Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manotok IV vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Manotok IV vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Manotok IV vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque
*
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO
M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M.
MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO
LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN
MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK,
JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R.
MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA.
CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L.
MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R.
MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR.
and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorneyin
fact, ROSA R. MANOTOK, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L.
BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Land Registration; Reconstitution of Titles; Republic Act No.
26; Land Registration Authority (LRA) properly ruled that the
reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution.—The LRA
properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined
himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the
reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26 clearly provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order: (a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; . . . .
Same; Same; Same; By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be
used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight
and preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other
enumerated sources.—Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less
deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be
spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the
reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and
preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other
enumerated sources.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact of administrative bodies are
accorded respect, even finality by the Court and, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very
compelling reasons.—The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’
title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’ title is
sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of
Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed
since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact of administrative bodies
are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very
compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies
exercising quasijudicial functions . . . are accorded not only respect but
even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially
not a trier of facts.
Same; Same; Same; In the reconstitution proceedings, the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) is bound to determine from the evidence
submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to
enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.—In the
reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the
evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and
existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.
Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency
clothed only with mechanical powers.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Land Registration; Reconstitution of Titles; Republic Act No.
26; The majority opinion patently violates Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree which expressly states that a Torrens title cannot be
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law; Only the
proper trial court in an action directly attacking the validity of a
Torrens title can cancel a Torrens title after trial on the merit.—The
majority opinion cancels the Torrens title of petitioners in these cases
which originated from an administrative reconstitution petition filed by
respondents before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The majority
opinion patently violates Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
which expressly states that a Torrens title “cannot be x x x cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Under Section 19
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, “Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein.” Thus, only the proper trial court, in an action directly
attacking the validity of a Torrens title, can cancel a Torrens title after
trial on the merit. Jurisprudence has aptly termed
this hornbook doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; The Land Registration Authority (LRA) erred
in ruling that Atty. Bustos should have confined himself to the owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 210177.—When Atty. Bustos requested Engr.
Dalire to furnish his office with a copy of Fls3168D, it was part of the
verification process prior to reconstitution of the title. Considering the
numerous petitions for reconstitution due to the destruction of the
Quezon City Hall, Atty. Bustos was merely exercising caution to avoid
the reconstitution of spurious titles. Atty. Bustos conducted a
verification of TCT No. 210177 pursuant to paragraph 8 of LRA
Circular No. 13. Hence, the LRA erred in ruling that Atty. Bustos
should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate of TCT No.
210177.
Same; Same; Same; The reconstituting officer must go beyond the
owner’s or coowner’s duplicate certificate of title to determine whether
the title is genuine.—The reconstitution of a certificate of title is far
from being a ministerial act. In an administrative reconstitution, the
petitioner must submit the owner’s or coowner’s duplicate of the
certificate of title as required by Section 3 of RA 26 and paragraph 4 of
LRA Circular No. 13. However, the submission of the source documents
does not mean that the reconstituting officer must forthwith grant the
petition for reconstitution. It does not also mean that the reconstituting
officer must confine himself with the owner’s or coowner’s duplicate of
the certificate of title. In accordance with paragraph 8 of LRA Circular
No. 13, the reconstituting officer or the Register of Deeds shall issue an
order of reconstitution only after appropriate verification which means
that he must be convinced that the certificate of title is genuine and not
spurious. Thus, the reconstituting officer must go beyond the owner’s or
coowner’s duplicate certificate of title to determine whether the title is
genuine. The process of verification allows the reconstituting officer to
countercheck with other government agencies to determine the validity
of the title to be reconstituted.
Same; Same; Same; The Land Registration Authority (LRA) has
jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions on petitions for reconstitution;
Land Registration Authority’s (LRA’s) jurisdiction to act on petitions for
administrative reconstitution does not include the power to declare a
title sham or spurious or to order the cancellation of a certificate of title.
—The LRA has jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions on petitions
for reconstitution. However, it is not within its powers and functions to
declare a title void. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (“BP
Blg. 129”), “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein.” The LRA, in its 24
June 1998 Resolution, recognized that only the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”) could declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. Clearly, LRA’s
jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution does not
include the power to declare a title sham or spurious or to order the
cancellation of a certificate of title.
Same; Same; Same; A certificate of title cannot be subject to
collateral attack; It may only altered, modified or cancelled in a direct
proceeding.—The settled rule is a certificate of title cannot be subject to
collateral attack. A certificate of title may only be altered, modified or
cancelled in a direct proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Land Registration Authority (LRA) exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.’s title is sham and
spurious.—To allow the cancellation of Manotok, et al.’s title in an
administrative reconstitution proceeding will permit an indirect attack
on the certificate of title in violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. The LRA
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.s’ title is
sham and spurious. The LRA itself acknowledged that only the RTC
could declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. By ruling on the
validity of Manotok, et al.’s title, the LRA assumed the function of the
RTC. The LRA also preempted whatever decision the RTC may render
on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; No court, much less an administrative body,
can entertain a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed title if the
land is already covered by a Torrens title in the name of another party
unless there is a final judgment first canceling such Torrens title.—The
Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of
Barque in view of the existing Torrens title of Manotok, et al. No court,
much less an administrative body, can entertain a petition for
reconstitution of lost or destroyed title if the land is already covered by
a Torrens title in the name of another party, unless there is a final
judgment first cancelling such Torrens title. The only exception is when
the Torrens title has been issued for less than one year, which is not the
situation in the present cases.
Same; Same; Same; The reconstituting officer in an administrative
proceeding has no authority to deprive a third party of his property by
canceling his Torrens title to the property.—In a petition for
reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a
reconstituted title because the reconstituting officer’s power is limited
to granting or denying a reconstituted title. The reconstituting officer
has no power to decide questions of ownership. A Torrens title, even a
reconstituted title, is “evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein.” Certainly, the
reconstituting officer in an administrative proceeding has no authority
to deprive a third party of his property by cancelling his Torrens title to
the property. In a petition for reconstitution, such third party is not
even required to be impleaded as a respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Ownership is never in issue in a petition for
reconstitution of title.—By cancelling the TCT of Manotok, et al., and
upholding the TCT of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals
resolved in the administrative reconstitution case the issue of
ownership over the property in dispute. This is grave error because
ownership is never in issue in a petition for reconstitution of title. As
this Court ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.: Respondent relies
solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a lost
duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not
determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title,
by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Where the law prescribes a particular remedy
with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity
jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.—Equity
jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law
is unable to render judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case
because of the limitations of its statutory jurisdiction. However, equity
follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still
apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law. Where the
law prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries,
the court cannot, by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the
boundaries further than the law allows.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Rule that factual findings of an
administrative body accorded respect if not finality does not apply when
the administrative body has no jurisdiction to make a conclusive factual
finding particularly when the findings might conflict with findings of
the tribunal or agency which has jurisdiction on the matter.—The
determination of the authenticity of the documents and veracity of the
claims of both parties requires a trial on the merits. The LRA exceeded
its jurisdiction when it made a conclusive finding on the validity of the
titles of the parties. Such function falls under the “exclusive original
jurisdiction” of the RTC under Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. The Court of
Appeals should not have resolved the factual issues by adopting as its
own the LRA’s finding. This Court accords respect, if not finality, to
factual findings of an administrative body. However, this rule does not
apply when the administrative body has no jurisdiction to make a
conclusive factual finding particularly when the findings might conflict
with findings of the tribunal or agency which has jurisdiction on the
matter.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision and
resolution for the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Felix B. Lerio for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruzcollaborating
counsel for petitioners.
Jose B. Flaminiano for respondents.
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third Division of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481 and directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT
No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended
Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division
in CAG.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481, and the LRA to reconstitute
respondents’ TCT No. T210177 and the March 12, 2004
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
“Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late
Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the
name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted
the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax
receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution,
private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto
claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms
part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT22481,
and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’
predecessorsininterest is spurious.”
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer,
denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on grounds that:
1. “1.Lots 823A and 823B, Fls3168D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq.
Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No.
210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an
area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered
in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under
Adm. Reconstitution No. Q213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. 2.The submitted plan Fls3168D is a spurious document as
categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated
February 19, 1997.”6
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order 7 dated
February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have
required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have
confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. 8 The LRA
further declared:
“Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by
clear and convincing evidence that TCT No. 210177 was, at the time of
the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective.
Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of
Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and
authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the
effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June
1988 . . . .
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and
boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to
the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . . as
indicated in the B. L. Form No. 2837R dated 11894 and B. L. Form
No. 3110 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . .
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity
and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and
irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the
reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is
mandatory.9
. . . .
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan
FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief,
Surveys Division LMSDENRNCR whose office is the lawful repository
of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region
including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and
Statistics Section, DENRNCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by
Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 923
96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to
Atty. Bustos . . . confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is
on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office.
Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty.
Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . . .
. . . .
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that
his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168D is belied
by the certified copy of the computer printout duly issued by the
Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into
the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned
Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report
No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer
printout is duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it
does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof.
The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be
simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and
concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . . .”10
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was
fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed
fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents’ title may
only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title
was void and should therefore be cancelled.11
The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT22481
(372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.”12
Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by
respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
respondents’ prayer for immediate reconstitution were denied.13
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that
the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177
without being subjected to the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT
22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent
jurisdiction.15 Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 66642.
In CAG.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed
Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in totoand
the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.”17
Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an
Amended Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby
reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is
hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT22481 of private respondents and
the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid,
genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T210177. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”19
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA
G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this petition docketed as G.R.
No. 162605.
Meanwhile, in CAG.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29, 2003, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the
LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”22
In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that
the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or
annulling respondents’ title.23
Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED
and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481 and directing the LRA to
reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T210177.
SO ORDERED.24
From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
66700 and CAG.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions
for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No.
162335, respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:
I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS’ EXISTING
TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
1. a.THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF
SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
2. b.THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
1. c.THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL
OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER
THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE
ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY
ALLOWING A “SHORT CUT”, THE MAJORITY JUSTICES
DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO,
CONSIDERING THAT:
1. a.IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING
OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE
RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF
MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS
HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS
RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE
RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
2. b.IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY. HENCE,
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA’S
TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO
SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH
WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF
PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.”25
In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT22481 OF
PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER
AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY
DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER
THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL
ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF,
REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION)
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED
DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO
CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR
POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING
ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24,
1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN
LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT
SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW
AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS
EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.
IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER
BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE
TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE
ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT
SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF
FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO
OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN
EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF
TIME.”
26
On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated
with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to
annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents’ Torrens title
would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c) they were
not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend
the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving
the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of
petitioners’ title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have
confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the
reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:
“Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in
the following order:
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
. . . .”
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted
in support thereof the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, real estate
tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more
than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of
RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be
made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In
addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No.
26. Thus:
“Section 12. . . . Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this
Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.”29
Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to
require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the
ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating
the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent
of the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic,
genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’ title is sham and
spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is
conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even
finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is
the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising quasijudicial
functions . . . are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from
the consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts. 30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or
whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without
doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by
a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence
submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and
convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side
should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their
spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in
the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to
give said proofs weight—all these are issues of fact. Questions like these
are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of
cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in
the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review
should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable.32
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33this Court
categorically declared:
“Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual
finding that petitioner’s title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound
by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals . . . .”
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to
the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners’ or
respondents’, is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA
and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative
reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function
is adjudicatory in nature—it can properly deliberate on the validity of
the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as
sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such
declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or
deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on
the Court of Appeals.34
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine
from the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is
genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve
the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic
agency clothed only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate
jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals
from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the
RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and
thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals. After
all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already
declared that petitioners’ title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals,35 we ruled that:
“Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale
and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos’ favor should be
had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the
Government. However, since all the facts are now before this
Court, and it is not within de los Santos’ power in any case to
alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made
inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that
cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los
Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would
unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, . .
. . This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by
the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has
done in other cases in similar premises.”
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an
issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision
raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.
The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
thereof.36
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have
jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The
doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc.,
et al.37does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court
stressed that:
“. . . [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles .
. . cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles filed by third parties without firstsecuring by final
judgment the cancellation of such existing titles . . . . The courts simply
have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands
that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titlesin the names of
their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration
rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the
same land to two different holders thereof . . . .”38
The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens
title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the
time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it
cannot be said that petitioners’ title was duly issued much less could it
be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of
Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down
in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly
declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39
“Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the
remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q5405) to the Court of
origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s
appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly
disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted
to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed
for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities
afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records
before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings
would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not
possible for Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon
would be unwarranted and unjust.”
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already
discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been
squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by
this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA,
et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their
title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue
resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between
the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot
even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case
refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of
“their property” without due process of law when the Court of Appeals
ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct
proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to
remand the case to the RTC for a redetermination on the validity of the
titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely
passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By
opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their
administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the
authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the
Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on
their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the
essence of due process. As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42
“Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition
for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in
submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition,
and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective
sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the
evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper
decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was
valid and binding.”
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on
petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first
place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province
of Cavite:44
“The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed
valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does
not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her
title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption
that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is
overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report . . .
that TCT No. T320601 was issued without legal basis . . .
. . . .
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of
title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest
title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested.
Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration
court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a
certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where
there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the
certificate.”
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly
reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and
misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and
benefits.45
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the
February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481 and directing the
Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended
Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in
CAG.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481, and the Land Registration
Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T210177 and the
March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman) and Quisumbing, J., concur.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Azcuna, J., I concur in separate opinion.
Note.—The issue of validity of a Torrens title whether fraudulently
issued or not may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or
annul it. (Ladignon vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 42 [2000])
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