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HAZOp Report - BFI PDF
HAZOp Report - BFI PDF
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
21 April 2017
Prepared by:
Vic Esterhuizen (Technical Risk Consultant) Date
Reviewed by:
Tony le Roy (Project Manager) Date
Approved by:
Graham Temlett (Technical Director) Date
Accepted by:
St Helena FMC (Operations) Date
Revision History
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................................1
2. HAZOP Workshop Participants .....................................................................................................1
3. HAZOP Study Methodology...........................................................................................................2
4. Risk Criteria.....................................................................................................................................4
5. HAZOP Workshop ..........................................................................................................................5
6. HAZOP Study Nodes ......................................................................................................................7
7. Risk Review Results .......................................................................................................................8
List of Figures
Figure 3-1: Flowchart (Schematic View) of the Hazard Study Process ..................................................3
Figure 4-1: Risk Matrix used during HAZOP Study ................................................................................4
Figure 6-1: HAZOP Nodes reviewed for the SHAP project ....................................................................7
List of Tables
Table 2-1: HAZOP Attendees ................................................................................................................. 1
Table 3-1: List of Acronyms used in this report....................................................................................... 2
Appendices
Appendix A : Proposed Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities
Appendix B : Risk Matrix and Risk Criteria
Appendix C : HAZOP Study Minutes
Appendix D : Piping Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
1. Introduction
As part of the project scope and deliverables for St Helena Airport Project , located at St
Helena Island approximately 1900 km from Africa, a Hazard Operability (HAZOP) study
workshop was held on 03-06 April 2017.
The need for the HAZOP study arose through the detail evaluation and review of hazards
related to the operation and design of process systems using Piping and Instrumentation
Diagrams (P&IDs) of the Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI).
The objective further includes project gate review requirements recognizing the importance
of identifying the potential risks related to safe operation, maintainability, accessibility,
control functionality and interface plant operational issues as contemplated on engineering
drawings.
The methodology followed was to evaluate P&ID’s as well as plant layout drawings, through
a systematic and careful consideration of hazard guide words or deviations that may occur.
With the completion of this HAZOP study workshop and the completion of proposed risk
reduction or mitigation actions, the engineering and equipment drawings and the control
function specification can be finalised and issued for development of detailed operational
procedures and construction activities. This report document number H354128-00000-142-
066-0001 summarises the hazard study participants, the HAZOP methodology and
outcomes of the risk review workshop.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Acrony Description/definition
m
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AFF Airport Fuel Facility
BS Bay Side
BFI Bulk Fuel
COC Certificate Of Compliance
FMC Fuel Management Contractor
HAZOP Hazard Operability
IEC International Electro-technical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
PSSR Pre Startup Safety Review
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Certification
SHAP St Helena Airport Project
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
S2S Ship to Shore
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPCC Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure
The HAZOP workshop were conducted in accordance with the requirements of international
standards for hazard studies (e.g. IEC 61882) and Risk Management Guidance as detailed
in ISO 31000, as well as the requirements of Basil Read Ltd and St Helena Airport project
risk management system.
The HAZOP study process as shown in Figure 3-1 is a structured and systematic technique
for examining detailed P&ID’s and plant layout drawings for defined systems, operational
facilities, control functional requirements and process equipment 3D-model views.
Through systematic and careful consideration of deviations that may occur from the intended
design (as represented in the engineering drawings), the objectives of this study were:
• Identify potential hazards during the operation of the St Helena Airport bulk fuel facilities.
The hazards involved may include both those essentially relevant only to the immediate
operational area and those with a much wider influence, e.g. safety and ergonomic
hazards; and
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Risks are usually measured in terms of likelihood and consequences, which unless a risk is
eliminated, will always be non-zero quantities. The ALARP principle dictates that if there are
simple or low-cost risk reduction options available, then they should be implemented. It must
be stressed that it is not sufficient to just reduce risks to “Tolerable” risk level. It should also
be demonstrated that it is “reasonably impracticable” to reduce them any further.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
4. Risk Criteria
Risk criteria refers to standards, measures, or expectations used in assessing a given risk in
context with strategic goals, the threshold or other decision rules by which the significance of
risk is assessed, to determine whether risk treatment actions are required. Risk criteria also
relate to a quantified expression of the level of “risk” a company, Individual or a Regulating
Body is prepared to tolerate. These are normally based on regulator or corporate risk
appetite, legal or inherent safe design requirements, ethical and social considerations,
financial prudence and/or broadly acceptable risk levels within society of what can and
cannot be construed as a tolerable level of risk. A tolerable risk level does not mean an
acceptable risk level, it indicates a willingness to work/operate with the identified hazards or
risks, with the provision that the hazard/risk scenario is kept under review. The risk level
should be reduced as and when feasible and practical to ensure the risk is maintained within
the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) ranges.
ALARP is a term used in risk management and safety engineering, which states:
That controls to mitigate either the consequence or probability of the risk or both have
been implemented
That the effectiveness of the mitigation controls are monitored and maintained.
Hazards identified during the workshop have been assessed on a qualitative basis, using
the agreed risk criteria and risk matrix for the SHAP project as contained in Figure 4-1
(Note: Refer to Appendix B for an enlarge view).
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
5. HAZOP Workshop
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) workshops are considered as an enhancement using
experienced- based approaches rather than a substitute for design codes, standards and
practice approaches to ensure safe operation.
This methodology results in a systematic way to identify hazards related to a process plant,
operational facility, fuel transfer system, construction site, etc.
The steps followed during the HAZOP study process are as follows:
1. Copies of the relevant P&ID’s as well as plant layout drawings were distributed amongst
all stakeholders.
2. The drawings were then split into “HAZOP nodes” based around a consolidated
operational function, process stream or system.
3. The operational methodology of each HAZOP node as per P&ID or set of drawings was
then explained to the risk review team by an engineer or expert in any of the specific
process systems (e.g. the draining and pigging system), as required.
4. Each node was then evaluated applying the “HAZOP process” by discussing the
possible operational disturbances and production deviations that could occur.
5. Each identified potential deviation was then analysed further in order to determine what
control and/or preventative measures were currently in place in order to either reduce or
mitigate the consequence or likelihood of the potential deviation from the normal design
basis.
6. The potential deviation was then ranked based on the pre-defined probability and
consequence tables as contained in the risk matrix (refer toFigure 4-1) in order to
determine whether any additional risk reduction or mitigation actions were required for
the potential deviation.
7. Based on the risk review team evaluation, potential deviations exceeding a risk value of
17 were assigned additional risk reduction or mitigation actions if needed, which were
then assigned to a relevant stakeholder.
Note:
The initial risk assessment value can only be reduced or mitigated to a lower risk level
or ALARP level after implementation and evaluation of the effectiveness of the
proposed risk reduction or mitigation action.
8. All data captured during the risk workshop were recorded using PHA-Pro software. The
software is a comprehensive and innovative tool, developed by Dyadem, for conducting
a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), also in this case known as Hazard/HAZOP or risk
review workshop.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
9. The following HAZOP guidewords were considered relevant for the workshop session,
according to international risk guidewords for hazard risk review studies:
High / No / Reverse or Misdirected Flow
High / Less or No Pressure
High / Less Temperature
High / Less or No Level
Loss of Containment Hazards
Interlocks / Alarm / Trip / Overload Protection Settings Specified
Explosion / Fire Hazards (storage or processing of flammable material)
Fire Protection System (passive / active)
Electrical Area Classifications (zone requirements for equipment)
Electrical Control Systems (power supply)
Static Earthing / Grounding Arrangements
Spares Availability
Maintenance Hazards (isolation, maintenance access)
Waste Management (ground pollution, disposal facility, legal requirements)
Emergency Systems (emergency event at upstream/downstream unit)
Natural Hazards (earthquake, flooding, thunder storm, lightning, high winds)
Normal Operations Hazards (human factors, safety, start-up operation, shutdown
operation, duration, sequence, sampling)
Vibration (mechanical fatigue, false signals instrumentation)
Sewer Systems (oil, rain water, utility water, catchments)
Environment (water & air pollution and consumption, legal requirements)
Safety Hazards (PPE, safety showers, eye baths, breathing apparatus, machine
guards)
Confined Spaces (pits, sumps, sewers, containers, vessels, etc.)
Ergonomics (equipment accessibility)
Piping Hazards (tie-in requirements, welding, material selection, hot-tapping)
Civil Construction (excavation hazards)
Health Exposure to Products (dust, fluids, gasses, fumes, etc.)
Building and Structures (ablution facilities, office location, control rooms, etc.)
Plant Structures (roofing, walls, grating, fixed ladders, walkways, etc.)
Utilities Availability (air, water, steam, nitrogen, oxygen, electricity)
Equipment Location (crane, road tanker or personnel accessibility, lay down
areas)
Note:
All the above listed guidewords were evaluated in detail and additional guidewords were
added for a specific concern or system when a team member identified a scenario for
discussion. Following an evaluation of the information available, the team decided not to
record any comments if it was found that no hazards could be identified for a specific
deviation or guideword.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Node 002 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 003 Draining and purging of floating hose (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 004 Pigging of the floating hose (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 005 Draining and retrieval of floating hose (Jet fuel) No drawing – operation activity
Node 006 Nitrogen purging of the Jet fuel system XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
(S2S including the valley pipeline) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 007 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 008 Draining and purging of floating hose (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 009 Pigging of the floating hose (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 010 Nitrogen purging of the Gas Oil system (S2S) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 011 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 012 Draining and purging of floating hose (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 013 Pigging of the floating hose (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 014 Nitrogen purging of the Gasoline system (S2S) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 015 Bayside gantry No drawing – operation activity will
use 3D Models during the review
Node 016 Fast flash ST-160 via pump P-210 (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 1 rev 4)
XPE-400-PE-3039 (sheet 1 rev 4)
Node 017 Fast flash ST-200 and ST-220 via pump P-220 XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 1 rev 4)
(Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 2 rev 4)
Node 018 Fast flash ST-100/ST-120 and St-140 via pump P-110 XPE-400-PE-3019 (sheet 1 rev 4)
(Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3020 (sheet 1 rev 4)
Node 019 Fast flash ST-300/ST-320 via pump P-310 (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3030 (sheet 1 rev 4)
XPE-400-PE-3040 (sheet 1 rev 4)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
However, all the hazards with an initial risk value of 15 or greater should be monitored by
the plant management to ensure that the current safeguards or existing risk controls,
including recommended reduction or mitigation actions, are implemented and the
effectiveness tested before the residual risk value may be accepted as a final risk value.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Appendix A:
Proposed Mitigation Actions and
Responsibilities
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H002; H020 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is provided and Basil Read Project
H076; H126 calibrated to ensure that connection is done Manager
effectively
H005 Act 002 Consider the inclusion of the availability of the SHG Project team
barge or backup barge into the contractual
requirements of fuel provision to the island
H005 Act 003 Review the configuration of the floating hose to Basil Read project
include flexibility for effective deployment (e.g. manager
one 200m length to be 100m/65m/35m
sections which will be bolted)
H006 Act 004 Ensure that a detail risk review is conducted FMC Operations
before night operation is allowed which shall be Manager
the exception
H006 Act 005 Consider that a small boat is available to FMC Operations
support the execution of the night operations Manager
H007 Act 006 Operating safety training program needs to FMC Operations
include safety awareness that no operator must Manager
be unnecessarily on the seaward side of the
gantry during deployment of the hose. They
need to be at the back of the gantry.
H007 Act 007 Further to the above the procedure needs to FMC Operations
define that the bolting of 200m sections shall Manager
be carried out at back of the gantry
H010; H049 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares from Basil Basil Read Project
H106; H156 Read which also need to identify the stock Manager
H176; H201 levels for critical items
H010; H049 Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list and FMC and Basil
H106; H156 determine the adequacy as well as the required Read
H176; H201 stock levels
H010; H049 Act 010 Develop a procedure which describes the rules Basil Read Project
H106; H156 regarding vendor and other warranties valid Manager
H176; H201 when plant becomes operational.
H013; H029 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which would be Basil Read Project
H053; H085 effective for safe operation in terms of Manager
H110; H160 frequency, range, etc.
H015; H070 Act 012 Confirm that the ship is provided with a over FMC Operations
H120 pressure protection to ensure that the floating Manager
hose safe operating pressure of 13bar cannot
be exceeded
H015; H070 Act 013 Ensure that the fuel transfer SOP define that FMC Operations
H120 the floating hose is kept at least 15-20m away Manager
from the wharf during fuel transfer
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H088 Act 025 Ensure that during procurement of the pigging Basil Read Project
equipment the effectives of the pigging Manager
equipment is checked with the supplier and the
design team to confirm that the holding tank
can accommodate double the volume of a 30m
floating hose as stated in action Action 024
H090; H139 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP for safe Basil Read Project
H175 connection of floating hoses Manager
H097; H147 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum pressure Basil Read
of the pigging system should not exceed the Procurement team
line class limit of 19bar and if not possible the
vendor need to ensure that safety protections
are included into the pigging system design
H169 Act 028 Basil Read need to confirm the civil Basil Read Project
arrangements beneath the gantry and up to Manager
the sea wall. (Is it all concrete within a
‘contained area’ ?) (Will the secondary
containment of spills complies with
international guidance such as 40 CFR 112.7
requirements
H169 Act 029 Basil Read need to confirm the boundaries of Basil Read Project
the ‘contained area’ (where does it ‘drain’ to? Manager
and (What prevents the beach or any unpaved
areas receiving the discharge)
H172 Act 030 Review the storage facility and include the Basil Read Project
vendor requirements (e.g. loose fitting covers, Manager
cooled dry ventilated area, etc.)
H174 Act 031 Establish the requirement cycle for off island Basil Read Project
hose inspections and include the requirement Manager
of a test cycle and service interval into the
maintenance philosophy of the floating hose.
(note the hose will be send to the
manufacturer for testing and re-certification if
mandatory) or tested on island if feasible
H174 Act 032 FMC to ensure that the required maintenance FMC Operations
philosophy is implemented Manager
H175 Act 033 Remove the Gas Oil/Gasoline spool piece Mauritz Coetzee
sections and replace it with two independent and Johann Ryan
fixed piping connections
H181; H189 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system clearly FMC Operations
H195; H201 states that the V-Jar system cannot be utilised Manager and Basil
while the fast flush pump is in operation Read Project
Manager
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Appendix B:
Risk Matrix and Risk Criteria
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Appendix C:
HAZOP Study Minutes
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
3. The current design of 1. Delay in fuel transfer None C4 P7 Serious Act 003 Review the configuration of the Basil Read
the floating hose result in demurrage 40 floating hose to include flexibility for project
sections could lead to charges effective deployment (e.g. one 200m manager
practical deployment length to be 100m/65m/35m sections
operational concerns which will be bolted)
20 - Normal H006 Unable to off-load fuel 1. Insufficient lights 1. Delay in fuel transfer The barge design criteria is C4 P6 High 36 Act 004 Ensure that a detail risk review is FMC
Operations (Are during night time (visibility) and the result in demurrage such that it should be capable to conducted before night operation is Operations
there any human current design charges support the floating hose at allowed which shall be the exception Manager
factors, start- philosophy is not to night and is equipped with a
Act 005 Consider that a small boat is FMC
up/shutdown, transfer fuel at night male retention device (dry-break
sampling hazards) coupling (note the hose will be available to support the execution of Operations
disconnected from the ship). the night operations Manager
The proper planning and
execution of fuel shipments.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
2. The fuel velocity in the The motorised flow control valve C4 P1 Low 10
line exceed the safe flow LV-903 will limit the flow to a
rate (static ignition risk) max of 95m3/hr. SOP for off-
loading of fuel and training of
operators. The floating hose is
provided with earth cable along
the hose length to minimise
ignition probability
01- High / Low / No H015 No flow of fuel from ship 1. Closure of any of 1. Pressure rise in the None (no pressure relief or PSV C5 P5 High 37 Act 012 Confirm that the ship is provided with FMC
Flow to the gantry interface valve VB- floating hose which could on the floating hose section) a over pressure protection to ensure Operations
section 1584/1585/1586 (human lead to failure of the that the floating hose safe operating Manager
error) floating hose pressure of 13bar cannot be
exceeded
2. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
below the pump suction operational impact (time 912, LT-912, LV-903 as well as recommended
point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
fuel transfer is not occurring
3. Inadvertent release of 1. Operational impact SOP and Training of operators C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
the dry-coupling due to (time loss) and possible and quality control checks after recommended
hose/ship movement over pressure of maintenance and monitoring of
(external force) upstream system ship and floating hose
movements
4. Loss of power supply 1. Unable to open the Bayside facility is provided with C5 P5 High 37 Act 013 Ensure that the fuel transfer SOP FMC
on island Bayside for sea traffic due backup power (generator) to define that the floating hose is kept at Operations
to that the floating hose is retrieve the floating hose as well least 15-20m away from the wharf Manager
still filled with fuel as N2 purge to empty the hose during fuel transfer
safely
02 - High / Low or H016 Low level of fuel in ship 1. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level compartment below the pump suction operational impact (time 912, LT-912, LV-903 as well as recommended
point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
fuel transfer is not occurring
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
04 - High / Less or H018 Low pressure of fuel 1. The pump capacity on 1. Operational cost A service agreement is in place C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pump from the ship the ship does not impact due to delay of off- with the fuel supplier which 26 recommended
provide the minimum load of ship includes the requirement for a
required pressure of 400 minimum pump pressure
kPa capacity of 400 kPa for a
preferred maximum flow rate of
95m3/hr
05 - High / Low H019 High temperature of the 1. Pumping against a 1. Loss of containment Although there is no TSV on the C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Temperature fuel in the floating hose close valve or the through failure of the floating hose, however the hard 19 recommended
pipeline is full of liquid floating hose piping is provided with TSV-900
during before entering the break tank.
PSV -930 protects the floating
hose against overpressure due
to temperature fluctuations.
07 - Loss of H020 Possible leaks from the 1. The operator does not 1. Environmental incident Operational procedure and C5 P5 High 37 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is Basil Read
containment floating hose tighten the connection and loss of product or training as well as competency provided and calibrated to ensure Project
clamp correctly or contamination of product of personnel as well as that connection is done effectively Manager
effectively deployment visual checks.
Refresher training or sessions
for operators
07 - Loss of H021 Overpressure of the line, 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The design include a pressure C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment coupling failure, flange valve or line blockage and loss of product safety valve PSV-930 to 19 recommended
leaks. etc. leading to pressure minimise probability of
increase overpressure and a deployable
spill kit is provided on the wharf
to support the clean up of
spillages
08 - Fire / H022 Possible fire event 1. Ignition of the fuel due 1. Damage of equipment The floating hose include an C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards to static and safety risk embedded earth cable along the 16 recommended
hose length to minimise ignition
probability and the fuel transfer
rate is limited to linear velocity
less than 1.5m/s. The Bayside is
provided with electrical isolation
flanges
09 - Contamination/ H023 Possible contamination of 1. Valves VB-1587 or 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion the fuel during transfer VG-1588 are left open and loss of product or on the listed valves and visual 20 recommended
activity or leak through possible fire event inspections by operators
2. The barge valve 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
arrangement tethered to and loss of product on the listed valves and visual 15 recommended
the buoy VB-1582 or inspections by operators
VB-1883 are left open or
leak through
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
20 - Normal H026 Ship pumps or control 1. Power loss, 1. Operational cost Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are systems failure mechanical failure, etc. impact due to delay of off- integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
there any human load of ship equipment on the ship and
factors, start- inspections are done by a third
up/shutdown, party
sampling hazards)
26 - Natural H027 Change in the weather 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Damage of equipment The transfer activities are C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards condition while transfer of island operation and safety or planned for periods when 26 recommended
(earthquake, product is in progress environmental risk weather changes are stable
flooding, thunder based on weather data and
storm, lightning, swell forecasts as well as
high winds procedures for safe making of
hazards) the system
26 - Natural H028 Insufficient visibility to 1. Bad weather (mist or 1. Possible damage to the Current methodology is to only C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards safety execute the heavy rainfall) or night hose and safety risk off load fuel in day time and the 26 recommended
(earthquake, transfer activity operations (fatality) Ship to shore procedure
flooding, thunder (document XPE-400-PE-RPT-
storm, lightning, 0085 revision P3) specify the
high winds visibility requirements. The dry-
hazards) break coupling can be released
and the floating hose can be
stabilised (tighten) to minimise
damage. The barge is also
provided with amber strobe light
to increase visibility.
30 - H029 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
operator and the gantry load of ship
operator
2. Radio signal or 1. Operational cost None C4 P6 High 36 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which Basil Read
frequency loss or natural impact due to delay of off- would be effective for safe operation Project
barriers (wind, rain, etc.) load of ship in terms of frequency, range, etc. Manager
leads to ineffective
communication
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
34 - Security H030 Security risk during 1. Unauthorised access 1. Damage to the floating Access control to Rupert's Bay C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards transfer of product to the Rupert's Bay hose result in as well as security patrols and 20 recommended
environmental risk media announcements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
N004 XPE-400-PE-3010 01- High / Low / No H037 Loss of N2 feed to the 1. Unavailability of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 016 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow pigging system cylinders or line failure the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
floating hose (Jet in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
fuel) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
with the operational volume pigging operations
requirement, however there is a
risk of unavailability
03 - Reverse or H038 Misdirected flow 1. Human error operator 1. Environmental incident The design include blind flanges C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow (incorrect destination) (incorrect valve position and loss of product or of the valves and SOP in terms 20 recommended
selections) possible fire event on the of valve positions and training of
gantry operators
04 - High / Less or H039 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 15.1bar high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
400-GA-4125 SHT 1 requires a
nitrogen pressure PSV on the
system to prevent against over
pressure of the upstream
sections of the floating hose
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
07 - Loss of H041 Possible line, coupling 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The facility have a formal C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment failure, flange leaks. etc. valve or line blockage and loss of product emergency response plan and a 15 recommended
leading to pressure spill kit is provided on the wharf
increase and line failure to support the clean up of
or leaks spillages
08 - Fire / H042 Possible fire during the 1. Incorrect tools used 1. Damage to equipment, SOP that non-metal tools and C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards pigging activity during the connection of the hose and safety risk non-static tools are used as well 20 recommended
lines (fatality) as PPE, and training of
operators. Non sparking engine
on the barge is also used.
2. Lightning strike 1. Damage to equipment, All electrical, control C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
the hose and safety risk instrumentation 20 recommended
(fatality) (EC&I)equipment in hazardous
areas are Zone rated
08 - Fire / H043 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
10 - Safety H044 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) use of nitrogen purging (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, of the line including task risk analysis as
eye baths, well as tool box talks safety
breathing awareness programs)
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
14 - Maintenance H045 Maintenance personnel 1. Working on process 1. Possible fatality Compliance to operational C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
and isolation could be exposed to high systems which are policy regarding stored energy recommended
hazards pressure during under pressure or where systems as well as the SOP
maintenance activities energy is stored which include the requirement
that the full system will be
isolated before working on any
equipment (e.g. the pressure
will be relieve via drain valves
venting to safe location, as part
of work permit procedure
17 - Position / H046 Possibility of damage to 1. The barge could 1. Environmental incident SOP that ensure the barge is C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of the floating hose move away from the and loss of product or properly positioned and 16 recommended
equipment (crane, safe pigging location possible injury to operator communication system between
ship, barge, etc.) (fatality) barge and gantry to manage
movements. The design
includes an emergency release
coupling to minimise damage
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 7
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
2. If one of the valves 1. Unable to continue with SOP, task checklist and training C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
are closed the pigging activity result of operators to ensure that all 19 recommended
in operational upset valves are in correct position
(delays) (open)
20 - Normal H048 Exposure of operator to 1. If the pigging 1. Possible fatality and SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Operations (Are fumes during the use of equipment is not operational upset of operators to ensure that all 26 recommended
there any human the pigging launcher operated according to pigging connections and task
factors, start- instructions (e.g. if the are done which include QA/QC
up/shutdown, pig lid is not effectively by supervisors
sampling hazards) connected onto the pig
launcher)
2. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
purging activity of the (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
line including task risk analysis as
well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
25 - Spares H049 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption for pigging available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope activity quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of of the pigging responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and equipment Read will provide operational
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the pigging
equipment are done
Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
21 - Emergency H050 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect execution of 1. Environmental risk SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Systems during pigging launching pigging procedure or (spillage exceeds SPCC and quality control checks after 15 recommended
and retrieval into the sea equipment failure guidance) and financial maintenance.
impact
27 - Ventilation and H051 Insufficient ventilation 1. The pigging is not 1. Possible fatality due to SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
lighting during pigging activity done outside the ISO exposure to N2 or of operators to ensure that 26 recommended
requirements container hydrocarbon fumes inside pigging is done according to
a confined space procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
0050
29 - Equipment H052 Exposure of operators to 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Operational delays due SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of lifting hazards and pigging system and to difficulty to as well as rigging task 15 recommended
equipment (crane, maintenance constraint barge operations install/remove pigging assessments, as well as
road truck, lay conditions equipment or ISO statutory inspections of lifting
down areas) containers equipment.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
33 - Area H054 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
N005 No drawing - 01- High / Low / No H055 Unable to drain all liquid 1. Pigging activity was in 1. Liquid could be trapped The design of the pigging and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Draining and operation activity Flow out of the floating hose efficient or fluid did pass in the last 30m hose N2 purge system is such that 15 recommended
retrieval of floating over the pig section and pressure 99% of the liquid will be
hose (Jet fuel) could built-up resulting in removed (thus the probability of
damage of liquid been trapped to cause a
equipment/hose risk is rare.
10 - Safety H056 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) purging of the floating (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, hose with nitrogen and including task risk analysis as
eye baths, etc.) breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
10 - Safety H057 Exposure of maintenance 1. Instrumentation and 1. Possible fatality (falling Access way provided in design C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, person to working at gantry access at top of from heights) for safe access with fall arrest 15 recommended
safety showers, heights structure with no fall anchor points. SOP and training
eye baths, etc.) protection facility of personnel
19 - Environmental H058 Fuel spillage during 1. Incorrect draining 1. Environmental incident SOP, task checklist and training C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards (Water venting of the floating procedure followed and loss of product of operators to ensure that 15 recommended
pollution and hose draining is done according to
consumption, legal procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
requirements) 0050
20 - Normal H059 Unable to safely vent 1. Deviation from SOP 1. Health hazard The SOP requires to connect C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Operations (Are nitrogen from the last (moderate impact) and valve VB-1584 to VB-1586 recommended
there any human 30m floating hose environmental risk which will allow the safe
factors, start- removal of nitrogen and any
up/shutdown, possible liquid through hard
sampling hazards) piping to the break tank
20 - Normal H060 Possible damage of the 1. Stress on the hose 1. Damage to the floating None C4 P6 High 36 Act 020 Ensure that the operating procedure FMC
Operations (Are floating hose while reeling hose result in cost and define the requirement to retrieve the Operations
there any human operational delay first three rotations by hand Manager
factors, start-
up/shutdown,
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H061 Cassette winder and/or 1. Insufficient 1. Unable to retrieve the Maintenance philosophy and C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are hydraulic drive trailer maintenance floating hose result in integrity inspections of the reeler 19 recommended
there any human defective operational delays as well as spares in stores
factors, start-
up/shutdown,
sampling hazards)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 9
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
02 - High / Low or H063 Level of liquid buildup in 1. The current route of 1. Unable to remove the The design basis include a N2 C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level the hard piping the hard piping contains liquid which could lead to purging and draining procedure 19 recommended
a low point that result in water hammering effect of the concern low point dead-
fluid accumulation or when the line is used leg section (refer to section
operator did not drain again 4.6.7 of XPE-400-PE-RPT-
the line 0050)
04 - High / Less or H064 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 15.1bar high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
cylinders incident piping between the gantry and
break tank is provided with a
PSV-930 with setpoint of
14.85bar
04 - High / Less or H065 Overpressure of the 1. The purging of N2 at 1. Failure of the valley The design basis include a N2 C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure valley pipeline with N2 the BFI to the BS pipeline result in purging requirement to take into 20 recommended
includes a static head operational losses and account the static head (refer to
which could lead to high environmental incident section 4.6.7.5 of XPE-400-PE-
pressure RPT-0050)
03 - Reverse or H066 Misdirected flow 1. Human error operator 1. Environmental incident The design include blind flanges C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow (incorrect destination of (incorrect valve position and loss of product or of the valves and SOP in terms 20 recommended
the N2 purge stream) selections) possible fire event on the of valve positions and training of
gantry operators
10 - Safety H067 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) purging of the floating (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, hose with nitrogen and including task risk analysis as
eye baths, breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
breathing awareness programs)
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
14 - Maintenance H068 Maintenance personnel 1. Working on process 1. Possible fatality Compliance to operational C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
and isolation could be exposed to high systems which are policy regarding stored energy recommended
hazards pressure during under pressure or where systems as well as the SOP
maintenance activities energy is stored which include the requirement
that the full system will be
isolated before working on any
equipment (e.g. the pressure
will be relieve via drain valves
venting to safe location, as part
of work permit procedure
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
2. The fuel velocity in the The motorised flow control valve C4 P1 Low 10
line exceed the safe flow LV-701 will limit the flow to a
rate (static ignition risk) max of 95m3/hr. SOP for off-
loading of fuel and training of
operators. The floating hose is
provided with earth cable along
the hose length to minimise
ignition probability
01- High / Low / No H070 No flow of fuel from ship 1. Closure of any of 1. Pressure rise in the None (no pressure relief or PSV C5 P5 High 37 Act 012 Confirm that the ship is provided with FMC
Flow to the gantry interface valve VB- floating hose which could on the floating hose section) a over pressure protection to ensure Operations
section 1147/1148/1149 (human lead to failure of the that the floating hose safe operating Manager
error) floating hose pressure of 13bar cannot be
exceeded
2. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
below the pump suction operational impact (time 701, LT-704, LV-701 as well as recommended
point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
fuel transfer is not occurring
3. Inadvertent release of 1. Operational impact SOP and Training of operators C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
the dry-coupling due to (time loss) and possible and quality control checks after recommended
hose/ship movement over pressure of maintenance and monitoring of
(external force) upstream system ship and floating hose
movements
4. Loss of power supply 1. Unable to open the Bayside facility is provided with C5 P5 High 37 Act 013 Ensure that the fuel transfer SOP FMC
on island Bayside for sea traffic due backup power (generator) to define that the floating hose is kept at Operations
to that the floating hose is retrieve the floating hose as well least 15-20m away from the wharf Manager
still filled with fuel as N2 purge to empty the hose during fuel transfer
safely
02 - High / Low or H071 Low level of fuel in ship 1. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level compartment below the pump suction operational impact (time 701, LT-704, LV-701 as well as recommended
point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
fuel transfer is not occurring
03 - Reverse or H072 Misdirected flow or feed 1. It may happen that 1. Contamination of SOP and Training of operators C4 P4 Moderate No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Gas Oil to Gasoline the ship arrive with product result operational and quality control checks 25 recommended
system multiple fuel grade costs before the transfer activity
compartments and the commence
operator connect to the
wrong compartment
04 - High / Less or H073 High pressure built up in 1. Pump against a close 1. Loss of containment PSV-730 installed on the hard C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure the floating hose valve with positive through failure of the piping with a set point of 19 recommended
displacement pump on floating hose 1875kPa which is below the
the ship (LV-701 will design of the floating hose. The
close on high break tank product is directed to the break
level and SDV-700 will tank and FS-700 will alarm the
close in emergency via operator
ESD-999 signal)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
07 - Loss of H076 Possible leaks from the 1. The operator does not 1. Environmental incident Operational procedure and C5 P5 High 37 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is Basil Read
containment floating hose tighten the connection and loss of product or training as well as competency provided and calibrated to ensure Project
clamp correctly or contamination of product of personnel as well as that connection is done effectively Manager
effectively deployment visual checks.
Refresher training or sessions
for operators
07 - Loss of H077 Overpressure of the line, 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The design include a pressure C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment coupling failure, flange valve or line blockage and loss of product safety valve PSV-730 to 19 recommended
leaks. etc. leading to pressure minimise probability of
increase overpressure and a deployable
spill kit is provided on the wharf
to support the clean up of
spillages
08 - Fire / H078 Possible fire event 1. Ignition of the fuel due 1. Damage of equipment The floating hose include an C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards to static and safety risk embedded earth cable along the 16 recommended
hose length to minimise ignition
probability and the fuel transfer
rate is limited to linear velocity
less than 1.5m/s. The Bayside is
provided with electrical isolation
flanges
09 - Contamination/ H079 Possible contamination of 1. Valves VB-1150 or 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion the fuel during transfer VG-1151 are left open and loss of product or on the listed valves and visual 20 recommended
activity or leak through possible fire event inspections by operators
2. The barge valve 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
arrangement tethered to and loss of product on the listed valves and visual 15 recommended
the buoy VB-1145 or inspections by operators
VB-1146 are left open or
leak through
19 - Environmental H080 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The floating line is provided with C5 P4 High 32 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test Basil Read
hazards (Water from floating hose into the the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC dry-couplings which minimise cycle and service interval into the Project
pollution and sea failure guidance) and financial the volume of spilled product. maintenance philosophy of the Manager
consumption, legal impact Thus minimal environmental floating hose. (note the hose will be
requirements) risk. The gantry design is such sent to the manufacturer for testing
that all product in the flexible and re-certification if mandatory) or
line is drained back to V-920. tested on island if feasible
Maintenance and integrity
testing of the floating hose Act 015 FMC to ensure that the required FMC
maintenance philosophy is Operations
implemented Manager
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
20 - Normal H082 Incorrect transfer 1. Deviation from the 1. Contamination of Gas Operating manual (document C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are sequence of Gas Oil and prescribe sequence of Oil with Gasoline (note XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 19 recommended
there any human Gasoline fuel transfer more severe risk if the E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
factors, start- Gas Oil is contaminated) the Gasoline needs to be
up/shutdown, transferred first and verification
sampling hazards) checks to be done before Gas
Oil can be transferred.
26 - Natural H083 Change in the weather 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Damage of equipment The transfer activities are C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards condition while transfer of island operation and safety or planned for periods when 26 recommended
(earthquake, product is in progress environmental risk weather changes are stable
flooding, thunder based on weather data and
storm, lightning, swell forecasts as well as
high winds procedures for safe making of
hazards) the system
26 - Natural H084 Insufficient visibility to 1. Bad weather (mist or 1. Possible damage to the Current methodology is to only C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards safety execute the heavy rainfall) or night hose and safety risk off load fuel in day time and the 26 recommended
(earthquake, transfer activity operations (fatality) Ship to shore procedure
flooding, thunder (document XPE-400-PE-RPT-
storm, lightning, 0085 revision P3) specify the
high winds visibility requirements. The dry-
hazards) break coupling can be released
and the floating hose can be
stabilised (tighten) to minimise
damage. The barge is also
provided with amber strobe light
to increase visibility.
30 - H085 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
operator and the gantry load of ship
operator
2. Radio signal or 1. Operational cost None C4 P6 High 36 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which Basil Read
frequency loss or natural impact due to delay of off- would be effective for safe operation Project
barriers (wind, rain, etc.) load of ship in terms of frequency, range, etc. Manager
leads to ineffective
communication
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
34 - Security H086 Security risk during 1. Unauthorised access 1. Damage to the floating Access control to Rupert's Bay C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards transfer of product to the Rupert's Bay hose result in as well as security patrols and 20 recommended
environmental risk media announcements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 13
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
02 - High / Low or H088 High level in the holding 1. The tank was not 1. Overflow of the tank The holding tank is provided C4 P6 High 36 Act 023 Consider to add a high level alarm Basil Read
No Level tank emptied after previous result in environmental with level indication (sight glass) function to the barge container to Project
draining activity risk and delay in and SOP to ensure the tank is initiate operator response. Manager
operations emptied before draining activity
start Act 024 Further to the above ensure that the Mauritz
barge holding tanks to be Coetzee and
approximately doubled in size Johann Ryan
(holding volume) to ensure that once
the local alarm on the barge is
initiated there will be sufficient time
(10-15min)for the operator to act and
prevent any discharge.
03 - Reverse or H090 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the Although the same floating hose C4 P6 High 36 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP Basil Read
Misdirected Flow of Gas Oil to Gasoline floating section to the product is used for Gas Oil and Gasoline for safe connection of floating hoses Project
system (ground fuels) wrong holding tank the holding tanks are uniquely Manager
(Note: The floating hose identifiable via labeling to
colour coding for Gas Oil minimise the probability
and Gasoline are the
same, however )
09 - Contamination/ H091 Possible corrosion 1. Incorrect selection of 1. Loss of containment The material of construction C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion material of construction result in environmental complies to the required 15 recommended
(expose to chlorides in risk standard for coastal areas (refer
sea water) to document XPE-400-DSH-
00264)
10 - Safety H092 Exposure of operating 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard (no PPE, safety training and safety C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, personnel to nitrogen use of nitrogen purging fatality due to no awareness programs and all 15 recommended
safety showers, of the line confinement) tasks are done according work
eye baths, permit system including
breathing maintenance of the N2 system
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
15 - H093 Inability to connect dry- 1. The line could not be 1. Operational cost Maintenance of the dry-break C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ break coupling to the connected due to impact due to delay of coupling on the holding tank recommended
Ergonomics / holding tank connection physical damages to the retrieval of the hose and connections and
Movement and for draining and purging coupling or connection inspections before use and
equipment points equipment checklist are
accessibility completed
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 14
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
03 - Reverse or H095 Misdirected flow of N2 1. Human error operator 1. Environmental incident The design include blind flanges C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow (incorrect destination) (incorrect valve position and loss of product or of the valves and SOP in terms 20 recommended
selections) possible fire event on the of valve positions and training of
gantry operators
04 - High / Less or H096 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 19bar for Gas Oil high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
system cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
400-GA-4125 SHT 1 requires a
nitrogen pressure PSV on the
system to prevent against over
pressure of the upstream
sections of the floating hose
04 - High / Less or H097 Exceed the hard piping 1. Unknown of what 1. Transient pressure PSV-730 is set at 18.75bar and C4 P6 High 36 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum Basil Read
No Pressure line class A2 pressure of pressure is required by surge through the hard the design pressure is pressure of the pigging system Procurement
19bar for Gas Oil system the vendor for the piping and consequently documented in data sheet XPE- should not exceed the line class limit team
pigging system damage to the line 400-DSH-00249 revP2. of 19bar and if not possible the
However the risk is still valid vendor need to ensure that safety
due to transient conditions protections are included into the
pigging system design
07 - Loss of H098 Possible line, coupling 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The facility have a formal C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment failure, flange leaks. etc. valve or line blockage and loss of product emergency response plan and a 15 recommended
leading to pressure spill kit is provided on the wharf
increase and line failure to support the clean up of
or leaks spillages
08 - Fire / H099 Possible fire during the 1. Incorrect tools used 1. Damage to equipment, SOP that non-metal tools and C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards pigging activity during the connection of the hose and safety risk non-static tools are used as well 20 recommended
lines (fatality) as PPE, and training of
operators. Non sparking engine
on the barge is also used.
2. Lightning strike 1. Damage to equipment, All electrical, control C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
the hose and safety risk instrumentation 20 recommended
(fatality) (EC&I)equipment in hazardous
areas are Zone rated
08 - Fire / H100 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
10 - Safety H101 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) use of nitrogen purging (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, of the line including task risk analysis as
eye baths, well as tool box talks safety
breathing awareness programs)
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 15
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 16
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
27 - Ventilation and H108 Insufficient ventilation 1. The pigging is not 1. Possible fatality due to SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
lighting during pigging activity done outside the ISO exposure to N2 or of operators to ensure that 26 recommended
requirements container hydrocarbon fumes inside pigging is done according to
a confined space procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
0050
29 - Equipment H109 Exposure of operators to 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Operational delays due SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of lifting hazards and pigging system and to difficulty to as well as rigging task 15 recommended
equipment (crane, maintenance constraint barge operations install/remove pigging assessments, as well as
road truck, lay conditions equipment or ISO statutory inspections of lifting
down areas) containers equipment.
30 - H110 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
operator and the gantry load of ship
operator
2. Radio signal or 1. Operational cost None C4 P6 High 36 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which Basil Read
frequency loss or natural impact due to delay of off- would be effective for safe operation Project
barriers (wind, rain, etc.) load of ship in terms of frequency, range, etc. Manager
leads to ineffective
communication
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
33 - Area H111 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
N010 XPE-400-PE-3012 01- High / Low / No H112 Loss of N2 feed to 1. Unavailability of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 021 Ensure that there is safe location for Basil Read
Nitrogen purging of (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow purging effectively cylinders or line failure the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge storage of large quantities of N2 Project
the Gas Oil system XPE-400-PE-3012 in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at bottles for a three fuel transfer Manager
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned approximately 80-100 bottles
with the operational volume
requirement, however here is a Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for FMC
risk of unavailability handling and transporting of bottles Operations
and re-use by supplier Manager
02 - High / Low or H113 Level of liquid buildup in 1. The current route of 1. Unable to remove the The design basis include a N2 C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level the hard piping the hard piping contains liquid which could lead to purging and draining procedure 19 recommended
a low point that result in water hammering effect of the concern low point dead-
fluid accumulation or when the line is used leg section (refer to section
operator did not drain again 4.6.7 of XPE-400-PE-RPT-
the line 0050)
04 - High / Less or H114 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 19bar for Gas Oil high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
cylinders incident piping between the gantry and
break tank is provided with a
PSV-730 with setpoint of
18.75bar
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 17
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 18
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
04 - High / Less or H122 High pressure built up in 1. Pump against a close 1. Loss of containment PSV-830 installed on the hard C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure the floating hose valve with positive through failure of the piping with a set point of 19 recommended
displacement pump on floating hose 1875kPa which is below the
the ship (LV-801 will design of the floating hose. The
close on high break tank product is directed to the break
level and SDV-800 will tank and FS-800 will alarm the
close in emergency via operator
ESD-999 signal)
04 - High / Less or H123 Possible temperature and 1. The operator did not 1. Damage to pipeline Operating manual (document C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pressure rise in the valley drain the fuel after the result in loss of XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 26 recommended
pipeline (Gasoline) transfer activity containment E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
(fire/explosion) the Gasoline line needs to be
drained and verification checks
to be done. The design also
include and pressure/relief into
the BFI storage tanks
04 - High / Less or H124 Low pressure of fuel 1. The pump capacity on 1. Operational cost A service agreement is in place C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pump from the ship the ship does not impact due to delay of off- with the fuel supplier which 26 recommended
provide the minimum load of ship includes the requirement for a
required pressure of 400 minimum pump pressure
kPa capacity of 400 kPa for a
preferred maximum flow rate of
95m3/hr
05 - High / Low H125 High temperature of the 1. Pumping against a 1. Loss of containment Although there is no TSV on the C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Temperature fuel in the floating hose close valve or the through failure of the floating hose, however the hard 19 recommended
pipeline is full of liquid floating hose piping is provided with TSV-800
during before entering the break tank.
PSV -830 protects the floating
hose against overpressure due
to temperature fluctuations.
07 - Loss of H126 Possible leaks from the 1. The operator does not 1. Environmental incident Operational procedure and C5 P5 High 37 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is Basil Read
containment floating hose tighten the connection and loss of product or training as well as competency provided and calibrated to ensure Project
clamp correctly or contamination of product of personnel as well as that connection is done effectively Manager
effectively deployment visual checks.
Refresher training or sessions
for operators
07 - Loss of H127 Overpressure of the line, 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The design include a pressure C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment coupling failure, flange valve or line blockage and loss of product safety valve PSV-830 to 19 recommended
leaks. etc. leading to pressure minimise probability of
increase overpressure and a deployable
spill kit is provided on the wharf
to support the clean up of
spillages
08 - Fire / H128 Possible fire event 1. Ignition of the fuel due 1. Damage of equipment The floating hose include an C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards to static and safety risk embedded earth cable along the 16 recommended
hose length to minimise ignition
probability and the fuel transfer
rate is limited to linear velocity
less than 1.5m/s. The Bayside is
provided with electrical isolation
flanges
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 19
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
19 - Environmental H130 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The floating line is provided with C5 P4 High 32 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test Basil Read
hazards (Water from floating hose into the the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC dry-couplings which minimise cycle and service interval into the Project
pollution and sea failure guidance) and financial the volume of spilled product. maintenance philosophy of the Manager
consumption, legal impact Thus minimal environmental floating hose. (note the hose will be
requirements) risk. The gantry design is such sent to the manufacturer for testing
that all product in the flexible and re-certification if mandatory) or
line is drained back to V-930. tested on island if feasible
Maintenance and integrity
testing of the floating hose Act 015 FMC to ensure that the required FMC
maintenance philosophy is Operations
implemented Manager
20 - Normal H131 Ship pumps or control 1. Power loss, 1. Operational cost Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are systems failure mechanical failure, etc. impact due to delay of off- integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
there any human load of ship equipment on the ship and
factors, start- inspections are done by a third
up/shutdown, party
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H132 Incorrect transfer 1. Deviation from the 1. Contamination of Gas Operating manual (document C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are sequence of Gas Oil and prescribe sequence of Oil with Gasoline (note XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 19 recommended
there any human Gasoline fuel transfer more severe risk if the E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
factors, start- Gas Oil is contaminated) the Gasoline needs to be
up/shutdown, transferred first and verification
sampling hazards) checks to be done before Gas
Oil can be transferred.
26 - Natural H133 Change in the weather 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Damage of equipment The transfer activities are C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards condition while transfer of island operation and safety or planned for periods when 26 recommended
(earthquake, product is in progress environmental risk weather changes are stable
flooding, thunder based on weather data and
storm, lightning, swell forecasts as well as
high winds procedures for safe making of
hazards) the system
26 - Natural H134 Insufficient visibility to 1. Bad weather (mist or 1. Possible damage to the Current methodology is to only C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards safety execute the heavy rainfall) or night hose and safety risk off load fuel in day time and the 26 recommended
(earthquake, transfer activity operations (fatality) Ship to shore procedure
flooding, thunder (document XPE-400-PE-RPT-
storm, lightning, 0085 revision P3) specify the
high winds visibility requirements. The dry-
hazards) break coupling can be released
and the floating hose can be
stabilised (tighten) to minimise
damage. The barge is also
provided with amber strobe light
to increase visibility.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 20
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
34 - Security H136 Security risk during 1. Unauthorised access 1. Damage to the floating Access control to Rupert's Bay C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards transfer of product to the Rupert's Bay hose result in as well as security patrols and 20 recommended
environmental risk media announcements
N012 XPE-400-PE-3013 01- High / Low / No H137 No flow of fuel from the 1. Dry-coupling failure or 1. Unable to make the The barge holding tank is C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Draining and purging (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow 30m hose section (fuel blockage or block and line safe for full retrieval provided with sight glass which 26 recommended
of floating hose left in floating hose) tackle failure which is provides visibility to operator in
(Gasoline) use to create a static terms of detection and draining
head of liquid
02 - High / Low or H138 High level in the holding 1. The tank was not 1. Overflow of the tank The holding tank is provided C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level tank emptied after previous result in environmental with level indication (sight glass) 19 recommended
draining activity risk and delay in and SOP to ensure the tank is
operations emptied before draining activity
start
03 - Reverse or H139 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the Although the same floating hose C4 P6 High 36 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP Basil Read
Misdirected Flow of Gasoline to Gas Oil floating section to the product is used for Gas Oil and Gasoline for safe connection of floating hoses Project
system (ground fuels) wrong holding tank the holding tanks are uniquely Manager
(Note: The floating hose identifiable via labeling to
colour coding for Gas Oil minimise the probability
and Gasoline are the
same, however )
03 - Reverse or H140 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the The floating hose between jet C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Gasoline to the Jet floating section to the product and ground fuel are uniquely 19 recommended
Fuel system wrong holding tank colour coded to minimise the
probability
09 - Contamination/ H141 Possible corrosion 1. Incorrect selection of 1. Loss of containment The material of construction C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion material of construction result in environmental complies to the required 15 recommended
(expose to chlorides in risk standard for coastal areas (refer
sea water) to document XPE-400-DSH-
00264)
10 - Safety H142 Exposure of operating 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard (no PPE, safety training and safety C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, personnel to nitrogen use of nitrogen purging fatality due to no awareness programs and all 15 recommended
safety showers, of the line confinement) tasks are done according work
etc.) permit system including
maintenance of the N2 system
15 - H143 Inability to connect dry- 1. The line could not be 1. Operational cost Maintenance of the dry-break C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ break coupling to the connected due to impact due to delay of coupling on the holding tank recommended
Ergonomics / holding tank connection physical damages to the retrieval of the hose and connections and
Movement and for draining and purging coupling or connection inspections before use and
equipment points equipment checklist are
accessibility completed
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 21
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
04 - High / Less or H146 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 19bar for Gasoline high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
400-GA-4125 SHT 1 requires a
nitrogen pressure PSV on the
system to prevent against over
pressure of the upstream
sections of the floating hose
04 - High / Less or H147 Exceed the hard piping 1. Unknown of what 1. Transient pressure PSV-830 is set at 18.75bar and C4 P6 High 36 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum Basil Read
No Pressure line class A2 pressure of pressure is required by surge through the hard the design pressure is pressure of the pigging system Procurement
19bar for Gasoline the vendor for the piping and consequently documented in data sheet XPE- should not exceed the line class limit team
pigging system damage to the line 400-DSH-00249 revP2. of 19bar and if not possible the
However the risk is still valid vendor need to ensure that safety
due to transient conditions protections are included into the
pigging system design
07 - Loss of H148 Possible line, coupling 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The facility have a formal C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment failure, flange leaks. etc. valve or line blockage and loss of product emergency response plan and a 15 recommended
leading to pressure spill kit is provided on the wharf
increase and line failure to support the clean up of
or leaks spillages
08 - Fire / H149 Possible fire during the 1. Incorrect tools used 1. Damage to equipment, SOP that non-metal tools and C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards pigging activity during the connection of the hose and safety risk non-static tools are used as well 20 recommended
lines (fatality) as PPE, and training of
operators. Non sparking engine
on the barge is also used.
2. Lightning strike 1. Damage to equipment, All electrical, control C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
the hose and safety risk instrumentation 20 recommended
(fatality) (EC&I)equipment in hazardous
areas are Zone rated
08 - Fire / H150 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
10 - Safety H151 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) use of nitrogen purging (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, of the line including task risk analysis as
eye baths, well as tool box talks safety
breathing awareness programs)
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 22
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
17 - Position / H153 Possibility of damage to 1. The barge could 1. Environmental incident SOP that ensure the barge is C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of the floating hose move away from the and loss of product or properly positioned and 16 recommended
equipment (crane, safe pigging location possible injury to operator communication system between
ship, barge, etc.) (fatality) barge and gantry to manage
movements. The design
includes an emergency release
coupling to minimise damage
20 - Normal H154 Stuck of the pig 1. Low or No flow of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 018 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Operations (Are (line leaks or emptied the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
there any human cylinder) in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
factors, start- (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
up/shutdown, with the operational volume barge operations
sampling hazards) requirement. The design include
Act 019 Consider to conduct a pigging trial Basil Read
a soft type of pig and full bore
valves. However there is a risk service test (at operating pressure) commissioning
of unavailability of nitrogen with water to ensure effective team
cylinders movement of the pig. (Note the
activity requires proper draining after
the test)
2. If one of the valves 1. Unable to continue with SOP, task checklist and training C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
are closed the pigging activity result of operators to ensure that all 19 recommended
in operational upset valves are in correct position
(delays) (open)
20 - Normal H155 Exposure of operator to 1. If the pigging 1. Possible fatality and SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Operations (Are fumes during the use of equipment is not operational upset of operators to ensure that all 26 recommended
there any human the pigging launcher operated according to pigging connections and task
factors, start- instructions (e.g. if the are done which include QA/QC
up/shutdown, pig lid is not effectively by supervisors
sampling hazards) connected onto the pig
launcher)
2. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
purging activity of the (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
line including task risk analysis as
well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
25 - Spares H156 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption for pigging available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope activity quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of of the pigging responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and equipment Read will provide operational
Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the pigging Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
equipment are done describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 23
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
27 - Ventilation and H158 Insufficient ventilation 1. The pigging is not 1. Possible fatality due to SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
lighting during pigging activity done outside the ISO exposure to N2 or of operators to ensure that 26 recommended
requirements container hydrocarbon fumes inside pigging is done according to
a confined space procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
0050
29 - Equipment H159 Exposure of operators to 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Operational delays due SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of lifting hazards and pigging system and to difficulty to as well as rigging task 15 recommended
equipment (crane, maintenance constraint barge operations install/remove pigging assessments, as well as
road truck, lay conditions equipment or ISO statutory inspections of lifting
down areas) containers equipment.
30 - H160 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
operator and the gantry load of ship
operator
2. Radio signal or 1. Operational cost None C4 P6 High 36 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which Basil Read
frequency loss or natural impact due to delay of off- would be effective for safe operation Project
barriers (wind, rain, etc.) load of ship in terms of frequency, range, etc. Manager
leads to ineffective
communication
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
33 - Area H161 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
N014 XPE-400-PE-3013 01- High / Low / No H162 Loss of N2 feed to 1. Unavailability of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 021 Ensure that there is safe location for Basil Read
Nitrogen purging of (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow purging effectively cylinders or line failure the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge storage of large quantities of N2 Project
the Gasoline system XPE-400-PE-3013 in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at bottles for a three fuel transfer Manager
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned approximately 80-100 bottles
with the operational volume
Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for FMC
requirement, however here is a
risk of unavailability handling and transporting of bottles Operations
and re-use by supplier Manager
02 - High / Low or H163 Level of liquid buildup in 1. The current route of 1. Unable to remove the The design basis include a N2 C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level the hard piping the hard piping contains liquid which could lead to purging and draining procedure 19 recommended
a low point that result in water hammering effect of the concern low point dead-
fluid accumulation or when the line is used leg section (refer to section
operator did not drain again 4.6.7 of XPE-400-PE-RPT-
the line 0050)
04 - High / Less or H164 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 19bar for Gasoline high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
cylinders incident piping between the gantry and
break tank is provided with a
PSV-830 with setpoint of
18.75bar
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 24
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 25
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 26
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 27
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
02 - High / Low or H188 Low level in tank ST-220 1. Higher outlet flow 1. Possible pump The design include a low level C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level and ST-200 than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-225 on ST-220 and recommended
LALL-205 on ST-200 to initiate
operator response to stop the
pump and release the spring
loaded 4" valve to close
03 - Reverse or H189 Possible reverse flow air 1. Operator opens the 2" 1. Air ingress into the line None C4 P6 High 36 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system FMC
Misdirected Flow ingress into the fast flash spring loaded valve to result in cavitation of the clearly states that the V-Jar system Operations
system the V-Jar is open while pump cannot be utilised while the fast flush Manager and
the fast flush pump is pump is in operation Basil Read
running Project
Manager
15 - H190 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tank is located C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental approximately 7m from the ST 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-200 or ST-220 separation distance risk tanks and SOP which describe
Movement and operator of pump P-220 between the operators hand signal communication due
equipment and PRT-950 to that the operators are in line
accessibility of sight of each other
25 - Spares H191 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption due to available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope unavailability of fast flush quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of pump components of pump equipment responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and Read will provide operational
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the gantry
equipment are done
Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
33 - Area H192 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier document XPE-400-PE-DSH-
done according to British contract 00098 revP2)
Standard requirements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 28
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
02 - High / Low or H194 Low level in tank ST- 1. Higher outlet flow 1. Possible pump The design include a low level C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level 100/ST-120/ ST-140 than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-105 on ST-100; recommended
LALL-125 on ST-120 and LALL-
145 on ST-140 to initiate
operator response to stop the
pump and release the spring
loaded 4" valve to close
03 - Reverse or H195 Possible reverse flow air 1. Operator opens the 2" 1. Air ingress into the line None C4 P6 High 36 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system FMC
Misdirected Flow ingress into the fast flash spring loaded valve to result in cavitation of the clearly states that the V-Jar system Operations
system the V-Jar is open while pump cannot be utilised while the fast flush Manager and
the fast flush pump is pump is in operation Basil Read
running Project
Manager
15 - H196 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tanks are on the same C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental level and is located 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-100 or ST-120 or separation distance risk approximately 25m from the
Movement and ST 140 operator of pump between the operators pump. SOP describe hand
equipment P-110 and PRT-750 signal communication due to
accessibility that the operators are in line of
sight of each other
25 - Spares H197 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption due to available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope unavailability of fast flush quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of pump components of pump equipment responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and Read will provide operational
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the gantry
equipment are done Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
33 - Area H198 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier document XPE-400-PE-DSH-
done according to British contract 00098 revP2)
Standard requirements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 29
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
02 - High / Low or H200 Low level in tank ST-300 1. Higher outlet flow 1. Possible pump The design include a low level C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-305 on ST-300 to recommended
initiate operator response to
stop the pump and release the
spring loaded 4" valve to close
03 - Reverse or H201 Possible reverse flow air 1. Operator opens the 2" 1. Air ingress into the line None C4 P6 High 36 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system FMC
Misdirected Flow ingress into the fast flash spring loaded valve to result in cavitation of the clearly states that the V-Jar system Operations
system the V-Jar is open while pump cannot be utilised while the fast flush Manager and
the fast flush pump is pump is in operation Basil Read
running Project
Manager
15 - H202 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tank is located C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental approximately 7m from the ST 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-300 tank and separation distance risk tank and SOP which describe
Movement and PRT-850 tank operator between the operators hand signal communication due
equipment to that the operators are in line
accessibility of sight of each other
25 - Spares H203 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption due to available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope unavailability of fast flush quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of pump components of pump equipment responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and Read will provide operational
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the gantry
equipment are done
Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
33 - Area H204 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier document XPE-400-PE-DSH-
done according to British contract 00098 revP2)
Standard requirements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 30
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Appendix D:
Piping Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 1
© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.