Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bre 368 PDF
Bre 368 PDF
smoke and h
ventilation
H P Morgan
B K Ghosh
G Garrad
R Pamlitschka
J-C De Smedt ST. J8
L R Schoonbaert
OF
Photo acknowledgomsnts
Wontcoe — conq it
Brussels International Airport
Company (MAC)
Rae con.' at
Colt Plates 1, 35
and 6
Cooper Qoip: Plate 4
F$ET: Plates2, Ji, .12, .13 and .14
BRE
Garston.Watford
WD2 7JR
Design methodologies
for smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation
J-CDeSmedt AlFireE
crc@constructemap.co.uk
BR368
ISBN 1 860812899
©CopyrightBRE 1999
Firstpublished1999
Publishedby
ConstructionResearch
CommunicationsLtd
bypermissionof
BuildingResearch
EstablishmentLtd
Applicationsto copy
anypart of this publication
shouldbemadeto:
CRC Ltd
P0 Box202
Wattord
WD2 7QG
Front coverphoto:
Hot-smoketest atBrussels
Airport,Belgium
1
______________
Foreword
Useby fire engineers ofsmoke and heat exhaust ventilationsystems (SHEVSasthey havebecome
known) has grown in recentyears.It istherefore welcomethatthis guide has beenproduced
whichprovidesthe fireengineer with assessmentdesignmethodologiesfor theuse ofthese
systems. SHEVSrequire the most carefuldesign prior to introduction. It is importanthowever to
ensure, aswith all fire-engineeringdesigns,that due regard is taken overissuessuchasescape time
andfire growth since thesefeatures provide thebase uponwhich the designparameters canbe
made.
It is also important that dueregard be ultimatelymade regardingthe maintenance ofany
systemsinstalledand current guidance,primarilywithin the BritishStandardsInstitution's DI)240
Firesafetyengineeringzi buildings.DD240 hasintroduced the overalldesign processwhichthefire
engineer should consider.DD240 also makes it clear that caution is necessaryandthatall options
haveto be consideredbefore entering intoa particulardesign process.SHEVSis oneofthose
options and thisbooktherefore provides comprehensiveidentificationofthe issueswhichneed
consideration.Itis particularlyimportant to payattention,as the document outlines,to the
restrictionsofcomputer softwaremodelling programs, as it is alsofor the fire engineer to
recognizethereare limitationsastowhat any systems (and that includes SHEYS) can achieve.
Withthesethoughts in mind, thisbookprovides amost usefuland comprehensivereview of
current thinkingregarding SHEVSdesignmethodologiesforutilization bythe fire engineer.
Preface
This guide does not consider the scenario whereafire in a room connecting to an atriumcausesa
flame plume to rise intotheatrium. Inthis context, anylarge space adjoiningthe fireroommay be
considered to be an atrium, egmalls in shopping complexes.
A discussionis included ofthe factorswhichneedto beconsidered whenspecifyingthe
hardware (ventilators,smoke curtains,etc.)required to implementthe design in abuilding.
Some adviceis alsoincluded on:
•• factorstobeconsidered ininstallingthe system inbuildings,
howtotest thefinctioning ofthe equipment separately and as a complete system onceit has
beeninstalled, and
• 'goodpractice' measuresinvolvingthemanagement andmaintenance ofthe system whenthe
buildingis in everyday use.
Howard P Morgan
Principal Consultant, Fire ProtectionSystemsCentre,
Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE
Head, FRS(Asia)Centre
Technical Director, FRSAFSET(Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong
Email: morganh@bre.co.uk
BijoyGhosh
Senior Fire Consultant, Fire Research Station (FRS),
BRE
Email: ghoshb@bre.co.uk
Gordon Garrad
FireScientist,Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE
Email: garradg@bre.co.uk
vi Aboutthe authors
ColonelR Pamlitschka
Head ofFirePrevention Department, Professional Fire
Service, Vienna, Austria
Head of Smoke-Control Department, Prüfstelle für
Brandschutztechnik des Osterreichischen
Bundesfeuerwehrverbandes, Austria
Jean-Claude De Smedt
Managing Director/PrincipalConsultant,International
Fire Safety Engineering Technology (IFSET),Belgium
Managing Director, FRS/IFSET(Asia) Ltd, HongKong
Email: jcds@ifsetcom
Lieven R Schoonbaert
SeniorConsultant, International Fire SafetyEngineering
Technology OFSET), Belgium
Director, FRSAFSET(Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong
Email: ls@ifset.com
VII
Contents
Foreword iii
Preface iv
Abouttheauthors v
Contents vii
Abbreviations xii
Nomenclature Xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Thehazardsofsmoke 1
13.2.6 Lowambienttemperature 82
13.2.7 Reliability 82
13.2.8 Abilityto resist windsuction 82
13.2.9 Abilityto resist rain penetration 82
13.3 Powered smoke and heat exhaustventilators 82
13.3.1 Timeto come into full operation 82
13.3.2 Resistancetoheat 83
13.3.3 Opening under load: snow 83
13.3.4 Opening under load: wind 83
13.3.5 Lowambienttemperature 83
13.3.6 Reliability 83
13.4 Automatic smoke curtains 83
13.4.1 Timeto deployto the fire-operational position 83
13.4.2 Speedoffallofbottombar 83
13.4.3 Resistance to hightemperature 83
13.4.4 Reliability 84
13.4.5 Fail-safe 84
13.5 Air inletsand doors 84
13.6 Smoke dampers 84
13.7 Smoke ducts 84
—
Chapter 14 Installation 86
Chapter 15 Acceptance testing (commissioning) 89
15.1 General 89
15.2 Testing and commissioning 89
15.3 Hot-smoketests 91
Chapter 16 Maintenance,management and re-testing 92
Chapter 17 Some common mistakes in the design of smoke ventilation systems 94
17.1 Mis-location ofthe point source of a 'point-source' smoke plume 94
17.2 Inadequate specificationof smoke curtains 94
17.3 Installation does not follow design 94
17.4 Mis-use of computer models 94
1 7.5 Mistaken perceptionsof conflict between 95
active and passive fire precautions
Chapter 18 Smoke ventilation design and enforcement of regulations 96
Chapter 19 Acknowledgements 97
Chapter 20 References 98
Annex A: Design procedure with a growing design fire 101
Annex B: Design procedure with a steady-state design fire 103
Annex C: Deflection of smoke curtains 106
Annex D: A comparison of differentspill-plume calculation methods 109
Annex E: User's guide to BREspill-plume calculations 112
AnnexF: 1977fire at IMF building, WashingtonDC (basedon reference [18]) 117
AnnexG: Design procedure for hybrid systems 119
________________ Contents ______________________________ ________ xi
Abbreviations
Nomenclature
A Functiondefined by Eqn(7.3)
Af Area ofthe fire(m2)
Ag Area ofthe gaps between smoke curtains, orbetween curtain and structure (m2)
A Area of inlet (measured)(m2)
Ares Plan areaofsmoke reservoir (m2)
1 Introduction
INFLUENCES
STRUCTURAL(PASSIVE)
FIRE PRECAUTIONS TECHNICALFIRE
Fftresistant stmcturea for PRECAUTIONS
compartments. means ofescape, tiredeteciton systems,
accessrotitas, cc bustbiIityofstructure extinguishing and firesuppression
systems,
fixinstalledfirefighting equipment
Irisers,
Limitation of fuel,
preventing thespread
ofproducts of
combustion
C/,
LU
C)
z
LU
D
-J
PRODUCTS OF
COMBUSTION
7
7
HEAT
fru
l
spa
ther res
struGturc
t
SMOE
ha .raslr
('OrOSOfl
ORGANISA1IONALRRE
SMOKE ANDHEAT EXHAUST
noperatiorts
PRECAUTIONS
andto eaceaflon teterveningplans,
VENTILATK)NSYSTEM
(SHEYS)
pnwisfonofeidingulsh1ngaents _________________________
INFLUENCES
Figure1 The roleofSHEVSin Fire Safety Engineering
;
Plate1 Fire at General Motorsplant,Livonia, Michigan, USA, 1953
Socialandtechnical changes haveled to changes in
buildingenvironmentswhich incorporate new(or
revived) buildingforms andthe useofinnovative
construction techniques and newsynthetic materials.
Thebuildingsadoptingthese changes oftenhave
movement ofthe smoke, the mixing ofair into the smoke, includedwithin theirdesignlarge spacesorvoids, often
and hence the sizes ofthevents orfans needed to exhaust integrated with many ofthe storeys.These largespaces
the smoky gasesin orderto maintain the smokelayerin have been describedas malls, atria, arcades and light
the mallsat asafeheight. Asummary ofthe designadvice wells.The generic termfor the buildingtype tends lobe
availablefrom FRS was publishedin 1979u•This advice 'atrium' andby theirvery nature, they can often run
has been expanded and updated in the lightoffurther contrary to the traditional BuildingRegulations'
research and experience,and has been incorporated in approach in terms ofhorizontal compartmentation and
the most recentdesignguidanceavailablefrom FRS'3. verticalseparation.
Inthe late 1970s, researchbegan on the related The originalatriumwasanentrance hall in aRoman
problems ofatrium buildings.The mainfeature ofan houseand was one ofthe most important rooms ini:he
atrium buildingis that a centralvoid rises throughtwo or building.The conceptofthis space hasevolved
morestoreys, allowinganysmoke entering the void to architecturallyover the past few hundred years and now
affectmorestoreys than the originalfirestorey. Unless,of applies to structuresmuch larger than the typicalRoman
course, these floors are separated from the atriumby fire- house. Modern atriaare designed such that the visualand
resistingconstruction, in whichcase the atrium is merely spacial 'outdoor' environmentsare createdindoors6.
aroom withanunusuallyhigh ceiling! It follows that In Romantimesthe control ofany smoke andhot:
design calculationmethods whichapply toatriain gases thatmayhave issuedfrom afire in a room adjacent
general, includingthe case wherethe fire is on the baseof to the atriumwaslikelyto have beenasimple matter,
the atrium directly beneaththeceiling,also cover provided therewereno adverse windconditions (due to
virtuallyallother buildinggeometries ofinterest. Note local topography ofadjacent structures) then the smoke
however thatthe design-firesizes dependvery strongly and heatwould undoubtedlyvent itselfviathe open
onthe use and contents ofthe building. portionofthe atrium roofknown as the'compluviurn'
It should bereadily obviousthat a shopping mall of (generallyusedforlighting purposes).
two or morestoreys represents a special case ofan Modern atriumbuildingstend to contain large
atrium. Itis an atrium with a singleclass ofoccupancy. quantitiesofcombustiblematerialand often have open-
The smokemovement willbesimilar,the smokehazards planlayoutsincreasingthe risk ofthe spread offire. The
will besimilar,andthe smoke control solutionscan be populationswithin such buildingshavealso increased,
expected to be similar. The pivotal problem forboth hencetherehasbeena substantialincreasein thenumber
mallsand atria is that smokeentering thevoid must not ofpeople tobeprotectedand evacuated in an emergency.
beallowedto endanger thesafeescape forpeopleinthe Modern atriumbuildingsare usuallydesigned withthe
mall ortheatrium itself; or for people inany adjacent atrium as a feature which canbe appreciated from within
space open tothe mall oratriumonanystorey. theadjacent rooms. Theroom/atriumboundary is
In atria ormultistoreymalls, every storeyopento the usuallyeitherglazedor completelyopen. Thuswhen
void is potentiallyrapidly affectedby smokefrom afire compared with 'conventional'buildings,this
on anyotherstorey. Twofires that illustratethiswerethe architectural/aesthetic requirement imposes additional
fire in the RegencyHyatt hotelat O'Hare in Chicago in problems oflife safetyduringafire, as smoke, hot gases
1972[14] and the firein the StJohn's Centre in Liverpool in and evenflames may travel from one (or more) rooms
1977[15]. It follows that to protectthe safe escape ofthe intotheatrium andthenceaffect areas which, but for the
building'soccupants,specialmeasures are needed for presence ofthe atrium, would not be affected.
atriaasfor malls. In conventionalmultistoreystructures thereis always
Anymeasuresto protectegressfrom abuildingwill thepossibilityoffire spread up theoutside ofthe building
alsoassisteasier entry for fire fighters.Hence, the same withflames issuingfrom one room and affectingthe
6 Design methodologies for SHEVS
floors above. Examplesofthis modeoffirespreadare an away in wholeorin largepart). Thisis becausethe
office block in Sao Paulo'71 andthe Villiers Buildingfire in airspeed neededfrom the atrium intothe roomin order
Londonon l9January, 1979. Ifthe escape facilitiesfrom to prevent the movement ofsmoky gases theotherway
the variousroomsare ofa suitablestandard and are through the same opening, can vary betweenabout
segregated from other compartments (as required inthe 0.5 ms1 and approximately4 ms1 depending on gas
UK), thereshould not (in theory) be anyserious hazard temperature, etc. All ofthis air must be continuously
to lifesafetyinthis fire condition. Itis only whenthe removed from within the fire room in orderto maintain
means ofescape are inadequate or the parameters theflow.Thequantitiesofair-handlingplantrequired
dictating their designare violated,that the loss oflife may will often exceed the size ofsmokeventilation systemsfor
occur. many typical atrium room openings. Note, however, that
Ifabuildinghas an atrium thenthis fireand smoke pressurizingthe atrium may be a viableoption wherethe
spreadcanalso occur internallysince thereisgenerally a atrium facadehas only relatively smallleakage paths.
maximizationofthe window areaand/or openboundary Wheresmoke from a firein aroom canspreadintothe
betweentheroomsandthe atrium. Hence,thereisan atrium, withthe possibilityofrapid further spread
increased risk toother levels oftheentry ofsmoke and affectingother partsofthebuilding,therewill be an
toxicgases andevenflamesfrom afire. extreme threat to safeevacuation ofoccupants from the
Anumberofmethods canbe usedto ensure safetyin affected parts ofthe building.Similarthreatswill occur if
7
an atriumbuilding. BS 5588:Part givesthe relevant
Code ofPractice describingwhichcombinationsof
thereis a serious fire in the atrium space itself. In either
case,the threat to means ofescape whichare either
measures are currently recommended and in which within the atrium, or are in spacesopento the atrium, can
circumstances.Oneofthosemethodsis smoke andheat develop rapidlyunless some form ofsmoke control is
exhaust ventilation. usedintheatrium, in order to protectthose means of
Experience offires inatriumbuildingsin the USA'4'181 escape. In otherwords, a smokecontrol system inthe
has shownthe problemofflametravel internally through atrium is essential to ensurethat escape is unhindered, b
the atrium tobe minor in comparison with the problem ensuringthatanylargequantities ofthermally buoyant
ofhotand toxic gasesaccumulatingand fillingthe atrium; smoky gasescan be keptseparate from people who may
spreading throughout the building;and affectingescape still be usingescape routes, or awaitingtheirturnfor
routes. Thus, thereappears to be a needfor aproperly evacuation.Therefore, the role ofa smokecontrol systersi
designed smoke and heatexhaust ventilationsystem in isprincipallyoneoflifesafety.
atrium buildings. In orderfor a design tobe achieved,itis necessaryto
The ideal optionwould be to prevent any smokefrom identifythe various 'types' ofatrium thatare built. These
a room fire entering the atrium at all. Aneasily canbe simplydefined asfollows.
understood wayofachievingthis is to ensure that the • The'steriletube'atrium: the atriumis separated from
theremainder ofthe buildingby fire-resistingglazing
boundary betweenthe roomand the atrium is both
imperforate and fire resisting,and that the atriumbase (FRG). The atriumspace generallyhas no functional
hasonlya very restricted use. This option hasfrequently use other than as a circulationarea(Figure2).
beenused,but is architecturallyrestrictive.Consequently • The closed atrium:the atrium isseparated from the
it is not favouredby designers.Theconcepthas been remainder ofthe buildingby ordinary (nonfire-
labelledthe 'steriletube'E'S]. resisting)glass.The atrium space may well be
Wherethe boundary betweenthe roomand the atrium functional (cafeterias,restaurants, recreation,etc)
is open, itis sometimes feasibleto provide a smoke
ventilation system within the room, to maintain smoky
fire gasesabove the openingto the atrium. Unfortunately,
• (Figure3).
Thepartiallyopen atrium:here some lowerlevelsare
open to the atriumand the remaining levels closed off
itis often verydifficult, impractical,orextremely byglazing (Figure4).
expensiveto fit aseparate smokeexhaust system to each • Thefrillyopen atrium:some ofthe upperlevelsor all of
and every room, however small. Occasionally, thebuildinglevelsareopen to the atrium (Figure 5).
circumstances dictate thatsmoke control dedicated to
eachroomin this wayis themostviableoptionfor 1.7 Active control of the fire
protecting the atrium (this can occur, for example,when
the roomlayout isofalarge area, ispredominantly open- A more detailed discussionofactivefire fightingis
planand open-fronted). Therehavebeen several presented in Chapter12.
examples ofthis.Nevertheless, it remainsgenerallytrue Itshould be remembered thatfire fightingbecomes
that this option is rarely foundto be appropriate for most both difficultand dangerous in a smoke-loggedbuilding.
atriumbuildings. Itfollowsthat to assistthefireservices,the smokecontrol
Another possibilityisthatthe atrium should be system should becapable ofperformingits design
pressurizedto prevent smokemoving from a room into function for aperiod oftimelonger than that required fir
theatrium. This is notusuallyaviableoptionwherethe the public to escape (seealso 12.2.2.1),thus allowinga
opening betweenthe room andtheatriumis large (egan speedierattack on thefiretobe made afterthe arrivalof
open-fronted room or room whose glazing has fallen the fire service. Anymeasuresto protectegress from a
1 ntroductkn 7
Figure2 Sterile tube: fire-resisting glazingbetween atriumand Figure3 Closed atrium:standard (non fire-resisting) glazing
compartments between atriumand compartments
buildingwill also assisteasier entryforfire fighters. argument is that opening the smokeventilators on smoke
Hence, the same measureswill servetoimprove the detection, iebefore sprinkler operation, may delay the
propertyprotection aspects ofthe fire-protection activation ofsprinklersand thus have detrimental effect
package (seealso 12.2.2.2).Wherethe smoke ventilation on sprinklerperformance. Onthe otherhand, ifthe
system is solelyintended to assistin fire-fighting opening ofsmokeventilators is delayeduntilsprinkler
operations,the design criteriarequired for safety might operation, theremaybe considerablesmoke loggingand
be differentfrom thoserequiredto protectthegeneral the effectivenessoftheSHEVS may be seriously
public inview ofthe special equipment andclothing used compromised. This debateis discussedin more detail
by firefighters (seealso 12.2.2.4). elsewhere in thisbook.
Anysmoke control measures needto specifya
maximumfire size for its designandsprinklers are often 1.8 Implementationof a smoke and heat
needed tolimit the sizeto thismaximum.It is also likely
that some kind ofsmokeventilationwill be required to exhaust system in a building
maintain a clear escape route. Thus both sprinklersand Whenthe 'concept design' ofthe SHEVShas been
smokeventilators are needed to achieve aproperlife completed satisfactorily(egby followingthemethods
safety design. Atpresentthereis considerabledebate describedinthisbook), therestill remains a great dealto
overthe effectsofinteraction betweenthetwo.One bedonebefore thesystem is successfullyinstalledin a
8 Design methodologies for SHEVS
2.1 Fire growth and smoke production for the plume ofsmoke to risebefore it reachesthe
smokelayer,henceless air is being entrained, with the
In most instances,a room (compartment) fire maybe result that the temperature ofthe smoke layer
assumed toburn in eitheroftwoways. increaseswith layerdepth, even for a steady fire. Most
• Fue/BedContra/is whenthe rate ofcombustion,heat fireswill continue to grow larger as the layerdeepens,
output and fire growth depends onthe fuel being reinforcingthis effect.
burned and thereis more than sufficientoxygen 3 6 mmplateglassmayshatter whenexposed to gasesas
presentto support the combustion.This isthe 'normal' littleas 100 K warmer thanambient. Oneofthemain
fire condition found in mostsingle-storeybuildings reasons forglassbreakage is the differentthermal
whilstthe fire is still small enough for successfulsmoke expansion values ofthe glassand itsmountings;
control. breakage at relativelylow temperature may result
• T/entz/atthn Controliswherethe rate ofcombustion etc. whenthereis noprovision for differentialexpansion.
is dependentuponthe quantity ofair availableto the Thus, oncethis temperature is passed,thereis an
firecompartment, assuming that anymechanical increasinglikelihood that the glasswill fracture.Ifthe
ventilation systemshavebeen madeinactive. compartment is sprinklered and the water spray hits
the glass, the localizedheating oftheglassby radiation
The quantity ofsmoky gases produced, ie the massflow from the fire andbythe gas layer, combined with
rate offire gasesin andfrom the compartment, andthe sudden coolingdue to the water spraymayincrease
energy (heatflux) contained therein, may be very the likelihoodoftheglassbreaking (note:there are
differentforboth regimes.It istherefore important to 'deluge' sprinklersystemsdesigned to keep the glass
identifythe regime whichappliesand to determine the cooland prevent it from breaking).Plate or 'float' glass
mass flow and the heat fluxwithin the smoky gases. breaksin an unpredictableway.A crackmay not result
It is important to understand the basic mechanisms in glassfallingout;but theassumption that glasswill
whichcontrol thefire condition. A step-by-step history fall away once broken is asafeassumption for design in
ofa growingfire may be as follows. the circumstancescovered in this book. Thesmoke
1 The fire starts for whatever reason, itsrate ofgrowth and hot gases will thenflow externallyto the
depending uponthe materialsinvolved,their atmosphere, orentertheatrium (where one is
orientation and positionsrelativeto eachother. In present), or both, depending uponthe natureofthe
most practical compartments there is sufficient oxygen compartment and its relativeposition in the building,
to support combustion in thefirstfew minutes, andthe thesize and position ofthefire inthe compartment,
firegrowth and smoke production are controlled by andthe strength ofdifferingglazing systems.
thefuel,ie fuel bed control. In atriumbuildings,ifthefire canbe accidentallyor
2 Smoke from the fire rises in a plume to the ceiling.As deliberatelyventedto the atmosphere then the threat
theplumerises,airis entrained intoit, increasingthe to otherlevelsviathe atrium is greatly reduced. There
volumeofsmoke and reducing its temperature. The will,however, be instanceswhen afire willvent all its
entrainment increases with increasingheightofrise of effluent gas into the atrium, and thisis generallythe
theplume. The smokespreads outradially underneath worstdesign scenario (Figure6).
theceilingand forms a layerwhichdeepens as the Thereis so muchmixing ofambient air intothe
compartment begins to fill. Ifthe compartment is open plume that,exceptclose to the fire itself, the hotsmoky
totheatrium (or a mall),thenthe gasesflow out gasescan be regarded asconsisting ofwarmed air,
immediatelythey reachthe opening. whencalculatingthe quantity (massflow rate)being
Ifthe compartment isglazed or the opening is produced in the compartment.
below a deepdownstand then the smokesteadily 4 Initially,this mass flow rate ofsmokewillbe controlled
deepens. As the layergets deeper thereis less height by the fuel bed, as mentioned above. However,the
2 Smoke production, movement and control 11
Air Inflow
I
designssuggestthatitis well-suitedtothe protection of involvingagrowing design fire)and in Annex B (for
stairwaysused as escape routesin tall buildings,although steady-state calculations).
the technique canbe usefulin othercircumstances.
Codesforpressurizationcanbe found in BS 5588:
Part4[301•
Depressurizationis a specialcaseofpressurization,
wheregasesare removed from the smoke-affectedspace
ina waythatmaintains thedesired pressure differences
and/orair speeds across leakage openings betweenthat
space and adjacent spaces30. Note that depressurization
doesnot protectthe smoke-affectedspace in any way.
Instead it protects theadjacent spaces. In the
circumstances ofan atrium, itis sometimespossibleto use
the buoyancyofthesmoky gases themselvesto create the
desired depressurizationeffects.This is explainedin
moredetail in section 6.3.
3 Design-fire size
similar,
3.1 General
• the availabilityofoxygen (in sealed rooms afire can
Manyareasoffire safety engineeringrequire the become oxygen-starved),
identificationofan appropriate fire size uponwhichthe • thepresence andeffectivenessoffiresuppression
design canbe based. Designfires can takemany forms, devices,
forexample,when consideringfire resistanceofdoors • changing ofburningbehaviour dueto ageing of
and wallsa fullydeveloped post-flashoverfire on oneside materials.
ofthedoor or wall is assumed:the designfire in this case
will be a frilly-involved fire compartment. Consequently,there is no methodavailable to calculate
Smoke exhaust ventilation is only ofvalue whenthe the development ofa fire in any but thesimplest fuel
people, contents orstructure being protectedare in the arrays. The likelysize ofafire can only be deduced from
same space as the fire, and it is therefore conventionalto the analysisofthe statisticsoffires in thetypeof
consider only pre-flashover fires. Thatscenario is also occupancy ofinterest, orfrom experiments on
commonly found wherethe 'timeto danger' for the appropriately similar fuelarrays. The values for fire
building'soccupants isbeingcalculated, eitheras part ofa growth and fire sizecontained in this bookare based on
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system design or asa both statistical analysesand experimentalwork. Itis
separate calculation.The calculationofthe quantity of worthnoting herethatdesign firesbasedon statistical
smoke and heatproduced byafire requires a knowledge analysisare always based on animplied acceptable risk
ofthe sizeofthefire,in terms ofarea, perimeterand heat whichcandiffer forvarious applications,andwhichis
fluxdeveloped perunitareaorfrom the fireas awhole. always ultimatelyrelated to public opinion.
Whendesigningsmokeventilation ordepressurization Adesign fire caneitherbe asteady-state fire with
systems,the massflowrate and heat fluxdeveloped in the constantheatoutputor atime-dependent growingfire to
room aremajorparameters in the calculationofthe whichthe means ofescape and evacuationtime for the
system requirements, changes in whichcan substantially particular buildingoccupancy could be related (see also
affectall ofthe subsequentsmoke flow conditions. section 12.2.2.1).Steady-statefires for designcalculation
Ideally,the designfire would be based on the materials invarious occupanciesaregiven in the relevant standards
within an occupancy,suggestingthat the choiceofa and thesehaveusuallybeenused historically.Although it
design fire should be straightforward.Unfortunately,this is acknowledgedthata real fireis notusually'steady
is notthe case.Whilethe heat release rates formany state', itis relativelysimple to assessthemaximum size a
materialsare known, it is rarely possibleto say thata fire fire can reasonably be expected to reachduring the
will consist ofaknown quantity ofmaterial.Within an escape period in aparticular scenario, and to design a
occupancya fire will involvea combination ofdifferent smokecontrol system ableto copewith that.
materials,so that the heat release rateforthat occupancy Theassumption ofa steady-statefireallows the smoke
will be a function ofallthe materials present. Hence the control system to cater for allfires up to designfiresize,
development ofa fire is dependenton a number of andby not consideringthegrowth phaseofthe fire, often
factors,including: introduces asignificantmargin ofsafetyto the system
• theprecise location ofthe ignitionwithrespect to the design.A firewill produce smaller quantitiesofcooler
smokein its early 'small'stage, depending on the nature
fuel,
•• the typeofmaterials present,
the quantity ofmaterialspresent,
andarrangement offuels.The reduction ineffectiveness
ofa natural SHEVS dueto the lower temperature will be
•• theposition ofthe materialsrelative to eachother, compensated by the reduction in the quantity ofsmoky
possible chemical reactionsbetweenmaterials present gas needing to be exhausted.
iftheir containment is Onthe otherhand, useofagrowingfire could result in
•the destroyed by fire,
position ofmaterialsrelativeto walls,ceilingsand a less onerous design criterion which mayresult in
3 Design-fire size 15
Retailpremises Fast to ultra-fast 280—650 kWm2 Between 100 kW Between 500 kW This occupancy type can contain
(videos) and 700 kW and 1000kW a wide range of fire hazards,
(packets of crisps) leading to a wide rangeof
growth ratesand heat release
rates. The arrangement of
materials can alsohave a
significant effectonfire growth,
eg fire growth may bemore
rapidingoods displayed on
shelving. __________
Cellularoffices Medium 270 kWm2 The fireload mainlycomprised
furniture, papers and computers.
Libraries Slowtomedium 150—650kWrn2 Thefuel comprised hardback and
paperback books.
Note: Heat release rate valuesare priortosprinkler operation.
3 Design-fire size ____ ______ 17
20
E
10
5
4
3
0 5 10152025 50 I
% ofsamp'e >
0 20 40 60 80
% offires>A1
the textile industry.References[34,35] followedthe class ofoccupancy must be expected to have itsown
earlierMorgan & Chandler°1 paper defininga 'relative characteristicdesignfire.
frequency',such thatit represents the percentage offire It is also impossiblein most casesto arriveat a heat
incidentsoutofadefined population ofincidentswhich release rate from the UK FireStatisticsdatabase, and so it
exceed aspecifiedfire-damaged area. For example,in has alwaysbeen necessaryto assumeor derivefrom some
Figure9a (fromreference [34]), 10% ofincidentsfrom a othersourcea valueofheat release rate per squaremetre
population definedas fires startinginofficeswhere appropriatetothe occupancyin question.Ithasbeen
sprinklersare present, exceed a fire-damagedareaof usual to assume apessimisticvaluefrom afrequency
16m2. In thiscase,whichhas become thecommonly distributionofheatrelease ratesper squaremetre, where
adopted designfire for sprinkler-equippedoffices,we can this can be deduced27. This approach necessarilymeans
say thatthe designfirehas arelativefrequencyof10%. that apessimisticview hasbeenintroduced in two
Another exampleis the more recentstudyby Ghosh3 of separate stagesoftheargument in arrivingatadesig:nfire.
fires startingin retail areas ofretail premises (Figure9b), It canalsobenotedthat wherethereis alackofreliable
although the decision as tothe designfiresizefor evidenceto support the choice ofeithera growing cr a
sprinkler-equippedpublic areas ofretail premises was steady-statefire, itis usuallymorepracticabletoassess
taken on the basisofmuch weakerevidence5'24. thelargest sizethat a fire might reasonablyachieve rather
Figures 9a and 9bshow that sprinklershavethe effect thanthetime itmighttaketo reach suchasize.This
ofreducing the frequencywithwhichfires exceed any means,forexample,thatwhenthereisnoclear evidence
given area, for all except the smaller fires. It is alsowell availableto support a choice ofeitheraparticular
establishedthat sprinklers,whenin operation, makeit constantinthe 't2' growth formula, or astatistically
muchless likelythat a fireinaroom will achieve reliablesteady-statemaximum fire, it isusuallysafer to
flashover.It is common inthe UK to speciIr that ask an experiencedfireofficerto assessthesize offire his
sprinklersbefitted,as part ofthesmokeventilation first-attendingcrew would begin to extinguishthan to ask
concept, in order tokeepthefire within limitswhich himto assesshowlong the fire would taketo grow to that
allow morepractical smokeventilation.Indeed, inthe size.
UKthe fittingofsprinklersin shops opento enclosed Workondesign guidancefor smokeventilation
shopping malls, combined withsmoke exhaust systemsinshopping centres5'24usedthe principleof
ventilation in those malls, is mandatory. selectinga fixed sizeoffirethatwould cater for almost all
It canalso be seen from Figures9aand 9b that different ofthe fire sizeslikelyto befound in that class of
occupancies (in this case offices and retail areas) donot occupancy and then deducing apessimisticheat output
followthe same curve. Itimmediatelyfollowsthatthereis from thatfire37'241. This procedure hasbeen adopted for
no suchthingas a universaldesignfire. Eachdifferent occupanciesother than retail, which are alsocommonly
18 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Retail areas
Standard response sprinklers 10 12 625 5000
Quick response sprinklers 5 9 625 2500
No sprinklers Entire room Width ofopening 1200 ?
.-
Open-planoffices
Standard response sprinklers 16 14 255 2700 (closetothe fireflume)
1000 (atthewindow)
Nosprinklers:fuel-bed 47 24 255 8000(closetothefireplume)
controlled 6000(atthe window)
No sprinklers: full involvement Entire room Width of opening 255 ?
ofcompartment .. -
Hotelbedroom
Standard responsesprinklers 2 6 250 400 (close tothe plume)
300 (at thewindow)
No sprinklers Entire room Width of opening 100 1000(atthe window)
(typically c. 20m2) .-
Carpark
(a burning car) 10 12 400 3000(closetothe plume) -
Notes:
Experimentsin a opriakieredcaisrimeter indicate thatthe fire sizes issomeoccepancies msybe smallerthee gineeisthe table, batasyetthere is not enoaghintormatisn togixe reliableasIans.
Desige fire sizes for offices asd hotelrooms are sotofficially 'epproxed'choices,althoeghtheyore widely soed.
Recentintormation osbaraisg cars ooggestothatmodern cars ese materialswhich may sometimesgixehigher borniegrates than isthe Table.The positionis not yetcleartorcarsoshre incar parks, arid
thisrecommesdotionmay changemhenbetter data become available.
associated with atrium buildings,ie officesand hotel above. The mass flowrate ofgasesentering the final
bedrooms34'351. reservoir will be less than would becalculated usingthe
Table3.3 summarizesseveral ofthe more commonly valuegiven above. Even forthis scenario, therefore, the
adoptedsteady-state design fire sizes incurrentuse. The above value should erronthe side ofsafety.Designers
heat release rate (qfAf) isthetotal heatgenerated by wishingto takesprinklercooling in the firecompartment
combustion per second, and is the parameter measured in morerigorously'intoaccount should adopt a fullyfire-
most calorimetryexperiments. Some ofthisheat is engineered approach appropriate to theirspecific
radiatedfrom the flames, and warms the surrounding circumstances,forexample byusingthe methods
walls,floor, etc. The heat remaining in the gases is the described insection 5.5 to assessthe effectofsprinkler
convectiveheat flux, and is the heatflow parameter cooling on the outfiowinggases.
required for calculationsofsubsequent smoke Theuse ofthe bedroom floor areafor the hotel
movement. bedroomdesign firereflects the situationwheretherearc
Whenconsidering an unsprinldered office occupancy nosprinklers present. Unpublished research on
thereexiststhepotential for flashoverto occur, and for sprinklered bed fires1391, wherethe lowheat output per
theentirefloor becoming involvedin fire. Even ifthe unitareawas comparable tovalues for hotelbedrooms,
buildinggeometry can accommodate this fire condition, suggest that the much lowerfuel load (compared withan
thedestructive powerofafullyinvolvedofficeroom fire office) expected in ahotelbedroomutilizing
is suchthat smokecontrol systemscannotusuallybe conventionalsprinklersshould makeitpossibleforthe
designed to protectsatisfactorilymeans ofeseapein this smokygases to be cooled sufficiently tobe retained
situation, except for fires in smallrooms. An assessment within the room oforigin (assumingthe windowis not
ofthe mass flowrate andheat fluxfrom aroom fire will open). The operation ofsprinklers islikelyto coolany
allow the potentialforflashoverto be estimated,and smokefrom afire and suppressthatfire to suchan extent
thencewhetheradditionalprecautionary measures are thatthe glazingto the bedroom willprobably remain
required, egsprinklers.This bookwill only provide intact. This is particularlytruefor double-glazed
gnidaneeforthe designofsmoke control systemsfor a windows.
fuel-bed-controlledfire in anoffice,and afullyinvolved The same research391 indicatesthatthe use of
fire in a hotelbedroom. conventionalsprinklersin a residentialenvironment may
Gases flowingintothe atrium from a fire deep within a not, however, allow conditionswithin the roomto
large-area officewith operating sprinklersmaybe cooler remain tenable, and it may be inferredthatthe presence
than is assumed in the 'sprinkleredoffice' designfire ofan open window to the room could produce hazardous
3 Design-fire size 19
conditionsinthe atrium, at least above the floor offire possiblefire, orthefastest possiblefiregrowth rate, In
origin.Thereare no statisticaldataavailableonfires in practice, itis alwaysnecessaryto designfor the largest
sprinkleredhotelbedrooms in the UK; consequently,any reasonablesize offire; orin otherwordsfor afire which
choice ofdesignfire size willbesubjective.Should a will be exceeded in anacceptablysmallproportion offire
designer wishto examinethe effectofa plume emanating incidentslikelytooccurinthe occupancytype ofinterest
from an open window in a sprinkleredhotelbedroom, it tothe designer.Wherethe dataexistsin thecorrectform,
would not seem unreasonabletouse a valueof6 m this essentiallymeans choosingan appropriatevalue of
perimeter(equivalentto asinglebed) with a convective relativefrequency andfindingthe correspondingareafor
heatoutputofaround 500 kW asthe designfire. thedesign fire. Similarlyforgrowingfires, it is always
Research intothe use offast-responsesprinklersin a necessaryto choose a designfire whose growthratewill
residentialenvironment°'41 has clearlyshown that at the be exceeded inanacceptably smallproportion of
time ofoperation ofthesesprinklersthe conditionsinside incidentsin the typeofoccupancyofinterest.As has
theroomswerestill tenable, ie therewas no life-safety already been notedabove, the paucity ofavailable
risk from thesmoke, evenwith excessiveceilinglevel probabilitydistributionsofgrowth curvesmakesthe
temperatures. This clearlyindicatesthat for anygases choice ofdesignfire difficult. For both steady-stateand
flowingintotheatrium (egthroughan openwindow) the growing designfires, these decisionsare necessarily
further entrainment induced by the risingsmokeplume subjective(more so wheredecisionshaveto be basedon
willensurethatconditionswithin the atriummust be an experiencedjudgement inthe absenceofaknown
tenable, regardless ofthe smoketemperature or smoke probabilitydistribution).
production rateinthe room. Whileitis possiblethatthis Oneexpects differencesofperception. It is common to
may also be true for cellularoffices employingfast- findthatindividualsresponsiblefor a singlebuildingwill
response sprinklers,thereis no evidence (experimentalor seeas low those values ofprobabilitywhichthe regulator
empirical)to validatethis, andso toerr ontheside of will see asunacceptablylargewhenapplied to alarge
safety,thisbookwillregard sprinklered offices employing numberofsimilarbuildingsforwhichhe has
fast-responsesprinklersinthe same wayas offices using responsibility.
conventionalsprinklers.Further research andstatistical Whatconstitutes an acceptable point in a probability
dataaredesirablein thisarea. distributionalso depends onthe likelypublicreactionin
Thedesignprocedure for a steady-statedesignfireis potentially multi-fatalityfires.Anecdotal evidence,egthe
summarizedin Annex B. strengthofthepublic reaction followingamajor
multiple-death fire suchas the Kings CrossUnderground
3.4 Acceptablefailure rates Station fire in Londonin 1987 after many decades
withoutany firedeathsin similarcircumstances,suggests
It has already beennotedthatit is never feasibleto design that forsome types ofpublic buildingtheacceptable
afire safetyengineered systemto copewiththe largest failurerate can be very low indeed.
20 ____ ____ _________
4 Escape times
SHEVS are often designed such that a clear layerwill Evacuation time
remain for an indefiniteperiod, provided thedesignfire Evacuationtimewill dependon the traveldistance,the
size is not exceeded.Ifthe purpose ofthe smoke control numberandwidth ofexits,and the population.It also
system is purely forlife safety then a clear layeroniyneed depends on the presence ofstragglers, disabled or injured
be maintainedforsuchaperiodthat safeevacuationofall people andthe unpredictablebehaviour ofhuman beings
the occupants cantakeplace. In thesecases, itis in an emergency: people whohavealready reached a safe
important todetermine both the availableescape time environment will often gobackintoan endangered zone
and the required escape time to ensurethatthe available for subjectivereasons (ega motherlooking for her child
escape timeis at leastas long as the required escape time. from whomshe became separated during evacuation).
Availableescape time is defined as the timefrom the Also,the population ofabuildingcannot be estimated
detectionofafireto the 'time to danger' whereescape accuratelyfor allcircumstances,eg in the timebefore
becomes impossibleorvery difficult. The time to danger Christmas there canbe far more people than normal
isthe timeuntil: inside ashopping mall. In this case,the required escape
• the clear layerheightis less than3 m (may be lowerin
some cases), or
time can be longer than assumed in the design.This could
leadto deaths ifthe safetymargin included in the design
• thehot gas layertemperature is 200 °C or more. is insufficient.
It isbeyondthescopeofthisbookto discuss escape
Ifthe clear layer (ievisibilityofatleast10 m) wastoo times in detail. In general, specialisthelp should be
shallow then escape would bethroughsmokeand will be sought for egress calculations.In some scenarios,itis not
difficult. Radiationfrom alayerwhose temperature is possibleto consider smoke control withoutan estimate of
morethan200 °C maycause severe painand discomfort. escape times.
It is relativelystraightforwardto calculatethe available Thesensitivityofthe 'time to danger' totheassumed
escape timefrom procedures given in this book. fire growth rate has been discussedin Chapter 3. This
Itis much moredifficult to assesswhat therequired introduces a probabilisticaspect tothe conceptofthe
escape timeswill be. In general,they will havetwo availableescape time. Similarly, the timeneededfor safe
components: evacuation ofoccupants should ideallybe described in
• alerting time and terms ofprobabilities,although the dependence on
• evacuation time. human behaviour makesthis difficult. Ideally,it should be
possibleto calculatethe combined probability ofa design
Alerting time being successfhl taking intoaccount allthe separate
Alerting time is the time needed for the people to realize probabilitiesofthe differentassumptions,both inthe
that thereis a lifethreatand to startto move. Evacuation availabletime for escape and in the time required for
time is the time needed to reacha place ofsafety. Alerting escape. Unfortunatelythis willbeimpossibleto do with
time will dependon many factors,some ofthe most accuracy in most cases because ofthe inadequacyof
important being the type ofalarmgiven and the availablesupporting data, and it willbe necessaryto
availabilityoftrainedstaff. Proulx & Sime421 have shown approximate to a greaterorlesserextent. This inturn
thatwhenusing only afire bell, as an alarmthealerting suggeststhe need for adequate safety margins to be
time canbe nearly 10 minutes, whereas withvoice-alarm applied to the results and conclusionsofsuch
and staffintervention thiscan be reduced to 60—90s. calculations.
Note that alerting times canchange due to too many false It should notbeforgotten that the time required for
alarms or to failureofthe alarmsystem. Experience has safeescape ofthe occupants from abuildingmay notbe
shown thatpeopletend to ignore alerts ifthey occur the only timelimit which has to be consideredwhen
frequently. carrying out atime-based SHEVSdesign. It isusefulto
regard fire-fightersasbuildingoccupants while they are
________________________________ ____ 4 Escapetimes ____ 21
inside fightinga fire; the design ofthe SHEVSshould not parameters whichleads, for example,tothe prediction
allow themto be putat risk simplybecausetheoriginal thatfirecrewsmay be caught in aflashovercannotbe
occupants have escaped. Anychoice ofdesign regarded as goodpracticeinSHEVS design (seealso
section 12.2.2.1).
22 _________________________________ ______________
5.1 Within the fire room ofthe opening (Figure 11).Whereno downstand exists,
and an exhaust slot is usedinstead,the exhaust capacity
In anysituation involvingthe potential movement of provided willneed to be compatiblewiththe layerdepth
smoke intoescape routesitis alwayspreferable, although (Figure 12). See section 5.12 on exhaust slots(slitextract).
notalways practicable (as in most shopping malls),to More generally,the minimumheightto the base ofthe
control the smokein the fire room and henceprevent its smoke layer formedin the smoke reservoirshould be
passageto otherwiseunaffected areas. Ventilationofthe chosen on the grounds ofsafety. Some minimumvalues
fire roommaybe achieved eitherby a dedicated SHEVS arelisted in Annex Bfordifferenttypes ofoccupancy of
orby adapting and boostingan air-conditioningor thebuilding.
ventilatingsystem. The latter systemsare usually This typeofplumeis definedas an axi-symmetric
designed to distribute air uniformlythrougha space and plume as the smokeflow should be approximately
notto establishthermalstratificationas in a SHEVS.It symmetricalabout an axis; intheabsence ofwindtheaxis
followsthat control dampers will usuallybeneededbe willbe vertical.Having establishedthe clear layer height
neededto modifythe mode ofoperation, egto keep inthe room, the mass flowrate ofsmoke canthen be
exhaust points nearthe ceilingopen and to shut down air calculated.
supply from the ceilingdownwards, as well as other
related changes in operation. Ifthe compartment isopen 5.1.1 Plumes above large fires
to anadjacent atrium, then thecompartment musthave Plumesabove large fires can be considered tobe those
eithera downstand barrier tocreateareservoir within the where:
compartment, or a high-powered exhaust slotat the
boundary edgeto achieve asimilar effect (Figures lOa Y 1O(Af)°5 (m) (5.1)
and lob).
Theminimum height ofthesmoke layer base in the whereY istheheightofrise oftheplumeand A(m2) is
room must be compatiblewiththe openings ontothe the areaofthe fire.
atrium, with the layer depthbeingno lowerthan the soffit WorkbyHansell43 drawing onworkby Zukoskiet
(a) (b)
Exhaust from Exhaust from Boundary edge
compartment compartment exhaust slot
Downstand downstand
Figure10 Smoke ventilation withina compartment:(a) use of a downstand to createa smoke reservoir, (b) use of a 'slot exhaust' to
preventsmokefrom enteringthe reservoir
5 Smoke control on storey offire origin 23
Exhaust from Ce = 0.34 (kgs'm512)for smallrooms suchas unitshops,
*
compartment cellularoffices, hotelbedrooms (prior to flashover
or fullinvolvement),etc. with ventilationopenings
/ predominantlyto one side ofthe fire (eg from an
office window in one wall only).Thusmost small
rooms will takethis value.
iJDownstand P = perimeter ofthe fire (m).
The earliestform ofEqn (5.2) wasby Thomas et a1191,and
was developed from theoretical considerations forthe
flameregion above extensive areas offire: wherethe fire
isnot close to any wall,the ceilingismuchhigherthan
theflame region ofthe plume, and air is free to app:roach
* Volumetric flowrate sufficiently great the firefrom all sides.
to prevent smoke spillage beneath The basic equation was simplifiedby merging
downstand for height of rise V. constants,and bygivingcertain parameters values
appropriate to flameconditions, reducing to Eqn (5.2)
Figure11 Plume height and layerdepthwith a downstand withCe=0.188. Itfollowsthatthejustificationfor using
Eqn (5.2) for thethermalplume region above theflames
is essentiallyempirical,and has beensummarizedby
Exhaust from Boundary edge Hinkley4, showing thattheequation has beenvalidated
compartment
* exhaust slot * experimentallyforvalues ofYupto 10 times (Af)0'5 (from
0.1 mto20m)[46] for firesinlargespaces,usingsquare
fires ofsidelengths between 0.2 m and 4.5 m.The
equationhasbeen validated for firesizes between8 kW
and 30 MW,withvalues ofthe heat-release ratedensity
between200 kWm2 and 1800 kWm2. Its extension
beyond those rangesisuntested, but it is likelythat any
fireextending above thatrange will rapidly leadto
flashover,andthe full involvementofany room, andthat
anyfire smallerthanthatrange would besubject to the
thermal plume breaking up intoalarger number of
smallerplumes.
* Volumetric flow rate sufficiently great Poreh& Morgan481haveshownthat Eqn (5.2) is
to prevent smoke spillage beyond the equivalenttothe equation derived byZukoskietal44
exhaust slot for height of rise Y. (see section 5.1.2 below) for entrainment intoabuoyant
plume, within the limits ofthe availableexperimental
Figure12 Plume height and layerdepthwith a slotexhaust uncertainties.
Note herethatEqn (5.2)(andall other axi-symmetric
plumes) will be fhrther modifiedifthe fireis very close to
al441 andQuintiere et al45 to modifyearlier studies by one or more walls.This effectisdiscussedinsection 5.1.3
Thomas etal9 and Hinkley4 has shown that the rate of below.
air entrainment intoa plume ofsmokerisingabove afire, Thequantity ofsmoke entering a ceilingreservoir or
Mf, maybe obtainedusingthe equation: flowinglayer given byEqn (5.2)is showngraphicallyin
Figures 13a and 13bforboth (small) cellularand open-
Mf= Ce Py3"2 (kgs1) (5.2) planrooms (Ce =0.34 andCe=0.19) and for sprinklered
and unsprinklered offices (P = 14m andP= 24 m).
where: Similarcurvesare showngraphicallyin Figure 14 for
Ce = 0.19 (kgs'm52) forlarge-area rooms suchas sprinklered large retail areas ofshops.
auditoria,stadia,largeopen-plan offices, atrium Thedemarcation betweena cellularroomand an
floors,etc. wherethe ceilingis wellabove the fire. open-plan layout is determined bythe abilityofthe
=
Ce 0.21 (kgs1m5"2) forlarge-area rooms, suchas open- incoming airflowtoflow intothe risingplume from all
plan offices,wherethe ceilingis close to the fire. sides.The narrower theroombecomes, the less easilythe
(Note:it isnot known how andunderwhat air can flow behind theplume. Inthis regard, cellular
conditionsoneshould regard a ceilingas being rooms areconsidered herein tobe those in which the
close to the fire. Until betterevidence appears, it is maximum roomdimension is less than orequalto 5 times
hereby suggestedthat Ceshould takethe value 0.21 the effectivewidthofthe designfire size (egits diameter
whenever Y is<threetimes JAf. Itishoped that ifcircular),and the incomingair canonly enterfrom one
researchwill allow a betterbasis for choice). direction (Figure 15).This demarcation dimensionwas
24 Design methodologies for SHEVS
C0Ol8U =
C0 O331
(a) (b)
5
a
U) 3
U)
0
Cs
E
U)
0
E
U)
0
•I
.0
U)
2
:2
0 0
20 30 40 50 60 0 :10 40 60 80 100
5
chosenarbitrarilywhenfirstproposed forinclusionin
reference [13], basedonthe experiencedjudgement of
the authors, and still has no theoretical derivation.
Research inthis areais highly desirable.
4 Whilst Figures 13a and 13b show the mass flow
production curvesfor cellularoffices, many such
configurationswillnot in practice have afixed wall
construction with agoodenough fire resistance,orhave i
large enough opening to sustain the replacement air
E
U) 3
U)
Cs
-D supply (seesection 5.8) needed for such large fires.
U)
0 Figure 13b also has a 'cut-off' belowwhichthe -
E
U) temperatureofthe gas layerwill exceed 600 °C and
0 flashoverofthe room will almost certainly have occurred.
Themechanism offlashovermaywellstartto occur prior
to this criticalpoint, and gastemperatures in excessof
500 °Cmay be considered aconservative lowerlimit for
flashoverpotentia147.The 'danger-zone' is shown as a
shadedareaon Figure13b.
Mass flowrates should be above this shaded zone for
the smoke control systems to operatesafely.
Figure16 Flow out ofanopening with(a) downstand and projectingbalcony, (b)a high balcony
• beWhere
calculated.)
Dd=0 (ieno downstand), do notseparately
Notethatfor the specificcaseofsingle-storey
shopping mallswhose ceilingsare nottoo much taller
calculateforthewindow ifitis not alsothe
opening thanthe shop units opening intothose malls, therehas
spilledge. In practice, it should bepossibleto ignore beenan alternativeempirical correlation2451. In this
very smalldownstands.It is here suggestedwithout approach, allthe calculationsofolltflow from the fire-
evidence thatwe can treat allvalues ofDd less than compartment detailed insection 5.2, aswell asEqn (5.9),
Atrium
Table 5.la Volume flowrateand temperature ofgases fora Table 5.lb Volumeflowrateand temperature ofgase fora
1 MWconvective heatflux 2.5MWconvective heat flux
Mass Temperature Volumerate Mass Temperature Volumerate
flowrate of gases of exhaust flowrate ofgases ofexhausi
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
ofexhaust) ambient temperature) ofexhaust) ambient temperature)
(kgs') (°C) (m3s') (kgs') (°C) (m3s')
Table 5.lc Volume flowrateandtemperatureofgases fora Table 5.ld Volume flowrateandtemperatureofgase fora
5MWconvective heatflux 6 MW convective heatflux
Mass Temperature Volumerate Mass Temperature Volumerale
flowrate of gases of exhaust flowrate of gases ofexhaust
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
ofexhaust) ambient temperature) of exhaust) ambient temperature)
(kgs') (°C) (m3s') (kgs1) (°C) (m3s')
Table 5.2a Minimum reservoir depths or minimum Table 5.2b Minimum reservoirdepths or minimum
channelling screen depths for 1 MW convective heatflux. channelling screen depths for 2.5 MWconvective heatflux.
Unimpeded flow: smoothsoffit Unimpededflow: smooth soffit
Massflowrate Mass flowrate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channelwidths (m) smoke layer Channelwidths (m)
(kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15
4 0.57
______0.51
______ 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 10 1.058 0.81 0.67 0.57 0.51 0.44
6 0.77 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.37 0.32 12 1.204 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.48 0.50
8 0.96 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.46 0.40 15 1.420 1.08 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.59
10 1.157 0.88 0.73 0.63 0.56 0.48 20 1.776 1.36 1.12 0.96 0.85 0.74
12 1.347 1.03 0.85
____________________ 0.73 0.65 0.56 25 2.13 1.63 1.90 1.16 1.02 0.88
15 1.635 1.25 1.03 0.89 0.79 0.68 30 2.481 1.89 1.56 1.35 1.19 1.03
20 2.107 1.61 1.33 1.14 1.01 0.87 35 2.833 2.16 1.78 1.54 1.36 1.17
25 2.581 1.97 1.63 1.40 1.24 1.07 40 3.186 2.43 2.0 1.73 1.53 1.32
30 3.044 2.32 1.92 1.65 1.46 1.26 50 3.88 2.96 2.44 2.11 1.87 1.61
35 3.549 3.55
_______________ 2.24 1.93 1.71 1.47 60 4.60 3.51 2.90 2.50 2.21 1.91
40 4.00 3.05 2.52 2.17 1.92 1.66 75 5.64 4.31 3.55 3.06 2.71 2.34
50 4.95 3.78 3.12 2.69 2.38 2.05 90 6.66 5.08 4.20 3.62 3.20 2.76
Note 1:The minimamdepthsforbi-directionalsmoke flowcanbe foundbylookingatthe column 110 8.04 6.14 5.1 4.37 3.87 3.33
correspondingtotwicethe actualwidthofthe channelorreservoir.
See NotestoTable5,2a.
Note 2:Tofindthe minimumdepth offlowbeneathadeep dswristandlega structural beam)
across the direction offlow, find the value in Tables5.2 correspondingtothe same massflowrate
andchannelwidth, andthen multiplythatvalue by1.67.
Table 5.2c Minimum reservoirdepths or minimum Table 5.2d Minimum reservoirdepths orminimum
channelling screen depths for5MW convective heatflux. channelling screen depths for 6 MWconvective heatflux.
Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit _______ Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit
Mass flowrate Mass flowrate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channelwidths (m) smoke layer Channelwidths (m)
(kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kgs') 4 6 8 10 12 15
10 1.082 0.83 0.68 0.59 0.52 0.45 12 1.22 0.93 0.77 0.66 0.59 0.51
12 1.206 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.58 0.50 15 1.40 1.07 0.88 0.76 0.67 0.58
15 1.386 1.06 0.87 0.75 0.67 0.57 20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.69
20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.70 25 1.95 1.49 1.23 1.06 0.94 0.81
25 1.97 1.50 1.24 1.07 0.95 0.82 30 2.22 1.69 1.40 1.21 1.07 0.92
30 2.25 1.72 1.42 1.22 1.08 0.93 35 2.49 1.90 1.57 1.35 1.20 1.03
35 2.54 1.94 1.60 1.38 1.22 . 1.05 40 2.76 2.10 1.74 1.50 1.33 1.14
40 2.82 2.15 1.78 1.53 1.36 1.17 50 3.29 2.51 2.07 1.79 1.58 1.36
50 3.38 2.58 2.13 1.84 1.63 1.40 60 3.82 2.92 2.41 2.07 1.84 1.58
60 3.94 3.01 2.48 2.14 1.89 1.63 75 4.61 3.52 2.90 2.50 2.22 1.91
75 4.78 3.65 3.01 2.59 2.30 1.98 90 5.40 4.12 3.4 2.93 2.60 2.24
90 5.62 4.29 3.54 3.05 2.70 2.33 110 4.92 4.06 3.50 3.10 2.67
110 5.14 4.243.653.24 2.79 130 5.71 4.71 4.06 3.60 3.1
130 4.94 4.26 3.77 3.25 150 5.37 4.63 4.10 3.53
150 5.64 4.86 4.31 3.71 200 7.0 6.04 5.35 4.61
200 6.35 5.62 4.85 SeeNotesto Table52a.
See Natesto Table5.2a.
0,3
0.2
0.1
D8(m)
where:
= measuredthroat areaofventilators (m2),
= total areaofall inlets (m2),
= coefficient ofdischarge (usuallybetween0.5
and 0.7), Winddirection
= entry coefficientfor inlets (typicallyabout0.6),
= pressure
M1 mass flow rate ofsmoke tobe extracted (kgs'),
p0 = ambient air density (kgm3),
g = accelerationdueto gravity (ms2),
D = depth ofsmoke beneath ventilator (m),
= temperaturerise ofsmoke layer above ambient (°C),
=
T1 absolutetemperature ofsmoke layer (K),
=
T0 absolutetemperature ofambient air (K).
Table 5.3a Minimum total ventilation area (m2) needed for A A (m2) needed for
Table 5.3b Minimum total ventilation area
asmokereservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC = 0.6); Q = 1 MW a smokereservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC 0.6); Q =2.5 MW
=
Mass Mass
flowrate flow rate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smokedepth beneath ventilators (m) rate) Smokedepth beneathventilators (m)
(kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10
4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 10 5.13 4.4 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.C
6 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 12 6.23 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4
8 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7 15 8.0 6.9 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.7 3.1
10 5.9 5.1 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.3 20 11.2 9.7 7.9 6.8 6.1 5.2 4.3
12 7.4 6.4 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.9 25 13.5 11.7 9.6 8.3 7.4 6.3 5.2
15 9.9 8.5 7.0 6.0 5.4 4.6 3.8 30 18.4 16.0 13.0 11.3 10.1 8.5 7.1
20 14.5 12.5 10.2 8.9 7.9 6.7 5.6 35 22.5 19.5 15.9 13.8 12.3 10.4 8.7
25 19.6 17.0 13.9 12.0 10.8 9.1 7.6 40 26.8 23.2 19.0 16.4 14.7 12.4 10.4
30 25.3 21.9 17.9 15.5 13.9 11.7 9.8 50 36.0 31.2 25.5 22.1 19.7 16.7 14.C
35 31.4 27.2 22.2 19.2 17.2 14.5 12.2 60 46.5 40.3 32.9 28.5 25.5 21.5 18.C
40 37.9 32.9 26.8 23.2 20.8 17.6 14.7 75 63.2 54.7 44.7 38.7 34.6 29.3 24.
50 52.2 45.2 36.9 32.0 28.6 24.2 20.2 90 81 70 57.3 50.0 44.4 37.5 31.4
60 67.9 58.8 48.0 41.5 37.2 31.4 26.3 110 108 93 76 66 59 50.0 41.7
Notesto Table5.3:Toallow forthe effectof limitedfresh air inletsthe fo]lowingguide canbe used Note: See Notes toTable5.3a.
asan alternativetsEqs 5.1 5):
Ifthe inletareatotheatrium istwice the exhaustventilationarea givesbyTable5.3the indicated
ventilationareaandthe inletareashould both be increasedbyapproximately10%.
Table 5.3c Minimum totalventilation area (m2) neededfor A Table 5.3d Minimum totalventilation area (m2)needed forA
a smoke reservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC= 0.6);Q= 5MW a smoke reservoir(fromEqn 5.15 withC =0.6); Q = 6MW
Mass Mass
flowrate flowrate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smoke depth beneathventilators (m) rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m)
(kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs') 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10
10 5.3 4.6 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.1 10 5.5 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.1
12 6.24 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4 12 6.4 5.5 4.5 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.5
15 7.7 6.7 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.6 3.0 15 7.8 6.7 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.0
20 10.3 8.9 7.3 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.0 20 10.2 8.9 7.2 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.0
25 13.0 11.3 9.2 8.0 7.1 6.0 5.0 25 12.9 11.1 9.2 7.9 7.0 6.0 5.0
30 16.0 13.8 11.3 9.8 8.7 7.4 6.2 30 15.6 13.5 11.1 9.6 8.6 7.2 6.1
35 19.1 16.5 13.5 11.7 10.4 8.8 7.4 35 18.6 16.1 13.1 11.4 10.2 8.6 7.2
40 22.3 19.3 15.8 13.7 12.2 10.3 8.6 40 21.6 18.7 15.3 13.2 11.8 10.0 8.4
50 29.3 25.4 20.7 18.0 16.1 13.6 11.4 50 28.2 24.4 19.9 17.2 15.4 13.0 10.9
60 36.9 31.9 26.1 22.6 20.2 17.1 14.3 60 35.2 30.5 24.9 21.6 19.3 16.3 13.6
75 49.3 42.7 34.9 30.2 27.0 22.8 19.1 75 46.7 40.4 33.0 28.6 25.6 21.6 18.1
90 63 54 44.4 38.4 34.4 29.1 24.3 90 59.2 51.2 41.8 36.2 32.4 27.4 22.9
110 82 71 58 50 45.1 38.1 31.9 110 77.2 66.9 54.6 47.3 42.3 35.8 29.9
130 104 90 73 63 57 48.0 40.2 130 96.8 83.8 68.5 59.3 53.0 44.8 37.5
150 126 109 89 77 69 59 49.0 150 117.8 102.0 83.3 72.1 64.5 54.5 45.6
200 189 164 134 116 103 87 73 200 175.9 152.3 124.4 107.7 96.3 81.4 68.1
po7J
(5.16) • firstcalculatethe flow rate ofgasesapproaching the
opening(orgap in thebalcony edge screens)using
where: sections 5.2—5.4 above as appropriate,
V1
= volumetricexhaustraterequiredin the reservoir •• multiplythis massflow rate by 5/3.
(m3s1), usingthe known layer convectiveheatflux (and
M1
= Mfor MB determined from theprevious section allowingfor sprinklercooling usingsection 5.5 above if
(kgs 1), appropriate) calculatethe volumetric exhaust rate
= ambient air temperature (K), required from the slit, usingEqn (5.10) to calculatethe
T1 =T0+01(K), meangas temperature drawn through thefan, and
p0 = densityofambient air (kgm3). Eqn (5.16)to calculatethe requiredfancapacity.
6.1 Smoke movement in the atrium level fire, the heightabove the topofthe opening (or
above the edge ofthe projecting canopyorbalcony above
Whenthe smokeand heat cannot, for variousreasons,be theopening where relevant) must be establishedwhere
confined andremoved from theroomoforigin or thefire is in an adjacentroom.
associatedbalconyspace, the use of'throughflow' or Notethatwhenthefire is onthe floor ofthe atriu.m and
steady-stateventilationfrom the atrium itselfis usually is directly belowthe smokelayerthat forms underthe
considered. atrium ceiling,entrainment intotherisingaxi-symmetric
Thisform ofsmoke control is commonly called 'smoke plume is similarto thatgiven in section 5.2 above. This
ventilation'or SHEVSandis based upona defined special case is discussedin section 6.4below.
buoyant smoke layer being establishedat some point In general, however, theworstcondition tobe catered
within the structure,with a 'clean' layer ofair beneath. for is a fire in an adjacentroomonthe lowestlevel,as
Themass flowofgasesentering this layer being resultsinthe most entrainment in the rising smokeplume
equivalenttothatflowingoutthroughthe exhaust andhencethelargest quantity ofsmokygas entering the
system (Figure23). buoyant layer.
Thebase ofsuch a layer is usuallyata height chosen Thefirecondition in the compartment (thedesign fire)
for safetyreasons (See Annex B,whereit is noted that the should bespecified,andthe mass fluxleavingthroughthe
clear heightabove the highestexposed escape route compartment opening and anyentrainment under1:he
should be 0.5 mmorethan for the single-storeycase projecting balconyorcanopycan be calculated as
described in Chapter 5), orto avoid breaching the described in sections 5.1—5.3.
practical'cutoff' limitsoutlined in section 6.7 below. Asthesmoke flows throughthe room opening intothe
Once the heightofthislayerbase is chosenfora lowest- atrium space it will either:
- /1 1L1
Inlet
• rotateupwardintoaround thetop edge oftheopeningand Reductionsin the mass flow rate ofsmoke entering the
theatrium space as aplume, or smokelayercan usuallybe effectedby changes to
• passdirectly
flowundera horizontal projection suchas abalcony
ofthe
parameters 3 and 4. In practice, the heightofrise ofthe
beyond theopening, pass to the
edge projection plume is usuallychosento permitsafeevacuation,leaving
and riseupwards intothe atrium space as a plume. only adependency on the length oftheline plume.
(a) (b)
-Ji
H
Figure 24(a) adhered plume, (b)free plume
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 41
(a) (b)
r
TT :*
(a) (b)
Figure26 Effect ofbalconydepth on plume trajectory: (a) deepbalcony projection, (b) shalow balcony projection
Ceiling
11 ____________
10
edge (m) H
6
5 H H
3
effective layer base
(I)
2 3
0
CD
CD
=
r-1-
0 0=
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
=
Temperature above ambient(°C) 3
(I)
Figure 27 A typical temperature profile for a broad reservoir layer 0
-
CD
(I,
C-)
CD
U)
.
(A)
44 _____Design methodologies for SHEVS
CFD study byMiles et al641 came tobroadlysimilar subsequent risingplume may be carried out usinga
conclusions.It is sufficient for design,however, to note numberofalternativeprocedures. Some ofthemare
that the phenomenon is experimentallyobservable,and given below. Ithas been shown'65 that all fourmethods
thateitherofthe two methods ofincluding this givereasonably close agreement whencompared with
phenomenonin designcalculationsshould be empirically the availableexperimentaldata.This is not surprisingin
acceptable. view ofthe fact that all derive their empiricalterms from
Thecurrentbookwill only presentthemethodfor the same experimental sources ofdata.
adjustingtheheightofrise ofthe plume in order to
achieve greatersimplicityofcalculation.This method is (a) The'BRE method'
as follows. This isthe procedure whichwas given in BRE Report
Deszrn approacheforsmokecom'rolinatthim buildthgsLul.
6.3.1.1 Smoke reservoirswhere visible depth <0.67
Forreservoirswherethevisibledepthisless than
A Followthe procedures ofMorgan & Marshall[2562] for free
plumes,usingthe modificationsintroduced byMorgan &
0.67 A, (and noting thatthis is basedon an analysisof Hansell71.Entrainment intosmoke flows rotating intoa
empirical data61 with no underpinning theory)proceed risingadhered plume canbe calculated usinga similar
as follows. method given by Morgan & Hansell271,although it
To calculatethe mass flow rates ofsmoke entering the should be noted that the entrainment constant
reservoir,introduce acorrection factor for the smoke appropriate to an adhered line plume isabout halfthat for
layer depth in the reservoir.Experiments withflat-roofed afreeplume66'611L Avalue of0.077 may be usedfor the
models62 have shownthatforcalculatingplume calculation61.
entrainment, the effectivelayerdepth (d2) is 1.26 times This calculation method is outlined in detail in
thevisiblelayer depthd1 (seeFigure27). Annex E. The algorithm described canbe used either
The effective heightofrise ofthe spillplume above the directly,orasthebasis for a computer program.
spilledge isthen given by: Oncethe desired height ofthe layer base (hb) has been
chosen, theopeningwidthhas been established,orthe
X= H-1.26d1 (m) (6.1) channelling screens separation L [and hencealso
channelling screen depthusingTables 5.2 a or5.2 b, or
A negative orverysmallvalue ofX resultingfrom this Eqn (5.11)] hasbeenchosenonthe basisofpracticality
procedure means thatonehasgonebeyond the limits of (egsuch thatthe screens contactthewalls separating the
validationofEqn (6.1). Itfollowsthat if afterapplying rooms) then the mass flowrate ofsmoke entering the
Eqn (6.1),X< 0.75 misobtained thenX should instead layerforming the ceilingspace ofthe atrium canbe
be definedas: calculated.
Resultsofexainpie calculationsofsmokeproduction
X= H-d (m) (6.2) dueto entrainment intothe risingplume areshown
graphicallyin Figures28—39. TheseFiguresmaybe used
Note that these procedures only apply whencalculating for designpurposes but itis preferableto do amore
entrainment into the spillplume. d2 hasnovalidity for precise calculation,using the procedures ofAnnex E.
any otherapplication.
(b) Methodusingequations derivedby Porehetal631
6.3.1.2 Smokereservoirs where visible depth>0.67 Recent work byPorehet al631, based on datareportedby
Forsmoke reservoirs wherethe visibledepthis greater Marshalland Harrison67, hasshownthat the
than0.67 A, no correction applies,and complicatedcalculation methods given in the BRE
methodabove to determine theentrainment intospill
X= H-d1 (m) plumes can be simplifiedas follows:
/
I
/
// /
29 23
1/,
// /
/,/
/ I/
/ /
// / /// /
II/
/1/1/
/ ,/
/
I
/ •1
/
//
I'
I / / // / / I
/
// /
// / /
I//I / 7
I//I
15 15
/ / /
I/I',
// / // II
I//I
//
//
/
I / / I'
/
E
0
0 III"
I /
,/ / / /
,' E
0
0
/
'li-
/ /
/ / / 1/
/
15 IS
II ///
/I // I,'/
0 0
-o
Cs
C
I 0)
5,
C
I
5)
I/i'
Ij,/
,'
—Wl0rn
I—j— W15rr
b20m L
5
0 50 150 150 200 250 300 350 0 50 150 150 200 250 300 350
Mass flow(kgs) Mass flow(kgs)
Figures 28, 29 Free plume from open-plan sprinkleredoffice: 28 no downstand, 29 1.0 mdownstand
30 25 31 20
Is 15
E E
0
0 0
10 10
0 0
-n
(0 (0
=S
0(
I 0)
Figures 30, 31 Adhered plumefrom open-plan sprinklered office: 30 no downstand, 311.0 m downstand
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 47
32 33 30
24 24
18 18
E E
0
0
a
I I
80
12 12
O 6
0 0
0 500 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 0 100 200 300 400 500 000 700 000
Massflaw (kgs-') Mass flaw (kgs)
Figures 32, 33 Free plume fromlargeshop fitted with quick-response sprinklers:32 nodownstand, 33 1.0 m downstand
30
34 35
24
18
12
5 52 100 550 200 250 050 350 400 0 50 500 150 200 252 300 350 400
Massflow (kgs) Massflow (kgsj
/
/
//
// /
/ 21
/
/
0
,1
/ // /
//
/ if
14
—. VI
VI.111,1
44: 151W - W.
—: W..
4I.0l1I VI :Ill0
22—101.: VI::)
...—.. II 41)1 —-—WIll
11)0 W 14)))
Figures 36, 37 Free plume from largeshopfitted with standard-response sprinklers,36 no downstand, 37 1.0 rn downstand
38 39 (0
Ill
if
S
I VI IS I —--4)50
7) 3 VI))
VII:: — .__ 14 .l)
3. 21Cr.
1:4 75 3)1.
7) 40. V. 4(ls
W VII — ---- VI..'1lo
Figures 38, 39Adhered plume from largeshop fitted with standardresponse sprinklers: 38 no downstand, 39 1.0 m downstand
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 49
notto adhered plumes TheThomasetal (1998) methodcan be expected to
Thomas et al expressed some uncertainty about the apply to free plumesonly, and to largesmoke reservoirs
effects oflargeand smallreservoirson the entrainment only. While it includes terms for entrainment into the
predicted by theirmethod, and identifiedthe need for ends ofthespillplume, thesewere stated with a
further research intothis aspect. They developed the cai.itionary note in the source paper.6'L
entrainment equations primarilyin terms ofdatalbr large We should notethat any and all empiricallybased
areareservoirsso consequentlytheir method should not modelscan be expected to have some dependence on the
be applied to smallareasmoke reservoirs.In the absence sourceexperimentsusedin deriving the empirical aspects
ofbetterdata,we canassume that the same criterion as in ofthose models. It is noteworthy that all the models cited
section 6.3.1 can be used to differentiatebetween large in section 6.3.2 drawon thesame experimental sources,
and small area smoke reservoirs. although not all use all ofthe availabledata,
The entrainment into the spillplume (ignoring Themethods have beencompared in Annex I) for a
entrainment intothe free ends) is then: design scenario which applies to all four, but extending
into a range ofparameter valuesdifflring from the
/
= l.2M, (6 7) originalexperimental source data. It can l:e seen from
+0.l6X1,L1 +0.0O27Q (kgs1) Annex1) that,fbr the examplechosen therein, there is a
reasonableifnot close agreement forup to 5 mn abovethe
while the entrainment intoboth the freeends (SM) is (for
unknown) :
X/L 'not too large', and wherethis limitingcriterion is
spilledge for all methods . This iswithin the most
common range of designheights of riseforspill plumes.
Note here that only the Thomas et al (1998) method is
expected to giveaccurate resultsat heights ofrise less
SM = 0.09X " than about 3 m above the spilledge. The methods diverge
L (kgs') (6 8) for greater heights, although it is noteworthy that thereis
amuch closer agreementbetweenthe BRE method and
6.3.3 Recommendationsfor selecting a spillplume the Thomas (1987) method using Eqn (6.6) to calculateA
formula for all relevant heights.
Thedifferentmethodsoutlinedin section 6 2 above do Thelarger valuesofmass flow represent themore
not all cover thesame circumstancesand scenarios.Some conservativedesign option in terms ofsafety,particularly
oftheselimitationsderive from theways in which the in view of the fact that at these greater heights ofrise, and
methods were derived.Itis not the purpose ofthe current hence at the correspondinglyvery large mass flow rates,
bookto reviewthe detailsoftheresearch papers the smoky g'astemperatures tendtohe low, It should also
concerned (which are anyway cited as reiCrencesabove). henotedthat therewas a good matchbetween the BRE
It is useful to summarizewhereeach canin principlehe method and experimental observation in a ftillseale hot
expected to be applicable,based on the assumptionsand smoketest9'with the very differentcircumstancesof an
selected dataemployed inthose sourcepapers. adhered plume with entrainment into the free ends, again
TheBRE method (see 6.3.2 (a) above),while being with a largeareasmoke reservoir.This tends to give
complicatedto use, coversfree and adhered plumes. It greater confidencein the range of validationof the BRE
can be usedbr largeorsmall areasmoke reservoirs,It method, and byimplicationof'theThomas (1987)/Poreh
('an he usedeitherwith or without mixingof'air into the method far free plumes.
free ends ofthe spillplume. This makes it the most Consequently,the authors of'thisbookrecommend
versatile of the ftur methods, thefollowing.
The Porehet al method (see 6.3.2 (h) above) is much • Forfreeintoplumes risingless than in above the
3 spill
simpler. It can be expected to apply to free and adhered edge, a large smoke reservoir,use the Thomaset al
plumes, but only to those risingbetweenside wallswhich
prevent any entrainment intothe endsofthe spillplume.
This greatly limitsthe range of scenarioslikelyto he
• Forfreeusemethod
(1998) of6.3.2
(d).
plumes risingmorethan m above the
3 spill
edge eitherthe BRE method of6.3.2 (a) forlarge Or
fbund in prac'tice. It applies to large smoke reservoirsand smallreservoirs,orthe Thomas (1987) method of
notto smallones. 6.3.2 (c) usingEqn (6.6), for largesmoke reservoirs
TheThomas (1987)method(see 6.3.2 (c) above) only
applies to free plumes, and cannot be used for adhered • For
only.
all other spillplume scenarios,use the BRE
plumes. Entrainment into the endsof'thespilll)ll.lmeis method,
explicitly calculated.The method can only he used with
confidencewith large smokereservoirs,and notwith 6.4 High temperature plume
smallreservoirs.The difficulty ofknowing the
appropriatevalue, ofA,the height from the virtualline Hansel! et al1 has suggested that the entrainment into a
sourceto the spill edge, without calculatingit each time high-temperature spillplume might be lower than intoa
for the circumstancesofthe specihc' design scenario, thermal plume. The effectis not sufficiently well studied
impliesthat this method should only be used whenA can to allow quantitativeadviceto begiven,beyond the
he calculated. statement thatthe effectbecomes apparent for valuesof
50 Design methodologies for SHEVS
may be:
• a group offoureasy chairs,clusteredtogether, forming
a perimeter ofaround 6 rn, with a convective heatflux
Figure 40 Rate of productionofhot gasesfrom afire on an
atriumfloor
of2 MW,
• a sprinklered office environment,provic:lingthe
sprinklerscan operate over the fire area,with atotal calculationsare essentiallythe samefor all subsequent
(q
convective heatflux ofabout 115kWm2 offire*, stages ofsmokemovement in the smoke reservoirasfor
• anunsprinklered office environment with a total
convective heatfluxQ1ofabout 250 kWm2 oflire,
an axi-symmetricplume. Thedesigner cansimply
employ the methods described in section 5.4 and
• a vehicle (car)with a fire perimeter of12 111 and a total
convective heatfluxof3,0 MW.
onwards to complete the basic design of the SF1EVS.
Notehowever that the designerwill still have many other
factorsto takeintoaccount,as discussed elsewhere in the
*Notc,.ifthe atrium ceilingis high, specialprovisionsmay current book.
haveto bemadeto ensure effectivesprinkler operation.
Ifthe heatfluxis not known forthe predicted fuel load, 6.7 Limitationsto the useofthroughflow
a convective heatfluxQ1of0.5 MWm2 offireareaisa ventilation
usefully pessimistic ruleofthumb' coveringmany cases. Themassflow rategenerated bythe entrainment intothe
Themass flow rate in theplume as it enters the smoke risingplume increasesrapidly with increasingheightof
layer maybe establishedfrom Figure40 orEqn (5.2). This rise ofa l)lume,and hencethe plume cools quicklywith
procedure can be used for Y 10.0 (Af)Oh. Forlarger height. This largeincrease in mass flow withincreases in
valuesofY, it would bebetterto use the 'smallfire' plume height tends to suggestthat theremay be some cut-off
theories (seesection 5.1.2 above). pointin the rise ofthe plume above whichit might
become economicallyimpractical interms of a smoke
6.6 Throughflowventilation: remaining control system.Experience suggeststhat this is often true
for flows larger than 150—200kgs'.
design procedures Anothereffectivelimitmayoccur ifthetemperature of
Oncethe smoky gaseshave reached the base ofthe the smokygas layer forming in theroofvoid is too low.If
smokelayer in the final smokereservoir,therewill be no internal day-to-day heat gains (solar,plant,etc. are
significantfurther entrainment. Once the massflow rate allowedto accumulatewithin the atrium roofspace
ofsmoky gasesentering this layeris known,the design (eg passivesolar atria) then high-level air temperatures
6 Smoke ventilationwithin multistorey spaces 51
within the atrium may be very high. Roofspace This energy loss will increase with the distancethe
temperatures have been recorded at or above 50 °C. smokehas to travel from the fire source, and will manifest
Smoke spreadingintoan atrium duringthe incipient itselfas aloss ofbuoyancy within theflowing layer. This
stagesofafire will naturallybevery cool, and the in turn cancause the layer todeepenbeyond the desired
entrainment processeswill draw in the surrounding design depth, perhaps considerablyso.
ambient air as the plume rises.In most instancesthis Cool smokewill alsobe sensitiveto airflow
ambient air willbe at or near 20 °C (either due to movements, such as air currents (draughts) due to
ventilationor airconditioning) producing a plume ventilation,air conditioning orweather conditions.
temperature which may be considerablylowerthan the Excessiveair movement in contact with a cool but
air within the roofspace, otherwise stable smokelayer can cause it to become
Unlessthis hot air canbe removed sufficiently quickly, unstable,spreading further throughout the building.The
this will result in the initialsmokelayer ft)rmingat a point formation of asmoke layer depends uponbuoyancy for
lowerdown in the buildingthanmay he desirable.This the maintenance of stability. Smoke layerswhichhave
process is known as early (or premature) stratification temperatures (and hencedensities)approaching that of
(Figure41). Asthe fire is probably growing,the plume theincoming replacement air supply will have a tendency
temperature will rise progressivelywith time. This may to 'mix' with this air, ratherthan 'float' above it. This
result in hotter smoke'punching' itswaythrough the process is known as dilution ventilationand is frequently
cooler smokelayer and fbrminganother warmer layer usedin industry to reduce contamination levelsin
above.This process may continue until th&' smoke 'strata' buildings(egwelding shops). The mechanismsinvolved
have become suflicientlymixed to rise up as a singlehulk in dilution ventilationcan easily induce downward
ofsmoke. This problem ofearly stratificationcanto some mixingofa smoke layerto the extentthat,with sufficient
extent he overcome by providingsmokedetectors at air movement, complete smoke logging of an atrium can
many heights within the atrium or located to ensure occur. It followstherefore that the atrium snmkelayer
detection of smokeclose to the fire. Once a ftrming should beata temperature compatiblewith stable
smokestratum is detected and the smokeventilation stratification.
system set off, the hottest (and therefore highest) gases Thereis littleinlbrination available on the
will be removed first, allowingany cooler strata to riseto destabilizationofcool buoyant layers,so a precise
taketheirplace. Hence smoky gaseswill reach the limitingtemperature beyondwhich the above effectswill
ventilators and the smoke ventilationsystem should lessencannot be given. Further research is desirablein
settle into its 'design'state. The timescale fir this process this area. Experienceand experimentalobservation
is uncertain and hence'early'detection ol smokein these however indicatethat these cfièctsmayhe severe in
circumstancesis essential. terms ofsrnoke control, perhaps leading to smoke
A further problem which may be encountered maybe spreadingto otherwiseunaffected escape roules.
more problematicalduring cooler weather, Atria with Inthe absence of the necessaryexperimental data, and
large areas ofexternal glazingwill presentalarge surface as aresult ofpracticalexperiencethis bookwill adopta
areato the smokelayer,whichcan lead to largeheat lowerlimit to thelayer under'design'conditions of2()°C
lossesfrom the layer. above ambient asthe critical layer temperature below
52 Design methodologies for SHEVS ______
7 Alternative forms of
smoke control for atria
(including multistorey malls
but excluding throughflow ventilation)
Clearly,theremust be no escape routes opento the upper installed,wherethe inlet areais equal to the exhaust vent
atrium. area, then the neutral pressure planewill exist
Ifsuch doorsand othersuchleakagepaths do not have approximatelymidway within the smoke layer
tightseals,smoke from the atrium mayentermany (Figure43). Ifthe inlet vent areais smaller than the
adjacent rooms on many levels,causing aloss ofvisibility exhaust vent area, then the neutral pressure planewill
in thoseroomsand possiblyaffectingescape routesaway move upwards (Figure44).
from theatrium(Figure42). Anyopeningsabove the neutral pressureplanewillbe
This might happensimultaneouslyon many floors, underapositivepressure (definedpositiveoutwards from
requiring the simultaneousevacuation ofall affected the atrium).Thus, therewillbe a flowofsmokefrom the
floors,thus adding to the pressure ofuse on escape routes atrium intorooms above the neutral pressure plane
elsewhereinthe building.This is likelytobeaparticular throughany leakagepathwhichmight exist.
problem wherethereis a'sleeping risk', egatrium hotels. However, carefulmanipulationoftheneutralpressure
It willalso be a problem for fire fighters,since theymay plane can raiseitto a 'safe'heightabove sensitivelevels,
feel the need to search all accommodation on allaffected wherethere is littleornothreat from the positive
floors to ensurethatno-oneremains atrisk. Such a search pressure above (Figure45). The pressure in the atrium
would be muchquicker ifall accommodation were kept belowthe neutral pressureplane willbe at apressure
clear ofsmoke. lowerthanambient, thus anyairflowwill be from the
Hence smoke must be prevented from passingin room intothe atrium. Hence the levelsbelowthe neutral
appreciablequantities through thesesmall leakage pressure planeareprotectedfrom heat and smoke
openings. Onewayofachievingthis may be by contamination.
depressurizingthe atrium71'72t Annex F givesa description ofa firethat occurredin
the IMFbuildinginWashington15.Thefire occurred on
7.3.2 Naturaldepressurization the 10th floor ofa 13-storeyatrium, and bythe time the
In anystructure with natural ventilation openingsat high fire servicearrived (16 minuteslater) the smokelevel had
and low level,and with a quantity ofheat trapped inside, descended belowthe 10th floor.
a ventilation rate will becreateddueto the 'stackeffect'. An interesting aspect ofthisfire was that despite the
In order forairto move out through the high-level presence ofa natural ventilation system inthe roof, the
opening, the pressure athighlevel inside mustbegreater atrium became completelysmoke-logged at onepoint.
thanthe external pressure otherwise therewould be no This apparent failure ofthe venting system was attributed
air movement. Similarly, for air to flow inwardsatlow to theuse ofnatural ventilation in a'tall'building,where
level the pressure atlow level inside must be less than the smokehadinsufficientbuoyancyto reachthe vents.
thatoutside. Thusthere must bea position within the However, the fire occurred on the 10thfloor, and for all
structure wherethepressure inside is equal to that practical purposes,whenthe fire brokeout itwas
outside. This is known as the 'neutral pressure plane'. Any effectivelyin athree-storey buildingwith adeep
openings situated atthe neutral pressure planewill have basement. Natural ventilationworksextremely well in
no airflowthroughthem,as therewill be no pressure 'shallow' buildings,andtherefore there must havebeen
differentialat that height. some other mechanism in action, affectingthe operation
In buildingswhereathroughflow ventilation system is ofthe ventilation system.
inlet: equals
vent area
Inlet:smaller
vent area
Theatrium had no apparent inlet facilityand depending uponfactors such as: inlet/ventarearatio, gas
accordinglyinstead oftheventilators providinga temperatures, windpressures,etc. It isnot, andshould
throughflow ventilationeffect,theatrium became notbe conflisedwith, the actualbase ofthe smoke layer.
depressurizedin the manner describedabove. This, in Theequation describingthe above relationship,in the
turn, prevented smoke from spreadingbeyondthe absence ofwindeffects is71'72:
atrium, despitebeingsmoke-loggedto ground-floor level
atone stage.
Theneutral pressureplane(NPP) will lie somewhere 4ç) T0I—1
(7.1)
Neutralpressureplane
IT'
where:
X = the heightfrom the base ofthe smoke layerto the
desired position ofthe NPP (m),
=
Dm maximum depthofsmokelayer from the
20
Thus, allpotentialinletleakage paths must be assessed Wind pressure coefficients(Cr's) have often been
whenusingEqn (7.1) or Figure46. measured so that structural wind loadingcan be
Itshould be notedthatthe simple approach set out calculated.Thereis aconsiderablebodyofdatain
herewillbe invalidwherethe leakage paths across the existence.
atrium boundary have appreciableareas onseveral Wherecomplete certainty isrequired for a novel or
storeys [although allleakage areas below the smoke complicatedbuilding,wind-tunnel observationsusing
layer's base can beaggregated and regarded as being at scale modelswillyieldusable results.In general,
thelayer's base for calculationpurposes whenusing however, it should often bepossibleto obtain reasonable
Eqn (7.1) orFigure 46].Wherethereareappreciable valuesfor the Ce'sneededforsmoke control calculations
significantleakagepaths on severalstoreys above the from availableliterature (seeegreference [73]).
layersbase, thesame depressurizationprinciplecanbe Figure48(a) shows the typical3-dimensional
employed but a more complicated'flownetwork' complicatedpatternofwind pressure coefficientsover a
calculationmust be used.This is bestleft to specialistsin tall towerblock741.In practice, itwould be necessaryto
the field. identifythe most pessimisticvaluesfor eachstorey, in
Itis difficultto givea simplegeneral rule to identif' whichcase theproblemcanbe simplifiedto
whenabuilding canberegardedas havinga single 2-dimensionalasshownin Figure48(b).
dominant inlet. Nevertheless,it may be sufficientto adopt Withthesedataestablishedfor any specific building
a guidelinefrom the related field of'air infiltration',so the design procedure for checkingon theperformance of
that one canassume a'dominant inlet' ifthetotalareaof anatural depressurizationsystem is fairlysimplewhere
all openings belowthelayer base is morethan twicethe thereis a singledominant opening.
total areaofall openingsabove the layerbase (excluding Toprevent smokeleakage intothetop leewardstorey
the areaoftheventilators themselves)[73J forall wind speeds71:
7.3.3 Naturaldepressurization and wind effects [(A—1)c —ACPL +Cpj} 0 (7.2)
TheNPPis sensitivetothe effects ofwind, and 'adverse'
windpressures might cause the NPPtofallto alower where:
position onthe leeward side ofthe building,possibly = windpressurecoefficientatthe vent,
contaminatingthe topmostleeward storeys ofthe = windpressurecoefficientatthe topmostleeward
building.It followsthatthe depressurizationdesign ofthe building,
procedure must takewind-force intoaccount. = storey
wind pressure coefficientatthe inlet, and
To assessthe efficiency ofoperation ofa
depressurizationsystem aknowledge ofthe wind
A=21QHYfL1+l (7.3)
pressure coefficientsactinguponabuildingwill be u;L4cj
necessary.These area well-establishedwayofrelating
thewindpressure anywhere on abuildingtothe wind Provided the requirements ofEqn (7.2) are satisfied, then
velocity at rooflevel. natural ventilationwillworkat all wind speeds. This
58 Design methodologies for SHEVS
(a) (b)
-0.8
Wndward Leeward
-0.60
0.75 -0.55
0.95 -045
0.95 -0.45
0.90 -0.45
0.80 — -0.45
0.70 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.60 -0.45
0.55 -0.45
0.50 -0.45
0.45 -0.45
0.35
0.30
0.25 - . . -0.45
-0.45
-0.45
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9 Figure48 Wind pressure coefficients(Cr's) around atypicaltower
0.95 block: (a) 3-dimensional, (b) 2-dimensional distribution
implies that the roofventilation system should be A natural smoke control system willbe affectedby the
subjected to suctionwindpressuresatall times. windpressuresoperating against allthe openings in the
However, ifit is impossibleto use a natural ventilator on a structure, thus pressure differentialsvary withwind
particular building,fans can beusedinstead. direction and openingposition and the throughflow ofair
willvary with windvelocity.
7.3.4 Powered depressurization However,whenthehole in the roofis replaced bya
The necessary capacityis a littleharderto calculate,and fan,the pressure differentials within the buildingnow
thebestfan is one whichis not affectedbywindpressures haveto bechangedby mechanicallyaltering the
on its exhaust. Witha fan,however, one must always throughflow ofair. Therefore, the system must be
assumeamaximum wind speed fordesignpurposes. The designed witha maximum designwindvelocityto cater
required volumetric flowratemaybe calculated from711: for all conditions.
Further sophisticationmaybe achievedby the use of
____ 174
an anemometer and having 'groups' offans, eachgroup
— — 2
+ 2gO1X1112
operating at a differentwindvelocity. So ifthe windwas
wind
[ T0 ][(C T1 ]
light, one group could operate, and ifthe wind speed
where: increased, ftirther groups might be activatedasnecessary.
V1
= fan capacityrequired (m3s 1),
vWlfld
= designwindvelocity (msj.
59
8 Depressurization/smoke ventilation
hybrid designs
Chapters 3 to 6 have indicated how smokeventilation suchahybrid designthe smoke layertemperature inthe
canonly keepa limitednumberoflowerstoreys clear of atrium required forthe depressurizationcalculationsis a
smokebelowthebuoyant smokelayerformed inthe natural outcome ofthe plume entrainment calculations
atrium. The technique does in principle,however, allow needed forthe smoke exhaust calculation.Notethat
those lower storeys to have adjacent spaces,and their hybrid designsare similarlypossiblewherepowered
escape routes, open to the atrium. Sections7.3 and 7.4 ventilators are usedfor atrium smokeexhaust.
above show thatitis often possibleto design a Hybrid designsusuallyfollowone oftwo approaches:
depressurizationsystem whereclean air is drawn through mass-flow-basedapproach and temperature-based
all significantleakageopenings on the atriumfacade approach.
immersed in the smokelayer.Depressurizationdoesnot,
however, protectany large leakageopenings on any Mass-flow-basedapproach
storey above the layerbase in the atrium. Nor will it This approachis wherethe atrium is designed with a
protectany escape routes onthatstoreyopen to the number ofopen levels above the atriumfloor and
atrium. Inthis context alarge openingisone wherethe requires aplume ofa specificheight. The maximum
opening in the atrium facadeis larger than the sumof number oflevelswillbedetermined by eitherthe
openingsfurther along the same leakagepath away from magnitude ofthe massflow rate entering the layer,or the
the atrium (eg ifthe atriumfacade opening islargerthan smokelayer temperature falling belowtheminimum
openings in the external wall). value of2O °C. The principles ofa mass-flow-based
Itwill often be thecasehowever,that architectswill hybrid smokeventilation system are shown in Figure49
want to maximizeuse ofthe atrium space,and anobvious (seenext page).
wayis to combinethe smokeventilation approach of
Chapters 3 to 6, allowinggreaterfreedom ofdesign on Temperature-based approach
theloweststoreys,with thelesser freedom of'leaky Thisapproachisto coola potentiallyhot smokelayer by
facades'allowed bythe depressurizationtechnique set the deliberate entrainment ofambient air into the rising
out in sections 7.3 and 7.4 above.In this'hybrid'design plume. This mayenable the use offacadematerials which
theratioofventareato fresh-airinletareawillbe cannotwithstand hightemperatures (eg floatglass).The
determined byEqn (7.2) orFignre46,whereas the actual principlesofatemperature-based hybridsmoke
valuesofthese areas must be consistentwiththe ventilationsystem are shown in Figure50 (seenextpage).
necessarysmoke exhaust requirement as defined in A designprocedure for hybridsystems is given in
sections 5.12 and 5.13.Itshould be appreciatedthatin AnnexG.
60 Design_methodologiesfor SHEVS
Inlet AjC1
Inlet AC
Situation A Situation B
Heatcarriedby
exhaust gases
openvenfilafors or
powered exhaust units
150
140
130
120
0 M1Okgs-
90
H—— M10kgs
'VP M125kgs
—
M15Okgs
M1100k9s
60
----
E
Go
50
40
\ -S..
30
20
IC
Figure52Atriumlayertemperaturefor fire of 1 MW
9Atrium smoke layertemperature 63
320
300
280 t\
26O
240
\ \
220 \
\\
200
\\ '\
\\
0=1MW
\ M=Ukga
Me10kgs
—
\ \ N M,25kgs
160
——M50kgs
aE 140 \ \\.
'
—— Mr100kgs
p
H
--- ___
20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tota'surfacearea (hicludOig base)
(mx 1000)
Figure 53 Atrium layertemperaturefor fire of 5 MW
020 _________
300 t
280
260\ \
240 \
220 \ '
\ \ 0=1MW
200
180
\ \\\ \ M,0kgs
S\
160
's M,=5Okgs1
— —
M=100kga
fi 140
120
100
2 4
22
othersidefavoursusingsmoke ventilationsimultaneously 10
I 23vents
-
withsprinklers in orderto increasethe effectivenessof
fire fighting.Therewere many paperspublishedduring
the 1980s discussingandreinforcingtheseviewpoints. 6 120 160 240 300 300 420
Time(secs)
Since then, much research has been carried out on
interactions betweensprinklers,ventilators and the
thermally buoyant layers.A numberofcomputer models Figure55The effect ofsmokeventilatorson sprinkler operation
havebeendeveloped, some ofwhicharelisted inTable
11.1. Typical results from some ofthe models predict a
small increasein the time to operation ofsprinklers escape routesusedby occupants ofthe compartment,
coupled with a considerableextension ofthe time to this must takepriority.Sprinklerswill usually be
develop smoke-loggingin the compartment. needed to control the fire to a sizewithwhichthe
Therehave alsobeen some experiments, most notably smokeventilation system can cope. The smoke
the large experimentsin Ghentin Belgium88,and at ventilationsystem andallits associated features
SP Bors89.Figure55 is atypical example ofthe results (except the sprinklers)must beactivated on first
from the Ghentexperiments, showing a smallincreasein detection ofsnsoke,whichalmost always means earlier
thetime to operatethe firstsprinklers,and anunexpected thanany sprinklerswill operate.
reduction in the total numbers ofsprinklers operating • Wherethe propertyis likelyto experienceahigh-
during the fire.Notethatthe fire growth andcontrol was challengefire, thereshould be adifferentapproach.
arbitrarilyselected for the purposes oftheexperiment. Pending research intothis aspect, wecan assume that
Resultsfrom the Ghentexperimentshavebeen usedto 'extra-high-hazard' occupanciesidentifiedfor
testthepredictions ofRADISM and resultsfrom the sprinkler installationpurposes correspond to this
SPBorásexperiment have beenusedto testthe category. Means ofescape should not dependon
predictionsofSPLASH andJASMINE. smoke exhaust ventilation,but should instead depend
Unfortunatelythe same evidencehas been interpreted oncompartmentation and adequatelyshorttravel
differentlyby the two sides and progress since 1980 has distances forescape ofthe occupants.Ifa smoke
not removed the controversy,although it has clearedup ventilation system is needed to assistfirefighting, it
many details.It has tendedto confirmthe two opposite should be operated byaswitch easily accessibleforfire
poles ofthe argument intheir respectiveviews. fighters withoutthem havingto enterthe fire
A compromise wassuggested byMorgan901 asfollows. compartment. This will allow the risk ofa backdraftto
• Wherethe primary purpose ofthe smokeventilation dissipatebefore any ofthe fire-fightershave to be put
system is the protection oflife, eg by protecting the
• atFor risk.
properties belowthe extra-high-hazard category,
andwherethe ofthe smoke
Table 11.1 Computer models developed to determine primarypurpose
interactions between sprinklers, ventilatorsand thermally ventilation system is to protectpropertyby assisting
buoyant layers fire-fightingintervention,we can identifytwo
Computer Developer alternativestrategies:
— where the attendance time ofthe fireservices is
model
likelyto belong, adopt the same strategy as for
RADISM DevelopedbyHinkleyfroma jointFRS—Colt extra-high-hazard occupanciesasabove.
Internationalproject, UK82 — where the attendance time ofthe fire servicesis
LAVENTS DevelopedbyCooper atNIST, USAt8384 likelyto be short, operate the smokeventilation
SPLASH DevelopedbyGardiner(1988)and Jackman (1992) system on firstdetection ofsmokein order to obtain
fromajoint collaboration between Brandforsk, themaximumadvantage ofasmoke-free region for
Sweden,FRSand SouthBank University,UK8586 fire-fightersto workin. Sprinklerscan be allowedto
JASMINE A two-phaseversion developedbyKumar et al at operate with theirusual triggering devices.
FRS, UK'8
building'soccupants and savingthe environment around assumption ofthe design firebeingthe most 'plausibly
thebuildingfrom the fire threat,it is notclear thatthere is pessimistic'fire sizewill dependon the limits ofthe
public acceptance forfire 'prevention' concepts which relevant statistics.
allow forthe total loss ofa buildingas long asoccupants' Forgrowingfireswhereeitherthereis no fixed fire-
safety andprotection ofthe environment are achieved. extinguishingmedium,or whereits effecton the growing
Theissue ofthe consequentialcoststo society in terms of firecannot be reliablyidentified,the intervening time for
job losses,rebuildingcosts, etc. is a frequent subjectfor thefire services (ie attendance time plus timefor
debate. developingasuccessfulattack on the fireas defined in
An even more threatening aspect ofusing the section 12.2.2.1 above) has to be the suitableparameter
evacuation time asthe determining design parameter for forassessingthefire size, although there mightbe some
thefiresizeofagrowingfire,whichin turn is a key severeuncertainties in these assumptions.These
parameter for designinga SHEVS,is the possibilityof uncertainties include difficulties in assessingthe
underestimatingthe evacuation time. attendance time ofthe fire services due to traffic jams or
Computer models simulatingevacuation, or casual deviationsdueto roadworksonthe access route,
evacuation exercisesperformed by test persons, willbe or simplythe possibilitythatthe fire-fightingforces
very helpful in assessingescape times. Butit hasto be closestto the buildingconcerned and dedicated to
bornein mind that thesesimulationsshould allow forthe intervenethere firstare already employed elsewhereon
possibleexistenceofstragglers, disabled and/or injured another emergency.
people. In addition,the fact thatfiremen often haveto Whatever method wasused, oncehaving assessed a
search for missingpeople after acompleted 'evacuation' suitabledesign-firesize on the pessimisticassumption
should not be forgotten. It is well known that people that it is the 'most likelylargest fire size'when
often entera burning buildingagainforsubjective extinguishingoperations (performed manuallyand/or
reasons. The existenceofthese problems impliesthe automatically)become successful, aSHEVS designedon
needfor safety margins in the estimated evacuationtime. thisbasic parameter will servefor lifesafety andproperty
Themain uncertainty in assessinganevacuationtime protection because all four fire-fightingobjectives
is the unpredictableperiod betweenalerting the (SHEVS designobjectives'life safety and property
occupants and theirsubjectivedecision to start escaping. protection' supporting the fire-fightingobjectives I—TV)
After 24 years' experience as an officerofa professional canbe achieved.
firebrigade the author ofthis chapterhas found that
people usuallydo not startto try to escape untilthey 12.2.2.3 SHEVS designobjective 'propertyprotection
perceive themselvesto be endangered whichis often too only'supportingfire-fighting objectives II and IV, and,
late forsafelyescaping withoutsupport from the fire ifalso designedtodo so,III
services. Forsome occupancies,thereis no, orjustavery low, risk
Adefinitestartofevacuation can therefore onlybe tolives due to threatfrom smoke.Thiswill be truefor all
assumed ifthe occupants are subject to some form of circumstanceswherethere are very few or usuallyno
directed organization.This can be eitherinside an persons inside alire-affectedcompartment (egas in most
existinghierarchy amongst themselves, as willbe the case warehouses,especiallyifthey are automaticallyloaded
for employees ofacompany or civil servants in large andunloadedby robots (seealso section 12.3 below).
office accommodation,or wheretheoccupants are Another example concerns premises wherethe means of
controlled by an organizationestablishedforthe purpose escape are provided by compartmentation: iewhere
ofevacuationsuchas trained staffinhotels or premises corridors andstaircasesare enclosed byafire-resistant
forpublic assemblies. structure and protectedfrom ingressofsmoke (egby
vented lobbieswith fire doors orby pressurization
12.2.2.2 SHEVS design objective 'life safety and systems).Under these circumstances,SHEVSneed not
propertyprotection'supportingfire-fighting provide asmoke-free layer from the very beginning ofthe
objectives I—IV outbreak ofa fireto ensurethat people are ableto escape.
Itfollowsfrom the discussionin section 12.2.2.1 above Wherethe concern is limited to property protection
that the designofaSHEVS merely forlifesafety based on therearetwo main approaches possible,although the
a designfiresize dependenton theevacuationtime is distinction between them can be blurred:
dangerous and inappropriate from fire-fightingaspects. • property protection mainly relying on fire-fighting
Eachassessmentfora suitabledesign fire sizeshould rely
onthe effectivenessofextinguishingsystems or on the • operations,
property protection mainly relying on effectivenessof
most likely assumptionthat the fireis controlled byfire- extinguishingsystems.
fightingoperations and cannotgrowfurther.
Forsteady-statefires, whicharederived from statistics 12.2.2.3aPropertj'protectürnrelyingonfire-JIghtingoperations
(eg>90% offires have notbeenlarger thana specified In this case a SHEVSis supposed to support fire-fighting
areawhenthe fire brigade started asuccessfulattack on operationsby removing smokeand heat in sufficient
them) orfrom experiments whichprovide evidencefor amounts for fire-fighterstobe able to:
the effectiveness ofextinguishingsystems,the • enterthe compartment on fire,
12 SHEVS and thefire services 75
•• theitlocation ofsothe
identifl,i stillrelatively small fire, and But the temperature rise duetothe fact that heatis not
extinguish quickly that therest ofthe exhausted from a closed space also enhances fire spread
compartmentremains undamaged. and, intheabsence ofsprinklers,can leadto early
flashover.
This means that a SHEVShas tobe designedtocreate a Therefore, ifthe interveningtime ofwell-equipped fire
smoke-freelayerin the fire compartment.This smoke- servicescan be expected to be reasonably short(eg 10
freelayer neednotbeprovided from thevery beginning minutes afterbeingalerted by asmoke-detection
ofsmokeproduction (as mentioned above)butmust be system),the maximum benefit ofaSHEVS creating a
availableforfire-fightingoperations. This consideration smoke-free layercan be obtained ifitis actuated on
onlyhasan influenceon the time for actuating the smoke detection before the fire-fightersarrive (aslongas
SHEVS, but not on the designfire size and the resultsof the design firesize remains manageableforthe fire-
consequent calculationsfor designingthe SHEVS (see fighters).
also section 11.1.3). This is likelyto apply forproperties below'High
Therefore, aSHEVS intended to protectpropertyonly Hazard'risks ('Extra-HighHazard'in older terminology)
by supportingfire-fightingoperationsbycreating a whichareprotectedby sprinklersorfor very low risks
smoke-free layer,willnot needless technical effort put (due to the nature ofthe contents) even ifnot protected
intothe designthanwill systemsfor lifesafety plus bysprinklers.
propertyprotection. Nevertheless,it has tobebornein mind that inthe
A delay in actuating the SHEVSis only tolerable ifthe absence ofsprinklerprotection thedesign firesizes can
temperature rise dueto smokelogging ofthe be larger, often getting beyondmanageable sizesforthe
compartment is notso severethatitmayignite other fire brigade.Wherethis happens,a SHEVSis not auseftil
goods away from the fire's origin,or mayseriously component ofthe fire-preventionconcept and limitation
endanger the building'sstructure. This is unlikelyto ofpropertylosses canonly beachieved by
happenifthe SHEVSisactuatedby a flowswitch in the compartmentation.
sprinklersupply,particularlywherequick-response Ifthe interveningtimeforfire servicesis assessedto be
sprinklersare usedto ensure that the sprinklersystem longer than 10 minutes (for risksbelow HighHazard, for
starts operating as earlyas possible,and wherethat which 10 minutes maybe toolong), firesizes will bemore
operation has the minimum delay dueto heat extraction likelyto growbeyond manageable sizesifno
by theSHEVS. Despite this temperature criterion, extinguishingsystem is used. In thiscase installationofan
caution has to be applied whenconsideringthe adverse extinguishingsystem to control the fireuntilfire-fighting
effectswheresmoke is notremovedfrom thevery early operationsbecome successful, has to be ensured.
stagesofthe fire. Thereis awidespreadbeliefamongst people in the
Ifgoods, contents, liningsorstructure maybe sprinkler world, that this can only be achievedby
destroyed orbecomeunusablebecause ofthe corrosive activatingaSHEVS after sprinklershave come into
and contaminating effectsofsmoke, any designconcept operation. Ithas tobekept in mind, however, that
involvingdelayed response ofaSHEVSis ofminor contentssusceptibleto smoke might notbe protected by
benefit to protectsuchgoods orproperty. Wherethis isa this approach as the compartment could be totally smoke
significantconsideration,actuating the SHEVSon a logged bythe time fire-fightersarrive.Acompronhise
signal from smoke detection canbe recommended. Itis solution (as explainedin section 11.1) could beto activate
also awell-experiencedfact thatit takes a significanttime the SHEVSon a flow-switchinthesprinkler supply
to create asmoke-free layer in an already smoke-logged provided that quick-responsesprinklersare usedas
space, especiallyifnatural throughflow ventilation is mentioned above. This makes itmuch more likely that
used. Forthis reason, the actuation ofa SHEVS on sprinklerswill be ableto control thefire until
detection ofsmoke is also preferable for assistingfire- extinguishingiscompleted by fire-fighters.Thiswill only
fightingoperations in these circumstances.SHEVS apply for risksbelowthe (Extra-)HighHazardcategory.
designedto open on a signalfrom smoke detection Another frequently heard argument for actuating a
support fire-fightingobjectiveIII,which isto separate SHEVSmanuallyisthe beliefthatfalseactuatingby the
valuableitems (egworks ofart, documents, data, etc.) smoke-detection system causesopening ofnatural vents
before being affectedbythe fire and/or itsproducts and leads to property damage dueto rain, snow or
(smokeand heat). freezing.This problemmust not be solvedby rely[ngon
The reasonswhythe actuation ofa SHEVSshould be manual actuation ofthe SHEVS,butinstead by making
delayed until the actuation ofsprinklers,or should be thedetectionsystem more sophisticated andreliable.
deferred until the arrival offire-fightersoften can be
considered to be asfollows. 12.2.2.3bPropertyprotectionrelyingon effectivenessof
A SHEVSencourages thedevelopment ofafire by extinguiththgsystems
ensuringthat the firehas asupply ofair. Therefore, it Wherethereareadverse effectsfor fire-fightingas
should only be actuated ifextinguishingorcontrolling outlinedin sections 12.3 and 12.4 below, orlong
operations eitherby fire-fightersorby extinguishing interventiontimesforfire servicesso thatsuccessfulfire-
systemsare already inprogress. This is true in principle. fightingis onlypossiblewith the support ofextinguishing
76 Design methodologies for SHEVS
13 Selection of equipment
equipment serves adualrole. That is, whereit fulfils a ofthe SHEVSisto protectlifesafety (egby protecting
non-fire role in everydayuse, and changes to afire-role as escape routes), and that it should be the responsibilityof
an integral part ofthe SHEVSfollowingdetection ofthe an enlightened buildingmanagement to carry outsuch
fire. Examples would include doorswhichalsoserve as tests. It has already been noted in section 13.1 that such
inlets for replacement air; and ducts which serve the tests are unlikelyto bedone ifeachtime thereis a
HVAC/ACMVrole untilthey are needed as part ofthe significantcost (intime, effort,or inconvenience).
SHEVS. These dual-role itemsfacethe challenge of Consequently it is felt thatall ventilators specifiedfor
having to meet all the requirements ofnormal use, as well use in a SHEVShaving alife-safetyrole should be
asallthe appropriate requirements for thefire protection capable ofbeingclosed automatically,on receipt ofa
application.In otherwords,the specifier(and the signalfrom the control panel. Thetimetakento close is
regulator) must be satisfiedthat those items are 'fit for less critical,and could wellbelonger than one minute.
purpose' in both roles. An additionalfeature essentialto allventilators except
It is notthe purpose ofthis chapterto be a those intended for use in manuallyinitiated systems,is
comprehensivelydetailed guide to allofthe requirements that theventilator should open (ie should 'fail-safe')
ofevery last nut, bolt, and wire usedin a SHEVS.Neither whenever there is a loss ofpowerto the usual opening
is it an attemptto describe eachtest method. What mechanisms.
followsis instead intended tobe an indication,for some
ofthemajorcomponents ofa SHEVS, ofsome ofthe 13.2.2 Coefficient of performance
factors whichneed to be considered ifthe installed Thepurposeofa natural ventilator istoallow smoky
system isto be 'fitforpurpose'. gases toflowthroughitfrom insidethe buildingto the
outside.Its abilityto do this obviouslydepends on the
13.2 Natural smoke and heat exhaust sizeofthe opening(known asthe geometric free area)
and on the resistanceto flow ofthat opening including
ventilators
any turbulence-generatingfeatures within it (egsprings,
13.2.1 Time takento comeintofull operation rods,louver blades,etc.). The geometric free areais easily
WhenaSHEVSisrequiredto come intooperation, itwill determined by simple measurement ofthe sizeofthe
usuallybeanurgentneed.Part ofthe designand opening inthe plane wherethe ventilator is fastened onto
specificationprocess should be to decidewhichsequence thebuilding.Anolderbut less usefuldefinitiontookthe
ofoperation ofthe differentitems ofequipment will be narrowest part ofthe flow-path through the ventilator.
needed so as to avoid one interferingwith another. At the This canbe difficult tomeasure, and whencombined
same time, wecan recognizethatveryfew real fires are with the measured coefficientofperformance (see
likelyto grow explosively, and iftheydo then a SHEVSis below) leads to the same practicalresult. The only
not appropriate to cope with anexplosion!It seems a significance ofthe olderdefinitionshould be that
reasonable compromiseto suggest that the entireSHEVS everyone concerned should be aware ofthe possibilityof
should come intoitsfullyoperating statein atime ofnot confusion!The resistancetoflow isless easy, and requires
more than one minute from the initiatingsignalbeing atest ofthe entireventilator (except wherethere is a
generated (whether byhuman orautomatic means). sufficientcollection ofexistingmeasurement dataon
Natural smokeand heat ventilators only operate to similarventilators for an assessmentto be made—
pass smoky gaseswhenthose gasesbuild up beneath possibleon only afew ventilator shapes).
them.Therewill be no clear adverse effectson the rest of Suchtests canbe done bydrivingair at ambient
the system iftheytakeas long to open fullyas the restof temperature through the ventilator bya measured
the system takes to deploy intoits fire-operationalstate. pressure difference,orbyusinga thermally buoyant hot
It follows thatit is reasonableto allow a maximumtime of gas layer to simulatethe firecondition. Current tests use
one minute for the ventilator to open fullyto itsfire-open the former method, while the latterhasbeen
position. demonstrated experimentallyas being feasible.We then
This maximum time should apply,however, regardless havethe followingrelationship:
oftheforces or temperatures towhichtheventilator
mightbe exposed,and so this maximum time must be Ap=
''V2
satisfiedas a 'pass' criterion in allthosetest methods for 2
2(CA) (13.1)
otherparameters wheretheventilator is required to open
as part ofthe test. Most ventilators availableon the where:
market open in much shorter times than oneminute, so = pressuredifferencebetweenthefront ofthe
this isnot an onerous criterion. ventilator (ie insidethe building) and the back
It is notadirectlife-safetyissue ifthe ventilator cannot (ie outsidethe building) (Pa),
close as quickly.One should,however, consider whether =
p density ofthe gasespassing through theventilator
the ventilator will befaced with a requirement for (kg m3),
repeatedfunctionaltesting duringits installedlifetime.It V = volume flow ratethroughthe ventilator (m3 sd),
is theopinion oftheauthors that suchregular and = geometric free areaofthe ventilator (m2),
frequent testing is highly desirablewherever the purpose C = coefficient ofperformance.
13 Selection ofequipment 81
Note: The product is know as theAerodynamicFree Theventilatormustnot cause the hot gasesemitted
Area. from it toplayonthe roofsurfaceoutsidethe building
Thecoefficientofperformance is also known asthe since this could cause secondary fires. Similarly, the
dischargecoefficient. It isa measure ofthe efficiencyof outsideofthe ventilatorbodyshould notbecome
the ventilator's design,highervaluesindicatinga higher sufficiently hotto threatenthe rooftowhichitis fixed.
efficiency. Ausefulbenchmark is the well-known value
for a simplehole in an infiniteplanebaffle, for which 13.2.4 Openingunderload:snow
C,=0.6.Carefulshaping oftheflowpath throughthe Snow comes inmany differentforms,depending on the
ventilatorwill leadtohighervalues,while turbulence- proportions ofice, air, andliquidwaterinthe mixture.In
generating devicesinthe gas-stream will reduce the general,older, more compacted snow willbe denser,
value. although partiallythawedsnow can alsobeverydenseas
It is known (see egsection 10.8) that a side-wind waterdisplacestheoriginallytrapped air.
blowing across the outletfrom the ventilator can increase Withthepossibleexception ofventilators designed for
C
the flow resistanceand leadto a reduction in the value. manual triggering,weexpectthata SHEVS will come
Thebetter testmethods include a wayofmeasuringthis into operation very early in the fire. It followsthatit isnot
effectbyrotating theventilator in a selectableairstream reasonableto dependonthe heatofthe fire gasesinside
(simulatingthe side-wind) while the aerodynamicfree the buildingmelting enough snow above the ventilator
areais being measured. Such tests usuallyrequire that the forittoopen despite a relativelyweak opening
worst (ie the lowest) valueof correspondingto the mechanism.
worst combination ofside-wind speedand direction must Therequirement fora natural ventilator is thatit
be cited bythe manufacturerand/orsupplier as beingthe should be able to open successfully, evenwhenit is
appropriate valueforuse indesign calculationssuch asin covered on the outsideby alayer ofsnow.The depth and
section 5.11. density ofthat snow will vary with the location andthe
It is commonly foundthatventilators having kerbs (see season,as wellas being subject to the usual random
section 10.8)and no parts projecting above the plane of chance ofweather. in practice this is not such a problem
the outletopening (ie above thetop ofthe kerb) do not as it might seem becausethose countries andlocalities
suffer adverse problems from side-winds.Ventilators wheresnow loads might be aproblemwill already have
having a singleflap which rises above the opening in the theirown Codes forstructural loading with designlimits
fire-operational position can cause catastrophic problems for theexpected snow loads.Theselimits cansimplybe
to the coefficientofperformance,with or withouta kerb adopted forspecifyingthe appropriate load Classfor
present. ventilator operation, as proved byan appropriate test.
Note that ifa ventilator is designed tobe mounted on
13.2.3 Resistance to heat sloping surfacessteep enough that snow cannot build up,
Anatural smoke andheat exhaustventilator canbe thereis no needto testforthis parameter.Aminimum
expected to experience exposuretothehotgases passing slope of45° should ensure thatnosnow will build up on
through it. In general,however, one doesnot expect the the slope.
operating mechanismsto be ableto surviveexposureto Onthe otherhand, theremaybeobstacles on a roof
heat— theventilatorwill be expected to openwhile the (egstructures for lift machinery,chimneys)whichcan
firehas onlyjustbeen detectedand is still small. The cause considerablyhigh and dense packagesofsnow due
exceptionto this concerns ventilatorsdesigned to beused tosnowtransport bywind.In theselocations ventflators
in applicationswherethe SHEVSwillbetriggered must not be installed.
manuallyrelativelylate in the fire. These latter ventilators
must beableto withstand considerable exposureto heat 13.2.5 Opening underload: side-wind
while remaining closed,andyet stillbe able to open It has beenstated in section 13.2.2thatparts ofa
satisfactorilywhencalled uponto do so. Relativelyfew ventilator whichproject intoa side-windblowingacross
existingdesignsare suited tothis combinationof the ventilator canaffectthe measured coefficientof
circumstances. performance.Ifsuch apart (eg aflap,or the dome ofa
Withthis exception noted, we canstatethat the domelight) hasto open againstthe wind direction,it may
important heat-resistingproperties ofaventilator should bepossiblefor the force ofthat wind to prevent it from
all apply whenthe ventilator is already open. opening fully (even ifthereis alockingmechanism to
Theventilator must not reduce its aerodynamicfree holdthe partin place onceithasbeenfullyopened). It
areawhensubjectedto a throughflow ofhotgases. This follows that the ventilatorshould have been testedwith a
must be demonstrated by the test method. real or simulatedside-windto ensure thatits opening
The ventilator must not allowhot or burning parts or mechanismis strong enough to function properly.One
flamingdroplets to fall ontopeople orobjects belowthe canexpectthatthis is nota problem for any ventilator
smokelayer since this could result in injury or in withoutany moving parts projecting intothe external
secondary fires. This requirement also concerns the wind.
safety offire-fighters,who should notbe endangered by,
forexample,hotplasticpartsfallingon them.
82 Design methodologies for SHEVS
13.2.6 Low ambienttemperature 13.2.8Abilityto resistwind suction
Whenanypieceofmachinery is cooled,parts made of Natural ventilators should neverbeexpected to operate
differentmaterials contract at differentrates, and in positionswheretheymay be exposed to wind-induced
lubricating oils and greases tend tobecomemoreviscous. overpressures.It followsthat theywill only normally
This is obviouslyalsotrue for natural ventilators.Thereis experience wind-induced suctions.Ifa ventilator can be
a chance that abadly designedventilator, ifcooled forced openby thesewindforces whenit is supposed to
sufficiently, may require a much larger force than usual to remain closed (ie whenthere is no fire),itwill become an
open to the fullyfire-operationalposition. Thereis evena embarrassment to the building'smanagement and there
chance thatmoving parts ofthe openingmechanism is astronglikelihood that it will be fastened shut
mightfail to clear other parts ofthe ventilator,which permanently.
mightthen jam.Ofmore specificconcern to those Natural ventilators should be ableto withstand the
ventilators powered byhigh-pressuregas cartridges is the largest suction force expected for the location on the
fact that the pressure in the cartridgewill fall at lower building,and forthatbuilding'sown location. Wind
temperatures. forceshavebeen well researched over the years in view
Itwill usuallyneedaconsiderable dropin temperature oftheir importance forstructural windloadinginthe
before these factorsbecomeimportant. Lowvaluesof designofbuildings91'921, and appropriate values ofwind
ambient temperature occur in many northerncountries, force canbe adopted from these sourcesto identifythe
and evenin northern Scandinaviathere are some appropriate Classofventilator.Itis important that any
unheated buildingsusedfor storage. ventilator specifiedhas been tested for its abilityto
Consequently,depending on the climaticconditions remain closed underthe applicationofthe appropriate
expected forthe localityofthe building,the specifierand simulatedwindibrce.
regulator should satisfythemselves that the selected
ventilators are capable ofopening satisfactorilyat the 13.2.9 Abilityto resistrain penetration
lowest temperature likelyto be experienced. ManyapplicationsofSHEVSwill be in circumstances
wherethe ventilatorsmust not allow any rainpenetration
13.2.7 Reliability in normal everydayuse. This doesnot matterduringthe
Anyventilator must be made ofmaterials expected to emergency circumstancesofa real fire, but one does not
keep theirproperties for the expected lifetimeofthe want theventilators to be covered over bysome sortof
SHEVS.This is primarilya matter for designby the fabricto stop rain penetration (as has happened). It
manufacturer. follows that the abilityofaventilator toresist rain
Perhaps more important istheneed to be surethatthe penetration can have safetyimplications,as well asbeing
SHEVSwillworkwhenneeded, however many years practicaland cost-related.
might have passed since installation.This implies aneed Anadditional feature whichcanbeconsidered for
for regular maintenance by appropriately skilled ventilators intended to be usedfor day-to-day comfort
personnel, perhaps most often satisfiedby some form of ventilation is arain sensor,whichautomaticallyclosesth
regular servicecontract. Wherethere is a high ventilatorswhena sensitivesurfacedetects water. It is, of
dependence on successfuloperation, suchas wherethe course, necessaryfor the rain sensor to beexcluded from
purpose ofthe SHEVSis to protectlife safety,it will thecontrol algorithm whenafire isdetected.
usuallybedesirableto havea regular programme of
functionaltestingaspart ofthe responsibilityofthe 13.3 Poweredsmoke and heat exhaust
building'smanagement,in order to identifyfailures as ventilators
theyoccur and to replace faultycomponents.
Whereversuchaprogramme isenvisaged,itwill be 13.3.1Time takento comeintofull operation
necessaryto specifyventilators (and other equipment) As fornatural ventilators,powered smokeand heat
whicharedesignedto survivethe number ofopen/close exhaust ventilators (almostalways this means fans,
cycles expected over the lifetimeofthe installation.This although other devicesare possible)must fit intoa
reliabilityshould have been confirmedby arepeated- SHEVSdesignwhichallowsthe entiresystem to come
operation test, wherethe ventilator's own opening and intofulloperation quicklyoncethesystem has been
closingdevices havebeen used(perhaps with aseparate initiated.
external sourceofpower) for that number ofcycles.For The only complicatingfeature withfans is that they
example,ifthe expected programme isforweekly usuallyhave amuchlarger starting current than when
operation over a20-year lifespan,the minimumnumber running atfull speed, and this often requires that the fans
ofcyclesbecomesmorethan 1000. Ifthe ventilator is bestartedin sequence,ratherthanall at the same time. In
intended to be usedfor day-to-day comfort ventilation, orderforthe entiresystem to be operating within one
closingwhenever itrains (as is one applicationin minute,this means thatindividualfans haveto bequicker
practice) the minimum number ofcycles can be much in running upto Eill speed. Amaximum timeof3O
greater still. secondshasbeen suggested as being appropriate,and
should represent the 'pass' criterion in all testsof
individualfanswhichinvolvesfurtingthe fan.
13 Selection ofequipment 83
13.3.2 Resistance to heat 13.3.5 Low ambienttemperature
Inthesame wayasthe natural ventilator,the fan must be Theproblemfacing afan in low ambient temperatures is
able to continueworking for long enough forthe SHEVS essentiallythe same as for natural ventilators.The
to achieve its designpurposes,whenexposed to the solution is alsosimilar,in thatthe ventilator should be
expected gas temperatures passingthroughit. The design shownby asuitabletestto beableto operate fullyin less
conditionsforthe exhausted gasescan vary from below than30 seconds in ambient temperature conditions
100 °C toflame temperatures, depending on the purpose appropriate to the location ofthe building.
ofthe design. Consequentlymosttest methods will
identifyclasses,eachofwhich isacombination ofgas 13.3.6 Reliability
temperature and exposuretime. Examples include Thesame argumentsinfavourofregular functional
'200 °C for 2 hours', '300 °C for 1 hour','600 °C for testingapply to fans asto natural ventilators when usedin
1 hour', and many more. In practice, different aSHEVS.Itfollowsthatthe fan should havebeentested
combinations have beenrequiredby differentregulatory for an equivalentnumberofstart/stopcycles compared
authorities in differentcountries.Thereis noapriori withthenatural ventilator,for asimilaruse.
universally correctcombination,but the choice should be
dictated by the designcalculationswith ofcourse a good
13.4Automatic smoke curtains
safety margin for the time inview ofthe usual
uncertainties in time-dependent aspects ofthe design 13.4.1 Time to deployto the fire-operational position
calculations. Automaticsmokecurtainsservetwo mainroles.They
Othersecondary aspectscanbeimportant, eg the canprovide partofthesmoke reservoir's containing
external casing ofthe fan should notbecome hot enough boundary, or they can channel the smokeflow while the
to igniteanythingin contact, andwherea separate smoke is en route tothe reservoir.Ifthe SHEVSis to
coolingair supply isusedfor the motor it should notbe reachits full operating condition in one minute, thenthe
hotenoughto ignite (or dischargedin aplace where curtainscan takeupto that one minute to deploy.
ignitionofany)nearby materialsmightbepossible.
13.4.2 Speed offall of bottombar
13.3.3 Opening underload: snow Ifa curtaindeploys too quickly,itsbottombarcanreacha
Manysmokeexhaustfansare mountedwith their relatively high velocity and represent adanger eitherto
exhaustspointingupwards. Sometimestherecan be someone whose head is inthe way, or to the fixings
otherdevicesto close theexit from the fan.Someofthese holding the curtain tothebuilding'sstructure ifthe
maysimplybe flaps whichareheldopenbythe force of curtain reaches its full extension and stops withajerk.
the exhausted gases. Others maybe similar to the Thecurtain needstobedesigned in sucha waythatitwill
automaticallyopening natural ventilator mechanisms. notdamageitself even ifthe designcalculationsof
Forallofthese thereis thepossibilitythat snow may section 5.8 leadto the specificationofaveryheavy
accumulateonthe exhaust ofthe fan, or even fillthe bottom bar. Inmany designsthis is achievedwith a
throatofanunprotectedfan. As stated in section 13.2.4, frictionbrake, and with the curtain fallingunderitsown
one cannot dependonthe heat ofthefiregasesto melt weight.It is important that the test on the curtain allowed
thesnow —theSHEVSmust operate earlyinthe fire for the heaviest weights which might occur in the design
whenthe gasesbeingexhausted willbebarely above ofthebuilding'sSHEVS. Onecannot simplyexpect a
ambient temperature. curtain mechanism that worked with alightbottom bar
Thesnow load whichthe fan must overcome canbe to be equallysuccessfulwith aheavy bar.
selected in the same wayas fornatural ventilators (see Themaximum allowablespeedto avoid injury to
13.2.4 above), andmustbeappropriate forthe location of people is more difficult to assess. Many curtainswill beso
the building.Theselected fanfor any applicationshould designedthat they never reach head height, and so this
havebeentestedandpassed in aClasssuitable forthat criterion is notrelevant to them.Othercurtains, suchas
location. thoseintended to close offa higher storeyfrom an
atrium, carry agreaterrisk. Thereis no clear guidanceon
13.3.4 Opening under load:wind howtotackle this problem. Beingstruckbyaheavy bar
Fansarecommonly specifiedwherewind overpressures travellingateven 1 m could be dangerous.Perhaps the
areexpected onthe roofofbuildings.Sometimesthese bestcompromise isto allow the curtain to fallatupto
pressures canbelarge.Fans fitted withdevicesto close 1 m s1, but to designthe positions ofthesecurtains in
the exhaust opening whenthe fan is not in usewill need order to minimizethe exposureofpeopleto this risk.
to be able to overcome thedynamic pressuresofthe
wind.Wherethis isrelevant to aSHEVS design,the fans 13.4.3 Resistance to high temperature
must be specifiedasbeing able to open to the filly It is generallytruethat smoke curtainsshould be ableto
operating position inless than 30 seconds againsta load survivethe temperatures towhichtheywill be exposed,
simulatingthe wind pressure. as predicted bythedesign oftheSHEVS. Thatis, the
curtain should beabletocontinue to fulfil itsfijnci:ion as a
barrier to the movement ofsmoke.It doesnot matter
84 Designmethodologies for SHEVS
14 Installation
provision,mustbe connected to the emergency back-up is suggested hereinthat the pragmatic approach canbe
power supply. adopted ofassumingthatthe total areaofall suchgaps
Wheninstallingsmokecurtains and particularly may not exceed 1% ofthe total curtain surface.
automatic retractable curtains, special attention needsto These gap sizesare sufficiently smallthatthey arevery
be givento the maximumgap betweenfabricand sensitiveto the detail and quality ofthe work ofthe
structure, and betweenadjacent curtains whereseparate installers,indicatingthe essentialtaskofthe co-ordinator
curtains are combined to form alongrun ofcurtain, when in checkingthat installationhas beendone satisfactorily.
inthe deployed position. Ideally thereshould be no gaps Other important decisionsrequiredoftheinstaller
at all.This is notpracticable,although whereadjacent concerns the specification,design, location, and
curtainsform a straight run it is possibleto overlapthe ergonomic layout ofcontrol panels, bearingin mind the
curtains,and to clip togetherthe bottombars, in a way requirements ofthe Fire Serviceas well as ofthe
whichminimizesthe leakage gap betweenthesheetsof building'smanagement.Somefurther detailsare included
fabric. It is more difficult to reduce the size ofthe gaps in Chapter15.
betweenthe edge ofa curtain and the adjacent structure. Lastly,and very importantly,theremust be a set of
It is moredifficult still toreducethe gap size wherethere detailed engineeringdrawings (the Detailed Engineering
is ajunctionbetweentwocurtains whicharenot aligned, Plan) showing the complete SHEVSinstallationas well
although inthis case the effectsofbuoyant deflectionof as ofthe related systems. These latter canbe.expected to
the curtains in opening upthe gap can be reduced by include the sprinklerand smoke-detection systemsin
using aheavier bottombar. mostcases, and should also indicateall the control
Thelarger the gap the more smoke willleakthrough, dampers in the HVAC/ACMVsystem whichhave arole
and the worse the effectwill be on the nominallysmoke— to play during afire. ThisPlan should be prepared in
freeside. It is possible,thoughdifficult and beyond the advance ofany actual installationofequipment, and
scope ofthe current book,toestimate the movement and should be revisedduringinstallationso that it is at the
rate ofbuild-up ofsmoke onthe side supposedly clear of end an accuraterepresentation ofwhathas beenfitted
smoke.The problem iscomplex, and depends on the air intothe building.These drawingsoughtto be made
movements and on the volume ofthe space the leakage of availableto the FireServiceaswell as tothebuilding's
smokeis entering, as both factorsinfluencethe dilution of management, togetherwiththe SHEVSDesign
thesmoke. What is safein onecircumstancecanbe documentation. It is cruciallyimportant that these
dangerous in another. Atthetime ofwritingthereis no drawingsshould be updated whenever any changes are
consensus on the safe limitsto suchgaps, although it made to the system duringthe building'slifetime.
89
15 Acceptance testing
(commissioning)
•Airflowmeasurementsforpowered ventilators
Simultaneousopening ofventilators and air inlet
•be manufacturedto an appropriate standard or
recognized equal international or national standards
devices whereappropriate and available.
•Eventualpneumatic leakageswheresuch power •havebeencalibrated by a recognizedtestingor
suppliesare used calibrationlaboratory not more than threemonths
••
Reaction ofautomatic andmanual controls priorto the dateoftest. The calibrationcertificate
Start-up time ofthe emergency power supply provided bythelaboratory should beavailableduring
•
Behaviourofthe automatic smoke curtains the test.
• Perform
supply.
the electricalcheckasper testprocedures for
•
Control and actuation check
Check thatall systems automaticallyactuate and
remain in operation until reset bythe testers, either
fan and motorized damper.
• operational positions.
Should therebe a failure ofthe supply make-up fans Itemstoinclude in a running checkrecord
•
(where includedinthe design) then only the supply Recordsofpressure testing during construction
system must shutdownandallsmoke andfire dampers • Make,serial no.typeand owner ofall instruments used, together
with acopyofthe calibration certificates
on the supplyductmust returnto the design position.
Theexhaust system shall continue to operate. •• Actual measurementstaken
16 Maintenance, management
and re-testing
Whatever the basic objectiveofthe SHEYS, itwillbe moreappropriate totest it once a month. It maybemore
intended to thnction properly whenthe fire happens. appropriate for systemsintended forpropertyprotection
Fires are essentiallyinfrequent events,whichcan occur in to be testedonceayearin some cases.It can be expected
a randomway. It isvery unlikelythat thefirewill happen that the RegulatoryAuthorities havingresponsibilityfor
immediatelyafterthe system has been installedand a buildingwill have a strong interest inthefrequency of
successfullydemonstrated towork. Years might pass functionalre-testing, especiallyifthe SHEVSis intended
before the system is called upontowork, andthen it is to protectthelivesofthe public.
criticallyimportant that the system doesindeed work as The building'smanagement will find theirtask much
designed. easier ifthey have been provided with fulldocumentatioi'
Buildings will not remain static inthe intervening summarizingthe designconcepts, in all the different
years, andthe usual forcesofcorrosion and decay can be scenariosconsidered, aswell as the 'Detailed engineering
expected to operate. Itfollowsthen, that aswith any plans' and documentation recommended tobe provided
otheractive system involvingmachinery,thereis a need bythe installer in Chapter 15. It isalso important that the
forthe system to be maintained and servicedduringthese key individualin the building'smanagement should be
years.This places a major responsibilityonthe building's familiarwith this documentation,and should understand
management. theideas involved.These documents, takentogether,
A regular checkon the system is essentialto ensure form the basis ofa'log book' forthe SHEVS, and could
that itwill operateas designed,ifneeded. Also, usefhllybewidened to include all other aspects offire
intervention oftrained staffis sometimesbeneficialor safety,although that goes beyond the scope ofthe
even necessaryto achieve satisfactoryevacuation ofthe current report.
occupants inthe eventofafire. For example,calculations The manager's taskwill alsobe eased ifthe installerha
done at FRS L1001 haveindicated thatthe presence of provided a 'maintenance file' as part ofthe logbookin
trained staffto help withevacuation is ofgreatbenefit in which the management can record all maintenance,
large single-storeybuildings.It is difficult to ensurethat modifications,tests andtheir results,etc.,duringthe
thereis acontinual training programme, particularly building'slifetime.
whenthe 'ownership' ofabuildingchanges. The maintenance programme canbe subdividedin
The bestwayto confirmthatthe SHEVS is workingas differentsections,in directrelation to the frequencyof
intended is to generate afire-detection signal (egby checking.Notethatthe frequenciessuggestedhere are
blowinga smallamount ofsmoke intoa smokedetector) intended to beillustrative, and are certainlynot intended
and confirmingthat all the devicessupposed to operate to beuniversalfor all applications!
actuallyhave operated satisfactorily. Ifthis is done
regularlyitis more likelythat anymechanical or Basic functional check (once a month)
electricalfailureswillbeidentified in time for the fault to • The component parts oftheSHEVS areoperated and
be corrected. It is also more likelythat anypoor people can see,hear or smellmalfunctioningparts:
maintenance will be identifiedintimeto becorrected. pressured air leakagesare quitecommon, a rusty spring
The optimum extentand frequency ofregular re- canprevent natural ventilators from closingagain.
testing ofthesystem will inevitablydependon
circumstances.Systemshaving a crucialroleinprotecting
• All defectiveparts must be repaired or replaced
immediately.
life safetyoughtto be testedmuch morefrequentlythan
those whichhave no suchrole. Even wherelife safetyis Maintenance programme (oneper 6 months)
concerned, the frequencyoffunctional re-testing may •On thebasis ofa maintenance checklist,all moving
vary. For example,itwould bedesirableto check the partsoftheinstallationwillbelooked at andreplaced
operation ofaSHEVS in a largeshopping complexat
least once aweek, whereas in an office buildingit may be • where necessary.
Special attention is givento corrosion,mechanical
16 Maintenance,management, re-testing 93
damage,penetrations, blocked activators,overheated thatthe usermust verifythroughthe years whetherthe
electricalparts. installedsystem is stillcapable ofdealingwith areal-fire
• All parts are cleaned andrelabelled wherenecessary. situation.
It is usuallyeasy to recognizewhenamajor structural
Full functionaltest(once per year) modificationto abuildingwill influencethe functioning
After the maintenance tour, afunctional check must be ofa SHEVS.Forexample,changing a workshop intoa
worked out, possiblyattendedby a representativeofthe high-rack warehouse willhavebig implicationsforthe
RegulatoryAuthorities,to seewhetherthe installation design parameters ofthe SHEVS. It isless often realized
still complieswiththe acceptance report. thata successionofsmallmodifications,eachone
• This test starts with the triggering ofone or more seeminglytootrivial to matter, can cumulativelyaffect
detectors inthe testedzone and all subsequent the functioningofaSHEVS. Itshould alsoberecognized
automatisms (ie the actions whichfollow that many buildingsspecialistswith noknowledge offire
automaticallywithouthuman intervention) are caneasilyfailto distinguishbetweenwhat is major and
checked out (reactiontime, emergency powersupply whatis minor.Whereas-builtplans,test reports and
unit comingup, openingorclosingofdampers, maintenance programs have beenkept fullyup-to--date,it
lowering ofsmokecurtains, ...). is more likelythat changeswillbecorrectly identified,
and that mistakeswill be more readily noticed and
This test shall be activatedand the equipment resetfor corrected. Notein this context thatthe building's
every smoke control zone. Results should berecordedin managers share withthe RegulatoryAuthorities (inmost
the logbook. countries) the responsibilityforcommissioninga new
SHEVSanalysisand re-designifthe building's
modificationschange the assumptions and conditions
Apartfrom themaintenance programme, a SHEVS whichwere appropriate to the originaldesign.
management program needsto beset up. This means
94 ___ ________
17.1 Mis-location of the point source of a the line betweencolumns.This position hasthe apparent
advantage ofeconomizing on the necessarylengthof
point-source smoke plume curtain, and hence on cost. Unfortunately,wherethe
Someofthe formulaeavailablefor the calculation ofthe columns are rounded orotherwise lackingin parallel
mass ofair entrained intoa smokeplume risingdirectly surfaces,any smalldeflection leads to a rapidly increasing
above a fire are derived for smallfires. When applied to gap betweenthe curtain's edgeand the column's surface,
fires which are not small(such asthose in real fire with consequent smokeleakage pastthe curtain.
scenarios),they require a correction whichtreats the
smoke as thoughit was risingfrom apoint (zero width) 17.3 Installation does not follow design
source at a distancebelowthe real fire which depends on
the actual physicalsize ofthe fire. Severalguidance Itis common for detail designchanges to occur during
documents statethat it is acceptable to ignore this the construction ofbuildings.Apossible consequenceis
correction and to takethe plume height asbeingthe that an initiallycorrectdesignbecomes unsuitable.An
heightofthelayerabove thefloor (orthe base ofthe real exampleknown to the authors is ofsmoke curtainsbeing
fireifdifferent).However, suchan assumptioncan leadto 1.5 m too shortwhenfitted. Itis desirablethatthe fire
an underestimate ofthe mass ofsmoky gases entering the safety system designers be retained bythe buildingdesign
smokelayer.For example,whenthe fire diameter team to comment onall designchanges and to confirm
approaches theheightofrise ofthe smokeplumethe that thefinal installedsystem fulfils the designconcept.
mass ofair entrained into the smoke can be
underestimated by more than a factor oftwo. 17.4 Mis-use of computer models
17.2 Inadequatespecification of smoke Every computer model ofany aspect ofsmoke
movement is based on mathematical representations of
curtains theunderlyingphysics.In zonemodels theseareoften
Research by FRS has shownthat the existingdeflection empiricallyderived formulae.In CFD models these are
tests for smoke curtainsare virtuallymeaninglessin terms more fundamentallybased,solving conservation
ofactual behaviour,and that it is necessary to bring equationstypically for mass,momentum, enthalpy, etc. It
smoke curtainsintothe designprocess97,usingthe is often forgotten thatthe equations expressing
procedures given inAnnex C. It is necessary tospecify turbulence in current commercialCFD models are also
thecorrectcombination ofcurtain materialweight and partlyempirical.
bottom bar weight to ensure that the curtain deflection Empirical relationshipsofwhatever sortall share the
remainswithin acceptable designlimits for the particular common feature that they have been developed to fit a
application.In general, the hotter and deeper the smoke specificrange ofexperimental circumstances.They may
layerbecomes, then the heavier the curtain and/or not be as accuratefor othercircumstances outsidethat
bottombar must be. This inturn canrequire major range. This affectsthe reliabilityofvalidation ofthe
differencesin the components, egthecurtainmightneed model: within the appropriate rangesa model can be
stronger motors, stronger brakes and stronger correctly shown to match reality — but outsidethe
attachments tothebuilding. appropriate ranges ofparameter values the same model
Specificationofa smokecurtain which istoo lightfor cangive grosslyincorrect answers. It is never simply
theapplication canresult inexcessivedeflection,with enough to note thata model 'hasbeen validated'.
accompanyingrise ofthe bottombar and leakage of One exampleofthis typeofproblem concerns the
smoke past the curtain. expressionfor the fire size at the onset offlashover ina
Another common mistake is to position smoke compartment. Oneofthemostcommoncorrelationsfor
curtains which are lightenoughto deflect appreciably,on this relationship is based onworkby McCaffreyet al981,
17 Common design mistakes 95
and variationson this areusedin designguidance, eg
refs28'291.McCaffreyet al's correlation was derived for a
17.5 Mistaken perceptionsof conflict
testroom ofless than 30 m3 in volume,withwindow betweenactive and passivefire precautions
openingswhichwere predominantly tall compared with There often appears tobe awidespread misconception
theirwidth. Itcanbeshownthatvery different thatin some wayactive fireprecautions suchas aSHEVS
relationshipscanbe expected for the firesize at the onset and passivefire precautionssuchas fire-resisting
offlashoverinverylarge rooms havinglarge openingsrc9i. partitions are competing one againsttheother. Such
Anothercommon exampleconcerns the common views can be seen to be the result oftoo narrow a focuson
practice in ZoneModels basedon small-fireplume one partofthe wide range ofmeasures available. Similar
formulaeto defaultthe location ofthe virtualpointsource problems exist inmisconceptions ofthe perceived
to thebase ofthe fire regardless ofthesize ofthe fire (see conflict between differentactive measures (seesection
section 17.1for amore detaileddiscussionofthis error). 11.1,for example,concerningthe interactionsbetween
CFD models dependfor accurate modelling ofreality smokeventilation and sprinklers).
on the correctness ofthe initialand oftheboundary It canbe misleadingto contrast one form offire
conditionsusedto definetheproblem mathematically. protection with anotheras iftheywere completely
These 'input conditions' are essentialto statecorrectly independent ofeachother. In practice, eachsystem
thephysicaland chemicalnature ofthe problem being influencesthe others. It is betterto regard the building
studied, andifthey are inappropriate,theCFDmodel itselfasthe system,withdifferentforms offireprot:ection
will givean inappropriate result.Anotheressentially sharing contributionstowards overall safety. The
mathematical constraint isthatthe computationalmesh importance ofthis cannot be overstated.
size (ie the selected dimensionsofeachelementary In fact virtuallyall formsofsmoke control depend on
'calculationvolume') mustbeappropriate tothe problem aspectsof'passive'fireprotection. Pressuredifferential
being studied. In practice, this means thatthe'solution' to systems aredesigned to protectagainst smokeleakage
the calculationmust be independent ofthemesh size, throughsmallgapsin whatis otherwisepassive
whichcannotbe automaticallyassumedfor all protection enclosingthe escape route. The marketfor
circumstances. fire-resistingmaterials is essentiallyunaffected bythe
Thevalidityofa CFD model for a given application presence ofsuchmethods ofsmoke control. Smoke and
would depend onthe fact thatit incorporates proper heat exhaust ventilationallowstheuse ofspacesmuch
descriptions,throughsubmodels,ofthedominant larger than a conventionalfire compartment. Usuallythis
physical andchemicalprocesses (suchas combustion, isthe result ofusing sprinklersas well.But even forthis
radiation,turbulence, etc.) forthat application.Because casethere are still many requirements for 'passive'fire
ofthe often partially empiricalnature ofthe built-in protection, eg all shop unitwalls exceptthe front, ofshop
submodels,validationofthe CFD model is crucialto units opening onto amall wherea SHEVSis fitted into
ensurethe validityofits submodelsfor aparticular themall, or where smoke exhaust ducts passthrough
application.It follows that a successfulvalidationforone neighbouringfirecompartments. Other examples
applicationwill apply to other scenariosinthe same include:
category ofapplication,but not necessarilyto other •• partitionmembranes,
walls,
categories. Forexample,caremust be takenwhena CFD
modelvalidated for smokemovement is applied to • ceiling
downstandsfor smokereservoirsor smoke barriers.
problems involvingflame spread. In general,one can say
that in view ofthe complex nature ofCFD models, Related 'passive'fire-protection measuresimportant for
knowledge offire science and ofCFD isessentialfor smoke control can also include intumescentseals forfire
'correct' use fora practicalfire application. doors and fire-resistingglazing.
The foregoingparagraphs should notbeseen as an As for all applications,there arethesame requirements
argument againstusing computer models. Many designs for fire-resistingmaterialsto be ableto withstand thermal
would be impossiblewithouttheiruse. Theyshould shocks,to be impermeableto smoke, andto bestable
instead be read as a warning that computer models underdifferentenvironmental conditions includingthe
should notbe used by inexperiencedpeople as 'black abilityto resist humidity, fringal attack,thefreeze—thaw
boxes' alwaysassumedby themto givethe correct cycle,and ageingofthematerials.Ifthe material cracks,it
answer.Itis alwaysnecessaryforthe designerofa could renderthe smokecontrol system unable to prevent
SHEVSto ensurethathe/shehas identifiedwhichmodel thepassage ofsmoke. Alllarger openings,suchas holes
(or models— a designmayrequire the use ofmore than madeforpipes, cables,ducting,etc., must beproperly
one) isappropriate to the circumstancesbeing sealed. This has to be aproperfire and smokeseal,riota
considered. It isalways necessaryfor the designer ofa patchwork usingwhatever materialis left on site
SHEVSto satisfy him/her selfthat the model isbeing (examplesexist ofthe failure offire-resistingwalls
usedwithin its prudentlimits.Andofcourseit is because ofsuch inadequate materials ascardboard and
necessaryforthe Regulator assessingadesignproposal to polystyrenehaving been used to seal holes madefor
become satisfiedthatthe designer ofthe system has cables,pipes, etc. —thiskind offault is seen alltoo often
considered thesefactors. duringpost-fire investigations).
96 __________ _______________
Thefinal decision as to whatis acceptable rests with As the buildingsbecome more complicated,both in
those who are responsiblefor enforcingthe relevant fire size and geometry and alsowiththe introduction ofnew
safetyregulations. In large or complexbuildingsit is innovativematerials andconstruction techniques,
usuallyimpracticaltofollowthe prescriptiveguidelines formulaenormallyusedfor design ofsmoke control
given in the relevant standards and a fire safety systemsbecome less reliableandparticular careis needed
engineeringapproach isneededto achieve a successful in the designprocess.In those scenariositmaybe
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system so that the desirableforthe enforcer ofregulationsto seek asecond
same level ofsafety is accomplished asfor amore opinion from an independent source ofexpertise.Ifthe
conventionalbuildingwithoutthe same amountof buildingis so complex that confidencein the design
compartmentation. process is low then it maybe desirableto do an 'in-situ'
The successor failureofthedesign will often depend commissioningfiretest to check the SHEVS designand
on the details.The assumptionsand calculation tofinetunethe system.A further advantage ofsuchatest
procedures whichare correct forone scenario may not be is that it may clearlyshow some implementation faults,eg
correctfor another. It should also beclearlyunderstood whetheradamper in a ducthas beeninstalledsuchthat i
thatthevarious publishedformulaewere derived from opens in the 'wrong' direction in the eventofafire.The
experimentsand maynotbe appropriate whenthe design testinvolvestheuse ofoneor more alcohol fires to
scenario is very different. For example,aformula produce sufficient heat such that the hot buoyant gas
experimentallyderivedfrom a tall and narrow atrium layerflows can bemonitored and the effectivenessofthe
maynotbe suitablefor SHEVSdesign ofa wide atrium SHEVScanbe assessed.Obviouslythe temperature must
with a relativelylow ceiling.Unfortunatelythereis often alsobekept low enough so as notto cause any damage to
confusionaboutthevalidity ofvarious assumptionsand thebuilding.Non-toxic and non-corrosiveoil-mist
calculationformulaeusedin the designprocess theatrical smokemay be injected into the fire plume if
It should be emphasized further that anySHEVS visualizationofthe hot gas layer is desired. Such methods
designprocedure has 'assumptions' built intoit. It is have beendeveloped andusedsuccessfullyin the last few
impossibleto do a smoke-control design from first years.
principleswithoutanyassumptions.Thus, it follows that One otherproblemwith a smoke-control system is
the enforcer ofregulations,and thebuilding'sowneror maintenance and training ofstaffwhere needed. A
developer, should insistthat the designer ofa system regular check on the system is essentialto ensure that it
should make all the assumptions explicit,and should state will operate as designed,ifneeded. Also, intervention by
the sourcesfor methodology and/or data.It is often the trained staffis sometimesbeneficial or even necessaryto
case that the most worrying problemswith adesign arise achieve satisfactoryevacuation oftheoccupants inthe
from unreasonable assumptions.Although itmay eventofafire. For example,calculationsdone atFRS'°°
sometimes be difficult to followthecalculation indicated that the presenceoftrained stafftohelp with
methodology itis usuallypossibleto make a evacuation isofgreatbenefit in large single-storey
commonsensejudgement about the validity ofthe buildings.Itis difficult to ensure that thereis a continual
assumptions. training programme, particularlywhenthe 'ownership' of
a buildingchanges.
97
19 Acknowledgements
Theauthors ofthis bookwould like to record their Theywould alsolike to statetheirappreciation cfthe
indebtednesstoDr G 0 Hansell, co-author ofDesin work ofCEN/TC191/SC1andoftherelated 'Mirror
approachesforsmokecontrolinatriumbuildizgsL'31, an earlier Groups' in the national Standards Institutesinprep:aring
BRE publication,some ofwhose texthasbeen carried thedraftParts ofPrEN12101. Manyideas havedeveloped
forwardintothispresentbook; and toMrJoris Verbeek of andhavebeenclarifiedasaresult oftheirdiscussions.
IFSET for his work on the Figuresand Plates.
98 ______ _____
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101
ofthe
criteria earlier than the 'time required for safety',the
design not accpable.
is
temperature,
external factors suchas wind pressures,snow loads, etc. Carparks Smaller of2.5 m or
fora considerable distance on any lowersurfacesupwind (b) Entrainment in, and flow outof, a side room
ofahigherstructure. Thepossibilityofsnow orice Theplumeabovethe fire is as above,butcan be
affectingthe operation ofthe ventilators must also be combined with the flowofsmoky gasesleavingthe
takenintoaccount whenspecifyingequipment. fireroom intoa single calculation.
(e)Airinlets(including anydoors servingas air inlets) (c) Smoke flowsbeneath a canopyor balcony,
Thesemust allow sufficient replacement air to enterthe approaching a spilledge
buildingtoreplace the gasesbeing exhausted as smoke.If Wherea canopy (or the underside ofa balcony) projects
they areusuallyclosed,theymust open on receipt ofthe beyondthe fireroom's opening,the effectonthe smoke
same signalthatoperatesthe rest ofthe smoke flowatthe spilledge canbecalculated to find the mass
ventilation system.The airspeed throughany inlets also flowrateflowingtowards that edge. Ifthe smokeexhaust
serving as escape doors (acommondesign feature) must ventilationdesign requires that smokebe contained
beless than 5 rn/sto avoid adverse effectson people beneaththe canopy or balcony, andbe prevented from
escaping throughthose doors. All inlet air must bebelow spillingintothe adjacent space, the remainder ofthe
the smoke layer and preferably moving at less than 1 rn/s design calculationis essentiallyas for section B.3.
whenit enters the affectedzone. Powered inlet fans
should never beusedwith powered smokeexhaust fans, (d) Thespillplume
in orderto avoid changing pressureforces on escape The mixingofair intothe spillplume as it risesto meet
doors asthe fire size changes. the buoyant smokelayerunderthe ceilingmust be
calculated,to give the total massflow rateofgas entering
Note: Ifthe provision ofinlet air is inadequate,the entire the smoke layer. Forlife-safetyapplicationsthe heightof
smokeventilation system will be ineffective. thebase ofthebuoyantlayerofsmoky gasesabove the
highest escape route open to the same space as the fire,
(f) Free-hanging smokecurtains must be specified. It is usual to add 0.5 mto the minimum
Wherepresent,these shallallow forthe effectsof valueslisted inTable B1.
buoyancy-induceddeflection away from the vertical,and For temperature control systemsthe temperature of
must meetthe criteria forminimum leakagewheninthe thegases in the smokereservoir (ie in the layer)shall be
deflected position. Notethatthis aspect ofdesign and specifiedand the mass flowentering the layercalculated.
specificationofsmokecurtains hasbeen largely Thecalculationprocedures for the spillplume canbe
overlooked untilrecently, and doesnot feature in any usedtofind theheightto thesmoke layer base.
earlier design guides.Nevertheless, it is clear from Where thereare higher balconies above the spilledge
experiments at FRS971that deflectioncan be a serious the designmust takeintoaccount thebreadthofthe
problemcapable ofjeopardizing the successofthe entire balconies,iethe distance betweenthe edgeofthe balcony
smokeventilation design, especiallyfor lighter and and thewall (or glazedfacade).This affectsthe abilityof
deeper curtains, unless the problemis properly addressed airto move betweenthe plume and the facade,and
by calculation duringthe designofthesystem andby determines whetherthe plume willthrowitselfclear of
specifyingthe equipment to compensate andthus reduce the wall or be pulled backagainst it to smokelog the
theproblemto harmless proportions. higherbalconies.
Annex C: Deflection of
smoke curtains
C.1 Principle
In SHEVSsmoke curtains areusedto create reservoirs
whichwill contain smoke andhot gases.To fulfil that role
theymustresist the sidewaysdeflection causedby the
buoyancy-drivenforces due tohot gases, orthefan-
induced forcesin mechanical exhaust systems.
Iftheydo notresist those forces, gapsmight occur
beneaththe curtain orbetweenthe curtain andthe
building structure,leading to the flowofhot gases from d1
thereservoir intoadjacent areas.
Theoretical andexperimental workhas shown that the
deflectionofasmoke curtain andthe flow ofhot gases C
N
through gapsin itcan berelated to the hot gas layer
contained bythe curtain.
ThisAnnex considers the deflectionoffree-hanging A
curtains only, as those whichare fixed atboth ceilingand
floor and/orsidesare effectivelylocked inplace and will
not be subjectto deflection.The methodofcalculationof
the leakagethroughgaps inthe curtains is validfor all
types ofcurtains. FigureCl Defleclionofa smoke curtainwhichdoes not reach
Free-hanging smoke curtainscan bedivided intotwo the floor
categories:
• those whichact to contain agas layer whichdoesnot
extend below the bottom ofthe curtain (FigureCl) (eg C.2Curtains not reaching the floor
reservoir screens and channelling screens),
• thosewhichfallto floor level and act completelyto Thedeflectionofthe curtain is calculated following
seal areas from asmoke compartment in whichthe gas reference [97] (FigureCl):
layer extends belowthe bottomofthe curtain (Figure
C2) (such as mightbeinstalled along balconies to form d =1.2 p061D
(Ct)
a closed atrium). 3T/(2Mb+MCLC)
Thetypes will bereferred to as those which do notreach
the floor andthosewhichclose an opening, respectively. where:
d = deflection ofthe curtain (m),
Thepressure ofgases acting onthesmoke curtain will p0 = density ofambient air (kgm3),
cause it to deflect from the normal verticallyhanging 01
= temperaturerise above ambient ofthegases in the
position. Thathorizontal deflectionofthe curtain causes smokelayer (°C),
the bottomofthe curtain to rise, whichcould leadto D1
= depthofthegas layer (m),
leakage ofgasunderneath the curtain ifthe rise takes the T = absolutetemperature ofthegas (K),
bottomofthe curtain above thebase ofthegas layer. Mb = mass per metrelengthofthe curtain'sbottombar
Because the curtainsare not rigid, they are alsolikelyto (kgnf'),
bowinuse, like a sail inthe wind. Such bowing will lead M == mass per m2ofthecurtainfabric (kgm2),
to afurther riseofthebottomofthe curtain. L to bottom
length ofthe smoke curtain from top
bar, measured along thefabric (m).
AnnexC: Deflection of smoke curtains 107
o L=zd0+d (C.5)
Theprocedure is:
d0 \Lc 1 assumea valuefor L d0,
2 calculatedusingEqn (C.4),
3 calculateLusing Eqn (C.5).
d1
Repeat steps 1—3withthenewvalueofL, until
C successivevaluesof differby 1% or less.
L
The calculatedvaluefor L must thenbe modifiedby
floor
includinga termto allow forbowing ofthecurtain as for
curtainsnot reachingthe floor,so that:
window
L(fiflal)
= L+ 1.7 (L
—
d0) (C.6)
M =A 352.172gDiO1 (C.7)
l\ T )l T0 )
g
L=D1+d (C.2)
where:
=
Mg mass ofgas flowingthrough the gap (kgs),
Ag areaofthe gap (m2),
==
M = 6Mh (C.8)
d C
12p0O(3D1—2d0)d (C.4)
g
3T1(2Mb+MCLC) where:
whered0 istheheightofthe opening (m) andother
variablesare as definedabove.
M = mass ofgas flowingintogas layer in protected area
(kgsj,
The required curtain length to contain agas layer of =
Mg mass ofgas flowingthroughagap in asmoke
depthD1 is calculatedusing an iterativeprocedure: curtain
(kgs'),
h = height ofrise from the base ofthe hot gas layerin
108 __________ Design methodologies for SHEVS _____
the reservoirto the ceilingin the protectedarea.
NIg o
Note:This equation is derived from a smallnumber of = (K) (C.9)
experiments'°1. It is desirableto extend thestudy further
to confirmthe derived correlation.
where =temperature above ambient ofthe smoke
Acalculationprocedure for thetemperature ofthe gas layerinitiallyforming (ignoringanysubsequent cooling)
layerwithin the protected areais: inthe protected reservoir adjacent to the leakage (°C).
109
UsingEqn (5.7):
Massflowrateofgases approaching spilledge=
29.2 kg/s.
Table D.1 Entrainment intothe example spill plume: Table D.3 Entrainment into theexample spill plume:
BRE_method,_15_m_ceiling ________ Thomas etal (1998) method
Heightofvisible Mass flow rateof Height ofvisible Massflowrateof
smoke base smoky gasesentering smoke base smoky gasesentering
above spill edge smoke layer above spill edge smoke layer
(m) (kg/s) (m) (kg/s)
(b) 11 m ceiling
The resultsofapplying section 6.3.2 (a) and Annex E are
showninTable D.2. D.4 Poreh et al method
Calculationsweredone usingEqns 6.3 and 6.4. Results
Table D.2 Entrainment into theexample spill plume: arelisted in TableD.4, and areplottedgraphicallyin
BRE method, 11 m ceiling FigureD2.
HeightofvisibJe Massflowrate of
smoke base smoky gasesentering Table D.4 Entrainment intothe example spill plume:
above spilledge smoke layer Poreh method
(m) (kg/s) Height ofvisible Mass flowrate of
smoke base smoky gasesentering
2.04 84.3 above spilledge smoke layer
2.83 105
(m) (kg/s)
3.62 124
4.41 146 2 69
5.21 167 4 94
6 189 6 119
8 144
10 170
E
0
0
IL 15
>
0
.0
a)
Co
10
a)
0
E
Cl)
- x BRE-method-iSm ceiling
It) o gRE-method - lim ceiling
.0
(It 5 + Thomas Ctal(1998) method
>
0 0 Poreh etal method
.0
[odiiedThomas)l987)method
It)
0
50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290
Mass FlowRate in Spill Plume (kg/s)
D.5 Thomas(1987) using Poreh method to theThomas (1987) method. It does, however,suggest
thatthis method isnotready yetfor general
calculate A.
Calculationswere done usingEqns 6.5 and 6.6.Results • application.
TheThomas methodwith calculatedusing
(1987) zX
arelisted in TableD.5 and areshown graphicallyin Poreh's method (Eqn isinclose agreement with
6.6)
FigureD2. theBRE methodsthroughout theheightrange.
• The Thomas method
(1998) isin reasonable
Table D.5Entrainment into theexample spill plume: agreement (althoughthe end-entrainment
Modified Thomas (1987)using Porehmethodto calculate A contributionissurprisinglysmall) forlesserheights of
Height ofvisible Massflowrate of rise (perhaps acceptablyso for heightsup to around 4
smoke base smokygases entering m for designpurposes). Thereis a large andgrowing
above spill edge smoke layer discrepancycompared with the BREand the modified
(m) (kg/s) Thomas (1987) methods above this height.
Note: This Annex usesa differentnomenclature to the modificationofthe originaltheoryto include morerecen:
rest ofthisbook:seethe nomenclature listatthe end of workon thermally buoyant horizontal flows271and
theAnnex. adhered (or attached, or wall, or single-sided)
plumes2761 (Figure24a).
The calculationscanbe done using an electronic
E 1 Introduction
calculator havingfrill scientificfunctions.This, however,
FRS has carried out anumberofstudies intothe maybetime-consuming,particularlywherethe designer
movement ofsmokeinbuildings.Part ofthis bookhas wishes tolookata numberofgeometries or conditions.
resulted inthe development ofatheoryby Morgan & Thecalculationscaneasilybeincorporated in a computer
Marshall251 to estimate the amount ofair entrained into program wherefrequent calculationsare required. An
free(ordouble-sided) thermalspillplumes (Figure24b). alternative method to FigureEl isgiven laterin this
Thiscalculation method is important forsmoke-control Annex in order to facilitatesuch programming.
design in that it enables the designer to calculatethe Many ofthe variablesusedin equations in this Annex
required fan capacity or vent areafor asmoke ventilation do not appear in the main bodyofthebook. To avoid
system forlarge undividedvolume buildings(egmulti- unnecessary complicationsfor the reader who doesnot
level shoppingmallsand atria). Anumberofstudies have wish to use this calculationprocedure, thisAnnex is
since been carried outwhichhave resulted in the providedwith a separate listofnomenclature.
———b
a
>,
0
C—.
a.
0—
— .i.
o
a
CCC
000
CCC
EEE
000
FigureEl Graphical representation ofthe theoreticalsolution for a plume issuing from a restrainedsource F < 1
AnnexE: BRE spilplume calculations 113
]
2B
layer ist52: c= (E.12)
— Fe ____
O —0
K
(K) (E.4) PoL[]i32
wherelcQ =0.95 for most typicalflowinglayers.
Greater accuracycan be achievedby calculatingthe
values ofthe profilecorrection factor 1M and KQusingthe
temperature-dependent formulaein52, although this is
usuallyunnecessary for mostpractical designs.
UG
and
- (E.1)
I
Determine the valueof (1g) by usingthe following
E.4.3 Calculate themass flux (Mr) rising pastthevoid procedure (or the alternative procedure ofE.6below):
edge271:
represents a valueon the vertical axisofFigure El.
M3, poWa'(2g )2d 3/2
+M (kgs1) (E.9)
Lookacross to the middle solid curve and findthe
correspondingvalueofIi(uc;) on the other axis.
wheretheentrainment constant a = 1.1.
Note: cC takes sucha large valueas aresult oftreatingall Calculate the transformed heightparameter ofx'
AnnexE: BRE spill-plumecalculations 115
correspondingto the desired plume height (x), noting SMr=4biia XPo (kgs1) (E.26)
thatxmust be setequal totheappropriate effective
heightofrise identifiedin section 6.1 ofChapter 6 ofthis
book. where:
2 x
x/ =—a— (E.17) E= (ba +b) (E.27)
(m)
2
Next calculateA11(u):
(;±u) (m) (E.28)
Al1(v) = (E.18)
[F2(1— F2)]113
Notethatwhile the originalderivation was semi-
and empirical,thistreatmentis equivalentto regarding the
freeends ofthe line plume as iftheywere themselvesline
11(v)= 11(v0)+M1(v) (E.19) plumesoflength2b at eachend, although the
parameter btakes its valuesfrom the properties ofthe
Determine valuesofb, p andu' correspondingto the main line plume itself
calculated valueofT1(n) usingthe followingmethodor an Addthis to theplume entrainment result from E4.5 to
alternativeprocedure which is setoutin E.7below. obtain the total mass flowMrofsmokygases risingpast
11(u) represents a valueonthe horizontal axis ofFigure thespecifiedheight(x), ie:
El. Usingthis valuefindthecorrespondingvalues (from
allthree curves) foru, p and b. Then use the following Mr=mrW + öMr (kg s') (E.29)
equations todetermine u', p and b':
It should benotedthat where both endsofa plume are
u'= u"F'1'3 (E.20) bounded by sidewalls (egas in a shaft)then öMr=0.
1
(E.21) E.4.7 Modifications to the above procedure for single-
(1—F2)1°p' sided27'611(or adhered) line plumes
Convert both the Equivalent GaussianSource and the
b'= b"[F2 (1— F2)]113 (E.22) plume intoacomposite ofa real andanimaginary balf
suchthatthe centreline ofthe composite lies along the
Nextdetermine thecharacteristichalf-width (b) ofthe verticalwallto whichthe plume is adhering. This is done
line plume251atheightx: bydoubling valuesfor B, M (and henceA), and Qfrom
b= b'bg E23" E.4.3)before returning to E.4.4—E.4.6 above. Note that
experiments [61] show thatthe valueofa needed in
Then calculatethe axial vertical velocity component E.4.4—E.4.6 should change valuefrom 0.16 (valid for a
(u) ofthe gases at height x: free- or double-sidedplume) to 0.077 forthe adhered
plume.
usc-
F (E.24) Oncompleting E.4.6, halvethe final valueofmass flow
Mrrisingpast thedesired plume height(x).
Calculate the massflow per unitplume length (mr)
passingthe chosen height25x: E.5 Limits to spill-plume entrainment
calculations
=
Poub[1 '[] (1 +A 2)112]
(kg s1 It isknown from experimental studies with free plumes
thatfor heights ofrisefrom the spilledgeto thevisible
Convert tothetotalmassflow in the line plume smoke layer base ofless than 3 m, no current theory
(ignoringend-effects)bymultiplyingEqn (E.25) by the adequately describes the entrainment. The mass flow
channel width(ie mrW). ratespredicted bytheoryaregreaterthan observed in
practice. Whereheights ofrise less than 3 m occur,this
E.4.6 Calculate the entrainmentöMr125'62 intothe free over-prediction ofentrainment will usuallyprovide an
ends ofthe line plume additionalsafetymargin inthe provision ofsmoke
The widthoftheline plume (and alsoits axial velocity) exhaust ventilation.
canbe taken asbeingapproximatelyconstantfor most of
itsheightas a first-order approximation,and equal tothe E.6 Alternative method for determination
meanofthevalues atthe EquivalentGaussian Source and
atthechosen heightx. Of l(Ug)
The entrainment öMrintoboth endsofthe line plume IfDg 1.549 then Ti(Ug) = (ug_ 0.75)/O.9607
is then623: IfDg 1.549 and 1.242
116 Design methodologies for SHEVS
List of subscripts
o Anambient property
c Variableevaluated athighestpointin a flow
(but outside anyboundary layer)
g A propertyofthe equivalentGaussian source
r Base ofceilingsmokereservoir
w Variableevaluatedinthe horizontal flow at opening
y Variable evaluated invertical flowpast top of
opening
117
Casehistory: Fire atIMF Building, WashingtonDC, in 1977 equipped with springsand release mechanisms.The
Building 13-storey.square-shapedreinforced concrete release devicewas operated by one smokedetector
office buildingwith penthouse, basementand locatedin theatrium roofFusiblelinks onindividual
4-storeyundergroundgarage ventilators were alsofitted. Sprinklerswereprovided at
Atrium Acentrally situated enclosed courtyard created the rooflevel in the atrium andthe buildingwasequipped
atrium. Thewindows otthe offices facingthe with manual fire-alarmpoints and hydrant valveson each
atrium were of6.35mm plate glass floor.
Dateoffire 13May1977
Locationoffire 10th-floor office
The fire
Fire protection At 6.45 pma worker discovereda fire in asmalloffice
(3 mx 4.6 m) onthe 10th floor (seeFigureFl for aplanof
Two ventilationsystemsrecirculated air atthetop ofthe this floor).The Fire Brigadereceived the alarm at
atrium, andatthe base oftheatrium therewas an air- 7.01 pm. On arrival,firemen found fireventing from the
handling unit. Smoke detectors wereprovided at the fans office window into the atrium. The firefloor was hoi: and
ofthe air-handlingunitand were arranged to shut down smoky andthis, coupled with the fact thatthe fire
thefans whenthe detectors activated. Theunits could be involvedaninner office, made locating the fire difficult.
manuallyrestarted and put on exhaust. The general office Thick black smokeissuingfrom the office hadbuiltclown
areawasfedbypenthouse air-handlingunits that could from the roofofthe atrium tobelowthe 10thfloor.
go intoa 'smoke-purge mode' iftheywererunning when Although the smoke detectorhad operated, only two
afire occurred. Noneofthe above systemswas in ofthe sixsmokeventilators had opened. TheotherIbur
operation at the time ofthe fire. had released butthespringshad lostsufficientstrengthto
Theroofofthe atrium was madeofclear plasticpanels. open themfully. These units had to bemanuallyopened
Sixcustom-made smokeventilators were provided in the from outside. Smoke however did not vent effectively
atrium's roofcomprising clear plasticpanels onhinges and atonestage completelysmoke-loggedthe atrium.
Smoke extractors could notbeconnected to the smoke
ventilators and so firemen usedlargeextractors pointed
upward from the atrium ground floor to pull fresh air
from the frontdoorsand pushsmoke upwards andout
throughthe ventilators.Nobuildingengineeringstaff
were availableto advisefiremen on the HVACsmoke-
purgecapabilityuntilmuchlater. It took2—3 hoursto
finally removethesmoke from the atrium.
Conclusions
• The firewasconfined to the room oforigin bythe
closed officedoorandwall construction.
• Windows facingtheatrium above the firefloor were
crackedby heatbut fire andsmoke had not penetrated
otherfloors.
• The temperature ofthe gas layer in the atrium was
insufficienttoactivate the sprinklersin the atrium roof
FigureFl Plan ofthe 10th floor ofthe IMF building showing
locationofthe office where the fire started • Dueto ah insufficiency ofreplacement air the existing
118 Design methodologies for SHEVS
ventilation system designwas inappropriate for • Despite thefact that therewere unprotected openings
onto the atrium, and thatatone theatrium was
clearance ofsmokefrom the atrium, andthe 'dilution' point
ventilation approach usedby the Fire Brigadetook totally smokeAogged,smokedid notmigrate from the
many hours to clear thesmoke. atrium to other parts ofthe building.This indicates
• Ifthis had beenan atrium with balconies providing that the existingventilation arrangements apparently
accessto escape ways, the smokemaywell have 'depressurized' the atrium.
causedserious escape problemsfrom upperfloors.
119
• Figure46.
Withthesevalues of(AC/A1C), D, M1 and 9 calculate
• Followprocedure given in G.3 below.
• Calculate
(eg200—300°C).
the totalsurfaceareaofthe smokelayer(the
inflowvelocitiesdo not in themselvesendanger the
safeuse ofany escape routes away from the atrium(see
atrium surface areain contactwiththe smokelayer section 5.9).
plus the area ofthe layerbase), and determine themass
120 _____ ________ ____________
t
Smoke exhaust
H.1 Assessmentof height ofthe neutral Me (A2Cvi) anatural ventilator)
H.1.iWitha'dominant'air inlet
A 'dominant' air inlet occurswhenthe total areaofinlets Pressurized
belowthe smoke layer's base is morethantwicethe total Height
ofNPP
area ofall openings,other thantheventilators
themselves, above the smoke layer'sbase.
Theheightofthe NPPabove the base ofthesmoke
layeris for natural smokeand heat exhaust ventilators
neglecting wind effects (seeFigure Hi):
Air
inlet
d1Tambr2
x
Tambr + T1 () (Hi)
AiC1
1.1 Whydo hot-smoketests (HST5)? neededto maintain a smokelayerat a given height might
for the latter casebetwicewhat is needed forthe former.
Hot-smoke tests (HSTs) are a form ofon-site acceptance Similardifferencescan occur betweenan adhered spill
testofthe entireSHEVS,in as close a form aspossibleto plume and a free spillplume. Another exampleis where
thefinal installedsystem. Itis not always necessaryto do smoky gasesfrom a side-room (eg from a shop) can
them.HSTs are desirablein the followingcircumstances. spread sidewaysunderneath aprojecting balcony before
• Wherethe designcalculationsfor the SHEVSare spillingintothe atrium, compared with another location
believed tobe inadequate bytheRegulatoryAuthority, wheresuchsidewaysspread cannot occur.
whois neverthelesswillingto grant conditional It is generallytruethat a SHEVSshould be designed to
approval subject to proofofperformance.Notethat cope with the worst-case location within any smokezone
this should not occur very often, as inadequate designs (ie within any areafeedingsmokeintoa singlesmoke
should be identifiedat an early stage inApprovals reservoir). It istherefore necessaryto locate the test fire
Procedures and the design corrected before inthatsame location.
installationofthe SHEVS equipment. Itmaybe Thefire should never be located in the easiestlocations
considered wherea designisdefended bythe specialist simplybecause they aremore convenient.
designer,but is still not trusted bythe Regulatory
• Authority.
Wherethe system,buildingshape,orequipment as
installed doesnot matchthe
1.3 Choosingthe test fire
on which
proposal Thebasicrequirements for the HST are that:
approvalwas granted,butthe SHEVSdesigner
nevertheless arguesthatthe system will work
••itmust notdamage the building,and
itmust be as similaraspossibleto the designfire, in
satisfactorily. This scenario oughtneverto happen, but order tominimize the extent ofextrapolationrequired
occurs all too often.
• Wherethe circumstancesofthebuildingaresuch that
the fundamentalassumptionsunderlyingthetheories
afterwards.
Reconcilingtheseconflictingrequirements inevitably
uponwhich designsarebasedarenot valid, and means thattheHST must be specificallydesignedto
approximationshad to be madeinthe design. Atypical matchthe chosen location in thebuilding.Thefollowing
casemightbe wherea spillplume rises past a strongly listgivesafew considerations.
curved (inthe horizontal plane) spilledgewhereas the 1 The fuelmustburncleanly.Ethanol (either pure
design methods are all basedonthe spilledge being anhydrous, or as the almost-pure industrial methylated
straight. This canperhapsbe regarded as a special case spirits)is excellentasitburns with no visiblesmoke,
ofthefirstcircumstance above,withno-onein a andleaves no deposits.
position ofblame in any way.In an ideal world, this 2 Theperimeter ofthe fire should beas closeaspossible
oughtto be the only reasonforwanting HSTs. to the designvalueinorderto obtain asimilar rate of
entrainment. This may mean using more than one fire
1.2 Choosing the test location trayto simultaneouslysatisfy3,nextpoint below.
3 Theheat output ofthe HSTshould beas closeas
It is possibleinmostbuildingsfitted with a SHEVSto possibleto the designvalue, subjecttothe gas
imaginea real fire occurring in anyone ofmany locations. temperatures being lowenough to avoid doingany
Someofthese locationswill represent amore severe damage.This must be calculated.
threatthan in otherplaces. For example,afireon the 4 Heatinsulatingmaterialsmust be usedwherever the
floor ofan atrium, notnear tothe walls,will entrain less gaseswillbehot enough to causelocal damage.
air than the same firelocatedin aside-room whereby the Typicallythis willinclude liningor simulatingaside-
smokeenters the atrium as a spillplume. The fan capacity roomand anybalcony projectingbeyondthe opening,
122 Designmethodologies for SHEVS
Qr, 1Q 2Or 3O 4O §O
;© ®
0
0
ci)
0
=
ci)
ci)
=
0
ci) 0
>
ci)
N
-á ci)
=
0 ci)
bJ
=
0 0
=
(ci =
0 (ci
0
0 =
0= -o
=
00 00
0
0 0
ci) 0
ci)
-J -J
ii)
0
(ci
ci)
0
(ci
0.
U, 0.
ci,
uJ U)
c() cf-)
-) -)a)
=
126 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Exhaustvolumejiow
MrT/(1.22 T0) = 11.9 m3/s (J.3)
where:
T0z=15+273 =288K,
T1 = 440 +288= 728 K,
01 440°, and
ambient temperature = 15 °C.
This exhaust rateis the same forall fourunderground
levels (Levels—5 to —2). Thereare no sprinkler
installationsplanned for the car parkareas.
The entrances on thenorth orsouthsidewill provide
replacement air.
At Level —1 thereis also astorage room for incoming
goods. As thispart ofthe buildingcan contain flammable
goods, thereis anappropriate quick-responsesprinkler
installation.Itwas agreed that it would be appropriate to
PlateJ2 D3 Espace Leopold Building: the light street' use the same fire size as before, andhenceEqns
(J.1)—(J.3) also apply here, withthe same numerical
valuesas above.
J.3 Fire risks and smoke control scenarios As thesmoke temperature willbe affectedby cooling
bythe sprinklers,the volumerate is reduced to 6.8 m3/s.
J.3.1 The underground levels (Plate J3} At Level —1, however, the exhaust rate willbe
Thedesignfireforacovered car parkwas taken to be determined bythepossibilityofa fire in a truck ata
12 m perimeter firewith a convectiveheat-release rateof loadingquay or ofa fire in the stockroom orrestaurant.
2500kW (2.5 MW). As thereis ahigh potential for risk to life in the restaurant,
Theceilingareaneedsto be dividedintosmoke and toreduce the chance ofa severe lorry fire, the
reservoirsby means ofautomatic curtains toprevent decision has been takento installquick-response
excessivecooling ofsmoke leading to smoke-loggingof sprinklersin both the restaurant and the deliveryquay.
the entirefloor area. The followingfireparameters have beenadopted:
Thevolume ofsmoky gases needingto be exhausted
from the underground zonewas calculated as follows. Restaurant
Intheabsence ofany specificdatafor restaurant fires, it
Massflow was decided that adopting the BRE Reportt241 designfire
Mf= 0.188 x P x (y)3/2 = 5.68 kg/s (J.1) for retail areas would be appropriately pessimistic,
modifiedbythe more recentadvicefrom FRS thatthe
where: size canbe halved whenquick-responsesprinklers are
P = 12 m perimeter, usedinstead ofstandard-response sprinklers.
Y = 1.85 m heightofrise.
Area = 5 m2,
Smoke layertemperature Q =2.5MW.
= Q/(cM-)=440° (J.2)
Stock-holding areas
where: In theabsence ofspecific dataforfires in the stock-
= 2500 kWconvectiveheatflux. holding areas, it was decided to adopt the BRE Reportt241
H8
4
5
I
H SMOKE CURTAINS1
I POSITIONED
AT
THE BRIDGES
O =67C
Of = 37 kg/s
V = 38 rnYh 2
= 36.800 m3/h MAIL
allowedto reduce the average layer temperature in the = 500kW, with smoke allowedto spillintothe
atrium to a valuethat will notbreakany glazingexposed voidpast alengthofspill edge of5 m.
to the layer. This corresponded to a height ofrise of1.9 m
above the fire-room's window to cool the smoketo 80 °C. Inthis case, once againfollowingthe calculation
Thecalculationprocedures were essentiallysimilarto procedures inreference [13], the smokevolume entering
thoseforashopfireinthe'covered street', but with a thevoid willbe 4.6 kg/s.
design firemore appropriate to the office scenario.The After entering the void, a further heightofrise of2.5 m
design solutionswere similarbut less onerous, andare is calculated to allow people on the higherlevels to
notdetailedfurther herein. evacuate.The resultingmass flow ofsmoke entering the
smoke reservoiris 24 kg/s while the temperature riseis
J.3.3 Centralregion 50 °C atthispoint. Hencethe volume rate = 22 m3/s
In thisarea,thefire risk is very lowbecause thereareno according to Eqn (J.3).
shopsor offices.Therefore, this location is not
sprinklered. Oneshould notehowever that,similarlyto .1.3.4Summary of smoke-control scenarios
the forums nearthe conference rooms, aspillageof See Tableji.
smoke intothe atriumfrom lowerstoreys could cause
highrisks forthepeople at higher levels.Theworst-case J.4 Practical solutionsand installation
fire scenario is whenafirestarts beside one ofthe voids
because smokewill rise throughthe voidsto a higher Thefollowingaspectshad tobe taken intoconsideration
levelwhile coolinglargeamounts ofsurrounding air by whendesigninginteractivefire-protection systems.
entrainment. ••Smoke compartments (automatic smoke curtains)
It was decided that an appropriate design fireforthis Automatic smoke detection systems
region would be:
Area = 1 m2,
••
Sprinklers(normal or quick-response)whereneeded
Reliablesmoke exhaust fans.
Quick-responsesprinklers
AnnexJ: Case history 129
J.4.1 Smoke and fire compartments • Curtainshave beeninstalledwhich close offthe
will
J.4.11 Fixedfire compartment betweenthe
openings andthe
bridges corresponding
According to BelgianStandards,the buildingis divided levelsto prevent the smoke movingfrom one sideof
into separate firecompartments. Afire-resistancerating the coveredstreetto theother.
(RI)is definedintermsofexposureto thetestfurnace
heatingcurve. Atotal length ofabout 1.5 kmofmovablesmokecurtains
This means: hasbeeninstalledintheD3building.
• thecomplex is compartmented horizontally,at every
level (Rf=4h), J4.1.2.2 Centralregion
• rooms or places havingvoids over 1 or morelevelsInthecentral areathere aretwo types ofmovablesmoke
needto becompartmented from the otherplaces on curtains:
J.5 Hot-smoketest
J.5.1 Introduction
Inview ofthenovel features, and the limited full-scale
validation ofcalculationprocedures foradheredspill
plumes in atria, the BrusselsFireServicerequired a full
scalehot-smoke test inthebuildingin orderto confirm
both the designandtheoperation ofthe smoke-control
system.This requirement was part ofthe conditions to
obtain thebuildingpermit. The test wasscheduled fora
dateas nearto completion ofthebuildingas was
compatiblewiththe construction schedule. Temporary
sheetingwas usedextensivelyto close offopenings,
whichwere due to be closed more permanently before
completion.
InMarch1996 IFSET and FRS collaborated for the
second time to carry out ahot-smoke test in abuilding
(thefirsttestbeingBrusselsAirport Terminal).Thetest
scenario agreed withthe Fire Servicewas afireina
typicalshop opening out intothe atrium. Twotest fires FigureJ6 Schematicarrangement ofhot-smoke test
were carried out, apreliminary onewith a 0.5 MWfire
and themaintestwitha 1 MWfire in conjunctionwith
theoretical calculationsto extrapolatethe experimental
resultsto the fill design scenario.
Afullreportwas presented to the client and to theFire
Servicedescribingthe test givingtheresultsand
conclusions.
CRC Ltd
151 Rosebery Avenue
LondonEC1R 4GB,UK
BR368
ISBN 1 86081 289 9
06C