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Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum
Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum
Book Reviews
Oct 192016
This excellent English translation of Ego Sum by one of Nancy’s most expert readers,
commentators, and philosophical interlocutors, Marie-Eve Morin, is long overdue.
Published originally France in 1979, the book occupies a singular place in Nancy’s
early works and, as both the author’s new preface and the translator’s introduction
indicate, it resonates in manifold ways throughout Nancy’s mature thinking such as it
has developed up to the present day. Its arguments are recalled in some of the most
important subsequent moments and works that define Nancy as a philosopher: the
thinking of experience and of freedom (in The Experience of Freedom), of embodiment
and embodied space (in works such as Corpus), of sense (The Sense of the World), of
exposition in the Nancean ontology of the singular plural (in Being Singular Plural and
elsewhere), and, more recently, the thinking of un-groundedness and void central to the
(auto-)deconstruction of Christianity. Indeed, as Nancy himself puts it in his preface, the
thought of Ego Sum: “has never ceased reworking, repeating and renewing itself within
me.” (vii). The book is therefore an indispensable point of reference for anyone wanting
to understand the core dynamic of Nancy’s thinking in general and its development
from the earliest phase of his career in particular.
This is all achieved by way of a singular and highly original return to the foundation of
the subject in Descartes in a reading that is inflected and influenced by a number of
thinkers, most obviously Heidegger and Nietzsche, but also Blanchot, Derrida, and
Nancy’s close friend and colleague Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. It is, as Nancy himself
puts it:
a matter of reaching the place, indeed of going back to the instant of a foundation, that
of the Subject—in order to lend an ear to what only the foundation can make audible,
because it triggers it and brings it about: the whisper of the subject that utters itself
there, and collapses there. (11)
The reading of Descartes that Nancy develops here is firmly embedded within the
context of his collaboration in the 1970s with Lacoue-Labarthe around the question of
the relation of philosophy to literature, a collaboration pursued in journals such as
Poétique. As with the later Nancean thinking of the deconstruction of Christianity, the
crux of the argument turns around an instance of auto-deconstruction that can be
discerned as operating at a point of origin, in a moment of originary or inaugural
foundation. So whereas in the later thought this inaugural moment is that of Christ’s
incarnation as flesh, in Ego Sum it is the enunciation and foundation of the subject in the
cogito (with embodiment being central to both). The Cartesian establishment of the
subject, Nancy writes, “corresponds, through the most binding necessity of its own
structure, to the instantaneous exhaustion of its essential possibilities. The very erection
and inauguration of the Subject will have brought about the collapse of its substance.”
(16) The subject does not need to be deconstructed or toppled since it has always
already undermined itself from the outset. It is just matter of discerning the logic of this
“collapse” and, in the context of Nancy’s thinking of the 1970s, this logic is one which
is articulated in the impossibility that philosophy encounters when it tries to separate
itself from its discursive and literary mode presentation in order to establish or found
itself as philosophy (an exact same logic is also discerned in Nancy’s reading of Kant in
Logodeadalus).
Nancy is interested in the way in which Descartes, in texts such as the Discourse on
Method in particular, seeks to both ground the philosophical subject in a moment of
autonomous self-foundation (the cogito) and give a portrait or narrative account of that
moment in order to hold it up for appraisal and judgment. There is a necessary interplay
or doubling here between the supposedly autonomous and self-sufficient moment of
foundation and its presentation or representation in discourse. This necessary interplay
means that the foundational moment is never in fact autonomous or self-sufficient but
always reliant on a kind of self-imaging in a discourse which, in the end, remains
fictive. As Nancy points out, Descartes very famously presents the Discourse on
Method as a fable. He notes that: “it is given as a fable and must be used as a fable.”
(68) This means that the foundational moment of the subject never really coincides with
itself as a self-identity which founds anything at all. It is only ever a fiction, mask, or
fable that is never self-coincident, always exposed in excess of itself, and, as a result, is
un-grounded in the very moment of its self-grounding. As Nancy puts it: “The author of
the method can only present himself in painting—and this painting is at the same time
its own original and the mask of the original who conceals himself, two feet away,
behind his portrait.” (43–44) Or put another way, with the emphasis being on the
articulation of the cogito in speech, “Within the uttering, the subject loses all finish, all
finition or figure…in the end I must give up the desire to define it….I encounter it
within the in-finite fable of the uttering.” (85)
As indicated above, it is not too much to say that all of Nancy’s subsequent thinking can
be seen to flow from this auto-deconstruction of the subject that is discerned in the
arguments of Ego Sum. Similarly some of the key questions that Nancy’s thought in
general provokes are raised here. Perhaps most notable amongst these in the context of
contemporary debate is the question of the way Nancy relates philosophical subjectivity
and a thinking of being to the human capacity of speech. This in turn raises the question
of the status or place of the animal and the non-human in his thinking and of whether he
remains an anthropocentric thinker. These are issues that Nancy raises explicitly in the
new preface when he notes that in Ego Sum: “the sense of ‘being’ is the act of speech,”
and that at such a point, “it becomes impossible not to consider the ‘I’ of every sensing
existence, hence of plant and animal existence—at the very least, and without excluding
a more extensive reflection on the mineral as exposed to actions outside and within
itself.” (ix) The exposure or exposition of the human speaking subject outside of itself
as discerned in the reading of Descartes is, as a (or indeed the) structure of being,
immediately generalizable to all beings and things and this exposition is “always and
everywhere mutual” and thanks to it “a sense circulates, the sense of the world.” (ix) So
Nancy is clear that sense passes or circulates from all beings to all beings independently
of the speaking of being in human utterance and speech. Yet human speech, when
uttered or articulated as such, speaks necessarily for all being since it speaks being as
such:
The sense of being-saying is not a sense imputed by the human being to the other beings
that are incapable of expressing themselves. It is the sense that is said from all beings to
all others through the speech that is not so much reserved for one of these beings than
carried by this one being for the sake of all, in the same way that mineral concretion is
carried by another being, or coloured profusion, sonorous emotion, etc. (x)
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