Robbins Digger soft sandstone and with substantially more ventilation and Eisenstein et al.
6
Shield siltstone advance rates restricted to no more (1995)
than 7.60 m/day
method information
claystone, siltstone, occa-

Eisenstein et al.
7 Digger Shield sional very hard calcare-
(1995)
ous cemented sandstone
8 NATM ? HSE (1999)
HSE (1999) and

Timber propping was introduced to http://www.madrid.o
9 NATM ?
prevent a full collapse rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
10 shieldless TBM coaly and clay shales Vlasov et al. (2001)
Investigation of the accident showed

that it was impossible to detect such
11 shieldless TBM coaly and clay shales Vlasov et al. (2001)
failures in the ground mass with existing
geological prospecting techniques.
12 NATM ? HSE (1999)
HSE (1999) and

http://www.madrid.o
13 NATM ?
rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
14 NATM ? HSE (1999)
15 ? ? Vlasov et al. (2001)
HSE (1999) and

http://www.madrid.o
16 Drill and blast ?
rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
HSE (1999) and
http://www.madrid.o
17 NATM ?
rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
18 NATM ? HSE (1999)
19 NATM sandstone HSE (1999)

method information
http://www.madrid.o
20 NATM ? rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
http://www.madrid.o
21 NATM gravel rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
http://www.madrid.o
22 NATM marl rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
http://www.madrid.o
tml
http://www.madrid.o
tml
http://www.madrid.o
25 NATM ? rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
http://www.tunnelbu
TBM; Drill and il-
26 ?
blast der.com/recordbrea
kers/hall.htm
http://www.madrid.o
27 ? ? rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
high-terrace gravel con-

taining materials
stemming from the penul-
timate Ice Age;
gypsum keuper compris-
Conventional ing clayey marls;
means formation of funnel-shaped
Kovari &
cavities, including exten-
28 Descoeudres
(drill and blast; sive swallow-holes filled
(2001)
pneumatic picks; with rock and soft material;
shield drive) intensively fractured
areas;
succession of anhydrite
dolomite, crinoidal
limestone, platy limestone
and trigonodus dolomite
HSE (1999) and

http://www.madrid.o
29 NATM ?
rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml
Excavation Ground Source of

No Consequences
method condition information
dense sands, silts and A comprehensive program of explora-
clays; lightly cemented tion and remediation with hundreds of Eisenstein et al.
30 Digger Shield
dune sand; uncemented borings and grout holes was under- (1995)
recent dune sand taken.
Folded Jura
(malm, dogger, lias),
La Caquerelle anticline
and Alsatian molasse:
essentially straight-forward A special channel and an extra excava-
Kovari &
limestone structure; tion in the direction of the emergency
31 TBM Descoeudres
tectonised marly rocks gallery were necessary to control the
(2001)
with overlapping planes; water flow.
fault zone formed of
alternating sub-horizontal
limestone and marlstone
layers
Earth claystone, siltstone and

Pressure occasional very hard cal- Eisenstein et al.
32
Balance careous cemented sand- (1995)
Machine stone
difficult, constantly
changing subsurface
conditions: glacial soils
with complex
Isaksson (2002),
hydrogeologie
Herrenknecht
conditions;
33 Mixshield TBM (1992)
core of molasse bedrock
and
(sandstones and marls);
www.ita-aites.org
varying glacial deposits,
ice-marginal deposits of
silt, sand, gravel and
ground moraine alternate
34 NATM clay HSE (1999)
weathered rock or clay;

various weathered gran-
Remedial works were started immedi-
ites ranging from decom- HSE (1999)
NATM; ately after collapse. The works were
35 posed granite soil to and
road header done first by dumping soils to fill the
weathered rock; ground Shin et al. (2006)
craters followed by grouting.
water table 3-10 m below
the ground surface
HSE (1999) and

http://www.madrid.o
36 NATM ?
rg/metro/infonatm.h
tml

No Consequences
http://www.ttcmag.net/t
pre-cutting unnel/archive/
37 ?
method 2002/august/panorama
0802.pdf
series of schist formations

(clayey, calcerous
limestones, greywackes,
open face siltstones, shales,
38 T&T (Nov 2001)
shield TBM limestones, marls); meta-
sandstones, metasiltones;
periodotitic and dibasic
bodies
39 NATM ? HSE (1999)
40 NATM ? HSE (1999)
HSE (1999) and

41 NATM ? http://www.madrid.org/
metro/infonatm.html
weathered, faulted and T&T (Apr 2002) and

Hard Rock
42 tectonically disturbed Bessolow & Makarow
Shield TBM
granite rocks (1992)
weathered rocks
43 Drill and blast Vlasov et al. (2001)
with high jointing
schistic gneisses trans-

forming into glimmerites at
the zones with granites;
44 Drill and blast Vlasov et al. (2001)
crumpled soils saturated
with granite lenses and
veins
http://www.madrid.org/
45 NATM soft rock
metro/infonatm.html
Shin et al. (2006) and

46 NATM weathered rock http://www.madrid.org/
metro/infonatm.html
http://www.madrid.org/
47 NATM weathered rock
metro/infonatm.html

No Consequences
http://www.madrid.or
48 NATM residual clay g/metro/infonatm.ht
ml
49 NATM ? HSE (1999)
50 NATM fissured hard clay HSE (1999)
Local propping was installed to prevent

51 NATM ? HSE (1999)
a full collapse.
conventional
means
(sequential
excavation with rock zones with pre-
shotcreting stressed, in part extremely Kovari &
52 method and with inhomogenous gravels Descoeudres
drill and blast; and lakebed deposits; (2001)
shield drive; platy limes
previously cre-
ated jet grouted
arch)
Drill and Blast;

phyllitic and quartziferous Maidl & Schmid
Double Shield
schists; (2001),
Tunnel Boring
Triassic formations with www.stucky.ch/DB/T
Machine
quartzites, dolomite, an- SOUT2_eng.cfm?X
with an hemi-
53 hydrite and gypsum; _NUME=4 and
spherical cutter-
Carboniferous marly www.ita-
head
schists interspersed with aites.org/cms/index.
and then
impervious mylonite zones php?id=372&type=9
modified to a flat
and strips of coal 8&no_cache=1&L=0
cutterhead
g/metro/infonatm.ht
ml and
http://timelines.ws/c
oun-
tries/BRAZIL.HTML
g/metro/infonatm.ht
ml and
http://www.fujitarese
arch.com/reports/tun
nelling.html
56 Drill and blast ? g/metro/infonatm.ht
ml
method information
carbonate-rich rocks in a HSE (1999) and

57 NATM fracture zone with albite- http://www.mindat.o
chlorite shales rg/loc-22035.html
In order to avoid endangering the sur-

HSE (1999) and
rounding area, the crater was filled with
excavation by marl under Knowledge
58 concrete. The tunnel tubes were finally
excavator waterlogged gravels Management
driven again from scratch, this time
(2004)
under compressed air conditions.
Following the collapses, the resulting

cavity was completely filled with foamed
T&T (Aug 2000)
concrete, and surrounding buildings
and
London clay; further away that were threatening to
59 NATM Knowledge
loose rock collapse were secured. In the course of
Management
the repair work, a circular shaft 50 me-
(2004)
tres in diameter and 40 metres deep
was first sunk with a secant pile wall.
Knowledge
Management
soft clayey soil; (2004)
Besides extensive grouting work, freez-
Drill and blast; 6 major faults, numerous and
ing of the subsoil was also necessary,
60 Earth-Pressure- fracture zones, and high- http://english.www.
while repair headings had to be driven
Balance TBMs pressure groundwater gov.tw/e-
under compressed air conditions.
everywhere Gov/index.jsp?cate
gid=
96&recordid=78587
crystalline rock
comprising biotitic
gneisses and plagioclase Kovari &
Several collapses required a complex
61 open TBM amphibolites; heavily tec- Descoeudres
supporting work
tonised rock (stable (2001)
Silvretta crystalline with
tendency to brittle fracture)
method information
Maidl & Schmid

(2001),
two www.npcaa.com.au/ht
mudstone, marl and
cut-and-cover ml/NationalPre-
limestone; Segments were coated on all six faces
sections; caster/BackIssues/prec
62 gypsum keuper to provide a long term resistance to
central section 19.pdf, www.geo-
(anhydrite); aggressive soils and groundwaters
Shield Tunnel online.com/pdf/2006-
river gravel sediments
Boring Machine 01Eurock_kib.pdf and
www.ita-
aites.org/cms/373.html
lower molasse layers and

weaker, water laden mo- T&T (Nov 2003),
raine ground; http://www.ttcmag.net/t
Mixshield weathered layer unnel/archive/
TBM; (lightly to strongly silty 2003/mar/Panorama%
63
cut-and-cover fine sand with little gravel; 20pages.pdf and
method layers of moraine http://www.solexperts.c
(slightly cohesive fine and om/pdfs/en/pub_P150_
medium sand with Oenzberg_mBd_en.pdf
medium gravel)
www.tunnelbuilder.
64 ? ? com/recordbreakers/ch
amber.htm
T&T (May 2001)

volcanic rock and
(water cooled lava rock http://www.tunnel.org/o
65 ?
and a mixture of hard and ldSite/tun-
soft material) nelTimes/Mar96issue/t
oyohama.html
WT (May 1999)
and
hard granite http://www.ita-
66 Drill and blast
(crystalline bedrock) aites.org/applications/3
0th/PDF/ITA_98_1-
177.pdf
Maidl & Schmid
(2001)
alternate sequencees of and
67 gripper TBM
mudstone and sandstone www.slopeindicator.co
m/stories/ennepetal.ht
ml
method information
Maidl & Schmid
(2001)
and
limestone layers, Ground freezing was chosen as the www2.polito.it/ricerca/r
Shield Tunnel
68 Black clay, most reliable measure to be carried out ock-
Boring Machine
argillite from the pilot tunnel. mech/Master%20Tunn
el-
ling%202005/Barla%20
Pelizza%202000.PDF
difficult geological and http://www.amberg.ch/

all manner of
hydrological conditions; aib/E-Sites/e-projekte_
cutting methods:
various geological forma- pmexpert_flims.html
pipe-screen,
tions; water-saturated and
69 blasting, lances
Verrucano landslip mate- http://www.ttcmag.net/t
and pilot tunnels;
rial (limestones and mar- unnel/archive/2002/
crown excavation
bles); areas of glacial septem-
with cutting shield
sediments ber/flims0902.pdf
banded or veined T&T

gneisses (Sep 1999)
(Precambrian), and
70 Drill and blast
often of gabbroitic compo- http://www.tunnelbuilde
sition, massive syenitic or r.com/recordbreakers/h
monzonitic augengneisses all.htm
young volcanic sequence The void walls were stabilised first by

T&T
composed of 50 - 120 Mpa shotcreting then by injection of mortar
(Jul 2000)
Double Shield agglomerates, basalts and and finally the debris treated with resin
71 and
Hard Rock TBM tuffs with inter-layered grouts while being excavated in succes-
http://www.tunnelmachi
sedimentary rocks includ- sive 1.8-2.5 m long sections. The final
nes.com/robbins/
ing limestone step involved consolidation grouting.
alluvial conditions with

peat/organic clay at the
The investigation methodology included
Earth Pressure crown;
intensive ground investigation of the
Balance Ma- substantial body of mobile
collapse location focusing on: construc-
chine, fine wind blown Aeolian T&T
tion; the lifetime of the section of the
72 using fo- (single sized) sand; (Mar 2002, Mar 2003
tunnel prior to collapse; the collapse;
am/polymer alluvial (clay, silt, sand, and Feb 2004)
verifying the design; confirming work-
ground condition- gravel and peat) and gla-
manship; analyses; centrifuge model-
ing agents cial (clay, fine to medium
ling; numerical modelling
sand and gravel) deposits,
two aquifers
method information
Knowledge
Management
soft soil;
(2004)
73 NATM clay and weak
and
rock zone
http://www.tfhrc.gov/str
uctur/00-146.pdf
http://www.tunnelmachi
nes.com/atlascopco/,
http://www.power-
technology.com/
74 Drill and blast moist crumbly rock projects/tala/
and
http://www.bhutannews
online.com/tala_hydrop
roject.html
T&T
The actual construction involves putting (Jul 2000),
in small-diameter piles along either side http://www.ice.org.uk/n
of the tunnel. A capping beam goes on ews_events/eventdetai
area of unlined chalk; these, which supports steel colliery l_ice.asp?Even-
75 ?
lined mostly in brick arches. Then a large steel shutter is tID=1481&EventType=
used in each tunnel to pour in concrete ICE&FacultyID= and
to encase the arches and form the http://www.networkrailc
shape of the tunnel. areers.co.uk/
caseStudies.cfm
T&T
(Mar 2000)
and
76 ? ?
http://english.people.co
m.cn/200602/15/eng20
060215_242791.html
As an immediate measure following the

accident, the excavation pit was com-
Knowledge
pletely back-filled and large areas of the
Management
adjoining subsoil were grouted with
(2004)
77 ? ? cement mortar. The undamaged sec-
and
tions of the diaphragm wall were
http://www.urbanrail.ne
strengthened to enable them to with-
t/as/daeg/daegu.htm
stand the loads arising once the pit was
re-excavated.
method information
A company has made a design of the

www.tunnelbuilder.com
remedial measures, needed to restore a
/recordbreakers/
damaged metrotunnel in Lisbon. After
chamber.htm,
Tunnel Boring an extensive damage assessment of the
78 sand http://www.metrolisboa
Machine damaged tunnel a second inner tunnel
.pt/cronolg_00_uk.htm
lining has been designed with the help
and http://www.tec-
of state of the art Finite Element mod-
tunnel.com/
els.
T&T
igneous rocks (Dec 2003),
(two-micas, coarse http://www.geodata.it/c
granite), alluvial material hisiamo/pubblicazioni/
above the weathered 47.pdf
Earth Pressure
79 granite and
Balance Machine
(fresh rock to http://www.ice.org.uk/n
residual soil); ews_events/eventdetai
water table 10-25 m l_ice.asp?EventID=
above the tunnel 1557&EventType=ICE
&FacultyID=
T&T
(Dec 2000),
http://www.icivilengine
er.com/Failure_Watch/
2000_Tunnel/,
mixed face http://archives.cnn.com
80 Roadheader comprising clay, soils /2000/US/11/02/dulles.
and competent siltstone collapse.01/
and
http://www.construction
.com/NewsCen-
ter/Headlines/ENR/200
10503b.asp
T&T
full face
(Mar 2003)
Earth Pressure
and
Balance TBM, cohesionless sand
http://www.edmund-
81 using foam/ layers between
nuttall.co.uk
polymer ground cohesive (clayey) layers
/Jobsheets/Wa-
conditioning
ter/Havant%20Flow%2
agents
0Tunnel.pdf
method information
Keuper and Lias T&T

Claystones; (Nov2003)
both drill & blast
massive, firm Osning and
and
82 Sandstone http://www.ttcmag.net/t
excavation by
and less firm unnel/archive/
excavator
Gault Sandstone; 2000/june/Compli-
karstified Muschelkalk cated%20Geology.pdf
T&T
The decision was taken to withdraw the
granite and granodiorite; (Jun 2003)
Open main-beam TBM and continue the heading by drill
several fault zones; and
83 gripper TBM; and blast via a bypass tunnel and start a
extreme ground water http://epubl.luth.se/140
Drill & blast downhill drill and blast heading to help
ingress 2-1617/2004/163/LTU-
make up lost time.
EX-04163-SE.pdf
T&T
(Dec 2001)
sandstone, claystone and
and siltstone; http://www.highbeam.c
The contractor secured the area with
strata of clay, sand om/doc/1G1:82006224
84 NATM bored piles and was going to complete
and back-filling /Istanbul+metro+collap
construction using cut and cover.
above the tunnel; se+investigations%7e
ground water R%7e+(Wt+on+Site)%
7eR%7e(Turkey).html?
refid=SEO
The cavity was grouted to stabilise the T&T

tunnel face whilst the solution for com- (Oct 2003),
granite intruded in Triassic
both drill & blast pleting the excavation was developed. http://haivan.cadp.jp/04
Period of Mesozoic Era
and The tunnelling crews that were con- _project_info/intro.htm
85 and thermal metamor-
excavation by structing the parallel evacuation tunnel and
phosed gneiss originated
excavator had managed to negotiate the initial http://homepage2.nifty.
from sedimentary rocks
poor quality soil and had progressed com/Lithosphere_Tec/
into the harder more stable granite. HP_URL.pdf
method information
T&T
NATM loose rock above (Apr 2002)
86 with umbrella competent rock; and
seals marl and gypsum keuper Tunnel
(1/2005)
T&T (Nov 2003),

Kovari &
penninic gneiss zone; Descoeudres
poor rock layer of silty This incident has led to the team at (2001)
Lucomagno gneiss; Gotthard considering a complete shift of and
87 Drill and blast
stratification changing the entire MFS towards either the north http://www.leica-
from sub-horizontal to or south geosystems.com/
almost vertical media/new/product_
solution/rep_eng_
gotthard_en.pdf
T&T
(Jul 2002),
http://www.n15-
europaweg.nl/
tekstversie/engels/
Immersed
88 ? content.asp
tunnelling
and
http://www.ita-
aites.org/applications/
30th/PDF/RCTUS_03_
v1_271-276.pdf
T&T
sequential (Jan 2003)
excavation and
89 ?
and www.retc.org./Attende
support method e/Tech/Tuesday/2-
AM.cfm
native sedimentary rocks;
crystalline rocks; T&T
limestone, granodiorite, (May 2002)
granite, gneiss; and
90 Drill and blast
short section with water Kovari &
under high pressure; ar- Descoeudres
eas of phyllites and a (2001)
carboniferous layer
http://en.structurae.de/
91 ? ? structures/data/index.
cfm?ID=s0003967
method information
T&T
(Feb 2003),
www.nzzamsonntag.ch
/2003/01/14/vm/newzz
DAXUNBHS-12.html,
92 ? ? www.beo-news.ch/
bns2003/jan2003/tunn
el30.htm
and
www.ibex-
sim.com/rock.html
T&T
The hole was swiftly filled with concrete (Mar 2003)
by the contractor and work was then and
Earth Pressure
93 limestone stopped until a further detailed investi- http://www.ttcmag.net/t
Balance Machine
gation into the cause of the collapse unnel/archive/
could be carried out 2003/mar/Panorama%
20pages.pdf
http://www.mjconstruct.
94 ? limestone com/artman/publish/art
icle_372.asp
T&T
(Aug 2003),
intrusive rocks of
http://www.ttcmag.net/t
granitoid type with
unnel/archive/
important water courses;
2002/april/panorama04
95 Hard Rock TBM igneous and metamorphic
02.pdf
rocks
and
(gneisses, granitoides,
http://www.geodata.it/e
dikes and faults)
nglish/progetti/
gallunghe/guadarrama/
T&T
(Aug 2003),
One remedial measure was to pour
Knowledge
cement into the ground near the af-
Management
fected buildings to prevent them from
coastal sand (2004)
96 ? sinking further. Four cement walls, each
and clay and
measuring 5.5 m high and 2.2 m thick,
www.chinadaily.com.c
were built at all the entrances to the
n/english/doc/2004-
tunnel.
04/02/content_320246.
htm
method information
T&T
(Oct 2003),
http://www.ita-
aites.org/cms/212.html,
http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr40
conventional squeezing ground
97 ? /f14_kit.html
mean pressure
and
http://www12.mainichi.
co.jp/news/mdn/search
-news/952527/nagano-
140-141.html
Tunnel
pronouncedly
(2/2004),
heterogenous geological
http://www.roadtraffic-
subsurface structure;
technology.com/
tertiary brown coal sands,
Slurry Shield projects/herren/
98 thick quaternary deposits ?
TBM and
consisting of glacial marl
http://www.tollroadsne
and basin clay;
ws.com/cgi-
artesian groundwater
bin/a.cgi/knT6JBIFEdq
aquifer
cEIJ61nsxIA
T&T
(May 2004)
and
99 ? ? ? www.chinadaily.com.c
n/english/doc/2004-
04/02/content_320246.
htm
T&T
(Jun 2005)
100 ? ? ? and
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C
ircle_MRT_Line
T&T
(Aug 2004),
www.deccanherald.co
m/deccanherald/may2
2005/national1952520
0551.asp
101 ? ? ?
and
http://autofeed.msn.co.
in/pando-
rav3/output/News/d120
7fba-7b22-4301-b194-
4c2483b61fe4.aspx
method information
T&T
(Dec 2005)
The affected area was infilled with con-
102 Roadheader sandstone and
crete.
http://www.ats.org.au/
wmview.php?ArtID=23
T&T
(Feb 2005),
www.geographyfieldwo
The judge heading the investigation into rk.com/CarmelTunnel.
the Carmel metro tunnel collapse has htm
103 ? ?
ordered excavations of the area parallel and
to the site of the collapse. www.typicallyspanish.c
om/cgi-
bin/news/exec/view.cgi
/2/2789
T&T (Jun 2005) and
http://english.sina.com/
105 ? ? ? chi-
na/1/2005/0523/32018.
html
T&T (Aug 2005) and

www.bucksfreepress.c
o.uk/featu-
A laser monitoring system has been
res/newsfeatures/displ
106 ? ? installed to monitor any future move-
ay.var.626103.0.is_the
ment in the tunnel's structure.
re_light_at_the_end_of
_the_tunnel_collapse_i
nvestigation.php
TBM had restarted in November after

beeing stopped for nearly three months
for pre-treatment of an extensive fault
zone. Preparations have been made to T&T
start drilling in the actual rock and it has (Feb 2006)
basalt and been decided to take safety measures and
107 Hard Rock TBM
glacial waters in the future and drill 25 metre long test www.karahnjukar.is/En
holes to inspect the conditions before- /category.asp?catID=4
hand. If the tests will reveal bad condi- 07
tions the rock will be "glued" together
with concrete before the TBM will start
drilling.
method information
T&T
(Nov 2005),
www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/english/
doc/2005-10/
108 ? ? ? 28/content_
488491.htm
and
www.jsjy.gov.cn/ne
wsfiles/78/2005-
10/6945.shtml
T&T
About 9,000 m³ of fill and concrete was (Jan 2006)
dumped in the collapsed section to and
Shield Tunnel
109 ? support and prevent further cave-ins http://en.wikipedia.o
Boring Machine
while longer term remedial measures rg/wiki/Kaohsiung_
are agreed Mass_Rapid_
Transit
Remark:
In several cases it was not possible to fill in every column of a row because there was no
more information available, for example about the consequences of a collapse. As already
mentioned above the list is an incomplete record. Furthermore gathering of data or informa-
tion is very difficult due to the silence and imposed secrecy following an incident or rather
collapse.
3.2 Interpretations and conclusions on the survey
By way of summarizing there can be drawn some conclusions from this record of incidents
and collapses in tunnelling. For example, it is practical to demonstrate as well as illustrate
clearly arranged,
Which categories of collapses took place?
Which different causes released the collapses?
Which excavation methods were affected proportionately by collapses?
Thus there are subsequent some diagrams showing percentages of various categories,
causes and methods with reference to the recorded collapses in tunnelling.
However, it is evident that these circular charts which resulted from an extensive literature
search cannot be generalized because not all failures have been reported and therefore the
list is not an all-embracing record. Nevertheless there can be detected and understood some
trends.
3.2.1 Categories of collapses
With regard to Table 4 it is clear that daylight and underground collapses have the biggest
part in all collapses. However, they are often in conjunction with water inrushes. Thus, the
share of water inrushes is actually much greater.
The fact that daylight collapses have such a big part in this diagram is due to their extent and
spectacle which make the headlines. Therefore almost every daylight collapse is registered.
By contrast not all underground collapses are probably recorded, and thus the number of
them might be much higher in fact.
Table 4: Circular chart: categories of collapses
Water inrushes
2% 5% 13%
Daylight collapses
Underground
collapses
40%
40% Rock bursts
Others
Remark:
In this case daylight collapses include also sinkholes and bigger settlements, i.e. collapses
which affect the surface. The category “Underground collapses” comprises collapses such as
roof caving, face collapse, ground collapse, heading hurrying on ahead of the driving, cave-in
of the side-walls etc. Furthermore the category “Others” means collapses which are not listed
in Chapter 2 and which are special cases such as the rock fall at the Chüebalm road tunnel.
3.2.2 Causes of collapses
By way of explaining Table No. 5 the circular chart is divided up into nine different types of
causes. Although there are many other causes involved in these reported collapses these
types are considered to be the main causes. Of course, some of them are interdependent or
occur in sequence. Therefore a more precise and careful division of different causes of col-
lapses will be conducted in Chapter 4.
Table 5: Circular chart: causes of collapses
Low overburden
Influence of water
6% Changed ground conditions

20%
16%
Bad ground conditions
Overload
13% 6%
3% Missing lining / support

2% 27%
7%
Obstacles
Other causes
Causes unknown
In order to understand these types of causes there is a short definition for some of them:
Low overburden: this type means little distance between roof of the tunnel and surface
Changed ground conditions: this type stands for a sudden alternation from good to bad
and unpredicted ground conditions
Bad ground conditions: this type comprises specific geological circumstances such as
loose broken rock in fault zone, unstable natural ground at the excavated face, major un-
foreseen fault zones, presence of "swelling clay" in the overhead strata etc.
Overload: failure of the temporary invert to the crown section and structural failure of the
partial completed lining is meant for instance by this type of cause
Obstacles: this type includes examples such as appearance of unforeseen wells, aban-
doned auger hole etc.
Other causes: this type contains occurrences such as the post Christmas break factor,
inadequate grouting quality etc.
3.2.3 Excavation methods affected by collapses
It has become usual to distinguish between conventional heading on the one hand and con-
tinuous or mechanised heading on the other hand. Hence there is often the question whether
conventional tunnelling is more likely to give rise to major hazards than mechanised tunnel-
ling. But each particular type of tunnelling method may introduce certain risk while removing
others. The risks associated with any choice of tunnelling method are specific to the individ-
ual location making a comparative study of risks between tunnelling methods adopted in dif-
fering locations valueless. Rather, it is for those proposing to undertake a particular project to
carry out a comparative risk assessment, specific to that location, based on the best informa-
tion available. Thus it is not possible to draw a general conclusion from Table No. 6.
Nevertheless it is obvious that more than half of the reported tunnelling projects, i.e. 55%,
afflicted by collapses had been coped with by conventional means.
Table 6: Circular chart: excavation methods affected by collapses
18% Conventional
mean
Mechanised
55% mean
27%
Unknown
4 Potential causes of collapses

4.1 Unpredicted geological causes
Unpredicted ground conditions, which are not the same as unpredictable or unforeseeable,
are frequently reported as the cause of collapses. Geology has been demonstrated by sev-
eral authors to be probably the single most important factor governing the feasibility of a par-
ticular tunnelling project. This chapter reviews some of the special geological conditions
which have given rise to the need to adopt special tunnelling practices or remedial measures.
4.1.1 Rock alteration
The natural processes of weathering produce rock alteration which can be of major impor-
tance to tunnelling. Weathering reduces the strength of the rocks and can extend to consid-
erable depths by the action of groundwater movement. Climatic and topographical features in
addition to rock type and structure influence the depth of weathering. Erosion often removes
weathered material, but deep channels and narrow valleys frequently remain with weathered
materials being well concealed from surface observation. Buried zones of weathered rocks
may exist under glacial drift materials. Pockets of highly weathered rocks usually contain
water and can be under appreciable hydrostatic pressure head. Consequently they can pos-
sess the ability to rapidly flow into an excavation if disturbed by underlying or adjacent tun-
nelling activities. Weathered pockets occur in igneous, metamorphic and sedimentary rock
types.
4.1.2 High rock stress
The risk of incidents increases when driving the tunnel at large depths due to variation of
strength and deformation properties of the soils and to such unfavourable physico-geological
manifestations as shooting, rock bumps, shocks, sudden rock and gas blow-ups and tem-
perature rise. Instability due to excessively high rock stress is also generally associated with
hard rock and can occur when mining at great depth or when very large excavations are cre-
ated at reasonably shallow depth. Unusual stress conditions such as those which may be
encountered when tunnelling in steep mountain regions or unusually weak rock conditions
can also give rise to stress-induced instability problems.
4.1.3 Faults
Collapses due to adverse structural geology tends to occur in hard rocks which are faulted
and where several sets of discontinuities are steeply inclined. The general characteristic of a
fault is essentially that of the effect of a differential stress producing rupture and subsequent
displacement along the plane of failure (Ramsay and Huber, 1987). Various classifications of
faults exist but they can be broadly identified under normal faults (Fig. 10), reverse faults
(Fig. 11) and strike-slip faults (Fig. 12). Whilst normal faults result in relative movement along
the plane of failure causing beds to displace laterally from each other, reverse faults cause
lateral displacement of beds to overlap each other by virtue of rock movements being thrown
over their previously matching beds. Strike-slip faults are characterised by predominantly
horizontal relative dislocation. Faulted rock may not necessarily give major water inflows if a
lot of clay is present, but adjacent jointing and fracturing may give very wet conditions. Al-
though faults are normally formed during brittle failure of a rock under stress, transitions exist
between true faults, where displacement has taken place on a sharply defined fault plane,
and ductile shear zones (Hatcher, 1995). Truly brittle faults are characteristic of rock failure
taking place at relatively high crustal levels, and these shear surfaces pass downwards
through a transitional zone of brittle-ductile shear zones into the deeper levels where dis-
placement differences change smoothly and continuously through a zone of ductile flow (Fig.
13).
Fig. 10: Normal fault [Whittaker and Frith, 1990]
Fig. 11: Reverse fault [Whittaker and Frith, 1990]
Fig. 12: Strike [Whittaker and Frith, 1990]

Fig. 13: Ductile shear zone at depth passing upwards through a brittle-ductile shear zone into a brittle
fault [Ramsay, and Huber, 1987]
Fig. 14: Typical geometric features of horst (H) and graben (G) structures produced by the activity of
conjugate normal fault systems [Ramsay and Huber, 1987]
Furthermore, faults are fractures on which identifiable shear displacement has taken place.
They may be recognised by the relative displacement of the rock on opposite sides of the
fault plane. Faults may be pervasive features which traverse a mining area or they may be of
relatively limited local extent on the scale of metres in the case of major, regional structures
to millimetres in the case of local faults. This fault thickness may contain weak materials such
as fault gouge, fault breccia, rock flour or angular fragments. The wall rock is frequently
slickensided and may be coated with minerals such as graphite and chlorite which have low
frictional strengths. The ground adjacent to the fault may be disturbed and weakened by as-
sociated structures such as drag folds or secondary faulting. These factors result in faults
being zones of low shear strength on which slip may readily occur.
The crossing of fault zones in TBM tunnelling represents in general a problematic event and
is often associated with a slow-down of progress rate, if not big delays in time schedule,
when a blockage of the TBM head occurs. Although localized along the tunnel length, this
may represent an unexpected event, due to either a lack of warning during excavation or to a
difficulty which has been greatly under estimated or not understood well ahead of time. The
types and extent of instabilities which occur in such cases may involve face collapses. Major
high pressure inflows, outwash of fines, formation of cavities at the crown or ahead of the
TBM take place at the same time. The most serious situation is when the tunnel is flooded
and the fines are pushed into the tunnel, while rock blocks are forced against the TBM head.
If an open TBM encounters this type of situation without pre-identifying it by probe drilling,
the condition may become dramatic and very difficult to deal with. When the same fault is
met by a shielded TBM, be it a single shielded or a double shielded machine, although it is
certainly not possible to continue the excavation, the treatment of the fault from inside the
shield becomes possible and at the same time the tunnel may be kept from being completely
filled up. It is relevant to point out that, unfortunately, with a certain frequency the encounter
of a fault zone may become a catastrophic event due to an incorrect excavation procedure:
the TBM operator, by stopping the machine and rotating the cutter head, induces the fault to
an emptying over the TBM.
4.1.4 Joints
Where a rock fracture results in no significant visible displacement at the plane of fracture,
then this is commonly referred to as a joint. Joints occur in sets and run essentially parallel to
each other. In accordance to Hatcher (1995) joints in rock structures have originated primar-
ily due to the regional tectonic history. Their frequency and orientation are related to the na-
ture of the stress field with tensional and compressive states coupled with folding and faulting
playing important roles. Appreciable intensification of jointing can be expected in close prox-
imity to the axis of severely folded rocks and adjacent to major faults. There are many situa-
tions, however, which exist where the occurrence of jointing cannot be directly related to lar-
ger structural features. This is indicative of joint sets having developed from different causes
and at different times. Joint patterns as observed at surface rock exposures may not neces-
sarily exhibit close similarity with those encountered in the tunnel, with the exception of the
portal areas. Joints observed in surface rocks may have developed primarily due to climatic
and weathering effects, as for example, due to expansion and contraction cycles, and there-
fore are most likely to be of limited depth of penetration below the surface.
Essentially, joint patterns represent structural weaknesses in rock masses, and can substan-
tially influence the stand-up time of different rock types. They are likely to influence the mode
of rock failure and character of its collapse potential during tunnel excavation operations.
Stability problems in blocky jointed rock are generally associated with gravity falls of blocks
from the roof and sidewalls. Consequently, the joint patterns require special considerations
when giving attention to the choice and application of support and particularly for temporary
measures. Rock joint patterns should be taken into account at the tunnel design stage and
when considering selection of the permanent support system.
The existence of fractures in a rock mass, either as sets of joints of limited continuity, or as
major, persistent features transgressing the formation, constrains the equilibrium state of
stress in the medium. Thus vertical fractures in an uplifted or elevated rock mass, such as a
ridge, can be taken to be associated with low horizontal stress components. Sets of frac-
tures, whose orientations, conformation and surface features are compatible with compres-
sive failure in the rock mass, can be related to the properties of the stress field inducing frac-
ture development.
4.1.5 Folded rock masses
The most common form of deformation of rock masses is that of folding and is especially
conspicuous in layered rock structures, although folding occurs in all rock types (Ramsay
and Huber, 1987). Folds occur on widely differing scales ranging in wavelengths from the
order of centimetres to kilometres. The intensity of folding reflects the degree of localised
distortion and relative slipping within different parts of the affected rock mass. Folded strata
allow natural traps to form which attract accumulation in significant quantities of natural gas
and water. The development of a fold is strongly controlled by the nature of the contacts be-
tween adjacent individual layers, whether the layers are effectively welded together or
whether the layers become mechanically detached and, in doing so, allow the individual lay-
ers to glide past one another. Severely distorted folds are frequently accompanied by plastic
behaviour of rocks especially in the softer sediments and in metamorphic rocks. Relative
sliding between layers also occurs in flexural folding in strongly stratified structures. Such
features (Fig. 15) as opening of tension gashes or cracks in stronger rock formations in addi-
tion to shear development in the compressive zones of folds also occur. Localised stress
concentrations frequently happen in association with flexural folded rocks, and where they
are of sufficient magnitude such stresses can cause bursting action effects during excavation
in certain rock types namely those of stronger and brittle categories.
Fig. 15: Structural features arising from changes in the hinge line plunges of folds [Ramsay and Huber,
1987]
Flexural folded rocks essentially represent zones of decreased competence in tunnels. This
is by virtue of the likelihood of more intense fracturing and stress relief encouraging in-
creased risk of dislodgement of rocks immediately surrounding freshly exposed tunnel exca-
vations. Stronger rock formations are more likely to experience fracturing together with open-
ing of fracture planes in regions of severe folding than by comparison to weaker rock types
which will probably behave plastically with less likelihood of fractures opening.
a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 16: Different types of folding: a) Single competent layer, b) Disharmonic folding, c) Harmonic folding,
d) Polyharmonic folding (Ramsay and Huber, 1987)
4.1.6 Running ground
Where ground possesses the ability to flow freely, as for example, with loose sand, then spe-
cial support and control difficulties can arise. Running ground in a relatively dry state can be
encountered in arid and/or hot countries where tunnel excavations tap unconsolidated de-
posits lying close to the surface.
In general, however, running ground is often saturated and the presence of water can en-
courage liquefaction when disturbed by tunnelling activities. A very low water content
amounting to less than complete saturation will provide temporary apparent cohesion as a
fresh surface is exposed in tunnel excavation because of capillary forces. This disappears as
the sand dries and ravelling begins. If groundwater is actually flowing through the working
face, any amount may be sufficient to permit the start of a run that can develop into total col-
lapse. Running ground conditions can arise at a later stage due to progressive collapse and
formation of a significant cavity tapping a major aquifer or overlying unconsolidated and satu-
rated deposits.
Bickel et al. (1996) explained that the cleaner the sand, the more liable it is to run when ex-
posed in an unsupported vertical face during tunnel construction. Single-sized, fine-grained
sands are the most troublesome, closely followed by sands containing less than about 7% of
silt and clay binder. The usual problem encountered with running sand is settlement and cra-
tering at the surface with damage to utilities in the area.
4.1.7 Groundwater aspects
The presence of groundwater in very large quantities is recognised as a major hazard in ad-
dition to causing operational difficulties in respect of tunnel construction works. Potential
problems from groundwater inflow during tunnelling can be predicted to a large extent in
many situations by a comprehensive site investigation employing deep boreholes. The rock
types representing significant known, or potential, aquifers within the rock sequence through
which the tunnel is to be driven can be generally identified and appropriate provisions made
to either control or deal with the water inflow problem. Empirical approaches for prediction of
groundwater are useful for providing a data base for planning and preliminary assessment.
Predicting with accuracy the likely water inflow quantities is, however, difficult, and detailed
monitoring and regular review of conditions together with the adoption of special measures
such as de-watering or injection programmes need consideration.
Encountering large quantities of water in weak ground conditions can lead to rapid formation
of cavities around the tunnel excavation. This can produce the potential for significant quanti-
ties of wet and loose ground to flow into the tunnel. Consequently, identification of such po-
tentially hazardous ground conditions is vitally important. Some tunnelling projects have ex-
perienced problems from relatively warm groundwater with temperatures greater than 30-
35°C which can impair the environmental conditions within the tunnel. The likelihood of such
groundwater occurrences should be assessed during the site investigation stage.
Groundwater may affect the mechanical performance of a rock mass too. Water under pres-
sure in the joints defining rock blocks reduces the normal effective stress between the rock
surfaces, and therefore reduces the potential shear resistance which can be mobilised by
friction. In porous rocks, such as sandstones, the effective stress law is obeyed as in granu-
lar soils. In both cases, the effect of fissure or pore water under pressure is to reduce the
ultimate strength of the mass, when compared with the drained condition.
The presence of groundwater, its hydrostatic pressure, flow rate and chemical composition
influence a tunnel project in all stages. During the excavation of the tunnel, ground water
produces hydraulic gradients which may cause erosion of loose ground or of joint filling ma-
terials in rock. In addition, it produces hydrodynamic pressures which reduce the stability of
the tunnel face. After excavation, water may cause softening of silty or clayey soils, or of
marls, mudstones and similar rock types. Ground types which contain anhydrite or certain
clay minerals exhibit a tendency to swell. Others such as gypsum or rock salt are, however,
soluble. At the service stage, the lining of watertight tunnels must be designed for the full
hydrostatic pressure. Drained tunnels require, however, maintenance to assure a permanent
drainage. In swelling ground, the lining must be designed for the expected swelling pressure.
Instability due to excessive groundwater pressure or flow can occur in almost any rock mass
but it would normally only reach serious proportions if associated with one of the other condi-
tions listed in this chapter.
4.1.8 Lenses of water
Notwithstanding ground investigations prior to construction, the most common unpredicted

geological feature leading to a collapse is the occurrence of washout or erosion structures in
the ground. This is often due to unsuspected lenses of water bearing sand or gravel, often
just outside the tunnel profile. It is usually good practice to continue the ground investigation,
particularly through forward probing, during the construction process and for the need for
competent persons to examine and record the excavation face.
4.1.9 Lenses of sand
The presence of sand lenses raised the possibility of ravelling or running sand conditions
leading either to local or global instability.
For example, during construction of the Toulouse metro extension (Langmaack and Feng,
2005) an EPB tunnel boring machine was affected by sand lenses. The geologic formation
was dry clayey silt with incorporated sand lenses under water pressure. In homogenious clay
formation it was possible to excavate in dry mode under air pressure, but as soon as the
sand lenses were hidden, the face support collapsed and water ingress was observed. This
resulted in overall slow advance rates, extensive TBM cleaning, conveyor belt difficulties and
last but not least in doubts on face stability and surface settlements. Only by using foam and
anti-clay polymer together with water it was possible to create a non adhesive, non-clogging
soil paste to fill the working chamber completely and work in EPB mode.
4.1.10 Karst formations
Karst development is the occurrence of solution features in limestone and related carbonate
rocks (Sowers, 1996), and gives rise to natural caverns and sinkholes through which water
can flow. The nature of the geological structure is an important controlling factor on the de-
velopment of karst and is especially encountered in association with fault zones and tensile
fracture zones where water flow has allowed the opening of joint and fault planes. Shear
zones are often affected by karst development. Anticlinal axes are also areas prone to karst
development and the occurrence of lines of sinkholes. Conversely, horizontal caverns can
develop within synclinal structures which act as subterranean water courses. By far the
greatest number of such problems worldwide occurs in regions underlain by soluble rock
formations, principally limestones and dolomites which are unique because they are very
soluble compared to the other abundant rocks of the earth’s crust. Percolation of water
through fissures in the otherwise sound rock enlarges them, producing cavities of varying
sizes, shapes, and extent in the rock. This is followed by ravelling and erosion of soil over-
burden into the rock cavities. New and different cavities with dome-shaped tops are gener-
ated in the soil overburden. If the process continues, the soil cavity roof of a shallow cave in
the limestone can also cause a subsidence or dropout at the ground surface.
4.1.11 Squeezing ground conditions
Squeezing ground commonly refers to weak, plastic rock materials which displace into the
tunnel excavation under the action of gravity and from the effect of stress gradients around
the tunnel opening (Barla, 2002). The effects of squeezing ground become evident immedi-
ately during excavation, with closure starting to take effect at the tunnel face. The mechanics
of squeezing ground involves a stress and deformation related phenomenon. It can be con-
trolled by the nature and magnitude of the support system employed. Plastic and semi-plastic
rocks which are sensitive to deformation and failure at relatively low stress levels are likely to
exhibit squeezing behaviour. Squeezing rock slowly advances into the tunnel without percep-
tible volume increase.
4.1.12 Swelling ground conditions
Swelling ground displaces into the tunnel opening as result of volume change due to water
adsorption and adsorption effects. Furthermore swelling ground is slower to take effect at the
tunnel face, and may require significant periods of time before noticeable deformation oc-
curs. Swelling behaviour denotes the response of rock to the presence of water. A simple
test is that of immersing a piece of rock in a vessel of water and observing its response and
whether it disintegrates. Some claystones disintegrate fairly quickly and increase their vol-
ume by more than 25%.
Swelling phenomena are generally associated with argillaceous soils or rocks derived from
such soils. Rocks which are rich in clay minerals are likely to have pronounced swelling
characteristics. Fault gouge, mudstones, claystones and highly altered rocks of the pyroclas-
tic and micaceous types also generally possess strongly swelling properties.
In the field, it is difficult to distinguish between squeezing and swelling ground, especially
since both conditions are often present at the same time. However, except in extreme condi-
tions, squeezing is almost always self-limiting and will not recur vigorously, while swelling
may continue as long as free water and swelling materials are present, especially when the
intruding material has been removed, thereby exposing fresh, unhydrated rock.
4.1.13 Shrinking ground conditions
Shrinkage cracks will form at the surface of clay soils on drying. One-dimensional vertical
shrinkage might occur in a plastic soil at depth where the overburden consolidates the clay,
but the usual case is approximately three-dimensional shrinkage, accompanied by cracking.
Cracks form where the cohesion of the soil is lowest. Where drying is not uniform, cracks will
form in the wetter soil. A change in particle orientation occurs at the crack surface, and on
redrying after wetting, the cracks will appear in the same places if the soil has not been oth-
erwise disturbed. The cracks formed in clay soils have an important role in water infiltration
and movement. Water can be conducted rapidly in the cracks of an otherwise impermeable
soil.
4.1.14 Sloping ground surface conditions
Some tunnelling projects have encountered instability by virtue of the nature of the sloping
ground surface overlying the tunnel location. Such sloping ground may be inherently unsta-
ble without any disturbance created by construction of the tunnel. In other situations, how-
ever, the tunnel may introduce changes in the stability conditions of the slope. Groundwater
conditions may also change. The tunnel excavation may prove to be a significant weakening
influence in the proximity of a potential landslip area.
In some cases, such natural phenomena as soil slips, snow avalanches, mud flows and
stone falls can also be the reasons of collapses. Tunnel sections and portals can be de-
formed or destroyed under the action of these manifestations if the positioning of tunnel
structures within the unstable slopes is inadequate.
4.1.15 Rock temperatures
Tunnelling operations can take place in rocks of relatively high temperature conditions
(Rossmanith, 1993). Heating a block of rock usually induces a triaxial state of tensile
stresses within the rock. The tensile stresses induced by heating often results in formation of
intergranular and intragranular cracking in the rock. Thermal fragmentation and crushing,
therefore, makes full use of the intrinsic attributes of rock, such as a great number of innate
microcracks, microcavities, and other defects within rock, great differences between tensile
and compressive strength of rock. The effects of temperatures on the mechanical properties
of rock obviously change with types of rock, heating ways and heating rates.
4.2 Mistakes in the course of planning and specification
Mistakes at the planning stage are related to poor design and engineering decisions on con-
struction and technological matters, disparity between the calculated arrangements of the
tunnel structures and nonobservance of the requirements stipulated in the specifications.
While it is impossible to anticipate all the geological conditions which can give rise to prob-
lems during the excavation of an underground opening, it is clearly necessary that every rea-
sonable effort should be made to obtain a complete picture of the ground characteristics at
an early stage in any project. This means that sufficient resources, both financial and man-
power, and enough time must be allowed for the geological data collection and site investiga-
tion phase of an underground excavation project.
Rock mass is inhomogeneous in nature. Data for underground structure designs are mainly
obtained from site investigations and tests, but they are very limited. For this reason, a great
deal of uncertainty is included in the construction of underground structures in a rock mass.
In a tunnel design, the main design parameters such as support pattern, advance rate and
excavation method must be determined optimally and optimized. However, it is difficult to
determine these parameters quantitatively. In addition, if these parameters are determined
incorrectly, unexpected risk occurs such as the decrease in the tunnel stability or economic
loss due to excessive amount of supports.
Faulty information on the physical properties of the soil, its strength, deformation and geo-
logical properties can lead to mistakes in the estimate of loading on the tunnel structures,
selection of the lining pattern, estimation of parameters for drilling and blasting, evaluation of
the strength of the temporary support, and selection of the excavation method and tunnel-
construction technology. In addition to the knowledge of the soils properties, it is necessary
to adequately evaluate the rock mass as a whole and its structural particularities, for example
the level of anisotropy, jointing and inhomogeneity. When tracing a tunnel in a direction that
does not match with the strike of the seams, there is a non-uniform load distribution along the
entire tunnel length causing probably a rock fall in the places where the tunnel undercuts the
strata of unstable soils. With the tunnels in stratified soils, it is necessary to accurately know
the stratification of the soil mass to avoid a lay-out of the tunnel in the contact boundary of
two soils with different properties.
The structural geological conditions which take place on any particular site are a product of
the geological history of the surrounding region. Hence the rock types, folds, faults and joints
in the relatively small rock volume with which the designer is concerned form part of a much
larger pattern which reflects the major geological processes to which the region was sub-
jected. Knowledge of these major geological processes can sometimes be of great benefit in
building up a detailed geological picture of the site since it will tend to suggest structural
trends which may not be obvious from the mass of detailed information available at a more
local level. Geological studies have been carried out in most areas of the world and these
studies are generally recorded in papers submitted to scientific journals or on maps which
may be available in local libraries, universities or government geological organisations. It is
important that any such information covering the area under study should be located and
studied as early as possible in the project.
Tunnel failures have occurred due to failure at the planning stage to locate underground
structures such as wells, culverts, abandoned foundations or mines and unfilled or poorly
filled boreholes, not being dissimilar to unpredicted geological features.
For example, Bickel et al. (1996) reported that 898 piles were encountered in the excavation
during construction of a tunnel in San Francisco. This was more than double the highest es-
timate. These piles were mostly unrecorded relics of earlier construction abandoned after
fires, which regularly ravaged the area during the late 19th century, as well as those left be-
hind by successive reclamation operations, which moved the waterfront several hundred me-
ters into the bay over a few decades. Thus, the lengths of pile left in place above the tunnel
eventually crept downward as they sought to carry the weight of soil adhering to them as well
as the artificial fill above. It would be possible to multiply examples endlessly, but the key to
all such problems is to gather the maximum available information, project the worst scenario,
and be prepared to deal with it as an engineering problem rather than an economic problem.
Other planning band specification mistakes reported include such as:

Tunnel level is too high leading to an inadequate competent ground cover to the tunnel
Excavation and support measures were specified without regard to the geological features
Faulty ground classification system leading to inappropriate support
Inadequate specification of construction materials
Inadequate specification of tolerances on profiles or levels
Inadequate specification of lining repair procedures
Inadequate planning for the unexpected or for emergency measures
Wrong excavation method
By way of example inadequate planning or improper design can contribute to and increase
the occurrence of burst in underground openings. The sequence of excavating and interac-
tion between adjacent openings or workings are important factors to consider. For a simpli-
fied case, an opening creates a pressure arch or abutment zone around the opening. The
excavating and blasting during development also create a stress-relieved zone in the prox-
imity of the opening. Developing tunnels or drifts within the abutment zone created by other
workings or high-stress areas may result in violent burst. Therefore underground structures
that cause or enhance stress concentrations are locations for many and severe bursts, which
can be significantly reduced if proper planning is implemented.
4.3 Calculation or numerical mistakes
Once the characteristics of the rock mass have been measured in the field and in the labora-
tory, they need to be quantified or assessed for input to design of tunnels. In general, the
values of the mechanical properties of rocks, such as strength and modulus, are assumed to
fit the normal distribution and the arithmetic mean is considered as the representative value
for use in design. Rock masses have originally many discontinuities. Therefore, mechanical
parameters of discontinuities considering the dimensions of structures due to the change of
stress condition are important to design tunnels.
Calculation or numerical mistakes arise both during design and construction, the latter fre-
quently in connection with the monitoring data. In accordance to other reported mistakes
there are further typical incidents owing to calculation or numerical mistakes such as:
Adoption of incorrect design calculation parameters
Insufficient allowance for the effect of water
Use of inappropriate and/or unvalidated computer programs
Numerical mistakes in gathering tunnel monitoring data
Failure to process numerical monitoring data fast enough
Inherent complexities in material
With reference to inherent complexities in material the following three subtitles are to illus-
trate exemplary the potential sources of trouble or rather difficulties coming up in the course
of calculation.
4.3.1 Rock fracture
Fracture of conventional engineering material occurs in a tensile stress field, and sophisti-
cated theories have been postulated to explain the pre-failure and post-failure performance
of these media. The stress fields operating in rock structures are pervasively compressive,
so that the established theories are not immediately applicable to the fracture of rock. A par-
ticular complication in rock subject to compression is associated with friction mobilised be-
tween the surfaces of the microcracks which are the sites for fracture initiation. This causes
the strength of rock to be highly sensitive to confining stress, and introduces doubts concern-
ing the relevance of such notions as the normality principle, associated flow and plasticity
theories generally, in analysing the strength and post-failure deformation properties of rock.
A related problem is the phenomenon of localisation, in which rupture in a rock medium is

expressed as the generation of bands of intensive shear deformation, separating domains of
apparently unaltered rock material.
4.3.2 Size effects
The response of rock to imposed load shows a pronounced effect of the size of the loaded
volume. This effect is related in part to the discontinuous nature of a rock mass. Joints and
other fractures of geological origin are ubiquitous features in a body of rock, and thus the
strength and deformation properties of the mass are influenced by both the properties of the
rock material and those of the various structural geological features. These effects may be
appreciated by considering various scales of loading to which a rock mass is subjected in
mining practice. The process of rock drilling will generally reflect the strength properties of
the intact rock, since the process operates by inducing rock material fracture under the drill-
ing tool. Mining a drive in jointed rock may reflect the properties of the joint system. In this
case, the final cross section of the opening will be defined by the joint attitudes. The behav-
iour of the rock around the periphery of the drive may reflect the presence of discrete blocks
of rock, whose stability is determined by frictional and other forces acting on their surfaces.
On a larger scale the jointed mass may demonstrate the properties of a pseudo-continuum.
These considerations suggest that the specification of the mechanical properties of a rock
mass is not s simple matter. In particular, the unlikely possibility of testing jointed rock
specimens, at scales sufficient to represent the equivalent continuum satisfactorily, indicates
that it is necessary to postulate and verify methods of synthesising rock mass properties from
those of the constituent elements.
4.3.3 Zone of influence of an excavation
The concept of a zone of influence is important in tunnel design, since it may provide consid-
erable simplification of a design problem. The essential idea of a zone of influence is that it
defines a domain of significant disturbance of the pre-mining stress field by an excavation. It
differentiates between the near field and far field of an opening. It is important to note that, in
general, the zone of influence of an opening is related to both excavation shape and pre-
mining stresses.
4.4 Mistakes during construction of a tunnel
Mistakes at the construction stage are resumed to a poor quality of tunnelling, use of defec-
tive materials and tools, violation of design variables and specification requirements. Un-
timely and unduly made heading support in poorly stable and unstable soils can lead to cav-
ing. Nonobservance of technological specifications and labour safety regulations, for exam-
ple while working with compressed air, can result in water and ground inrush into the head-
ing.
For example, the ground vibrations produced by inadequate use of explosives for construc-
tion of a tunnel, or construction near the tunnel, could potentially damage the tunnel or re-
lease roof caving. When an explosive contained in a borehole is detonated, the high pres-
sure gasses generated by the explosion impact the walls of the borehole and generate an
intense pressure wave which travels outwards into the rock. In the immediate vicinity of the
borehole wall, the stresses can exceed the strength of the rock and the rock will be shattered
and crushed. Since the intensity of the stresses falls off rapidly with distance from the bore-
hole, the rock behaviour will range from plastic deformation to brittle elastic fracturing and the
particle size will increase rapidly with distance from the borehole wall. Outside this zone in
which the compressive strength of the rock is exceeded, a zone of radial cracks will be
formed by the tangential tensile stress component of the stress field induced by the explo-
sion. These radial cracks will continue to propagate radially as long as the tangential tensile
stress at the crack tips exceeds the tensile strength of the rock. Therefore, the blast should
break the rock efficiently and economically as well as the rock mass left behind should be
damaged as little as possible. The potential damage to a structure that would result from
blast vibrations will be a function of the nature of the source, the ground and the structure.
A wide range of construction errors, too numerous to tabulate in full, have been recorded
covering almost all aspects of the construction work. Unfortunately, they are also often due to
unqualified or wrongly deployed staff. Some of the most common are such as:
Lining not constructed to specified thickness
Insufficient shotcrete strength and thickness, causing a decrease in the resistance of the
permanent lining
Belated placing of the means of support, thus increasing the unsupported length of the
tunnel and reducing the bearing reserves
Faulty installation of rock anchors and lattice arches
Faulty installation of ground freezing pipes
Incorporation of excavated material, and rebound in the invert concrete

Poor profiling of the invert
Improper reworking, where loosening blasting was too heavy or where areas were ex-
posed that were too large
Badly executed lining repairs
Disregard or misinterpretation of the report
4.5 Management and control mistakes
It is never possible beforehand to obtain complete information on the strata which will be en-
countered by a tunnel and to anticipate their behaviour. Therefore, provision must be made
for observation and any other necessary investigation during construction. This investigation
aims at continuously updating the acquired information and to check the validity of the prog-
noses. It comprises mappings of the tunnel face and wall, measurements of deformations,
settlements, stresses, vibrations and groundwater.
The check-up of stability during construction commences with a comparison between various
predictions at the time of the planning and design stage and the measurements at the con-
struction stage. If necessary, the modification of designs and changes of construction proce-
dures have to be carried out, in order to assure safety during construction. For this purpose,
planning of observations and measurements is made prior to construction. The standard sec-
tions as well as predicted troublesome sections are chosen as measuring points, and instru-
ments are installed in these points before or immediately after the progress of excavation.
The geotechnical conditions, such as distribution of the geological structure, rock properties,
seams and joints are recorded together with the progress of excavation of access and other
tunnels, the arch and side walls. Also, the geotechnical conditions of the overall rock mass
should be studied and forecasted, even to unexcavated portions, and modifications of the
geological maps and profiles should be done with the progress of excavation. Data obtained
from various measurements have to be immediately examined, in order to check whether the
work is proceeding as safely as expected. In order to evaluate safety conditions during con-
struction, it is necessary to compare the figures obtained from measuring the instruments
installed in various places with those from the FEM analysis, for instance. Based on the re-
sults, the behaviour around the cavern is examined and the judgement of safety is made.
The ultimate inflow of groundwater into tunnels and caverns requires the use of control
measures before and during construction. If the location and quantity of potentially large in-
flow are well-established through investigations in the planning stage, the choice of a new
location for the tunnel or use of a parallel drainage tunnel may be appropriate. This is espe-
cially true when the rock mass is likely to deteriorate under the influence of the inflow.
Further management and control mistakes cited in the literature as leading to the collapse of
tunnels include such as:
Retention of incompetent or inexperienced designers
Incompetent or inexperienced site management
Management’s inability to learn from past experience, both good and bad
Retention of incompetent or inexperienced construction contractors
Poor supervision of construction work
Allowing the wrong sequence of tunnel construction in multi-tunnel situations
Failure to act on monitoring data
4.6 Interruptions and breaks
Even in tunnelling for other carriers, collapses repeatedly occurred shortly after the resump-
tion of work following a holiday shut-down. These collapses probably occurred as a result of
the considerable difference in stiffness between the old, hardened and the freshly placed
shotcrete shell. Due to the higher stiffness, loads are concentrated on the area of the hard-
ened shotcrete shell to a higher degree than originally assumed. Additionally, the resumption
of work causes a disturbance of an already consolidated state of stress.
4.7 Mistakes in communication and organisation
For example, mistakes in communication and organisation can occur in the areas of informa-
tion flow or decision-making (Isaksson, 2002). An example of failure in the information flow
process can occur when measuring results are:
Not gathered,
Gathered, but measurements not made,
Gathered but interpreted incorrectly,
Gathered and correctly interpreted but the incorrect measurements are taken.
5 Failure mechanisms
5.1 Aspects concerning rock and soil mechanics
5.1.1 Failure criteria
In tunnels, unlike other structures, the ground acts not only as the loading mechanism, but as
the primary supporting medium as well. When the excavation is made, the strength of the
ground keeps the hole open until supports are installed. Even after supports are in place, the
ground provides a substantial percentage of the load-carrying capacity. Thus, for the tunnel
designer and builder, the rock or soil surrounding a tunnel is a construction material, and its
characteristics are as important as those of the concrete or steel used in other aspects of the
work.
Tunnels are driven both in soil and in rock. The transition between soil and rock is not sharp,
and there are many kinds of rock, which may be considered either as soft rock or as soil. If
one refrains from the separation by arrays of joints, the strength of rock is usually modelled in
the same way as the strength of soil. The differences are then quantitative, but not qualita-
tive.
Soil and/or rock classifications can either be descriptive of the materials themselves or be
based on how they behave during tunnel construction. The classification systems take on
different characteristics depending whether they are describing soil or rock. Rock mass de-
scriptions are even more complex than soils. Aside from the obvious greater strength of the
intact rock, the major difference in the behaviour of rock from that of soils is the dominant
effect of the anisotropy or other discontinuities in the rock mass. The stresses which exist in
an undisturbed rock mass are related to the weight of the overlaying strata and the geologi-
cal history of the rock mass. This stress field is disturbed by the creation of an underground
excavation inducing sometimes stresses which are high enough to exceed the strength of the
rock. In these cases, failure of the rock adjacent to the excavation boundary can lead to in-
stability which may take the form of gradual closure of the excavation and collapses which
are already listed.
Failure mechanisms are very often based on failure criteria meaning the state at which the
rock will fracture or attain the peak load (Mahtab and Grasso, 1992). Following there are
some well-known failure criteria listed:
Failure criterion of Coulomb (1773):

τ = c + σ ⋅ tan φ
Failure criterion of Mohr (1900):
τ = f (σ )
Criterion of Griffith (1924):
(σ 1 − σ 3 ) = 8 ⋅ T0 ⋅ (σ 1 + σ 3 )
2
σ1 + 3 ⋅σ 3 > 0
For
σ 3 = −T0 σ1 + 3 ⋅σ 3 < 0
Criterion of Hoek and Brown (1980):
1
σ 1 = σ 3 + ( m ⋅ C0 ⋅ σ 3 + s ⋅ C02 ) 2
Most experts (e.g. Rossmanith, 1992) accept that the classical stress-strain formulations as
well as the the classical linear elastic fracture mechanics are insufficient to deal with many
practical structural problems involving fracture of rocks. It is evident that the classical
analysis that is applied in all fields of rock engineering cannot predict the behaviour of rocks
beyond their elastic range. Numerical simulation based on a perfect plasticity model with
unlimited ductility does not provide any information on magnitudes of strains and
displacements occurring before failure. Therefore, there is a need for models which consider
the specific properties of these materials.
Shear fractures dominating the stability of tunnels are the most important features when the
strength of rock is exceeded. The mechanisms of failure occurring typically around tunnels
are often described by plastic continuum theory. However, at least in rather brittle rock it
becomes obvious that continuum mechanics does not reproduce correct behaviour because
of discrete shear failures which are beyond the limits of continuum mechanics.
In underground excavations, two types of instability conditons may develop as a result of

rock failure (Lee, 1980):
Defect-induced instability which appears in the form of loose joint blocks, wedges or slabs,
falling off locally from the roof or sidewalls
Stress-induced instability which appears in the form of rockburst or buckling of sidewalls,
roofs or inverts, and is due to the effect of stress redistribution upon excavation
5.1.2 Failure due to low tensile strength
Rock is distinguished from a lot of other common engineering materials by its low tensile
strength. Rock material specimens tested in uniaxial tension fail at stresses an order of
magnitude lower than when tested in uniaxial compression. Since joints and other fractures
in rock can offer little or no resistance to tensile stresses, the tensile strength of a rock mass
can be assumed to be non-existent. Therefore tensile stresses cannot be generated or
sustained in a rock mass. The implication of this property for excavation design in rock is that
any zone identified by analysis as being subject to tensile stress will be de-stressed, and
cause local stress redistribution. De-stressing may result in local instability in the rock,
expressed as either episodic or progressive detachment of rock units from the host mass.
5.1.3 Rock cavity roof collapse
If a rock cavity enlarges both the shear and tensile stresses in the cavity roof (Fig. 17), and
the compressive stresses in the cavity walls increase. As the cavern continues to enlarge,
tensile fissures may develop in the cavern roof, sometimes accompanied by diagonal shear
fissures about midway between the cavern roof crown and the side walls. The tensile crack-
ing allows blocks of rock to fall out of the roof, depending on the bedding and joint geometry
of the roof.
Fig. 17: Stresses in the rock surrounding a cavity [Sowers, 1996]
5.1.4 Microcollapses
A major collapse at the tunnel face appearing during boring or with an interval depending on
the geotechnical condtions is the result of the propagation of one or several microcollapses
occurring at the tunnel face vicinity and generally near the tunnel crown. Thus, a major col-
lapse can only occur if both a microcollapse happens near the tunnel crown and the collapse
has the possibility to spread up to surface layers or existing foundations.
On the one hand microcollapses are due to inadequate confinement conditions. That means
either an insufficient confinement pressure for the actual soil strength and water level, or too
poor slurry rheological property for the actual soil porosity and permeability. On the other
hand the possibility to spread up is bound to local geotechnical properties not only just
around the tunnel, but also of the upper layers. If these are strong enough, they make be
able to stop the collapse propagation thanks to arching effects. However, if a natural or artifi-
cial weak area exists above the initial microcollapse, it enhances this collapse spreading.
5.2 Deformations and ground displacements – preliminary stages of

collapses
Factors that determine which deformation mechanism will dominate are temperature, total
stress, differential stress, fluid pressure, composition, grain size, texture and strain rate as
defined by Goodman (1993).
Brittle deformation is concentrated in a rock mass along movement surfaces that have no
cohesion (Chernyshev and Dearman, 1991). This type of deformation is characterized by
megascopic breccias, gouge, fractures and faults, microbreccias, and microfractures. It
produces brittle granulation of rock at low temperature and low to moderate confining
pressure, but may be facilitated by high fluid pressure. Also, where strain rate is high, failure
occurs under brittle conditions by exceeding the elastic limit of the material. Some map-scale
fault zones contain rocks that resemble ductilely formed fault rocks, but microscopic
examination reveals that deformation was brittle and that the rock was granulated frictionally
to a very fine powder of unaltered grains. The process may also describe large-scale
changes in shape due to small-scale brittle fracturing.
Furthermore, creep mechanisms may involve mass transport or diffusion of atoms or ions at
grain boundaries, including pressure solution, climb of dislocations within a lattice, and
diffusion of point defects through lattices. Each is a separate mechanism that is most efficient
over a particular range of temperature, pressure, and grain size. Pressure solution consists
of of dissolution, under stress, of soluble constituents such as calcite or quartz, and is
generally active at low to moderate temperature in the presence of water. The process is
limited by the requirement of water between grains.
Creep processes depend on strain rate, but the amount of strain is not limited by strain rate.
These processes also overlap and compete with one another under the right conditions so
that more than one mechanism masy occur simultaneously, although one usually dominates.
Creep is slow but may result in large strains if it occurs over a long time interval, as with
mantle convection. With reference to Hatcher (1995) these mechanisms are sometimes
referred to as steady-state deformation mechanisms because they operate above threshold
values of pressure and temperature, and when initiated, continue unchecked until a
competing mechanism becomes more efficient as temperature or pressure increase, or the
fluid supply is exhausted, or until the energy supply is exhausted.
Settlements depend on geological, hydrogeological and geotechnical conditions, on the work

geometry and underground position as well as on methods of excavation. However, it is clear
that a shallow project is often more harmful and requires special monitoring.
Tunnelling disrupts the initial stress field as well as the hydrogeological conditions. Generally,
this stress modification is accompanied by instantaneous displacement of the face towards
excavation as well as convergence of the tunnel walls. In the specific case of soft grounds,
the pore pressure field modification may include long term displacements. The magnitude,
orientation and location of the soil mass points around the tunnel depend on the soil me-
chanical characteristics, geostatic stress, surface overloads, hydraulic conditions as well as
methods of excavation and support.
When the soil mass mechanical capabilities are locally exceeded, there occur many dis-
placements. They often pave the way to yielded zones. This situation is harmful, whether it
be for support or displacement limitation. Thus, if the walls are poorly confined, the dis-
placements around the excavation profiles may lead to a fracture zone rear of the face. If the
face is not adequately confined, this zone can spread ahead of the face.
Knowledge of fracture risks at the working face provides useful data to assess the settlement
likelihood as well as an estimate of immediate safety conditions during tunnelling insofar as
ground collapses at the face represent one of the main settlement causes and as they are
most likely to take place in poor stable conditions.
Whatever the subsoil nature is, the magnitude and distribution of settlements caused at the
surface by tunnelling works depend on the soil mass structure, deformability and anisotropy.
Of course, the soil mass behaviour is also influenced by the hydrologeological conditions of
the worksite. Consequently, the stability time is linked to the ground permeability.
In addition to the stability of the excavation face, the convergence of its walls influences the
deformations of the soil mass. It shall be remembered that the essential factor to reduce the
excavation wall convergences, which may generate possible settlements, is the immediate
installation of an adequately stiff support the nearest possible to the face, or even ahead of it.
5.3 Burst mechanisms
The exact causes of rock bursts are very difficult to determine, and reliable prediction is
nearly impossible (Hatcher, 1995). While localized high-stressed zones are common to all
burst occurrences, other factors may act independently or together to cause a burst.
Rock has the capacity to store large amounts of strain energy before failing. The higher the
maximum strain energy that can be stored in a given type of rock, the more likely the rock will
have the tendency to burst. The total energy stored depends on rock mechanical properties,
lateral confinement, and the magnitude of the applied stress. Magnitude of the stress is
largely dependent on the number, size, and shape of openings. Before the excavation, the
rock mass is in equilibrium. Entry opening development redistributes stress in the rock mass
and results in permanent deformation around the opening. Stress increases around the
opening until a critical level is reached, once the capacity of the rock to store strain energy is
reached, any additional stress will cause the rock to burst. Failures caused by impact loading
may also occur because failure of strong roofs in underground excavations can transmit an
induced stress wave over a great distance, resulting in simultaneous bursts over a large
area. This effect occurs when sudden loading causes high stresses to develop in a progres-
sive manner.
In underground excavations, geological features and rock physical properties are factors
over which the engineer has no control (Lutgens and Tarbuck, 1992). The location and orien-
tation of geological anomalies, such as faults, folds, dikes, and joints, often contribute to
burst conditions. Interactions between anomalies and bursts are difficult to quantify, and
opinions on the subject vary significantly. Increasing depths, thick overburdens, and steeply
dipping excavations are generally synonymous with burst conditions. Steep terrains, with
resulting fluctuation in overburden pressure, and strong overlying strata that may resist cav-
ing are contributing factors to bursts. In general, the extent and degree of geologic distur-
bance in a rock deposit can create burst-prone conditions and should be carefully studied
prior to planning underground excavations.
High stress build-up is closely related to the rock mass physical properties. The properties of
the rock in the opening zone and nearby strata have a significant effect on burst conditions.
The type of rock generally associated with rock burst is qualitatively described as hard,
strong, and brittle.
5.4 Blow-out failure
Compressed air can be an effective and productive means of stabilizing the soil and control-
ling groundwater, especially in granular, sandy soils below the water table or in squeezing
soft cohesive soils. However, Megaw and Bartlett (1981) reported that in loose sandy or silty
soils which are headed conventionally or with shield the application of compressed air is con-
nected with hazard. If the pressurized air pipes through the soil, it can abruptly escape, thus
causing a sudden pressure drop in the tunnel which can lead to collapse of the tunnel. In
escaping it expands and displaces water and fine material, and may well develop and
enlarge a channel or pipe to the surface, through which large volumes can escape, perhaps
catastrophically. It is in most cases announced with increasing air leakage.
The choice of air pressure for practical use is a matter of judgement. The level in the face at
which the selected air pressure balances the hydrostatic head (Fig. 18) is a convenient
measure to define pressure at any time. If the air pressure is balanced at the invert, the water
at the crown will be driven away from the tunnel. This can dry the sand, leading to possible
running conditions and even the risk of the air blow. If the air pressure is balanced at the
crown, the water at the invert will be under a pressure value, enough for troublesome flows of
water into the tunnel and possibly for flowing conditions to exist, as well as the tunnel will be
wetter with more danger of ground washing in and it may become more difficult to excavate
and line the invert.
Fig. 18: Air balance in tunnel [Megaw and Bartlett, 1981]

5.5 Chimney caving mechanisms
Three distinct chimney caving mechanisms may be identified as defined by Brady and Brown
(1985), each associated with different geological environments. These mechanisms are usu-
ally connected with weakness in the crown of a tunnel (Fig. 19), insufficient cover to overlay-
ing permeable water bearing strata (Fig. 20), or insufficient cover to overlaying deposit mate-
rials (Fig. 21). Furthermore, they can also be due to vertical fissures, pipes and man made
features, such as wells or sewer constructions.
The first mechanism occurs in weathered or weak rock, or in previously caved rock. It is a
progressive mechanism that starts with failure of the stope roof or hanging wall on inclined
surfaces. If a stable, self-supporting arch cannot be formed, the failure may progressively
propagate towards the surface. As materials falls from the roof or from the propagating cave,
it will bulk and will tend to fill the stope void. Unless the stope is initially large and open, or
unless sufficient material is progressively drawn from it, the stope will eventually become
filled with caved material which will provide support for the upper surface and so arrest the
development of the cave. It is for this reason that the development of chimney caving is so
closely associated with draw control. This progressive failure mechanism has been well es-
tablished in model studies of the failure of shallow tunnels in sand and clay and in model
studies of the mining of steeply dipping, tabular orebodies. It is most likely to occur when the
mechanical properties of the hanging-wall material are similar to those of a soil. Once initi-
ated, propagation of the failure to surface can be very rapid, above all in regions of insuffi-
cient cover (Fig. 22). This can give the impression that the cave reaches the surface instan-
taneously and that the mechanism is that of sudden plug subsidence rather than a progres-
sive one.
The second mechanism is also progressive, but occurs as a result of the unravelling of a
discontinuous rock mass. The rock material itself may be quite strong and may not fail except
in flexure. The mechanism is controlled by the regular discontinuities in the rock mass. As in
the previous case, a sufficient void must be maintained beneath the cave if it is to continue to
propagate.
The third mechanism, i.e. the plug subsidence, differs from the other two in that it is con-
trolled by one or more major structural features which provide low shear strength surfaces on
which the plug of undercut rock may slide under the influence of gravity. In this case, the
mass of rock will undergo essentially rigid-body displacement without breaking up or dilating.
Thus, a vertical displacement at the stope boundary will result in a vertical displacement of
similar magnitude at the surface. Although an initial void must exist for this mechanism to
occur, the development of this type of chimney cave is not as closely associated with draw
control as are the other two types.
When a tunnel is driven at depth in relatively weak rock, a range of effects may be encoun-
tered, from squeezing through popping to explosive failure of the rock mass. Heavy loading
may also result from the effects of tunnelling in swelling clays or chemically active materials
such as anhydrite. Furthermore, mixed face conditions are a source of numerous potential
problems, especially where hardness varies greatly. At the face, fall-out of hard blocks from a
soft matrix causes potential cutter head blockage of a TBM.
Fig. 19: Weakness in crown [HSE, 1999]
Fig. 20: Insufficient cover to overlaying permeable water bearing strata [HSE, 1999]
Fig. 21: Tunnel tapping an ancient river bed [Whittaker and Frith, 1990]
Fig. 22: Insufficient cover to surface [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
5.6 Stand-up time – Stability of the tunnel face
In most cases the ground itself is not stable and face stability is achieved by applying fluid
pressure to the tunnel front, although the excavation face is stable for a certain stand-up
time. This fact has been discussed in the literature, Kolymbas (2005) and Leca & Dormieux
(1990). The delay of collapse is attributable partly to creep of the ground and partly to pore
water pressure. The amount of material involved in these mechanisms is limited, but such
geometries could be representative of initial ground movements that could lead to larger
scale failures (Fig. 23).
a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 23: Different types of failures: a) Bench failure, b) Crown failure, c) Full face failure, d) Local face
failure [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
Stability of the tunnel face is a function of many variables of which the more important appear
to be type of soil and variability, size and geometry of opening, existing hydrostatic condition,
past and existing state of stress, and excavation method and support (Anagnostou and
Kovari, 1992).
The stability of the unsupported tunnel excavation and the face of the excavation determine
the methods and means of construction and generally dictate the time at which tunnel sup-
port must be applied. The construction of every soft ground tunnel is associated with some
change in the state of stress in the ground surrounding the tunnel with corresponding in-
duced strains and displacements. These induced strains and displacements are not neces-
sarily bad for they allow the mobilization of the soils inherent strength to support the excava-
tion. However, if they exceed the strength of the soil, they can result in excessive movements
or failure of the soil itself if these movements are allowed to continue without the support of
the opening, threatening the stability of the excavation allowing large movements of sur-
rounding ground. In less extreme cases the instability of the face and sidewalls may manifest
itself as cave-ins or as a slow creep and plastic flow into the excavation.
According to Terzaghi’s consolidation theory, a load suddenly applied on a water-saturated

cohesive soil acts, in the first instance, only upon the pore water. It is gradually transmitted to
the grain skeleton, to the extent that the pore water is squeezed out. Due to the excavation of
a tunnel, exactly the same procedure occurs at unloading. Initially, the pressure in the pore
water is reduced. The effective stresses are thus increased and, subsequently, reduced to
the extent that water from the environment is sucked into the voids. This reduction can finally
lead to cave-in. Consequently the less permeable the ground, the larger the delay of the
cave-in is.
Furthermore, three failure mechanisms (Fig. 24 - 26) involving the movement of solid conical
blocks with circular cross-sections can be considered. Mechanisms a) and b) are typical col-
lapse mechanisms, whereas mechanism c) refers to blow-out failure (compare to Chapter
5.5). For most conditions, failure can not reach the ground surface and mechanism a) as well
as b) can be considered as local collapse mechanisms. However, such mechanisms could
lead to some larger scale failure with the formation of sink holes, since a large amount of soil
would be left unsupported once initial collapse of the tunnel face had occurred.
Fig. 24: Failure mechanism a) [Leca & Dormieux, 1990]
Fig. 25: Failure mechanism b) [Leca & Dormieux, 1990]
Fig. 26: Failure mechanism c) [Leca & Dormieux, 1990]
The stability of a tunnel face in cohesionless materials such as uncemented sand, silts, and
gravels is essentially controlled by the groundwater conditions and effects of the construction
method used. Excavations in this material can be carried out only by providing complete pro-
tection to the face and excavated parameter of the tunnel. Above the groundwater table
these soils will not generally stand unsupported but will ravel until a stable slope is formed at
the face with a slope equal to the angle of repose of the soil material in such a loose state. In
many instances granular soils above the moisture table contain enough soil moisture to cre-
ate a small apparent cohesion which may be sufficient to allow erection of an initial support
system if the erection time is small enough to prevent drying and the mechanically induced
vibration of the construction process from destroying this effect, otherwise full breasting or
forepoling may be required to support the tunnelled face. Failure to do so will allow runs to
develop. Runs may also develop into cavities and unfilled voids outside the initial or rather
final support system which remain open temporarily but may collapse following excavation
and lead to surface subsidence at a later time. Unless groundwater is adequately drained
from ahead of such soil masses, even small seepage gradients may induce large ground
movements or runs which completely invade the heading. The control of groundwater then
becomes paramount. Dewatering may be applied to drain the soil, however, the general
stratified and lenticular nature of most soil deposits makes the complete drainage of all zones
unlikely allowing imperfect drainage of others. Coarser and more permeable zones will be
well drained and tunnelling advance satisfactory until a poorly drained area is encountered
and a run may develop. Fine grained soils may also be easily transported through even the
smallest of cracks in lagging or initial support systems or poorly cast joints in the final lining
for the smallest of flows. Loss of such ground around the lining system once erected may be
result in a run which may deprive the support system of the necessary restraining ground
reaction, inducing failure of the lining system.
Observations of built tunnels as well as mathematical approaches and physical models have
shown that for purely cohesive ground, the face stability can be expressed by a critical value
of the “load factor” which compares the stresses acting at the level of the tunnel axis with the
available cohesion. For frictional ground, the mathematical approach is more complex. Meth-
ods based on the plasticity theory suggest upper and lower bound solutions which can be
considered as a good design aid.
Cohesive granular soils such as clayey sands, sandy clays or cohesive silts behave admira-
bly with sufficient stand-up time to allow support of the excavation. Losses of ground are
typically associated with the infilling of the annular space behind the tunnelling shield once
the support system is erected and emerges from the shield. Ravelling may develop if support
is not provided or installed in sufficient time. The use of a shield is considered a prudent pre-
cautionary measure to forestall such problems. Where stand-up time is long enough to allow
erection of an initial support system behind the shield, expansion or immediate grout injec-
tions may be beneficial to minimize the infilling of the annular space. If allowed to begin, rav-
elling of such ground may continue to persist and where these soils exhibit sensitivity to ad-
verse seepage gradients, they must be predrained in advance of tunnelling to minimize
catastrophic ground losses.
Soils comprising nonswelling stiff or hard clays are not likely to be adversely influenced by
seepage gradients towards the tunnel face or subjected to ravelling. Some such ground does
possess relic or secondary structures such as slickensided joints. Further saturated clays
ranging from soft to stiff are characterized by undrained shear strengths and comprise a rela-
tively large number of naturally occurring clay strata generally found at shallower depths and
which are also generally impervious. Movement of the ground during tunnelling occurs as a
longitudinal or inward movement into the shield without any visible signs of distress or soil
ravelling. This process continues for the duration of the jacking and excavation process itself
and generally seems to diminish once these activities are stopped. The minimization of
ground movements may be established by filling the annular void created during the tunnel-
ling process.
When the state of fracturing and/or weathering of the rock mass to be excavated is such that
major instabilities occur at the excavation face with falling down of blocks and fine materials,
which does not stop until equilibrium is attained causing large over-excavations, it is possible
to arrive at a limiting situation for the functioning of shielded TBM’s for rock. In this situation,
the advance of the machine may be hampered for two fundamental reasons. Concerning the
first one, the cutter head can no longer rotate because the accumulated, failed materials act
against or block the head. With regard to the second reason, the over-excavation caused by
the instability is such that cavities are formed in front of the TBM, which suggest stopping the
advance and treating the problem before the situation self excites and eventually becomes
uncontrollable. This is a typical limiting situation which also affects shielded TBM’s of any
type.
5.7 Rock fall in the area of the unsupported length
This type of collapse mechanism involves leaching of the work face and/or an above-lying
chimney when encountering geological fault zones or driving through layers that interrupt the
groundwater flow. An inadequate stand-up time allows material to cave or to be eroded by
water at a faster rate than the machine advance, for instance, resulting in a void when the
penetration into unstable faulted ground has been taken too far (Fig. 27) without the neces-
sary probe drilling and pre-treatment. The void may take the form of a chimney or inverted
trench, or may extend the diameter of the tunnel on one or both sides.
1 2
Fig. 27: Typical TBM problems in faulted rock with very short stand-up time [Barton, 2000]
5.8 Failure of lining before or after ring closure
With reference to Whittaker & Frith (1990) and Bickel et al. (1996) tunnel lining behaviour is a
four-dimensional problem. During construction, ground conditions at the tunnel heading in-
volve both transverse arching and longitudinal arching or cantilevering from the unexcavated
face. All ground properties are time-dependent, particularly in the short term, which leads to
the commonly observed phenomenon of stand-up time, without which most practical tunnel
construction methods would be impossible. The timing of lining installation is an important
variable.
The most serious structural problems encountered with actual lining behaviour are related to
absence of support rather than to intensity and distribution of load. In virtually all cases, the
bending strength and stiffness of structural linings are small compared with those of the sur-
rounding ground. The properties of the ground control the deformation of the lining, and
changing the properties of the lining will not significantly change this deformation. The proper
criterion for judging lining behaviour is therefore not adequate strength to resist bending
stresses, but adequate ductility to conform to imposed deformations. Design of a tunnel lining
is not a structural problem, but a ground-structure interaction problem, with the emphasis on
the ground.
When the stresses around a newly-excavated tunnel exceed the rock strength, failure oc-
curs. Tunnel supports usually are not sufficiently stiff and strong, and generally they cannot
be installed early enough to maintain a stress state in which the rock remains intact. Even if it
were possible to construct such a support, it would not necessarily be the most economical
one, because it would not allow the mobilization of the significant residual strength of the
surrounding rock. Optimizing a support system will require this mobilization. Therefore it is
necessary to analyze the consequences of rock failure on the stress distribution around a
tunnel. Failed rock has a reduced strength, and the propagation of failure causes stress re-
laxation. Pronounced relaxation can lead to a situation where local gravity effects around the
tunnel can no longer be ignored.
With reference to collapses in the area of the supported top heading, there is a three-
dimensional state of stress within one or two times the diameter around the top heading work
face, whereas this state of stress is two-dimensional further toward the back of the tunnel.
The transition zone is a weak point because the shotcrete has not yet developed its full
strength in the area of the work face, and the bearing capacity of the rock is lower at the rear
on account of the missing third stress component. During the setting time and hardening pe-
riod, the strength and the Young’s modulus of the shotcrete increase progressively. The high
deformability of the fresh shotcrete may help to sustain considerable tunnel convergences
without failure. This property may explain the frequently observed high efficiency of a thin
shotcrete layer installed as a primary support. A top heading that is already in a critical state
due to overestimated rock properties of faulty execution may fail in this transition zone. The
collapse may occur all the earlier, the higher the rate of advance and the slower the devel-
opment of shotcrete strength.
In top heading the upper part of the tunnel is excavated first and supported with shotcrete
lining. This lining constitutes a sort of arch footings of which must be safely founded, i.e. the
vertical force exerted by the overburden is to be introduced into the subsoil. If the abutment
pressure is not high enough, displacement of the ground in the base of the arch or shotcrete
support happens resulting in its sinking, and bearing failure of the arch footings (Fig. 28) can
occur.
Fig. 28: Bearing failure of arch footings [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
The temporary support of the crown with shotcrete can be conceived as a sort of arch bridge.
This explains why the abutments are prone to settlements, which induce settlements of the
ground surface. Countermeasures are to enlarge the abutments, to strengthen them with
micropiles or the construction of a temporary invert.
Fig. 29: Failure due to horizontal movement of arch footing [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
During bench excavation, the free height of the tunnel is increased. Because with the usual
lateral pressure, the highest loads occur in the side walls, this construction stage is very criti-
cal, particularly if large fissures occur parallel to the strike in close proximity to the cavity , if
the side wall zones have only limited bearing capacity or if the top heading invert has to be
dismantled.
The initiation of sidewall fracture (Fig. 30) is dependent upon the geometrical shape of the
excavation. In the case of the square tunnel, the high stress concentration in the sharp cor-
ners results in fracture initiation at a vertical applied pressure of two times as much as cracks
start in the roof. The critical crack trajectories suggest that this fracture would propagate in
such a way that slabbing of the sidewall would occur. In the case of the elliptical tunnel, side-
wall failure can be anticipated at a pressure 70% higher than at the square tunnel and this
failure would probably take the form of sidewall scaling. The fact that this scaling occurs at
such a high stress level is important. Practical experience in deep-level mines which use
both square and elliptical cross-sections confirms that the elliptical tunnel, at the same depth,
has a lower tendency to sidewall failure and requires less maintenance and support in the
form of rock bolting. In all cases, however, the high stress concentrations in the corners of
the excavation will result in fracture initiation at these points. The directions of fracture
propagation alsop suggest that this fracture will propagate in such a way that slabbing of the
sidewall would occur.
Fig. 30: Failure of side gallery wall [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
Another failure mechanism is due to shear failure (Fig. 31) which is caused by genuine rock
pressure (John, 2002). In the stage of the elastic deformation, the rock mass behaves elasti-
cally and is characterized by shortening of the vertical diameter and lengthening of the hori-
zontal diameter of the tunnel. It is assumed that the ratio of horizontal to vertical component
of the primary stress field is smaller than unity. Afterwards, in the stage of forming of shear
wedge, the strength of the rock mass is reached in the sidewalls and formation of a failure
zone occurs. The failure phenomena which appear at this stage may differ widely depending
on the type of rock and may vary from plastic deformation to brittle fracture such as sidewall
spalling. This spalling may even occur suddenly and may happen in the form of rockbursts.
When the two wedges of failed rock deform and move towards the excavation, the actual
span of the opening is increased. Further convergence of roof and floor will occur in the
stage of stress increase in roof and invert, and may result in failure of roof and floor. Tensile
cracks in the roof stem from stable crack propagation or are suppressed in case of a high
horizontal stress field.
Fig. 31: Shear failure [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
In addition there are further failure mechanisms including such as compression failure (Fig.
32a), punching failure (Fig. 32b), and combined bending and thrust (Fig. 32c,d). These fail-
ure mechanisms can lead to or rather comprise one of the following types of rock falls
(Vlasov et al., 2001):
Deformations and destruction of the calotte shotcrete support because of considerable
local differentials in rock pressure, in particular with loading concrete at its early stage
Violation of stability of lateral benches and subsequent destruction of the calotte channel
Turning off the side adits as a result of rock movement
Destruction of the primary lining in the spots of concentrated loads caused, for example,
by presence of karts voids filled with an unconsolidated material saturated with water
a) b)
c) d)
..........................................................................................................................
Fig. 32: Different types of failure mechanisms: a) Compression failure; b) Punching failure; c) and d)
Combined bending and thrust [Health and Safety Executive, 1999]
5.9 Squeezing and swelling ground behaviour
Heaving of the floor (Fig. 33) is a commonly encountered phenomenon in tunnels especially
in weak sedimentary strata (Whittaker & Frith, 1990). Weak plastic floor beds are sensitive to
stress change in addition to susceptibility to damage by support penetration and weakening
by the action of water. An extrusion into the tunnel excavation by a weak floor in the form of
heaving is essentially representative of the line of least resistance. Furthermore, heaving
ground surrounding a tunnel excavation causes general distortion of the support system and
can frequently result in support damage at particular positions around the excavation. Addi-
tionally, ground extrusion (Fig. 34) can occur around steel girders. Heaving and swelling
ground effects (Fig. 35) on rectangular tunnel profiles commonly result in significant bending
of the roof and invert support girders in addition to inward deflection of the side support mem-
bers. The general bowing of the girder supports can eventually lead to becoming unstable
especially when the joints become distorted, sheared or twisted during the deformation proc-
ess. Where a localised band within strata is sensitive to stress and water, then extrusion into
the tunnel can induce localised damage to the support system.
Fig. 33: Heaving ground [Whittaker & Frith, 1990]
Fig. 34: Extrusion into the tunnel [Whittaker & Frith, 1990]
Fig. 35: Heaving and swelling ground effects [Whittaker & Frith, 1990]
6 Case study No.1: Lausanne Metro M2

6.1 System and project
Line M2 of the Lausanne metro2 in Switzerland consists in building a new section between
Flon and Croisettes and replacing a funicular railway that connects the centre of the city with
Lake Geneva.
Fig. 36: Projet m2 - Métro Lausanne-Ouchy [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
2
in conformity with the authority of Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA
Lausanne is the capital of the Swiss canton of Vaud on the northern shore of Lake Geneva
(Lac Leman) in the French speaking part of Switzerland (Appendix, Fig. 69). The Olympic
Capital spreads out over the hills along the lake, where trolley buses run up and down the
serpentine roads to the old city centre near Flon. In 1877 a funicular railway opened to con-
nect the lakeside resort of Ouchy along the lake to the city centre of Flon. This single track
line, which was only double track at Montriond station to allow crossing of trains, was con-
verted to rack railway operation in 1958. It was operated with two 2-car-trains using a kind of
electric locomotive. Trains provide a fast and frequent service between Flon and Ouchy via
the Swiss Federal Railways Station. The line is now referred to as Metro-Ouchy or M2.
Metro-Gare is a special shuttle service between Flon and Gare CFF using a separate track in
the same tunnel between these two stations. On 22nd January 2006 the original Metro-
Ouchy was closed. This section is now being upgraded (Fig. 37) and double-tracked to be
connected to the new Flon-Croisettes section.
Fig. 37: Upgraded section between Flon and Ouchy [Seidenfuss, 2006]
The new automatic metro will be about 6.4 km long and will have slopes averaging 5.7% with
a maximum point reaching 12% to climb an elevation difference of 340 metres. The metro
leads from the lake promenade at Ouchy to the suburb of Epalinges located above
Lausanne. More than 70 % of its length runs underground. The section Flon-Croisettes con-
sists of 2,884 metres of tunnels driven by underground means and 260 metres of cut-and-
cover tunnels. The underground stations are not included in these lengths. The tunnel pro-
files vary from 9.94 m wide x 6.74 m high to 11.7 m wide x 7.61 m high. The work on all tun-
nels is progressing simultaneously. The system is scheduled to go into service in 2008 and
should have the capacity to transport 70,000 people per day.
6.2 Excavation method
The tunnelling method has required a fleet of two small roadheaders for tunnelling in top
heading and bench sequence and five big roadheaders (Fig. 38) for full section tunnelling.
Using top heading the crown is excavated before the bench.
The roadheaders have the ability to cut these sections as part of their standard cutting range
without the need for machine repositioning, allowing for a faster work cycle. These tools are
used for moderate rock strengths and for laminated or joined rock. The cutter is mounted on
an extension arm of the excavator and mills the rock into small pieces. Thus, overprofiling
can be limited and also the loosening of the surrounding rock is widely avoided.
The main design features of the roadheader are those of flexibility in operation, the ability to
cut a range of tunnel shapes and its manoeuvrability for cutting mine roadway junctions
(Maidl & Schmid, 2001). Stratified rock conditions which contain a significantly wide weak
band within the tunnel allow the opportunity for it to be cut firstly. Consequently, this provides
a measure of stress relief and weakening of the remaining beds forming the tunnel section
thereby easing subsequent excavation. The use of water jet operating can make significant
reductions in pick cutting forces. High pressure water jet assisted cutting essentially contrib-
utes to improving the cutting rate whilst decreasing the cutting specific energy and make of
dust. Roadheaders have been applied to increasingly strong rock conditions. This has
prompted the development of heavy duty types of machines with the result of considerably
increasing the scope of application of such tunnelling machines. Furthermore, automatic
guidance of a roadheader gives increased scope for improved tunnel profile excavation and
machine steering. Cutting can progress irrespective of the lack of visibility caused by the dust
created. Hydraulic impact hammers can eliminate the need for drilling and blasting at the
tunnel face. An important advantage is that of being able to simultaneously load out broken
rock whilst excavation is in progress, providing the tunnel has sufficient cross-sectional area.
This form of tunnelling machine is best suited to geological conditions where fissured and
well-defined layered strata exist.
Fig. 38: Eickhoff roadheader ET 380 [http://www.tunnelsonline.info/]
Almost all of the stations have been built with cut-and-cover method, except the Place de
l’Ours and Bessières stations, which have been constructed in top heading and bench se-
quence. The Fourmi station quite close to the motorway A9 has been built from a shaft in a
cavern excavated in divided sequence horizontally.
All the spoil is mucked away by loaders and dumpers, and is reused in La Sallaz for land-
scaping purpose and stored at a dump site between Vennes and Croisettes. The support
consists of 15-20 cm of steel fibre-reinforced shotcrete, HEB steel arches, lattice girders,
Swellex and other bolts.
6.3 Exceptional challenges
The 136 m-long Langallerie tunnel cutting through the pillars of Bessières Bridge (Fig.) is the
most expensive part of the M2 project, at CHF 100,000 per metre (http://www.Tunnelbuilder.
net/frmain.php, 12-04-2006).
Fig. 39: Pillar of Bessières Bridge [Seidenfuss, 2006]
In accordance with Fabio Soares, consulting engineer of the client, tunnelling in a top head-
ing and bench sequence has been adopted due to water-bearing ground with poor cohesion
and high compressibility. Instead of full section tunnelling, which would increase the risk of
collapse, crews excavate two small parallel tunnels, at the right and left handsides of the
tunnel. These sidewalls tunnels or galleries (Fig. 40 and Fig. 41) are excavated and sup-
ported first (Fig. 40,c ). They serve as abutment for the support of the crown, which is sub-
sequently excavated. With regard to their extent they measure approximately three metres in
width and four metres in height.
Once tunnelling is complete, the walls are concreted to shape stiff supports for the top head-
ing of the main tunnel. Then, back to the starting point, crews drive the top heading (Fig.
40,d ) above the two sidewalls already completed. In technical language top heading means
that the crown is excavated before the bench. The temporary support of the crown with shot-
crete can be conceived as a sort of arch bridge.
The next stage is the excavation of the middle bench between the two sidewall tunnels (Fig.
40,e ) and the last phase is the invert. The tunnel is therefore built in four stages. The face
and crown of the sidewalls tunnels are treated with jet grouting, by injecting prior to excava-
tion a high pressure cement grout into the ground. Then crews dig in this solidified aggre-
gate. The same technique is employed to drive the tunnel crown. Near CHUV station, soft
ground required the construction of umbrella vaults.
Umbrella vault
Crown drivage
Middle Bench
Left Sidewall gallery Right Sidewall gallery
e
c c
Fig. 40: Construction process of sidewall galeries [Seidenfuss, 2006]
In this case the application of horizontal jet grouting is also named forepoling (Kolymbas,
2005). A high pressure is applied to a cement suspension which is pumped through a pipe
with a lateral nozzle at its bottom end. The jet erodes the surrounding soil. When the pipe is
pulled out and rotated simultaneously, a cylindrical body, composed of soil and cement, is
formed. The consistence of the cement suspension is important. If it is too liquid, it can easily
escape and settlements can occur. If it is too thick, it can cause upheavals of the ground sur-
face. It should also be taken into account that the position accuracy of the grouting pipes is
limited.
Fig. 41: Parallel side wall galleries of the Langallerie tunnel [Seidenfuss, 2006]
The construction of the viaduct through the pillars of the bridge was the world first. The tun-
nel has been cut through the two pillars, with reference to Fabio Soares. Firstly, a canopy of
steel pipes has been constructed, introducing steel bars through the pillar above the future
excavation, to avoid any subsequent collapse of material. Then, the pillar has been rein-
forced with steel anchors. Numerous vibration and fissure sensors have been installed to
monitor the stability of the bridge.
6.4 Geology and hydrology
The geology of the M2 project is composed of molasse, marls and sandstone. Tunnelling
takes place in majority in loose ground, generally dry but sometimes saturated with water.
Molasse is a sedimentary sequence deposited during the Miocene and Oligocene periods,
subsequent to the rising of the Alps (Lutgens & Tarbuck, 1992). It is composed primarily of
soft, green sandstone associated with marl and conglomerates. Marl is a calcerous clay or
mixture of clay and particles of calcite and dolomite, usually derived from shell fragments
(West, 1995).
With regard to the geological map of Lausanne (Fig. 42 and Appendix, Fig. 70 - 72), there
are sub-alpine (Molasse subalpine) and plateau molasse (Molasse du Plateau) layers ac-
companied by quaternary strata due to the Holocene and Pleistocene period consisiting of
lakeside, lacustrine and glacial-lacustrine terraces (Terrasse lacustre) and morainal deposits
(Dépôt inframorainique), as well as lacustrine sediments (Sédiments lacustres récents) and
artificial deposits (Dépot artificiel). The molasse strata contain different types of molasse
(Molasse grise de Lausanne, Molasse à charbon, etc.) and molasse under weak and poor
cover (Molasse sous faible couverture).
Moraines are the most widespread features created by glacial. Several types of moraines are
identified. In this case, both the erosional and depositional features of the glacier provided a
general smoothing effect because the deposits tend to fill in old stream valleys to the level of
the surrounding. When the ice front was stationary, the glacier continued to carry in and de-
posit large quantities of rock debris, creating a ridge of till. As the ice front retreated, the con-
veyor belt action of the glacier continued to provide fresh supplies of till to the terminus of the
glacier. In this manner a large quantity of till was deposited as the ice melted away.
Fig. 42: Cartes Géologiques Suisse 1:25000 [Atlas géologique de la Suisse, Feuille: 1243 Lausanne]
6.5 Daylight collapse of Saint-Laurent

6.5.1 Description of the collapse and its consequences
On 22 February a tunnel collapse on Lot 1200 consisting of the 306 m-long Saint-Laurent
tunnel between Flon and Riponne stations and the 272 m-long Viret tunnel between Riponne
and Bessières stations (Fig. 43) displaced a huge amount of material into the tunnel and
caused extensive damage as it cratered towards the surface (Fig. 44, 45) in the busy St.
Laurent’s commercial district (T&T, April 2005).
Fig. 43: Map of Lot 1200 [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
The incident took place at around 6 pm, at a depth of approximately 12 m below the surface.
Fortunately, no-one was injured, although two buildings, a supermarket and a takeaway food
outlet, were evacuated when their cellars collapsed. Reports said that no work was being
carried out in the tunnel at the time of the incident, which is believed to be due to the sudden
inrush of groundwater from a pocket in the glacial moraine the tunnel was being driven
through. Fig. 46 and Fig. 47 show the soil conditions in the final design documents and the
real soil conditions detected by additional probing after the collapse.
At the time of the incident investigation works were said to be underway following an earlier
inrush. Following an overnight assessment of the void, owner Metro Lausanne-Ouchy SA,
moved equipment to the location on surface and began breaking the overlying flagstones in
order to access the cavity for further investigation and remedial works. Within 44 hours of the
collapse, Metro Lausanne-Ouchy SA said the critical phase had passed and allowed some
building works to recommence on the subway, whilst retrieval of the collapsed area was be-
ing carried out. A curtain of eleven piles was drilled and concreted ahead of the collapsed
face to consolidate the ground and limit the possible flow of further material into the tunnel, in
conjunction with grouting (Appendix, Fig. 73 - 80). By 3 March, backfilling of the void with
sand from crushed glass got underway. Roughly 800 m³ of glass-sand were required to
backfill up to the damaged buildings. The material was selected as it is cheap and has good
compaction properties. It is obtained by crushing the glass collected by the town for recy-
cling.
In July 2005, tunnelling recommenced from Riponne to Saint-Laurent Square. Excavation of

the last 30 metres started in February 2006. Prior to excavation with the roadheader, the face
is reinforced with glass-fibre rods and a rigid roof of steel pipes. This double technique com-
bining canopy of steel pipes around the vault and glass-fibre rods at the face will have to be
repeated three times to cover the distance between the face driven downwards and the cur-
tain of piles installed after the collapse. More than seven months will be necessary to com-
plete these last 30 metres. Further to the collapse at Saint-Laurent, it was decided to drive
the Viret tunnel 3.5 metres deeper in the molasse preventing to endanger the historic build-
ings of the old part of town (Prin, 02 septembre 2005). The consequence for trains will be an
added gradient of 12% instead of 5% to reach Bessières Bridge and a speed limit allowing
passengers a pleasant train ride.
Several independent experts are due to be appointed to head an investigation into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident. In addition, a compensation fund was set up with Zu-
rich Insurance for any injury or property damage claims.
Fig. 44: Ingress of soil mixed with water [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2005]
Fig. 45: Crater of Saint-Laurent Place [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2005]

Fig. 46: Soil conditions in the final design documents [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA]
Additional probing after the collapse
Fig. 47: Real soil conditions after the collapse [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA]
6.5.2 Reports on the incident
This section summarizes reports on the incident from various sources. Those reports are
obviously written by journalists whose technical and engineering knowledge is probably not
established. However, they presented their observations and investigations into incident.
According to newspaper reports (e.g. Prin, 23 février 2005), Saint-Laurent was trembled by
the Metro M2. With reference to Prin (22 février 2005) the cave-in occurred on Tuesday at six
o’clock in the evening on the section of the building site between Flon and Riponne. A de-
partment store and a fast food restaurant had to be evacuated. Luckily, the accident caused
no casualties, but the quarter of Saint-Laurent was barricaded all night long. The collapse
took place in the subsoil of the Coop City Centre and of the McDonald’s restaurant at Saint-
Laurent Place, right in the centre of Lausanne.
Following this, the tunnel was filled with soil and water. Bottles of wine and champagne
stored in the wine shop of Coop City Centre (Fig. 48) turned upside down and fell into the
excavation. The size of the cave-in measured 10 m in length, 5-7 m in width and approxi-
mately 3-5 m in depth, according to Olivier Français, member of the town council.
Fig. 48: Crater in the wine shop of Coop City Centre [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2005]
On Monday evening the responsible site managers and workmen discovered a relative im-
portant appearance of water in the moraine layer and traced its origin. They were present
when about 50 m³ of soil mixed with water collapsed into the tunnel. This appearance of wa-
ter which is probably the exit of a saturated void was unknown and was not discovered by
the number of bore-holes and soundings carried out in the course of the preparations for the
excavation works. The overhead part of the tunnel was no longer in the molasse layer, but in
a glacial moraine layer with a big saturated water table. The geological accident occurred at
this point where measures did not predict any existence of a water-bearing stratum in the
moraine layer. In accordance with the statement of Olivier Français it is quite exceptional to
find a big saturated void or secondary water table in a glacial moraine layer. Nevertheless
this rarity happened to Saint-Laurent implying an absolute crisis situation. The cave-in did not
give rise to exposed damages on the surface. No inhabitant had to be moved to other ac-
commodations, although several preferred to spend the night elsewhere.
Afterwards building machinery began to identify and stop the ingress of water triggered by
the collapse (http://www.tsr.ch/tsr/index.html?site Sect=100000. tsr.ch, 23 février 2005). At
the same time several drainages were laid to hold the water still flowing into the cavity. Thus
all efforts were exhausted to stop flow of water and soil. The hazard of subsidence for the
surrounding buildings was not precluded.
A number of surveyors monitored permanently the most affected structures. Some fissures
were detected in a neighbouring pharmacy which was subsequently evacuated. The struc-
ture of the fast food restaurant was secured by installing of a steel construction at the front.
On the one hand the incident has caused delay, on the other hand excavation works were
ahead by two weeks in comparison with the construction time schedule, while on the other
sections work was continued.
Some persons of the project confirmed that the cave-in had been foreseeable and avoidable
(Prin, 24 février 2005). Hazards of this geological zone have been already demonstrated
above all during the construction of the Coop City Centre in 1958. Several papers and docu-
ments give a detailed description of a demanding geological zone above the Saint-Laurent
tunnel. These documents reporting on the existence of a glacial, lacustrine deposit zone lo-
cated just below the place are kept in the geology museum of the canton in Lausanne. Ac-
cording to them the dangers of this former Saint-Laurent Lake are known for a long time.
Since 1876 at least five scientific publications have made the hazards of the ancient lake
clear. The city and the canton of Vaud admitted that they had been up to date on the Saint-
Laurent Lake and the level of risk of this zone (Prin, 25 février 2005). They assured that all
questions about carrying out of precautionary measures which would have prevented the
cave-in will be answered. In accordance with an ancient employee of M2 the existence of a
difficult zone in the quarter of Saint-Laurent was known since the moment when the canton
handed the specifications of the project to the Metro Corporation.
In accordance to the journalistic reports e.g. Prin (01 mars 2005) both the designers and the
contractors did not know these documents kept in the geology museum of Lausanne which
illustrate the difficulties about the construction of Coop City Centre and the extent of this in-
stable zone, according to their statements of defence. They carried out a data logging in the
national geology archives of Switzerland as usual, but these documents and papers are not
stored there, for the simple reason that these national archives keeping all the geological
data of Switzerland did not exist in 1958, during the construction of the Coop building. Thus
they had to look in the geology museum of the town.In addition, because of core drillings
before construction the presence of loose and unstable soil was known by several persons.
Under the impression that excavation by driving would be protected from this mixture of soil
and water by the compact moraine layer, they experienced that this protective layer of ap-
proximately 5 m thickness had broken through. A newspaper report from 1958 dedicated to
the construction of the department store publishes an astonishing account:” Excavations are
still showing soft ground up to a depth of 11.5 m. Pressure is becoming stronger, timbering
are yielding and creaking. The crane is inclining critically. It is impossible to excavate
deeper.”
A collapse was already 16 years ago. During the construction of line M1 connecting Flon with
Renens these days a tragic accident happened in1989 leading to the death of one worker. In
the course of excavating the hill of Montbenon a roof caving occurred and the miner was
covered by eight tons of soil.
Less than one year after the collapse the tunnel under Saint-Laurent place continued to be
excavated again (Prin, 03 février 2006). This second “attempt” required no special protective
measures on the surface, but several measures below it. Avoiding any difficulty the miners
stabilized the ground and will excavate the remaining 30 metres of stabilised slurry in three
steps ten metres each. With reference to Filippo Gaj, tunnelling engineer of tl – transports
publics de la région lausannoise, horizontal bore-holes are systematically arranged to predict
the ground conditions. The curtain of bored piles as explained by Prin (26 mars 2005) will be
demolished. On the hand risks for inhabitants do not exist on the other hand hazard for min-
ers becomes quite big.
The sum of the accident at Saint-Laurent is made public now and amounts to approximately
12 million CHF consisting as well the repairs of damages and remedial measures as the in-
crease of costs of additional securing measures, but not containing the claims for damages
of the affected shopkeepers.
6.5.3 Summary and conclusions
Unfortunately in the period of writing this thesis3, the case of the Saint-Laurent collapse was
taken to court and is still object of explorations. This subject is being dealt with by experts
and insurance company. At this stage no conclusion has been drawn. Thus, there are no
official causes judged by court and experts for the daylight collapse until now, and all of the
statements and assessments in this work are attempts for explaining of failure mechanisms
and descriptions of the circumstances.
It is understood from the site observation that the incident of Saint-Laurent was on the one
hand a spectacular daylight collapse; on the other hand it was “just” a front collapse of the
face in the cavity, triggering a volume of 1,400 m³ collapsed material. The sides and the roof
of the tunnel were not afflicted by the cave-in. Thus, only one arch of steel girder was de-
formed because of that.
Furthermore, it was noted that a constant gradient of the molasse layer between the two
probing No. A21 and A22 was assumed during the pre-investigations and the preparations of
the soil investigation report. Moreover, the two bore-holes were just about 50 metres sepa-
rated along the alignment of the metro, and the geological exploratory measurements were
carried out as usual. Unfortunately, there was no constant gradient between the two bore-
holes with regard to the map of the real soil conditions after the collapse (Fig. 47), but a flat
gradient with a sudden steep rise of the molasse layer. In addition, this unexpected zone
contained a pocket in the glacial moraine filled with water.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there could be several causes of tunnel failure, including for ex-
ample unforeseeable geological features, deficiency in planning and designing, as well as in
proper construction management, and others.
At this stage, the case is under investigation. The collapse could be due to one of the causes
or due to a combination of several causes.
However, it is evident that the collapse was triggered by the pocket in the glacial moraine
filled with water. If this ground feature had been known, appropriate ground treatment would
have been applied, and the incident of Saint-Laurent might have been prevented.
3
in conformity with the authority of Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA
7 Case study No.2: Wienerwald Railway Tunnel
7.1 System and project
The Eisenbahn - Hochleistungsstrecken AG (HL-AG) has commissioned a 42.3 km long new

route (Fig. 49) to be constructed between Vienna and St. Pölten as part of the “Westbahn’s”
fourtrack extension. A total of € 1.3 billion has been earmarked for the project. The Wiener-
wald Railway Tunnel (WWT) whose construction costs have been estimated to € 520 million,
corresponding to some € 20 million per km of tunnel, represents an integral part of this new
route (ÖBB-Infrastruktur Bau AG, 2005). It is intended to link the western urban periphery of
Vienna with the Tullnerfeld. In the process it passes under mountain ridges located between
Gablitz and Mauerbach in the north of the Wienerwald. Work on the tunnel has commenced
in December 2004. Once the furnishing operations have been undertaken the Wienerwald
Tunnel is planned to go into service in 2012 as part of the new route linking Vienna and St.
Pölten.
Wienerwald Railway
Tunnel
St. Pölten Vienna
Fig. 49: New route between Vienna and St. Pölten [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
The project named contract section LT26/WT2/TF34 (Appendix, Fig. 81) is split up into three
sections. The eastern section of the Wienerwald Tunnel dubbed LT26 is designed as a twin-
track tunnel and an enlargement area over a length of 2.37 km. The western section WT2
contains two single-track tunnel tubes which are constructed by tunnel boring machines. The
third section consists of redevelopment of residual waste, earthworks, roadworks, sewer and
concrete construction. During the course of the roughly 13.35 km long tunnel the overburden
above the tunnel roof varies between 6 and 190 m.
4
in conformity with the authority of Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel
7.2 Eastern section

7.2.1 Description of construction and methods
The eastern section (Fig. 50) consists of an enlargement area leading over to the two single-
track tunnels of the western section and of a twin-track tunnel (Brux, 2005). Three safety ex-
its as well as recesses and chambers for occupational safety reasons and for technical re-
quirements will be produced for the two-track tunnel. A 200 m long emergency ventilation
shaft is to be set up in the transition zone leading from the two-track to the single-track tun-
nel, which is to be connected to the emergency ventilation chamber located transversely to
the route tunnels. This means that one of the two single-track tunnels can be kept free of
smoke in the event of fire.
Fig. 50: Eastern section [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Concerning the excavation methods side wall headings were driven at the start of the section
to minimise the risk of settlement within a suburb of Vienna. The cover above the tunnel roof
reaches only 4 -10 m in this section. Afterwards the remaining length of the eastern section
through the geological zone called Flysch is coped with by bench excavation and crown
drivage hurrying on ahead of the bench. Supporting will be completed in the form of gaskets
and a reinforced concrete inner lining.
7.2.2 Description of geology
The geology of the eastern section (Fig. 51) consists mostly of the Flysch zone which is a
rhythmical alternating sequence of sedimentary rocks. This sequence comprising competent
layers of sandstone and lime marl as well as incompetent layers of claystone, siltstone and
marl appears both in small and in large scales. There are rock strengths varying from 1 to
190 MPa (Fig. 52). Owing to strong tectonic forces and stresses the bond of strata is often
disintegrated and further incompetent layers are transformed into cataclasites which are
metamorphic rocks deformed mechanically by shear stresses. As a result there are found
rapid alternating conditions (Fig. 53) concerning both properties of material and strength of
rock. So there are predominantly mixed-face conditions (Fig. 54).
EASTERN SECTION
Fig. 51: Geological characteristics of the eastern section [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Flysch is developed from sedimentary deposits containing different particle sizes. These de-
posits which had settled on the continental slope were transported by turbidity currents into
deeper depth of the sea and eventually hardened. In the course of the alpine rock formation
change of the stratigraphic sequence occurred including steeply pitched positions, formation
of shear zones, folding, and transport of them stretching for miles. Graded bedding is formed
by the rapid deposition of particles from turbid water carrying a range of different sizes. It is
generally agreed that these are deposited by turbidity currents that sweep down steep slopes
in an ocean or large lake.
Hard sandstone
Crumbly sandstone
Claystone
Fig. 52: Different rock strengths within one ground type [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Fig. 53: Rapid change of ground types [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Fig. 54: Mixed-face conditions [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
7.2.3 Difficulties due to water inrushes
In the course of excavation by driving significant deformations of the face, in particular of the
shotcrete-securing, appeared for the first time at approximately chainage 659.00 and re-
sulted in cracks and little water inrushes. These deformations and ingresses were obviously
caused by water pressures behind the shotcrete shell which are due to accumulated fissure
water. Even so, greater ingresses of water resulting probably in face collapse or roof caving
could be prevented by relieving bore-holes which released unloading and draining off of the
face.
With regard to the hydrology the Flysch zone does not show a continuous water level. In-
stead there are insulated, little-spatial water occurrences within the sandstones which are
interspersed by joints. This zone is also formed by an open fault system. Thus sudden fills of
water can take place due to bore-holes in the sandstones which are carried out during roof
bolting and face nailing. Afterwards, i.e. after hours or few days, there is a noticeable decline
of water inrush or even dewatering of the joints and voids. This manifestation can be associ-
ated with the effect of a bath tub which drains off after opening of the closure.
Furthermore there was another spectacular water inrush which caused breaking down of the
concrete shell and reinforcement as well as deformation of the lattice girder, and led finally to
collapse of the side wall (Fig. 55).
Fig. 55: Course of the side-wall collapse due to water inrush [Joint Venture ÖBA, 2006]
With regard to formation and process this cave-in can be explained as follows: Ground water
or rather fissure water led to decompaction and bulking of the sandstone. Because of that
shear strength was decreased. From this it follows that there was not any longer strength of
rock and so ground pressure loaded the temporary concrete shell which is not designed for
that kind of high loading. Therefore the concrete shell chipped off and the lattice girder was
deformed owing to the high application of force.
Immediately afterwards the collapsed zone was coped with both by drainage pipes dewater-
ing the joints and by shotcrete closing and filling up the overbreak. Fortunately neither per-
sons nor machinery were damaged by this incident as far as I know.
As a result of the difficult ground conditions, i.e. rapid alternating conditions, different rock
strengths within one ground type, and insulated, little-spatial water occurrences, flexibility of
the excavation method and continuous adaptation of the support means is required. Fur-
thermore a margin of safety has to be considered in carrying out of the face securing. It is
also obvious that a dense grid of geotechnical measurements is to be applied before excava-
tion.
However a current prediction and exact forecast in the course of driving is very difficult be-
cause of the rapid alternating conditions. Bore-holes running on ahead of the excavation may
not show a distinct description of the zone in front of the working face. It can happen that
drilling for the purpose of drainage does not reveal any water-bearing stratum or joint. There-
fore it may be useful to apply geophysical methods such as seismology and electrical sound-
ing and to combine them with the geological information.
It is evident that the above-mentioned instabilities during driving of the eastern section are
due to fissure water and ground water exerting pressure. This can produce both the reduc-
tion of shear strength and strength of rock leading to load distribution and the potential for
significant quantities of wet and loose ground to flow into the tunnel.
One may conclude that these kinds of water inrushes are hardly avoidable. Thus it is advis-
able to be prepared for ingress of water and to take precautions against sudden cave-ins. It
is obvious that quick and immediate measures against flowing-in of water and building-up of
water pressure such as drainage pipes may reduce the risk of greater water inrushes and
prevent more serious incidents like collapse of the face or cave-in of the side wall.
In summary it may be said that certainly on the one hand there are no unpredicted ground
conditions, but on the other hand it is too difficult and uncertain as well as uneconomical to
find out and establish all of the water-bearing joints causing possible ingress of water.
7.3 Western section

7.3.1 Description of construction and methods
The longest of the three sections (Fig. 56) comprises two 10,750 m long, parallel single-track
tunnel tubes that are to be excavated by two shield machines driving without neither air pres-
sure, nor earth pressure, nor liquid support of the face.
WESTERN PORTAL
AND
START-UP GALLERY
Fig. 56: Western section [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
The hard rock machines with 10.62 m shield diameter each (Fig. 57) drive on a rise with a
gradient of 0.3 %. The primary support is provided by unbolted, non-sealed expansion seg-
ments, which are 35 cm thick and 2.25 m wide. The shield gap in the invert is filled through
injection openings in the segments with mortar and with pearl gravel in the roof zone. Once
the water impermeable reinforced concrete base invert and an umbrella seal are produced,
the permanent lining in the form of a 35 cm thick unreinforced concrete shell is to be created.
In addition, a 490 m long muck heading with a 31.6 % gradient and a 14.8 m² cross-section,
25 cross-passages and an emergency exit shaft have to be produced.
Fig. 57: Hard rock shield machine Wienerwald Tunnel [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
With regard to the compatibility of the applied mechanised mean hard rock machines are
used in geologies, which have as main feature a high stability and a high degree of hard-
ness. The cutter head (Fig. 58) was especially designed for the local conditions, to be able to
handle these geologies. Discs are used as cutting tools which are distributed regularly on the
radius, to be able to treat the complete tunnel face with the cutting tools. The material is
transported by buckets to the rear section of the excavation chamber. The screw conveyor
transports the excavated material on the conveyor belt. The advance of the tunnelling ma-
chine is carried out via the thrust cylinders installed in the center shield (Fig. 58), which sup-
port themselves at the last built segment ring. The complete supply infrastructure of the ma-
chine is situated in the shield and on the gantries of the machine. Among them are the elec-
trical energy supplies, the hydraulic system, the industrial water and air circuits, the back
filling equipment, the drilling equipment as well as the equipment for the handling of the seg-
ments.
Fig. 58: Cutter head WWT [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel, 2005]
The lining of the tunnel is carried out by steel reinforced concrete segments, which are posi-
tioned and bolted manually by means of the erector in the tail shield section.
The steel construction of the machine is designed according to the given water and working
loads as well as the working resistance that occurs. All connections necessary for the opera-
tion of the shield are integrated. The tunnelling plant consists of the following components:
Shield
Cutter head
Cutter head drive
Erector
Screw conveyor
Back up system
Circuits and networks
Technical description and data of the hard rock shield machine can be represented as fol-
lows:
Shield diameter 10.620 m
Excavation diameter 10.695 m
Driving power 4,900 kW
split up into 14 electric motors
Maximum driving force 156,260 kN
Maximum torque 29,525 kNm
Total weight 1,750 to
Length 248.00 m
Cutter head with 64 cutting discs
The entire excavated material from the shield section is subsequently to be used as fill for
the railway embankment along a roughly 10 km long open stretch as well as being deposited
in a municipal waste landfill that will first be decontaminated. Altogether, around 2 million m³
of excavated material will be treated.
7.3.2 Description of geology
The route passes through layers of siltstone, mudstone and sandstone. Furthermore, layers
of marl and marlstone have to be penetrated. Ingressing water of up to 0.5 l/s must be reck-
oned with.
The geology of the western section (Fig. 59) is composed of the Molasse and the Flysch
zone. Above all there are two categories of ground divided up into level of tectonics. The first
category is disturbed and folded. Its tectonics is strained from moderate to strong. The other
one is undisturbed and weakly folded. Concerning tectonics the second one is little strained.
In view of the crystalline structure or rather conditions of fabric the strata planes are fre-
quently covered by clay. Shear zones show little-thick clayey cataclasites. Within zones of
faults there is flat-undulated bedding combined with steep positions and shear zones.
WESTERN SECTION
Fig. 59: Geological characteristics of the western section [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tun-
nel]
In this case both the crystalline structure and the ground water are very significant for tunnel-
ling and affect driving by TBM to a great degree. The clayey covered strata planes dip flatly
in direction of the driving section or rather against direction of it. Furthermore shear zones in
conjunction with slickensides and little-thick clayey cataclasites have a high degree of sepa-
ration. Moreover open textures coupled with little ingresses of ground water lead to a strong
reduction of strength of rock.
7.3.3 Report on disruptions of driving due to collapses
Unfortunately, the disruptions of driving due to several collapses are still object of explora-
tions arranged by client as well as by contractors. As these incidents are accompanied by
different and opposite points of view, no conclusions have been drawn at this stage5, and
there are no official causes judged by independent experts until now. Thus much caution and
humbleness is necessary in approaching these matters.
Nevertheless, this chapter focuses on two collapses at the start of driving and on two col-
lapses during the course. These collapses, in particular roof and side wall cave-ins as well as
face collapses, are chosen on the one hand to describe the incidents and the circumstances
before and during the collapse on the other hand to explain their mechanisms and their spe-
cific features.
After construction of the start-up gallery, about 27 metres in length and built by conventional
methods, TBM-driving started on installing of tubbing segments of ring No.7 without disman-
tling of the diaphragm rounded off on account of statical requirements and secured by shot-
crete and face nailing such as glass fibre anchors. Subsequently placing of ring No.8 in-
cludes cutting through the diaphragm and excavation of 1.2 m of competent rock. During
driving of this section there was found an unforeseen anchor rod with its drill bit in the exca-
vation material. It had been probably drilled too deep into the diaphragm. Furthermore in the
subsequent course of measuring of the excavation amount it was discovered that there was
an additional output of roughly 40 m³ of material.
After several activities consisting of clarification, service, repair work and standstill of the belt
conveyor fitting in of ring No.9 was continued one day later. During driving of the initial me-
ters repeated clogging of the grout lines took place. Therefore both consistency of mortar in
favour of gap backfilling had to be modified and clarification of the clogged grout lines had to
be carried out. Moreover the defect of the belt conveyor (Fig. 60) led to breakdown of it tak-
ing approximately 16 hours. As well in this raising an additional output of about 25 m³ of ma-
terial triggered off by overbreak which was not noticed at that time according to subsequent
measurements.
5
in conformity with the authority of Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel
Fig. 60: Belt conveyor, inside and outside [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel, 2005]
The excavation material is usually measured by a belt scale. As the belt scale was not yet
adjusted, displays and scoreboard (Fig. 61) of the belt scale were ignored. Because of differ-
ent belt stresses which are brought about by the belt conveyor storage during driving the
calibration of the belt scale has to be carried out by a comparative weighing with the help of a
truck scale.
THEORETICAL AMOUNT
ACTUAL AMOUNT
Fig. 61: Display of the belt scale [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Immediately afterwards driving of ring No.10 was started. After excavating of only 0.04 m in
length the cutter head was suddenly blocked by an immense resistance released obviously
by collapse of the face and by caving of the roof. Adding up all the amounts of the overbreak
and the side piling of the cutter head there was an additional output of approximately 100 m³
of collapsed material. As there are openings in the shield because of roof bolting unit it was
possible to analyse the collapsed area and to discover a void with a volume of about 120 m³.
Exploring of the void was not possible by means of drilling through the pipe screen openings
owing to the retracted thrust ring. For that a minimum extension of 1.40 m is required. More-
over the cutting wheel was loaded extremely, for example its cylinders showed pressures
measuring 260 BAR on the left and 70 BAR on the right. As the gap had been backfilled
completely driving back of the TBM was not possible without damaging of the tail skin seal-
ing.
Furthermore the automatic TBM current overload shut-off of the 20-kilovolt electric power
supply caused a power failure triggered off in all probability by the collapse. Tunnel boring
machines are usually supplied by electric cables which are monitored by a power supply shift
protecting against current overload, short-circuit and earth fault. Therefore this power supply
shift is switched off automatically if the electric current exceeds a specific value input into the
monitoring relay station. As the values of the power supply shift had been set with allowance
and fitted sufficiently, an automatic shut-off released by current overload is normally very
exceptional during driving. Thus the blocking of the cutter head led to a rapid rise of the elec-
tric current, releasing of the monitoring relay station and finally to shut-off of the electric
power supply.
Concerning geology the construction of the start-up gallery took place in the sand-streaks
comprising a thinly stratified alternate sequence of siltstone, claystone, clay marl and marly
siltstone which is accompanied by moderate hard layers of sandstone. With reference to Fig.
62 there are four geological zones which are explained subsequently:
Zone A: Top layer consisting of scree and clayed loess
Zone B: Sandy-clayed fabrics which are bulked strongly
Zone C: Thin interfaces covered by residual materials; fabrics are still bulked, but
strength of rock becomes better
Zone D: Thin interfaces coming from marine deposits among layers of sandstone; fab-
rics is bulked moderately and strength of rock is good
Fig. 62: Geological situation during construction of the start-up gallery [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald
Railway Tunnel]
Under the circumstances of these fabrics the ground showed a composition or bond similar
to brick masonry. During excavation of the start-up gallery carried out initially by excavator,
then by milling machine several cave-ins of separate rock blocks occurred in the range of the
roof and the spring line towards the first location of the face nails. In particular within zone B
separation of shallow beds happened quickly.
In accordance with monitoring of the face carried out during the interruption between con-
struction of ring No.8 and 9 the alternate sequence of weathered sand-streaks corresponding
to zone D cropped out in the range of ring No.8. The shape of the rock blocks was pressed
and similar to clay bricks. No cave-in or rather instability could be observed. Joints were
marked by isolated sandy-silty fillings.
Two days after the collapse of the face and the roof an examination of the area in front of the
cutter head and above the shield revealed that the roof broke off 7 m in length extending
from the shotcrete lining of the start-up gallery as far as in front of the cutter head. The
ground of the collapsed area was made up of clearly-textured sand-streaks corresponding to
zone C.
In the period following, the collapsed area in front of the cutter head was secured by shot-
crete and producing of a seal made of backfill concrete. After that the resumption of driving of
ring No.10 occurred while both the muck ring clotted and closed up due to viscous material
and a drive engine switched off due to overload of torque. Thus clearing out of the bucket lips
without feed force of the cutter head which mined a delivery of about 15 m³ of material and
clarification of the muck ring was necessary. A cutter head displacement right at the outset of
the reopening to a value of 200 mm as well as at the time of the renewed switching on to a
value of 400 mm happened, too. As a result of this maximum head displacement and filling of
the cutter head with material due to the repeated clotted muck ring the cutter head was dis-
placed to its right side by the immense weight. Pulling back of the overturned cutter head
was not feasible with the used displacement cylinders. Lastly, the reopening of driving was
stopped by breakdown of the safe-sets including the predetermined breaking fuses of oil
supply, coupling and gear.
It was discovered during check of the face that there was not any longer a shotcrete shell
and the void in front of the cutter head reappeared. Both the former void was enlarged by the
renewed driving of ring No.10 and the face collapsed on the right side of the sectional area in
front of the cutter head.
With regard to the geological situation (Fig. 63) owing to exploration of the zone in front of
the cutter head a slickenside, which was evident from the first incident, flowing on the right
side separated in two halves in direction to the roof and formed an additional wedge-shaped
texture in combination with another interface which enlarged upwards. The face in range of
the upper face of the cutter head was 3 m away from cutting wheel skewing downwards. Fur-
thermore there were some water ingresses at the top of the cross section due to open strata
joints. It was also observed that there were no advancing instabilities of the ground.
Interfaces
Fig. 63: Geological situation after the 2nd collapse [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
After these first disruptions as a result of the collapses the cutter head and particularly the
cutting wheel was changed and modified. In detail the bucket lips were equipped with grain
size limiter to prevent putting away of collapsed material such as boulders or bigger rocks.
Moreover the grillbars in the periphery zones were extended and strengthened.
During driving of ring No. 757 situated approximately at chainage 1,712 there was a further
blocking of the cutter head inclusive of power failure. On the point of examining the face and
the cutting wheel a collapse hurrying on ahead of the face (Fig. 64) was discovered triggering
a volume of about 50 m³ collapsed material, while the roof was quite stable. Therefore the
void in front of the cutter head was filled in with silicate foam. Then driving was continued
without overbreak.
Fig. 64: Geological situation after the 3rd collapse [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
The next incident took place at the construction of ring No.765 situated roughly at chainage
1,731. As a result of the collapse hurrying on ahead of the face whose void was also subse-
quently filled in with foaming agents the belt scale established an additional output of about
30 tons. During stroke of the TBM to a cutter head displacement of 350 mm the additional
output rose to a value of 70 tons. After checking of the cutting wheel the responsible persons
observed a caving of the roof which reached even to the shield. In the course of closing the
resulted void, parts of the applied silicate components were eroded immediately by ingresses
of water. In spite of this unforeseen incident foaming work was continued and finished not
before sufficient filling in of the void. Thus the remaining section of ring No. 765 was driven
without any problems. Nevertheless a concluded observation of the face of this section
showed slipping down of the foamy structure resulting in renewed foaming of the roof.
According to the geological situation (Fig. 65) there were steep standing slickensides in the
area of the left quadrant carrying water with it and striking into the void. Furthermore the
planes of the strata appear as wavy slickensides on the roof, which was caved in 2 metres
upwards above the cutter head. In addition there is a third dominant fabric consisting of a
wavy slickenside which drops out medium-steeply of the face. On account of this crystalline
structure, opening widths of the interfaces measuring up to 1 cm, and water ingresses of 0.5
l/s resulting in strong decrease of the strength of rock there was bond failure of wedge-
shaped rock blocks and composites triggering off the said collapse.
Roof caving
Face collapse
Fig. 65: Geology at the construction of ring No.765 [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
During the construction of these rings (No.757 and No.765) several settlement measure-
ments have been carried out. In the area above the tunnel the observations noticed signifi-
cant increase of settlement stated in the following:
Table 7: Increase of settlement [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Increase of settlement
Chainage Δ [mm]
from [mm] to [mm]
1,702 18 29 11
1,707 20 34 14
1,717 12 29 17
1,727 5 18 13
1,737 3 10 7
By way of summarizing these results it is evident that the increase of settlement is bigger in
the range of the sections (chainage 1,712 and 1,731) where collapses and cave-ins have
happened than in other areas. And so it is also probable that the collapses affect the surface
above the tunnel. In this case there was no property damage as far as I know.
Furthermore there were little collapses (Fig. 66) corresponding to cave-ins of roof and side
walls without instability of the face. In this particular case separate wedge-shaped rock
blocks and components broke out. However these incidents showed little extent.
Fig. 66: Cave-in of roof and side walls [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
By way of summarizing these matters or rather incidents are to be approached by the Ger-
man so-called 5-M method (Englert et al., 2003). Because of that it is possible to draw con-
clusions on the collapses and to prevent them in future.
Problems concerning construction legislation in conjunction with the production of tunnels are
solved under the application of the practical terms “real” and “unreal” ground risks in accor-
dance with the 5-M method as far as the causes and responsibilities are concerned as ex-
plained by Englert (2005). To start with an issue has to be examined whether persons (1.M)
have properly planned, investigated the ground in keeping with national specifications, for
instance in Germany the DIN 4020 specifications which include geotechnical investigations
for construction technical purposes, completely laid down the tendering procedure and un-
dertaken the monitoring and execution of construction in keeping with the state of the art.
The 2.M relates to the question of the choice of the correct method i.e. corresponding to the
described ground. Afterwards the 3.M examines the issue of the proper material, prior to ex-
amining the compatibility of the machines (4.M) that are used. The most important medium is
“ground” (5.M) as presented in many countries by the client without which it would not be
possible to build a tunnel.
FIRST M: Persons and human factors
First of all, particularly during excavation by using TBM, it is very important to observe and
inspect the zone in front and above the cutter head (Fig. 67) at regular intervals in the course
of driving or rather to every irregularity such as differences between actual weight of excava-
tion material and theoretical weight per section. If small cave-ins are recognised prematurely,
it is possible to prevent collapses to a great extent with the help of measures like filling-in of
foaming agents. Furthermore small cave-ins of the roof or the side walls are hardly notice-
able during driving, for instance there is no remarkable increase of power or rather decline of
rotational speed.
The void triggered off by the collapse extended from the diaphragm of the start-up gallery to
a range situated 4 m in front of the cutter head. It is probable that rock material broke down
of the roof during cutting through of the shotcrete shell and was consequently conveyed by
the belt conveyor. These facts are confirmed by a subsequent comparison of the actual
amount and the theoretical amount of excavation material.
In this case, the check of the actual amounts was understood wrongly during driving as well
as the specific weight of the ground was set false, for instance a specific gravity of γ=1.8
to/m³ was assumed instead of a specific gravity of γ=2.3 to/m³. Further there were also no
reference examinations such as slump tests in the course of driving. Comparison of the
amounts was carried out not before the first collapse.
Fig. 67: Inspection of the cutter head [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
Referring to Fig. 68 it is very important in the course of monitoring that the linear-constant
gradient of the actual excavated amount in relation to position of thrust cylinders is kept dur-
ing every section as well as the actual and the theoretical gradient is identical.
Actual gradient
Theoretical gradient
Fig. 68: Comparison of actual and theoretical amount of excavated material at ring No.765 [Joint Venture
ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel]
As a result of the interruptions during construction of ring No.8 and No.9 a lot of time passed
leading in all probability to worse conditions. Unfortunately, long periods of cutting accompa-
nied by little penetration, little turning moment, and high rotational speed are beneficial to the
progress of roof cave-ins. In this case there was an advance speed of 26 mm/min and a
mean penetration of 7.7 mm per turn. On account of these parameters the buckets of the
cutting wheel passed the roof 20-times on a way of 26 mm corresponding to 6 bucket open-
ings. This means more or less quasi-turning in a standing position.
Therefore it is necessary on the one hand to prevent long interruptions owing to machine
failure or rather to organizing faults in any case on the other hand to achieve sufficient pene-
tration and adequate contact force in favour of stability of the face. Incidentally, the little ad-
vance speed was also due to an adjusting of the belt conveyors rear outside during driving.
With reference to the second incident during reopening of driving it is probable that complete
scraping and clarification of cutter head and cutting wheel could have prevented clotting of
buckets and muck ring. Breakdown of the safe-sets was also due to the overload of the cut-
ter head owing to a too high overturning moment. Therefore it is necessary to avoid excess
load. Without interruption of driving the zone of the bulking in front of the TBM on the right
side might have been cut through quickly.
Nevertheless every start-up process of an excavation by driving is usually the most critical
situation in the course of the whole driving concerning not only geological aspects (Compare
to 5th M), but also human and mechanically aspects.
This means that the learning factor, i.e. the learning process of the crew as well of the re-
sponsible engineers, plays an important role at the start. Each construction of a tunnel has to
be a new challenge for all of them and requires specific knowledge and proficiency.
For example, experience or know-how of a crew about a slurry shield is not completely appli-
cable to a hard rock shield machine, but has to be enlarged before and during driving. Cor-
rect adjusting of the mechanically components takes time just like treatment of ground and
machine. On top of it, the geology in the range of the start-up gallery is frequently very sus-
ceptible to collapses, and so requires much sensitivity and heightened caution.
SECOND M: Choice of the correct method
On account of the diaphragm rounded off owing to statical requirements the periphery zones
of the cross section are cut at the outset first of all. Not until after the cutting of the periphery
the disc cutters affected the inner part of the cross section. Thus the ground pressure which
had rested on the securing of the heading thronged around the not secured zones and led to
additional load distribution as well as to possible bulking. At the same time the ground in the
periphery zones, which had been already broken up due to excavation inclusive of placing of
anchors and nails as well as load distribution during turning on, was passed without percep-
tible cutter pressure. In this way broken-down material was conveyed immediately by the
buckets.
With regard to the second single-track tunnel tube and its start-up gallery it is advisable to
construct a nail screen above the expectant tunnel soffit in range of the diaphragm. A nail
screen is preferable to a pipe screen which can make the ground worse.
By way of summarizing the rounded off construction of the start-up gallery is favourable to
cave-in of the roof. In reference to the length of the start-up gallery it is very difficult to predict
or to design the correct length of it. On the hand a short start-up gallery requires a huge steel
start-up construction on the other hand a longer start-up gallery brings more conventional
deep mining with it. Definitely both of these methods lead to higher costs and bigger efforts.
However, it is probable that a longer start-up gallery might have reduced the risk of collapse
in this case.
Concerning assessment of driving concept it is necessary that the area of the portal, in par-
ticular the start-up gallery, plays an important role within planning. Especially little overbur-
den and level of weathering requires high caution.
THIRD M: Issue of the proper material
Although there have been applied several different materials, it is evident that the collapse
was not released by failure of material or rather use of false material as far as I know. There-
fore this third issue will not be followed up in this case.
FOURTH M: Compatibility of the machines
Modification of the driving concept, for example employment of a mix-shield equipped with
earth pressure mode, is doubtful. The production of the pulp which is required for support of
the face could cause great problems because of the ground which is poor in fines and rich in
large-sized block. Therefore a huge amount of conditioning agents is necessary. Further-
more modification and consequently disruption would lead to high cost and prolongation of
construction time.
Breakdowns of mechanically components causing standstill or interruptions cannot be ex-

cluded. Therefore they have to be considered in the geological specifications as well as
measures have to be settled at the start of driving. Furthermore interruptions due to adjusting
or repair works as well as to setting of mortar consistency or belt conveyor in combination
with standstill affect excavation by driving in such a way that stability of the roof and the face
is deteriorated.
In the course of construction of ring No.8 and No.9 the confirmatory measurements, i.e. the
belt scale, did not run. Furthermore there was a wrong calibration of the belt scale by means
of calibration weights. In the following table there is a view of the differences between actual
and theoretical amounts of the excavated material per section.
Table 8: Differences between actual and theoretical amounts [Joint Venture ÖBA]
ring No. length [m] weight [to] specific gravity actual [m³] theoretical [m³] Δ [m³]
8 1,20 530 2,35 226 108 118

9 2,25 780 2,35 332 202 130
sum 3,45 1310 2,35 557 310 247
FIFTH M: Ground - Geological and hydrological conditions
First of all in the course of drawing conclusions from the geological conditions it can be es-
tablished that three different categories of collapses or rather failures separate from each
other occurred:
Face hurrying on ahead of the driving,
Instabilities of the roof and the face,
Cave-ins of roof and side walls without instability of the face.
On closer examination they have on the one hand their own reasons, origin and mechanism
on the other hand all three of them took place due to instabilities of the ground.
It is probable that the behaviour of the ground in the range of the diaphragm is more unfa-
vourable due to stress relief and possible drenching of the ground than in areas which are
not affected by excavation methods.
On account of the geological situation as stated above (Chapter 7.3.3) the collapse could be
triggered off by several mechanisms. The cutter head encountered systems of torn interfaces
in the range of the weathered sand-streaks corresponding to zone C. Owing to the described
characteristic of a brick masonry it was composed a wide-stressed vault in the ground which
released breaking down of rock blocks at the crown and led to cave-ins like domino. The
steep slickenside, which both struck, acute angled into the void and separated zone C as
well as zone D, represented a predetermined breaking point because of its undulated and
smooth forming. Thus the failure of bond was accelerated by this breaking point. Further-
more the decrease of strength of rock in direction of the roof as well as increasing bulking
was favourable to breaking out of the roof. Referring to the second incident which happened
during turning on of the cutting wheel, the scrap of an additional interface separating the
ground spaciously and an interface dropping out of the heading caused failure of the working
face. According to the geologists of the WWT this situation and the development of the cave-
ins are typical of portal areas (Compare to chapter 3.5)
8 Summary and conclusion
Excluding the portal incidents, nearly all reported tunnel collapse incidents originate within
the tunnel heading. Therefore, the inherent problem with tunnel constructions appears to rest
in the construction of the heading. Safe construction of a heading requires that the excavated
face, and the short length of incomplete lining immediately next to it, is stable and under con-
trol at all times.
The cause most frequently cited for the heading collapse is unstable ground conditions. Ob-
viously, if a more appropriate construction method had been selected the tunnel heading
would not have collapsed. Hence the cause of the collapse is not the ground but the use of
the wrong construction method in the ground conditions which existed. This kind of error can
only occur if those responsible for the construction had not foreseen deficiencies in the con-
struction method in use in the ground conditions encountered, if they had not foreseen
changes in the ground conditions and hence did not alter the construction method in time
and if they failed to identify the nature, and hence predict the behaviour of the ground en-
countered.
Typically, heading failures in shallow tunnels occur when permeable water bearing ground is
close to the tunnel. The presence of water appears to be critical. If it is not present the loose
ground falling into the heading will form a fairly steep stable slope. This slope will block the
tunnel and thereby limit the size of the crown hole above the tunnel. In the presence of water,
this type of heading failure occurs fairly rapidly.
It is clear from the references that lining failures do occur but they are not well publicised,
and they tend to be poorly documented. This imbalance in reporting makes it difficult to es-
tablish the overall level of risk, and as a result the risk of lining failure may be underesti-
mated.
Tunnels require the deployment of considerable skill and care in their investigation, planning,
design, construction and monitoring if they are to be safely constructed. Several of the tunnel
collapses described above appear to be due to a failure properly to plan and design for un-
certainties, in particular for an unfavourable change in ground conditions. Procedures can be
developed to overcome these uncertainties and permit safe tunnel construction, but their
successful application requires the proper management of complex technical issues.
Every collapse is carefully analyzed because, on the one hand, the cost questions have to be
settled, and on the other hand, conclusions for the continuation of work can be drawn from
the knowledge gained in this way. To date, analyses have shown that in only some cases
could the collapses be attributed to one single reason. Usually, the collapse resulted from a
coincidence of several unfavourable circumstances. In several cases, it was found that the
combination of unexpected geological influences and faulty execution caused the collapse.
Tunnelling hazards cover a wide range of potential occurrences or incidents which can have
wide ranging effects on the construction and subsequent service of the structure. Hazard
assessment should be undertaken during the site investigation stage and contingency plan-
ning devised to meet the particular tunnelling situation. Tunnelling hazards demand an acute
awareness at all stages from the site investigation through design and planning to construc-
tion and completion of the project in addition to its subsequent service.
Finally the following quotation seems to be the most suitable conclusion closing this Master
Thesis work (Wannick, 2006):
“No construction project is risk free.

Risk can be managed, minimised,
shared, transferred or accepted.
It cannot be ignored.”
(Sir Michael Latham, 1994)

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Appendix
Appendix: Survey on tunnel collapses during the last 70 years
Table. A 1: Record of incidents and collapses in tunnelling 1

Excavation Category of
No Date Location Project Ground condition Source of information
method collapse
Los Angeles, MWD Hollywood conglomerate sand-
1 1940 - 1941 United Tunnel - water stone, shale and Drill and Blast water inrush Eisenstein et al. (1995)
States supply basalt
conglomerate sand-
Los Angeles, La Cienega-San water inrush,
stone, shale granite,
2 1954 - 1956 United Fernando Valley Drill and Blast sinkhole to Eisenstein et al. (1995)
basalt and Young
States Sewer Tunnel surface
Alluvium
Eucumbene-
Snowy
Snowy Tunnel,
3 1969 Mountain, rockfall Jacobs (1975)
Snowy Mountain
Australia
Scheme
Lemonthyme
4 Tasmania phyllite rockfall Jacobs (1975)
Tunnel
A. Kemano
5 Canada mylonite and gouge rockfall Jacobs (1975)
Tunnel, BC
Metropolitan
Los Angeles, Water District
soft sandstone and Robbins water inrush,
6 1970 - 1975 United San Fernando Eisenstein et al. (1995)
siltstone Digger Shield sinkhole
States Tunnel - water
supply
claystone, siltstone,
Los Angeles,
LACFCD Saca- occasional very hard
7 1972 - 1976 United Digger Shield roof caving Eisenstein et al. (1995)
tella Tunnel calcareous cemented
States
sandstone
1973, "cantilever"
8 Paris, France Rail tunnel ? NATM HSE (1999)
October collapse
Sao Paulo
1981, Sao Paulo, cone of settle- HSE (1999) and
9 metro, North- ? NATM
December Brazil ment at surface http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
South link
Dilizhan tunnel,
Dilizhan, Trans- cauca- shieldless roof caving,
10 1983, June coaly and clay shales Vlasov et al. (2001)
USSR sian Railway, TBM face collapse
case 1
Dilizhan tunnel,
Dilizhan, Trans- cauca- shieldless
11 1983, July coaly and clay shales face collapse Vlasov et al. (2001)
USSR sian Railway, TBM
case 2
Santana, Santana Under- daylight col-
12 1983 ? NATM HSE (1999)
Brazil ground Railway lapse
1984, Landrücken, Landrücken Rail HSE (1999) and

13 ? NATM roof caving
November Germany Tunnel http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
Bochum, daylight col-
14 1984 Bochum Metro ? NATM HSE (1999)
Germany lapse
Kodarsky tunnel,
15 1984 USSR ? ? face collapse Vlasov et al. (2001)
Baikal-Amur Line
1985, Richthof, Richthof Rail daylight col- HSE (1999) and

16 ? Drill and blast
January Germany Tunnel lapse http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
1985, Kaiserau, Kaiserau Rail collapse of the HSE (1999) and

17 ? NATM
August Germany Tunnel bench http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
daylight col-
Bochum,
18 1985 Bochum Metro ? NATM lapse, roof HSE (1999)
Germany
caving
1986, Krieberg, Krieberg Rail completed
19 sandstone NATM HSE (1999)
February Germany Tunnel lining collapse
water inrush,
1987 Munich, Munich Metro,
20 ? NATM daylight col- http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
(before) Germany case 1
lapse
1987 Munich, Munich Metro, daylight col-

21 gravel NATM http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html
(before) Germany case 2 lapse

22 marl NATM http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html

23 marl NATM http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html

method collapse
1987 Munich, Munich Metro, http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm

24 marl NATM daylight collapse
(before) Germany case 5 .html
1987 Munich, Munich Metro, http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.

25 ? NATM blowout
(before) Germany case 6 html
Papallacta,
1988, Quito, TBM; Drill and http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreak
26 water transfer ? roof caving
September Ecuador blast ers/hall.htm
tunnel
http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm
27 1988 Germany Michaels Tunnel ? ? roof caving
.html
high-terrace gravel
containing materials
stemming from the
penultimate Ice Age;
gypsum keuper com-
prising clayey marls;
formation of funnel- Conventional
shaped cavities, means (drill
Habsburgtunnel,
1988 - Brugg, including extensive and blast;
28 National High- daylight collapse Kovari & Descoeudres (2001)
1994 Switzerland swallow-holes filled pneumatic
way A3
with rock and soft picks; shield
material; intensively drive)
fractured areas;
succession of anhy-
drite dolomite, crinoi-
dal limestone, platy
limestone and
trigonodus dolomite
Karawanken, HSE (1999) and
1989, Karawanken
29 Austria/Slove ? NATM roof caving http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.
January Road Tunnel
nia html
dense sands, silts and
North Outfall
clays; lightly cemented
Los Angeles, Replacement
30 1989 dune sand; unce- Digger Shield sinkholes Eisenstein et al. (1995)
United States Sewer Tunnel
mented recent dune
(NORS)
sand
Folded Jura (malm,
dogger, lias), La
Caquerelle anticline
and Alsatian molasse:
essentially straight-
Mont Russelin forward limestone
1989 - Delémont, face collapse,
31 Tunnel, National structure; tectonised TBM Kovari & Descoeudres (2001)
1995 Switzerland water inrush
Highway A16 marly rocks with
overlapping planes;
fault zone formed of
alternating sub-
horizontal limestone
and marlstone layers
North Outfall claystone, siltstone
Earth Pressu-
1990 - Los Angeles, Replacement and occasional very
32 re Balance sinkhole Eisenstein et al. (1995)
1991 United States Sewer Tunnel hard calcareous
Machine
(NORS) cemented sandstone
difficult, constantly
changing subsurface
conditions: glacial soils
with complex hydro-
geologie conditions;
core of molasse face collapse,
1990 - Bern, Mixshield Isaksson (2002), Herrenknecht (1992)
33 Grauholz Tunnel bedrock (sandstones settlements at
1992 Switzerland TBM and www.ita-aites.org
and marls); varying the surface
glacial deposits, ice-
marginal deposits of
silt, sand, gravel and
ground moraine
alternate
1991, Kwachon, Kwachon Metro
34 clay NATM daylight collapse HSE (1999)
September Korea Tunnel
weathered rock or
clay; various weath-
ered granites ranging
from decomposed
1991, Seoul, Seoul Metro, NATM; road
35 granite soil to weath- daylight collapse HSE (1999) and Shin et al. (2006)
November Korea Phase 2, case 1 header
ered rock; ground
water table 3-10 m
below the ground
surface

method collapse
HSE (1999) and

1991, Seoul, Seoul Metro,
36 ? NATM daylight collapse http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht
November Korea Phase 2, case 2
ml
Toulon, Motorway Link pre-cutting http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200

37 1991 ? ?
France Tunnel A57-A50 method 2/august/panorama0802.pdf
series of schist forma-

tions (clayey, calcer-
ous limestones,
greywackes, silt- daylight col-
1991 - Athens, Metro Tunnel open face
38 stones, shales, lime- lapse, roof T&T (Nov 2001)
2000 Greece Line 2 shield TBM
stones, marls); meta- caving
sandstones, metasil-
tones; periodotitic and
dibasic bodies
1992, Seoul Metro,
39 Seoul, Korea ? NATM daylight collapse HSE (1999)
February Phase 2, case 3
Lambach, Lambach Rail
40 1992, June ? NATM daylight collapse HSE (1999)
Austria Tunnel
HSE (1999) and

Yamagata, Funagata Road
41 1992 ? NATM ? http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.
Japan Tunnel
html
Severomuisk weathered, faulted and

Hard Rock water inrush, T&T (Apr 2002) and Bessolow & Maka-
42 1992 USSR railway tunnel, tectonically disturbed
Shield TBM face collapse row (1992)
Baikal-Amur Line granite rocks
Mysovy tunnel,
weathered rocks with
43 USSR Baikal-Amur Drill and blast face collapse Vlasov et al. (2001)
high jointing
Line, case 1
schistic gneisses
transforming into
Mysovy tunnel, glimmerites at the
44 USSR Baikal-Amur zones with granites; Drill and blast face collapse Vlasov et al. (2001)
Line, case 2 crumpled soils satu-
rated with granite
lenses and veins
1993, Seoul Metro, face collapse, http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht
45 Seoul, Korea soft rock NATM
January Phase 2, case 4 daylight collapse ml
Shin et al. (2006) and

1993, Seoul Metro,
46 Seoul, Korea weathered rock NATM daylight collapse http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht
February Phase 2, case 5
ml
1993, Seoul Metro, http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht

47 Seoul, Korea weathered rock NATM daylight collapse
March Phase 2, case 6 ml
1993, Seoul Metro, http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht

48 Seoul, Korea residual clay NATM daylight collapse
March Phase 2, case 7 ml
1993, Taipei, Chungho Road

49 ? NATM roof caving HSE (1999)
March Taiwan Tunnel
Road Tunnel at
1993, Sao Paulo, face collapse,
50 Avienda Santo fissured hard clay NATM HSE (1999)
November Brazil collapse of drain
Amaro
Road tunnel
Tuscany,
51 1993 "Poggio ? NATM ? HSE (1999)
Italy
Fornello"

method collapse
conventional
means (se-
quential
rock zones with pre- excavation
stressed, in part with shotcret-
Schaff- Fäsenstaub
extremely inhomoge- ing method
52 1993 hausen, Tunnel, National roof caving Kovari & Descoeudres (2001)
nous gravels and and with drill
Switzerland Highway A4
lakebed deposits; platy and blast;
limes shield drive;
previously
created jet
grouted arch)
phyllitic and quartzife- Drill and

rous schists; Triassic Blast; Double
formations with quartz- Shield Tunnel
Maidl & Schmid (2001),
pressure shaft, ites, dolomite, anhy- Boring Ma-
www.stucky.ch/DB/TSOUT2_eng.cfm?X_
1993 - Sion/Valais, hydraulic power drite and gypsum; chine with an
53 roof caving NUME=4 and www.ita-aites.org/cms
1998 Switzerland plant Cleuson- Carboniferous marly hemispherical
/index.php?id=372&type=98&no_cache=
Dixence schists interspersed cutterhead
1&L=0
with impervious my- and then
lonite zones and strips modified to a
of coal flat cutterhead
http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.
Sao Paulo, Carvalho Pinto
54 1994, April ? Drill and blast roof caving html and http://timelines.ws/countries/
Brazil Road Tunnel
BRAZIL.HTML
http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht
Montemor, Montemor Road ml and
55 1994, July ? Drill and blast daylight collapse
Portugal Tunnel, case 1 http://www.fujitaresearch.com/reports/tun
nelling.html
1994, Montemor, Montemor Road http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.ht

56 ? Drill and blast daylight collapse
August Portugal Tunnel, case 2 ml
carbonate-rich rocks in
1994, Leoben, Galgenberg HSE (1999) and
57 a fracture zone with NATM rock burst
August Austria Tunnel http://www.mindat.org/loc-22035.html
albite-chlorite shales
1994, Munich, marl under waterlog- excavation by HSE (1999) and Knowledge Manage-
58 Munich Metro daylight collapse
September Germany ged gravels excavator ment (2004)
London, Heathrow Ex-

1994, London clay; loose T&T (Aug 2000) and Knowledge Man-
59 United press Link NATM sinkholes
October rock agement (2004)
Kingdom Airport Tunnel
soft clayey soil; 6

Drill and blast;
major faults, numerous Knowledge Management (2004) and
Hsuehshan Earth-
1994 - Taipei, fracture zones, and water inrush, http://english.www.gov.tw/e-
60 Tunnel, Taipei- Pressure-
1995 Taiwan high-pressure ground collapse Gov/index.jsp?categid=
Ilan Expressway Balance
groundwater every- 96&recordid=78587
TBMs
where
crystalline rock com-

prising biotitic
gneisses and plagio-
1994 - Klosters, Vereina Tunnel, clase amphibolites; face collapse,
61 open TBM Kovari & Descoeudres (2001)
1997 Switzerland Central Section heavily tectonised rock roof caving
(stable Silvretta crys-
talline with tendency to
brittle fracture)

method collapse
two cut-and-
Maidl & Schmid (2001),
mudstone, marl and cover sec-
www.npcaa.com.au/html/NationalPrecast
Basel, Adler Railway limestone; gypsum tions; central settlements,
62 1994 - 2000 er/BackIssues/prec19.pdf, www.geo-
Switzerland Tunnel keuper (anhydrite); section Shield daylight collapse
online.com/pdf/2006-01Eurock_kib.pdf
river gravel sediments Tunnel Boring
and www.ita-aites.org/cms/373.html
Machine
lower molasse layers

and weaker, water
laden moraine ground;
weathered layer T&T (Nov 2003),
Oenzberg rail (lightly to strongly silty Mixshield http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200
Bolken,
63 1994 - 2000 tunnel, Bahn fine sand with little TBM; cut-and- ground collapse 3/mar/Panorama%20pages.pdf and
Switzerland
2000 gravel; layers of cover method http://www.solexperts.com/pdfs/en/pub_P
moraine (slightly 150_Oenzberg_mBd_en.pdf
cohesive fine and
medium sand with
medium gravel)
Hollywood
Los Angeles, water inrush, www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreakers/c
64 1995 section, LA ? ?
United States sinkhole hamber.htm
Metro extension
volcanic rock (water

T&T (May 2001) and
1996, Hokkaido, Toyohama cooled lava rock and a
65 ? cave-in http://www.tunnel.org/oldSite/tunnelTimes
February Japan tunnel mixture of hard and
/Mar96issue/toyohama.html
soft material)
WT (May 1999) and http://www.ita-

1998, Asikkala, Päijänne Tunnel hard granite (crystalli-
66 Drill and blast aites.org/applications/30th/PDF/ITA_98_
February Finland - water supply ne bedrock)
1-177.pdf
drainage and alternate sequencees Maidl & Schmid (2001) and

Ruhr,
67 1998 controll gallery, of mudstone and gripper TBM overbreaks www.slopeindicator.com/stories/ennepeta
Germany
Ennepe dam sandstone l.html
Maidl & Schmid (2001) and

Shield Tunnel water inrush,
Frasnadello, San Pellegrino limestone layers, www2.polito.it/ricerca/rockmech/Master%
68 1998 Boring Ma- ground collapse,
Italy road tunnel Black clay, argillite 20Tunnelling%202005/Barla%20Pelizza
chine rock burst
%202000.PDF
all manner of
difficult geological and
cutting meth-
hydrological condi-
ods: pipe-
tions; various geologi-
screen, http://www.amberg.ch/aib/E-Sites/e-
Flims Bypass, cal formations; water-
Flims, blasting, water inrush, projekte_pmexpert_flims.html and
69 1998 tunnel Flim- saturated Verrucano
Switzerland lances and roof caving http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200
serstein landslip material
pilot tunnels; 2/september/flims0902.pdf
(limestones and
crown exca-
marbles); areas of
vation with
glacial sediments
cutting shield

method collapse
banded or veined
gneisses (Precam-
Sogn and brian), often of gabbro- T&T (Sep 1999) and
rock burst, face
70 1999, June Fjordane, Laerdal Tunnel itic composition, Drill and blast http://www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreak
collapse
Norway massive syenitic or ers/hall.htm
monzonitic augeng-
neisses
young volcanic se-
east-west a- quence composed of
Umiray- lignement of the 50 - 120 Mpa agglom- Double Shield
1999, T&T (Jul 2000) and
71 Angat, Umiray-Angat erates, basalts and Hard Rock roof caving
November http://www.tunnelmachines.com/robbins/
Philippines Transbasin main tuffs with inter-layered TBM
tunnel sedimentary rocks
including limestone
alluvial conditions with
peat/organic clay at
the crown; substantial Earth Pres-
body of mobile fine sure Balance
wind blown Aeolian Machine,
Hull,
1999, Hull flow transfer (single sized) sand; using fo-
72 United roof caving T&T (Mar 2002, Mar 2003 and Feb 2004)
November tunnel alluvial (clay, silt, am/polymer
Kingdom
sand, gravel and peat) ground
and glacial (clay, fine conditioning
to medium sand and agents
gravel) deposits, two
aquifers
Bolu Tunnel,
1999, Bolu, soft soil; clay and Knowledge Management (2004) and
73 Anatolian Mo- NATM roof caving
November Turkey weak rock zone http://www.tfhrc.gov/structur/00-146.pdf
torway Link
http://www.tunnelmachines.com/atlascop
Tala/Chukha co/, http://www.power-
Tala Hydroe-
74 1999 Dzongkhag, moist crumbly rock Drill and blast face collapse technology.com/projects/tala/ and
lectric Project
Bhutan http://www.bhutannewsonline.com/tala_h
ydroproject.html
T&T (Jul 2000),

http://www.ice.org.uk/news_events/event
1999 -
Strood/Kent, de-
2000, Strood Railway area of unlined chalk;
75 United ? sinkhole tail_ice.asp?EventID=1481&EventType=I
December - Tunnel lined mostly in brick
Kingdom CE&FacultyID= and
June
http://www.networkrailcareers.co.uk/case
Studies.cfm
Dongjiang- T&T (Mar 2000) and

2000, Shenzhen,
76 Shenzhen Water ? ? roof caving http://english.people.com.cn/200602/15/e
January China
Supply Scheme ng20060215_242791.html
Knowledge Management (2004) and

2000, Taegu,
77 Taegu Metro ? ? daylight collapse http://www.urbanrail.net/as/daeg/daegu.h
January South Korea
tm

method collapse
www.tunnelbuilder.com/recordbreakers/c
Blue Line (Linha
Lisbon, Tunnel Boring water inrush, hamber.htm, http://www.metrolisboa.pt/
78 2000, June Azul), Pontinha - sand
Portugal Machine roof caving cronolg_00_uk.htm and http://www.tec-
Amadora Este
tunnel.com/
igneous rocks (two-

micas, coarse granite), T&T (Dec 2003),
2000 - 2001, alluvial material above Earth Pressu- http://www.geodata.it/chisiamo/pubblicazi
Porto, Porto Metro
79 October - the weathered granite re Balance roof caving oni/47.pdf and http://www.ice.org.uk/
Portugal Light Rail project
January (fresh rock to residual Machine news_events/eventdtail_ice.asp?EventID
soil); water table 10-25 =1557&EventType=ICE&FacultyID=
m above the tunnel
T&T (Dec 2000),

http://www.icivilengineer.com/Failure_Wa
Washington Washington mixed face comprising tch/2000_Tunnel/,
2000, No-
80 DC, United DC's Dulles clay, soils and compe- Roadheader roof caving http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/11/02/d
vember
States airport tunnel tent siltstone ulles.collapse.01/ and
http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter
/Headlines/ENR/20010503b.asp
full face Earth

Pressure
Balance TBM,
Portsmouth, cohesionless sand T&T (Mar 2003) and http://www.edmund-
Havant Flow using fo-
81 2000 United King- layers between cohe- water inrush nuttall.co.uk/Jobsheets/Water/
Transfer Tunnel am/polymer
dom sive (clayey) layers Havant%20Flow%20Tunnel.pdf
ground
conditioning
agents
Keuper and Lias

Claystones; massive, both drill and
T&T (Nov2003) and
Paderborn, Egge Railway firm Osning Sandstone blast and
82 2000 water inrush http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200
Germany Tunnel and less firm Gault excavation by
0/june/Complicated%20Geology.pdf
Sandstone; karstified excavator
Muschelkalk
granite and granodio- Open main-

T&T (Jun 2003) and
Yuncan, Yuncan Hydroe- rite; several fault beam gripper
83 2001, March water inrush http://epubl.luth.se/1402-
Peru lectric Project zones; extreme TBM; Drill and
1617/2004/163/LTU-EX-04163-SE.pdf
ground water ingress blast
sandstone, claystone T&T (Dec 2001) and

and siltstone; strata of http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1:8200
2001, Sep- Istanbul, Istanbul Metro,
84 clay, sand and back- NATM daylight collapse 6224/Istanbul+metro+collapse+investigati
tember Turkey phase 2
filling above the ons%7eR%7e+(Wt+on+Site)%7eR%7e(
tunnel; ground water Turkey).html?refid=SEO

method collapse
granite intruded in
Triassic Period of T&T (Oct 2003),
both drill and
Mesozoic Era and http://haivan.cadp.jp/04_project_info/intro
Lang Co, Haivan Pass blast and settlement, roof
85 2001 thermal metamor- .htm and
Vietnam Tunnel excavation by caving
phosed gneiss origi- http://homepage2.nifty.com/Lithosphere_
excavator
nated from sedimen- Tec/HP_URL.pdf
tary rocks
loose rock above NATM with

2002, Sissach,
86 Chienberg tunnel competent rock; marl umbrella daylight collapse T&T (Apr 2002) and Tunnel (1/2005)
February Switzerland
and gypsum keuper seals
Gotthard Base penninic gneiss zone;

Tunnel, South- poor rock layer of silty T&T (Nov 2003), Kovari & Descoeudres
Faido, ern section, Lucomagno gneiss; (2001) and http://www.leica-
87 2002, April Drill and blast roof caving
Switzerland Multifunctional stratification changing geosystems.com/media/new/product
Station Faido from sub-horizontal to _solution/rep_eng_gotthard_en.pdf
(MFS) almost vertical
T&T (Jul 2002), http://www.n15-

europaweg.nl/tekstversie/engels/
Rotterdam, New Caland immersed
88 2002, June ? content.asp and http://www.ita-
Netherlands tunnel tunnelling
aites.org/applications/30th/PDF/
RCTUS_03_v1_271-276.pdf
sequential
Hokou tunnel, T&T (Jan 2003) and
2002, Taoyuan, excavation
89 Taiwan High ? roof caving www.retc.org./Attendee/Tech/Tuesday/2-
December Taiwan and support
Speed Rail Link AM.cfm
method
native sedimentary
rocks; crystalline
rocks; limestone,
Lötschberg Base
granodiorite, granite,
St German, Tunnel, Sou- T&T (May 2002) and Kovari & Des-
90 2002 gneiss; short section Drill and blast setllement
Switzerland thern section, coeudres (2001)
with water under high
Raron portal
pressure; areas of
phyllites and a carbon-
iferous layer
Vienna, Lainzer railroad http://en.structurae.de/structures/data/ind

91 2002 ? ? face collapses
Austria tunnel ex.cfm?ID=s0003967
T&T (Feb 2003),

Chüebalm road www.nzzamsonntag.ch/2003/01/14/vm/n
2003, Iseltwald,
92 tunnel, Motorway ? ? roof caving ewzzDAXUNBHS-12.html, www.beo-
January Switzerland
A8 news.ch/bns2003/jan2003/tunnel30.htm
and www.ibex-sim.com/rock.html
East London, Contract 240 of Earth Pressu- T&T (Mar 2003) and
2003,
93 United the Channel limestone re Balance daylight collapse http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200
February
Kingdom Tunnel Rail Link Machine 3/mar/Panorama%20pages.pdf

method collapse
2003, Paris, http://www.mjconstruct.com/artman/publi

94 Metro Line 14 limestone ? daylight collapse
February France sh/article_372.asp
intrusive rocks of
granitoid type with T&T (Aug 2003),
important water http://www.ttcmag.net/tunnel/archive/200
Segovia, Guadarrama rail Hard Rock
95 2003, June courses; igneous and ground collapse 2/april/panorama0402.pdf and
Spain tunnels TBM
metamorphic rocks http://www.geodata.it/english/progetti/gall
(gneisses, granitoides, unghe/guadarrama/
dikes and faults)
T&T (Aug 2003), Knowledge Manage-

Shanghai, ment (2004) and
96 2003, July Metro Line 4 coastal sand and clay ? water inrush
China www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004
-04/02/content_320246.htm
T&T (Oct 2003), http://www.ita-

Liyama rail
aites.org/cms/212.html,
2003, Hokoriku, tunnel, Hokuriku squeezing ground conventional water inrush,
97 http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr40/f14_kit.html and
September Japan Shinkansen pressure mean daylight collapse
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/se
railway project
arch-news/952527/nagano-140-141.html
pronouncedly hetero-
genous geological
subsurface structure;
Tunnel (2/2004), http://www.roadtraffic-
tertiary brown coal
Lübeck, Lübeck Herren Slurry Shield roof caving, rock technology.com/projects/herren/ and
98 2003 sands, thick quater-
Germany Tunnel TBM burst http://www.tollroadsnews.com/cgi-
nary deposits consist-
bin/a.cgi/knT6JBIFEdqcEIJ61nsxIA
ing of glacial marl and
basin clay; artesian
groundwater aquifer
T&T (May 2004) and

Guangzhou, Guangzhou's
99 2004, April ? ? www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004
China Metro Line 3
-04/02/content_320246.htm
Mass Rapid
T&T (Jun 2005) and
100 2004, April Singapore Transit Circle ? ? daylight collapse
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circle_MRT_Line
Line

method collapse
T&T (Aug 2004),

www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/m
Tehri/ Tehri Hydro
2004, ay22005/national19525200551.asp and
101 Uttaranchal, Development ? ? roof caving
August http://autofeed.msn.co.in/pandorav3/outp
India Project
ut/News/d1207fba-7b22-4301-b194-
4c2483b61fe4.aspx
T&T (Dec 2005) and

2004, Sydney, Lane Cove road
102 sandstone Roadheader daylight collapse http://www.ats.org.au/wmview.php?ArtID
November Australia tunnel
=23
T&T (Feb 2005),

www.geographyfieldwork.com/CarmelTu
2005, Barcelona,
103 Line 5 ? ? daylight collapse nnel.htm and
January Spain
www.typicallyspanish.com/cgi-
bin/news/exec/view.cgi/2/2789
2005, Lausanne, molasse, marls and daylight col-

104 Metro 2 Roadheader
February Switzerland sandstone lapse
T&T (Jun 2005) and

Kunming, Yunnan rail
105 2005, May ? ? roof caving http://english.sina.com/china/1/2005/0523
China tunnel
/32018.html
T&T (Aug 2005) and

Gerrards www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/features/news
106 2005, June Cross, United Tesco tunnel ? ? daylight collapse features/display.var.626103.0.is_there_
Kingdom light_at_the_end_of_the_tunnel_collapse
_investigation.php
Karahnjukar T&T (Feb 2006) and

2005, Karahnjukar, basalt and glacial Hard Rock
107 hydropower roof caving www.karahnjukar.is/En/category.asp?catI
August Iceland waters TBM
project D=407
T&T (Nov 2005),

Guangfu Tunnel, www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
2005, Meizhou,
108 Tianjin-Shantou ? ? roof caving doc/2005-10/28/content_488491.htm and
October China
Expressway www.jsjy.gov.cn/newsfiles/78/2005-
10/6945.shtml
Shield Tunnel T&T (Jan 2006) and

2005, Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung Mass
109 ? Boring Ma- daylight collapse http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaohsiung_M
December Taiwan Rapid Transit
chine ass_Rapid_Transit
Shield Tunnel roof caving, face

Vienna, Wienerwald Molasse and Flysch
110 2005 Boring Ma- collapse, water
Austria tunnel zone
chine inrush
Appendix: Case study No.1- Lausanne Metro M2
Fig. 69: Map of Lausanne [http://map.search.ch, 2006]

Fig. 70: Cartes Géologiques Suisse 1:25000 [Atlas géologique de la Suisse, Feuille: 1243 Lausanne]
Fig. 71: Legend of geology map 1 [Esquisse tectonique, Atlas géologique de la Suisse, Feuille: 1243 Lau-
sanne]
Fig. 72: Legend of geology map 2 [Esquisse tectonique, Atlas géologique de la Suisse, Feuille: 1243 Lau-
sanne]
Fig. 73: Measurements after the collapse, Phase 1 [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
Fig. 77: Plan of affected redevelopment area [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
Fig. 78: Working drawing of pipe screen [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
Fig. 79: Longitudinal section of pipe screen [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
Fig. 80: Cross section of the „new“face [Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, 2006]
Appendix: Case study No.2 - Wienerwald Railway Tunnel
Western Section
Eastern
Section
Fig. 81: General plan of the project [Joint Venture ÖBA Wienerwald Railway Tunnel, 2006]

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Master Thesis

Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Timo Seidenfuß

Register No. 870003

Fachhochschule Stuttgart – Hochschule für Technik

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne - EPFL

Association Internationale des Travaux En Souterrain - AITES

Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Fritz Grübl,

Prof. Jian Zhao,

Prof. Andre P Assis,

 Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, Chemin du Clossel 15 Case postale, CH-1020 Renens

will be handled confidentially.

Declaration according to §16 (5) StPRO 1995

Erklärung gemäss § 16 (5) StPRO 1995

Preface and Acknowledgement

Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, in particular Filippo Gaj and Fabio Soares,

Finally I express my gratitude to the Knödler-Decker-Foundation of the Stuttgart University of

Lausanne, July 2006

On the basis of an extensive literature search supplemented by information from different

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................... 9

TABLE OF TABLES ....................................................................................... 15

1.2 Background .............................................................................................................. 16

1.3 Objective and scope of this Thesis........................................................................ 19

1.4 Organization of the Thesis...................................................................................... 19

2 CATEGORIES OF COLLAPSES ............................................................. 20

2.2 Underground collapse............................................................................................. 22

2.3 Rock burst ................................................................................................................ 24

2.4 Ingress of water / Inrush of water........................................................................... 26

2.5 Portal collapses ....................................................................................................... 27

3 SURVEY ON TUNNEL COLLAPSES DURING THE LAST 70 YEARS.. 28

3.2 Interpretations and conclusions on the survey .................................................... 78

4 POTENTIAL CAUSES OF COLLAPSES................................................. 82

4.2 Mistakes in the course of planning and specification.......................................... 94

4.3 Calculation or numerical mistakes......................................................................... 97

4.4 Mistakes during construction of a tunnel.............................................................. 99

4.5 Management and control mistakes ...................................................................... 100

4.6 Interruptions and breaks....................................................................................... 101

4.7 Mistakes in communication and organisation .................................................... 101

5 FAILURE MECHANISMS ....................................................................... 102

5.2 Deformations and ground displacements – preliminary stages of collapses . 105

5.3 Burst mechanisms................................................................................................. 107

5.4 Blow-out failure...................................................................................................... 108

5.5 Chimney caving mechanisms............................................................................... 109

5.6 Stand-up time – Stability of the tunnel face ........................................................ 111

5.8 Failure of lining before or after ring closure ....................................................... 117

5.9 Squeezing and swelling ground behaviour......................................................... 121

6 CASE STUDY NO.1: LAUSANNE METRO M2 ..................................... 122

6.2 Excavation method ................................................................................................ 124

6.3 Exceptional challenges ......................................................................................... 126

6.4 Geology and hydrology......................................................................................... 129

6.5 Daylight collapse of Saint-Laurent....................................................................... 131

7 CASE STUDY NO.2: WIENERWALD RAILWAY TUNNEL................... 139

7.2 Eastern section ...................................................................................................... 140

7.3 Western section ..................................................................................................... 145

8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................................................... 163

REFERENCES .............................................................................................. 165

INTERNET REFERENCES ........................................................................... 172

APPENDIX .................................................................................................... 175

FIG. 2: SUBSIDENCE CAUSED BY A COLLAPSED TUNNEL [HTTP://WWW.MUNICHRE.COM/PUBLICATIONS]....................... 21

TABLE 4: CIRCULAR CHART: CATEGORIES OF COLLAPSES ......................................................................................... 79

TABLE. A 1: RECORD OF INCIDENTS AND COLLAPSES IN TUNNELLING 1 ........................................................................ 176

1.1 Preliminary remarks

1.3 Objective and scope of this Thesis

Métro Lausanne-Ouchy SA, Chemin du Clossel 15 Case postale, CH-1020 Renens