12.14 ALVAREZ V.
CFI 64 PHIL 33 has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could
Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service
of the Anti- Usury Board, of the Department of
Justice,presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David
then presiding over the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a moneylender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the
law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of
the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge
and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but
upon the information received by him from a reliable
person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date,
issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the
petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at
any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books
and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With
said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered Alvarez's store and residence on 4 June 1936,
and seized and took possession of his confidential
files. The search for and seizure of said articles were
made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his
protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As
the articles had not been brought immediately to the
judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez,
through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936,
praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized
articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
disobeyed the order of the court.
Issue:Whether the search warrant issued by the court
is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit
ofagent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had
no personal knowledge of the facts.
Ruling:Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
requirethat there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the search
warrant must be based upon an application supported
by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient
and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which
the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents
and other papers are illegal. Neither the Constitution
nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable
cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with
that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of
the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts
12.15 WEBB V. DE LEON GR 121234 AUG. 23,1995
Facts:On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and
her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its
finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica
Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between
her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown
statements. They criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge
that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent
Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest
against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination. Complain about the denial
of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation.
They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES: W/N respondent judges de Leon and
Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
Ruling: NO. It is a valid arrest -- In arrest cases,
there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Consti II (section 2) 1
 Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of
an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.” Clearly then, our laws repudiate the
submission that respondent judges should have
conducted “searching examination of witnesses”
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
For Search:
12.16 BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800
Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, law enforcement
officers searched the offices of the “We forum” and
“Metropolitan Mail” newspapers. During the course of
the search, the law enforcement officers seized office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and
several other materials used in the distribution of
newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the
seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to
seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly
conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It
must be noted that real properties are not susceptible
of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this
appeal which assails the validity of the search and the
seizure of the properties of the petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioner’s
assertion that real property were invalidly seized
under the disputed warrants.
Ruling: No. The petitioner’s assertion does not hold
water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code,
“machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works” are considered
immovable property. In another case decided by the
Court, in which the abovementioned legal provision
was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at
bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the
land and/or building on which the machineries were
placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remains
movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.
12.17 PRUDENTE V. DAYRIT 180 SCRA 69
FACTS: The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action
Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the
issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the
deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it
was made mentioned of “result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered
information from verified sources that the holders of
said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions
aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and
ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not student who were
not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and
ammunitions. Person to be searched in Nemesio
Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his
control or possession firearms, explosives hand
grenades and ammunitions which are illegally
possesses at the office of Department of Military
Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He
claimed that:
1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the
facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not
in form of searching questions and answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme
Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was
valid?
Ruling: No. Valid search warrant to issue, there
must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under
oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons and things to
be seized. The probable cause must be in connection
with one specific offense and the Judge must, before
issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, In writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce, on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection which the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. This probable case must
be shown to be personal knowledge and of the
Consti II (section 2) 2
complainant and witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay.
12.18 UNITED STATES V. JONES JANUARY 23,
2012
Facts: Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005,
for drug possession after police attached a tracker to
Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it
to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not
guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which
point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the
loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones
and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones
owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of
Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted,
but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court
specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of
a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not
be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a
warrant.
Issue: W/N the warrantless use of a tracking device
on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public
streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights?
Ruling: Yes. The Court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS
tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant,
constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court rejected the government's
argument that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a person's movement on public
thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment provided some protection for trespass
onto personal property.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion,
agreeing that the government had obtained
information by usurping Jones' property and by
invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned
with trespasses onto property. She stated that a
Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the
government violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is
particularly important in an era where physical
intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of
surveillance.
II Who determines Probable Cause
12.19 PEOPLE V. CA GR 126005 JAN. 21, 1999
Facts: Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an information
for murder in connection with the fatal shooting of
Rosalinda Dy inside the office of his father, Billy
Cerbo. The information was amended to include Billy
Cerbo as one of the accused and a warrant for his
arrest was correspondingly issued. Respondent judge,
in a motion to quash warrant of arrest, dismissed the
case against Billy for insufficiency of evidence,
recalled the warrant issued, and ordered the
prosecution to withdraw its amended information and
to file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only. The
private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, his resort to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in affirming the trial court held that
the trial court RTC has authority to reverse the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause and dismiss the
information on the ground that the evidence
presented did not substantiate the charge.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of
charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo.
Ruling: Yes. The determination of probable cause to
hold a person for trial is a function that belongs to the
public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. The judge should not override
the public prosecutor's determination of probable
cause on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of a warrant of arrest was
insufficient. As a general rule, if the information is
valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the
part of the public prosecutor, courts should not
dismiss it for want of evidence because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard during the
trial.
III. Kinds of Evidence Needed to Establish Probable
Cause
12.20 MICROSOFT CORP. V. MAXICORP, GR
140946
FACTS : This case involves the issuance of search
warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for alleged
violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and
Article 189 of the RPC (unfair competition). Armed
with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a
search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property
fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that there was no probable cause for their
issuance and that the warrants are in the form of
"general warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion
and at the same time denied their motion for
reconsideration. According to RTC they’ve found a
probable cause to issue such warrant after examining
the NBI agent and the computer technician who
visited Maxicorp. Maxicorp filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set
aside the RTC’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed
Consti II (section 2) 3
the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash
the search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999. The Court
of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to
present during the preliminary examination
conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold
the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano
presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel
Diaz."
ISSUE: Whether or not there’s a probable cause on
the part of CA to quash the search warrants issued by
RTC
RULING: Probable cause means "such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper."Thus, probable cause for a search warrant
requires such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. The testimonies of these two witnesses,
coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent
that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also
produced, packaged and in some cases, installed
there. The determination of probable cause does not
call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man,not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law or rule
states that probable cause requires a specific kind of
evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists.Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. 26
Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to
reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales
receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name. For purposes of
determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not
the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software
occurred. During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the
judge the computer unit that he purchased from
Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-
installed petitioners’ software.
IV. In General
13.11 Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003
FACTS: On June 2001, PO3 Alcoser together with
his witness applied for the issuance of a warrant to
search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard
R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as
“Rumolo Nala alias Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion,
Kitaotao, Bukidnon.” The application was filed in
connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession
of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in
violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the
same day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of
Malaybalay City, issued Search and Seizure Warrant.
The fact that the items seized were not exactly the
items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the
same because the items seized bear a direct relation
to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
(Respondent judge also found that petitioner was
sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first
name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and
not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was
couched in terms that would make it enforceable
against the person and residence of petitioner and no
other.)
ISSUE: Was petitioner sufficiently described in the
search and seizure warrant?
RULING: YES. the failure to correctly state in the
search and seizure warrant the first name of
petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or
“Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because the
additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said
to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to
locate and identify the petitioner. . What is
prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party,
and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a
description personae that will enable the officer to
identify the accused without difficulty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. Search and Seizure Warrant
is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue
thereof are declared inadmissible in evidence.
13.12 Betoy v. Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES,
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1608, February 28, 2006
Facts: In a Letter-Complaint dated July 2000, signed
by Bernardo Betoy, Sr. (complainant) charges Judge
Consti II (section 2) 4
Mamerto Y. Coliflores (respondent) with Grave Abuse
of Discretion and Authority, Conduct Unbecoming as
a Judge and Gross Negligence Resulting to Procedural
Lapses (Dereliction of Duty).Complainant attached to
the Letter-Complaint an Affidavit executed by his
wife Lucia Betoy.
Issue: Whether respondent retired Judge was found
guily of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent retired Judge Mamerto Y.
Coliflores is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
He is fined P20,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge. Section 11(A) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent is found guilty of a serious charge is either
a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more
thanP40,000.00, suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
13.13 20th Century Fox v. CA, 162 SCRA 655; G.R.
Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988
Facts: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting
searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s
anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that
certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of
the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search
warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The lower court issued the
desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by
the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described in the three warrants.
Issue: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants
he issued earlier?
Ruling: YES, the judge properly lifted the search
warrants he issued earlier. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED
the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.
13.14 Columbia Pictures v. CA, 262 SCRA 219
Facts:In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board
(VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco
(Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly
pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia
Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco
filed a motion to quash the search warrant but the
same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an
Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return
the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted
the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling
in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be
issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films
alleged to be pirated must be attached in the
application for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox ruling may be
applied retroactively in this case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th
Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower
court could not possibly have expected more evidence
from the VRB and Columbia Pictures in their
application for a search warrant other than what the
law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially
accepted, required with respect to the finding of
probable cause.
B. Personally Determined by the Judge
13.15 Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463
Facts: Petitioners filed information in the city court
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
information, respondent judge set the hearing of the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the information to
aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review
of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to
compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscal’s certification in the
information of the existence of probable cause
constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to
issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether respondent city judge may, for the
purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the
fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
Consti II (section 2) 5
and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification
for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such
certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under
Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable
cause. Petition dismissed.
13.16 Lim v. Judge Fenix, 194 SCRA 292
FACTS: On March 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality
of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin. Mr. Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a
gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then
followed.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the
court issued an order concluding that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of named accused.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a
probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of
the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor.
The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.
The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
13.17 People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788
Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint
against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly
transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant,
Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior
permission or clearance from COMELEC as required
by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s
complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case.
Hence, on September 1988, he filed with the
respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against
the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30,
1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused OIC Mayor.
Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by
a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial
Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine
whether or not probable cause exists?
Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the
COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. This power is exclusive
with COMELEC. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC
is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a
mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of
every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in
relation to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional
mandate.
13.18 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715, 189 SCRA
715, 1990
Facts: On January 1988 the COMELEC received a
report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo
City against private respondents for alleged violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who
eventually recommended the filing of an information
against each of the private respondents for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc
resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations
and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. Later, an order was
issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC
through the Regional Election Director of Region VII
to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The
Consti II (section 2) 6
COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration and opposition to the motion for
reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the
Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders,
rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether the (RTC) has the authority to review
the actions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses filed in said court.
Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code, it is clear that aside from the
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
to decide election contests and administrative
questions, it is also vested the power of a public
prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation and the prosecution of
election offenses punishable under the Code before
the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and
upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files
the information in the proper court, said court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be
subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC
cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without
the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
court.
13.19 Allado v. Diokno – 232 SCRA 192
Facts: On September 1993, a Security Guard and a
discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement
implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza who are
partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the
alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Van Twest,
a German national. Based on that confession of
Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto
Barrios of the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant
issued separately raided the dwellings of police
officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the
perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and
ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping,
kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation
of authority.
Issue: Whether a warrant of arrest without bail can
be set aside and the case be dismissed for lack of
probable cause even if the accused was not in the
custody of the court.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding in the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier
cases resolved by the high court, the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that
the accused be in the custody of the law. Various
reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to
accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.
13.20 Gozos v. Tac-an – GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998
Facts: On February 1995, the officials, teachers, and
students of the Concepcion Aguila Memorial College
in San Jose, Batangas organized a school party. While
the party was going on, the principal, Felizardo
Aguila, was informed that several men, who appeared
to be drunk, were trying to force their way through
the main gate. One of the men seemed armed with a
handgun. After calling the police, Aguila went to the
main gate, where he asked the men what their
business was.
At this point, private respondents Blanco and Atienza
arrived at the school. They were shortly joined by
private respondents Pedro Castillo, Sulit, and
Ildefonso Castillo, who were all members of the
Philippine National Police of San Jose, Batangas.
They demanded from the man armed with a handgun,
who later turned out to be the victim Gilbert Dyogi,
that he surrender his gun and go with them to the
station. Gilbert Dyogi gave the handgun to the
respondents, who then asked to see his license. He
produced a sheet of paper from his wallet which he
handed to private respondents. After allowing them to
inspect the weapon and the alleged license, Gilbert
Dyogi asked the private respondents to give them
back to him. However, private respondent Blanco,
who had the gun, refused to do so.
What exactly followed is unclear. Before long the two
were grappling for possession of the gun. Apparently,
Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired at Gilbert
Dyogi twice. Order dated January 1996 Respondent
judge Tac-an denied the second motion for
reconsideration filed by complainant Edna Dyogi,
questioning the authority of respondent to require the
Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information. (long
facts to be substantial)
Consti II (section 2) 7
Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause against
all the accused before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest
Ruling: The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the
judge regarding the designation of the offense
committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for
the offense charged, he should issue a warrant of
arrest against the accused for the crime charged in
the information.Wherefore, the petition is hereby
granted and the orders, dated October 1995 ,
November 1995, and January 1996, of respondent
Judge Paterno tac-an are annulled and set aside.
14.11 FLORES vs. SUMALJAG (290 SCRA 568)
Facts: This is an administrative case against Judge
Antonio C. Sumaljag, Acting Presiding Judge of
Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, for
gross ignorance of the law in connection with the
preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and
the arrest of complainants.
Complainants Domingo Veloso, et al, were charged for
conspiring together in preparing a spurious and
falsified excerpt from the alleged minutes of the
regular session dated August 24, 1996 to unduly
protest the application of another person in the name
of Gualberto Parmis to own a certain lot in Sitio
Hayahay in Baybay, Leyte. The charge arises from
the fact that no regular session was held on the above-
mentioned date.
Basically, the complainants instituted this
administrative case because of the four main points:
1. The testimonies during the preliminary
examinations failed to establish probable
cause;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. R-3227-A and R-3228-
A, the complainant was not personally
examined by respondent, the ones who
testified being only complainants witnesses;
3. In Criminal Case No. R 3231-A, there was
absence of searching questions and answers
during the preliminary examination, the
questions propounded being answerable by
Yes, Judge;
4. There was no cause under the law to arrest
them as the possibility of fleeing to escape the
hands of justice is remote as they are
barangay officials.
In response to the charge, the respondent judge said
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation had likewise been observed. He
contended that, by posting bail, complainants waived
objection to any irregularities which might have been
committed in the course of the preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE:When may an investigating judge issue a
warrant of arrest of the accused?
HELD:What differentiates the present rule from the
previous one before the 1985 revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is that while before, it was
mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused if he found
probable cause, the rule now is that the investigating
judges power to order the arrest of the accused is
limited to instances in which there is a necessity for
placing him in custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. The arrest of the accused can be
ordered only in the event the prosecutor files the case
and the judge of the Regional Trial Court finds
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It is entirely new rule, and it is plain to see
that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused, even after having personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, for the
determination of whether a probable cause exists and
whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound
judgment or discretion.
14.12 BACHE & CO. vs RUIZ (37 SCRA 823)
Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of
Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file
the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his
witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search
warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken.
The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to
Consti II (section 2) 8
take the oath and warned him that if his deposition
was found to be false and without legal basis, he could
be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s
application for search warrant and Logronio’s
deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search
warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three
grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witness. Personal
examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is
necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable
cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than
one specific offense. The search warrant in
question was issued for at least four distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in
Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the
irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense.’
Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no
search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly
describe the things to be seized. The
documents, papers and effects sought to be
seized are described in the Search Warrant
“Unregistered and private books of accounts
(ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers);
receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory
notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications,
accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and
withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art
III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized. A search
warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact
not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.
14.13 SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR (GR 8287, Nov.
14, 1981)
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel
against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit". He
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue
of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also
contends that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character of the publication.
He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed
would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
ISSUE:Whether or not the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause
HELD: What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
14.14 LUNA vs. PLAZA (26 SCRA 310)
Consti II (section 2) 9
Facts: Luna was charged with the crime of murder
before the court of respondent-judge Lorenzo Plaza.
Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of
the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of
questions and answers taken by investigator T-Sgt.
Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the
respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the
complaint. The respondent Judge examined the
prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over
again the questions and answers" in their statements
in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before
said Judge that the questions were propounded by T-
Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made
by them. Considering the answers of the affiants to
the questions contained in their sworn statements,
together with the post-mortem and autopsy report on
the dead body of the victim, the respondent Judge
opined that there was reasonable ground to believe
that the crime of murder had been committed and the
accused was probably guilty thereof. Respondent
Judge issued the order and warrant of arrest,
specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for
the provisional release of the accused.
Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 3828
imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a
warrant of arrest, two specific duties, to wit: (1) he
must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers. The record of the
instant case, according to petitioner, does not show
that said examination was performed by respondent
Judge.
ISSUE: Did the respondent judge violate the above-
mentioned requisites for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest?
HELD:The first condition was fulfilled. The trial
court found as a fact that "the respondent judge
personally examined the witnesses for the
prosecution; that respondent judge adopted as his own
personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt.
Patosa appearing in the written statements, which he
read over again the witnesses together with the
answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether
said answers were theirs, and whether the same
answers were true, to which the witnesses answered
in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not
prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the
questions asked by a previous investigator. The
second condition for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest was also fulfilled. The trial court found
that the complaint was "supported by statements of
the witnesses under oath." The third condition
requiredwas likewise fulfilled. The examination of
the witnesses was written down, in the form of
searching questions and answers.
Additional notes: The term "searching questions and
answers" means only, taking into consideration the
purpose of the preliminary examination which is to
determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of
arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial.”
What would be searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature
of the offense, the date, time, and place of its
commission, the possible motives for its commission;
the subject, his age, education, status, financial and
social circumstances, his attitude toward the
investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to
commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family
responsibilities, financial and social circumstances,
characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of
inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions,
therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the
Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court
a quo found that respondent Judge was "satisfied that
the questions and answers contained in the sworn
statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the
nature of his searching questions and answers as
required by law," so the respondent Judge adopted
them.
14.15 KHO vs. JUDGE MAKALINTAL (GR 94902-06)
Facts: May 15, 1990, NBI agents Max Salvador and
Eduardo Arugay applied for the issuance of search
warrants by the respondent Judge against petitioner
Kho, in his residences in BF homes and Moonwalk,
Paranaque. The search warrants were applied after
teams of NBI agents had conducted personal
surveillances and investigation in the 2 houses on the
basis of confidential information they received that
said places were being used as storage centers for
unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. On the
same day, respondent Judge conducted the necessary
examination of the applicants and their witnesses,
after which he issued search warrants. On May 16,
1990, NBI searched the premises and recovered
unlicensed high-powered firearms, ammunitions,
radio transceivers and unregistered motor vehicles.
On May 28, 1990, petitioners file a Motion to Quash
contending that said warrants were issued without
probable cause and were in the nature of general
warrants. On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge denied
said motion.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was probable cause in
the issuance of the search warrants?
HELD:Yes. It is within the discretion of the
examining judge to determine what questions to ask
the witnesses so long as the questions asked are
germane to the pivot of inquiry – the existence or
Consti II (section 2) 10
absence of probable cause. The respondent judge
examined the applicants and witnesses under oath,
and asked them questions on the facts and
circumstances personally known to them enough to
create a probable cause.
On the issue of general warrants, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be described
in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Further, the description is required to be specific only
so far as the circumstance will ordinarily allow.
14.16 ALVAREZ vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
(64 PHIL 33)
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of
Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit
that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of
books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of
law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say
that the information was based on his personal
knowledge but was only received by him from a
reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the
warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and
seized different documents namely, banknotes,
bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not
brought immediately to the custody of the judge who
issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the
Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that
all articles in question be returned to him because the
SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-
Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain
custody of the articles seized for further investigation.
When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez
elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the
search warrant as well as the order of the judge
authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be
declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether the search warrant issued by the
judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit
of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which
were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant
but he had knowledge thereof only through
information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable.
HELD:Yes.The oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The
true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held
liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore,
the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal.
Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach
the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant
to the application. It is admitted that the judge who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition of
any other witness. The Constitution does not provide
that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of
the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as
the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit
of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge
of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is
likewise illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge
of the facts.
14.17 BACHE & CO. vs. RUIZ (37 SCRA 823)
Facts:Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Revenue Examiner
Rodolfo de Leon and Arturo Logronio went to CFI
with proper documents. Judge Vivencio Ruiz asked
his secretary to take the deposition and when done
stenographer read it to the judge. Logronio took the
oath and was warned by judge that he may be
charged with perjury if found lying. Search warrant
was issued and served. Petitioners’ lawyers protested
Consti II (section 2) 11
the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant.
The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search
which yielded six boxes of documents. BIR based on
the documents seized. Petitioner contend that judged
failed to personally examine the complainant and
witnesses.
ISSUE:Whether or not search warrant is null and
void on the ground of no personal examination of the
judge?
RULING:Yes. If there was an examination at all of
the complainant and his witness, it was the one
conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as
stated, the Constitution and the rules require a
personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on
account of the intention of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the
issuing judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses that the question of how much time
would be consumed by the judge in examining them
came up before the Convention, as can be seen from
the record of the proceedings quoted above. The
reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge
did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that
manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial
and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on
account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or
not there was probable cause.
14.18 BORLONGAN vs. PENA (GR 143591, Nov. 23,
2007)
Facts: Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for
recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and
petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion
to dismiss, including several documents as evidence.
Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified.
He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with
the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found probable
cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC.
Warrants of arrest were issued for the petitioners /
accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to
avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban
Ban. On the scheduled date for the arraignment,
despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the
court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them.
The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of
arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of
bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Informations charging the
petitioners were validly filed and the warrants
for their arrest were properly issued;
2. WON this Court can, itself, determine
probable cause; and
3. WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes
a waiver of their right to question the validity
of their arrest.
HELD:First issue: For the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites
for a warrant of arrest to be valid. On the basis of the
above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the
strength of the affidavit executed by the respondent,
the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists.
These same affidavit and documents were used by the
trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest. The SC
finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments
insufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the
documents were mere assertions. It must be
emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or
any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their
(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the
respondent that the signatures were falsified does not
qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said
affidavit did respondent state that he was present at
the time of the execution of the documents. Neither
did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures
of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion
Second issue:Regarding the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were
illegally issued as they were solely based on the
affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III
of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. But the
judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may
already make a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard
the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
Consti II (section 2) 12
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which
makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory
before the judge could determine probable cause.
Third issue:Yes. The erstwhile ruling of this Court
was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule
114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The
principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his
plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner
after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be
argued that she waived her right to question the
finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her
right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party
does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
14.19 PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL (GR 147607)
Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC
for a search warrant authorizing the search for
marijuana at the family residence of appellant
Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching
team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana
leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated
items and prepared a receipt of property seized and
certified that the house was properly searched, which
was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials
who witnessed the search. The PNP Crime Laboratory
issued a report finding the seized specimens positive
for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the
examination on the urine sample of appellant
affirmed that it was positive for the same. Appellant
denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and
that he was at his parent’s house when the search
was conducted only because he visited his mother. He
also said that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized
for the first time during the trial, although he
admitted that the signature on the certification that
the house was properly searched was his.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing
a search warrant.
RULING:Yes. In determining probable cause, it is
required that (1) the judge must examine the
complaint and his witnesses personally; (2) that the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers. The prosecution
failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant
put into writing his examination of the applicant, and
his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers before issuance of the search warrant. When
the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on
the available records kept in their office, neither
transcript of the proceedings of a searching question
and answer nor the sworn statements of the
complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge
examined them in writing was presented. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary
in order that the judge may be able to properly
determine the existence and non-existence of probable
cause.
14.20ORTIZ vs. PALAYPAYON (234 SCRA 391)
Facts: Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is
administratively charged with gross ignorance of the
law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression
relative to a criminal case pending before respondent
judge. The charge stemmed from a complaint for
damage to property thru reckless imprudence filed
before the respondent's sala on May 19, 1993
involving a collision between a Toyota Corolla owned
by one Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her
husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck owned by
one Juliana Lu which was entrusted to herein
complainant, and then driven by one Rodrigo
Vasquez. It appears that on May 19, 1993, respondent
judge issued an order for the arrest of accused Juliana
Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David
Ortiz, on the basis of mere affidavits by the offended
party and without conducting the preliminary
investigation required by Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court
Respondent judge, instead of filing his comment on
the complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack
of factual or legal basis. claims that pursuant to the
said rule, he personally examined in writing and
under oath the private complainant and his witnesses
by asking the same questions propounded to them in
their sworn statements and the same answers were
given. At the same time, respondent judge maintains
that it is customary for him to adopt the sworn
statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he
is satisfied of the existence of probable cause. This
practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings and
save the party litigants' time and money.
Consti II (section 2) 13
ISSUE:Whether or not Palaypon erred in ordering the
arrest of the accused Juliana Lu, et al.?
HELD:The respondent judge's action clearly violates
constitutional provisions and established rules of
procedure. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution provides: “…no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce...” In
relation thereto, Rule 112, Section 6 (b) of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides
that “If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest.”
From the foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is
evident that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted. Respondent judge did not personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking
searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause as mandated by law.
He simply ignored the constitutional requirement of
procedural due process. This Court cannot
countenance such blatant practice of disregarding
fairly elementary legal principles and substituting it
with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice
which appears convenient only to respondent judge.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v.
Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it
would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277). However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough
that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the
sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of the State.
D. Particularity of Description
15.11 People versus Veloso
F:In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose
Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of
Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was
also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had
reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary
Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of
the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified
this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective
Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of
Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant
from Judge Garduño of the municipal court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused,
Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of
the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252
of the Penal CodeThe errors assigned by counsel for
the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that
the resistance of the police was justifiable on account
of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
I:Whether there was a valid SW?
R:YES. John Doe warrants are valid if the best
description possible is given in the arrest warrant. It
must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to
be served, by stating his occupation, personal
appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other
circumstances which he may be identified.
The Court agree with the trial judge and with
the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect
that the search warrant was valid, and that the
defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de
la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly,
as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within that provided by the Penal
Code.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.12 Alvarez versus CFI
F: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of
Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit
that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of
books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of
law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say
that the information was based on his personal
knowledge but was only received by him from a
reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the
warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On
June, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks,
stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.
Consti II (section 2) 14
 Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought
immediately to the custody of the judge who issued
the Search Warrant (SW). Alvarez moved that the
agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt
and prays that all articles in question be returned to
him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other
hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for
further investigation. When the judge sustained the
latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC
and prayed that the search warrant as well as the
order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board
to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal
for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent
Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had
no personal knowledge of the facts which were to
serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he
had knowledge thereof only through information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: The Constitution requires that there be not
only probable cause before the issuance of a search
warrant but that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound
in conscience to perform an act faithfully and
truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward
pledge given by the person taking it that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate
sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient
and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which
the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents
and other papers are illegal.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
Particularity of Decision
15.13 Corro versus Lising
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for
the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in
committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed
copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner
moved to quash the warrant but his motion was
denied.
I: Whether the SW was valid?
R: The statements made in the affidavits are
mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language used is
all embracing as to include all conceivable words and
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they
are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant
which is objectionable. Conclusions of law of
military officers will not satisfy probable cause
requirement for issuance of search warrants.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.14 Pangandaman versus Casar
F: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao
led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners
assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of
arrest against fifty “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants
should particularly describe the persons or things to
be seized.
I: Whether said warrant is valid?
R: NO. Insofar as said warrant is issued against
fifty “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify. Clearly such was
violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe
the person or persons to be seized, the warrant
must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.
Wherefore, the warrant complained of is
upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the
arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the
extent that it is issued against fifty “John Does.” The
respondent Judge is directed to forward to the
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
preliminary investigation of the complaint of his court
for further appropriate action.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.15 Stonehill versus Diokno
F: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42
search warrants against petitioners personally, and
Consti II (section 2) 15
corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and residences
to search for personal properties “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarettes)” as the subject of
the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents,
papers, money and other records. Petitioners then
were subjected to deportation proceedings and were
constrained to question the legality of the searches
and seizures as well as the admissibility of those
seized as evidence against them.
On March 1962, the SC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same
on June with respect to some documents and papers.
I: Whether the SW were vaid?
R: NO. Search warrants issued were violative of
the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable
cause and warrant did not particularly specify
the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search
warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned,
except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the
validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they
are treated as personality different from that of the
corporation.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.16 People versus Martinez
F: September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1
Bernard Azarden was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City
when a concerned citizen reported that a pot session
was underway in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1
Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to
aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the
area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team
entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was
arrested while coming out. Inside the house were
Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin
Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic
sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to police
station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan
Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused,
except for Doria, were found positive for methyl
amphetamine HCL. On February 13, 2008, RTC found
Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and
Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt
under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA
9165and sentenced each to life imprisonment and
fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit. The CA supported
the findings of the lower court.(IN SHORT THE
ACCUSED HEREIN ARE CAUGHT IN A POT
SESSION INFLAGRANTE DELICTO)
I: Whether the accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest.
R: YES. Section 2 as a constitutional guarantee,
however, is not a blanket prohibition against all
searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and
seizures in the following instances are allowed even in
the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi)
stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
This case would appear to fall under either a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a
plain view search, both of which require a lawful
arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the
constitutional guarantee.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.17 Microsoft Corp versus Maxicorp
F: In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of
the National Bureau of Investigation conducted a
surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that
Microsoft Softwares were being produced and
packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano,
Consti II (section 2) 16
together with a civilian witness (John Benedict
Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp.
The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of
Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a
receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain “Joel Diaz”.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search
warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz
as witness. He also brought the computer unit they
bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even
added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that the
software in the computer unit bought by Samiano
from Maxicorp was pirated.
The RTC judge, convinced that there is a
probable cause for a case of copyright infringement
and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp,
issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed
the legality of the warrant before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact
that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’
name hence the proceeding in the trial court was
infirm from the onset.
I: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct
in ruling in favor of Maxicorp.?
R: NO. The testimonies of the two witnesses,
coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause. From what they have
witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent
that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also
produced, packaged and in some cases, installed
there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in
Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does
not render the issuance of the warrant void. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed
rule for its determination exists. Probable cause
is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was
improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.18 Burgos versus Chief of Staff, AFP
F: Two warrants were issued against petitioners
for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail”
and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items
alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents
be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the
lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were
real properties.
Issue: Whether the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items.
R: NO.What makes the search warrants
under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. Mere generalization will not
suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in
his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885,
as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
The Search Warrants issued by respondent
judge are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners.
15.19EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
Frank Uy versus BIR
F: In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former
employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho
aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling
thousands of cartons of canned cartons without
issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of
the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR
requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant.
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day.
A second warrant was issued which contains the same
substance but has only one page, the same was dated
Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the
alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant
was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of
Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength
of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by
Consti II (section 2) 17
members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the
premises of the UPC. They seized, among other
things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of
said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC
of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants
which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before
the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for
a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
I: Whether there was a valid search warrant
issued?
R: NO. The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a
way for it ordered the return of the seized items but
sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled
that the search warrant issued has not met some
basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must
conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions. These
requirements, in outline form, are
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable
cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by
the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been
inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the
thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the
judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were
also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One
warrant was directed only against Uy and the other
was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that
the inconsistencies were cured by the issuance of the
latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
15.20 Yousex Al Ghoul versus CA
F: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of
the RTC, Caloocan City, issued 2 search warrants for
the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment
No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Caloocan City.
On April, the police searched Apartment No.
8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber
pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. Petitioners were
charged before the RTC of Caloocan City accusing
them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and
detained.
Petitioners contend that the search and
seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of
Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure because the place
searched and articles seized were not described with
particularity. They argue that the two-witness
requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored
when only one witness signed the receipt for the
properties seized during the search, and said witness
was not presented at the trial.
I: Whether the items described in the warrant
were sufficiently described with particularity.
R: NO. The place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their
task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken
that constitutional and legal safeguards are not
disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence
is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to
declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is
illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is
inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at
Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned
Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the
description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. That the articles seized during the search of
Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant
appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from
Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the
warrants in question.
The nature of the items ordered to be seized
did not require a technical description. Moreover, the
law does not require that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute details as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a search
Consti II (section 2) 18
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of
things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of
those articles described as a class or species would
suffice.
EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED
16.11 People v CA
FACTS; A petition for certiorari has been filed to
invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which
quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and
declared inadmissible for any purpose the items
seized under the warrant. An application for a search
warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr.
Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession
firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt
1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay,
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day
Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served
not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1,
immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store
resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and
the seizure of a number of different explosives and
firearms.
ISSUE: Whether the search warrant is valid
RULING: No. What was done was to substitute for
the place that the Judge had written down in the
warrant and the premises that the executing officers
had in their mind. This should not have been done. It
is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search
a place different from that stated in the warrant on
the claim that the place actually searched — although
not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what
they had in view when they applied for the warrant
and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity
of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. The place to be searched, as set
out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises,
or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things
to be seized
16.12 Paper Industries v Asuncion
FACTS: Petitioners pray, inter alia for the
nullification of Search Warrant No. 799. Petitioners
submit that Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing
to quash such warrant as probable cause has not been
sufficiently established and it was of the nature of a
general search warrant and on the additional ground
that the warrant was unlawfully served or
implemented.
ISSUE: Whether the warrant is valid
RULING: NO. In the present case, the search
warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and
(3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity. Search Warrant No. 799 is declared null
and void.
16.13 Malalaon v CA
FACTS: Filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City an application for search warrant in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
perpetrated at Quezon City. Respondent RTC Judge
of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90,
the same was implemented and resulted to the
indictment of herein petitioners. Petitioners raise the
issue of WHETHER A COURT MAY TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN
OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE
ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE
A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A
PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
ISSUE: Whether a branch of a RTC has the authority
to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its
territorial jurisdiction
RULING: YES. A search warrant is but a judicial
process, not a criminal action. No legal provision,
statutory or reglamentary, expressly or impliedly
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area
of enforceability. The Interim or Transitional Rules
and Guidelines expressly authorizes its enforcement
anywhere in the country. Contrary to what petitioners
aver, there was no violation of their constitutional
right which is translated into specifically enumerated
safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and
all these have to be observed regardless of whatever
court in whichever region is importuned for or
actually issues a search warrant.
16.14 People v Estrada
FACTS: Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal,
Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the
Consti II (section 2) 19
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the RTC
of Quezon City, an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of Cebu City,"
for violation of The Consumer Act of the Philippines
(selling medicines without appropriate license from
DOH). Judge Estrada issued Search Warrant No. 958
(95). Private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a motion
to quash the warrant which the respondent Judge
granted.
ISSUE: Whether the quashal of the warrant was
valid
RULING: YES. The respondent Judge acted correctly
in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.
The search warrant merely indicated the address of
the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to
be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the
specific house of private respondent. Thus, the
inadequacy of the description of the residence of
private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a
general warrant, which is violative of the
constitutional requirement.
4. Only a Judge May Issue Warrant
16.15 Salazar v Achcoso
FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed
with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal
recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Marquez
directed petitioner to appear to the POEA regarding
the complaint against him. After knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, respondent Administrator Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It
stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, having
verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or
authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing
acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team
was then tasked to implement the said Order. The
group went to petitioner’s residence. They served the
order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in.
The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner
filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing. The said Order violated due
process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the
Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated
against her will and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation.
ISSUE: Whether the search order was valid?
RULING: No. Under the new Constitution, “. . . no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized”. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the
Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate
that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process.
Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the
nature of a general warrant. The court held that the
warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
16.16 Republic (PCGG) v Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The PCGG, established to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages and
sequestration against Respondents Tan
(among others). The PCGG filed a motion to
disqualify Respondent Mendoza as counsel of
Respondents Tan on the basis that Mendoza
was then the SolGen and counsel to Central
Bank who actively interfered in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was acquired
by Respondents Tan. Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza since it failed
to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former
function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGG invokes Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in
denying the motion to disqualify
RULING: No. The Court in interpreting Rule
6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the
client to lose not only the law firm of choice,
but probably an individual lawyer in whom
the client has confidence. The client with a
Consti II (section 2) 20
 disqualified lawyer must start again often
without the benefit of the work done by the
latter The effects of this prejudice to the right
to choose an effective counsel cannot be
overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
1.
absolute sale purportedly executed in her favor by
Domingo. RTC granted Sy’s petition. Domingo filed a
petition seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles,
injunction and damages as well as a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO. This was granted by the Court which
led the Sy to claim that her right to due process was
violated
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of due process

RULING:

16.17 Morano v Vivo

FACTS: Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan

Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months. In a letter
dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, to
leave the country on or before September 10, 1962
with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will
issue a warrant for their arrest.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Immigration

can issue a warrant of arrest

RULING: YES. The constitutional guarantee set

forth in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution ,
requiring that the issue of probable cause be
determined by a judge (prior issuance of a warrant),
does not extend to deportation proceedings. The view
we here express finds support in the discussions
during the constitutional convention. The convention
recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities
and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order
of a competent court.

RATIO: The stay as a temporary visitor is subject to

certain contractual stipulations as contained in the
cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of
breach the Commissioner may require the
recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond
has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to
enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to
enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for
his deportation under section 37(a) of Commonwealth
Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such
power nugatory to the detriment of the State.

16.18 Sy v Domingo

FACTS: The property in dispute was a vacant unfenced lot

situated in White Plains, Quezon City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-165606 issued in
the name of respondent Lilia V. Domingo who learned that
construction activities were being undertaken on her
property without her consent. She soon unearthed the
series of anomalous transactions affecting her property. Sy
representing herself as the owner of the property,
petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a new owner’s copy
of Domingo’s TCT appending to her petition, a deed of
Consti II (section 2) 21
16.19 Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag Lucien Tran Van
Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318, G.R. No. 78596 July 13,
1989
FACTS: Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French
national temporarily in Manila. Respondent Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation (CID) Commissioner Ramon
J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio
G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner’s landlord, accusing
petitioner of being an undesirable alien for “committing
acts inimical to public safety and progress.” A warrant of
arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner. Nghia now
alleges that he was arrested without warrant and deprived
of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation and his agents.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrant
RULING: YES. The requirement of probable cause to be
determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.’ What is essential is that there should be a
specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested
and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted. Secondly,
records show that formal deportation proceedings have
been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special
Inquiry of the CID.10 The restraint (if any) against
petitioner’s person has therefore become legal. The writ of
habeas corpus has served its purpose.
16. 20 Board of Commissioners v Judge De La Rosa
FACTS: On January, 1962, the then Secretary of
Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 which directed the
Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry (to the Philippines) was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among
those cases was that of William Gatchalian and
others. The new Board of Commissioners, after a
review motu proprio of the proceedings in the Board of
Special Inquiry ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian. Gatchalian filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the RTC of Manila as presided by respondent
Judge De La Rosa. The petition is anchored on inter
alia, the proposition that: respondent judges have no
jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners,
et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate
jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of
Appeals
ISSUE: Whether the warrant is valid
RULING:NO. From a perusal of the Immigration Act,
it is clear that in matters insofar as deportation of
aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be
valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final
order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and
void for being unconstitutional since the same was
issued only for purposes of investigation of the
suspects, William Gatchalian included.
17.11 Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners are the following: American Nationals
Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72. Dutch
Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
Pagsanjan Laguna. Respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) to comprehend petitioners at their residences.
The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was
found together with two young boys. Richard
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his
room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission
Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has
been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-
in for some time now. Seized during the petitioner’s
apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos
of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Poster
and other literature advertising the child prostitutes
were also found. Petitioners were among the 22
suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended
February 17, 1988, after close surveillance for 3
months of the CID in Pagsanjan., Laguna. 17 of the
arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One
released for lack of evidence, no other charge but
working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On March 4, 1988,
deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens
for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of
Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of arrest were
issued on March 7, 1988 against petitioners for
violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and
Sec. 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the
Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same
date. Petition for Bail was filed on March 11, 1988 but
was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration.
April 4, 1988, Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral
argument on April 20, 1988.
Issue: Whether the Commissioner has the power to
arrest and detain petitioners pending determination
of existence of probable cause.
Ruling: While pedophilia is not a crime under the
Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral,
spiritual and social well-being of the youth. The arrest
Consti II (section 2) 22
of petitioners was based in the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore
the article are admissible evidences (Rule 126 Section
12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
17.12 Ho v. People 280 SCRA 365
Facts: On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor
Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho,
Rolando S. Narciso, Anthony Marden, Arsenio
Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoño. The complaint
was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019 prohibiting a public office from entering into
any contract or transaction on behalf of the
government if it is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the
public officer profited or will not profit thereby.
According to the information, Rolando
Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the National
Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or
controlled corporation organized and operating under
the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the President of
National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private
corporation organized and operating under our
Corporation law, was said to have entered without
legal justification into a negotiated contract of
affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the
haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT,
from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered
into despite their full knowledge that the rate they
have agreed upon as much higher than those offered
by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and
Premier Shippng Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of
P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in
the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to the National Marine Corporation.
Ho and Narciso alleged that the
Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of their arrest, merely relied
on the information and the resolution attached
thereto, filed by the Ombudsmand without other
supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements
of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and
settled jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in
personally determining the existence of probable
cause, must have before him sufficient evidence
submitted by the parties, other than the information
filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his
conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest
warrant. Such evidence should not be “merely
described in a prosecutor’s resolution.”
Issue: Whether a judge may determine probable
cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis
of the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation, without having before him
any of the evidence (such as complainant’s affidavit,
respondent’s counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which
may have been submitted at the preliminary
investigation.
Ruling: Article III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
The word “personally” does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present
Constitution’s intent to a place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
under the previous charters.
The Court, in this case, reiterated and
elaborated on the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Inting and ruled that:
“First, as held in Inting, the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the judge.
Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing
him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base
their findings on one and the same proceeding or
evidence, there should be no confusion as to their
distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different,
the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s
report will support his own conclusion that there is
reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold
him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report,
Consti II (section 2) 23
upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence of probable cause to issue an arrest order.
Their responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of
probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the
most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the
prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and
speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare resolution
finding probable cause, but also so much of the
records and the evidence on hand as to enable his
honor to make his personal and separate judicial
finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or
entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the
judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts
by obliging them to examine te complete records of
every case all the time simply for the purpose of
ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at
the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court
did in this case enjoys the legal presumption or
regularity in the performance of his official duties and
functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
Court consistently held that judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating
officer.”
IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent
relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the
graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the
reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information
filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman
would not have approved their recommendation
without supporting evidence. It had no other
documents from either the complainant (the Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines) Court palpably
committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto
issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole
basis of the prosecutor’s findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own
the issue of probable cause based on evidence other
than such bare findings and recommendation.
17.13 Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La
Rosa 197 SCRA 853
Facts: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian,
grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
citizen following the citizenship of natural mother
Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William, the
12 years old, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They
had with them certificate of registration and identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based
on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary
of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens. On July 6, 1961, the
board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as
Filipino citizens and issued an identification
certificate to William. The Board of Commissioners
directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all
cases where entry was allowed on the grounds that
the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the
case of William. As a result of the decision of the
board of special inquiry which recommended for the
reversal of the decision of the Board of
Commissioners. Acting Commissioner issued an order
affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and
was released upon posting P200,000 cash bond. Thus
on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A
motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
Issue: Whether William Gatchalian is to be declare as
a Filipino citizen.
Ruling: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino
citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as
valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child.
Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are
citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.
5. “Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose”
17.14 Material Distribution v. Judge 84 Phil 127
(1989)
Facts: On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a
complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include
Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against
petitioners on three causes of action in the total of
P1,256,229.30. On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a
motion for the production and inspection of
documents. On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a
supplemental motion for the production and
inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of the
complaint. On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a
Consti II (section 2) 24
memorandum and opposition to Sarreal’s original and
supplemental motion on the ground that he failed to
show good cause and that the motion were evidently
filed for the purpose of fishing evidence. On July 16,
1947, respondent judge, granting both motions,
required petitioners to produce the documents and
annexes in question on July 24, 1947. On account of
the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons,
petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights they have
under the Rules of Court, to postpone the inspection of
the documents and annexes in question and
accordingly respondent judge postponed it to August
15, 1947. Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders
of July 16 and September 27, 1947, as were issued by
the respondent judge in excess of his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the
annulment or modificationOf the order of July 16,
1947.
Issue: Whether the order of the trial judge violated
petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.
Ruling: This Court have considered carefully persons
advanced by petitioners and memoranda in support of
this allegation and found nothing in them to show
how, without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the
complaint petitioners may incriminate themselves.
The Court have, therefore, to dismiss such contention.
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the
provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that
cannot be identified or confused with the
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution.
But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production
and inspection of books and documents in question is
tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure
outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge
place them outside the realm of the prohibited
unreasonable searches.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of
communication and correspondence will not be
violated, because the trial court has power and
jurisdiction to issue an order for the production and
inspection of the books and documents in question in
virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an
express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order
of a court of justice. After a careful consideration of
the legal question raised by petitioners, this Court has
arrived at the conclusion that the trial judge, in
issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his
jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.
17.15 Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 US 186
Facts: The provisions of Section 11(a) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, authorizing the Administrator
to investigate conditions and practices of employment
in any industry subject to the Act, and of Section 9,
incorporating the provisions of Section 9 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act authorizing the
issuance and judicial enforcement of subpoenas, were
challenge by the petitioners, contending that they
violate the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures or any
other provision of the Constitution. Said law applies
to business of publishing and distributing newspapers
like the herein petitioners. Respondent conducted an
investigation pursuant to the above-mentioned law
against the petitioners.
Issue: Whether the Fair Labor Standard Act violates
the fourth amendment.
Ruling: No. The Fourth Amendment, if applicable,
guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be
“particularly described,” if the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and
the materials specified are relevant, the gist of the
protection being the requirement that the disclosure
sought shall not be unreasonable. There was no
violation of petitioner’s rights in these cases, since
both petitioners were corporations; the only records or
documents sought were corporate ones; no element of
self-incrimination was presented or claimed; all the
records sought were relevant to an inquiry for the
purpose of determining whether petitioners were
subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were
violating it; and such an inquiry was authorized by
Section 11 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
17.16 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 523
(1967)
Facts: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the
Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment
building to make a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The
inspector was informed that the Appellant was using
part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The
inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to
inspect the premises because residential use was not
allowed on the first floor of the apartment building.
The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter
because he did not have a warrant. The inspector
attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a
second time two days later, and again the Appellant
refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was
sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district
attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a
few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to
gain access to his apartment and were again refused
because they did not have a search warrant. A
complaint was then filed against the Appellant for
Consti II (section 2) 25
violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was
denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of
Appeals held the housing section “does not violate
Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a
regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather
than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section
creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope
and may not be exercised under reasonable
conditions.”
Issue: Whether administrative inspection programs,
as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth
Amendment rights as those rights are enforced
against the States through Fourteenth Amendment.
Ruling: Yes. (Frank v. Maryland) to the exten that it
sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be
overruled.” In Frank v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the
purposes of locating and abating a suspected public
nuisance.” The Frank opinion has been generally been
interpreted as carving out an additional exception to
the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” The majority here
observed, the practical effect of this system is to leave
the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in
the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested
party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot
say that the protections provided by the warrant
procedure are not needed in this context; broad
statutory safeguards are no subtle for individualized
review, particularly when those safeguards may only
be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness of a search other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. But the majority thought
that a number if persuasive inspections. First, such
programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that
all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it
is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions –
faulty wiring is an obvious example – are not
observable from outside the building and indeed may
not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself.
Finally, because the inspections are neither personal
in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen’s privacy. Further, after concluded that
the area inspection is a reasonable search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, the majority observed it is obvious that
“probable cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must
exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
6. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
A. General Rule: Get a Search Warrant
17.17 People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 402
Facts: Idel Aminuddin, accused-appellant was
arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in
Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting
for him because of a tip from one of their informers
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner. An information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting
officers absolving her after a thorough investigation.
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted. In his defense, Aminuddin disclaimed
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two
pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms
even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However,
the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only
has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether the search of defendant’s bad is legal.
Ruling: the search is illegal. Defendant was not
caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his
arrest, he was no committing a crime. Nor was he
about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances,
Consti II (section 2) 26
he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against
the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the
crime charged.
17.18 People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 85
Facts: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police
force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, testified that at
around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received
a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of
a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe
Valdez y De La Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly
planted close to appellant’s hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverder,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report. At approximately 5:00
o’clock A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown.
After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the
place pinpointed by their informant. The police found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They then proceeded
to look around the area where appellant had his
kaingin and saw seven five-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25
meters from appellant’s hut. The appellant admitted
that the said marijuana was owned by him. The police
took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants. Appellant was then arrested. The accused was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by trial court of
cultivating marijuana plants punishable under
section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The accused-appellant contended
there was unlawful search and that the court erred in
declaring the marijuana plants, as evidence despite
that was the product of an illegal search.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure of the
marijuana plants in this case lawful.
Ruling: No. in the instant case, there was no search
warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. The
Supreme Court Reversed the decision of the RTC and
the appellant was acquitted.
17.19 People v. Oliver Edano, GR No.188133, 729
SCRA 255, July 7, 2014
Facts: The prosecution charged appellant Edaño and
Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A No. 9165 under two separate Informations.
The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits
followed. The Regional Trial Court found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of shabu under section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay P500,000.00
fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Appellant move to reconsider this decision, but the CA
denied his motion.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid, and
if so, whether the seized items were admissible.
Ruling: No. the shabu purportedly seized from the
appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person, when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
This is known as arrest in flagrante delicto.
“For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught
in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED MUST
EXECUTED AN OVERT ACT INDICATING THAT
HE HAS JUST COMMITTED, IS ACTUALLY
COMMITTING, OR WAS ATTEMPTING TO
COMMIT A CRIME. In fact, SPO3 Corbe testified
that the appellant and the informant were just
talking with each other when he approached them.
There was no exchange of money and drugs when he
approached the car.
17.20 Dale Grady v. North Carolina, March 30, 2015
Facts: Between 1997 and 2006, Dale Grady was
convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released
for the second time, a trial court civilly committed
Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based
monitoring program for the duration of his life. The
program required participants to wear a GPS
monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure
that participants are complying with prescriptive
schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged
the constitutionality of the program and argued that
the constant tracking amounted to unreasonable
search that was prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment. Both the trial court and North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did
not amount to a search.
Issue: Whether wearing of a GPS monitor constitute
a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Ruling: Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held
that the trial court and appellate court both failed to
apply correct law based on the Court’s decision in
United States v. Jones, which held that placing a GPS
Consti II (section 2) 27
tracker on the bottom of a vehicle constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that
participation in the North Carolina program
amounted to a search because requiring someone to
wear a bracelet that tracks the person’s whereabouts
constitutes what the Jones decision termed a
“physical occupation of private property for the
purpose of obtaining information.” The Court
remanded the case back to the trial court for a
determination of whether or not this “search” was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
B. When is search a “search”
18.11 Valmonte v. General de Villa – 178 SCRA 211
(Main) and 185 SCRA 655 (MR)
FACTS: The National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of
said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE: Whether the installation of checkpoints
violates the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures
RULING: No. Petitioner's concern for their safety
and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to
declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the
course of theirroutine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners''
rightsagainst unlawful search and seizure of other
rights. The constitutional right againstunreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invoked only
by those whose rightshave been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and
seizures areprohibited. Those, which are reasonable,
are not forbidden.
Between the inherent right of thestate to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an
individual’s right against awarrantless search w/c is,
however, reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the military in
thesame manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost ofoccasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpointsduring these abnormal times,
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the
pricewe pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
18.12 Guazon v. De Villa – 181 SCRA 623
The military and police officers conducted “Areal
Target Zonings” or “saturation drives” in Metro
Manila, specifically on places where the subversives,
as pinpointed by said authorities, were hiding. During
these saturation drives, police and military units
cordon an area o! more than one residence and
sometimes the whole barangay or areas of barangays,
without any search warrant or warrant o! arrest.
Petitioners claimed that said saturation drives
followed a common pattern of human rights abuses,
as such, sought for its stoppage.
FACTS: The petitioners, who are of legal age,
bonafide residents of Metro Manila, and taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities, sought to
prohibit the military and police officers from
conducting “real Target Zonings" or “saturation
drives" in Metro Manila.
ISSUE: Whether a search may be conducted legally
without search warrant.
RULING: No. Nothing in the Constitution denies the
authority of the Chief Executive to order police
actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness and alarming communist activities.
However, all police actions are governed by the
limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government
cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of
authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left,
the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions
may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit
strengthened through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing features.
Moreover, the right to be left alone in the privacy of
his own house guaranteed under Article IV of the
Consti II (section 2) 28
1973 Constitution which the Government may not
touch.
18.13 People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept 26, 2003
Facts: Sometime during the months of July and
August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City
received a report from a “civilian asset” named
Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier
related that his neighbors have been complaining
about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to
the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta
and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members
of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station,
conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in
Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered
information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then
approached the suspects and identified themselves as
police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the
police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night. The man who
resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was
carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he
could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged,
saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box
himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded
pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles,
one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in
newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap
the packages. They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus
arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of
their rights and brought them to the police station.
The two did not resist. The confiscated items were
turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on
specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed
the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag
contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the
newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel
Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were
subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was proper.
RULING:No. The RTC justified the warrantless
search of appellants’ belongings under the first
exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A
search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by
the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the
search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless,
a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search. The question, therefore, is whether the police
herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied
with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable
information alone is insufficient. The search of
Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible
in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than
the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and
their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al.
cannot be sustained.
18.14 Sony Music v. Judge Espanol, GR 156804,
March 14, 2005
The presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot, by
itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected
rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods
that the Constitution itself detests.
FACTS: In a criminal complaint filed with the DOJ,
the VRB charged Respondents with violation of PD
1987. As alleged in the complaint, the four were
engaged in the replication, reproduction and
distribution of videograms without license and
authority from Videograms Regulatory Board. The
NBI through Agent Lavin applied on with the RTC
presided by respondent judge for the issuance of
search warrants against private respondents which
was then issued.
Individual private respondents, through counsel filed
a motion to quash search warrant and to release
seized properties grounded on lack of probable cause,
that the warrant did not sufficiently describe the
items to be seized and that the warrant was
improperly enforced.
ISSUE: Whether the warrant was issued without
probable cause.
RULING: In the determination of probable cause, the
court must necessarily resolve whether or not an
offense exist to justify the issuance or quashal of the
Consti II (section 2) 29
warrant. Moreover, a core requisite before a warrant
shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning “the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched.”
In the exercise of this mandate which we can allow as
being akin to conducting a preliminary investigation
abuse of discretion cannot plausibly be laid at the
doorstep of the issuing court on account of its prima
facie holding that no offense has been committed,
even if consequent to such holding a warrant is
recalled and the private complainant is incidentally
deprived of vital evidence to prove his case.
D. Instances of Warrantless Searches and
Seizures
18.15 People v. Sevilla– 339 SCRA 625
FACTS: Automatic review after the trial court find
both the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Sec 8 , Art II, Republic Act
6425, as amended by R.A 7659, An Act To Impose The
Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Laws,
As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For
Other Purposes both of them are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Death with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. Accused are now
contending that the court erred in convicting the
accused despite the absence of search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure
was valid.
RULING: YES. There are certain cases where the
law itself allows a search even in the absence of a
warrant. Jurisprudence mentions the following
instances under which a warrantless search and
seizure may be effected, to wit: 1. Search which is
incidental to the arrest. 2. Seizure of evidence in plain
view 3. Search of moving vehicle 4 Consented
warrantless search 5. Customs search 6. Stop and
frisk 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
i. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
Sec. 12 Rule 16, Rules of Court
Two Requisites:
1. Item to be searched was within the
arrestee’s custody or area of immediate
control.
2. Search was contemporaneous with an
arrest.
18.16 Padilla v. CA, GR 121917 March 12, 1997
FACTS: A vehicle heading north with plate number
PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident.
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile 3 were able
to intercept the vehicle by cutting into the latter's
path forcing it to stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the
vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its
driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window
and put his head out while raising both his hands.
They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. SPO2
Miranda told Padilla to alight to which Padilla
complied. Padilla was wearing a short leather jacket
such that when he alighted with both his hands
raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed, its butt protruding. SPO2 Borja made the
move to confiscate the gun but Padilla held the
former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by
legal papers. SPO2 Borja disarmed Padilla and told
the latter about the hit and run incident. Padilla,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead,
played with the crowd by holding their hands with
one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with his right
hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." Because
Padilla's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right
pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when Padilla
turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his
vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from
Padilla. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla
by including as its ground illegal possession of
firearms. SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights. The police officers brought
Padilla to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a
third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a single
round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with 7
other live bullets.
ISSUE: Whether the firearms and ammunition
confiscated during a warrantless search and seizure,
especially the baby armalite, are admissible as
evidence against Robin Padilla.
RULING: Yes. When in pursuing an illegal action or
in the commission of a criminal offense, the police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police
officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and
the taking of the corpus delicti. Objects whose
possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found
in plain view are subject to seizure even without a
warrant." With respect to the Berreta pistol and a
black bag containing assorted magazines, Padilla
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter
gesture of Padilla indicated a waiver of his right
against the alleged search and seizure, and that his
failure to quash the information estopped him from
Consti II (section 2) 30
assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that
the firearms and ammunitions were products of an
active search done by the authorities on the person
and vehicle of Padilla, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may
undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are
within Padilla's grabbing distance regardless of the
nature of the offense.
18.17 Espano v. CA 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
FACTS: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat.
Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely,
Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo
Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD),
Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling
"something" to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached Espano, identified
themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana .
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to
his residence where they found ten more cellophane
tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the
police headquarters where he was charged with
possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991,
Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order
of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the
trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of
the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on
15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the search of Espano’s home after
his arrest does not violate against his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule
113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was caught
in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade of
drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano
handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the
buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana
seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of
the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana
found at Espano's residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from
Espano during his arrest were valid under the
doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not
armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it
was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized." An exception to the said rule is a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana
seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at
Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the
said exceptions.
18.18 People v. De Lara – 236 SCRA 291
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the sale of prohibited drugs. The
National Criminal Investigation Service were ordered
to conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of
Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila,
after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing in
that area. No arrest was made because the team was
instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance
operation only. Weeks after, Capt. Cablayan
instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation.
The confidential informant proceeded to the house of
appellant and bought two foils of marijuana. It was
after the accused handed the two foils that he sensed
the presence of the police operatives. Thereafter, the
team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD
headquarters for investigation. The prohibited drugs
seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for
chemical analysis. In his appeal, appellant questions
the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited
drugs found inside his house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without warrant
was lawful
RULING: As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we
find that the police operatives acted within the
bounds of law. In the case at bench, appellant was
caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of
marijuana to the poseur-buyer. Applying the
Consti II (section 2) 31
aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest
was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of
arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were
not only authorized but were also under obligation to
apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of
arrest"
18.19 People v. Leangsiri – 252 SCRA 213
FACTS: Leangsiri, a Thai national, was arrested at
the arrival area of the (NAIA). He was in the act of
bringing into the country heroin hidden under a black
suitcase. He was brought to the headquarters of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA for
further investigation. The head of the command
formed a team to conduct follow-up operations in the
case. Leangsiri received a telephone call from his
contact and was told that the black suitcase would be
picked up at about ten oclock that night. He relayed
the information to the NARCOM agents. At about ten
p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola,
arrived at the Las Palmas hotel. They knocked on the
door of Room 504. Leangsiri took the black suitcase
and brought it to the dining area of the room where
appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents
Gapiangao and Balneg and handed it over to
appellants. They started to leave the hotel room with
the contraband when Agents barged out of the
washroom and made the arrest. Appellants identified
themselves by presenting their respective passports.
Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was
staying in Room 413 in the same hotel. Accompanied
by the hotels owner and security officer, appellant
Amidus room was searched. Tucked within the pages
of her telephone and address book was a piece of
paper with the name Suchinda Leangsiri written on
it. The paper and Amidu’s other possessions were
confiscated. The trial court convicted appellants,
finding them guilty of conspiring to transport heroin.
The argument of appellants is that the piece of paper
found in Amidus hotel room should not be admitted to
the court because such warrantless search is illegal
being made in a place other than the place of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search made
by the agents at Amidu’s room is illegal
RULING: The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a)
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. The better and established rule is
a strict application of the exception provided that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who
is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of
and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense. Such warrantless
search obviously cannot be made in a place other than
the place of arrest. In the case at bar, appellants were
arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The
piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name was obtained
through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same
hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant
Amidus telephone and address book. Clearly, the
warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper
bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as
evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of
this evidence will not, however, exculpate
appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the
prosecution’s case against appellants.
18.20 People v. Cuenco – GR 128277, Nov. 16, 1998
FACTS: Ferdinand Cueno y Mata was accused for the
sale of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. A surveillance
operations was ordered to be conducted on the alleged
drug pushing activities of herein accused. During the
operation, a sale of marijuana has been consummated.
They reported the result of their surveillance to their
commanding officer who instructed them to apply for
a search warrant. They were issued a search warrant
which ordered the search of the premises of Ferdie
and the seizure of dried marijuana leaves allegedly in
the possession of aforesaid person. However, they
were instructed that a buy-bust operation be
conducted on the accused first before the
implementation of the search warrant. After the
operation, they arrested Ferdie. The policemen
announced that they had with them a search warrant
for the search and seizure of marijuana. Before the
raiders proceeded to search the house of the accused,
they called for barangay officials in the area to
witness the conduct of the search. Appellant
questioned his conviction because of the illegality of
the search made in his house. He contends that the
policemen showed the barangay officials the search
warrant which was not shown to the them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search made in the house
of the accused was illegal
RULING: The arrest of appellant has been made in
the course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante
delicto. A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment
which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Law - is far variant from an ordinary arrest. In
lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect but also
in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that
point which is within the effective control of the
person arrested, or that which may furnish him with
the means of committing violence or of escaping.
Consti II (section 2) 32
This is not yet complete, lacking case digests are the ff:
13.43-13.45(3 cases)
1.21 PEOPLE V. CHE CHUN TING
FACTS: Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two
transparent bags of drugs to Mabel Po, in full view of
NARCOM agents. Police officers arrested the surprised man
and conducted a search of Unit 122 where they found more
bags of shabu so convicted for dispatching in transit and
having in his possession large amounts of shabu. He contends
that the shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized
without a valid search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible without a
valid search warrant?
RULING: No. The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of
drugs found therein are illegal. A warrantless search should
be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under the
immediate control of the accused. As a consequence of the
illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are
regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the
“fruit of a poisonous tree.”
1.22 People V Chi Chan
Facts: Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani received a radio message
from barangay captain of ambil island, looc, oriental Mindoro
saying that there is a suspicious boat in the vicinity of the
island and when they responded they saw a fishing boat and a
speed boat who was transferring cargo to each other, upon
approachement of the police officer the speed boat sped away
and was not able to caught except for the fishing boat. Officer
found shabu inside the boat and asked for its identification
papers but failed to do so. They were apprehended and have
been read their rights. Information was filed against
respondent for violation of dangerous drug act and was found
by the court guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent
contended that the drugs were from the barangay captian and
that the search and seizure was invalid.
Issue: Whether or not there was unreasonable search and
seizure and if the warrantless arrest was unjustified as to make
the bag inadmissible?
Ruling: Court ruled that the appellant were actually
committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending
officer in flagrante delicto. While acting upon the report of the
barangay captain, spotted appellant transferring cargos and the
speed boat sped away upon closing naturally arouse suspicion,
they failed to provide paper and even offered big big lump
sum of money to the officers.
1.23 People V Evaristo
Facts: Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and
CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine Constabulary together
with Sgt. Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the
Integrated National Police were on routine patrol duty in
Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the afternoon, the
officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came
upon Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo
prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the
immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon
Evaristo and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of
Rosillo. The police patrol members were told that he had
already escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta
noticed a bulge around the waist of Carillo and upon being
frisked he admitted the same to be a revolver. As the patrol
was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought
Evaristo’s permission to scour through the house which was
granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms and
paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture
of firearms. Evaristo and Carillo were ound guilty of illegal
possession of firearms.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant
in accidental discovery of evidence is admissible
Ruling: Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for
being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense was committed
in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant.
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view.
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted
permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had
sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for
firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house,
thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as inadvertent
and even accidental..
1.24 People V Tabar
Facts: Respondent-accused was charged, together with her
nephew, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an
information, That on or about the 8th day of February 1989, at
about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell and
deliver, without authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited drugs, to a person who posted
himself as a buyer, Dangerous Act of 1972. The accused were
then convicted of the offense charged against them in the trial
court. On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the
lower court erred in admitting the evidence against her when
there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore, violating the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Consti II (section 2) 33
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation against the
constitutional guarantee of individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Ruling: Court ruled there was a valid search and seizure since
he voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made
of his person or premises. The evidence for the prosecution
discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana
sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then
carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing
the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out,
which she voluntary did, the package containing the packs of
marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the
member of the team. A crime was thus committed in the
presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113
and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she
could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without
the corresponding arrest and search warrants
1.25 Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Facts:The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was
searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the
warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
18 live bullets which they confiscated and the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
Issue:Whether those seized from the petitioner could have
been taken even without a warrant?
Ruling:No. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long
as the search is valid. In this case, the Court found out that
there was no valid search warrant. The applicant who asked
for the issuance of the search warrant was based on mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as
required by settled jurisprudence. In short, the military officers
who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there
and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
1.26 United Laboratories v. Isip
Facts:NBI raided the first and second floors of a building for
the seizure of finished or unfinished UNILAB products
particularly counterfeit Revicon multivitamins. No fake
Revicon multivitamins were found; instead there were boxes
of Disudrin and Inoflox, which were granted by the court to be
turned over to the custody of BFAD for examination. The
respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search
Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. They asserted that the NBI
officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not
included in the list of properties to be seized in the search
warrant and were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu,
as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.
Issue:Whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox
products was justified by the plain view doctrine
Ruling:No. Objects, articles or papers not described in the
warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be
seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the
essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a)
the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification
for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from
which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.
The petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI
agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners
representative who was present at the time of the enforcement
of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered
the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must
be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the
warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and
their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent.
1.27 People v. Doria
Facts:Doria was entrapped and arrested in a buy-bust
operation after the members of the North Metropolitan
District, PNP NARCOM, received information from 2 civilian
informants that one “Jun” was engaged in illegal drug
activities. During the arrest, the marked bills handed to him as
payment for the marijuana could not be found on him. He
revelead that he left the money at the house of his associate
named “Neneth”, whose house he led the police to. The team
found the door of Neneth’s house open and a woman inside,
whom Jun identified as his associate. While asked about the
marked bills, a carton box under the dining table was noticed
by one of the policemen, PO3 Manlangit. The content of
which is wrapped in plastic similar to the marijuana sold to
them. The box contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s
discovery, was the recovery of the marked bills. Neneth was
arrested and the box together with its contents and marked
bills were turned over to the investigators at the headquarters.
This was
Issue:Whether the box that contained bricks of marijuana is
considered in plain view during the seizure
Ruling:No. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person
Consti II (section 2) 34
and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to
be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
"buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals
that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to
clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the 10 bricks
of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue
in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other
than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit
that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was
not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It
was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court.
1.28 Del Rosario v. People
Facts: In 1996, the police received a report that Rosario was
in possession of firearms without the necessary licenses.
Police applied for a SW to enable them to search the house of
appellant. When they entered, they informed him that they had
a SW and that they were authorized to search his house. The
search yielded the following items: a caliber .45 pistol, 5
magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios found in the
room of the daughter; and a caliber .22 revolver with 8 pieces
of live ammunition found in the kitchen of the house. When
asked about his license to possess, he failed to produce any.
This prompted the police to seize the firearms. For his
defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the
caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other
items seized were planted by the police officers. Appellant
likewise assails the manner in which the search was carried
out, the officers just barged into his house without asking
permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay
officials arrived only after the police already had finished the
search.
Issue: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in
the search warrant was illegal.
Ruling: No. Seizure is limited to those items particularly
described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are
without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize.
Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the
proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." It shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. the firearm
was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as
a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's
house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the
search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.
1.29 Hizon v. Court of Appeals
Facts: Fishermen represented by Richard Hizon, were charged
with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D.
704 for using of obnoxious or poisonous substance. The trial
court found the 31 petitioners guilty and sentenced them to
imprisonment and also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture
of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted
live fishes and instruments and proceeds of the offense. They
claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First
Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to
engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the
hook and line method and that they were intimidated by the
policemen. The trial court found the petitioners guilty of the
crime of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance commonly known as sodium cyanide.
Issue: Whether the evidence against petitioner in view of the
warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent
arrest of the petitioners is admissible.
Ruling: YES. As a general rule, any evidence obtained
without judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, subject to certain exceptions which
are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; and (4)
search in violation of customs laws. Search and seizure
without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations
of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on
the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor
vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and
secured. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of
fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. The
Court holds as valid the warrantless search on the F/B
Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in
illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the
course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.
1.30 Bagalihog V Fernandez
Facts: Congressman Espinosa, Sr. and his escorts were
attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Only Dante Siblante
survived although he suffered a gunshot wound. Investigation
of the incident was made. investigator Tandiado, filed an
amended complaint with MTC of Masbate accusing the
petitioners of the crime multiple murder and frustrated murder
in connection with the incident. After conducting PI, the court
issued an order stating that: ". . . after weighing the affidavits
and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during
the preliminary examination in searching questions and
answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the
amended complaint, namely
Issue: May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his
own personal determination and relying solely on the
certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a
probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
Consti II (section 2) 35

Ruling: Court reiterate that in making the required personal
determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the
evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent
of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and
is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge
abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he
issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error
when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of
the existence of a probable cause.
1.31 Aniag jr V comelec
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the
Comelec in connection to the national & local election, the
Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested
petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him.
In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick
up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On his
way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down
in a check point and police search the car. Upon finding the
guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was
referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner
was not made a party to the charge but was invited to shed
light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how
Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and
wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the charges.
The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The
Comelec however issued a resolution filing information in
violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves
for reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence
this petition contending that the search on his car was illegal
and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the
preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due
process was violated.
Issue: Whether or not the search on his car was illegal?
Ruling: Yes, An extensive search without warrant could only
be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe there is evidence
pertaining to the commission of a crime. However in this case
there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the
policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have
conducted, such action constitutes an unreasonable intrusion
of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his property. The
manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of
the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence
in any proceeding against the petitioner.
1.32 People V Aminuddin
Facts: The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a
reliable informer that the accused, Aminnudin, was on a vessel
bound for Iloilo and is carrying with him marijuana. The said
vessel was to arrive few days after such tip. On the day of the
arrival, the agents then waited at the port for the vessel. Upon
arrival of the vessel and when the suspect disembarked, they
immediately frisked him and searched his bag which
contained the marijuana. Subsequently, the Aminnudin was
arrested. During the trial, the accused that alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed and that his
bag was confiscated without a search warrant.
Issue: Is the marijuana found in the accused bag admissible
evidence?
Ruling: No. The police agents had enough time to secure a
warrant to arrest and search the accused but did not do so. In
addition to this, the arrest did not fall into any of the
exceptions of a valid warrantless arrest because the accused-
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so.
1.33 People V Malmstedt
Facts: The appellant is sending a package to Switzerland thru
the packing and export forwarder business owned by Job
Reyes. Following standard operating procedure, the owner
opened the package for inspection prior to delivery to the
Bureau of Post/Customs and smelled a peculiar odor from the
box which prompted him to investigate further and found
some dried leaves inside. He took samples and forwarded the
content of the shipment to NBI for lab test. He was then
investigated by the narcotics division of the NBI and was
requested to bring the package to their office. The lab result
showed the samples were that of marijuana leaves. Thereafter,
NBI took charge of the inventory of the package and an
information was filed against the appellant in violation of RA
6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). It was contended that the
court erred in admitting the evidence in a violation of his
constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure and
privacy of communication.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained should be
inadmissible to court?
Ruling: The court held that as a general rule evidence
obtained thru illegal and unreasonable search and seizures by
law enforcers and other government agencies are inadmissible
to court. The case at bar however has a peculiar character
where the evidence was obtained by a private person without
the intervention of State authorities. In the absence of
government interference, the Constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked against the
State. The Bill of Rights provided by the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against act of private individuals and
such restraint is only directed against the government and any
of its agencies. Thus the court affirmed that the evidence is
deemed admissible to the case and affirmed the decision of the
lower court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Consti II (section 2) 36
1.34 People v. Lo Ho Wing
Facts: This case involves the transport of shabu by Lo Ho
Wing aka Peter Lo and Lim Cheng Huat aka Antonio Lim,
from China to Manila. Peter Lo was apprehended by a special
operations group under the Philippine Constabulary while
riding a taxi cab from the naia. He was brought to the Criminal
Investigation Service Headquarters for interrogation. During
the investigation, the travelling bag of Peter Lo was inspected
and recovered from it are shabu, packed in tea bags.
The trial court convicted Peter Lo and Antonio Lim, applying
the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performace of
official duties.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure can be
invoked by the convicted Peter Lo and Antonio Lim in their
appeals, asserting that they have already planned the arrest 2
days before the expected arrival in the airport.
Ruling: The Supreme Court said that the rule on search and
seizure supported by a valid a warrant is not absolute. There
are 3 exceptions: 1. A search incidental to an arrest; 2. A
search on a moving vehicle; and 3. Seizure of evidence in
plain view. Since the case at bar shows that the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle, a valid warrant was not
necessarily.
1.35 People v. Saycon
Facts: Alvaro Saycon, while on board a courier named Doña
Virginia bound for Dumaguete City, he was apprehended by
the coast guards and his bag was opened and recovered from it
is a Marlboro pack containing a pack of shabu. While he was
searched and arrested, the coast guards did not have a warrant.
Issue: Whether a valid warrant is necessary in apprehending a
passenger of a sea courier while on board.
Ruling: The general rule is that the search and seizure must be
carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure shall be unreasonable. However, the rule is
not absolute. There are exceptions recognized by law. The
instant case falls under once of the exceptions relating to the
search on a moving vehicle. Peace officers may lawfully
conduct searches of moving vehicles —automobiles, trucks,
etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to
secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant may be sought.
In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, peace
officers are limited to ocular inspection. However, when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that a passenger
or a cargo has illegal contents.
1.36 People v. CFI
Facts: This case involves the smuggled items apprehended by
government officers in the course of warrantless search and
seizure on a moving light blue dodge car driven by Jessie
Hope. Inside the car were 4 boxes which supposedly to be
transported from Angeles City to Manila.
Intelligence officers who apprehended the car driven by Jessie
Hope opened the boxes and recovered wrist watches and
bracelets.
Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the merchandise in a
moving vehicle by authorized agents commissioned to enforce
customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the
constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and
seizure and therefore, such merchandise are inadmissible in
evidence.
Ruling: Under the Tariffs and Customs Code, the the
authority of persons duly commissioned to enforce tariff and
customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the
domain of searches and seizures of goods suspected to have
been introduced in the country in violation of the customs
laws. Said persons were granted to have police power limited
to the search and seizure that violated the customs laws.
It cannot be said that there is a violation to the right to travel,
as long as there is a reasonable cause to believe that
merchandise contained inside a moving vehicle are illegal.
1.37 People v. Barros
Facts: M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, boarded to
chackchakan, bontok were seated at the back of the bus, they
saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan,
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being
their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the
carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found out that it contained marijuana. Accused was
charged with violating Dangerous drug act of 1972 and was
sentenced by the RTC of Bontoc, Barros now appeals from the
judgement of conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the court deprived him of his right to
due process by ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory
warrant in the arrest and search?
Consti II (section 2) 37
Ruling: Court held not all search and seizure are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. It is determined
according to the facts of each case which in this case a in
carrying a warrantless arrest it is recognized that in search of a
moving vehicle the officer can do plain view inspection and in
order for a intensive search the officer must have probable
cause to conduct such search which Both officers here failed
to do so, they were not given any information or tips from an
informant or manifested that the stench of marijuana inside
provided them probable cause to search.
1.38 People v. Mustang
Facts: The crime alleged is a violation of sec. 68 of PD No.
705 (as amended by E.O. NO. 277). Acting on a tip received,
the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the
DENR conducted surveillance at petitioner’s lumberyard. In
the course thereof, the team members seize petitioner’s truck,
which was coming out from the lumberyard carrying lauan,
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. When
asked for the necessary documents, the driver was unable to
provide them. Two days later, SAID executed a search
warrant. They seized four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs. A day after, the team returned and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber because petitioner failed to
produce upon demand the corresponding documents. The
Secretary of DENR suspended the permit of petitioner.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and
Robles,and questioned the validity of the seizure.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure after the
following day was valid?
Ruling: Yes. The search and seizures made is valid. Search
the day after was valid since it was a continuation of the
search done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued.
Under ROC Rule 126 Sec 9, a search warrant has a lifetime of
10 days. Hence, it could be served.
1.39 People v. Lacerna
Facts: (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the Mobile
Patrol Division of the Western Police District (WPD),
appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed
by PO3 Valenzuela's place of assignment, which was then
heavy with traffic, looking suspicious PO3 Valenzuela looked
at the occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and
slouched, refusing to look at him. Feeling that something was
amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his companion stopped the
vehicle, signalling the driver to park by the side of the road.
PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to
search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police
officers went about searching the luggages. They asked
appellant what the contents of the plastic bag were, Co-
accused NorielLacerna immediately answered that the bag
contained his vomit. PO3 Carlito found several blocks
wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana
emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one of the boxes
and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-
accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-
accused readily affirmed. Accused contended that there was a
violation of their right since they were only riding the taxicab.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
Ruling: Confident that they [the accused] have not done
anything wrong, they allowed to be searched." This
declaration of appellant is a confirmation of his intelligent and
voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks
were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and
seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no
poisonous tree to speak of.
1.40De Garcia v. Locsin
Facts: Leona de Garcia’s office were searched and some
packages of records and documents were seized by Mariano
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. He conducted the
search and seizure with a warrant. The search warrant was
issued upon the affidavit executed by Almeda saying that he
had a probable cause to believe that Leona de Garcia keeps
and conceals in her house and office certain books, receipts
and other pertinent papers relating to her activities as a usurer,
all of which is contrary to the Anti-Usury Law.
After the seizure, Leona de Garcia on several occasions,
demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of her
documents. When 6 criminal cases were initiated against her,
she challenged the legality of the search warrant. The trial
judge denied her motion because there was a waiver on her
part.
Issue: Whether there has been a waiver on the part of Leona
de Garcia.
Ruling: There was implied waiver on her constitutional
immunity against unreasonable search and seizure. She could
have objected the legality of the search warrant when the
search was conducted without her presence because she was
sich, but no objection was made. Since the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure is a personal one, it
can be waived, expressly or impliedly.
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional
right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that
the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Consti II (section 2) 38

1.41 Caballes v. Court of Appeals
Facts: Police Officers apprehended a jeepney believing that it
may contain something suspicious. The officers told the driver
that they will look at the vehicle. Recovered from it were
cabled wires owned by the National Power Corporation. The
driver was convicted of theft.
He then filed a petition for certiorari asserting the illegality of
the search warrant, thus, the evidence obtained shall be
inadmissible.
Issue: Whether there is consented search when the police
officers did not ask the driver to conduct the search but rather
told him that they will inspect the vehicle.
Ruling: The Supreme Court said that the evidence is lacking
that the driver intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the police
officers obtained consent of the driver for them to conduct the
search is not in the manner of asking or requesting, but rather
the manner is imposing upon the driver that they will search
the vehicle.
The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
1.42 People v. Agbot
Facts: Antonio Agbot was charged and convicted of murder
for the death of her sister Leona Agbot-Subat. When the police
officers went to the scene of the crime, took the “paltik” gun
as well as brought him to the station. He admitted the crime
and thus, he was convicted. He appealed his case asserting that
there was no search warrant when the gun was taken from the
house and cannot be used as an evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or not the seizure was valid?
Ruling: The Supreme Court said that Agbot’s admission is an
express consent. His admission does not constitute a violation
of the constitutional guarantee against inadmissibility of
illegally seized objects as evidence against an accused. Also,
the Supreme Court found that the confession itself can only be
supplied by the accused only and the police officers cannot
make up such stories according to their imaginations.
1.43 Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs
Facts: The Davao anti-smuggling team apprehended the
vessel MV Jolo Lima which was chatered by Velasco. The
MV Jolo lema carried smuggled copra and coffee. The captain
told the team that Velasco was in a hotel. The anti-smuggling
team entered the hotel but, Velasco was not there. But, the
wife of Velasco gave the documents of the smuggled product.
Issue: Whether there was consent on part of occupant of
hotelroom rented by velasco?
Ruling: Yes, because there was a person inside who gave their
request. Thus, the unreasonable search may be waived by
somebody other than the person himself. Therefore such
consent is sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a
search warrant.
1.44 People v. Damaso
Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of
violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure
conducted at his house at night time when he was not around,
on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without
the owner’s presence is valid.
Ruling: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-
appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right. The constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights
are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in
his or her behalf.
1.45 People v. Asis
Facts: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y
Saricon were charged in an Informationthat the said accused,
stabbed and robbed one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING.
both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes
"although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were
presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery
of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved
that the two (2) x x x committed the crime. arguing that the
search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair
of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The
prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was
Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that
contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus
claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search
without a warrant.
Issue: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to
the recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his
possession during the warrantless search.
Ruling: Primarily, the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights
are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or
her behalf. Because to constitute a valid waiver, it must be
shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
Consti II (section 2) 39
a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have
consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he
did not understand what was happening at that moment. There
was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the
arrest, search and seizure.
2.21 SPOUSES VEROY v LAYAGUE
Facts: The Police raided the house of herein petitioners in
Davao City on information that the said residence was being
used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter
the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the
house since the owner was not present and they did not have a
search warrant. The following day they conducted the search
pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa
Veroy. They recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine, a
bag etc. The spouse Veroy were held liable for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion).
Issues: Whether the herein petitioner will be held liable for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 following the
unreasonable searches and seizures in their dwelling.
Held: No. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The rule having
been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles
seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected
by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against
them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that
there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita,
while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be
knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime. The criminal case against the
petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED
2.22 PEOPLE vs OMAWENG
Facts: The PC constable put up a checkpoint at the junction
of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc.
They stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the
checkpoint. The vehicle was driven by respondent and had no
passengers was stopped and inspected with the permission of
the latter. A travelling bag was noticed and with the consent of
the respondent to open and see it, it was found to be contained
forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing
pulverized substances of marijuana.
Issue: Whether in the case at bar, respondent after
voluntarily submits to a search or consented to have it made
waived his the right to be secure from unreasonable search.
Held: Yes. He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his
vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
2.23 PEOPLE vs. CORREA
Facts: The respondents were placed under surveillance on
account of confidential and intelligence reports that
respondents were engaged in illegal drug trade.The Police
Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit tailed the subject
jeepney and upon reaching the intersection of Bambang
Extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, the operatives
stopped and parked their vehicles around the suspect's vehicle
and accosted the respondents who were the passengers of the
owner-type jeepney. The operatives inspected and able to
seized the suspected contrabands. The respondents together
with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the
police station for investigation.
Issue: Whether the evidences presented before the
court is inadmissible being the fruit of an illegal search
conducted without any search warrant.
Held: No. The respondents never protested when
the operative opened the tin can loaded in the appellants'
vehicle and found eight (8) bundles of marijuana. As well
they did not raise any protest when they, together with their
cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police
station for investigation. When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made on his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
2.24 PEOPLE vs. RAMOS
Facts: A police team went to the residence of respondent on
the declaration of a drug suspect identifying him as the source
of the of the marijuana leaves. Thereby, arresting him and
immediately brought to the Drugs Enforcement Section of
WPD Headquarters for investigation. The respondent made an
admission before the police investigators.
Issue: Whether the respondent who made verbal
admission before the investigating officers. is not adequately
educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel be made guilty
of his
Held: No. As mandated, it is not enough that the
police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements
down, the interrogating officer must have patience in
explaining these rights to him. In consonance with Section 20
of the Bill of Rights which states that "any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant
Consti II (section 2) 40
during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence
against him.
2.25 PEOPLE vs TUDTUD
Facts: A man who identified himself as a police officer
approached the respondent, pointing a .38 caliber revolver.
The man told him not to run. The Police officer tried to inspect
the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed him to
open the bag, which revealed no contrabands. The officer then
directed him to open a carton box some two meters away
which according to him not his, but proceeded to open it out of
fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. They
discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was
something wrapped in cellophane and turned out to be
marijuana. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his
companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to
the police station. The two did not resist.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of constitutional rights
on unreasonable search and seizure in the case at bar.
Held: Yes. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the
menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times
be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. The officers who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty. It is simply not allowed in free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.
2.26 PEOPLE vs TABAR
Facts: The respondent on her appeal assailed that the
marijuana cigarettes seized from her are inadmissible in
evidence because they were obtained in violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure without warrant. The evidence for the prosecution
discloses that the respondent placed the packs of marijuana
sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then
carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty. When she
was asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the
package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus
exposed in plain view to the member of the officers.
Issue: Whether the respondent can invoke her constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure without
warrant.
Held: No. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach
and seizure were without a warrant, the respondent had
effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by
voluntarily submitting to the seach and seizure. When one
voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of
his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof . The right to be secure from unreasonable seach may,
like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly.
2.27 PEOPLE vs ENCINADA
Facts: The police officer received a tip from an informant
that the respondent would be arriving bringing with him
“marijuana”. They were not able to secure warrant of arrest
because the office was already closed. However, they still
decided to pursue the apprehension of the appellant. The
officers followed the respondent carrying two small colored
plastic chairs and boarded a tricycle. The appellant was chased
and ordered the driver to stop, they inspect the plastic chairs
and discovered that a package was place between; tearing the
package they were convinced that it is marijuana because of
the smell. They apprehended the appellant brought him to the
police station and in the presence of a member of the local
media, they opened the package and saw that indeed it
contains dried leaves of marijuana.
Issue: Whether the evidence seized during the warrantless
arrest inadmissible?
Held: Yes. The court ruled acquitting the appellant, it
reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence seized
without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any
proceeding. A guild of incriminating evidence will not
legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the
means. In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in
the presence of the policemen. Moreover, the Lawmen did not
have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search
cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw
intelligence information is not sufficient ground for a
warrantless arrest.
2.28 PEOPLE vs. ARUTA
Facts: The respondent was crossing the street and was not
acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
the respondent and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana. Upon inspection of her bag, it was found to
contain dried marijuana. The team confiscated the bag and the
respondent was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation.
Issue: Whether the discovery of marijuana inside the bag of
the respondent by the NARCOM officers justified as seizure
of evidence in plain view to effect a valid and legal
warrantless arrest.
Held: No. In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid
and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of
respondent bag would also not be justified as seizure of
evidence in plain view under the second exception. The
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown
Consti II (section 2) 41
by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request her to
open the bag to ascertain its contents.
2.29 PAPA vs MAGO
Facts: The head of the counter-intelligence unit of the
Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
received that upon orders of the Chief of Police of Manila and
a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and upon orders of the Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs
seized the load of the two alleged trucks.
Issue: Whether the police officers policemen had authority
to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court.
Held: Yes. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases.
2.30 PACIS vs PAMARAN
Facts: The Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila, issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an
automobile owned by respondent, who, according to the
records in his office, had not paid the customs duty collectible
thereon. The respondent invoking what he alleged was a
violation of the constitutional provision that only a judge,
under the 1935 Constitution could issue a search warrant, and
filed the aforesaid complaint for usurpation.
Issue: Whether the petitioner violated the Constitution and
committed usurpation when he issued such warrant of seizure.
Held: Based on such an assumption and with petitioner
clearly not being a member of the judiciary, there was
plausibility in the claim that he ran afoul of the penal law.
While the matter was pressed with vigor by counsel for
respondent, the applicable legal doctrine is on the side of
petitioner. It is a well-settled principle that for violations of
customs laws, the power to issue such a warrant is conceded.
On the undisputed facts and in accordance with the controlling
legal doctrine, no such offense as usurpation of judicial
function could have been committed.
2.31 PEOPLE vs. GATWARD
Facts: Customs Police requested manager of the KLM
airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from
the aircraft and to have his checked-in luggage, if any,
unloaded. The manager acceded to the request to off-load
Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as the
plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the
flight. However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would
be returned immediately to the Philippines on the first
available flight from Bangkok. The following day, Gatward's
luggage was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through
the Thai Airways, pursuant to the request. Upon examination
of the bag it was observed to contain two cardboard envelopes,
with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams of heroin.
Issue: Whether the evidence gathered from a warrantless
search is admissible?
Held: Yes. Even though no search warrant had been
obtained for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag
as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. 806
he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with
customs rules and regulations, an international practice of
strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless
search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery
and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.
2.32 PEOPLE vs. SUSAN CANTON
Facts: SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for
Saigon, Vietnam. The frisker on duty at that time conducted
the frisking and felt something at Susan’s abdominal, genital
area and thighs packages containing what felt like rice
granules. The examiner brought SUSAN to a comfort room
for a thorough physical examination and was able to collect
the packages that turned out to be a regulated drug, Shabu.
Issue: Whether the strip search conducted on Susan in the
ladies’ room was constitutionally invalid because it was not
"incidental to an arrest."
Held: No. The arrest could not be said to have been made
before the search because at the time of the strip search, the
arresting officers could not have known what was inside the
plastic containers hidden on her body. They could not have
determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime.
The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing
expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught
flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental
to a lawful arrest.
2.33 PEOPLE vs. JOHNSON
Facts: The respondent entered the pre-departure area of the
Bacolod Airport Terminal bound to Manila. Upon passing to a
walk through metal detector machine the red light switched on
and the alarm sounded. It was because of his hand carried box
of piaya. The respondent was ordered to go to the hand-carried
luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and
Consti II (section 2) 42
NARCOM personnel were present. When it was opened with
his permission, the officers found illegal contrabands. They
apprehended him and brought to the PASCOM office.
Issue: Whether the PASCOM and NARCOM personnel
have no right to conduct search of prohibited materials or
substances.
Held: No. Travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. In the case at bar, the PASCOM agents have the
right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials
or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected
illegal items to enter the pre-departure area.
2.34 TERRY vs OHIO
Facts: Terry and two other men were observed by a plain
clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a
job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men,
and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in
jail.
Issue: Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other
men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Held: the Court held that the search undertaken by the
officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that
the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against
Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this
particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more
than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would
have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus
presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was
investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that
the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to
protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.
2.35 POSADAS vs CA
Facts: While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by
the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the
"buri" bag of the petitioner where they found contrabands. The
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority
to possess the firearms and ammunitions but failed to do so.
Issue: Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was
valid.
Held: An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
2.36 PEOPLE vs SOLAYAO
Facts: A CAFGU members was conducting an intelligence
patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons
roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. On their patrol
they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao
numbering five. The former became suspicious when they
observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant
himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC" after which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in
it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as
"latong". When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a
license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with
the same. There upon, the officer confiscated the firearm and
turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with
illegal possession of firearm.
Issue: Whether the “stop and frisk” conducted by the
officers were justified.
Held. Yes. In the case at bar constitutes an instance where a
search and seizure may be effected without first making an
arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-
appellant. Under the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Thus,
there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
2.37 MALACAT vs CA
Facts: allegedly in response to bomb threats Police Officers
was on foot patrol along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,
near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced
upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,
comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner. They mad a stop and frisk and they seized a grenade
from Malacat. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant
to the exception of stop and frisk.
Held: Yes. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect
the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
Consti II (section 2) 43
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the
circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a hot pursuit arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a
stop and frisk. The concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused.
2.38 MANALIL vs. CA
Facts: Police operatives conducted surveillance along the
front of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that
drug addicts were roaming around in the area, they saw
Manalili who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced
themselves as policemen. The latter avoided them and tried to
resist, when they asked what he was holding in his hand, the
man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it,
who found what he suspected to be crushed marijuana leaves.
Issue: Whether the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk
is admissible.
Held: Yes. Manalili effectively waived the inadmissibility
of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this
issue or object during trial. A valid waiver of right against
unreasonable searches and seizures require the concurrence of
these requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2) the
person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had actual
intention to relinquish the right. In this case however, it is
deemed that Manalili has waived such right for failure to raise
its violation before the trial court, at the earliest opportunity
possible.
2.39 PEOPLE vs ARUTA
Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant
that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City
with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next
day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming
from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling
Rosa” was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They
found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
“cash katutak”.
Issue: Whether the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk
is admissible.
Held: Yes. The following cases are specifically provided or
allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which
are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
2.40 PEOPLE vs SY CHUA
Facts: Police officer s received a report that the
respondent will be delivering drugs that night in a
hotel in Angeles. When they spotted the latter
coming out from his car the police officer
confronted him and introduced themselves as Police
and subjected him to a body search which yielded for some
illegal contrabands.
Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest.
Held: No.In the case at bar" neither the in flagrante delicto
nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by
the police operatives on accused-appellant. In in flagrante
delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment
he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must
concur 1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime: and 2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
2.41 PEOPLE vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA
Facts: Accused Victor Cogaed and his companion was
apprehended by the police officer upon the tip from the
jeepney driver that the two was carrying an illegal
contrabands. The police officers identified the alleged
perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal
knowledge.
Issue: Whether the stop and frisk principle in the case at bar
to justify the exception of a warrantless search.
Held: No. The search involved in this case was initially a
"stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act. In the case at bar, the
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but
Consti II (section 2) 44
by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
2.42 PEOPLE vs. DE GRACIA
Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup
d’etat staged bu ultra-rightiest elements headed by the Reform
the Armed forces Movemnt-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government. Rolando de Gracia was
apprehended by the military operatives, holding a C-4 in the
building of Eurocar Office during the raid. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them,
at the time there was so much disorder considering that the
neardy Cmp Aguinaldo was being mopped upby the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of
Eurocar office and that the courts were consequently closed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search
and seizure during the height of the coup d’etat.
Held: Yes.The raid of, and the consequent seizure
of firearms and ammunition in, the Eurocar Sales Office at the
height of coup d’etat was held valid, considering the exigent
and emergency situation obtaining. The military operatives
had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed, and they had no opportunity to apply for a search
warrant from the courts because the latter were closed. Under
such urgency and exigency, a search warrant could be validly
dispensed with"
2.43 LASERNA vs. DDB
Facts: the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. Petitioner Atty. Manuel J.
Laserna, Jr. assiled that the said law is unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against
self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection guarantees.
Issue: Whether RA 9165 violated the right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause.
Held: No. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
2.44 PIMENTEL JR. vs COMELEC
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test.
Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the
2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the
said law.
Issue: Whether RA 9165, sec. 36(g) violates the
Constitutional right of the citizen to a democratic process of
election?
Held: Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right
of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
2.45 PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ
Facts:After receiving a confidential report, a "buy-bust"
operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit .
At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom an agent first
negotiated with on the purchase and when the agnt told De la
Cruz that he was buying marijuana, De la Cruz instructed
Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana
which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to
the agent. The agent gave the prearranged signal to his
teammates and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran.
The marked bill used by the agent was found in the possession
of Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and
containing marijuana.
Issue:Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-
bust operation violates accused’s constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: No. A buy-bust operation is the method employed by
peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there
is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search
warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the
search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial
experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were
invariably caught red handed.
3.21 People v. Doria – GR 125299, Jan. 22, 1999
Consti II (section 2) 45
Facts: Doria was entrapped and arrested in a buy-bust
operation after the members of the North Metropolitan
District, PNP NARCOM, received information from 2 civilian
informants that one “Jun” was engaged in illegal drug
activities. During the arrest, the marked bills handed to him as
payment for the marijuana could not be found on him. He
revelead that he left the money at the house of his associate
named “Neneth”, whose house he led the police to. The team
found the door of Neneth’s house open and a woman inside,
whom Jun identified as his associate. While asked about the
marked bills, a carton box under the dining table was noticed
by one of the policemen, PO3 Manlangit. The content of
which is wrapped in plastic similar to the marijuana sold to
them. The box contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s
discovery, was the recovery of the marked bills. Neneth was
arrested and the box together with its contents and marked
bills were turned over to the investigators at the headquarters.
This was
Issue: Whether the box that contained bricks of marijuana is
considered in plain view during the seizure
Ruling: No. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person
and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to
be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
"buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals
that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to
clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the 10 bricks
of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue
in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other
than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit
that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was
not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It
was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court.
3.22 Espiritu v. General Lim, GR 85727, October 3, 1991
FACTS: Espiritu, in a gathering of drivers and sympathizers
at the corner of Valencia St. and Magsaysay Boulevard, said,
among others: “Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang
Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang
hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba
ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating
pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na.” Later, at
a conference at the National Press Club, he called for a
nationwide strike. He was arrested without a warrant, for
inciting to sedition.
ISSUE: Was the arrest valid?
RULING: Yes. People may differ as to the criminal character
of the speech, which at any rate will be decided in court. But
for the purposes of arrest, not conviction, there was sufficient
ground for the officer to believe that Espiritu was in the act of
committing a crime. For purposes of arrest, the law tilts in
favor of authority. This is an allowable subsequent
punishment of expression because the speech of Espiritu
creates a dangerous tendency, which the state has the right
to prevent. There’s a rational connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended.
3.23 Umil v. Fidel Ramos, GR 81567, July 9, 1990
FACTS:On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched
to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to
verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the
day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed
by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Binan,
Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of
the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
RULING:Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of
the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense
when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature
of continuing crimes.
3.24 People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388
Consti II (section 2) 46
FACTS: Pat Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C.
Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison Sucro (Accused).
Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2
meters away from Regalado’s house. Accused was monitored
to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third
buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and
later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Seraspi to
intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
crossing in front of Aklan Medical Center. Macabante saw the
police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from accused in
front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested
accused at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered
were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest made without warrant is lawful
RULING: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant
of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec. 12 of Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched from dangerous weapons or anything, which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant. The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required
from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements
for its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are
legal as long as Probable Cause existed. The police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As
police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is
presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties
3.25 People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791
FACTS: An informer of the Narcotics Division reported
activity on illegal drug trafficking to the authorities and a buy-
bust operation was conducted where the informer successfully
bought 100 grams of marijuana for P10.00 from the accused.
The authorities immediately conducted a raid and apprehended
the accused while confiscating marijuana leaves and syringes.
The raid however was not authorized by a search warrant.
Accused now contends that the court erred in admitting the
evidence seized without any search warrant and in violation of
his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not evidence obtained without a valid
search warrant may be used to prosecute the accused.
RULING: The court held that a buy bust operation is a form
of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the
term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug
dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing
as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted
by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. The
Narcom agents should have secured a valid search warrant
prior the raid since they have already been conducting
surveillance against the accused for quite sometime already
and the urgency of their cause of action cannot be justified in
court. Hence the accused was acquitted.
3.26 People v. Yap, 229 SCRA 787
FACTS: An informant reported to the office of the Station
Drug Enforcement Unit, a person referred to by the alias
Manong, who was allegedly selling shabu at the vicinity of
B.M.B.A.. With this information, Police Chief Senior
Inspector Jose Valencia formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation, in which SPO1 Joseph delos Santos was designated
as the poseur-buyer. That same night, the team proceeded to
the reported area. The informant, upon seeing Manong,
approached the latter and introduced Delos Santos as a
customer. Delos Santos then told Manong, Pare, pabili ng
piso, and handed him the marked 100-peso bill. Upon receipt
of the marked money, Manong took out from his pocket and
handed Delos Santos a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline granules. Delos Santos then scratched his left ear,
signaling a positive bust. SPO3 Antonio responded to the
signal and came to the aid of Delos Santos. They frisked
Manong and found four more plastic sachets of white
crystalline granules on his body. They also recovered the
marked money from Manong. They then brought Manong to
the police station for investigation. It was only then that the
police learned that Manong is Danilo Jocson, herein accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant Jocson denied the accusations
against him. He testified that on the night of his arrest, he was
at his residence. While watching a late-night television show
with his mother and his 11-year old niece, SPO3 Antonio
entered his house, and upon seeing him, shouted
Positive! Thereafter, five other policemen entered the house,
forced accused-appellant out of his bed and handcuffed him.
ISSUE: WON the arrest was valid without a warrant of arrest?
RULING: In the case at bar, the police arrested accused-
appellant in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is one
form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective
way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission
of an offense. Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that
a person, acting as a decoy for the state, or that public officials
furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the
offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the
crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute
him, there is permissible entrapment and the accused must be
convicted.
Consti II (section 2) 47
3.27 People v. Alolod, 266 SCRA 154
FACTS: Respondent was charged with Robbery with
Homicide when he forcibly took from one Romeo a bag,
which contains a lump sum of money and that respondent
inflicted serious physical injuries, which caused Romeo’s
death. He argued that there was a commotion going on and
that he was only a by-passer, after hearing some gunshots,
people panicked and so did he. Several by-passers claimed
that he was the one who fired the gun and immediately the
police apprehended him. Upon examination, he demanded to
subject his hands to x-ray to determine if he indeed fired a gun
or not, but was denied. Convicted of the crime, since evidence
shows that police seized a gun, which was used in the
commission of the crime. In addition, the procedure followed
by the police officers in effecting the arrest of the accused and
in procuring evidence against him. The accused argues
that: (a) the police officers did not observe his constitutional
rights in effecting his arrest and while under custodial
interrogation; (b) they did not subject the gun taken from him
as well as the slug recovered from the body of the victim to a
ballistics test to determine if indeed the slug came from the
gun; and, (c) despite his request, they did not bother to subject
him to a paraffin test to determine if he recently fired the gun.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid arrest?
RULING: Court ruled that contrary to the argument of the
defense, the records fail to disclose that there were violations
by the police of the Constitutional rights of the accused during
his custodial interrogation. We hold that there was no more
need for any ballistics test on the gun recovered from the
accused and the slug retrieved from the body of the victim;
neither was it necessary to conduct a paraffin test to determine
if the accused indeed fired a gun.
3.28 People v. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174
FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men
looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen.
They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable
to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-
appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions
in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were
taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed
before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of
firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police
including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to
prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to
possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted
on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation
of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his
appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and
therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was
illegal.
RULING: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose as provided by Art. III of the Constitution. Rule 113
sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant
lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b)
when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested
has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped
from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
3.29 People v. Elamparo – 329 SCRA
FACTS: Police Officers conducted a buy-bust operation on
the sale of shabu or marijuana by themselves without a
warrant. When the police officers ran after the seller of illegal
drugs named Erwin Spencer, the latter ran with the marked
money towards a bungalow house where the police officers,
when they got inside, saw Joel Elamparo packing bricks of
dried marijuana leaves with a newspaper.
The 2 were arrested and taken to the precinct to the inquest
fiscal for further investigation. They charged of illegal
possession of drugs and Elamparo was convicted with penalty
of reclusion perpetua and a P9-million fine.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the arrest was invalid considering that the police
officers had no warrant with them.
RULING:
1. As to the warrantless search, Section 2 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution prohibits a search and seizure
without a judicial warrant. Section 3 also provides
that any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Consti II (section 2) 48
 However, not being absolute, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to
exceptions.
This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine.
Reiterated the case of People v Doria (1999): "Objects
falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent."
When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of
PO2 Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of
appellant. The members of the buy-bust team were
justified in running after him and entering the house
without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of
a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police
officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust
money from him. They also caught appellant
in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks
which were in full view on top of a table.
In flagrante delicto arrest is lawful, provided that the 2
elements have concurred: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating the he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Thus,
when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the
police officers were not only authorized but also duty-
bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
B. Hot Pursuit
Two Requisites:
1. An offense had just been committed.
2. The person making the arrest has probable cause to believe,
based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances,
that the person to be arrested committed it.
*There must be immediacy between the time the offense is
committed and the time of the arrest.
3.30 Rizaldy Cajili v. People, GR 204589
FACTS: Accused was found to be in possession of “shabu”,
upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. However, RTC ruled that accused was caught in
flagrante delicto, in actual possession of shabu. Accused
contended that the searched was done without a valid warrant
and the shabu seized must be inadmissible as evidence before
the court.
ISSUE: WON the accused was caught in flagrante delicto,
hence, a warrant is not needed.
RULING: The Court ruled that there was no warrant needed
since the accused was found to be in flagrante delicto on the
basis of the plain-view doctrine.
3.31 Go v. CA – 206 SCRA 138
FACTS: Rolito Go was driving and upon nearly bumping
another car driven by Eldon Maguan, Rolito stepped out from
his car, approached Eldon’s car and shot Eldon with a 9 mm
caliber pistol. Rolito went back to his car and drove away. A
security guard nearby the incident was able to witness the
alleged crime and was able to take note of the plate number of
the car of the assailant. The police shortly arrived thereafter.
The car plate number was verified at the LTO showing that the
car driven by the assailant was registered to Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police officer launched a manhunt for
Rolito Go, after the Security Guard has given his statement
and confirmed the assailant was the petitioner.
6 days later, Rolito Go appeared in the Police Station with his
2 lawyers, to confirm the news that he was being hunted by
the police. He was detained and was also charged with
frustrated homicide by the police on that same day.
Rolito Go questioned right away the validity of the warrantless
arrest to be unlawful. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest is lawful considering that the accused
personally appeared in the police station 6 days after the
alleged shooting incident and was detained and arrested on
that same day without a warrant.
Consti II (section 2) 49

RULING: The instant case does not fall within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting
of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge"
of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted
had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number, which turned out to be registered
in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."
3.32 People v. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701 (1994)
FACTS: A man (Alfaro) was allegedly stabbed and shot in a
drinking spree by Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson at
around 1 am of May 30, 1986. The assailants fled. Manlulu
was arrested the same day, around 7 pm, by the police officers
recovering from him the pistol used to shoot the victim and a
wristwatch owned by the victim, but the police officers had no
warrant and did not inform the accused Manlulu of his right to
counsel. Manlulu admitted the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: W/N the convicted Manlulu and Samson can
challenged the validity of the warrantless arrest considering
that the arrest took place 19 hours from the time of the alleged
commission of the crime [the time of the commission of the
crime was 1 AM, May 30, 1986 and the time of the
warrantless arrest was 7 PM, May 30, 1986].
RULING: Yes. The SC said that the warrantless arrest in this
case cannot be regarded as lawful within the meaning of Sec 5
(b) Rule 113 of the Criminal Procedure which provides: that
the arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of
an offense which "has in fact just been committed." The
arresting officer does not have personal knowledge since
“personal gathering of information” is different from
“personal knowledge”, and the rule requires that the arrest
immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some
nineteen hours later.
However, inspite of the nullification of the arrest of Manlulu
and the exclusion of real evidence, the SC affirmed that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. After all, the illegality of the warrantless
arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
3.33 People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
FACTS: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after
gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of
prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents
were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the
agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don.
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a
certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as
marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went
back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a
team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in
the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the
NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no
authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found
positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering
the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution,
found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Consti II (section 2) 50
ISSUE: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its
judgment.
RULING: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the
entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that
the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act
of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the
operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid
also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and
seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances
wherein a search may be validly made even without a search
warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by
invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
place had already been put under surveillance for quite some
time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily could, have first secured a search
warrant during that time.Failure to do so would be fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside
and accused is acquitted.
3.34 People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586
FACTS: Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him. Sandiganbayan
denied Enrile’s motion on the ground of its prematurity
considering that he had not yet voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law. Subsequently, warrant for
his arrest was issued, however, Enrile voluntarily surrendered.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention and to Fix
Bail, heard by the Sandiganbayan but was denied because it is
only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence
and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be
duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
ISSUE: WON the contention of the Sandiganbayan in
denying the accused for fixing bail correct?
RULING: For purposes of bail, admittedly, the accused’s age,
physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of
bail. However, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount
of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of the
guilt against accused is not strong. Thus, bail denied.
3.35 People v. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166 (1997)
FACTS: Jayson was a bouncer at a nightclub. He was arrested
without a warrant after being pointed by an eyewitness as the
gunman in the killing of Jordan. Recovered from him was a
gun which was issued by Major Arquillano. He was
subsequently charged with illegal possession of firearm.
However, accused did not raise any error pertinent to consider
the circumstances surrounding accused’s arrest and the seizure
from him of the firearm in question considering that both were
made without any warrant.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest, search and seizure were
valid.
RULING: Yes. Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a warrantless arrest shall be
lawful when an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it. In the case at bar, the arresting
officers acting on the basis of their personal knowledge of the
death of the victim and of facts indicating that Jayson was the
assailant. The arrest, search and seizure were incident to a
lawful one as allowed under Rule 126, Sec. 12.
3.36 People v. Del Rosario, GR 127755, April 14, 1999
FACTS: Joselito del Rosario, Ernesto Marquez, Virgilio
Santos and John Doe were charged with special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, for having robbed a 66-year
old businesswoman, of P200k cash and jewelry and on the
occasion, shot and killed her.
2 man snatched the bag of the old woman. One ran after
another man who tried to help the woman, the other who was
armed with a pistol kicked the woman onto the ground and
shot her. The armed man brought the bag to another man
waiting inside a tricycle and sat behind the tricycle driver
while the other entered the side car. The driver of the tricycle
was Joselito del Rosario.
Consti II (section 2) 51
An eye witness (Alonzo) saw the incident and tried to chase have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the
the tricycle but the tricycle sped away. He was able to get the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.
plate number and went to report to the Police station right
away.

The following day, a raid was conducted by the police officers

at the house of Ernesto Marquez. They were arrested,
including del Rosario, without a warrant.

Accused del Rosario countered that he was hired by 3 men and
during the occasion he wanted to leave but he was threatened,
thus, his defense as an exempting circumstance was
“irresistible force” and “uncontrollable fear”.
The trial court still convicted them including del Rosario.
Hence, the case for certiorari.
3.37 People v. Samus, GR 135957, 2002
FACTS: Guillermo Samus was charged with murder for the
death of a 61-year old woman named Dedicacion Soriano-
Balisi and of 6-year old boy named John Ardee Balisi by
strangling their neck and banging their heads against the
concrete pavement of the floor.

ISSUE: w/n the arrest of del Rosario and the other 3 men falls
under the lawful warrantless arrest provided in Sec 5 Rule 113
of the Criminal Procedures.
The alleged crime took place in September 2, 1996, and the
arrest of Guillermo Samus was on September 10, 1996, by
police officers and without a warrant.

RULING: No. The instant case does not fall under the lawful
warrantless arrest.
Sec 5(a) requires that the accused be caught in flagrante
delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the
act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview
of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day
following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
Sec 5(b) necessitates that: 1. An offense was just committed;
and, 2. the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that a person to be arrested had committed it. The
arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements
since: 1. the arrest came a day after the consummation of the
crime and not immediately thereafter, and 2. the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed the offense since they
were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime.
ISSUE: Is there an unlawful warrantless arrest?
RULING: Yes. Under the Rules,peace officers may, without a
warrant, arrest a person under any of these circumstances: (a)
when, in their presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit,
an offense; (b) when an offense has just been committed, and
they have probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another, or from a penal
establishment where he or she is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while the case is pending.

None of these circumstances was present when members of

However, the objection to a valid warrantless arrest was
deemed waived in this case, because the accused submitted to
the arraignment without objection.
The SC affirmed the conviction of the other 3 men, but
acquitted del Rosario from the crime.
the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG) arrested appellant. He
was not a prisoner. The killing of Dedicacion and John Ardee
Balisi was not done in the presence of the arresting
officers. Since it took place on September 2, 1996, it could not
have been considered as having just been committed.
Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant on September
10, 1996.

MAINPOINT: In Sec 5(b) Rule 113 of the criminal procedure,

there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time 3.38 People v. Cubcubin, GR 136267, October 2, 2001
the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if
there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and
the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also
mandatory that the person making the arrest must
Consti II (section 2) 52
FACTS: A tricycle driver named Henry Piamonte was shot
and killed while he was riding his tricycle around 3 AM,
August 26, 1997.
He was last seen in a Café, located a kilometer away from the
crime scene, and he was last seen together with Fidel
Cubcubin Jr. Fidel Cubcubin Jr. was arrested by the police
officers around 4 am on the same day the alleged crime was
committed, at his house, with no warrant. The police officers
also seized a shirt, empty shells of a paltik gun.
ISSUE: Does the warrantless arrest of Fidel Cubcubin Jr. fall
under the meaning of Sec 5 (b) Rule 113 of the criminal
procedure, making it a lawful one, after consideration that the
arrest was made within the same day the alleged crime was
committed?
RULING: The SC held that the warrantless arrest made by the
police officers is an illegal one. Sec 5(b) Rulle 113 requires 2
conditions to concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: 1. The
offense has just been committed, and 2. The arresting officer
has personal knowledge that the person to be arrested has
committed it. IN the case at bar, although the arrest was
effected shortly after the victim was killed, but the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge since they were not
present when the victim was killed and since their information
came entirely from an informant.
3.39 People v. Gorente, 219 SCRA 756
FACTS: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started
drinking liquor andsmoking marijuana in the house of
the appellant. She overheard the three men talking about their
intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and
Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes,
testified that she witnessed the killing as follows: Fredo
Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed
by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice
with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the
house of Gerente.Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela
Police Station received a report from the Palo Police
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He
was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on
arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
They were informed by Reyes, that she saw the killing and she
pointed toGabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who
was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and
they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
friskedappellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which
contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. Only
the appellant, GabrielGerente, was apprehended by the police.
The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at
large.
Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of
Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, and for
Murder. The trial court convicted him of Violation of Section
8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the
marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution
RULING: YES. The search conducted on Gerente's person
was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides: A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was
a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first.
3.40 Padilla v. CA, GR 121917, March 12, 1997
FACTS: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused
appellant’s car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires
was heard and thus, made the officer run out and investigate.
Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took
place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the Police.
When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the
windows with his hands raised. The officers then noticed that
it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended,
because of the hit-and-run incident, the police saw the
revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the police
insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal. The
crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and
pointing to the police while saying “iyan kinuha ang baril ko”,
as if it was in the movies. The gesture then revealed a
magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that
there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The
other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin.
Now, Robin’s defense was that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.
Consti II (section 2) 53
Robin Padilla was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal
possession of firearms. He was in possession of a .357 caliber
revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6 live ammunitions, One M-
16 baby Armalite Rifle with ammunitions, One .380 Pietro
Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is illegal and the evidences
is inadmissible.
RULING: NO.The policemen's warrantless arrest of
petitioner could likewise be justified as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's
report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as
reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's
Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
3.41 People v. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1
FACTS: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting
members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its
members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del
Sur.
From the information filed by the police authorities upon the
information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant
tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest
defendant and had his house searched.
Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm,
allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA,
are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any
subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in
order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his
alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under
fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family.
He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid
warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant
in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court
erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.
ISSUE: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related
documents are lawful.
RULING:NO. Records disclose that when the police went to
defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by
Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with
them is unlawful.
The trial court has erred in its conclusion that said
warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC.
At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was
not committing any “subversive” act,he was plowing his
field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is
that a crime must have been in fact or actually have been
committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may
have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies
only to the identity of the perpetrator.
3.42 People v. Sucro – 195 SCRA 388
FACTS: Pat Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C.
Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison Sucro (Accused).
Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2
meters away from Regalado’s house. Accused was monitored
to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third
buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and
later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Seraspi to
intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
crossing in front of Aklan Medical Center. Macabante saw the
police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from accused in
front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested
accused at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered
were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
RULING: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant
of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec. 12 of Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched from dangerous weapons or anything, which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant. The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required
from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements
for its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are
legal as long as Probable Cause existed. The police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As
police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is
presumed that they are regularly in performance of their
duties.
3.43 People v. Briones – 202 SCRA 708
Consti II (section 2) 54
FACTS: The accused-appellants are questioning their
conviction by the RTC of robbery with double homicide. The
contend that the trial court erred in holding that the crime
committed is robbery with double homicide despite
insufficiency of evidence, in not holding that the evidence
obtained against them is inadmissible for violation of their
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and against
self-incrimination during custodial investigation, and in not
holding that their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. They likewise argue that their arrest was illegal for
having been made without a warrant.
ISSUE: WON the court erred without considering the validity
of the arrest.
RULING: The constitutional rights of the appellants to
remain silent and to counsel, the same cannot be held to have
been violated. It is not disputed that the appellants were
investigated by the police. However, it is important to note
that the confession, admission or evidence obtained from the
appellants was never offered in evidence by the prosecution.
on appellants' claim that since their warrantless arrest is void,
all the other proceedings, including their conviction, are also
void, We find such claim undeserving of merit. It is
unequivocally clear that no valid arrest was made on the
accused-appellants, the arrest having been made without any
warrant at all. Neither can the appellants' arrest qualify as
lawful arrest without a warrant under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure because the police officer
effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime. It is eyewitnesses Francisco who had such personal
knowledge. In like manner, we cannot accept appellee's
allegation that Briones was a fugitive from justice at the time
of the latter's arrest because it is not supported by the evidence
on record. In sum, therefore, the warrantless arrest of the
appellants is illegal. Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality
cannot render all the other proceedings, including the
conviction of the appellants, void. It cannot deprive the state
of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to their culpability.
3.44 People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79
FACTS: Accused was found guilty by the trial court for the
charges of robbery with homicide when he did and there steal
and carry away the payroll money of Jose, and on the occasion
thereof, shot Pedro who was back riding, thereby inflicting
upon him a gunshot wound on the head, resulting to Pedro’s
death. Accused contends that the prosecution failed to
consider the non-observance of the Constitution in the
investigation with the accused by the police when they did not
remind the accused of their right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel
ISSUE: WON the accused was reminded of his constitutional
safeguards?
RULING: The Court, however, must express its dismay over
the questionable means employed by the police in
investigating the accused. The police officers concerned
mocked the Constitution, which they themselves have sworn
to honor and revere, when they did not remind the accused of
their right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. They
must be instructed by their superiors in no uncertain terms to
respect the Constitution at all times in the performance of their
duties. Be that as it may, this unconstitutional act may not
benefit the cause of the accused. After all, nothing in the
evidence for the prosecution was taken from the police
investigation in question. Also, in the course of his testimony,
police officer Elpidio Luna was rebuked by the trial court for
his violation of the constitutional rights of accused.
3.45 People v. Nazareno – 260 SCRA 256
FACTS: Accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil
Regala was found guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo
Bunye. Both the accused claimed that they were tortured to
admit to the crime. The trial court ruled the confessions of the
accused to be inadmissible. However, it held Regala and
Nazareno guilty on the basis of their positive identification by
witnesses and their testimony in court. Accused-appellant
Ramil Regala contends that the court erred in not considering
the unlawful arrest. Accused-appellants claim that their
arrests without warrant were illegal and justify the
nullification of the proceedings of the trial court. It was
alleged that Nazarenos arrest was illegal because it was made
without warrant fourteen days after the killing of Romulo
Bunye II.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in not considering the unlawful
arrest.
RULING: The Court already held that the warrantless arrest
was in accordance with Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (b) When an offense has
just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
4.21 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-
appellee, vs. SAMUEL MAHUSAY y FLORES AND
Consti II (section 2) 55
CRISTITUTO PASPOS Toto y CATARIG,accused-
appellants.
Facts:Appellants Samuel Mahusay and Cristituto Paspos,
along with Felomino Galo, Alfredo Mendio, Justiniano
Velacsi (at large), and Tanciong Egloba (at large), were
charged with the crime of robbery with rape and physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. N-1283 before the Regional
Trial Court of Naval, Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Branch
16, under an information dated July 19, 1988.However,after
the final judgement they contended that the arrest made was a
warrantless one.
Issue:Whether the arrest made was valid?
RulingSection 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Under Section 5(b) of the aforequoted rule, two conditions
must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid:first, the
person to be arrested must have just committed an offense, and
second, the arresting peace officer or private person must have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense.It has been
ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested on the sole basis of
Bughaos verbal report.The arresting officers were led to
suspect that, indeed, appellants had committed a crime.Thus,
the arrest was made in violation of their fundamental right
against an unjustified warrantless arrest.This notwithstanding,
appellants cannot find comfort solely in this error.
The Court has ruled on several occasions that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.Indeed, it is too late for appellants
to raise the question of their arrest.When appellants were
arrested and a case was filed against them, they pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented
their respective evidence.Appellants are thus estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest.At the outset, appellants
should have moved for the quashal of the information before
the trial court on this ground.Accordingly, any irregularity in
their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
4.22 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ARMANDO ALVARIO,accused-appellant.
Facts:ARMANDO ALVARIO guilty of the crime of
Rape.However,Alvario consistently protested the his arrest
was made without a valid warrant of arrest.
Issue:Whether the warrantless arrest maid was valid?
Ruling:Suffice it to say that his arrest falls within the purview
of Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure,viz.:
Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
The personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at
bar was culled from the information supplied by the victim
herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at
the time of his arrest
4.23 Larranaga Vs CA
Facts:On October 1, 1997, petitioner, represented by his
mother, Margarita G. Larranaga,filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.Petitioner
alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation and sought to annul the informations as well as
the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof.In the
alternative, petitioner prayed that a preliminary investigation
be conducted and that he be released from detention pending
the investigation.Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for
habeas corpus or bail on October 6, 1997
Issue:Whether the petitioner is entitled for a preliminary
investigation?
Ruling:The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment.Petitioner, in this case,
has been actively and consistently demanding a regular
preliminary investigation even before he was charged in
court.Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court
regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation.Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are
inconsistent with a waiver.Preliminary investigation is part of
procedural due process.It cannot be waived unless the waiver
appears to be clear and informed.
Consti II (section 2) 56
Issue:whether the petitioner should be released from detention
pending the investigation
Ruling:The records show that on September 17, 1997, two
informations were filed against petitioner for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.Executive Judge Priscila Agana
issued a warrant of arrest on September 19, 1997. was arrested
on September 22, 1997 by virtue of said warrant.We held in
Sanchez v. Demetriou the filing of charges and the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will
cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right
to be released because of such defect.The Court ruled:
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless
illegal.Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue
of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against
him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay
cases.It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we
find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner.The rule is that if the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may
move to quash the information, but only on that ground.If, as
in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to
quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
4.24 People Vs.Olivarez
Facts:Involved in this case is the crime of robbery with
homicide committed during the season of yuletide .Convicting
appellants of the crime charged, sentenced them to suffer the
death penalty and to indemnify the victims heirs..However, In
this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and
robbery and; thus, no direct evidence points to appellants
criminal liability.The prosecutions principal evidence against
them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers
who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their
confession.Such evidence when juxtaposed with appellants
constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of
confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held
liable for the offense charged despite the inherent weakness of
their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not
guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
Issue: Whether warrantless arrest qualifies in the case at bar
Ruling:First, appellants were arrested without a valid a valid
warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot even be justified under
any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest
mentioned in Section 6, (now Section 5) Rule 113 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure
None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest
concurs herein.At the time appellants were apprehended, two
days had already lapsed after the discovery of the crime they
were not doing nor had just done any criminal act. Neither
were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from
confinement.Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they
made, the arresting officers testified that appellants were
merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation,
however, when construed in the light of the circumstances is
actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of
conducting an interrogation.Mere invitation is covered by the
proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended for
no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus,
pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
which was in effect at that time, any evidence obtained in
violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining
to invalid warrantess arrest)shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.By virtue of said constitutional
protection, any evidence obtained, including all the things and
properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were taken
by the police from the place of the illegal arrest cannot be used
as evidence for their conviction.In the same manner, all the
products of those illegal arrests cannot be utilized to sustain
any civil liability that they may have incurred by reason of
their acts.This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it
provides that those illegally obtained evidence being the fruits
of the poisonous tree are inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.The foregoing constitutional protection on the
inadmissibility of evidence (which are the product of an illegal
search and arrest) known as the exclusionary rule, applies not
only to criminal cases but even extends to civil, administrative
and any other form of proceedings.No distinction is made by
the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.
4.25 Cadua Vs CA
Facts:In the evening of January PO3 Joselito Burdeos and
companions, all assigned with the Central Police District in
Quezon City, were aboard mobile unit patrolling the vicinity
of Fairview, Quezon City.Their tour of duty was from 3:00
p.m. to 11:00 p.m.While deployed, they received a radio
dispatch requesting them to proceed to. North Fairview.Said
dispatch was based on a report concerning an alleged holdup
of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her daughter Bernadette,
who were in need of police assistance.At said address, police
officers found both complainants who stated that the alleged
holduppers had just fled.PO3 Burdeos asked where the
robbery took place.Complainants replied that they were held
up by two (2) men at the corner of Archer and Regalado
Streets, near their house.The police officers also asked in what
direction the alleged holduppers fled and what they were
wearing.Then, the police officers requested the complainants
to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for the
two (2) men.As they were patrolling around the area,
complainants informed the police officers that one of the
suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was
dressed in a black top and black pants.The police officers then
noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and as the
officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the
complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one
Consti II (section 2) 57
of which is the petitioner in this case.The police officers
slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called
out to the suspects.As Burdeos was approaching the suspects,
he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something
which was tucked at the right side of his waist.Burdeos
promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to
move.He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38
caliber paltik revolver.PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended
Caduas companion, who was later identified as Joselito
Aguilar.In Aguilars possession was found a fan
knife.According to petitioner, since his arrest is null and void,
the search conducted by the police officers as an incident to
his arrest is likewise defective.In support of his claim,
petitioner seeks to invoke his constitutional right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures,and the
corresponding prohibition against admitting into evidence
anything obtained in violation of such right.
Issue:whether or not his right to be protected from any
unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated.
Ruling:we find that there was sufficient reason to justify a
warrantless arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of
firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, provides
that:
Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court,
show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5
abovecited.Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime
report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained
that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting
officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly
implicated as a suspect.As explained by a respected authority
on criminal procedure:
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts, in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.Peace officers may pursue and arrest without
warrant any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such
person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or
breach of the peace.Probable cause for an arrest without
warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a
reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty.Besides
reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
protective bulwark for the officer.Under such conditions, even
if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace
officer is not liable.The cases hold that a peace officer might
arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in
the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect
of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so
arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of
suspicion to mislead the officer.The reason of the rule is
apparent.Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the streets
and uninhabited premises at midnight.Citizens must be
protected from annoyance and crime.Prevention of crime is
just as commendatory as the capture of criminals.Surely the
officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery
or other felony.The rule is supported by the necessities of life.
4.26 (name of case) People v. Cubcubin
Facts:On August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin , armed with an unlicensed
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver,
with no serial number, with intent to kill, acting with treachery
and evident premeditation and taking advantage of the
darkness of [the] night, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the
aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO
PIAMONTE, hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot
wounds in the head which caused the latters instantaneous
death.October 5, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City,finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica
Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death. Accused-appellant contends that his
arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a warrant, was
illegal.
Issue:Whether the petitioner’s arrest was valid?
Ruling:On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 5.without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
Consti II (section 2) 58
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
.Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless
arrest to be valid:first, the offender has just committed an
offense and,second, the arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.It has been held that
personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion
4.27 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA,accused-
appellant.
Facts:Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police
informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio
Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment
conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon,
San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995.During
the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the
backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be
marijuana plants.SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the
result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr.,
Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a
team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division
Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command
and the Special Action Force.Two members of the media, one
from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were also
included in the composite team.On July 12, 1995, the team
applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge
Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City.However, Judge
Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the matter.The team then left Bacolod City
for San Carlos City.They arrived there around six-thirty in the
evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S.
Javellana to secure a search warrant.They were not able to do
so because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously
over.They were told by the judge to go back in the
morning.Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay
Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in
the early morning of July 13, 1995.SPO4 Villamor knocked at
the gate and called out for the accused-appellant
Issue:whether accused-appelant’s constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the
police authorities.
Ruling:The relevant constitutional provisions are found in
Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows:
Sec. 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless,
malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and
liberty.The Court, in Villanueva v. Querubin,underscored their
importance:
It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home, but not
necessarily thereto confined.What is sought to be guarded is a
mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his
residence.
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes unreasonable within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the
fruits of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the
proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute.There are several instances
when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner
of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a
search;when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion;when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest;when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws;when it is made on automobiles for
the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws;when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view;when it involves a stop and frisk situation;when the
search is under exigent and emergency circumstances;or in
cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.In these
instances, a search may be validly made even without a
warrant.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the
composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not
authorized by a search warrant.It does not appear either that
the situation falls under any of the above mentioned
cases.Consequently, accused-appellants right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not
consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted.While
the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
may, like every right, be waived either expressly or
impliedly,such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.The act of the
accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to
Consti II (section 2) 59
enter his premises and his consequent silence during the
unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of
the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily
armed.His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.The case of People v.
Burgos,is instructive.In Burgos, the Court ruled that the
accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search simply because he failed to object. There, we held: To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
(Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65)
4.28 ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and
MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and
ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.
Facts:Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the
University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994.In a
letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas,
then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance
in determining the persons responsible for the crime.In
response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief
of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went
to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro
Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest
Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects
in the killing of Venturina.It appears that the two suspects had
come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk
between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity. The
NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan
four days after the commission of the crime.They had no
personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the
two students were probably guilty of the crime.What they had
were the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without
a warrant by the NBI.
Issues: Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by
the NBI could be validly made without a warrant
Ruling:In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that
no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by
a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.The
exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a
warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure .
Second,We have already explained what constitutes "personal
knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:"Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section
5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts,i.e.,supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.
4.29 People Vs Acol
Facts:The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint
trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of
September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his
jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they
crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two
other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was
instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where
the other passengers were divested of their personal
belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta.
Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near
the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan
and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime.
A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the
culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding
police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was
wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort
Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said persons.
After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four
men scampered to different directions but three of them,
namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were
apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in
possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets.
After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio
and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who
ganged up on the accused.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid?
Ruling:With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of
accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search falls
Consti II (section 2) 60
within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves
as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:When
an offense has in fact been committed, and the has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;inasmuch as the police team was
formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for
the crime on account of the information related by Percival
Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed (People
vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205
SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-appellant's arrest was
lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was
valid (People vs. Tanilon,221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover,
the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team
apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs. Cruz,165
SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla
in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs.
Palacio(90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:When, in pursuing an illegal
action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the
corpus delicti.
4.30 People Vs Rabang
Facts:The case before the Court is an appeal taken by accused
Maximo (Dagit) Rabang, Jr. from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan, convicting him of
murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,and to pay
the heirs of the victim Floramante Talaro the amount of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as death compensation, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. Accused-appellant also assails the trial courts finding
that treachery qualified the killing to murder.He interposes the
defense of alibi.
Issue:Whether the trial court erred in finding that treachery
qualified the killing
Ruling:We do not agree.The trial court was in the best position
to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses presented before it
for it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses deportment
on the stand and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies.Thus, in the absence of showing that serious and
substantial errors were committed by the lower court in the
appraisal of the evidence before it, the trial judges assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses is accorded great weight and
respect.
4.31 People Vs Lopez
Facts:This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan (Branch 52), finding accused-appellant
guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder and ordering him to pay a total of P204,300.00 in
damages. In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that the
honorable court erred in rendering two counts of murder and
one count of frustrated murder.
Issue:Whether the court erred in rendering its decision
Ruling:The Information is formally defective as it charged
more the one offense in violation of Rule 110, 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court.However, because of his failure to file
a motion to quash, accused-appellant is deemed to have
waived objection based on the ground of duplicity.The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision finds accused-
appellant guilty of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, but
sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one
count of frustrated homicide.We hold that accused-appellant
was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of attempted
murder.Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex
crime is committed only when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies. As the victims in this case
were successively shot by accused-appellant with a shotgun,
each shot necessarily constitutes one act.Accused-appellant
should thus be held liable for three separate crimes.
The lower court correctly appreciated treachery as having
qualified the killings of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo
Padapat.The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim.Here, it was clearly established that
the victims, when shot, were unarmed and were peacefully
walking along a trail when accused-appellant suddenly opened
fire on them.The swiftness of the shooting left them helpless
to put up any form of defense.
The lower court however erred in convicting accused-
appellant of frustrated homicide for the injuries inflicted on
Mario Seldera.Although it correctly appreciated the intent to
kill, which can be inferred from the weapon used, the
proximity of the assailants and the location of the injuries, it
should have appreciated treachery in the attack.Treachery
attended the shooting not only of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo
Padapat but also of Mario Seldera.
4.32 Velasco Vs CA
Facts:This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
Lorenzo Velasco and Socorro J. Velasco (hereinafter referred
to as the petitioners) against the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated June 28, 1969 in CA-G.R. 42376, which
ordered the dismissal of the appeal interposed by the
petitioners from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City on the ground that they had failed seasonably to
file their printed record on appeal. According to the petitioner
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the appeal of the petitioner.
Issue:Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Ruling:This Court held in Bello vs. Fernando that the right to
appeal is nota natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner provided by law. In this connection, the Rule of Court
Consti II (section 2) 61
expressly makes it the duty of an appellant to file a printed
record on appeal with the Court of Appeals within sixty (60)
record on appeal approved by the trial court has already been
received by the said court. Thus, section 5 of Rule 46 states:
Sec. 5.Duty of appellant upon receipt of
notice. — It shall be the duty of the appellant
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
notice referred to in the preceding section, to
pay the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee
for the docketing of the appeal, and within
sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to
the court forty (40) printed copies of the
record on appeal, together with proof of
service of fifteen (15) printed copies thereof
upon the appelee.
As the petitioners failed to comply with the above-mentioned
duty which the Rules of Court enjoins, and considering that, as
found by the Court of Appeals, there was a deliberate effort on
their part to mislead the said Court in grating them an
extension of time within which to file their printed record on
appeal, it stands to reason that the appellate court cannot be
said to have abused its discretion or to have acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of their
appeal
4.33 People Vs Buluran
Facts:On appeal is the decision dated February 4, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting
accused-appellants of the crime of murder and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay
solidarily the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00
as indemnity, and P8,000.00 as actual damages, and also to
pay proportionately the costs. The petitioner raised the
following the court erred in convicting the appellants who
instead are entitled to acquittal on grounds of violation of their
constitutional rights and procedural rights to due process
which divested the court of jurisdiction
Issue: Whether the court erred in convicting the appellants
who instead are entitled to acquittal on grounds of violation of
their constitutional rights and procedural rights to due process
which divested the court of jurisdiction
Ruling: There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused during custodial investigation since neither one
executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the
records show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain
silent during the custodial investigation. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission
or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
their conviction.In this case, the basis of the conviction by the
trial court was the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses,
Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo. It is
noteworthy that appellants never attempted to impeach their
testimonies during trial. Neither do they assail the credibility
of said witnesses on appeal. The failure to accord appellants
their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the
validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court.While the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of
Consti II (section 2) 62