Macariola Vs.

Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:

On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola.
The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A – E.
Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following provisions:
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also
known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:

No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who
earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated
October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce,
which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever there is a
change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted
by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in
any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that
the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation
on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes against Canon 25.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the
documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his
office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent
Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the
issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect
Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have
Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also,with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from
Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no
longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will
provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen
the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

 4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid
of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.

1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.

2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus
ibi remedium.

2. The Court agree.

1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.

2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
 management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

3. It is not premature.

1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.

4. There was grave abuse of discretion.

1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid
of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy
the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.

2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:
 1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules.

2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to
alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law
is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO
284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

IBP VS ZAMORA

Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.
RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Heirs of Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, 09 October 2012

18APR

[CARPIO, J.]

FACTS

Movants Philippine Stock Exchange’s (PSE) President, Manuel V. Pangilinan, Napoleon L. Nazareno, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) contend that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long
been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact,
movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in
favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted this particular definition in its
numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a “new”
definition or “midstream redefinition” of the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether the term “capital” includes both voting and non-voting shares.

RULING

NO.

The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy “effectively controlled” by Filipinos.
Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules
explain that “[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is
not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate
voting rights is essential.” In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial
ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership
of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.

CASE DIGEST

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner
and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he
is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has
the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from
which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to
be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not
to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified
compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the
only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and
write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine
Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and
to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they
contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products
of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy
of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy
in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence
on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control
of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public
utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries
that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products,
domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial
and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally
fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and
judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise.
It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it
is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in
the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority.
As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is
a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their
policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

Planas v. COMELEC

7/17/2014 1 Comment

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.

PLANAS VS. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:

While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention approved its proposed
constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the
proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a
petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are
lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the
president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On
January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.

ISSUES:

1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?

2. Is PD 73 valid?

3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?
HELD:

The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but also
of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of the
Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the
Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus
Cogens.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

 The Plebiscite Case

1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution of the Philippines.

2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,
1971.

3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution
on January 15, 1973.

5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter
alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be
used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the
purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission
to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,
press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
 6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January
15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the
meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then,
again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January
22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not
have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission
on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent
motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973.”

10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later
than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order
and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and
restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and
its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado
Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such
task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were
supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the
two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case
G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,
1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being
heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this
opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to
him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No.
L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present
that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said
Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

 The Ratification Case

 1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.

2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to
ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree,
and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said
new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is
well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled
applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution.

2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
 2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.

3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.

4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This
is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest”
expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void,
insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution

3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no
expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of
the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application
in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of
the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”

3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under
a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted
the Constitution.”

4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line
with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

2. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of
Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of
Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not
 constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that
the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of
Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

3. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

4. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has
been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and
effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the
submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in
accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election
Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect.

2. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force
by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court,
voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are
not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree 991.

On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to
he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
 The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it
directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum- Plebiscite scheduled on
16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30

September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, was instituted by
Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim
National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan,
docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-
Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to
the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions
reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance
with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e.,
period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the
members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v.
COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he
shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President
the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on
the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening
of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15,
1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the
interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February
1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January,
1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the
business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an
organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve
or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or
adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on
February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict
with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy
required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the
President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent
President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President,
their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled
election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from
holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue
into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of
the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at
the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of
letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner

vs.

President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power
by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

 In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.

 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the
judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Rulings:

1. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners
did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the present government.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )

Posted: August 10, 2011 in Political Law

Tags: Immunity from Suits 0

Immunity from Suits

Facts:

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of
the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.

Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and
elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers to.

Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?

Held:

It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.(Note: ROC provides that the
jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC )

More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President
Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.

It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for
the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election

Case outline: Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth Dimaano –
G.R. No. 104768

PUBLISHED APRIL 25, 2016

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The Case

 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth Dimaano – G.R. No.
104768

 Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.

 The first Resolution dismissed petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Amended Complaint and ordered the
return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Motion for Reconsideration.

 Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for
the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to
complete the presentation of its evidence.

Statement of Facts

 Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)

o President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon assuming Malacañang, enacts Executive Order 1 (EO
No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). It is mandated to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates.

o EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:

 (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order and the power

 (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order.

o Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
(AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.

 AFP Board

o The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q. Josephus Ramas.

o On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on Ramas’ alleged ill gotten wealth. It
submits the following findings:

 Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-
Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City may be estimated
modestly at P700,000.00.

 He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square
meters.
  Communication equipment and facilities are found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a
Confidential Agent of the Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas.

 These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use
by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

 Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

 Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

 Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus Ramas’ mistress. She does not have
any means to acquire the communications equipment as well as the aforementioned money.

o The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General Josephus Ramas for ill gotten wealth and
unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

o Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

o On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379)
against Ramas.

o Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and
close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

o The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

 Ramas’ Answer:

o Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon
City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income.

o He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other
items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

o Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

 The Sandiganbayan

o On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.
 o Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a year.

o on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further
evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days
within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

o Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason
of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.

o Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano.

o The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

o Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

 (1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court
in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

 (2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.

 (3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

 (4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

Issues

1. PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

2. Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence — Petitioner also contends that
the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

3. Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure — Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring
the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This
issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence
against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private
respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.Ruling

1. First issue:

1. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These
are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
 2. Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims
that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

3. We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

4. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos.

2. Second issue:

1. Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending
for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.

3. Third issue:

1. On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

2. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people. Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

3. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same
in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

4. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

5. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

6. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
 7. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

8. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A revolution has been defined as
the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen’s book, General Theory
of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified
and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

9. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

10. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

11. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to
the items specifically described in the warrant.

12. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

De Leon vs. Esguerra

153 SCRA 602

No. L-78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won as Councilmen of Brgy.
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which
commenced on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987, while the petitioners still have one year and four
months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new
Brgy. Captain and other respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents relied on the
Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or designate new successors within the one year
period which ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that the terms of office of the petitioners were already been
abolished and that they continued in office simply because no new successors were appointed yet; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials up to six years must have been
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an original action for
prohibition to review the order of the governor.

ISSUE: Whether the designation was valid?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal effect. Though the designation
was within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution
took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the 1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer had the authority to
designate successors under the Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been superseded. There has been
no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and the Barangay Election Act is
not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition was granted and the petitioners have acquired the
security of tenure.

Notes:

When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?

- The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article XVIII, Section
27 that it “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose.” (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of
1986)

- The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the people have
cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should not be on
the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be no need to wait for
any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done
by the people. The COMELEC, on the other hand, should make the official announcement that the votes show that the
Constitution was ratified, but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite.