Pelagian Is Mo

Foreword
There are many works on Dooyeweerd's philosophy available. However,

none of them gives priority to the path pursued in Dooyeweerd's own intellec-
tual development, namely first to test the fruitfulness of his new insights and
distinctions within his own field of specialization – the science of law – and
then broaden the perspective towards the general philosophical implications
of his new insights and systematic distinctions. Approaching his philosophy
from this angle will enable us to highlight from the outset why this philosophy
is so fruitful for an understanding of what takes place within the various aca-
demic disciplines, including the natural sciences. However, this work will re-
flect on Dooyeweerd's basic ideas elaborated both in terms of a systematic
perspective and considering more recent developments within the varous aca-
demic disciplines. This aim will explore key elements of his significant Inau-
gural Address of 1926 (briefly discussed in Chapter 2) which has laid the
foundaiton for a non-reductionist ontology.
The theory of modal asepcts, which will initially occupy a central position
in our exposition, will be supported by examples of the significance of the
principles of sphere sovereignty and sphere universality. Of course the key
role of analogical basic concepts within the special sciences in particular will
receive special attention (Chapter 3). In order to show that the theory of modal
aspects is fruitful also for the discipline of mathematics, Chapter 4 will dis-
cuss insights from Bernays and Gödel which in a remarkable way approxi-
mates our analysis of the uniqueness and coherence between number and
space – yet without being able to arrive at a theory of modal aspects. In subse-
quent Chapters it will be shown that some of the most basic issues in philoso-
phy and the special sciences could be related to alternative understandings of
the meaning of number and space and their interconnections. Perennial philo-
sophical problems will be highlighted, namely that of universality and what is
individual, the quest for a basic denominator in terms of which the universe
could be understood (mainly the opposition between atomism and holism,
also designated as the opposition between individualism and universalism),
the ideas of uniqueness (sphere sovereignty) and coherence (sphere univer-
sality) themselves – all of these are exploring the meaning of the aspects of
number and space in various directions, including the humanities, while con-
stantly exploring the implications of a non-reductionist ontology.
Against the background of what is mentioned above, Chapter 5 expands the
task of discerning the various modal aspects, related to the general signifi-
cance of uniqueness and coherence, the limits of concept formation (primitive
or indefinable terms), the rationalist over-estimation of conceptual knowledge
and the nature of constructive scholarly communication, concluded with ex-
amples of immanent criticism – perhaps the strongest “communicative
weapon” available in service of a non-reductionist ontology.
An analysis of the modal aspects of reality has to account for their order of
succession. Special reference is given to the logical-analytical, cultural-his-
torical and sign modes of reality, and to the intermodal connections between
Introduction to the philosophy of Dooyeweerd
the sign mode and the social aspect, underlying the nature of communication
itself. This naturally leads to a discussion of the complexity of the dimension
of time (Chapter 7), briefly focussing on the problem of time and eternity, the
limitations involved in dating an event, universal constants and units of mea-
surement, the fact that time exceeds physical time, and the impasse caused by
time for positivism. Dooyeweerd's alternative view opens up an acknowl-
edgement of the unique way in which “cosmic time” (ontic time) entails that
time expresses itself within each mode of time, i.e., within all the modal as-
pects conforming to their sphere sovereignty.
In Chapter 8 the historically significant distinction between concept and
idea receives an elaboration in the direction of distinguishing between con-
ceptual knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge. Discussing this dis-
tinction brings into the picture both the history of philosophy, general philo-
sophical orientations and special scientific distinctions. The same applies to
Chapter 9 where historical and systematics considerations are directed to-
wards the special sciences. The humanistic science ideal and personality ideal
are related to the philosophical problem of continuity and discontinuity as it
permeated modern biological thought and generated inconsistencies in the
standard view of evolution as continuous flux. The dominant position within
the public domain, occupied by atheistic Darwinism, inspired Chapter 10 to
enter into a further analysis of the philosophical continuity postulate operative
in neo-Darwinism – still in the grip of the humanistic motive of nature and
freedom. The immanent criticism of Gould on the standard neo-Darwinian
view is devastating and indirectly shows how the latter view eliminates the
idea of type laws (Gould frequently employs the term Bauplan = structural
design!)
The uniqueness of humankind is analyzed in Chapter 11. It is done against
the background of Greek, Medieval and modern Humanistic views. An alter-
native approach is found in acknowledging that the human body have sub-
ject-functions within all the aspects of reality – including the aspects of nature
(the physical, biotic and sensitive) and the normative aspects (from the logi-
cal-analytical up to and including the certitudinal aspect).
Chapter 12 sets out to pave the way for an understanding of human society
exceeding the limitations and one-sidedness of individualism and universal-
ism as well as the problematic distinction between individual and society,
while Chapter 13 continues this task, focussed on law, state and society.
[A few more Chapters are envisaged!]
General Remark on how to read this book

The reader may choose to read any Chapter (paragraph/sub-paragraph) or
leave out any Chapter (paragraph/sub-paragraph). However, reading at least
the overview of all the Chapter(s) will keep the reader in touch with the main
argument underlying and unfolding through the successive Chapters of the
book.
ii
Another background remark:
None of the many Introductions to Dooyeweerd's philosophy (Spier, Popma,
Mekkes, Van Riessen, Hommes, Troost) gave prominence to Dooyeweerd's
own development.
When Dooyeweerd started to explore the philosophical foundations of the
discipline of law he was confronted with the two prominent neo-Kantian
schools of thought – and among them with the ideal of a “pure science of law”
(reine Rechtslehre) which attempted to generate the contents of all scholarly
distinctions from the rational faculty of being human, while ignoring the
ontically given inter-modal meaning-coherence between all the aspects of re-
ality.
From a historical perspective these conceptions were influenced by
Maimon who provided a point of departure for the way in which the neo-
Kantian Marburg school transformed Kant's thought. Already in the logic of
origin developed by Cohen the aspiration is to furnish a certain starting-point
to logic in the statement of origin which, according to the law of the continuity
of thought, can produce the (coherence of) cognitive objects: “What must be-
come the first request of thought is to put into thought itself the origin of every
content that it can bring forth.” A few pages further Cohen writes: “By virtue
of continuity all elements of thought, insofar as they may serve as elements of
knowledge, must be brought forth from the origin” (Cohen, 1914:92). As in
the case of Leibniz, the so-called infinitesimal method of mathematics plays a
decisive role in this view of the principle of continuity. The infinitely small as
movement principle (in the treatment of the tangent problem) leads to the ba-
sic principle of continuity: “And this positive meaning, this motive of the infi-
nitely small as a principle of movement which is fruitful for the geometrical
determination, ..., leads to the genuine principle of this approach, the principle
of continuity” (see also Cohen, 1883:33). As an expression of the unity of
consciousness (page 35) continuity fundamentally is a non-spatial determina-
tion of thought (page 37).
Paul Natorp articulated this logicistic approach explicitly. He realized that
the demands set by the logic of origin of Cohen cannot any longer accept sen-
sibility as an opposing instance, for how would the heterogeneous manifold of
the senses be absorbed within the unity of a concept? “For thinking there is no
being that is not posited within thought itself” (Natorp, 1921:48). This radical,
orientation implies that understanding is no longer considered to be bound to
sensibility as something foreign to it.1
From the research done by Jeremy Ive for his PhD he believes that the trig-
ger for Dooyeweerd's thinking was his debate with Scholten, from the Baden
school, in the spring of 1922. This led to the train of thought which came to a
1 For now reason once again can stretch itself over Kant's super-sensory domain of the autono-
mous (moral) freedom of the human being! By proceeding from Maimon's thought Cohen
and Natorp in this way terminated the Kantian delimitation of understanding and its restric-
tion to sensory phenomena.
iii
point of his walk on the Dunes which I would situate in the summer of 1922 –
which I think he did with Vollenhoven. Certainly this insight was very much
the product of their intensive conversations at the time. This was encapsu-
lated in ‘Logos en Kosmos’ which I think he and Vollenhoven discussed to-
gether. He holds that Dooyeweerd had this already with him when he went to
work at the Kuyper Foundation that autumn and which he incorporated into
the critique of Roman Catholic political theory which he prepared for the
Kuyper Foundation in early 1923 (for more detail see Ive, 2012).
iv
Contents
Foreword
First orientation
Chapter 1
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Dooyeweerd‘s Inaugural Address

Chapter 2
The early intellectual development of Dooyeweerd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The main contours of the Inaugural Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The significance of Dooyeweerd’s Inaugural Address for his
further intellectual development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Unity and Diversity

Chapter 3
Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Human beings embedded within a cosmic diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The multi-aspectual functioning of human beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
What prompted Dooyeweerd's new theory of the
aspects of reality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The modal aspects of reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Uniqueness and coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Sphere sovereignty and sphere universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Scholarly disciplines cannot side-step the coherence
between aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Differences and similarities: the nature of analogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Physical space and mathematical space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
More about analogies of force, validity, causality and life . . . . . . . . . . 31
Fichter's unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the use of
analogical basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Number and space:

modes of thought or aspects of reality?
Chapter 4
Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Key distinctions in the mathematical thought of Paul Bernays
approximating Dooyeweerd's views. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Defining mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
How do we obtain knowledge of ontic reality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
“Arithmetical” and the “geometric” intuitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Arithmetic and Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
iii
Ontic conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Analogical interconnections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Potential infinity and actual infinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Points of connection with the thought of Dooyeweerd and Gödel . . . . . . . . 52
The actual infinite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The intrinsic shortcomings of Arithmeticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Why number is not “continuous”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Concluding remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Discerning Modal Aspects

Chapter 5
Our everyday experience of uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Irreducibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
The uniqueness of and coherence between the physical
and biotic aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The implication of uniqueness: indefinability and the
limits of concept formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The indefinability of number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
The indefinability of space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The indefinability of the kinematic aspect:
Zeno against multiplicity and motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Analyticity and meaning: the apparent circularity
in “defining” them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
The core meaning of the aesthetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Is it possible to define the core meaning of the jural aspect? . . . . . . . . . 80
A blow to the rationalist ideal of conceptual knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Meaningful scholarly discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Critical solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
The possibility of Christian scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Immanent criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Descartes' proof for the existence of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Postmodernism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Relativism and Historicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Moral commandments and natural law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Does the first three logical principles provide a material criterion of truth? . 90
The Nature and succession of

Modal Aspects
Chapter 6
Characterizing an aspect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The order of succession between the aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
The order relation between the logical, cultural-historical
and the lingual aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
iv
Contents
Communication – the “marriage” between the

sign mode and the post-lingual aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Time and Modal Aspects

Chapter 7
Time and eternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
The limitations involved in dating an event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Universal constants and units of measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Our time awareness exceeds physical time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Do we live in a “space-time continuum”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Time and the impasse of positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Ontic time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Functional specifications of time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Succession, simultaneity, reversibility and irreversibility . . . . . . . . . . 108
Other non-physical modes of time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Concept and Idea

Chapter 8
Philosophy and the distinction between concept and idea . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Concept and idea in the history of Western philosophy:
an overview of its main contours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Negative theology and its intrinsic inconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Preliminary remark on the development of the distinction
between concept and idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Are ideas limiting concepts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
The limits (boundaries) of concept-formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
The discovery of a twofold use of modal terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Implications of idea-usages of the meaning of the first four modal aspects . . . 128
Rationality presupposes a more-than-rational foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
The history of Philosophy, Systematic

distinctions and the Special Sciences
Chapter 9
A familiar opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
The continuity postulate in modern scholarly thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Discontinuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
“Imperfection” of the fossil record? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Fossil evidence for human origins? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
v
Philosophical Assumptions behind the

Evolutionary Idea of Continuous Flux
Chapter 10
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
The two opposing paradigms: gradualism versus
discontinuous stasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
The rejection of type laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Humankind
Chapter 11
The influence of Greek culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
The Greek dialectic of matter (body) and form (soul) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
The Medieval synthesis – the substance concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
The transition to modern Humanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
To be human: a rational-ethical being? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
The typical physical function of living entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Physicalism eliminates original biotic terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
The typical biotic functioning of humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
The ontogenetic uniqueness of humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Nesthocker and Nestflüchter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
The typical way in which animals and humans function
within the sensory mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Sensitive openness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
How do we characterize humans? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The new integral view of Dooyeweerd – the structural
interlacements present within the human body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
‘Body’ and ‘soul’: between temporality, supratemporality
and eternity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Human bodily actions: the normative structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Enkaptic interlacement: an example of ramifications for
all four bodily structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
The functioning of animals and humans within the
normative aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Is language uniquely human? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
The anatomical limitations precluding animal speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Human Society
Chapter 12
Society and sociology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
The significance of the transcendental-empirical method . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
vi
Contents
Inevitable presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Social action (personal freedom) versus social order
(collective structures) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Sociological individualism versus sociological universalism . . . . . . . . . . 207
The need for an analysis of analogical basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
“General assumptions”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
An appraisal of some contemporary theoretical approaches
to an understanding of human society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
A dynamic social field theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
The dualism between action and system (order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
The step from modal to typical concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Structuration: the theory of Giddens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
The category-mistake implied by the opposition
of individual and society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Summarizing the argument regarding individual and society . . . . . . . . . . 232
Law, State and Society

Chapter 13
The universality of political order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Greek conceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Cicero and the Stoics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Augstine and Thomas Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Transition to the modern era. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Locke and Rousseau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Kant and Hegel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
The Historical school and legal positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Concluding remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Literature
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
vii
viii
First orientation
Chapter 1
1.1 Historical Background
Western philosophy originated in Greek antiquity and was transformed dur-
ing the medieval period through an attempted synthesis of elements from both
Greek philosophy and Biblical Christianity. It eventually continued its path
via the Renaissance and Enlightenment up to our present day. During the last
500 years it was largely dominated by diverse humanistic traditions. The first
radical Christian philosophical movement that appreciated positive insights
while taking distance from un-biblical motives present in the thought of major
writers such as Augustine (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1277),
emerged in a tradition dating back to the Reformation of the sixteenth century
and eventualy were followed up by Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) and
Abraham Kuyper (1837- 1920). These thinkers in particular paved the way
for the contribution of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) who, alongside his
brother-in-law D. H. Th Vollenhoven (1892-1978), developed a philosophi-
cal understanding of reality that is directed and informed by the biblical dis-
tinction between Creator and creation. This understanding also took into ac-
count the effect of sin, as disobedience to God's creational Law-Word, and ac-
knowledged the creation-wide scope of redemption. This approach also had
the effect of liberating philosophy from the impasse of reductionistic isms – a
theme that will receive a more detailed treatment in the subsequent Chapters
of this Introduction.
By distinguishing between the motivating root-commitment of scholarly
thinking and the theoretical distinctions involved in understanding the coher-
ing diversity within creation, this philosophical tradition avoids metaphysical
speculation, takes serious the states of affairs revealed by the various special
sciences (the natural sciences and the humanities) and encourages scholarly
communication across the boundaries of alternative (and even opposing) phi-
losophical orientations. The aim of this work is to introduce this non-reduct-
ionist approach to those interested in philosophy and its implications for the
various academic disciplines as well as for everyday life in general. Its focus
is on Herman Dooyeweerd, one of the main 20th century representatives of
this philosophical trend. There are numerous followers of Dooyeweerd's phi-
losophy, from all over the world encompassing quite a number of languages.
* * * * *
In 1917 Herman Dooyeweerd completed his legal studies on a dissertation en-

titled: De Ministerraad in het Nederlandsche staatsrecht.1 During the early
1 “The Cabinet in Dutch constitutional law.”
1
Introduction to the Philosophy of Dooyeweerd
1920s he broadened his perspective by contemplating general philosophical

problems, including an in-depth study of the history of philosophy and closely
related to an extensive study “The Struggle for a Christian Politics.”1 During
this period he developed his new philosophical insights in close cooperation
with his brother-in-law, D. Theodor H. Vollenhoven, who wrote a dissertation
on the foundations of mathematics in 1918.
When Dooyeweerd was appointed
® 1894 Born October
at the Free University of Amsterdam 7th, in Amsterdam
in 1926 the development of a new ® 1912-1917 Univer-
philosophical orientation was reflect- sity: Vrije Universiteit
in Amsterdam,..
ed in a comprehensive address on the ® 1917 Ph.D. disserta-
theme, The Significance of the Cos- tion, completed: De
monomic Idea2 for the Science of Law Ministerraad in het
Nederlandsche
and Legal Philosophy (Inaugural Staatsrecht [The
Lecture, Free University, Amster- Cabinet in Dutch
dam, October 15, 1926). A mere Constitutional Law].
® -1918 work in tax office, Haarlingen, Friesland.
glimpse of the extensive footnotes of ® 1918: legal advisor for municipal government in
this address clearly indicates that it Leiden.
significantly exceeded the expecta- ® 1919-22: post at Health Office, Dept. of Labour,
The Hague, examining draft legislation.
tions of a normal Inaugural address. ® 1922 approx: ‘discovery’ of the idea of
During the next decade he published a law-spheres (aspects).
work on the crisis in humanistic polit- ® 1922-6: Worked at the Kuyper Institute, The
Hague; a time of intense study and writing, dur-
ical theory (1931) and in 1935-1936 ing which the idea of law-spheres was worked
his magnum opus, De Wijsbegeerte out.
der Wetsidee appeared. This was ® 1926: Appointed as professor in Faculty of Law
at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
eventually translated, updated and ex- ® 1926: ‘First Lecture’
panded in its English translation: A ® 1926-35: Developing his theory.
New Critique of Theoretical Thought ® 1935-6: Publication of first version of magnum
(NC: 1953-1957 – 4 volumes). Be- opus De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 3 volumes.
® 1953-8: Publication of second version of mag-
sides numberless articles covering a num opus A New Critique of Theoretical Thought
wide range of academic disciplines 4 volumes.
(“special sciences”), Dooyeweerd's ® 1977: Deceased.
main academic work since his inau-
gural address was focused on the science of law. This work
comprises four Volumes and it represents an entirely new En-
cyclopedic method of analyzing reality as well as the forma-
tion of the basic concepts of the numerous academic disci-
plines. Dooyeweerd first wanted to see if his new philosophi-
cal understanding of reality proved to be fruitful for a special
scientific discipline, such as the science of law (his own field D.Th. Vollenhoven
(1892-1978)
1 “In den strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde. Proeve van een fundeering der calvinistische
levens- en wereldbeschouwing in hare wetsidee.” This series of articles that appeared in the
monthly journal Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde between 1924 and 1927 is now available as
Volume 5 of the B Series of the Collected Works of Dooyeweerd.
2 See note 1 on page 4 in connection with translating the Dutch term wetsidee as cosmonomic
idea.
2
Chapter 1
of specialization), before he ventured to make public its general philosophical

implications, as explained in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee and A New Cri-
tique.
Three intimately connected issues guided his intellectual endeavors
throughout his life:
(i) He observed that many philosophical trends proceed from one or an-
other idea of the order for or orderliness of reality1 – a situation that
prompts him to coin the term law-idea (“wetsidee”) which underlies
every philosophical stance. What he actually has in mind is that no single
scholarly discipline, be it philosophy, the natural sciences or the humani-
ties, can operate without one or another theoretical view of reality.2
Dooyeweerd holds that a Christian philosophy ought to avoid deifying
anything within creation, for then theoretical thought ends up in becom-
ing an ism – such as physicalism, biologism, psychologism, logicism,
historicism, marxism, aestheticism or moralism.3
(ii) He finds it problematic that throughout the entire history of Western phi-
losophy the claim was made that human reason is autonomous4 and op-
erates without any prior (supra-)theoretical assumptions or pre-supposi-
tions. Particularly during the development of 20th century philosophy of
science various trends acknowledged that faith in the rationality of hu-
man reason is not rational itself (compare the views of Popper and
Stegmüller). If human understanding truly was unprejudiced and auton-
omous, the perplexing question is why the rationality of intellectual pur-
suits did not eliminate the endless number of (often times mutually con-
flicting) philosophical stances found both within the domain of philoso-
phy itself and within the various academic disciplines (physics and
mathematics not excluded)?
Just consider the following significant remark made by a prominent math-
ematician: “The developments in the foundations of mathematics since
1900 are bewildering, and the present state of mathematics is anomalous
and deplorable. The light of truth no longer illuminates the road to follow.
In place of the unique, universally admired and universally accepted body
of mathematics whose proofs, though sometimes requiring emendation,
were regarded as the acme of sound reasoning, we now have conflicting
approaches to mathematics. Beyond the logicist, intuitionist, and formalist
bases, the approach through set theory alone gives many options. Some di-
1 Dooyeweerd employs the terms law and lawfulness/law-conformity as equivalents.
2 We shall see that Dooyeweerd argues that theoretical thought by definition is guided by a
foundational theoretical idea regarding the diversity, radical unity and totality, and origin of
the universe. He calls this basic idea the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy and it
serves as the hypothesis of all theoretical thought.
3 That these isms are all plagued by inner contradictions and antinomies will be explained later.
These antinomies result from the attempt to explain all of reality solely in terms of one of its
aspects, elevated to become an all-encompassing mode of explanation.
4 The term autonomy literally means being a law (nomos) for oneself (autos), i.e. as Rousseau
formulates it in his 1762 work on the social contract, “Freedom is obedience to a law that we
have prescribed to ourselves” (Rousseau, 1975:247).
3
vergent and even conflicting positions are possible even within the other
schools. Thus the constructivist movement within the intuitionist philoso-
phy has many splinter groups. Within formalism there are choices to be
made about what principles of metamathematics may be employed.
Non-standard analysis, though not a doctrine of any one school, permits an
alternative approach to analysis which may also lead to conflicting views.
At the very least what was considered to be illogical and to be banished is
now accepted by some schools as logically sound (Kline, 1980:275-276).
(iii) As an alternative Dooyeweerd conjectures that it may be the case that all
theoretical thought ultimately is in the grip of a theoretical view of real-
ity which is itself in the grip of a supra-theoretical commitment. He des-
ignated this supra-theoretical commitment as the ground motive or basic
motive that gives direction to the distinctions introduced in theoretical
thought.
(iv) In view of these three considerations he dedicated himself to show how
philosophy and all the other scholarly disciplines are made possible by
the inevitable presence of an ultimate ground motive and an irreplace-
able theoretical view of reality (a cosmonomic idea).1
(v) For that reason his concern from the beginning was to inspire scholars
within the different special sciences to think through independently the
implications of his new philosophical understanding of reality for their
respective disciplines (see Foreword, Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:vii).
* * *
Dooyeweerd mentions the inspiring role of Abraham Kuyper, a Dutch aca-
demic and politician of the late 19th and early 20th century, who realized that
the great movement of the Reformation of the 17th century cannot be restricted
merely to the reformation of church and theology, for its biblical point of de-
parture indeed touches on what he calls the religious root2 of the entire tempo-
ral life of human beings and therefore has to assert its validity in all walks of
life. Dooyeweerd points out that Kuyper, for lack of a better term, spoke of
“Calvinism” as an all-embracing world view which was clearly to be disting-
1 When De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee was translated into English the translators coined the ex-
pression cosmonomic idea as equivalent of wetsidee. (The Greek word cosmos represents re-
ality and the word nomos, as we mentioned, captures the idea of law in a cosmic sense, not re-
stricted to its jural meaning.) The advantage of the term cosmonomic is that it at once refers
both to the law and to what is subjected to the law – the cosmos – whereas the term wetsidee
seems merely to make an appeal to what Dooyeweerd calls the law side of creation.
2 In the Foreword to the original Dutch edition Dooyeweerd remarks that he realized that it is
not possible to “bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy
which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason” (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:v).
It should be noted, though, that Dooyeweerd identifies an aspect designated as the faith as-
pect (derived from a Greek root) or the pistical aspect. This aspect is also known as the
certitudinal or fiduciary aspect. However, as we shall explain in more detail later, Dooye-
weerd draws a distinction between the active function of human beings within the faith as-
pect, the norm (principium) of the faith aspect, its content, the direction and the religious root
of this aspect (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:298).
4
Chapter 1
uished from both Roman Catholicism and modern Humanism. However,

since this could easily lead to the misunderstanding that a specific theological
orientation has been canonized, anyone who seriously aims at advancing a
biblical-reformational approach to scholarship would prefer to avoid this and
at the same time side-step the narrowing down of the broad basis for discus-
sion – both concerns already realized by Kuyper himself (see Dooyeweerd
1996:1-2).1 Furthermore, theology itself, as an academic discipline, is influ-
enced both by an underlying theoretical view of reality (which is philosophi-
cal in nature) and by a supra-theological ultimate commitment (ground motive
or religious basic motive).
Once the inevitability of a theoretical view of reality and a more-than-theo-
retical (direction-giving) ultimate commitment are acknowledged, it must be
clear that the ideal of Christian scholarship directly flows from the dynamics
of the Christian life and world view (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:157). Accord-
ing to Dooyeweerd the Christian starting point (ground motive) and the theo-
retical view of reality informed by it, does not escape from the effects of sin
and therefore it should not “lay claim to infallibility” (Dooyeweerd,
1997-I:117). Rather, a Christian orientation acknowledges “the complete rel-
ativity and lack of self-sufficiency” of everything created (Dooyeweerd,
1997-I:123).
An Introduction to the philosophy of Dooyeweerd should explain his basic
concerns that were briefly mentioned above. His theory of the various aspects
of reality – designated by him as law-spheres – and of concretely existing
(natural and societal) things (entities, “individuality-structures”), belong to
the most significant subdivisions of his philosophy. Of course these subdivi-
sions are intimately linked to his penetrating analysis of the role of the various
non-Christian basic motives (see Dooyeweerd, 2003), his theory of knowl-
edge, his view of time as a distinct dimension of creation, and his understand-
ing of the human being (his anthropology).
The following questions capture the substance of this Chapter:
Questions
1. What were the three issues that guided Dooyeweerd's endeavours?
2. What does it mean to deify an aspect of creation?
3. What is the problem with the assumed autonomy of human reason?
4. What does Dooyeweerd mean by an ‘ultimate ground motive’?
5. Why is the term ‘Calvinistic’ to describe this approach best avoided?
6. What was the influence of Kuyper upon Dooyeweerd?
7. Why are the distinctions of a Christian philosophy not infallible?
1 In volume one of A New Critique we find a paragraph heading that reads: “Why I reject the
term ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ ” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:524).
5
6
Dooyeweerd‘s Inaugural Address
Chapter 2
Overview of Chapter 2
Dooyeweerd entered the scene as a talented academic who soon
caught the eye and was offered the position of Deputy Director of the
Kuyper Foundation in 1922. A mere four years later he accepted a po-
sition at the Faculty of Law at the Free University as professor in Phi-
losophy of Law, Encyclopedia of the Science of Law and Ancient
Dutch Law. Apart from an extensive series of articles on the struggle
for a Christian politics Dooyeweerd presented his Inaugural Address
in 1926 on The Significance of the Cosmonomic Idea for the Science of
Law and Legal Philosophy. This Inaugural Address marks a signifi-
cant shift away from the biblicistic appeal to “Scriptural principles”
which obstructed the inner reformation of the special sciences and
opened up an alternative approach to Christian scholarship. Moreover,
this is not done in isolation but explicitly in confrontation with the
dominant trends of thought within the discipline of law. At the same
time he succeeded in advancing a novel and penetrating insight into
the deepest dialectical motivation directing modern philosophy since
the Renaissance, designated by him as the science ideal (nature) and
the personality ideal (freedom). The basic antinomy entailed within
this dialectical ground motive of modern humanistic philosophy mani-
fested itself in multiple theoretical antinomies (clashes of law)also
within the science of law. His new intermodal understanding of theo-
retical antinomies is equally novel and innovative and it undergirded
his analysis of the various sphere sovereign modal aspects of reality.
The promise entailed in this Inaugural Address came to fruition in two
directions: elaborating his philosophical foundation of the science of
law in his multi-volume Encyclopedia of the Science of Law and pre-
senting his new insight in the form of a general philosophical account
to the academic world - in the publication of his magnum opus, De
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (three volumes in 1935-1936), translated
into English in the four volume work, A New Critique of Theoretical
Thought (1953-1958). This Inaugural Address may be appreciated as
the cradle of his immensely encompassing and penetrating intellectual
legacy.
2.1 The early intellectual development of Dooyeweerd

Initially he was influenced by the two neo-Kantian traditions, the Baden
school and the Marburg school, as well as the phenomenology of Husserl.
Dooyeweerd took notice of Stahl who defended, in his Philosophie des
Rechts, a divine, moral world order. He opposed sociological explanations of
law, but could neither accept morality as the basis of law. However, one of his
7
teachers, Fabius, emphasized the divine character of law. While considering

the doctrine of legal sovereignty and the modern idea of the state as defended
by the Dutch scholar Krabbe, his new idea of modal aspects dawned upon him
in as he walked in the dunes of The Hague on a warm summer evening (see
Verburg 1989:40). This idea of a diversity of aspects eventually not only
proved to be highly original but also to be extremely fruitful for an under-
standing of the foundational problems of the various special sciences.1
In 1922 Dooyeweerd was approached by the Dutch Minister of Defence,

J.J.C. van Dijk, to consider becoming the Deputy Director of the Kuyper
Foundation. In his letter of May 15, 1922 Dooyeweerd mentioned that since
1917 he focused all his leisure time on methodological and legal philosophical
studies. He did not want to spend all his time preparing advice for the Anti-
revolutionary Party and requested enough time to work on developing a sys-
tematic foundation for such recommendations (see Puchinger 1961: 46-49).
He was appointed in the said position and his first extensive philosophical
writing appeared as a series of articles: “The Struggle for a Christian Politics”
from 1924 until 1927.2
Colijn and Idenburg wanted to pursue an option of the Statutes of the

Kuyper Foundation which provided for establishing a special chair in
Antirevolutionary Political Science at the Free University of Amsterdam, but
it turned out that there was a certain amount of resistance against the idea from
within the faculty of law. However, when Zevenbergen passed away, in 1926
Dooyeweerd was appointed as his successor and professor in Philosophy of
Law, Encyclopedia of the Science of Law and Ancient Dutch Law (Puchinger
1961:54).
After his appointment at the Free University of Amsterdam the growing de-
velopment of a new philosophical orientation was reflected in the previosly
mentioned comprehensive Inaugural Address on the theme, The Significance
of the Cosmonomic Idea for the Science of Law and Legal Philosophy.3
Dooyeweerd’s main academic work since his Inaugural Address was focused
on the science of law. This work comprises five Volumes and it represents an
entirely new Encyclopedic method of analyzing reality as well as the forma-
tion of the basic concepts of the numerous academic disciplines.
1 By the end of 1923 Dooyeweerd introduced the phrases law sphere and idea of law (wetsidee)
(see Henderson 1994:30).
2 “In den strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde. Proeve van een fundeering der calvinistische
levens- en wereldbeschouwing in hare wetsidee.” This series of articles appeared in the
monthly journal Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde between 1924 and 1927. It is also available as
Volume 5 of the B Series of the Collected Works of Dooyeweerd (see Dooyeweerd 2008).
3 Inaugural Lecture, Free University, Amsterdam, October 15, 1926.
8
Chapter 2
2.2 The main contours of the Inaugural Address

What is novel in Dooyeweerd's approach is that he dedicated himself to show
how philosophy and all the other scholarly disciplines are made possible by
the inevitable presence of an ultimate ground motive and an irreplaceable the-
oretical view of reality (a cosmonomic idea). For this reason, he always urged
scholars within the different special sciences to elaborate the implications of
his new philosophical understanding of reality.
In the introductory part of his Inaugural Address Dooyeweerd enters into a
brief analysis of the dialectical development of the modern humanistic ground
motive of nature and freedom, also designated as mutually competing motives
– the natural science ideal and the personality ideal. He elaborates in some
more detail how, within the science ideal of Leibniz, the continuity postulate
took shape. This assumption acknowledged no set boundaries because theo-
retical thought can eliminate all limits in its rational (re-)construction of real-
ity. Yet the initial primacy assigned to the science ideal (Hobbes, Spinoza,
Leibniz, Locke and Hume) was turned upside-down in the philosophy of Kant
during the 18th century. The dialectical tension between science ideal and per-
sonality ideal entails that both poles at once need each other and oppose each
other – split by an absolute divide. Dooyeweerd briefly sketches the tension
between nature and freedom in the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724-1801).
For Kant human understanding is restricted to the world of the senses (the “is”
– the domain of the science ideal), while reason rules over the supra-sensory
sphere of the “ought” (the domain of the personality ideal).1
“Is” and “ought”, the realm of reality and the realm of personal freedom, law
of nature and norm, ideal of science and ideal of personality, they are sepa-
rated by an absolute boundary and lie in totally different dimensions. Under-
standing is law-giver for the realm of nature while reason provides the law for
the realm of freedom (Dooyeweerd 1926:9).
Particularly in respect of the status of a discipline such as the science of law it
is clear that Kant cannot simultaneously defend its scientific (empirical) char-
acter and its concern for jural normativity. With his identity philosophy Fichte
subsequently attempted to discover within reason itself the principle which
could unite nature and freedom within a higher unity. However, this entire
rescue operation still remained stuck within the same dialectic of nature and
freedom. Dooyeweerd says:
The concept of “Sollen”, the central concept of Fichte's philosophy, could
only take this central place by absorbing the antinomy between nature and
freedom, the ideal of science and the ideal of personality, while the theory of
science on which Fichte wished to base the identity of science-ideal and per-
sonality-ideal could take no other form than that of an antinomic dialectic
(Dooyeweerd 1926:12).
1 The modern opposition of “science” and “faith” is rooted in this dualism of nature and free-
dom (is and ought; science ideal and personality ideal).
9
The prominence of the root-dialectic directing humanistic thought, causing

theoretical thinking to get entangled in numerous antinomies, explains why
Dooyeweerd, in the first paragraph of his Inaugural Address, commences
with discussing the nature of an antinomy in the light of the law-idea
(cosmonomic idea – Dooyeweerd 1926:14 ff.).
Traditionally an antinomy was equated with a logical contradiction.
Dooyeweerd reverted (although initially not consistently so) to the literal
meaning of the term antinomy, which designates a clash of laws (anti =
against; nomos = law). A clash of laws differs from contraries (like logical-il-
logical, polite-impolite, legal-illegal or moral-immoral). The new perspective
added by him is found in his novel idea of “spheres of law,” also designated by
him as law-spheres. “The essence of antinomy, of inner contradiction, is not
mere contrast, but a clash of laws. Justice and injustice, truth and falsehood,
virtue and vice are contraries but they are not antinomies, not clashes of laws”
(Dooyeweerd 1926:14). For example, when a square and a circle are confused
an illogical concept results: the concept of a “square circle.” But the attempt
of the Greek philosopher Zeno to reduce motion to the static meaning of space
is antinomous because it concerns clash of the laws of motion of the laws of
space.
According to Dooyeweerd this new understanding of antinomies presup-
poses a multiplicity of distinct law-spheres (modal aspects/functions) and ac-
knowledging such law-spheres needs an assessment of their mutual coher-
ence. Yet the effect of both the science ideal and the personality ideal is that
they constantly aim at eliminating the boundaries between different law-
spheres. This is the result of an overestimation of human understanding, as-
sumed to be able, through the continuity of human thought, to bridge the dis-
continuity between the various aspects of reality. Dooyeweerd speaks of the
continuity postulate, inherent both to the science ideal and the personality
ideal. These continuity postulates gave birth to an endless number of anti-
nomies. The underlying issue concerns what Dooyeweerd identifies as the ba-
sic problem of a life and world view: “The origin and mutual coherence of the
various law-spheres, that is the basic problem of every life and world view”
(Dooyeweerd 1926:14). Later on it became clear that this issue actually con-
cerns the problem of uniqueness and coherence, or, as it may preferably be
phrased as “the coherence of irreducibles.” 1
Dooyeweerd enumerates some of the antinomies flowing from the natural-
istic attempt to deduce normative legal consequences from the psychological
concept of will. The psychological trend within the science of law, introduced
by Zitelmann, characterized the will as a nerve-driven bodily movement: “...
that psychological act which works immediately upon the motoric nerves and
1 See Strauss 2009:13, 18, 52, 59-60, 157, 170, 174, 214, 260, 286, 323, 611.
10
Chapter 2
thus is the cause of a particular bodily movement.”1 In similar vein, within the
domain of criminal law (penal law), the Dutch scholar Van Hamel defines a
jural act as a willed muscle-movement (see Dooyeweerd 1967-II:18).
In his Encyclopedia of the Science of Law Dooyeweerd, in connection with
train signals, illuminates the antinomic nature of trying to employ a psycho-
logical concept of will and a physical concept of causality within the science
of law – see below (pages 23 ff.) where it is argued that in a jural sense one
can cause a jural effect without being involved in any physical or psychical
action, such as a willed muscle movement.
In his Inaugural Address Dooyeweerd also pays attention to other variants
of the humanistic cosmonomic idea. He discusses the idealistic-function-
alistic type (the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism), the relativistic-person-
alistic type (the Baden school in neo-Kantian legal theory), and the trans-
personalistic type (the revival of objective idealism in legal philosophy), be-
fore he focuses upon the antithesis between the Christian and the Humanistic
basic structure of the idea of law. He summarizes his analysis of the various
humanistic orientations and then points at the constant elements amidst all nu-
ances and differences: “Reflection on the fundamentals of the humanistic life
and world view has taken us to the recognition of a general structure of an idea
of law which, despite the seemingly most diverse, indeed, even anti-thetical,
elaborations given to it, nevertheless indicates two elements as constants
throughout: the ideal of personality and the ideal of science, which alternately
acquired primacy” (Dooyeweerd 1926:60).
In articulating his own Christian orientation,2 Dooyeweerd highlighted its
differences with Augustine (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and
he also accounted for the line from Luther and Melanchton to Kuyper.
Finally Dooyeweerd provides an indication of the significance of the
cosmonomic idea for the science of law. He mentions three elements: (a) the
heuristic function; (b) the methodical function; and (c) the critical function
(see Dooyeweerd 1926:67-72).
Re (a): the heuristic function

According to Dooyeweerd the heuristic value of the idea of law (in the sense
of cosmonomic idea) enables us to unveil the various points of departure of ju-
risprudential and legal-philosophical systems. It also helps to know in ad-
1 Zitelmann, 1897:79. [“derjenige Akt, welcher unmittelbar auf die motorischen Nerven
einwirkt und so Ursache einer eigenen körperlichen Bewegung ist”] – see Dooyeweerd
1926:18.
2 For quite some time Dooyeweerd used the word “Calvinistic” alongside the term “Chris-
tian.” But owing to the multiple misunderstandings caused by this practice he eventually in-
serted the following paragraph-heading in Volume I of his A New Critique of Theoretical
Thought: Why I reject the term “Calvinistic philosophy” (Dooyeweerd 1997-I:524).
11
vance which law-idea types will lead to certain kinds of antinomies within the
science of law and in legal-philosophical thought.
Re (b): the methodical function
Concerning the second point Dooyeweerd summarizes his position as fol-
lows: “The methodical value of the Calvinist idea of [cosmic] law lies in the
fact that it compels us to base scientific thought generally, and the science of
law and legal philosophy in particular on the principle of sphere sovereignty
in its organic sense.”
Re (c): the critical function
The critical function incorporates the positive outcome of Dooyeweerd's new
understanding of modal aspects and on that basis his original view of antino-
mies as being inter-modal (inter-aspectual) in nature. Acknowledging the in-
dissoluble coherence between all law spheres in principle rejects any reduc-
tion of what is irreducible. Dooyeweerd emphasizes “that no law sphere can
come into conflict with another as long as, in all one's doing, the divine ordi-
nances in every sphere are taken as guide-line. That is the critical value of our
idea of law. The juridical sphere appeals and refers to all the law spheres posi-
tioned round about it in the cosmic coherence, and the laws of all these
spheres buttress and support each other. This insight is of great importance,
also for the theory of the formation of law.”
2.3 The significance of Dooyeweerd’s Inaugural Address for his
further intellectual development
It is amazing to see how much Dooyeweerd “digested” of philosophy in gen-
eral, of the science of law in particular and even of a number of the other aca-
demic disciplines in the short period of time after his first rudimentary insights
in what became known as the theory of modal law spheres (aspects) in 1922
dawned upon him. In the forthcoming years Dooyeweerd embarked on vari-
ous special scientific studies within the discipline of law, articulating in more
detail the implications of his new philosophical paradigm. Of course one
could not expect that every part of his systematic view of reality reached ma-
turity at this early stage. For example, although he did have a glimpse of his
later philosophy of time in 1926, he did not as yet explore the insight that cos-
mic time embraces all aspects, things and processes and that it expresses itself
in accordance with the unique (sphere-sovereign) meaning of each aspect
within every aspect. In his Inaugural Address he merely distinguished be-
tween “natural time” and jural time – but he appreciated the latter as a modal
analogy:1
1 In the next Chapter we shall explain how the various aspects reflect within their own bound-
aries their coherence with the other aspects. In the text below as brief overview is given re-
garding the coherence between the jural and non-jural aspects. In our everyday language
many phrases reflect this coherence. Speaking of social life highlights an analogy of the
12
Chapter 2
As illustration of the peculiar character of analogies in the legal sphere, con-

sider the juridical period (term) of validity. This period of validity undoubt-
edly rests on the substrate of natural time. But whereas the latter proceeds in
one direction only, the juridical analogy of time, peculiarly, can proceed in
two directions (think of retro-active validity) (Dooyeweerd 1926:68).
What is also significant about his early development is that he conformed to
the general natural scientific tendency since the Renaissance which resolved
all concepts of things into concepts of relations. In 1923 he wrote: “The natu-
ral-scientific attitude in general ignores all the various peculiarities of the phe-
nomena it observes. The only thing of importance to it is law-fulness, the sys-
tem of relations” (Dooyeweerd 1923 – Henderson 1994:178).
However, it was the challenge entailed in the typical nature of the state and
other societal collectivities that helped him to develop his classification of so-
cial entities and to design his theory of individuality structures.
The Inaugural Address of 1926 served as the starting point for two large
projects. The first one was to further develop the finesse of his systematic
philosophical distinctions in the context of the science of law. Dooyeweerd
first wanted, as we noted, to convince himself that these systematic distinc-
tions are fruitful for his own field of expertise before he ventured to elaborate
his philosophical insights in a general philosophical context.
It is a pity that the multi-volume work, the Encylopedia of the Science of
Law, was never published in Dutch (or in English). It remained available only
in Stenciled form from the Student Representative Council (SRVU – last edi-
tion 1967). After his retirement Dooyeweerd partially reworked the Introduc-
tion. In the meantime an English translation of the original Introductory Vol-
ume appeared with Mellen Press. All the other Volumes have been translated
and are still in the process of being edited.
A brief summary of the basic concepts analyzed in the Encyclopedia cer-
tainly demonstrates the methodological scope of Dooyeweerd's study of the
foundations of the science of law. In the Systematic Volume Dooyeweerd
elaborates his impressive analysis of the elementary or analogical basic con-
cepts of the science of law. This analysis concerns the following constitutive
structural moments (i.e., building blocks) within the modal structure of the
jural aspect – we merely briefly list the analogical connections between the
jural and non-jural aspects:
The concept of a legal order [quantitative analogy], legal sphere [spatial anal-
ogy], legal constancy [kinematic], jural causality [physical], legal life and le-
gal organ [biotic analogy within the jural]; the juridical will-function [sensi-
tive analogy]; legal accountability, legal conformity and legal contradiction
[logical-analytical analogy within the jural]; legal power and the formation
meaning of life (the biotic aspect) within the structure of the social aspect. Bio-milieu reflects
a spatial analogy within the biotic aspect, emotional control analogically from the sensitive
mode points forward to the culural-historical modality, and so on.
13
(positivization) of law [cultural-historical analogy]; juridical meaning and ju-

ridical interpretation [lingual analogy]; legal intercourse in the correlation of
jural coordinational and communal relationships [social analogy within the
jural]; juridical economy and avoiding jural excesses – such as an abuse of
power [economic analogy within the jural]; the juridical harmonization of in-
terests [aesthetic analogy within the jural]. 1
In addition to this Dooyeweerd also provided a detailed analysis of what he

termed to be compound or complex basic concepts of the science of law. They
are also defined as categorial basic concepts. Three categorial relations are
distinguished: (a) the categorial juridical relation of legal norms and legal
facts; (b) the categorial juridical subject-object relation; and (c) the categorial
relation of coming into being and passing away.
This entails an investigation into the nature of the compound basic concepts
of a legal subject, of a legal personality, of a subjective right, and of a legal
object (see Dooyeweerd 1967-II:98-262).
The other important legacy of the Inaugural Address is found in the

previosly mentioned magnum opus of Dooyeweerd, De Wijsbegeerte der
Wetsidee with its English translation: A New Critique of Theoretical Thought
(NC: 1953-1957 – 4 volumes – see Dooyeweerd 1997). In this work Dooye-
weerd commences with his transcendental critique of theoretical thought,
aimed at unveiling the ultimate ground motives directing theoretical thinking,
immediately followed up by a more detailed analysis of the dialectical devel-
opment of humanistic philosophy (see Dooyeweerd 1997-I:215-495). It
should not be overlooked, however, that this first volume of NC contains an
important concluding section in which Dooyeweerd addresses the relation-
ship between philosophy and the special sciences (Dooyeweerd 1977-I:
528-566). It was anticipated by a remark in the Foreword of the Volume,
where Dooyeweerd stated: “I am strongly convinced that for the fruitful
working out of this philosophy, in a genuinely scientific manner, there is
needed a staff of fellow-labourers who would be in a position independently
to think through its basic ideas in the special scientific fields” (Dooyeweerd
1997-I:vii).
The inspirational effect of the call to make this philosophy relevant for the
special sciences directed my own scholarly work during the past four decades
towards an exploration of the philosophical foundations of various natural
and social sciences (disciplines within the humanities) – eventually resulting,
apart from many articles, in a work dedicated to the foundational role of phi-
losophy for the special sciences (see Strauss 2009).
1 See also the extensive analysis of these basic concepts by Hommes (Hommes, 1972:
106-480).
14
Chapter 2
2.4 Perspective
More than a century ago the ideal of sphere sovereignty undergirded Kuyper’s
efforts to establish a free Christian university. He articulated it already in his
speech at the opening of the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880 – on the
theme of sphere sovereignty. However, the fundamentalistic (biblicistic) ac-
count of “reformed principles” did not succeed in bringing about an inner ref-
ormation of the various special sciences. Dooyeweerd indeed moved beyond
this shortcoming by distinguishing between the radical and central motivating
power of a ground motive and the theoretical view of reality (transcendental
ground-idea). Dooyeweerd explicitly rejects every conception of “a scriptural
philosophy” that looks for support in specific Bible texts for intrinsically phi-
losophical and in general scholarly problems and theories. It actually merely
boils down to “positing a few privileged issues” about which the Bible would
give explicit statements, while for the rest, where such special texts are not
found, one can at leisure continue to fit into a mode of thinking driven by in-
trinsically un-biblical motives (Dooyeweerd 1950:3-4).
Amongst other considerations the significance of Dooyeweerd’s Inaugural
Address is certainly found in launching a program for the inner reformation of
the science of law and scholarship in general. What he subsequently achieved
in this regard simply underscores the importance of meaningful systematic
distinctions and analyses. We shall see that a key element in the acknowledg-
ment of a diversity of irreducible modal aspects is given in the idea of the in-
definable meaning-nuclei of these aspects. Any attempt to eliminate the
modal sphere sovereignty of aspects, by elevating a specific one to become
the all-encompassing mode of explanation of all the others, exemplified in
multiple monistic isms, according to Dooyeweerd inevitably results in insur-
mountable theoretical antinomies. The appearance of an antinomy is always a
negative indication that theoretical thought ignored the necessary distinctions
or the distinctness of particular modal aspects (serving as modes of existence
and as modes of explanation). It is therefore understandable that laying bare
theoretical antinomies became one of the most powerful theoretical tools in
the intellectual arsenal of Dooyeweerd, because he amply used it in exercizing
immanent criticism on untenable scientific views. Exercizing immanent criti-
cism nonetheless requires a sharp intellect. Therefore it should not surprise us
that already in his first public presentation, on April 8, 1922, dealing with the
issue of personal freedom versus governmental constraints, Dooyeweerd ef-
fectively employed the method of immanent criticism.1 His Inaugural Ad-
dress expanded the scope of immanent criticism by highlighting antinomies
practically in all sub-domains of the science of law. This Inaugural Address
may therefore be appreciated as the originating source of his immensely
encompassing en penetrating intellectual legacy.
1 Interestingly his contribution to the discussion also brought the sphere sovereignty of modal
aspects into play (see Verburg 1989:31).
15
Questions
1. What are the main contours of Dooyeweerd's Inaugural Address?
2. What is the new content given by Dooyeweerd to the idea of an antinomy?
3. Dooyeweerd describes the significance of the cosmonomic idea for the science of law by distin-
guishing three functions – briefly discuss them.
16
Unity and Diversity
Chapter 3
Overview of Chapter 3:
Because Dooyeweerd developed his new understanding of reality
while wrestling with the problem regarding the basic concepts of the
discipline of law, Chapter 3 will follow this path in order to explain
how he arrived at his theory of modal aspects. After briefly alluding to
the normativity of life, we proceed to a succinct analysis of the multi-
aspectual functioning of human beings, showing that every person in
principle functions within every aspect of reality. At this point a brief
provisional characterization of the nature of an aspect will be given,
followed by an explanation of the importance of the problem of uni-
queness and coherence (the principles of sphere sovereignty and
sphere universality). By itself this leads to the fact that academic disci-
plines cannot avoid the use of analogical basic concepts, reflecting the
(inter-modal) coherence between the various aspects of reality. The
nature of an analogy ought to be explained before specific examples of
modal analogies are discussed (such as the difference between physi-
cal space and mathematical space). Analogies related to the terms
force, validity, causality and life will receive attention in this context.
A provisional overview will then be provided by a diagram in which
the various analogies within the jural aspect are shown. The last exam-
ple demonstrates how a special scientist, the German sociologist
Fichter, could not avoid using analogical elements within the structure
of the social aspect.
Reality as we experience it in our everyday lives displays a rich diversity of
kinds of things and processes as well as many different aspects or modes of
existence (ways in which things exist). As crown of creation the human being
manifests and experiences all of this at once. With the realm of natural (physi-
cal) things we share in the constitutive role and function of diverse atoms,
molecules and macromolecules present in the human body. With the realm of
plants we share the functioning of diverse organs – from the cell up to highly
complex configurations such as the kidneys, heart and brain. Likewise, simi-
lar to the realm of animals we are also sentient creatures, capable of sensing
and observing our environment and capable of varying feelings. But in addi-
tion to all these capacities human beings can act under the guidance of distinct
normative vistas, opening up norm-conformative deeds or antinormative
ways of behaving.
3.1 Normativity
Humans are indeed constituted as normed beings. They are called to respond
to the normativity of human life either by conforming to or by rejecting the
17
norms guiding human endeavors. Humans are able to discern truth from false-
ness and what is logically sound from what is illogical, just as they are able to
know the difference between what is beautiful and what is ugly. This norma-
tive fibre of our shared humanity naturally spans across multiple dimensions
of normativity, exemplified in considerations such as (see PDD:41 ff.):
± Humans are extremely sensitive to the difference between justice and in-
justice.
± They are aware of the benefits of frugality as opposed to the sorrows of
wastefulness.
± Their experience of lingual ambiguities is filled with examples of correct
and wrong interpretations.
± They know what the value of courtesy is and what the effects of impolite-
ness may be.
± They appreciate moral integrity and despise immorality.
± Similarly, humankind has heroic and heartbreaking stories to tell about
what is norm-conformative in a historical sense and what is historically
antinormative or un-historical (for example: what is reactionary or what is
revolutionary as opposed to what is reformational).
± From early childhood humans discern and appreciate proper identification
and distinguishing and oftentimes find it comic when people or entities are
confused.
Every inter-human encounter brings to expression this normative dimension
and takes place under its supervision; is played out within this cosmic theatre
of human beings as norm-observing agents. Although individuals may have
diverging understandings of what truth, logicality, justice, love, frugality, in-
terpretation, courtesy, norm-conformative historical actions and morality
are, they cannot side-step this norm-determinedness of human life. For this
reason, even in the case of every antinormative action, the human being is
constantly haunted by the underlying and presupposed normative awareness
of what ought to be – aptly captured by an age-old legacy called the uniquely
human conscience.
But precisely for this reason, it belongs to the very constitution of human
life and to the intricate fabric of human society to have a vital concern and in-
terest in the normative orientation of human beings – whether they are fellow
citizens or even closer to home, children and students, who are dependent
upon decent educational institutions on their path towards responsible adult-
hood. Because the multi-dimensional existence of the human being is not ab-
sorbed in or exhausted by any single societal institution (such as the state,
some or other ecclesiastical denomination, business enterprise or a particular
social club), it is wrong in principle to restrict or narrow down the process of
education to serve a single or even a number of specific societal institutions
only. Therefore, human beings are never (exclusively) educated for “citizen-
ship,” or for “church-membership,” or for “partnership” (“friendship”). They
are educated to fulfil a multiplicity of roles within diverse societal institutions,
18
Chapter 3
and throughout one's life, these functionally distinguishable social roles are
constantly and concurrently acted out.
3.2 Human beings embedded within a cosmic diversity
Even as young children we are aware of the fact that the world in which we
live increasingly fascinates us for constantly we see, hear, smell and touch
new things, ask new questions and make new discoveries. This ever-expand-
ing field of experiences is ultimately guided by the many-sidedness of
creational reality itself. Our empirical world is not merely populated by the
same kinds of things. There are not only flowers, only animals, only human
beings or only cultural artifacts. Even if we would abstract from all other
kinds of entities and concentrate only on entities of a specific kind or type –
like humans – our first awareness more often is not concerned with the simi-
larities but with the differrences between them. If, however, we focus on enti-
ties belonging to different categories, we are bound to disregard the unique-
ness of different entities while lifting out that which is common between all of
them, thus arriving at general concepts. For example, if we want to distin-
guish between humans and animals we only pay attention to that which consti-
tutes the being-human of each individual human being and that which consti-
tutes the being-an-animal of each individual animal. In other words, in order
to accomplish this we solely have to lift out the shared properties between dif-
ferent human individuals or different animals. Only what is (universally)
present in all humans as humans or in all animals as animals, is then of impor-
tance.
In our actual daily life each person is constantly engaged in similar pro-
cesses of lifting out by disregarding, i.e. with acts of identifying and distin-
guishing. Actions like these demonstrate the basic analytical abilities of hu-
man beings, since the act of analyzing something entails the recognition
(identification) of certain properties by distinguishing them from other fea-
tures. This state of affairs is also described by the word abstraction. When-
ever someone is engaged in an act of abstraction such a person has to lift out
(i.e. identify) certain properties while simultaneously disregarding other
properties (i.e. by distinguishing them from those identified). From this it
must be clear that in this sense analysis and abstraction are interchangeable
terms – whoever analyses is abstracting and whoever is engaged in abstrac-
tion is analyzing. Ordinary everyday activities of classification, using a
drawer and folder system, are examples of analysis (abstraction), showing
that analysis or abstraction does not necessarily need to be theoretical in
nature.
In regard of the diversity in creation it is important to note that each analyti-
cal act or act of abstraction is always dependent upon a given multiplicity (di-
versity) that has to be identified and distinguished. Owing to the inherent di-
versity within the whole creation we are able to analyze it. Formulated differ-
ently: analysis (abstraction) presupposes a given multiplicity that transcends
the limits of our analytical activity. In other words, were it not for the more-
19
than-logical diversity within creation, it simply would have been impossible

to think analytically! Logical-analytical thinking of human beings presup-
poses the diversity within creation.
3.3 The multi-aspectual functioning of human beings
We can bring these perspectives even closer to home by reflecting for a mo-
ment on the way in which humans function within all the aspects of reality dis-
tinguished by Dooyeweerd. Within the quantitative aspect the human being
functions as a unity. We can count human beings for there are many of them.
The particular form and shape of our bodies highlight the concrete function
we have within the aspect of space. Human beings can move – even when they
are sitting or lying they share in the movement of the earth around its axis and
around the sun (“rest” is therefore relative, it is a “state of motion”). The
strength of our bodies (or muscles) brings to expression our function within
the physical aspect of energy-operation. Of course we are alive (biotic func-
tion) and are sensitive (sensory mode). We mentioned our analytical ability to
identify and distinguish. Furthermore, we are culturally active (thus function-
ing within the cultural-historical aspect), we use language (our function with-
in the sign mode), interact with other human beings in social contexts (our so-
cial functioning) and we can buy and sell stuff (economic function). In addi-
tion we appreciate what is beautiful or ugly (aesthetic mode), legal or illegal
(jural mode), moral or immoral (ethical mode) and trustworthy or not (fidu-
ciary, certitudinal or faith mode).
The diversity of creational aspects is therefore not foreign to us – we are
embedded within them and experience their functional diversity within reality
through this immediate (intuitive) awareness as our own.
3.4 What prompted Dooyeweerd's new theory of the
aspects of reality?
One of the most fundamental problems facing philosophy and the various dis-
ciplines has always been how to account for the unity and diversity of reality.
What is known as monistic isms – such as physicalism, vitalism, psycholo-
gism, historicism, materialism, and moralism – are all examples of philosoph-
ical orientations that attempt to reduce all aspects of reality to one of them or
to explain all of them merely in terms of one only – thus actually deifying or
absolutizing something within creation.1 The radical Christian starting point
of reformational philosophy in principle rejects every attempt to elevate
something within creation to the level of Creator. The biblical distinction be-
tween Creator and creation should therefore not be violated in our scholarly
activities.
The alternative approach explored by Dooyeweerd is to respect the diver-
sity within creation without attempting to deify any aspect of reality. In order
to understand his contribution in this regard it is first of all necessary to ex-
1 See the excellent critique of Roy Clouser on this kind of reductionism (Clouser, 2005:
192-197).
20
Chapter 3
plain his idea of modal aspects. In doing this we shall deviate from traditional
Introductions that straightaway start with a discussion of the meaning of each
modal aspect. Instead we shall commence with a general characterization of
what aspects are and then rather follow the unique intellectual development of
Dooyeweerd as it was confronted by the perennial philosophical problem of
uniqueness and coherence.
3.4.1 The modal aspects of reality

The aspects of reality are do not concern the concrete what of entities and pro-
cesses, for they represent the way (manner) in which such entities and pro-
cesses function – that is, they relate to the how of concrete entities and pro-
cesses. From Latin we inherited expressions such as modus operandi and mo-
dus vivendi in which the how is represented by the term “modus.” An aspect is
therefore to be seen as a specific (unique) mode which, in a general sense, as a
modus quo or a mode of being, provides a framework within which everything
and all processes within reality function. As an equivalent for referring to fac-
ets, aspects or functions, one can therefore also speak about modalities, modal
aspects or modal functions. Already in 1910 Cassirer has highlighted the im-
portance of this distinction between entity (“substance”) and function (see
Cassirer, 1953) – a work often quoted by Dooyeweerd. When entities and pro-
cesses are resolved into functions we meet functionalism;1 and when modal
functions are treated as if they are entities it is said that they are reified
(“hypostatized”).2 Modal aspects belong to a dimension of reality that is dif-
ferent from (natural and societal) entities and events. For that reason the uni-
versal functional structure of modal aspects co-condition the existence of
concrete entities – just recall the account of all the aspectual functions of a
human being.
It should be noted here that concrete entities have both an individual side
and a universal side.3 Consequently the relation between aspects and entities
is misrepresented when aspects are structurally “degraded” into mere “as-
pects of individual things” which “require a ‘bearer’, or ‘substratum’ ” (com-
pare Van Woudenberg, 2003:1).
1 Compare the claim of physicalism: everything is physical. Particularly within the two
neo-Kantian schools of philosophy mentioned below it is attempted to resolve all concepts of
things into concepts of function (preferably designated by them as relational concepts).
2 Neo-Darwinism, for example, reifies the biotic function when it speaks of the origin of life –
as if the biotic aspect of reality is an entity. Living things are not exhausted by any aspect
within which they function – even the smallest living unit, the cell, has in addition to its biotic
functioning also functions within other aspects of reality, such as the physical aspect (thermo-
dynamically the cell is an open system, constantly exchanging materials with its environ-
ment), the spatial aspect (captured in the idea of the Umwelt or ambient of living entities, i.e.
their bio-milieu), and within the numerical aspect (a multiplicity of vital or organic functions
are unified within the cell).
3 This atom (individual side) is an atom (universal side).
21
3.4.2 Uniqueness and coherence

As legal scholar Dooyeweerd was exposed, amidst other trends in legal phi-
losophy, to the two prominent neo-Kantian1 schools of thought that domi-
nated the philosophical scene during the first decades of the 20th century,
namely the Baden school2 and the Marburg school.3 The development of this
new philosophical approach benefited from his struggle with these dominant
schools of thought. Dooyeweerd realized that their attempts to derive the ba-
sic concepts of the discipline of law from supposedly purely logical thought
forms were unsuccessful. Hans Kelsen in particular conjectured that, discon-
nected from other disciplines, something like a “pure theory of law” (“reine
Rechtslehre”) is possible. Yet the moment it is attempted to explain one or an-
other aspect in its assumed “purity,” one ends up by exploring its coherence
with other aspects distinct from it. In general Dooyeweerd therefore empha-
sizes that the uniqueness of every aspect of reality comes to expression in its
coherence with other aspects. For example, any analysis of the meaning of law
(the jural aspect) cannot escape from composite expressions that concurrently
use a term reflecting the uniqueness of the jural aspect and another term re-
flecting the meaning of an aspect different from the jural. Consider the phrase
legal order where the first word, namely “legal,” represents the jural aspect
and the second term, namely “order,” refers to the unity in the multiplicity of
legal norms (the one and the many represent the meaning of number). Similar
composite phrases are jural causality (cause and effect), jural accountability,
jural power, jural interpretation, and jural economy (avoiding what is legally
excessive). We shall see that these composite phrases actually embody what
Dooyeweerd called elementary (or analogical) basic concept of the discipline
of law.
By investigating the basic concepts of the science of law in general, Dooye-
weerd discovered that some of the most important ones primarily relate not to
things and events (i.e. not to the concrete what of reality), but to the previosly
mentioned modes of being, that is, to the ways in which things and events exist
and function (that is, to the how of reality). For example, answering the ques-
tion: “what is this?” calls for a response in which some concretely existing
“thing,” such as a chair, is identified. However, once something is pointed out,
subsequent questions relate to the aspectual properties of this entity, embed-
ded in questions about the how, about the modes of existence of such an entity,
1 Immanuel Kant (1724-1801) is the most influential philosopher of the Enlightenment Age
(the 18th century).
2 This school included philosophers such as Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), Heinrich
Rickert (1863-1936) and Max Weber (1852-1937). From this school Western civilization in-
herited the dualistic opposition of “facts” and “values” (with the accompanying ideal of
“value-free” scholarship – propagated with an equal amount of enthusiasm by (neo-)positiv-
ism, the trend in modern philosophy that wanted to restrict true science to sensory impres-
sions).
3 The founder of this school is Hermann Cohen (1842-1918). Other prominent figures include
Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Hans Kelsen (1881-1973).
22
Chapter 3
such as: “how many legs does it have?”; “how expensive is it?”; “how comfort-
able is it?”; “how large is it?” and so on. Clearly these questions address as-
pects, functions, or modalities of chairs, respectively the quantitative (how
many?), the economic (how expensive?), the sensory mode of feeling (how
comfortable?) and the spatial aspect (how big? – its size).
An example may explain why the idea concerning “pure concepts of law” is
untenable. When a dead person is found it has to be reported to the police.
Why? It is because the integrity of the human body constitutes a public legal
interest protected by the legal order of the state as a public legal institution.
The discovery of a dead body is therefore an effect relevant to state-law. The
first question that comes to mind is: what or who caused this juridically signif-
icant legal effect? Since the discipline of physics also speaks of (physical)
causes and effects (causality), one can step back and ask the more fundamen-
tal (philosophical) question: is there a difference between jural causation and
physical causation?1
The concept of jural causality is therefore not at all purely juridical in na-
ture, because it depends upon the coherence between the jural aspect and
non-jural aspects, in this example the physical. The opposite extreme of aim-
ing at “pure” juridical concepts is when the reference to a non-jural aspect is
not understood as an analogy – in which case the true meaning of the jural is
distorted.2 Consider a physicalistic approach in which human actions are por-
trayed as “willed muscle movements.” In an article on jural causality Dooye-
weerd highlights the shortcoming in such a view with reference to train
signals:
The person controlling the signals who disregards the duty to switch the signal
from safe to unsafe, causes a dangerous condition on the railway lines through
this neglect (Dooyeweerd, 1997a:61).
This person did not move the muscles needed to make the switch and there-
fore, in terms of the (physicalistic) definition of a human action as a “willed
muscle movement,” did not act. But because of the obligation to switch the
signal from safe to unsafe, that person jurally indeed caused the derailment of
the train and the damage flowing from it. In other words, both a commission
1 Notice the difference between what is given in reality and what reflects human involvement.
Living entities are alive, they therefore function as biotic entities, but once the human being
embarks on a scientific study of living entities we meet the discipline of biology. Interaction
between human beings constitutes social phenomena that can be studied by the discipline of
sociology – but a young couple walking on campus is not a sociological phenomenon. Like-
wise we refer to the jural aspect of reality as something given, while terms such as juridical
and judicial are employed in order to designate organized human functioning within the jural
aspect.
2 For example, the dominant organic mode of thinking during the 19th century eliminated the
differences between the original biotic meaning of terms and their analogical occurrence
within non-biotic aspects. As a result such theories identified human society with an organism
– society itself became an organism, with the diverse societal collectivities viewed as its bi-
otic organs.
23
and an omission, from a juridical perspective, are jural acts! Consequently,

the person not “doing” anything in a physical sense is still held responsible (li-
able) for the accident. This concerns the legal issue of accountability as well.
3.4.3 Sphere sovereignty and sphere universality

Considerations like these convinced Dooyeweerd that one has to distinguish
between different aspects or functions (modes of being) of events and (natural
and societal) entities, such as when one recognizes that the jural aspect differs
from the physical aspect. Moreover, these modes are cohering in a peculiar
way enabling compound phrases such as those mentioned above, expressing
the connection between different modes (also evidenced in the expression
jural causality briefly discussed in connection with an omission). Many other
composite phrases are known to everyday experience: economic trust (credit);
moral accountability; aesthetic sensitivity; social justice; economic growth;
historical change; emotional control; and so on.1
The uniqueness of each aspect is captured by referring to its sphere sover-
eignty. This term was first employed in the political thought of Groen van
Prinsterer, a Dutch statesman from the 19th century. Kuyper then explored the
significance of this principle for an understanding of human society, and
eventually Dooyeweerd applied it to an understanding of various dimensions
of reality, such as the dimension of modal functions, that of concretely exist-
ing entities, processes and societal relationships, as well as what he designated
as the dimension of cosmic time (to be explained in Chapter 5 below).
Furthermore, the mentioned interconnectedness between the various as-
pects, through which every aspect displays moments of coherence with the
others, is designated as the principle of sphere universality. These distinctions
are worked out in a general theory of modal aspects (also known as law
spheres). The important implication of this theory is that it accounts for uni-
queness and for coherence: The meaning of every aspect only comes to ex-
pression in its coherence with all the other aspects. Therefore, as soon as an at-
tempt is made to lift any aspect out of this inter-modal coherence, the elevated
(absolutized or deified) aspect will lose its meaning. When Albert Schweitzer
brought his vitalism into practice in hospitals in Africa, the vitalist motto live
and let live did not allow the nursing personnel to kill flies, and consequently
many people died as an effect of the lack of hygienic circumstances. Marxist
communism in Russia promised an economic heaven on earth, in that every-
one will possess everything – yet the irony in Russia was that no subject (citi-
zen) possessed anything. The irony of all -isms in the disciplines (and in prac-
tical life) is that through their disruptive nature they always achieve the oppo-
site of what was aimed for.
1 The aspects involved in these composite phrases are: economic trust (the economic and the
certitudinal); legal order (the jural and the aritmetical); aesthetic sensitivity (the aesthetic and
the sensory); social justice (the social and the jural); economic growth (the economic and the
biotic); historical change (the cultural-historical aspect and the physical aspect).
24
Chapter 3
However, Dooyeweerd did not develop these insights in isolation from the
various academic disciplines. In order to explain the fruitfulness of his idea of
inter-modal coherences in more detail we reflect briefly on a number of exam-
ples from different disciplines.
3.4.4 Scholarly disciplines cannot side-step the coherence
between aspects
Special scientists – such as mathematicians, physicists, biologists, historians,
sociologists, economists and political scientists – sometimes tend to think that
their particular disciplines employ concepts that are peculiar to their specific
discipline only. This explains why some scholars on the one hand want to get
away from certain “misleading” figures or metaphors, but on the other want to
demarcate a unique and if possible even an exclusive universe of discourse.
The German sociologist, Fichter, for example, commences by treating typi-
cal concepts, focused upon the investigation of specific types of entities, types
of societal collectivities and types of social processes – such as behaviour,
role, institution, culture, and society – and then he immediately proceeds with
a discussion of what he considers to be basic concepts. In this context he nega-
tively refers to the “imaginative analogies” used to explain “social life”. In
particular he has the “organic analogies” of the 19th century in mind. In a simi-
lar vein, but not as totally exclusive, the contemporary British sociologist An-
thony Giddens remarks:
There are few today who, as Durkheim, Spencer and many other in nine-
teenth-century social thought were prone to do, use direct organic analogies in
describing social systems (Giddens, 1986:163).
Ironically enough, throughout this work of Giddens we nevertheless repeat-
edly find the expression “social life” without an acknowledgement of the fact
that the primary (original or primitive)1 meaning of “life” derives from the
same biotic domain of reality as the objectionable “organic analogies” of the
19th century!
Fichter also does not critically reflect on the meaning of the phrase “social
life” – something clearly seen from his straight-forward rejection of biologis-
tic, mechanistic, psychologistic and other approaches to sociology (Fichter,
1968:6). He claims that it is certain that the reality of the social could not be re-
duced to biological, physical or psychological concepts.
Remarkably enough he correctly realizes that an analogy refers to a partial
similarity and a partial difference (Fichter, 1968:5). At the same time he holds
the opinion that “the social sciences managed to develop their own terminol-
ogy so well that these analogies are totally dispensable” (Fichter, 1968:6). If
this is true, he cannot answer the question why he still uses the expression “so-
cial life”?! Is it not the case that the term “life” in the first place refers to living
entities in their biotic (organic) functioning? Just think about what biological
text books normally discuss as phenomena of life, namely metabolism (ana-
1 The term “primitive” designates the uniqueness of an aspect, expressed in its indefinable core
meaning or basic meaning (sometimes also depicted as the meaning-nucleus of an aspect.
25
bolism and catabolism), growth (differentiation and integration), adaptation,

and so on. If biology concerns itself with vital phenomena, does it mean that it
has the monopoly on the employment of the term “life”? But then what about
the normal practice of everyday life where people speak about social life, cul-
tural life or economic life?
Since life inherently concerns phenomena of growth we do not have any
problems in contemplating the growth of children, animals, or plants. But are
we speaking about the same phenomenon when we refer to the “growth” of
economies or of growing markets?
Dooyeweerd realized that there is indeed something important present in
instances like these, for it cannot be denied that every academic discipline em-
ploys terms also used by other special sciences. Variation, for example, is a
well-known term in biology. Yet at once it reminds us of changes in a physical
sense (causes and effects: causality). Closer reflection teaches us that what is
variable has its foundation in what endures or persists over time in the sense
that change always requires something constant. This awareness of constancy
amidst change reminds us of the core meaning of uniform motion, that is to
say, of the kinematic aspect of movement. Once this is clear, we can point out
that in addition to biology and physics also the discipline of (mathematical)
logic employs these terms, for speaking of constants and variables is indeed
essential to its theoretical concerns.
The acknowledgement that the same term is used differently by different
disciplines implies that there is a difference between social life and biotic life
or between economic life and biotic life. If this is the case, two implications
follow:
(i) the science of biology loses its exclusive “right” to the employment of
the term “life”; and
(ii) the non-biological disciplines ought to specify the sense of their peculiar
use of (analogical) biotic terms.
Since alternative usages of particular scientific terms presuppose both an ele-
ment of continuity and discontinuity or an element of similarity and differ-
ence, we are immediately confronted with a configuration practically known
throughout the history of philosophy and the disciplines, traditionally desig-
nated as an analogy and sometimes as a metaphor. Even more basic is the fact
that human language as such is permeated by analogies, inducing Schmidt to
say that analogy is not a special case of language and speech, but their normal
structure (Schmidt, 1984:7).
When there is a similarity in one respect only we have an equivalence. Sim-
ilarities in all respects constitutes equality, while an analogy embodies simi-
larities and differences1 in a peculiar way (see Sandkühler, 1999:48). On the
basis of the nature of an analogy in composite phrases, such as social life and
1 Since Leibniz logical equality is understood to concern what cannot be distinguished with the
aid of statements from a well-defined domain of statements (Cf. Mittelstrass, 1974:671). The
indiscernability criterion entailed in the definition of logical equality given by Leibniz was
literally followed by Frege, Peano and Russell – as pointed out by Mittelstrass (1974:672).
26
Chapter 3
economic life, we may observe examples of analogies between different as-

pects of our experience. This means that the original biotic meaning of life ac-
quires an analogical connotation, for example when it is employed in a social
or economic context.
3.5 Differences and similarities: the nature of analogies
Of course the other non-biological disciplines are also entitled to explore le-
gitimate and meaningful usages of biotic analogies in scientific language, for
in reality these disciplines indeed use the term “life” (and synonymous terms)
in an analogical sense. Two questions emerge: (i) is it not purely accidental
that such (biotical) analogies are used in non-biological sciences?; and (ii) is it
not the case that these examples of analogies are nothing but metaphors (in-
stances of figurative speech)?
Suppose that provisionally, as a general characterization, we accept that
whenever differences are shown in what is similar (or: when what is similar is
evinced in what is different), we have an analogy at hand. Surely, the exam-
ples mentioned above are instances of analogies. But there is something pecu-
liar to them, for the biotical, the social and the economic are not concrete (nat-
ural or societal) entities, but aspects in which such entities have concrete func-
tions. Furthermore, the next question is: are there not also similarities and dif-
ferences present between the multiple (natural and societal) entities within re-
ality – such as material things, plants, animals, human beings and human arti-
facts?
Of course the answer is affirmative, for human language is inseparable
from the metaphorical designation of such (entitary) “similarities-shown-
in-their-differences” – just think about metaphors such as “the nose of the
car,” the “bottom of the hill,” the “head of the mountain,” the “lion of Western
Transvaal” (General De la Rey during the second Anglo-Boer war), the “el-
bow of my finger,” and so on. Though it is always possible to replace genuine
metaphors (analogies between entities) with metaphors completely different
from the initial ones, analogies between different modal aspects cannot be re-
placed, for whenever that is attempted, either a switch is made to a different
mode, or the original analogical meaning is merely substituted by a synonym
of the initial designation of a modal analogy. Contemplate another example.
3.5.1 Physical space and mathematical space
It should be kept in mind that analogies between aspects display two features:
similarities and differences, with the important qualification that the differ-
ence is shown in the moment of similarity. Before we analyze the nature of
mathematical and physical space, we briefly mention two examples, social
distance and credit. Social space differs from mathematical space, because
the social distance between a president of a country and his bodyguard is
pretty large, in spite of the fact that they are, in terms of space in its original
modal sense, quite close to each other. Therefore, while distance is the mo-
ment of similarity in it, the difference is also shown: social distance is far
apart and spatial distance is close-by. Trust in a certitudinal sense concerns a
27
relationship between humans and what is considered to be divine. Economic

trust (credit), however, differs from ceritudinal trust in that one does not need
to worship the financial institution (such as a Bank) worthy of economic trust.
Likewise, we shall now argue that although both mathematical space and
physical space are extended, the former is continuous and infinitely divisible
while the latter is not.
When the expression physical extension is substituted with the phrase physi-
cal field or physical domain, we are still dealing with a spatial analogy within
the physical modal aspect. In fact the initial understanding of material entities
(physical things) first of all explored our awareness of distinctness and conti-
nuity (entailing divisibility).1
The Greek atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, were convinced that there
indeed are last indivisible units, which they called atoms. Since Descartes
(1596-1650) modern conceptions switched to the (functionalistic) conviction
that physical space is both continuous and infinitely divisible.
By the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, however, it
turned out that it is necessary to distinguish between mathematical space and
physical space. Whereas the former – in a purely abstract and functional per-
spective – is both continuous and infinitely divisible, the latter (physical
space) by contrast, is neither continuous nor infinitely divisible. This differ-
ence presupposes the similarity: both forms of space are extended. Since phy-
sical space is bound to the quantum structure of energy2 it cannot be subdi-
vided ad infinitum. Energy quanta indeed represent the limit of the divisibility
of energy.
From the very beginnings in Greek culture our attempts to arrive at a scien-
tific understanding of what “matter” is remained burdened with mystery. At
most, scientists succeeded in advancing partial perspectives from the angle of
distinct modes of being which were at once employed as modes of explana-
tion. For this reason Stegmüller is certainly justified when he states that even
for the science of the 20th century the concept of matter is one of the most dif-
ficult and most mysterious concepts whatsoever.3
1 The relationship between modes and entities and that between modal aspects themselves can
always be captured in metaphorical language as well. For example, physical space and emo-
tional space may be designated by metaphorical phrases such as “the space is squeezing me
out” and “the space is full of pain”. Yet the original modal analogies between aspects remain
unaffected by such metaphorical expressions for the latter actually presuppose the basic real-
ity of modal analogies.
2 Planck discovered the quantum of energy h – portraying the fundamental discontinuity of en-
ergy. In order to account for the discrete nature of the omission or absorbtion of energy,
Planck postulated that radiant energy is quantized, proportional to the frequency v in the for-
mula E = hnv – where n is an integer, v the frequency, and h the quantum of action (Wir-
kungsquantum) with the value 6.62 × 10-34 joule sec.
3 “Und daß auf der anderen Seite ausgerechnet der Materiebegriff der schwierigste, unbe-
wältigste und rätselhafteste Begriff überhaupt für die Wissenschaft dieses Jahrhunderts
blieb” (Stegmüller, 1987:90).
28
Chapter 3
In his reflections on the notion of infinity the famous German mathemati-

cian, David Hilbert (1862-1943), first of all looks at the discipline of physics.
He remarks that instead of the old principle “natura non facit saltus” (nature
does not make jumps) we might even assert the opposite, namely that “nature
makes jumps” (Hilbert, 1925: 164). He says: “In addition to matter and elec-
tricity, there is one other entity in physics for which the law of energy conser-
vation holds, viz., energy itself (see the explanation on page 83). But it has
been established that even energy does not unconditionally admit of infinite
divisibility. Planck has discovered quanta of energy. Hence, a homogeneous
continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realize the infi-
nitely small is nowhere to be found in reality” (Hilbert, 1925: 164).
More recently his co-worker, the mathematician Paul Bernays, advances a
similar view when he says: “Only through the contemporary development of
geometry and physics did it become necessary to distinguish between space as
something physical and space as an ideal multiplicity determined by spatial
laws.”1
Therefore we may conclude that physical space and mathematical space are
both extended (their similarity), but within this shared property the difference
between them evinces itself in the way just explained.2
These remarks gain in weight and effect when we realize that Stegmüller
makes his previosly mentioned observations on the basis of an acquaintance
with the most advanced technical physical and mathematical theories in this
regard. The disciplines focused on the biggest bodies in the universe, namely
astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology, remain dependent upon “knowledge
of what is the smallest” – and it is often not possible to decide whether or not
the scientific mysteries presenting themselves here are to be mastered with
these macro-disciplines or through a combination of them and the sciences of
matter:
One can defend the vicious thesis that the current “matter experts,” in a partic-
ular sense, are forced into a worse situation than Goethes's Faust. They are not
only “not wiser than before,” namely as in the time when they started their re-
search, for they have not once become cleverer than those first thinkers of
2000 years ago who attempted to find a foundation for their understanding of
matter in a purely speculative way. Even the two basic concepts concerning
1 “Erst durch die zeitherige Entwicklung der Geometrie und der Physik tritt die Notwendigkeit
hervor, zwischen dem Raum als etwas Physikalischem und dem Raum als eine ideellen,
durch geometrische Gesetze bestimmten Mannigfaltigkeit zu unterscheiden” (Bernays,
1976:37).
2 In an e-mail correspondence with the physicist M.D. Stafleu (July 27, 2005) he remarked that
“as far as I know in concrete physically qualified ‘things’ (like molecules), energy cannot be
infinitely divided, for within such a thing energy is always quantized”. One can of course re-
vert to a modal functional (mathematical) description of processes involving energy (with
reference to a continuous variable), but then recourse is taken to a functional mathematical
notion – where it is indeed meaningful to maintain that such a continuous variable entails infi-
nite divisibility.
29
the nature of matter are currently as before open for discussion, although fre-
quently camouflaged behind mountains of formulas. These two basic concep-
tions could be designated as the atomistic view and the continuum view of mat-
ter (Stegmüller, 1987:90-91).1
The fundamental issue underlying these two views concerns the difference
between physical space and mathematical space, for it is directed to the ques-
tion whether or not matter is endlessly divisible. In addition to the exploration
of the numerical and the spatial aspects as modes of explanation (atomism
versus continuum),2 these two theories were also involved in attempts to solve
the problems regarding two other modes of explanation alluded to above
(Stegmüller, 1987:91):
Before anything else, both theories were therefore engaged in solving two
problems – the apparent or real immutability of matter and the apparent or real
limitless transformability of matter.3
This formulation highlights the relation between constancy and change (dy-
namics) and thus introduces the two previosly mentioned modal aspects,
namely the kinematical (uniform motion, constancy) and the physical (en-
ergy-operation, change, causality). The core meaning of these two aspects
also frequently appears in multiple analogical contexts. We select the term
‘force’ to illustrate this point.
1 “Wir haben in den früheren Abschnitten mehrmals festgestellt, wie sehr gerade auch
diejenigen Wissenschaften, welche sich mit den größten körperlichen Gebilden überhaupt
beschäftigen: die Astronomie, die Astrophysik und die Kosmologie, auf das ‘Wissen vom
Kleinsten’ angewiesen bleiben, ja daß wir heute sogar oft nicht einmal sagen können, ob ein
hier auftretendes wissenschaftliches Rätsel oder theoretisches Dilemma als bloße
Herausforderung der ‘Wissenschaften vom Größten’ allein aufzufassen ist oder als eine
simultane Herausforderung sowohl dieser Wissenschaften als auch der Wissenschaften von
der Materie. Es ließe sich die boshafte Behauptung verfechten, daß die heutigen ‘Materie-
Experten’ in einem gewissen Sinn zu einem schlimmeren Eingeständnis gezwungen sind als
Goethes Faust. Sie sind nicht nur ‘nicht klüger als zuvor’, nämlich als zu der Zeit, da sie zu
forschen anfingen, sondern sie sind nicht einmal klüger geworden als jene ersten Denker,
welche vor über 2000 Jahren die Materie rein spekulativ zu ergründen versuchten. Selbst die
beiden großen Grundkonzepte über die Natur der Materie stehen heute nach wie vor zur
Diskussion, wenn auch mannigfaltig verschleiert hinter Bergen von Formeln. Diese beiden
Grundkonzepte kann man als die atomistische Auffassung und als die Kontinuumsauffassung
der Materie bezeichnen”.
2 Laugwitz mentions that D'Alembert adhered to a widely accepted 18th century interpretation
of Leibniz's view according to which only ‘continuous’ functions occur in the solution of
physical problems (Laugwitz, 1997:293).
3 “Beide Theorien waren darum bemüht, vor allem zwei Probleme zu lösen: das der – schein-
baren oder wirklichen? – Unvergänglichkeit der Materie und das der – scheinbaren oder
wirklichen? – unbegrenzten Verwandlungsfähigkeit der Materie”. This formulation explores
the kinematic mode of explanation (constancy/uniform motion) and the physical mode of ex-
planation (change).
30
Chapter 3
3.5.2 More about analogies of force, validity, causality and life

After modern physics transcended the limitations of its mechanistic orienta-
tion by the end of the 19th century, it acknowledged the concept of force as a
necessary physical term. A physical force normally presupposes the kinema-
tical meaning of constancy since the former can be associated with decelera-
tion and acceleration. But this does not mean that one can elevate the term
force above any specific aspect in order to float in “thin air.” The naturalistic
sociologist, W. R. Catton (see 1966:233-234), advances an understanding of
the general concept force such that it is elevated above any specific modal
meaning:
If a force is that which produces acceleration, then a physical force is that
which accelerates material bodies in physical space, and a social force is what-
ever accelerates social processes. It makes sense to use the term ‘force’ in both
contexts because both physical forces and social forces are special cases of the
general concept.
In its floating generality the notion of “force” may assume any modal specifi-
cation – as if it does not “reside” in some or other aspect where it displays its
original, basic or (indefinable) primitive meaning. And the only place where
the term “force” can be located is within the physical aspect. Speaking about
“social force” will then always designate a physical analogy within the struc-
ture of the social aspect.
The road of development of modern biology also crossed the employment
of the term “force.” At the beginning of the 20th century modern biology was
for some time under the spell of the vitalistic biology of Hans Driesch who ad-
vocated the idea that a living entity is an equi-potential, harmonic system (see
Weber, 1999:267 ff. ).1 He speaks of an immaterial vital force (to which he re-
fers as entelechie or psychoide). Driesch attempted to apply the (determinis-
tic) concept of natural law to biotical phenomena. Eventually the ideas of
Driesch were further elaborated by various biologists. Rainer Schubert-Sol-
dern defends the vitalistic position with a range of biochemical arguments. As
the functional and formal unit of life the existence of the cell would, according
to Schubert-Soldern, depend on the actualization of a double potential: “(a)
the ‘form’ or order of the cell, and (b) the chemical laws governing molecules
… This principle of order may be called the ‘active potentiality’ of the mate-
rial parts” (Schubert-Soldern, 1962:102). His view of the principle of order
links up with the views of Aristotle: “Hence the Aristotelian concept of ente-
lechy corresponds exactly with the principle of order, which we see at work
making the cell into a whole. It is a principle of wholeness which forms a unity
from parts which would otherwise go their separate ways. Thus a hologenous
system is born” (Schubert-Soldern, 1962:113).
Where Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and even Driesch still account for indi-
viduality in terms of the material components, Schubert-Soldern chooses an-
1 Dooyeweerd entered into a thorough systematic discussion of the vitalist biology of Driesch
(see Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:733-749).
31
other way: “Since the form brings about the individualization of something
which previously had been poli-substantial or poli-individual, it must be the
form, which expresses the individuality, which itself must be the individual-
ity” (Schubert-Soldern, 1959:285). In his view the form of a body “brings
about a real entity with a non-material character, concerning a substance
which in its essence possesses its dynamic character” (Schubert-Soldern,
1959:286).
In neo-Vitalist circles organization is understood in terms of their particu-
lar understanding of form (order). The botanist E.W. Sinnott, for example,
writes “Uexküll and others have emphasized this idea and regard organic
form as essentially an independent aspect of an organism, parallel with its
matter and energy [...] Indeed, the concept of organization as something inde-
pendent of the inner and outer environment implies that form must be a basic
characteristic of all living things” (Sinnott, 1972:51). Against mechanistic at-
omism Sinnott emphasizes in a neo-Vitalist fashion the dynamic-creative and
indivisibly continuous form of living things: “Form, [...] is changing and cre-
ative […] It is a category of being very different from matter” (Sinnott, 1963:
199).
The neo-Vitalist biologist J. Haas emphasizes the obedience of every living
thing in the elaboration of the course of its life to an inherent law or program,
preferably designated by him as its life-plan: “The life-plan contains as com-
ponents the blueprints of each of its expressions; the genetic plan for their suc-
cession; the functional plan for carrying out its activities; the behavioral plan
for all its ‘acts’” (Haas, 1974:336). Life-plans have (similar to norms and laws
in general) an ideal being (ideales Sein) in Haas's view (Haas, 1974:338), and
cannot be explained physically-chemically: “Physical-chemical forces and
laws are in themselves unable to bring forth the structures of meaning which
we identify as the life-plan, and even less can it produce a non-material bearer
of life-plans” (Haas, 1974:355). 1 Even the well-known neo-Darwinist, Ste-
phen Gould, repeatedly employs the idea of a design (Bauplan) (Gould,
2002:582, 1156, 1198, 1202).
However, in general the (neo-)vitalist idea of an immaterial “vital force” is
contradictory, because the term “force” in the first place is derives from the
physical domain which is characteristic of (non-living) material things.
Let us briefly return to the science of law. Within this discipline the contro-
versy between theories of “natural law” and the theoretical stance of legal
positivism is based upon an alternative appreciation of the concept of legal
force (juridical validity – an analogy of the physical aspect within the jural as-
pect). What is shared by theories of natural law in their modern shape is the
conviction that – founded in human reason – there exists a universally valid
system of juridical stipulations holding for all possible times and places. Nat-
ural law is supposed to be valid law independent of positive law. Eventually
1 Recently a revival of the neo-Vitalist orientation surfaced in the form of theories about intelli-
gent design (see Dekker et al 2005).
32
Chapter 3
Hobbes (1588-1679), Thomasius (1622-1684), Rousseau (1712-1778) and

Kant (1724-1804) altered this position by advancing the view that natural law
can only have a juridical validity when it is realized within positive law.1
The rise of the historical school of law of Von Savigny at the beginning of
the 19th century challenged the (rationalist)2 assumption of natural law and
claimed that above and next to positive law there simply is no universally
valid system of (pre-positive) law – law is always embedded in a changing re-
ality.
This controversy eliminates an insight into the normativity of human life
mentioned above. Legal principles are not valid in and of themselves since
they are always dependent upon human intervention, upon the normative task
of competent jural organs to give a positive shape to these basic legal princi-
ples in order to make them valid, to enforce them in securing their legal valid-
ity.
The French philosopher Derrida understands this issue in his own way
when he says that there “are a certain number of idiomatic expressions” in the
English language that “have no strict equivalent in French,” such as the phrase
“to enforce the law,” or the phrase “the enforceability of the law” (Derrida,
2002: 232). The difficulties encountered in translating these phrases the fact
that the “enforcement” of law requires human acts of formation (shaping,
making valid underlying universal and constant principles). This is also ex-
plicitly noticed by Habermas where he refers to “the positivization of law”
(Habermas, 1996:71).3
Particularly in modern (symbolic) logic the “force” of an argument is ex-
plained in terms of the validity of an inference, which ought to be distin-
guished from the truth or falsity of the premises or conclusions of arguments –
therefore once more analogically employing the term force within a logical
context.
Without a theory of the analogical connections between different aspects of
reality the difference between force in its original (non-analogical) physical
sense and analogical occurrences of this term – such as in expressions like “vi-
tal force,” “logical validity,” “jural force” (the “force of law”) – would be in-
explicable.
The original meaning of physical energy-operation underlies the reality of
(physiccal) causes and effects – for the operation of energy always causes cer-
1 Hommes (1961:55), the successor of Dooyeweerd at the Free University of Amsterdam, sum-
marizes the traditional concept of natural law as follows: “natural law in its traditional sense
is the totality of pre-positive (not brought into existence through the declaration of will of the
human formation of law) immutable, universal and per se valid legal norms and eventually
subjective natural rights and correlating duties, based upon a natural order (whether or not
traced back to a divine origin), such that the human being can derive it from the natural order
aided by natural reason”.
2 Rationalism will be defined later – see the brief definition on page 81).
3 Compare Habermas, 1998:101 where he discusses “die Positivierung des Rechts”.
33
tain effects. This physical relation between cause and effect – also known as
causality – not only inspired prominent physicists to part ways (determinism –
Einstein, and indeterminism – Heisenberg and Bohr) since within the disci-
pline of law also different schools of thought are found as a result of alterna-
tive accounts of the meaning of the elementary (analogical) juridical basic
concept of jural causality.
The general assessment of the 19th century regarding the meaning of causal-
ity was exclusively in terms of a physical necessity, stripped from every ele-
ment of normativity. The so-called philosophical concept of causality used in
this context derives from J S Mill's idea of causality. It received the label of the
(conditio) sine qua non theory – of which Traeger claims that every juridical
theory of causality has to proceed.1 The well-known theories developed on the
basis of this (deterministic) concept of causality are those of the conditio sine
qua non (von Buri) and those of the adequate cause (von Kries, Traeger) (also
see Hart and Honoré, 1985: 442 ff., 465 ff.). The shared shortcoming in these
theories is that they deny the possibility of a normatively qualified form of
causality, such as the basic legal understanding of jural causality. Of course in
terms of a deterministic (naturalistic) approach this option will be considered
to be inconsistent (antinomic). Nonetheless there are significant jural phe-
nomena that would be left unaccounted for if causality merely had a natural
scientific meaning, such as the nature of omission mentioned above in con-
nection with the train signal. No physical concept of causality can ever ex-
plain an omission which, in a jural sense, can cause a juridically significant
effect without the performing any action in a physical sense.
In general the basic (analogical) concepts of all special sciences therefore
testify to the interconnectedness prevailing between their distinct fields of in-
vestigation. Just observe the way in which the jural aspect analogically re-
flects its coherence with all the non-jural aspects of reality, captured in the
diagram below:
Aspects Analogies
Faith aspect Jural/legal certainty (“good faith”)
Ethical aspect Jural/legal morality (fault, equity, etc.)
Jural aspect [Meaning nucleus: retribution]
Aesthetic aspect Jural/legal harmony
Economic aspect Jural/legal economy (avoiding excess)
Social aspect Jural/legal interaction
Lingual aspect Jural/legal signification and interpretation
Cultural-historical aspect Jural power / Legal competence
1 “Als ein nicht unterchätzender Gewinn für das Verständnis der Kausalitätsfrage im Recht
muß die sich immer mehr Bahn brechende Erkenntnis betrachtet werden, daß jede juristische
Kausalitätstheorie von der condition sine qua non auszugehen hat” (Traeger, 1904:38).
34
Chapter 3
Logical-analytical aspect Jural lawfulness and unlawfulness
Sensitive aspect Jural/legal feeling (desire, will)
Botical aspect Jural/legal life/jural organ
Physical aspect Jural/legal dynamics (causality)
Kinematical aspect Jural/legal constancy
Spatial aspect Jural/legal sphere (domain)
Arithmetical aspect Jural/legal order (unity and multiplicity)
We will now examine in some more detail how the previosly mentioned soci-
ologist, Fichter, accounts for basic concepts.
3.5.3 Fichter's unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the use of
analogical basic concepts
Fichter claims that sociology had to liberate itself from outdated organic met-
aphors by developing its “own terminology”. However, it soon turns out that
he is not at all aware of the following two considerations:
(i) that the basic terms introduced by him, which are supposed to be exclu-
sively sociological in nature, in fact are not original terms within the so-
ciological field of investigation, and
(i) that the same terms are indeed amply used by various other academic
disciplines as well.
Which are the terms that Fichter has in mind?
Having argued for the dispensability of analogies, Fichter continues on the
next page by paying attention to the problem of constants (Fichter, 1968:7).
Since the term constancy originally belongs to the domain of the kinematical
aspect of uniform motion, as noted earlier, employing this term within other
disciplines can only use it in a non-original way, i. e. in an analogical way.
Fichter writes here that the basic concepts analyzed by him represent “the con-
stant and everywhere appearing elements” (Fichter, 1968:7), but once again
he does not realize that the term “everywhere” stems from the meaning of the
spatial aspect of reality (every place – just consider the equivalent spatial
term: universal). Similarly, the term “elements” reflect the unique meaning of
the numerical aspect since it is related to multiplicity, to the one and the many.
This implies that Fichter necessarily had to use numerical and spatial terms in
order to explain his employment of the (kinematical) term constancy. This
demonstrates that an analysis of the elementary basic concepts of a special
science in itself is a complex undertaking involving multiple analogical terms
(which may partly be analyzed or not yet be analyzed). In other words, the
analysis of any specific analogical basic concept is only possible by (implic-
itly or explicitly) using other (analyzed or not yet analyzed) analogical
structural moments within the modal structure of the aspect concerned.
35
Therefore it should not surprise us that Fichter (1968:8), on the basis of his
introduction of “social constants,” proceeds by speaking about social dynam-
ics and social change (Fichter, 1968:8). A few pages further he also speaks
about social causes (Fichter, 1968:12). We have noted above that the relation
between cause and effect in the first place manifests itself within the structure
of the physical aspect of reality (causality). Analogous to this physical rela-
tion sociology employs the (basic) concept of social causation (compare the
book with this title by McIver written in 1942). In other words, although
Fichter believes that he can dispense with the former “imaginative analogies”
used by sociologists through the development of an “own terminology,” he
continues (be it unconsciously and unintended) to use certain analogical con-
cepts – including those coming from the biotic aspect (such as: “social life”).
As a result, Fichter's philosophical prejudice, convincing him that sociol-

ogy does not need any (modal) analogies, did not prevent his continued un-
conscious use of such analogies. Particularly within postmodernism1 some-
thing similar is found, for postmodern thinkers try to steer clear of employing
analogical terms coming from mathematical and physical theories. Some-
times these postmodernists claim that “modernist” thinking is linear while
postmodern thought is supposedly non-linear. Quantum mechanics would be
an instance of non-linear thinking, while chaos theory is supposed to be in op-
position to the deterministic Newtonian legacy in physics. However, the
well-known (second order differential) equation of Schrödinger in quantum
mechanics is absolutely linear, while chaos theory is nothing but an exten-
sion of Newton's classical mechanics (cf. Sokol & Bricmont, 1998: 164 ff.).
Sokol and Bricmont are themselves struggling to come to terms with the con-
nections between different scholarly universes of discourse. Unfortunately
they only consider analogies between different disciplines or theories (such as
between the theory of relativity and social theories), without addressing the
real issue, namely that the employment of analogical concepts does not con-
cern relationships between scientific disciplines in the first place, since they
call for the recognition of connections between different “ontic domains”
within reality itself (“ontic coherences”).2
It may be the case that the theory of relativity, for example, does help us to
better understand the nature of the kinematic meaning of uniform movement
by highlighting the core meaning of kinematic constancy (the velocity of light
in a vacuum). When sociology, for example, cannot avoid references to the
notion of social constancy, we do not discern an analogy between the disci-
pline of sociology and the discipline of physics (kinematics or phoronomy in
particular), but merely an analogy between two modal functions (the kine-
1 Dooyeweerd's philosophy enables a penetrating understanding of postmodernism. It will be
discussed in a later context.
2 The Greek word for what truly exists is “on” – the root from which we derive the English
word ontic.
36
Chapter 3
matical and the social) of ontic reality, that are fitted in a mutual coherence
prior to any scholarly reflection.
With his theory of modal aspects Dooyeweerd thus opened up a novel and
original way of understanding the basic concepts of the various disciplines in
terms of the analogies within the structure of the various aspects of reality.
None of these disciplines can escape from the inevitability of employing
multivocal terms and from the challenge to account for the specific meaning in
which they are used within a particular academic discipline.
* * * *
Although the current Chapter developed a first account of the problem of
uniqueness and coherence by investigating some interconnections between
the various aspects of reality, it did not fully unfold the picture of Dooye-
weerd's theory of modal aspects. This will be continued in Chapter 5. How-
ever, in Chapter 4 we shall follow Dooyeweerd's procedure. He first explored
the discipline of law to see if his new philosophical insights and distinctions
make sense within a particular special science. Since the field of investigation
of the discipline of law is delimited by one of the normative aspects of reality,
namely the jural, we shall explore some of the core issues within the founda-
tion of mathematics to show that Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects is in-
deed friutful for an understanding of the two most basic aspects of the uni-
verse, namely number and space. In order to accomplish this we shall incorpo-
rate the views of the outstanding logician of the 20th century, Kurt Gödel
(1906-1978), and of a prominent mathematician of the 20th century, Paul Ber-
nays (1888-1977) – both contemporaries of Dooyeweerd. Our aim is to show
that the basic traits of Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects can pass the test
of the key distinctions and insights also found in the thought of Bernays and
Gödel and that within Dooyeweerd's theory one finds a systematic framework
capable of adequately explaining the uniqueness and coherence between these
aspects as well as the nature of the two kinds of infinity which played a key
role throughout the history of philosophy and mathematics, traditionally
known as the potential infinite and the actual infinite.
Questions:
1. What is entailed in the expression “the normativity of human life”?
2. What does it mean to say that human beings are embedded in a cosmic diversity?
3. How does an understanding of the diversity within creation shed light on the multi-aspectual
functioning of human beings?
4. What prompted Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal aspects of reality?
5. What are the implications of a proper understanding of the problem of uniqueness for the ideal to
employ supposedly “pure concepts” within a discipline, divorced from the coherence between
different aspects of reality?
6. What is the meaning of sphere sovereignty and sphere universality?
7. Is it possible for the special sciences to avoid the coherence between aspects?
37
8. How does the nature of modal analogies elucidate the difference between physical space and
mathematical space?
9. How does the nature of inter-modal coherences enhance our understanding of analogies of
force, validity, causality and life?
10. Why was the sociologist Fichter unsuccessful in his attempt to eliminate the use of analogical ba-
sic concepts?
38
Number and space:
modes of thought or aspects of reality?
Chapter 4
Chapter 3 was concluded by the observation that Dooyeweerd first in-
vestigated the science of law to see if his new philosophical insights
are worth their while. We now proceed by looking at the aspects of
number and space, sometimes considered to be mere modes of thought
(Descartes), while considering the views of a prominent mathemati-
cian (Bernays) and logician (Gödel), because pursuing this path will
explore Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects within a domain differ-
ent from the science of law. Since his Encyclopedia of the Science of
Law is in the process of being translated and published this Chapter
will explore another discipline as a test for the fruitfulness of Dooye-
weerd's theory of modal aspects. While highlighting the remarkable
convergence found in the thought of Bernays,1 Dooyeweerd and
Gödel, attention will be given to the task of defining mathematics, to
the difference between arithmetic and logic, interconnections between
number and space, the potential and the actual infinite, the shortcom-
ings of arithmeticism, as well as to the fact that number is not continu-
ous. The reader who wants to skip this Chapter may directly go to
Chapter 5.
Bernays was a full-blown mathematician who studied under formidable fig-

ures such as David Hilbert, Edmund Landau, Hermann Weyl and Felix Klein
(teaching at Berlin and Göttingen). Noteworthy is his philosophical studies
under Alois Riehl, Carl Stumpf and in particular Ernst Cassirer who, as we
shall see below, also influenced the thought of Dooyeweerd. Bernays re-
ceived his Ph.D from Berlin and then completed his “Habilitationsschrift” at
the University of Zürich. Ernst Zermelo, who introduced the first group of ax-
ioms for set theory, was the examiner. After he completed his Ph.D in 1912 he
worked as an assistant of Zermelo at the university of Zürich until 1917. Later
on Bernays also developed his own system of axioms for set theory. Since
1917 Bernays started to work with Hilbert (1862-1943) on the foundations of
mathematics. This relationship eventually produced a two volume work
which they jointly published (in 1934 and 1939): “Grundlagen der Mathe-
matik.”
1 Perhaps with the exception of one, all the other systematics distinctions involved in Dooye-
weerd's theory of modal aspects are found in the thought of Barnays – and yet Bernays did not
develop a theory of modal aspects as such.
39
Gödel, who grew up in Austria, is rated in the first place as an outstanding

logician, although his discoveries had a direct impact on mathematics, in par-
ticular on consistency and completeness.2 In 1930, when Hilbert received
honorary citizenship from his birth place, Königsberg, he concluded his ora-
tion on knowledge of nature and logic (“Naturerkennen und Logik”) with the
optimistic lines: “Wir müssen wissen, Wir werden wissen” (“We must know,
we shall know” – Hilbert, 1970:387 – it now serves as the inscription on his
tombstone). This hope included the expectation that it would be possible to
demonstrate or prove that the axiomatic foundation of mathematics secures
the consistency of these axioms.3 In other words, it was hoped that a system of
axioms would exclude any and all contradictions. In addition, the conviction
existed that it should be possible to show that such an axiom system is com-
plete, i.e., that it would be possible to demonstrate (prove) all true statements
within it.
Yet Gödel shattered both these expectations. First of all it turned out that
any proof that the axioms are consistent exceeds or transcends the axioms of
the axiom system under consideration. Secondly, Gödel has shown that any
axiomatic system capable of axiomatizing arithmetic (such as the axioms of
Peano), contains unprovable but true statements. However, at this point the
idea of infinite totalities complicated the scene. Gödel stressed the fact that
constructing sets by repeatedly forming a new set “never led to any anti-
nomies.” He pointed out that intuitive, unformalized arithmetic, during the
vast history of mathematical thinking, employed this basic notion of succes-
sion in an unproblematic way. But the mere acknowledgment of succession
does not justify the idea of an infinite totality. For this reason Gödel had to add
the qualification that holding on to succession does not allow “dividing the to-
2 On request from the Journal Erkenntnis he produced a summary formulation of his famous
1931 article on “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia mathematica und
verwandter Systeme.” His succinct statement of the problems treated in this article reads:
“The paper deals with problems of two kinds, namely 1. the question of completeness
(decidability) of formal systems of mathematics, 2. the question of consistency proofs for
such systems” (Gödel, 1986:202). [“Es handelt sich in dieser Arbeit um Probleme von
Zweierlei Art, nämlich 1. Um die Frage der Vollständigkeit (Entscheidungsdefinitheit)
formaler Systeme der Mathematik, 2. Um die Frage der Widerspruchsfreiheitsbeweise für
solche Systeme”.]
3 Traditionally an axiom was seen as a proposition which is true without requiring a proof for
its truth, while whatever is deduced from it, is also true (see Szabó, 1965:401 ff.). As an ex-
ample we mention the axioms of Peano (1858-1932), holding for successions of numbers,
such as 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., (where zero (0) is viewed as a natural number):
1. 0 is a natural number;
2. If a is a number, the successor of a is a number;
3. Zero is not the successor of a number;
4. If the successors of two numbers are equal, these two numbers are themselves equal;
5. If S is a set of numbers that contains zero and the successor of every number in S, then ev-
ery number is contained in S.
40
Chapter 4
tality of all existing things into two categories” (quoted by Yourgrau,

2005:137). That is to say, Gödel argues that as long as the idea of infinite total-
ities or wholes is avoided, no antinomies emerge.
However, we shall argue that restricting the infinite merely to the succes-
sive infinite cannot do justice to the spatially deepened meaning of the numeri-
cal aspect as it is explored in modern (Cantorian) mathematics (see page 56 ff.
below).
Unfortunately such a restricted understanding of the infinite is also found
in the thought of Dooyeweerd. Since the feature of wholeness or of being a to-
tality belongs to the uniqueness of space, the arithmetical idea of an infinite to-
tality clearly embodies a forward-pointing analogy within the aspect of num-
ber (an anticipation). Whereas our first acquaintance with numerical succes-
sion highlights the most basic meaning of infinity (one, another one, and so on
indefinitely) in the literal sense of an endless succession (endlessness), the an-
ticipating idea of an infinite totality deepens this original (basic) meaning of
the infinite by viewing the successive elements in an endless row of numbers
as if they are all given at once. Without an acknowledgment of the uniqueness
of number and space, the interconnections between these aspects cannot be
accounted for – that is, their backward- and forward-pointing analogies are
then not recognized. The uniqueness of these (and other) aspects first of all
comes to expression in
their irreducibility, ex-
pressing their (irreduc-
ible ad indefinable) pri-
mitive meaning. Ulti-
mately every discipline
therefore has to employ
primitive terms.4
In anticipation of the
structural elements that
will feature in our dis-
cussion this Sketch will
be intuitively clear.
Dooyeweerd's theory
of modal aspects pro-
vides a new systematic
way to account for prim-
4 Ewing mentions that G.E. Moore believed that the good has no definition: “I think we shall
see that some terms must be indefinable if anything is to be defined at all” (Ewing, 1962:87);
and Korzybski underscores that one cannot define ad infinitum: “We thus see that all linguis-
tic schemes, if analysed far enough, would depend on a set of ‘undefined terms’. If we enquire
about the ‘meaning’ of a word, we find that it depends on the ‘meaning’ of other words used
in defining it, and that the eventual new relations posited between them ultimately depend on
the … meanings of the undefined terms, which, at a given period, cannot be elucidated any
further” (Korzybski, 1948:21).
41
itive terms, regarding the problem of uniqueness and coherence, as well as for
the mentioned interconnections (moments of coherence or modal analogies)
between the domains harbouring what are primitive and unique (we shall see
that Gödel also sensed the importance of these issues). However, by under-
standing infinity in terms of the intuitionistic restriction of mathematics to in-
finity in the sense of endlessness (succession without an end – the successive
infinite), Dooyeweerd did not fully explore the enriching implications of his
own theory of modal aspects in connection with the infinite (we shall return to
this shortcoming below – see the Sketch on the previous page and also the one
at the end of this Chapter, on page 66).
In order to appreciate the positive and negative sides of Dooyeweerd's con-
tribution in this regard, it will prove worthwhile to investigate the basic dis-
tinctions and insights present within the mathematical thought of Paul
Bernays, because such an approach will help us assess the significance of
Dooyeweerd's views for the discipline of mathematics and for a critique of
contemporary arithmeticism within mathematics.
4.1 Historical background
Emerging from various ancient civilizations the discipline of mathematics ap-
peared to be appreciated as one of the prime examples of human rationality.
During the era of Greek antiquity significant advances were made, particu-
larly in respect of deductive reasoning, exemplified in Euclid's “Elements.”
Of course this legacy was still largely in the grip of the Pythagorean convic-
tion that the essence of everything could be captured by natural numbers and
their ratios (fractions). Number itself was elevated to become the essence of
everything (“everything is number”). Today we know that although number
indeed forms the foundation of rational knowledge, it cannot any longer be
equated with the “essence” of everything.
At the same time this restriction to the rational numbers (i.e., fractions) pre-
pared the way towards what eventually became known as the first founda-
tional crisis of mathematics – given in the discovery of the irrational numbers.
The inability to conquer irrational numbers in an arithmetical way, merely
employing fractions, resulted in the geometrization of mathematics. For this
reason Euclid treated the theory of number as a part of geometry.5
The initial intellectual stimulus setting mathematics on its path of develop-
ment therefore derives from the atomistic Pythagorean thesis that everything
is number. However, this approach soon had to revert to a spatial perspective,
in terms of which the importance of the (spatial) whole-parts relation6 domi-
nated the subsequent development of mathematics up to the 19th century.
5 “Das begründet einen Vorrang der Geometrie vor der Arithmetik, und die Konsequenz sind
die Bücher des Euklid: Die Theorie der Zahlen ist ein Teil der Geometrie” – Laugwitz,
1986:10.
6 Without recognizing its connection with the aspect of space Russell later on acknowledged
the whole-parts relation as basic: “The relation of whole and part is, it would seem, an inde-
finable and ultimate relation” (Russell, 1956:138).
42
Chapter 4
Eudoxos has already approximated the discovery of the modern calculus

(later independently attributed to Leibniz and Newton), but restricting himself
to the perspective of space prevented him from contemplating the arithmeti-
cal concept of a limit, which eventually turned out to be an indispensible start-
ing point for the development of the calculus and mathematical analysis.7
Having resolved the continuum into a set of (isolated) points, set theory then
super-imposes upon it, with the auxilliary set theoretical construction of envi-
ronments and open sets, a “topology” within which it is once again possible to
speak of “continuity” (“Stetigkeit”) (see Laugwitz, 1997:266). Laugwitz also
mentions that Cantorean set theory advances an “atomistic conception” of
“the continuum.” The position of intuitionism remained ambiguous because
Brouwer's “basal intuition” embraced both the elements of discreteness and
continuity.8
4.2 Key distinctions in the mathematical thought of Paul Bernays

approximating Dooyeweerd's views
Bernays wrestled with all these problems and advanced a distinct view on the
issues involved in the claim, made by Cantor (1845-1918) and most of his fol-
lowers, namely that mathematics can be fully arithemetized. His philosophy
of mathematics embraces the basic issues stretching across the full scope of an
articulated ontology, that is, an account of what is.
He reflected on what is universal and what is individual, on what is discrete

and continuous (including the infinite divisibility of the latter), on what is
given as an extended whole with intrinsic positions but not as an ordered mul-
tiplicity of points, and held the view that the idea of the continuum originally
is geometrical and that mathematical analysis expressed it in arithmetical
terms. He distinguished between human reflection and what is “ontically”
given, proceeding from the assumption that that reality displays “objective”
quantitative properties. He advanced a sound argument in support of Dooye-
weerd's idea that spatial continuity is irreducible to number. He linked this
irreducibility to the totality character of continuity and even revealed an in-
sight into the difference between mathematical space and physical space dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. His distinction between a law and what is subjected to
such a law represents a key concern in Dooyeweerd's philosophy. Finally, in
his understanding of infinite totalities he surpasses a shortcoming in the ap-
proach of Dooyeweerd.
7 In general a number l is called the limit of the sequence (xn), when for an arbitrary 0 < Î a nat-
ural number n0 exists such that |xn – l| < Î for all n ³ n0.
8 Brouwer states: “Finally this basal intuition of mathematics, in which the connected and the
separate, the continuous and the discrete are united, gives rise immediately to the intuition of
the linear contniuum, i.e., of the ‘between,’ which is not exhaustible by the interposition of
new units and which therefore can never be thought of as a mere collection of units”
(Brouwer, 1964:69).
43
Particularly within the intellectual atmosphere of mathematicians who

were in the grip of an arithmeticistic orientation, the stance of Bernays is truly
remarkable. Let us explore the significance of his position in more detail for
an appreciation of the uniqueness and mutual coherence of number and space.
4.2.1 Defining mathematics
Defining mathematics may appear, at first sight, to be straight-forward. Two
considerations immediately surface: (i) any definition of mathematics ex-
ceeds the boundaries of mathematics, and (ii) any definition becomes absurd
when it does not “touch reality.”
Bernays considers the concept of an ordinal number (designating positions
in a sequence: first, second, third, and so on)9 as a basic element of mathemat-
ics (Bernays, 1976:41), although his definition of mathematics goes further.
He does not want to proceed on the basis of the opposition between what is
qualitative and quantitative. In a phenomenological sense the qualitative is
opposed to the structural. As far as mathematics is concerned this structural
trait exists in the forms of next-to-each-other, after-each-other, and being
composed, accompanied by all the conceptual determinations and law-con-
formities related to them (Bernays, 1976:141). Of course one may be tempted
to point out that within widely differing contexts structures are encountered
(Bernays mentions structures of society, economic structures, the structure of
the earth, of plants, and so on). For this reason Bernays provides a more pre-
cise qualification: modal abstraction treats possible structures, in particular
the “idealisierten strukturen” (idealized structures) (Bernays, 1976:172).
The problem with this definition is unveiled through the question: are these
structures given or are they constructed by the mathematician? From the
previosly mentioned explanation it may appear as if the focus is on con-
structed structures. Yet in a different context Bernays argues that the
“Gegenstand” (object) of scientific investigation must be given prior to
(vorgängig) this research (Bernays, 1976:110). On the basis of what is thus
given, mathematics further explores the development of additional theoreti-
cally articulated elements (Bernays, 1976:110).
Clearly, his general definition, namely: “Mathematics is concerned with
possible structures, and indeed in particular idealized structures” (Bernays,
1976:172), intends to account for the interplay between what is given and
what is developed on that basis. One may also say: what is disclosed on the ba-
sis of what is given. Bernays opts for the view that certain ontic traits of reality
enable the formulation of the axioms of arithmetic. Hao Wang remarks that
Kurt Gödel was very “fond of an observation that he attributes to Bernays”:
9 In the case of an ordinal number no order relation between the elements of a sequence is taken
into account. Maddy explains: “Cardinal numbers tell us ‘how many’ – one, two, three ... – as
opposed to ordinal numbers, which tell ‘how many-ith – first, second, third ...” (Maddy,
1997:17, note 43 – see page 76 below).
44
Chapter 4
“That the flower has five petals is as much part of objective reality as that its
color is red” (quoted by Wang, 1982:202). In other words, “objective reality
displays a numerical aspect.”
Because every response to what is given in an ontic sense is historically
“dated,” every attempt to define mathematics exclusively in such “response
terms” will invalidate and actually eliminate the history of mathematics alto-
gether. For example, saying that mathematics is set theory eliminates all forms
of mathematics before Cantor introduced his set theory. Hersh is therefore
justified in his questioning of this view: “What does this assumption, that all
mathematics is fundamentally set theory, do to Euclid, Archimedes, Newton,
Leibniz, and Euler? No one dares to say they were thinking in terms of sets,
hundreds of years before the set-theoretic reduction was invented” (Hersh,
1997:27). This remark underscores our statement above, namely that any defi-
nition of mathematics becomes absurd when it does not “touch reality” [point
(ii)].
The best way to articulate the nature of mathematics in this regard is to ac-
cept what is ontically given, namely, among other, the aspects of number and
space, and then account for the possibility to explore (investigate) the mean-
ing of these aspects (and their interrelations) by means of our theoretical re-
flection on them – resulting in the historical development of the discipline of
mathematics. This is precisely the point of view defended by Bernays. Ac-
cording to him an operative conception of mathematics will hold that mathe-
matics certainly has to bring forth its own objects. Alternatively, he suggests,
one may acknowledge that the Gegenstand [object] of mathematics is some-
thing given to us prior to our reflection and that through the concepts we form
and by means of our axiomatic descriptions we open up and make what is
given accessible to human cognition.10
The first previosly mentioned consideration stated that any definition of
mathematics exceeds the boundaries of mathematics. For example, when it is
said that “mathematics consists of algebra and topology” then it is obvious
that this definition itself is not an axiom or theorem either within algebra or
within topology. Posing and answering this question belongs to the philo-
sophical foundation of mathematics. The issue is not who provides the defi-
nition but what is the nature of this definition. Mathematicians may want to
argue that only a mathematician can tell us what mathematics is. However,
without denying any mathematician the right to answer it, the answer will
still not be mathematical in nature!
10 “Eine operative Auffassung der Mathematik wird von vielen verfochten. Für diese ist cha-
racteristisch, daß sie den Gegenstand der Mathematik nicht in etwas vorgängig Vor-
liegendem erblickt, das durch die Begriffsbildungen und axiomatischen Beschreibungen für
unser Erkennen zugänglich gemacht werden soll, sondern das mathematische Operieren
selbst und the Gegenständlichkeiten, die darin zustande kommen, als das Thema der
Mathematik ansieht. Die Mathematik soll hiernach ihre Gegenstände gewissermaßen selbst
erzeugen” (Bernays, 1976:114).
45
If there is something given prior to the practice of mathematics, then the

next question is: how do we obtain knowledge of this given ontic reality?
4.2.2 How do we obtain knowledge of ontic reality?
Bernays answers that “idealizations are characteristic for the formation of
mathematical concepts” (Bernays, 1976:VIII). The limitations of our empiri-
cal world, restricting us to what is finite, can only be exceeded by what
Bernays calls “the formal abstraction which helps us to transcend the bound-
aries of factuality” (Bernays, 1976:38). As soon as one contemplates the infi-
nite divisibility of space, it becomes clear that our metrical spatial representa-
tions become meaningless in a physical sense (Bernays, 1976:38). Likewise,
the foundational assumption of infinite totalities, employed in analysis, can-
not be grasped in our intuition but only by means the formation of ideas
(Ideenbildung). Although Bernays does not know the idea of modal (func-
tional) aspects of reality, his account of discreteness and continuity is com-
pletely equivalent to the aspects of number and space in Dooyeweerd's theory
of modal aspects.
4.2.3 “Arithmetical” and the “geometric” intuitions
What, according to Bernays, is characteristic of our distinction between the
“arithmetic” and the “geometric” intuitions? He rejects the widespread view
that this distinction concerns time and space, for according to him, the proper
distinction needed is that between the discrete and the continuous.11 This
characterization on the one hand supports the way in which Fraenkel et al.
portrays the history of mathematics and on the other coincides with
Dooyeweerd’s view.
Fraenkel et al. address this issue in their 1973 work on the Foundations of Set
Theory: “Bridging the gap between the domains of discreteness and of conti-
nuity, or between arithmetic and geometry, is a central, presumably even the
central problem of the foundation of mathematics” (Fraenkel, A., et al.,
1973:211).12 We may quote other scholars, having the same view: “from the
earliest times two opposing tendencies, sometimes helping one another, have
governed the whole involved development of mathematics. Roughly these are
the discrete and the continuous” (Bell, 1965:12); and Rucker remarks: “The
discrete and continuous represent fundamentally different aspects of the
mathematical universe” (Rucker, 1982:243).
But then the question recurs: what is the relationship between the “discrete”
and the “continuous”? Bernays, in an unequivocal way, declares that the rep-
resentation of number is more basic than that of space (Bernays, 1976:69).13
11 “Es empfiehlt sich, die Unterscheidung von ‘arithmetischer’ und ‘geometrischer’ An-
schauung nicht nach den Momenten des Räumlichen und Zeitlichen, sondern im Hinblick auf
den Unterschied des Diskreten und Kontinuierlichen vorzunehmen” (Bernays, 1976:81).
12 It must be kept in mind that contemporary scholars currently still refer to this work as authori-
tative (see for example the references in Maddy, 1997:14, 39-42, 47-48, 50, 52-54, 57-58, 61,
85).
13 “Die Vorstellung der Zahl ist elementarer als die geometrischen Vorstellungen.”
46
Chapter 4
By contrast, since everything continuously extended can be comprehended at

once, Greek mathematics believed that space is more fundamental than num-
ber (Fraenkel, et al., 1973:213). Also modern mathematicians adhered to the
same view, in particular Gottlob Frege and René Thom.
Close to the end of his life, still devastated by the discovery of the inconsis-
tency of naive set theory by Russell and Zermelo in 1901, Frege believed that
ultimately mathematics is geometry (Frege, 1979:277). Longo mentions that
René Thom also upholds the view that continuity precedes discreteness: “For
him, as for many mathematicians of the continuum, ‘the Continuum precedes
ontologically the discrete’, for the latter is merely an ‘accident coming out of
the continuum background’, ‘a broken line’ ” (Longo, 2001:6). 14
Of course, during his early development, Frege adhered to the growing
view of modern mathematics, namely that it could be reduced to number
(arithmeticism). In 1884 Frege asked the question: “Is it not the case that the
basis of arithmetic is deeper than all our experiential knowledge and even
deeper than that of geometry?”15 Interestingly, although he opposes
arithmeticism, Bernays holds that the number concept is more immediate to
our understanding than the representation of space.16 However, as we shall
see below, Bernays, similar to the later Frege, ultimately did not adhere to an
arithmeticistic orientation.
4.2.4 Arithmetic and Logic
Merely distinguishing discreteness and continuity does not solve all the prob-
lems. Even if the foundational role of discreteness is accepted, another issue
surfaces, namely the question what the relationship between logic and arith-
metic is? Although no academic discipline can avoid its “logic,” this does not
entail that the logical-analytical aspect lies at the foundation of all the aspects
of reality. Analyzing a specific aspect in a logical consistent way requires an
additional argument if one wants to establish the “order-place” of this aspect
within the order of aspects.
Bernays points out that according to Hilbert there is a circularity entailed in
the logicist attempt to deduce the quantitative meaning of number from that of
the logical-analytical mode. He quotes Hilbert saying:
Only when we analyze attentively do we realize that in presenting the laws of
logic we already have had to employ certain arithmetical basic concepts, for
example the concept of a set and partially also the concept of number, particu-
larly as cardinal number [Anzahl]. Here we end up in a vicious circle and in or-
14 Later on in this article Longo combined Thom's views with those of Leibniz: “By contrast
Leibniz and Thom consider the continuum as the original giving, central to all mathematical
construction, while the discrete is only represented as a singularity, as a catastrophe” (Longo
2001:19).
15 “Liegt nicht der Grund der Arithmetik tiefer als der alles Erfahrungswissens, tiefer selbst als
der der Geometrie?” (Frege, 1884:44). Dooyeweerd is also convinced that number precedes
space.
16 “Der Zahlbegriff ist für unsern Geist unmittelbarer als die Vorstellung des Raumes”
(Bernays, 1976:75).
47
der to avoid paradoxes it is necessary to come to a partially simultaneous de-

velopment of the laws of logic and arithmetic (Bernays, 1970:199).
A similar idea is found in the thought of the well-known neo-Kantian thinker,

Ernst Cassirer, who taught philosophy to Bernays. He acknowledged original
functions (aspects) that are irreducible (“not in need of genuine derivation”).17
He therefore had an understanding of “original functions” [Urfunktionen] and
their mutual relationships, accounting for the similarities and differences be-
tween them. He distinguishes between “a logical identity and diversity and a
numerical unity and difference.”18
Bernays is convinced that mathematical knowledge represents a higher ab-
straction than what is found within logic. “As we have established, in respect
of the formal, the mathematical perspective in opposition to the conceptual
logical represents the standpoint of a higher abstraction.” 19
Bernays was convinced that the number concept is original and non-logical
in nature: “What is necessary is to acknowledge that deductive logic already
includes intuitive evidence and that the logical number definitions do not
show that for example the number concepts as such are specifically logical in
nature (as pure reflective concepts), for they rather are solely normings of ele-
mentary structural concepts.”20 What is normally designated as “formal ele-
ments” actually represent the logical side of statements, although Bernays re-
peatedly affirms that the logical terms and principles partially relate to certain
very general characteristics of reality [“gewisse sehr allgemeine
Chracteristica der Wirklichkeit”]. It implies that both the logic of our every-
17 “In order not to accept a regressus in infinitum a critical analysis of knowledge has to stop at
specific original functions which are not in need of genuine derivation and which are also not
capable of it” [“Denn die kritische Analyse der Erkenntnis wird, wenn man nicht einen
regressus in infinitum annehmen will, immer bei gewissen Urfunktionen Halt machen
müssen, die einer eigentlichen ‘Ableitung’ weder fähig noch bedurftig sind”] (Cassirer,
1957:73).
18 “In der Tat ist nicht einzusehen, warum man lediglich logische Identität und Verschiedenheit,
die als notwendige Momente in den Mengenbegriff eingehen, als solche Urfunktionen gelten
lassen und nicht auch die numerische Einheit und den numersichen Unterschied von Anfang
an in diesen Kreis aufnehmen will. Eine wirklich befriedigende Herleitung des einen aus dem
anderen ist auch der mengentheoretischen Auffassung nicht gelungen, und der Verdacht
eines versteckten erkenntnistheoretischen Zirkels blieb gegenüber allen Versuchen, die in
dieser Richtung gemacht werden, immer bestehen” (Cassirer, 1957:73-74).
19 “In hinsicht auf das Formale stellt aber, wie wir fanden, die mathematische Betrachtung
gegenüber der begrifflich logischen den Standpunkt der höheren Abstraktion dar” (Bernays,
1976:27).
20 “Dort kam es darauf an, zu erkennen, daß in die deduktive Logik bereits anschauliche
Evidenz eingeht, und daß die logischen Anzahl-Definitionen nicht etwa die Anzahlbegriffe
als solche von spezifisch logischer Natur (als reine Reflexionsbegriffe) erwiesen, sondern
vielmehr nur logische Normierungen elementarer Strukturbegriffe sind” (Bernays, 1976:46).
48
Chapter 4
day language and symbolic logic contain at once, adjacent to each other, ele-
ments that are formally and object-wise [“gegenständlich”] motivated.21
The possibility to subsume arithmetical and in particular numerical propo-
sitions in logical terms may appear to justify the traditional view that logic
represents the more general perspective. However, Bernays does not hesitate
to affirm that notwithstanding this possibility arithmetic is still the more gen-
eral (“purer”) schema, showing upon closer investigation that it is unjustified
to see logical universality as the highest universality.22
What is therefore at stake in this regard, is the acknowledgement that con-
cept formation and definition ultimately rests upon the acceptance and em-
ployment of primitive terms. In order to avoid a regressus in infinitum, this
state of affairs ought to be respected. Cassirer has a clear understanding of this
when he writes:
In order not to accept a regressus in infinitum a critical analysis of knowledge
has to stop at specific original functions which are not in need of genuine deri-
vation and which are also not capable of it (Cassirer, 1957:73).
4.2.5 Ontic conditions
Not only do we have to distinguish between number and space (discretenes
and continuity) but also between these two and the logical-analytical aspect.
Moreover, the key terms involved in rational conceptual understanding are
themselves not open to (rational) conceptual definition, for they are, as
Cassirer puts it, Urfunktionen (original functions)!23 These ontic conditions
not only make possible our concept of numbers but also explains why Bernays
rejects the idea that an axiomatic system in its entirety is an arbitrary construc-
tion: “One cannot justifiably object to this axiomatic procedure with the accu-
sation that it is arbitrary since in the case of the foundations of systematic
arithmetic we are not concerned with an axiom system configured at will for
the need of it, but with a systematic extrapolation of elementary number the-
21 “In der Logik, und zwar sowohl in derjenigen der Umgangsprache wie in der symbolischen
Logic, haben wir nebeneinander formal und gegenständlich motivierte Elemente. Eine
gegenständliche Motivierung liegt insofern vor, als die logischen Termini und Prinzipien zu
einem Teil Bezug haben auf gewisse sehr allgemeine Characteristika der Wirklichkeit”
(Bernays, 1976:80).
22 “Ungeachtet also der Möglichkeit der Einordnung der Arithmetik in die Logistik stellt die
Arithmetik das abstraktere (‘reinere’) Schema dar, und dieses erscheint als paradox nur auf
Grund einer traditionellen, aber bei nähereem Zusehen nicht gerechtfertigten Ansicht, wo-
nach die Allgemeinheit des Logischen in jeder Hinsicht die höchste Allgemeinheit bildet”
(Bernays, 1976:135).
23 Mühlenberg points out that already for Aristotle thinking presupposed knowledge that was
not mediated by any proof (Mühlenberg, 1966:73).
49
ory conforming to the nature of the matter (naturgemäß).”24 The “nature of the
matter” contains an implicit reference to the ontic status of the “multiplic-
ity-aspect” of reality and it presupposes an awareness of the difference be-
tween the various (modal, functional) aspects of reality and the concrete di-
mension of entities and events functioning within these aspects. Sometimes
the distinction between aspects and entities is captured by referring to the dif-
ference between modal laws and type laws (modality and typicality). Natural
and social entities function in a “typical” way within every modal aspect. The
word “typical” actually refers to the typonomic specification of entitary func-
tions (typos = type and nomos = law). Therefore typical functions can also be
designated as typonomic functions. Whereas modal laws are normally dis-
cerned through modal abstraction, the discovery and analysis of type laws are
dependent (at least in physics) upon experimentation.
According to Bernays there are two kinds of factuality: (i) modal subjects
(such as numbers and spatial figures that are factually subjected to their
correspondig numerical and spatial laws); and (ii) typical subjects (factual en-
tities, such as atoms and molecules, material things, plants, animals and hu-
mans). Bernays touches upon these differences when he refers to the intuitive,
the theoretical and the experimental.25 In his discussion of Wittgenstein it is
noteworthy that Bernays rejects the view of those who merely acknowledge
one kind of factuality, that which is concrete: “It appears that only a pre-con-
ceived philosophical view determines this requirement, that view namely, ac-
cording to which there can solely exist one kind of factuality, that of concrete
reality.”26
Bernays also appreciates the similarities and differences between different

kinds of space, owing to the fact that it became necessary to distinguish be-
tween physical space and mathematical space determined by geometrical
laws: “It was only through the recent development of geometry and physics
that it appears to be necessary to distinguish between space as something
physical and space as an ideal multiplicity determined by geometrical laws”
(Bernays, 1976:37).27
24 “Gegen diese axiomatische Vorgehen besteht auch nicht etwa der Vorwurf der Willkür-
lichkeit zu Recht, denn wir haben es bei den Grundlagen der systematische Arithmetik nicht
mit einem beliebigen, nach Bedarf zusammengestellten Axiomensystem zu tun, sondern mit
einer naturgemäßen systematischen Exstrapolation der Elementare Zahlenlehre” (Bernays,
1976:45).
25 “dem intuitive, dem theoretischen und dem experimentellen” (Bernays, 1976:108).
26 “Es scheint, daß nur eine vorgefaste philosophische Ansicht dieses Erfordenis bestimmt, die
Ansicht nämlich, daß es nur eine Art von Tatsächlichkeit geben könne, diejenige der
konkreten Wirklichkeit” (Bernays, 1976:122).
27 He does not hesitate to speak of the “permanence of laws” (Bernays, 1976:75).
50
Chapter 4
4.2.6 Analogical interconnections

Having proposed a clear distinction between discreteness and continuity one
may contemplate the question: are there for Bernays elements of coherence
between these two domains?
First of all it must be mentioned that Bernays repeatedly emphasizes that
the idea of the continuum originally is a geometrical idea. The immediate im-
plication is that for him the reduction of continuity to what is discrete is only
successful in an approximative sense.28 For this reason he declares that a com-
plete arithmetization of the idea of the continuum cannot be justified because
this idea in the first place (ursprünglich) is a geometrical idea.29 The word
ursprünglich reflects the original meaning of continuity, suggesting that in
different or other contexts one can merely encounter a non-original, that is to
say, an analogical employment of the idea of continuity. Bernays indeed does
not hesitate to pursue this path, for he holds that in the mathematical discipline
of analysis the idea of the continuum is expressed in an arithmetical language:
“The idea of the continuum is a geometrical idea, which in analysis is ex-
pressed in an arithmetical language.”30
The way in which the arithmetical perspective analogically reflects the
original meaning of continuity is by acknowledging that the completeness [to-
tality character] it evinces (“jenen Character der Geschlossenheit”) stands in
the way of a complete arithmetization of the continuum: “It derives from the
fact that the intuitionistic representation does not display that characteristic
completeness which undoubtedly belongs to the geometrical representation of
the continuum. And it is this feature which obstructs a perfect arithmetization
of the continuum” (Bernays, 1976:74).31
4.2.7 Potential infinity and actual infinity
Since Aristotle philosophy and mathematics employed these two phrases (the
potential infinite and the actual infinite) to distinguish between two kinds of
infinity. Apart from the rich history attached to them we are currently merely
interested in the fact that as soon as the difference between them is at stake the
notion of a totality surfaces. Even Hilbert himself speaks of the “totality of the
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, ...” when he explains the nature of the actual infinite.
28 “Tatsächlich gelingt auch die Reduktion des Stetigen auf das Diskrete nur in einem ange-
näherten Sinn” (Bernays, 1976:82).
29 “Jedoch, es ist sehr zweifelhaft, ob eine restlose Arithmetisierung der Idee des Kontinuums
voll gerecht werden kann. Die Idee des Kontinuums ist, jedenfalls ursprünglich, eine geome-
trische Idee” (Bernays, 1976:188).
30 “Die Idee des Kontiuums ist eine geometrische Idee, welche durch die Analysis in arith-
metischer Sprache ausgedrückt wird” (Bernays, 1976:74).
31 “Das rührt davon her, daß die intuitionistische Vorstellung nicht jenen Charakter der Ge-
schlossenheit besizt, der zweifellos zur geometrischen Vorstellung des Kontinuums gehört.
Und es ist auch dieser Charakter, der einer vollkommenen Arithmetisierung entgegensteht.”
51
Lorenzen, who studied with Hilbert as a school boy, eventually opted for a
constructive mathematics in which the actual infinite is questioned. Yet, ow-
ing to his thorough understanding of the dominating role of infinity in modern
mathematics he acknowledges that an account of the real numbers which em-
ploys the actual infinite reveals its ties with space and geometry:
The overwhelming appearance of the actual infinite in modern mathematics is
therefore only understandable if one includes geometry in one's treatment. ...
The actual infinite contained in the modern concept of real numbers still re-
veals its descent (Herkunft) from geometry (Lorenzen, 1968:97).
From the previosly mentioned remarks of Bernays it is particularly the totality
character of continuity that caused him to point out that the idea of the contin-
uum originally is a geometrical idea. Reflecting on the same assumption
Lorenzen focuses on another feature of spatial continuity, namely that it is de-
termined by an order of simultaneity (at once). This is seen when he explains
how one can account for real numbers in terms of the actual infinite:
One imagines much rather the real numbers as all at once actually present –
even every real number is thus represented as an infinite decimal fraction, as if
the infinitely many figures (Ziffern) existed all at once (alle auf einmal
existierten) (1972:163).32
The mode of speech employed by Lorenzen, similar to that of Bernays, makes
it plain that arithmetic by itself does not provide any motive for the introduc-
tion of the actual infinite, as correctly pointed out by Lorenzen (Lorenzen,
1972:159). From a different corner Körner also holds the view that the basic
difference between arithmetic and analysis in its classical form is that the lat-
ter defines real numbers with the aid of actual infinite totalities.33 (“aktual
unendlicher Gesamtheiten” – Körner, 1972:134).
Sometimes Bernays uses an alternative mode of speech. Infinite multiplici-
ties (Unendliche Mannigfaltigkeiten) provides access to our thinking only
(Bernays, 1976:39). The postulates of analysis cannot be verified in intuition
and the same applies to “infinite totalities” which can solely by grasped by the
formation of ideas (Ideenbildung) (Bernays, 1976:44).
4.3 Points of connection with the thought of Dooyeweerd and Gödel
Dooyeweerd is primarily known for his theory of modal aspects, although it
must be remembered that this theory is constitutive for his theory of “individ-
uality structures,” aimed at accounting for the structural laws or principles
32 Bernays reiterates a long-standing practice, dating back to Plotinus, Augustine, and Maimon,
when he refers to the thought of divine omniscience which should be attributed with the ca-
pacity to overlook an infinite totality in one purview (analogous to Lorenzen's “alle auf
einmal”): “Wenn wir schon den Gedanken einer göttlichen Allwissenheit konzipieren, so
würden wir dieser doch zuschreiben, das sie eine Gesamtheit, deren jedes einzelne Element
uns grundsätzlich zugänglich ist, in einem Blick überschaut” (Bernays, 1976:131).
33 “Dieser grundlegende Unterschied zwischen elementarer Arithmetik und Analysis in ihrer
klassischen Form beruht auf der Tatsache, daß der zentrale Begriff der Analysis, der einer
reellen Zahl, mit Hilfe aktual unendlicher Gesamtheiten definiert wird” (Körner, 1972:134).
52
Chapter 4
holding for multi-aspectual (natural and social) entities. The important as-
sumption of the theory of modal aspects is that they are not mere modes of
thought for he holds that they are ontic a priori's, truly existing in a transcen-
dental sense, that is, in the sense of partially making possible whatever func-
tions within them (natural and social entities and concrete processes).
Dooyeweerd therefore, just like Bernays, also distinguishes between “two
kinds of factuality.” Modal or typical facts are always correlated with modal
laws and typical laws. Within the modal aspects the mature conception of
Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the law-side and the factual side of each
aspect and on the factual side he distinguishes between subject-subject
relations and subject-object relations.
For example, the biotic time-order (law-side) reveals itself on the factual
side in the actual life-span of individual plants, animals and human beings,
which invariably follow the succession of birth, growth, maturation, ageing
and dying. The factual duration may be one year or even close to five thou-
sand years (the Promotheus is estimated to be 4844 years old).
Gödel, in his own way, struggled with the ontic status of numerical rela-
tionships, referred to by him as “objective reality.” His argument in support
of the acknowledgement of “objective aspects of reality” proceeds from the
idea of “semiperceptions.” Distinct from physical data Gödel argues that
“mathematical objects” can be accessed through this second kind of percep-
tions, namely “semiperceptions.” Obviously data of this second kind “can-
not be associated with actions of certain things upon our sense organs”
(quoted by Wang, 1988:304). In terms of the idea of ontic aspects these
“semiperceptions” indeed relate to the functional aspects of reality. Gödel
says:
It by no means follows, however, [that they] are something purely subjective
as Kant says. Rather they, too, may represent “an aspect of objective reality”
(my emphasis – DS), but, as opposed to the sensations, their presence in us
may be due to another kind of relationship between ourselves and reality
(quoted by Wang, 1988:304).
Although Wang is inclined to agree with Gödel he does “not know how to
elaborate his assertions” (Wang, 1988:304). The way in which Wang ex-
presses himself is simply a sign of lacking the distinction between the di-
mensions of (natural and social) entities and modal aspects. In terms of this
distinction one can simply say that the various aspects (including the numer-
ical) belong to “objective” reality and therefore display an ontic status. Yet
they do not concern the concrete “whatness” of the dimension of entities, for
they embody the “howness” of the functional modes of reality. The aspects
as functional modes of being are just as “real” as the many concretely exist-
ing entities “out there.”
Dooyeweerd, Gödel and Wang indeed advance the idea that “reality” also
embraces the “ontic” “aspects of reality,” designated by Gödel and Wang as
“objective.” According to Gödel these aspects are not like “concrete enti-
ties” occupying “a location in spacetime.” We must note that the previosly
53
mentioned philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, effectively captured the legacy of

Western philosophical thinking in the title of a significant book, Function
Concept and Substance Concept, directed at the distinction between func-
tion and entity (“substance”). The first edition of this book appeared in
1910, and it covers both the Greek-Medieval and the modern (post-Renais-
sance) eras. The former was pre-occupied with concrete entities – while the
latter increasingly started to appreciate functional relations within reality.
Whereas traditional Greek and medieval philosophy tend to be substan-
tialitstic, modern philosophy by and large opted for a functionalistic stance.
Dooyeweerd wanted to avoid both these extremes. According to him the
possibility to identify different aspects is guaranteed by their respective
meaning-nuclei. The meaning-nucleus of an aspect secures its uniqueness,
its irreducibility and this core meaning is indefinable (“primitive”). Owing
to the relativity of lingual meanings the constant challenge to philosophy
and the special sciences is to ensure that the lingual terms employed to des-
ignate their core meanings are appropriate. What is remarkable in this con-
nection is that Dooyeweerd‘s designation of the core meaning of the aspects
of number and space is coinciding with the previously mentioned proposal
of Bernays: discreteness and continuity!
In addition both Dooyeweerd and Bernays held the view that number is
more basic than space. Dooyeweerd would prefer to say that the numerical
aspect is foundational to the spatial aspect. This entails his idea of the inter-
connectedness between the various aspects, exemplified in backward- and
forward-pointing analogies between them. The former are also known as
retrocipations and the latter as anticipations. Since the numerical aspect is
not preceeded by any aspect, it does not have any retrocipatory analogies.
The spatial aspect, however, since it is founded in the numerical mode, does
have retrocipatory analogies to number. On the law side of space Dooye-
weerd discerns dimensionality as a numerical analogy (1, 2, 3 or more di-
mensions) and on the factual side magnitude is identified as an arithmetical
analogy within the aspect of space (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:85 ff.).
Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects and the analogical moments which
reflect their unbreakable coherence represents a particular answer to one of
the previosly mentioned classical problems of philosophy, namely how to ac-
count for uniqueness and coherence (the coherence of irreducibles). The spe-
cific answer given by Dooyeweerd to this problem introduced new descrip-
tive terms: the uniqueness of a modal aspect is captured with reference to their
sphere sovereignty and their mutual coherence (through retrocipations and
anticipations) is designated as their sphere universality. What guarantees the
sphere sovereignty of an aspect is its indefinable, primitive meaning-nucleus.
The acknowledgement of “primitive terms” highlights the first element of
the just mentioned problem regarding the coherence of irreducibles. What
Gödel had to say in this regard approximates closely what Dooyeweerd said.
Yourgrau explains that Gödel “insisted that to know the primitive concepts,
54
Chapter 4
one must not only understand their relationships to the other primitives but
must grasp them on their own, by a kind of ‘intuition’ ” (Yourgrau, 2005:169).
Dooyeweerd also makes an appeal to an immediate, intuitive insight into the
core meaning of an aspect which cannot be captured in a conceptual definition
(see Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:475). When Gödel continues on the next page by
stating that “the fundamental concepts are primitive and their meaning is not
exhausted by their relationships to other concepts,” this formulation is as
close one can get to the (modal) principles of sphere sovereignty and sphere
universality!
However, Gödel's acknowledgement of what cannot be defined also en-
compasses the basic notion of a set:
The operation ‘set of x's’ (where the variable ‘x’ ranges over some given kind
of objects) cannot be defined satisfactorily (at least not in the present state of
knowledge), but can only be paraphrased by other expressions involving again
the concept of set, such as: ‘multitude of x's’, ‘combination of any number of
x's’, ‘part of the totality of x's’, where a ‘multitude’ (‘combination’, ‘part’) is
conceived as something that exists in itself, no matter whether we can define it
in a finite number of words (so that random sets are not excluded) (Gödel,
1964:262).
Yet Gödel did not develop a theory of modal aspects as such, which explains
why he did not “position” primitives in the sense of indefinable meaning-nu-
clei within modal aspects in their qualifying role in respect of all the analogi-
cal structural elements found within any one of them. It is not the primitives
themselves (the meaning-nuclei) that point backward and forward (retro-
cipate and anticipate), but the various aspects.
The astonishing impact which Gödel's 1931 publication had on our under-
standing of mathematics and logic may acquire a deepened perspective when
it is seen in relation to the emphasis Dooyeweerd from very early on laid upon
the self-insufficiency of human thought. The mere idea that the irreducible
core meaning of an aspect is indefinable (primitive) and can solely be ap-
proximated by means of immediate, intuitive insight, underscores the limits
of conceptual rationality. Ultimately rational analysis and concept-forma-
tion is therefore dependent upon terms exceeding a rational conceptual
grasp. This outcome is similar to the previosly mentioned outcome of
Gödel's result that any consistency proof of an axiomatic system necessarily
transcends the formalism of the system.
Grünfeld explains Gödel's achievement as follows:
Gödel proved that if any formal theory T that is adequate to include the theory
of whole numbers is consistent, then T is incomplete. This means that there is a
meaningful statement of number theory S, such that neither S nor not-S is
provable within the theory. Now either S or not-S is true; there is then a true
statement of number theory which is not provable and so not decidable. The
price of consistency is incompleteness (Grünfeld, 1983:45).
Recollecting the optimistic closing lines of Hilbert's 1930 speech at the occa-
sion of receiving honorary citizenship of Königsberg, namely “Wir müssen
55
wissen, Wir werden wissen,” may help us to realize what a big blow Gödel's
finding was for this expectation, that is, for the hope of proving the consis-
tency of mathematics. Surely Hilbert's own brilliant student, Hermann Weyl
(1885-1955), who left his (axiomatic-)formalist orientation in favour of
Brouwer's intuitionism, has had a thorough understanding of the predicament
in which Hilbert found himself. Weyl comments strikingly in this regard: “It
must have been hard on Hilbert, the axiomatist, to acknowledge that the in-
sight of consistency is rather to be attained by intuitive reasoning which is
based on evidence and not on axioms” (Weyl, 1970:269).
4.4 The actual infinite
The larger part of the history of philosophy and mathematics accepted only
the potential infinite and advanced a negative assessment of the actual infi-
nite. Since and after Gregory of Nyssa (335-394+) actual infinity was ascribed
to God, opposed to the finiteness of the world. Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)
altered this restriction by introducing the idea that whereas the world is poten-
tially infinite, God is actually infinite. Spinoza (1632-1677) completed the
circle later on in seeing both the world and God as actually infinite, a view re-
vived in the thought of Cantor.
The latter is renowned for his employment of the actual infinite in mathe-
matics, thus transcending the objection of Gauss (1777-1855), who said in a
letter to Schumacher in 1831 that within mathematics it is never allowed to see
the infinite as something completed, and Kronecker (1823-1891), who aimed
at restricting mathematics to the potential infinite. However, at this point the
views of Dooyeweerd and Bernays part ways. Dooyeweerd appears to follow
the intuitionism of Brouwer (1881-1966) and Herman Weyl,34 while Bernays
advanced an “as if” approach towards the actual infinite.
In spite of his mentioned well-articulated account of the sphere sovereignty
of the aspects of number and space, guaranteed by their respective mean-
ing-nuclei, discreteness and continuity, Dooyeweerd accepted infinity only as
something unfinished. According to him the infinite is merely a law determin-
ing an endless succession. It is on the basis of this restricted criterion that he
criticizes the transfinite arithmetic of Cantor as well as the so-called anti-
nomies of the actual infinite (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:87).35 The intuitionistic
mathematics of Brouwer and Weyl surely did influence Dooyeweerd in his re-
jection of the actual infinite in mathematics, as it is manifest in his view that an
infinite succession of numbers is determined “by the law of arithmetical pro-
gression” making it possible “to determine the discrete arithmetical time of
any possible finite numerical relation in the series” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:
92). The same assumption underlies his following remark: “Numbers and spa-
tial figures are subject to their proper laws, and they may not be identified with
or reduced to the latter. This distinction is the subject of the famous problem
34 One of the distinctive features of intuitionism is that it solely accepts the potential infinite.
35 In passing we may note that another legal scholar, Felix Kaufmann, dedicated a whole work
in support of his rejection of the actual infinite within mathematics – see Kaufmann, 1930.
56
Chapter 4
concerning the socalled ‘actual infinity’ in pure mathematics. The principle of

progression is a mathematical law which holds good for an infinite series of
numbers or spatial figures. But the infinite itself cannot be made into an actual
number” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:98-99, note 1). Dooyeweerd's dependence is
explicit when, with reference to the “speculative-constructive basis” of Can-
tor's theory of transfinite numbers, he refers to Weyl (1931) (1997-II:340,
note 1).36
Being the co-worker of the leading mathematician of the 20th century, Da-
vid Hilbert, it is understandable that Bernays supported the employment of the
actual infinite within mathematics. Hilbert after all said: “No one shall drive
us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us” (Hilbert 1925:170).37
Yet the justification which Bernays gave for the use of actual infinity repre-
sents a unique position, as mentioned, an “as if” approach which is indeed
worth considering.
Vaihinger initially developed a whole philosophy of the “as if” (Die Philo-
sophie des Als Ob), in which he attempts to demonstrate that various academic
disciplines may positively use certain fictions which in themselves are intrin-
sically antinomic. As examples of “fruitful” fictions he mentions the infinitely
large and the infinitely small (cf. Vaihinger, 1922:87 ff., 530). Ludwig
Fischer presents a more elaborate mathematical explanation of this notion of a
fiction. In general he argues: “The definition of an irrational number by means
of a formation rule always involves an ‘endless’, i.e. unfinished process. Sup-
posing that the number is thus given, then one has to think of it as the comple-
tion (Vollendung) of this unfinished process. Only in this ... the internally
antinomic (in sich widerspruchsvolle) and fictitious character of those num-
bers are already founded” (Fischer, 1933:113-114). In the absence of an anal-
ysis of the modal meaning and interconnections between the aspects of num-
ber and space this conclusion seems to be self-evident. Vaihinger and Fischer
in particular merely used the number concept of potential infinity as a
yardstick to judge the (onto-)logical status of the actual infinite.
As soon as the mutual relationships between the aspects of number and
space are contemplated from the perspective of the numerical aspect, new
possibilities emerge. What should first of all be kept in mind, is that the spatial
order of simultaneity determines the original meaning of the whole-parts rela-
tion. The practice to speak of integers, that is of whole numbers, clearly imi-
tates the “wholeness” part of the whole-parts relation. When the direction is
reverted and turned from wholeness towards the parts of the whole-parts rela-
tion, we encounter the infinite divisibility of a (continuous) whole and this
move underlies the equally meaningful practice to speak of fractions (“bro-
ken” numbers; the rational numbers). Only the natural numbers appear to be
36 Dooyeweerd did not know about the development of “lawless sequences” in intuitionism, es-
pecially after Brouwer's article of 1952 – see Troelstra and van Dalen 1988 and Kreisel 1968.
37 “Aus dem Paradies, das Cantor uns geschaffen, soll Niemand uns vertreiben können.”
57
envisaged without imitating some or another spatial feature. But what is the
case with the potential and the actual infinite?
The most basic difference between these two kinds of infinity is that they
rely upon what Dooyeweerd identified as distinct modal time orders, namely
the numerical time order of succession and the spatial time order of at once.
The lack of an intuitive understanding of the traditional phrases potential in-
finity and actual infinity is immediately rectified when the numerical and spa-
tial time orders are involved. The obvious expressions then are: the successive
infinite and the simultaneous infinite. In German this distinction is captured
by the phrases “das sukzessiv Unendliche” and “das simultan Unendliche,”
while their Latin equivalents read infinitum successivum and infinitum
simultaneum (see Maier, 1964:77-79). A succinct rendering of the simulta-
neous infinite is: the at once infinite.
The key element in this designation is given in the appeal to the spatial time
order for this reference indicates that in the at once infinite the meaning of the
numerical aspect is deepened through this anticipation to space. Pointing to-
wards the spatial time order does not belong to the constitutive meaning of the
arithmetical aspect. Only when its meaning is regulatively opened up towards
space do we encounter the regulative hypothesis of the at once infinite.38
Whereas the number concept of successive infinity is constitutive, the num-
ber idea of the at once infinite is regulative. As regulative hypothesis this
deepened structural element within the numerical aspect enables mathemati-
cal thought to observe any successively infinite sequence of numbers as if it is
given at once, as an infinite whole or totality.
This regulative hypothesis prompted both Lorenzen and Bernays to allude
to the idea of a fiction. According to Paul Lorenzen the meaning of actual in-
finity as attached to the “all” shows the employment of a fiction – “the fiction,
as if (my emphasis – DFMS) infinitely many numbers are given” (Lorenzen,
1952:593). However, Paul Bernays did see the essentially hypothetical char-
acter of the opened up meaning of number, clearly revealed in his statement:
The position at which we have arrived in connection with the theory of the in-
finite may be seen as a kind of the philosophy of the ‘as if’. Nevertheless, it
distinguishes itself from the thus named philosophy of Vaihinger fundamen-
tally by emphasizing the consistency and trustworthiness of this formation of
ideas, where Vaihinger considered the demand for consistency as a prejudice
... (Bernays, 1976:60).
Paul Lorenzen describes the modern conception of real numbers in terms of
the at once infinite in a way which strikingly reflects the spatial time order of
at once: “and thus every real number as such is represented as an infinite deci-
38 The term constitutive is used to refer to the basic elements built into the structure of the jural
aspect, in other words it refers to the “building blocks” of this aspect. The term regulative, by
contrast, presupposes the constitutive structural elements but point the meaning of an aspect
beyond them towards those aspects which appear later in the cosmic order of aspects.
58
Chapter 4
mal fraction as if the infinite number of digits all existed at once (auf einmal
existierten).”39
If succession and simultaneity are irreducible, reflecting the irreducibility
of the aspects of number and space, then the idea of an infinite totality cannot
simply be seen as the completion of an infinite succession. Therefore, when
Dummett refers to the classical treatment of infinite structures “as if they
could be completed and then surveyed in their totality” he mistakenly equates
this “infinite totality” with “the entire output of an infinite process” (Dum-
mett, 1978:56). The idea of an infinite totality once and for all transcends the
concept of the successive infinite.
The fact that Cantor explicitly describes the actual infinite as a constant
quantity, firm and determined in all its parts (Cantor, 1962:401) underscores
the implicit appeal to the meaning of space in the idea of a set. Throughout the
history of Western philosophy and mathematics, all supporters of the idea of
actual infinity (the at once infinite) implicitly or explicitly employed some
form of the spatial order of simultaneity. What should have been used as an
anticipatory regulative hypothesis (the idea of actual infinity), was often
(since Augustine) reserved for God or an eternal being, accredited with the
ability to oversee any infinite multiplicity all at once, also found in the thought
of Bernays (as noted above).
Although modern (axiomatic) set theory (Cantor, Zermelo, Fraenkel,
Hilbert, Ackermann, Von Neumann) largely pretends to be purely atomistic
the structure of set theory actually implicitly (in the undefined term “set”)
“borrows” the whole-parts relation from space. This explains why Hao Wang
informs us that Gödel speaks of sets as being “quasi-spatial” – and then adds
the remark that he is not sure whether Gödel would have said the “same thing
of numbers” (Wang, 1988:202)!
Without entering into an analysis of the intellectual journey of Edmund
Husserl (1859-1938) 40 it will suffice to recall that he truly wrestled with what
he experienced as the crisis of Europe and the disciplines. Close to the end of
his life Gödel spent much time in studying the works of Husserl (see
Yourgrau, 2005:170, 182). The fact that we have seen that Gödel advanced
ideas concerning primitive terms and coherence which closely approximate
the principles of sphere sovereignty and sphere universality may be linked to
the fact that Dooyeweerd acknowledged that during his early development he
was strongly influenced by Husserl (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:v).
Interestingly the so-called set theoretical antinomies made Gödel cautious
for the idea of the totality character of sets, at least in the case of infinite “all”
claims. He remarks that the “naively” employed concept of a set “has not led
39 “Man stellt sich vielmehr die reellen Zahlen als alle auf einmal wirklich vorhanden vor – es
wird sogar jede reelle Zahl als unendlicher Dezimalbruch selbst schon so vorgestellt, als ob
die unendlich vielen Ziffern alle auf einmal existierten” [“Much rather one imagines that all
real numbers are really present – and even every real number is represented as an infinite dec-
imal fraction as if the infinitely many digits all existed at once”] (Lorenzen, 1972:163).
40 The dialectical development in the thought of Husserl is analyzed in Strauss, 2009:625-631).
59
to paradoxes”: “This concept of set, according to which a set is anything ob-

tainable from integers (or some other well-defined objects) by iterated appli-
cation of the operation of ‘set of ’, and not something obtained by dividing the
totality of all existing things into two categories, has never led to any anti-
nomy whatsoever” (quoted by Yourgrau, 2005:137). From this quotation it is
clear that Gödel and Yourgrau do not realize that the idea of a set inherently
contains an appeal to the whole-parts relation originally given within the spa-
tial aspect.
Once the forward-pointing (anticipatory) hypothesis (referring number to
space) is recognized as a disclosed or deepened approach, it is clear that any
successively infinite sequence of numbers may be viewed as if they are all
given at once, as an infinite whole or an infinite totality. This regulative hy-
pothesis is not purely theoretical, in the sense of solely being an intellectual
construct, for ultimately it explores and opens up ontic features of reality. In
respect of the logical itself Russell equally maintains an ontic appeal: “Logic,
I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology; for logic is
concerned with the real world (my emphasis – DS) just as truly as zoology,
though with its more abstract and general features” (Russell, 1919: 169).
Gödel quotes the second half of this statement with approval – see Wang
(1988:313).
Yet we saw that Gödel sensed that the notion of a set echoes something of
the meaning of space, for he said that sets are “quasi-spatial.” In terms of
Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects one might say that the mathematical
theory of sets, proceeding from Cantor's idea of a set as a multiplicity of truly
distinct elements united into a whole (zu einem Ganzen – Cantor, 1962:282),
must be seen as a spatially deepened mathematical theory. In other words, set
theory is based upon a spatial anticipation within the modal structure of the
numerical aspect. This statement is equivalent to what we mentioned in quot-
ing that Bernays stated that the idea of the continuum is a geometrical idea
which is expressed in the language of arithmetic by analysis (Bernays,
1976:74). One is therefore equally justified in viewing mathematical analysis
as a spatially disclosed mathematical theory. What do these considerations
imply for the claims of arithmeticism?
4.5 The intrinsic shortcomings of Arithmeticism
In our discussion thus far the problem of arithmeticism frequently surfaced.
Both Bernays and Dooyeweerd objected to its claims. Yet the striking point is
that Dooyeweerd rejected the at once infinite while Bernays defended it with-
out attaching to it the arithmeticistic consequences of Cantor and those who
followed the latter in his pursuit of what he considered to be a purely arithmet-
ical concept, that of a continuum of points (Cantor, 1962:192). Bernays real-
ized that Brouwer and his intuitionistic school advanced an alternative under-
standing of “the continuum,” one in which the viewpoint of a strict arithmeti-
zation made way for an over-accentuation of the geometrical perspective
(Bernays, 1976:173).
60
Chapter 4
Bernays remarked that the weakest Platonist assumption within arithmetic

is that of the totality of the integers [whole numbers – “ist die von der
Gesamtheit der ganzen Zahlen”] (Bernays, 1976:63). Nonetheless we noted
that it is precisely this totality character of continuity that withstand every
arithmeticistic attempt to reduce continuity completely to discreteness – he re-
peatedly emphatically stated that the idea of the continuum originally is a
geometrical idea.
Perhaps his most radical questioning of arithmeticism within mathematics
is found in his statement: “The arithmetizing monism within mathematics is
an arbitrary thesis. That the field of investigation of mathematics solely de-
rives from representations of number is not at all shown” (Bernays,
1976:188). His subsequent remarks on this page reveals his own account of
what Dooyeweerd has called the sphere sovereignty and irreducibility of the
various modal aspects of reality: “Much rather it is presumably the case that
concepts such as those of a continuous curve and a surface, which are dis-
closed particularly in topology, cannot be reduced to representations of num-
ber.”41 In connection with the whole-parts relation Hermann Weyl points out
that having broken the continuum apart in isolated points, contemporary anal-
ysis had to take refuge in the concept of an environment: “By contrast it be-
longs to the essence of the continuum that every part of it allows an unlimited
continued division; ... To reflect the continuous coherence of points contem-
porary analysis, since it broke the continuum apart in a set of isolated points,
took refuge in the environment concept.”42
At this point something apparently strange surfaces. When one compares
the criteria stipulated by Aristotle for continuity, it turns out that Can-
tor-Dedekind description of continuity still adhere to them. Yet Aristotle con-
siders it impossible to explain the continuity of a straight line in terms of the
(infinite) number of its points. If “that which is infinite is constituted by
points, these points must be either continuous or in contact with one another”
(Physica, 231a29-31; Aristotle, 2001:316). Points are however indivisible (a
point has no parts), while “that which is intermediate between two points is al-
ways a line” (Physica, 231b8; Aristotle, 2001:316). According to Aristotle it
is clear that “everything continuous is divisible into divisibles that are infi-
nitely divisible: for if it were divisible into indivisibles, we should have an in-
divisible in contact with an indivisble, since the extremities of things that are
41 “Der arithmetisierende Monismus in der Mathematik ist eine willkürliche These. Daß die
mathematische Gegenständlichkeit lediglich aus der Zahlenvorstellung erwächst, ist
keineswegs erwiesen. Vielmehr lassen sich vermutlich Begriffe wie diejenigen der stetigen
Kurve und der Fläche, die ja insbesondere in der Topologie zur Entfaltung kommen, nicht auf
die Zahlenvorstellungen zurückführen” (Bernays, 1976:188).
42 “Hingegen gehört es zum Wesen des Kontinums, daß jedes seiner Teile sich unbegrenzt
weiter teilen läßt; ... Um die stetigen Zusammenhang der Punkte wiederzugeben, nahm die
bisherigen Analysis, da sie ja das Kontinuum in eine Menge isolierter Punkt zerschlagen
hatte, ihre zuflucht zu dem Umgebungsbegriff” (Weyl, 1921:77).
61
continuous with one another are one [i.e. the same – DFMS] and are in
contact” (Physica, 231b15ff.; Aristotle, 2001:317).
The new arithmeticistic tendency which emerged at the beginning of the
19th century aimed at an arithmetical definition of spatial continuity. Bernard
Bolzano already illuminates this tendency in § 38 of his work on the para-
doxes of the infinite (postumously published in 1851). He mentions the objec-
tion that there is an apparent hidden circle in the attempt to build extension out
of parts which themselves are not extended. Yet he holds that the problem dis-
appears when it is realized that “each whole” “has numerous properties absent
in the parts” (Bolzano, 1920:72). According Dedekind's notion of a cut the
point representing the “split” is greater than or equal to every element in the
one set and smaller than or equal to all the elements of the other set (cf. e.g.
Bartle, 1964:51).
Cantor himself refers to the relation which exists between his view of a per-
fect set and Dedekind's cut theorem (Cantor, 1962:194). Böhme realized that
Cantor's definition of the continuum contains two stipulations which both
meet the Aristotelian definition of a continuum, namely coherence and a char-
acteristic which ensures the existence of dividing points for infinite division
(Böhme, 1966:309). When only a Dedekind-cut is allowed at divisions,
Böhme justifies his statement as follows:
[W]hen a Cantorian continuum as such is divided in two by means of the indi-
cation of a point so that the one set contains those points which are in numeri-
cal value greater than or equal to the indicated point, while the other set con-
tains those points of which the numerical values are smaller than or equal to
the numerical value of the indicated point, both parts are again continuous.
Such divisions are possible into infinity (due to the perfection of the contin-
uum), and the parts are still coherent in the Aristotelian sense (i.e. their
limit-points are the same) (Böhme, 1966:309).
This is a remarkable situation: the Cantor-Dedekind description of the contin-

uum presupposes the use of the completed infinite (in particular by using the
at once infinite set of real numbers), but nonetheless meets Aristotle's two re-
quirements for a continuum – in spite of the fact that Aristotle indeed rejects
the actual infinite and recognizes only the successive infinite! Did Aristotle
after all use the at once infinite implicitly, or is the Cantor-Dedekind defini-
tion in the last instance not purely arithmetically in nature?
From our earlier considerations the problem is immediately solved. Be-
cause Aristotle argues from the perspective of the spatial aspect he merely
needs the successive infinite (a retrocipation within space to the primitive nu-
merical meaning of the successive infinite, making possible the infinite
divisibility of a continuum). Cantor and Dekind by contrast, approach the is-
sue from the perspective of the deepened numerical aspect by using the idea of
the at once infinite.
62
Chapter 4
4.6 Why number is not “continuous”?

Since every attempt to reduce spatial continuity to numerical discreteness im-
plicitly or explicitly has to employ the at once infinite we have to acknowl-
edge that not even the real numbers are continuous. While the integers imitate
the totality character of spatial continuity and fractions the part element of the
spatial whole-parts relation, one can at most say that the real numbers imitate
(that is, analogically reflect) the nature of spatial continuity.
Bernays points at two tendencies apparently striving in opposite directions,
exemplified in the homogeneity of the continuum on the one hand and the dis-
crete determination of magnitudes on the other, for within the sequence of
numbers every element is to be seen as an individual with its own particular
properties. Within the context of space one merely has the succession of a
repitition of what is the same. The challenge for constructing a theory of the
continuum is to accomplish a reconciliation of these two opposing tendencies.
In the operational treatment the one becomes so dominant that the homogene-
ity of the other is not sufficiently acknowledged.43
Laugwitz also points out that although there are a multiplicity of lines and
surfaces in space, neither points, nor lines, nor surfaces display, like number,
characteristic features.44 On the next page he states that the set concept was
designed in such a way that what is continuous escapes from its grasp. Cantor
contemplated that a set combines properly distinct elements into a whole,
from which it is clear that the discrete rules: “The set concept from the begin-
ning has been designed in such a way that the continuous withdraws itself
from ist grasp, for according to Cantor in the case of a set it ought to concern a
‘combination’ of properly distinct things ... – the discrete reigns.”45
4.7 Concluding remark
It is indeed remarkble to what an extent, in spite of the obvious differences
that are still present between them, the thought of Bernays, Dooyeweerd and
Gödel converges, particularly in respect of the acknowledgement of the dif-
43 The free translation in the text is based upon the following explanation by Bernays: “Die
wiederstrebenden Momente für die zu wählende Begriffbildung sind diejenigen der in der
Idee des Kontinuums intendierten Homogenität einerseits und des Erfordernisses der
begrifflichen Unterscheidungen für die Maßbestimmung der Größen anderseits. In der
Zahlenreihe ist arithmetisch betrachtet jedes Element ein Individuum mit seinen ganz
besonderen Eigenschaften; geometrisch angesehen haben wir hier bloß die Aufeinanderfolge
von sich wiederholenden Gleichartigen. Die Aufgabe bei der Bildung einer Theorie des
Kontinuums ist nicht einfach ein Beschreiben, sondern eine Versöhnung zweier
auseinanderstrebender Tendenzen. Bei der operativen Behandlung erhält die eine so sehr das
Übergewicht, daß dabei die Homogenität zu kurz kommt” (Bernays, 1976:115).
44 “... es ist nicht möglich, einen Punkt vom andern zu unterscheiden, keine Gerade oder Ebene
ist vor einer anderen Gerade oder Ebene ausgezeichnet” (Laugwitz 1986:9).
45 “Der Mengenbegriff ist von vornherein so angelegt worden, daß sich das Kontinuierliche
seinem Zugriff entzieht, denn es soll sich nach Cantor bei einer Menge ja handeln um eine
‘Zusammenfassung’ wohlunterschiedener Dinge ... – das Diskrete herrscht” (Laugwitz,
1986:10).
63
ference between the discrete and the continuous, the foundational position of
number, the fact that continuity (totality) is originally spatial in nature, the in-
evitability to recognize what is primitive (and indefinable) and at once ac-
counting for the coherence of what is unique, as well as observing the quasi-
spatial character of sets. It is clear that Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects
provides a philosophical framework that exceeds his own restrictive under-
standing of infinity and at the same time makes it possible to account for key
insights found in the thought of such prominent thinkers as Bernays and
Gödel. When Laugwitz says that discreteness rules within the sphere of the
numerical, he says nothing more than what Dooyeweerd had in mind with his
idea that discrete quantity, as the meaning-nucleus of the arithmetical aspect,
qualifies every element within the structure of the quantitative aspect. And
when Bernays says that analysis expresses the idea of the continuum in arith-
metical language, he intends what from a Dooyeweerdian perspective is seen
as the spatial anticipation within the structure of the arithmetical aspect.
The view of the at once infinite in terms of an “as if” approach (Bernays),
that is, as a regulative hypothesis, through which every successively infinite
multiplicity of numbers could be envisaged as being giving all at once as an
infinite totality, provides a sound understanding of the at once infinite and
makes it plain why every form of arithmeticism fails. Such attempts have to
make an appeal to Cantor's proof on the non-denumerability of the real num-
bers – and this proof presupposes the use of the at once infinite. Without this
assumption, which therefore pre-supposes the spatial order of simultaneity,
the real numbers collapses into denumerability.46 While rejecting the actual
infinite, intuitionism interprets Cantor's diagonal proof of the non-denumera-
bility of the real numbers in a constructive (non-denumerable) sense – cf.
Heyting (1971:40), Fraenkel et al. (1973:256,272), and Fraenkel (1928:239
note 1).
Having passed the test of the ideas of Bernays and Gödel, we can now pro-
ceed with a more encompassing view of the various aspects of reality, with a
view to the limits of concept-formation.
Questions
1) What is the historical background of the distinction between discreteness and continuity?
2) Who is competent to define mathematics and what is the nature of such a definition?
3) What is more basic: discreteness or continuity?
4) What is the relation between arithmetic and logic?
5) Are mathematical theories purely thought constructions or do they pressupose an ontic founda-
tion? Provide reasons for your anwer.
6) Explain why Gödel's idea of “semiperceptions” implicitly supports the conception of ontic modal
aspects?
46 To reach the conclusion of non-denumerability, every constructive interpretation falls short –
simply because there does not exist a constructive transition from the potential to the actual
infinite (cf. Wolff, 1971).
64
Chapter 4
7) How does Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects make possible a deepened account of the ac-
tual infinite in spite of the fact that he rejected the idea of actual infinity?
8) How does the views of Bernays support Dooyeweerd's rejection of the dominant arithmeticistic
trend in modern mathematics ?
9) Why is number not continuous?
The Uniqueness of and

Interconnections between
Number and Space
Types of number Spatial features
(reflecting in their multiplicity (imitated, i.e. analogically
the qualifying role of discrete reflected in the anticipa-
quantity as meaning-nucleus of tory coherence between
the quantitative aspect) number and space)
Not-yet-disclosed
characterization
Natural Numbers
(subject to the primitive SERIAL
numerical time-order The Spatial Order
of succession) of Extension
Semi-Disclosed
characterization The Factual
Integers
(imitating spatial WHOLENESS Whole-Parts
anticipatory coherence
wholeness) Relation
Semi-Disclosed
Fractions characterization The Infinite Divisi-
(imitating the infinite DENSE bility of a Conti-
anticipation to a retrocipation
divisibility of nuous Whole
spatial wholeness) Fully Disclosed
characterization
The Spatial Time-
Real numbers Order of At Once
(imitating spatial PERFECTLY Determining every
fully disclosed
continuity on the basis COHERENT
of the at once infinite)
anticipation Factually Extended
(‘continuous’)
Spatial Continuum
65
66
Discerning Modal Aspects
Chapter 5
Our experience of reality is embedded in an awareness of unity and di-
versity, uniquness and coherence. Prior to the introduction of any sci-
entific distinctions reality presents itself to us in multiple aspects and
different kinds of entities. Understanding differences such as these
teaches us that realms are demarcated by unbridgeable boundaries,
such as the dividing line between non-living and living entities, also
confirmed by the unsuccessful attempt of neo-Darwinian theories on
“pre-biotic evolution.” These problems presuppose the irreducibility
of the various modal aspects, illustrated by a more extensive discus-
sion of the irreducibility of the physical and biotic aspects. That
uniqueness and irreducibility entail indefinability is shown with refer-
ence to a number of aspects (number, space, the kinematic and physi-
cal aspects, analyticity and meaning, as well as the core meaning of the
aesthetic and the jural modes). This is followed up by an analysis of
meaningful scholarly discourse – focusing on immanent criticism and
of applying the method of discerning antinomies. While antinomies
always entail logical contradictions, the latter does not necessarily
presuppose antinomies. As an alternative to the maxim of critical
thinking the ideal of critical solidarity is advanced, the possibility of
Christian scholarship is accounted for before four examples of antino-
mies are discussed.
In confrontation with the dominant schools of thought in legal philosophy

Dooyeweerd developed his new understanding of reality and in particular his
theory of modal aspects. While working within the discipline of law he had
the opportunity to convince himself that his intricate theoretical distinctions
are not speculative thought constructions but indeed are touching ground with
the universe we all share.
5.1 Our everyday experience of uniqueness
For this reason he constantly emphasizes that our immediate and encompass-
ing experience of the world is basic to all scholarly reflection and that it
should not be mistaken with a theory of reality – even though it may be influ-
enced by theoretical orientations. Contemplate for a moment that the defini-
tion of plant science (botany) and the definition of animal science (zoology)
do not belong to these disciplines themselves. Stipulating that “plant science
is a study of plants” does not tell us anything about plants, for its sole focus is
to say something about the scholarly discipline investigating plants. Let us
now ask a more basic question: what is a plant? (or: what is an animal?). Many
67
people will react by claiming that only botany as an academic discipline can
tell us what a plant really is. However, the problem is that without prior
knowledge of the nature of plants (distinct from physical things, animals and
human beings) plant science would not be able to commence, for in the ab-
sence of this distinguishing knowledge one may just as well enter into a study
of stones or animals.
Neo-Darwinism prompted the idea that it will be possible to account for the
genesis of the first living entities by a long, incremental process spread over
millions of years. According to this view viruses are “transitional,” represent-
ing and intermediate configuration between “life” and “death.” Since viruses
are dependent upon truly living entities in order to perform their destructive
and “life-imitating” activities, there is just one either-or available, leaving
them on either side of the divide: they are either alive or non-living. Once it is
acknowledged that an entity is either alive or non-living the apparent convin-
cingness of the millions of years needed for the “transition” vanishes, because
it camouflages the actual problem. Every moment of the extensive period of
time assumed for the rise of the first living entity, the “constellation-in-pro-
cess” could be assessed in terms of this strict either-or perspective. Every mo-
ment of this process one can ask: is it already alive? And in each instance the
answer can just be: yes or no. The implication is that somewhere along the line
an abrupt jump is required: the one moment the constellation is non-living and
the next moment it is alive. The crux of explaining what supposedly happened
is therefore not found in the “millions of years” but in the abrupt jump taking
place in one (speculatively assumed) single moment!1
The underlying issue operative in the recent history of biology concerns
what Dooyeweerd designates as the irreducibility of the different modal as-
pects. In Chapter 3 some implications of the distinction between uniqueness
and coherence were discussed, pertaining to the coherence of diverse aspects
as revealed in the multiple analogical connections between them. The irredu-
cibility of each aspect is indeed one of the most significant consequences of
the idea of uniqueness.
5.2 Irreducibility
On the basis of our experience of different kinds of entities it is a small step to
an awareness of the different aspects of reality. On the conceptual level
uniqueness translates into irreducibility and irreducibility translates into
indefinability.
Dooyeweerd argues that the uniqueness and irreducibility of each aspect is
guaranteed by its core meaning, designated by him as its meaning-nucleus. An
attempt to account for this meaning-nucleus faces two options: (i) either one
accepts its uniqueness as it is expressed in its indefinability or (ii) one aims at
defining it by using terms that are derived from a different aspect. Let us fur-
ther explore our remarks concerning the uniqueness of the biotic aspect.
1 A more detailed analysis of contemporary calssifications of living entities (of up to five
realms) is found in PDD:477 ff.
68
Chapter 5
5.3 The uniqueness of and coherence between the physical

and biotic aspects
Postulating a single principle of explanation, such as found in the Pythagorean
statement that everything is number, the postmodern claim that everything is
intepretation or the psychologistic exclamation of Goethe, “Gefühl ist alles,”
feeling is everything, theoretical thinking entangles itself in serious problems.
This also applies to the way in which philosophical views on the physical and
biotic aspects were articulated in the past. Biological thinking preceding Dar-
win's Origin of Species (1859) was dominated by the long-standing vitalistic
tradition known as idealistic morphology – from Aristotle up to the neo-
vitalism of the early 20th century (Hans Driesch and his followers in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, Sinnott, Haas, Heitler, Rainer-Schubert Soldern
and Overhage).
In a striking way Hans Jonas explains the monistic views entailed in vital-
ism and mechanism. A monistic approach does not, like the dualist, reduce re-
ality to two basic principles, because it aims at finding one all-inclusive and
all-explicating principle. It is more appropriate to designate such extreme mo-
nistic biological orientations as pan-vitalism and pan-mechanism. Already
the earliest Greek philosopher of nature, Thales, advanced a hulèsoistic (zoè =
life; hulè = matter) view. One of his indirectly preserved statements says that
everything lives. From this point of view it is unthinkable that “life” is not the
normal, governing rule in the universe. Jonas remarks: “In such a world view,
death is a puzzle which stares humankind in the face, the antithesis of the natu-
ral, self-explanatory and understandable, that which is the common life”
(Jonas, 1973:20). The paragraph in which Jonas makes this remark is entitled:
Pan-vitalism and the problem of death (Jonas, 1973:19).1 Those, however,
who think pan-mechanistically, stress the idea that the phenomenon of life is
actually a borderline case in the encompassing homogeneous physical world
view. Quantitively negligible in the immeasurability of cosmic matter, quali-
tatively an exception to the rule of material characteristics, epistemologically
the unexplained in the explicable physical nature – that is how life has become
a stumbling block for pan-mechanism: “Conceiving life as a problem here
1 Perhaps Thales might have been pleased to read the following explanation: “Through the key
processes of respiration and photosynthesis (the world's most important redox reactions!), or-
ganisms entirely renew the carbon dioxide in the air every few years, and even the much
larger volume of oxygen is renewed in about 2000 years. Most incredibly of all, even the 1.5
billion, billion metric tonnes of water on the Earth are eventually split and reconstituted by
the activities of living things. It would seem incredible, because the biosphere is such a very
thin film on the Earth's surface (it is spread throughout the oceans of course, but incredibly
thinly). Compared with the depth and volume of the atmosphere, hydrosphere or crust, the
biosphere is insignificant. For every atom in the biosphere, there are about 700 in the atmo-
sphere, 400 000 in the hydrosphere and 2 000 000 in the crust! Yet this insignificant scum
maintains most of the rest of the world in a steady state adjusted optimally to its own needs.
So accurate is the biosphere's system of balances and adjustments that, for example, the oxy-
gen concentration in the air has not measurably varied during the 80 years for which accurate
measurements have been available” (Jones, 1998:42).
69
means that its strangeness in the mechanical world, which is reality, is recog-
nized; explaining it means – on this level of the universal ontology of death –
denying it, relegating it to a variant of the possibility of the lifeless” (Jonas,
1973:23). This paragraph deals with: Pan-mechanism and the problem of life
(Jonas, 1973:22 ff.).
Modern philosophy is thoroughly familiar with a materialistic stance. In
the footsteps of Descartes and Hobbes and consistent with the mechanistic
main tendency of classical physics, the 18th century witnessed prominent ma-
terialist thinkers in various countries, such as Germany, France and England.
Particularly well-known are the works of J. Lamettrie (1745), C. Helvetius
(1758), D. Diderot (1746) and P. Holbach (1770) (see Nieke, 1980:842, 850).
Within the context of contemporary philosophy of science materialism is seen
as physicalistic: “Physicalism denotes what used to be called materialism, the
view that the universe is ultimately an entirely physical system. … Ultimately
there are no phenomena in the universe which cannot be understood in terms
of the concepts of physics” (Klee, 1997:99).
In his 1859 work Darwin opted for the idea that living entities are intrinsi-
cally changeful and subject to chance processes. But his eventual acceptance
of the principle of uniformitarianism (derived from his acquaintance with
Lyell's work in the field of geology)1 did continue a feature formally similar to
an element of idealistic morphology. Between 1831 and 1836, on his world
tour, Darwin discovered animal fossils in South America and discerned simi-
larities with variations of living plants and animals found on the Galapagos Is-
lands. In his Origin of Species Darwin developed his view of the (incremental)
all-encompassing process of becoming (change), stretching over millions of
years and giving rise, through differentiation or speciation, to the rich variety
of species we know today. Adaptation is the mechanism through which living
things survive and Darwin characterizes the overall process as being con-
trolled by natural selection.
More recently Gould advances a consistent physicalist approach in terms of
which the “assumption that evolution must entail progress” is rejected “as a
cultural bias.” To this he adds “that no good scientific argument for expecting
progress exists, no more so in our own time than in Darwin's day” (Gould,
1996:145). The explanation suggested here by Gould is that on the one hand
Darwin advanced a theory of change through natural selection precluding any
idea of progress, while at the same time he revealed his indebtedness to a con-
servative layer of society by at once also advocating the idea of progress.
Gould argues that Darwin's “strained and uncomfortable argument for prog-
ress arises from a conflict between two of his beings – the intellectual radical
and the cultural conservative.” The irony is that in his Origin of Species Dar-
win actually did not develop a theory of evolution in the biotical sense of the
word!
1 Principles of Geology (1830-1833) and Elements of Geology (1838). Henslow advised Dar-
win to take Leyll's first work with him to the Cape Verde Islands – but not to believe it.
70
Chapter 5
The dominant neo-Darwinist (synthetic) evolutionary theory in principle

chooses for a physical principle of explanation (basic denominator), even
though increasing efforts are made from this perspective to account for the
qualitative differences that emerged in the course of the on-going evolution-
ary process. J. Huxley warns against the “nothing but” trap into which many
evolutionary and natural scientific explanatory techniques fall: “… if sexual
impulse is at the base of love, then love is regarded as nothing but sex; if it can
be shown that man originated from an animal, then in all essentials he is noth-
ing but an animal. This, I repeat, is a dangerous fallacy. We have tended to
misunderstand the nature of the difference between ourselves and animals.
We have a way of thinking that if there is a continuity in time there must be a
continuity in quality” (Huxley, 1968:137).
Simpson also distinguishes between non-biotic and biotic levels (of organi-
zation) and is convinced that it is preposterous “to base ... a concept of scien-
tific explanation wholly on the non-biological levels of the hierarchy and then
to attempt to apply it to the biological levels without modification” (Simpson,
1969:8). Any treatment of this problem would, according to Simpson, have to
avoid the extremes of both vitalism and “physicism” (Simpson, 1969:21).
Against an extreme physicalist reductionism he openly states: “I think it fair to
say that in this respect, as truly biological investigation and an attempt to ex-
plain vital phenomena, unmodified reductionism has failed” (Simpson,
1969:26). Because of this he remains convinced that evolutionary organismal
biology cannot be reduced “to a philosophy taking account only of the physi-
cal, non-biological aspects of the universe” (Simpson, 1969:7). Simpson
therefore rejects an extreme reductionism (physicalism), and speaks of the
physical and biological aspects of reality.
However, as close as this may come to an argument in support of the irredu-

cibility of these two aspects, he does not give up the original Darwinian pre-
mises regarding the (physical) complexity of living entities: “It is the com-
plexity and the kind of structural and functional assembly in living organisms
that differentiate them from non-living systems” (Simpson, 1969:7). In Simp-
son's view the biotical aspect emerges out of the organizational complexity of
natural systems, which actually implies that the term “biotical aspect” cannot
be understood in the sense of irreducible ontic mode of existence. Although
not stated in extreme reductionistic, or unmodified reductionistic terms,
Simpson still defends a form of physicalism. Earlier we pointed out that
neo-vitalism opted for asserting the irreducibility of “life” – but unfortunately
did not understand “life” in the functional sense of the biotic aspect of reality.
The effect was that it transformed the biotic aspect into an immaterial “vital
force,” without realizing that the term “force” itself is derived from the physi-
cal aspect that characterizes “matter.” At most it represents a retrocipation
71
within the biotic aspect pointing backwards to its foundational coherence with
the physical aspect.1
Darwinism and neo-Darwinism sincerely wanted to bridge the gap between
the living and the non-living. In order to accomplish this goal it was thought
that the increasing knowledge about the micro-dimensions of living entities
will enable us to provide a rational explanation of the transition. Let us see
what happened during the preivous century, keeping in mind that some of the
oldest unicellular algae were found in South Africa close to Baberton (Ar-
chaeosphairoïdes barbertonensis – estimated to be about 3 100 million years
old; cf. Schopf, W. & Barghoorn, 1967:508 ff).
Oparin, a Russian biochemist from the first part of the 20th century, claimed
that carbon “made its first appearance on the Earth's surface not in the oxi-
dized form of carbon dioxide but, on the contrary, in the reduced state, in the
form of hydrocarbons” (Oparin, 1953:101-102). Initially, during the first part
of the 20th century, the Haldane-Oparin hypothesis regarding the “origin of
life” stimulated experimentation and international discussions into the fifties,
sixties and seventies. From a physical-chemical perspective living entities
function on the basis of both protein (enzymes) and nucleic acid (DNA).
Mechanistic speculation about the “origin of life” is therefore obliged to pre-
sume that initially there must have been an intimate interconnection between
protein and DNA. At one of the then fashionable international conferences on
“pre-biotic” (“a-biotic”) evolution Orgel and Sulston commented in this re-
gard: “This approach leads to new difficulties so severe that it has never been
carried very far” (Orgel and Sulston, 1971:91). They continue with the strik-
ing observation that “progress” can only be recorded in this regard when char-
acteristics are attributed to protein and DNA “which have not been demon-
strated experimentally, and which usually seem implausible” (Orgel and
Sulston, 1971:91).
These comments actually refer back to ideas initially (and independently)
developed by Haldane (already in 1928) and the Russian biochemist Oparin
(cf. Oparin, 1953, chapters 4-7:64-195). The assumptions of the Oparin-
Haldane approach eventually turned out to be highly questionable. The as-
sumption was that the initial atmosphere of the earth was mainly composed of
hydrogen, methane, ammonia and water vapor. In particular Oparin holds that
carbon “made its first appearance on the Earth's surface not in the oxidized
form of carbon dioxide but, on the contrary, in the reduced state, in the form of
hydrocarbons” (Oparin, 1953:101-102).
1 In his mentioned extensive analysis of Driesch's vitalism Dooyeweerd shows that he super-
imposed upon the traditional mechanistic understanding of matter an immaterial vital force
designated as entelechy – something much more than the biotic aspect of reality. Without giv-
ing up the validity of the mechanistic analysis of matter, and without denying the causal
claims of the classical humanistic scientific ideal, aimed at a deterministic view of nature,
Driesch attempted to apply the concept of natural law in an equally deterministic sense to vi-
tal phenomena (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:733-749).
72
Chapter 5
By the end of the 20th century, however, Silver points out that there is at
present “no evidence that the atmosphere was reducing (methane and hydro-
gen)” and remarks that “the prevalent opinion at the moment is that the Earth's
atmosphere, at the time that life emerged, was mainly carbon dioxide and ni-
trogen” (Silver, 1998:344). The role of methane is also unacceptable in the
Oparin story since it is one of the components of natural gas which is pro-
duced by the “effect of millions of years of pressure and heat acting on prehis-
toric plant material” (Silver, 1998:344). Although the Haldane-Oparin con-
jecture was kept alive for a considerable time, supported by the experiments
done by Stanley Miller (from Chicago) in 1953, it does not bring us closer to
an understanding of the mystery of the genesis of the living cell. With regard
to Miller's experimentation Silver remarks:
The Haldane-Oparin hypothesis is out of fashion. Of the forty or so simple
molecules that would be needed to form a primitive cell, the experiment pro-
duces two. It is worth bearing in mind that glycine contains only ten atoms and
alanine, thirteen. The simplest nucleotide contains thirty atoms. The probabil-
ity that a given large molecule will be produced by chance from small mole-
cules, by sparks, falls drastically as the molecular size increases. It has to be
realized that even if heat, radiation, and lightning, on the young Earth, had pro-
duced all the amino acids and nucleotides needed for present forms of life, the
gap between an aqueous solution of these emolecules and a living cell is
stipendous. It's a question of organization: in the absence of a guiding intelli-
gence, presentday scientists are not doing very well. For the moment, let's
show the Miller experiment to the side door and see who is next in line in the
waiting room (Silver, 1998:345).
More recently Behe summarizes the situation as follows:
The story of the slow paralysis of research on life's origin is quite interesting,
but space precludes its retelling here. Suffice it to say that at present the field
of origin-of-life studies has dissolved into a cacophony of conflicting models,
each unconvincing, seriously incomplete, and incompatible with competing
models. In private, even most evolutionary biologists will admit that they have
no explanation for the beginning of life (Behe, 2003:292). 1
Interestingly it should be noted that the attempt to reduce the biotic aspect the
physical was turned upside down in the holism of Meyer. Needham summa-
rizes the position of Meyer as follows:
Thus Meyer, in his interesting discussion of the concept of wholeness, main-
tains that the fundamental conceptions of physics ought to be deducible from
the fundamental conceptions of biology; the latter not being reducible to the
former. Thus entropy would be, as it were, a special case of biological disorga-
nization; the uncertainty principle would follow from the psycho-physical re-
1 Those who respect scholarly integrity and honesty may find the conversation between Silver
and Haldane significant: “I had a long conversation with J.B.S. Haldane, which started off
with politics and ended with science. When I questioned him about evolution, one of his re-
marks sparked my interest, and sent me to the library that evening: ‘Evolution's not the prob-
lem. Life is’ Then he said, ‘Oparin and I once had an idea about that, but we'll never know the
real answer’ ” (Silver, 1998:353).
73
lation; and the principle of relativity would be derivable from the relation be-
tween organism and environment (Needham, 1968: 27 note 34).
After Lever published his work on “Creation and Evolution” in 1956 Dooye-
weerd responded under the same title with his critical analysis in Philosophia
Reformata in 1959. Dooyeweerd was particularly skeptical about the three
speculative hypotheses formulated by Lever (see Dooyeweerd, 1959:121-
130). One of his objections relates to the reversal of the genetic order: “The
complex and highly flexible protein compounds operative within the inner
sphere of the living organism do not appear, in terms of our present and past
experience, anywhere outside the living organism. Their building-up and de-
composition occur in bio-chemical and bio-physical processes in which the
organic function of life itself fulfills the leading role. These processes take
place within the typical totality structure of the organism and therefore can
never serve to explain the origination of the organic function of life within the
large evolutionary process of our temporal world” (Dooyeweerd, 1959:128).
Practically 50 years later Dooyeweerd's arguments are not only still valid but
are supported by the dead end in which neo-Darwinian speculations about
“pre-biotic” or “a-biotic” evolution found themselves enclosed.
The recognition of the irreducibility of an aspect is accompanied by an
awareness of its indefinability. This feature opens up two options: (i) either
define it by employing terms derived from a different (irreducible) aspect, in
which case no definition is forthcoming but merely a reduction; (ii) or use
synonyms resulting in a meaningful tautology boiling down to something like
life is life.
5.4 The implication of uniqueness: indefinability and the
limits of concept formation
It is often required that a scientist define the terms employed within a specific
discipline or theory. The accompanying questions are concerned with the
meaning of terms and the contents of concepts. Although every single aca-
demic discipline employs concepts an explicit account of the nature of con-
cept formation is almost never encountered – in general the concept of a con-
cept is absent. Normally key (or: supposedly basic) concepts are defined
straightaway. Yet various disciplines did realize that definitions employ terms
and that one cannot simply continue to define these terms without ending in an
infinite iteration (a so-called regressus in infinitum). Concept-formation and
definition therefore ultimately rest upon terms which are not defined and
cannot be defined. But what is a concept?
In particular two decisive hallmarks ought to be highlighted:
(i) A concept always combines a multiplicity of features or triats into a logi-
cal unity;
(ii) Each characteristic united in a concept evinces universality.
Consider the concept of a human being. Whenever we encounter a human be-
ing we immediately identify it as a human person because the concept human
being applies universally, wherever. Of course people may differ about what a
74
Chapter 5
proper concept of being human may entail, but it always unites a multiplicity
of (logically discerned) characteristics. Plato had a fairly simplistic definition
of being human. In one of his later periods he described a human person as a
“bipedal living being without feathers.” An anecdote mentioned by Michael
Landmann mentions that Diogenes plucked a cock as an example of Plato's
human being, upon which Plato added to his definition: “with flat toenails”!
(In Chapter 7 we shall return to an investigation of the nature of being human.)
Consider another familiar concept, that of a triangle. Usually a triangle is
subsumed under the concept of a polygon. The crucial elements united in the
concept of a triangle are the terms “three,” “angle,” and “lines.”1 The word
polygon combines a numerical element and a spatial element – literally it
says: many (number) angled (space). This concept therefore presupposes an
awareness of spatial dimensions because it delineates a two-dimensional spa-
tial figure, i.e. it concerns the spatial extension of a delimited surface,
entailing an “inside-outside” distinction (interior – exterior).
5.4.1 The indefinability of number
Let us first identify the numerical elements present in this concept. The arith-
metical meaning of “one” is implicit – it concerns just one kind of spatial fig-
ure, not many of them. The numerical term “two” is used in characterizing it
as a two dimensional spatial figure. The term “three” is evident from the fact
that we contemplate what a tri-angle is – as a subcategory of the more general
nature of a polygon (in which the numerical meaning of many is explored).
However, all these numerical elements are occurring within a spatial context.
In arithmetic numbers and numerical relations are investigated by disregard-
ing any non-numerical context (such as a spatial one). In arithmetic the num-
bers 1, 2 and 3 are not related to spatial figures.
Ignoring for the moment the question concerning the interconnections be-
tween number and space (seen in the use of numerical terms within a spatial
context), it is clear that a triangle cannot be defined without the use of numeri-
cal terms. Does this mean that we now also have to define these numerical ele-
ments? The well-known British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, thought that
he can define the concept of number by deriving it from the logical class con-
cept and the notion of the logical addition of classes. Dooyeweerd saw
through the vicious circle entailed in this attempt (see Dooyeweerd,
1997-II:83). Russell assumes that the logical class concept is purely logical in
nature. His “definition” of the number 2 is therefore:
1 + 1 is the number of a class w which is the logical sum of two classes u and v
which have no common terms and have each only one term. The chief point to
be observed is that logical addition of numbers is the fundamental notion,
1 It is constituted by three corners (vertices), three straight line segments as sides, such that the
interior of the triangle is that part of a plane enclosed by the triangle, and its outside (its exte-
rior – see Weisstein, Eric W. 2005. “Triangle.” From MathWorld, A Wolfram Web Resource.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Triangle.html).
75
while arithmetical addition of numbers is wholly subsequent (Russell,

1956:119; see Clouser, 2005:349-350).
The irony, however, is that Russell already had to use number in its original
arithmetical meaning in order to distinguish between different (“logical”)
classes. After all, he speaks of the sum of “two” classes where each of them
contains “one” element. This presupposes an insight into the numerical mean-
ing of the numbers “1” and “2.” Consequently, the number “2,” which had to
appear as the result of “logical addition,” is actually presupposed by it. In his
discussion of number and the concept of class Cassirer displays a clear under-
standing of this circularity (Cassirer, 1953:44 ff.). The foremost mathemati-
cian of the 20th century, David Hilbert, who advanced a distinct kind of mathe-
matics (known as axiomatic formalism), was therefore justifiably cautious in
avoiding the idea that logic alone is sufficient for an adequate foundation of
mathematics. The order of modal aspects distinguished by Dooyeweerd con-
siders the numerical to be foundational to the logical-analytical aspect.
Hilbert acknowledges this insight by pointing out that presenting logic re-
quires the prior application of “arithmetical basic concepts.”1
Particularly intuitionistic mathematics – Brouwer, Weyl, Heyting, Troel-
stra and others – emphasized that the succession displayed by the natural num-
bers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, … implies that ordinal numbers are foundational to cardinal
numbers.2 Dummett critized Frege for not realizing that “the notion of an ordi-
nal number is more fundamental than that of a cardinal number” (Dummett,
1995:293).
The core meaning of number, discrete quantity, expressing itself in the dis-
tinctness of every (kind of) number, sets a limit to every attempt to define
number. In mathematics and logic the set concept therefore had to use the idea
of a primitive term, i.e. a term that is evident without the need of a definition.
For example, in Zermelo-Fraenkel (axiomatic) set theory the (binary) predi-
cate [epsilon], denoting the membership relation, is the only set theoretical
primitive symbol (cf. Fraenkel, 1973:22-23). No one less famous than Kurt
Gödel once remarked that as yet we do not have a satisfactory, non-circular
definition of the term “set”: “The operation ‘set of x's’ (where the variable ‘x’
ranges over some given kind of objects) cannot be defined satisfactorily (at
least not in the present state of knowledge), but can only be paraphrased by
other expressions involving again the concept of set, such as: ‘multitude of
1 “Only when we analyze attentively do we realize that in presenting the laws of logic we al-
ready had to employ certain arithmetical basic concepts, for example the concept of a set and
partially also the concept of number, particularly as cardinal number [Anzahl]. Here we end
up in a vicious circle and in order to avoid paradoxes it is necessary to come to a partially si-
multaneous development of the laws of logic and arithmetic” (Hilbert, 1970:199). Quine also
correctly affirms: “Any logic has to come to terms somehow with quantification, if it is not
going to stop short” (Quine, 1970:88).
2 Just recall Maddy's account of the the difference between ordinal numbers and cardinal num-
bers succinctly: “Cardinal numbers tell ‘how many’ – one, two, three … – as opposed to ordi-
nal numbers, which tell ‘how many-ith’ – first, second, third, …” (Maddy, 1997:17 note 43).
76
Chapter 5
x's’, ‘combination of any number of x's’, ‘part of the totality of x's’, where a
‘multitude’ (‘combination’, ‘part’) is conceived as something that exists in it-
self, no matter whether we can define it in a finite number of words (so that
random sets are not excluded)” (Gödel, 1964:262).
The acknowledgement of the indefinability of number within intuitionistic
mathematics led to a reversal of the logicistic claim of Russell that mathemat-
ics is logic. Heyting writes: “This is the case for every logical theorem: it is but
a mathematical theorem of extreme generality; that is to say, logic is a part of
mathematics, and can by no means serve as a foundation for it” (Heyting,
1971:6).
5.4.2 The indefinability of space
As the starting point of our discussion of uniqueness and indefinability we de-
fined a triangle in numerical and spatial terms. We have now seen that the core
meaning of number itself is basic (“primitive”) and therefore does not allow
for an infinite regress. The same applies to the core meaning of space, contin-
uous extension, underlying spatial terms line, angle, figure and surface (with
the implied interior-exterior distinction) employed in the definition of a trian-
gle. Dantzig writes: “From time immemorial the term continuous has been ap-
plied to space, ..., something that is of the same nature in its smallest parts as it
is in its entirety, something singly connected, in short something continuous!
don’t you know .... any attempt to formulate it in a precise definition invari-
ably ends in an impatient: ‘Well, you know what I mean!’” (Dantzig,
1947:167).). Synonyms like “uninterrupted,” “connected,” “coherent,” and so
on, simply repeat what is meant by continuity, in stead of defining it.1
5.4.3 The indefinability of the kinematic aspect:
Zeno against multiplicity and motion
Zeno belonged to the school of the Greek philosopher Parmenides and he ar-
gued against multiplicity and movement by assuming an absolutely static be-
ing. The well-known reasoning regarding the flying arrow, Achilles and the
tortoise as well as what is known as the dichotomy paradox is reported by Ar-
istotle in his Physics (239 b 5 ff.). Achilles, the fastest athlete in Greece, can
never overtake a tortoise – it cannot even catch up with the tortoise, for the tor-
toise constantly establishes a further (though smaller) lead by the time Achil-
les has caught up with its previous position. A different argument is that one
cannot move from point A to point B for in order to do so it is first of all neces-
sary to traverse half the distance, thereafter half of the remaining distance, and
thereafter again half of the remaining distance – ad infinitum.
Perhaps the easiest and most beautiful argument against motion is found in
the flying arrow. This paradox of the flying arrow seems to grant movement
1 When we later on return to the fundamental idea of Dooyeweerd's theory of law spheres,
namely that the meaning of an aspect only comes to expression in its coherence with other as-
pects, we shall explain why spatial continuity is infinitely divisibile.
77
and then immediately “freezes” it into distinct “moments” of time – as if

something moving from “moment” to “moment” has a definitive place in
space. Suppose we consider a flying arrow and then, at any given moment, ask
the question: is it possible for the arrow at this moment to be at once at this
place and at a different place? The answer appears to be negative. Of course
the same question can be repeated at any other “moment” of the arrow's flight,
each time calling forth the answer that it cannot be at once at different places.
But what does it mean to say that the arrow is just at one place at a specific mo-
ment in time? Is “being-at-one-place” not equivalent to “being-at-rest”? In the
third authentic Fragment of Zeno still available to us, he holds: “That which
moves neither moves in the space it occupies, nor in the space it does not oc-
cupy” (Dielz-Kranz, 1959-60 B Fr.3). Since the “flying” arrow is every mo-
ment of its “flight” actually at rest, it does not move at all. Clearly, by attempt-
ing to define motion in spatial terms one actually arrives at an elimination of
motion. In his attempt to define motion in spatial terms Zeno in fact reduced
motion to space. However, modern kinematics holds that “rest” is a (relative)
state of motion.1
Consequently, within the domain of what is indefinable the possibility of
definitions is twofold: (i) instead of defining one can specify synonyms, or (ii)
instead of defining one can arrive at the impasse of an attempted reduction.
Early modern developments realized that a steady or constant motion,
sometimes also designated as uniform, reflects the core meaning of the kine-
matic aspect. Since the awareness of change depends on the action of forces,
i.e., it is dependent upon the operation of energy in its various forms, the phys-
ical aspect of energy-operation ought to be distinguished from the (preceding
and foundational) kinematic aspect. When energy operates it causes changes,
explaining why the cause-effect relation belongs to an aspect different from
the kinematic aspect of motion. When Einstein, in his special theory of relativ-
ity (1905), postulated the constancy of the velocity of light in a vacuum, he
merely continued an insight already advanced by Galileo and his predecessors
concerning the meaning of inertia. Galileo reversed the Aristotelian view that
whatever moves requires a causing force in order to continue its movement.
He did that with the aid of a thought-experiment concerning a body that is in
motion on a plane which is extended into the infinite – and from this experi-
ment he derives the law of inertia. The question is whether or not the meaning
of uniform motion is primitive and unique in the sense that it ought to be dis-
tinguished both from the static meaning of space and the dynamic meaning of
physical energy-operation? Since physics always deals with dynamic forces
operative in the interplay of energy transformation, and since a (constant) uni-
form motion can indeed be envisaged without making an appeal to a cause
(causal force), it is clear that something unique and irreducible is here at stake.
It entails that in a functional sense movement is something original. Whatever
1 Without reference to some or other system, one cannot speak of the motion of a specific
kinematical subject (see Stafleu, 1980:81, 83-84).
78
Chapter 5
moves will continue its (uniform or rectilinear) motion endlessly. Motion is

not in need of a cause – only a change of motion needs a cause. Both accelera-
tion and deceleration require an energy-input (i.e., a physical cause).
5.4.4 Analyticity and meaning: the apparent circularity
in “defining” them
Fodor aptly remarks: “The goal we have been pursuing is the traditional one
of reducing meaning to some more basic and better understood entity. But
analyticity is too intimately related to meaning to provide such a reduction. In
fact, as far as anyone knows, there is no meaning-independent way of charac-
terizing either analyticity or meaning (Fodor, 1977:43). This remark partially
flows from the fact that every concrete act of thinking or talking in principle
always at once functions within all aspects of reality, including the logical and
sign modes. In addition to this insight Dooyeweerd argues that the logical-an-
alytical aspect is foundational to the sign mode (he refers to this aspect as the
lingual aspect). Although words (with their diverse meaning-nuances) may
designate concepts, concepts are not words. The previosly mentioned concept
of a triangle has a logical universality – anyone, no matter what language such
a person may use, can grasp what “triangularity” is all about. Therefore a con-
cept cannot be translated – it can be understood or not understood. A word, by
contrast, can be translated (sometimes requiring a whole circumscription).
This means that the concept triangle can be designated by different words de-
rived from different languages – such as “triangle” (English), “driehoek”
(Dutch), “Dreieck” (German), and so on. A concept as a logical unity in the
multiplicity of hall-marks therefore appears to be foundational for the
meaning of the sign mode and language.
This foundational position of the analytical aspect explains at once why the
logical development of children are more rapid than their lingual develop-
ment. Consider the following example. A little girl for the first time notices a
pigeon and asks her father what it is, upon which the father responds by saying
that it is a pigeon. The next day they walk once again in the garden and then
she observes a shrike. In the absence of the necessary linguistic competence
(vocabulary) she does not yet know
that its name is a shrike, but based
on her encounter with a pigeon she
notices the similarities and says to The concept of a bird is formed by lifting our shared properties,
such as having feathers, a beak and wings while disregarding
her father: “dad, look, a pigeon!” differences in size, shape and colour
Implicitly she formed the concept

of a “bird” (by lifting out – i.e.
identifying – what is similar, name-
ly having a beak, wings and feath-
ers, while simultaneously relin-
quishing the specific characteris-
tics distinguishing a pigeon from a
79
shrike), but indicated it with the verbal sign “pigeon” (see PDD:15).
5.4.5 The core meaning of the aesthetic
Dooyeweerd suggests that the uniqueness of the aesthetic aspect is found in

(beautiful) harmony, lying at the foundation of the contrary beautiful-ugly.
However, the well-known reformational scholar within the field of aesthetics,
Calvin Seerveld, considers this to be mistaken since according to him it is
nothing but a continuation of the Greek ideal of beauty. He reacts to the Pla-
tonic view of beauty as a “matter of measure and proportion; a thing of beauty
is one with appeasing, fitting harmony.” He commenced with the alternative
idea of “symbolic objectification” under the “law of coherence” (Seerveld,
1968:44). Later on he switched from ambiguity to allusivity (nuancefulness)
(Seerveld, 1979:284, 286). This changed his initial definition for now art is
seen as “is the symbolical objectification of certain meaning aspects of a thing
[better: “meaning-realities …] subject to the law of allusiveness” (Seerveld,
1979:290; see Seerveld, 1980:132; note 12; see also Seerveld, 2001: 163).
The way in which Seerveld employs the term nuancefulness unmistakably
(analogically) reflects the meaning of the numerical and the spatial aspects of
reality – those aspects in which Seerveld wants to “locate” and restrict the
meaning of beauty/harmony and from which he wants to escape in his charac-
terization of the core meaning of the aesthetic. Nuancefulness is synonymous
with many-sidedness where the the term “many” originally appears in the nu-
merical mode while the element of “sidedness” refers to spatial configurations
or sides. Instead of explaining the core meaning of the aesthetic aspect,
Seerveld appears merely to have supplied us with numerical and spatial analo-
gies within the aesthetic aspect – the two aspects which, according to him,
serve as the basis of (beautiful) harmony (see Strauss, 2008:208-212;
PDD:250-253).
5.4.6 Is it possible to define the core meaning of the jural aspect?
From the previosly mentioned examples of indefinability one can deduce a

general pattern. Either one introduces terms synonymous to the one that is
meant to be defined, or one employs terms missing the target altogether. An-
other instance of the latter case is found in the science of law where the Dutch
legal scholar, Polak, attempts to define “law” as “an objective, trans-egoistic
harmonization of interests.” Since this “definition” does not contain anything
specific to the jural aspect it indeed misses the target – “objective” intends
something inter-subjective or universal (not distinctively jural); trans-egoistic
has an ethical meaning; “harmonization” stems from the aesthetic domain,
and “interests” are non-specific and in need of a further qualification (such as
“economic interests,” “social interests,” and so on). The result is simply a rule
equally applicable to the distribution of alms amongst the poor, as Dooye-
weerd aptly remarks (Dooyeweerd, 1967:9).
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Chapter 5
5.5 A blow to the rationalist ideal of conceptual knowledge

The core meaning or the meaning-nucleus of a modal aspect not only guaran-
tees its uniqueness and irreducibility but also its indefinability. The various
aspects of reality are the fundamental modes of being within which all (natural
and societal) entities and processes invariably function. A reversal of this re-
mark acknowledges that the various aspects are also points of entry to con-
crete reality. When something, like a chair, is identified, describing it inevita-
bly has to employ modal terms (see page 22 above). The chair is big or small,
strong or weak, comfortable or uncomfortable, cheap or expensive, beautiful
or ugly, beloved or hated. Within scholarly parlance this leads to a practice in
which the modal aspects at once also serve as modes of explanation. It is com-
mon practice to say that from an economic perspective or from a juridical
point of view one may explain a given situation. But since the core meanings
of the various modes of explanation are indefinable, it is clear that ultimately
concepts and concept formation rest upon terms that cannot be conceptual-
ized. When conceptual knowledge is over-estimated we encounter the stance
of rationalism. In this context it means that such a rationalist understanding of
knowledge is untenable because ultimately every conceptual grasp rests upon
elements exceeding the grasp of concepts!
The theory of modal aspects clearly represents a response to uniqueness
and diversity, to what may be called the problem of the “coherence of irredu-
cibiles.” The principles of sphere sovereignty and sphere universality intro-
duced in Chapter 3 not only account for the connection between uniqueness
and coherence but also enable an account of meaningful scholarly discourse.
5.6 Meaningful scholarly discourse
Most of the time this problem is related to the ideal of critical thinking. How-
ever, the ideal of critical thinking is itself embedded in a long-standing appre-
ciation of human rationality. Particularly scholarly thinking is respected for
its claim to rationality. Critical thinking is supposed to be a manifestation of
rationality per se. Yet, when the motto of critical thinking is advanced one sel-
dom gets informed about the criteria that ought to guide critical thinking.
Much rather the implicit assumption is that when rationality rules as final
judge unanimity (or, as Habermas prefers to call it: consensus) will prevail.
This assessment is still quite alive, particularly when it comes to what used to
be considered as the acme of sound reasoning, mathematics. Fern, for exam-
ple, recently writes:
Mathematical calculations are paradigmatic instances of universally accessi-
ble, rationally compelling argument. Anyone who fails to see “two plus two
equals four” denies the Pythagorean Theorem, or dismisses as nonsense the
esoterics of infinitesimal calculus forfeits the crown of rationality (Fern,
2002:96-97).
Unfortunately the history and practice of mathematics and logic highlight the
fact that even within this allegedly most “exact” of all the disciplines conflict-
81
ing approaches are found1 – and the same applies to logic, because in the case
of the infinite intuitionistic logic does not accept the universal validity of the
logical principle of the excluded middle (see Brouwer, 1919). Particularly
when the underlying assumption is that rationality ought to be the final judge
in intellectual endeavors, this outcome certainly is perplexing and embarrass-
ing.
Dooyeweerd realized that logic alone cannot account for this situation. Ac-
cording to him every academic discipline (special science) is made possible
by a basic idea of the cohering diversity within reality. He calls this basic idea
the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy.2 His argument is that the com-
peting and diverging trends of thought within the disciplines are determined
by their respective ideas concerning the diversity, totality and Origin of real-
ity. During the second half of the 20th century Thomas Kuhn introduced the
term “paradigms” on the basis of his analysis of diverging theoretical trends in
physics.
Dooyeweerd consistently acknowledged the normative meaning of the log-
ical-analytical aspect, evinced in the contrary logical–illogical. Throughout
their long history both philosophy and logic by and large accepted the logical
principles of idendity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle.3 These
principles not only guide formal logic since what is known as informal logic is
also governed by thse principles. Suppose I want to argue a point by disquali-
fying some or other personal quality you may have without providing any
grounds for the conclusion I want to defend, then the fallacy involved is
known as an argument ad hominem. Referring to a widely held negative senti-
ment as such also does not porovide any argument and this fallacy is known as
an argumentum ad invidiam. Merely praising or flattering someone also does
not provide any argument and falls prey to the fallacy of an argumentum ad
captandum. Furthermore, if an appeal is made to a general sentiment, empa-
thy, pity, fear or other sentiment, then the ad populum fallacy is encountered.
1 Stegmüller writes: “The special character of intuitionistic mathematics is expressed in a se-
ries of theorems that contradict the classical results. For instance, while in classical mathe-
matics only a small part of the real functions are uniformly continuous, in intuitionistic math-
ematics the principle holds that any function that is definable at all is uniformly continuous
(Stegmüller, 1969:331). The Dutch logician, Beth, underscores this remark when he states:
“It is clear that intuitionistic mathematics is not merely that part of classical mathematics
which would remain if one removed certain methods not acceptable to the intuitionists. On
the contrary, intuitionistic mathematics replaces those methods by other ones that lead to re-
sults which find no counterpart in classical mathematics” (Beth, 1965:89).
2 Dooyeweerd actually distinguishes three transcendental ideas: an idea of the cohering diver-
sity within creation, an idea of the radical unity and totality of meaning of creation and an idea
of the Origin of the univserse.
3 In the standard text book on logic written by Copi these three principle are characterized in
terms of truth and falsity. “The principle of identity asserts that if any statement is true, then it
is true; The principle of contradiction asserts that no statement can be both true and false; The
principle of the excluded middle asserts that any statement is either true or false (Copi,
1994:372).
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Chapter 5
When someone responds to a charge by making the same or a similar charge

the tu quoque fallacy is committed. The ad ignorantiam fallacy jumps from a
lacking proof that p is true that in fact it is false (or the other way around, it
concludes that if there is not proof that p is false then it is true).
Perhaps one of the best known informal fallacies is the case where the con-
clusion simply repeats the premises, i.e., when one assumes what one wants to
proof (petitio principii). It is also known as begging the question. The fallacy
of equivocation tempts one to produce an absurdity with the appearance of va-
lidity. For example, one can easily “prove” that a bug (the famous German VW
car) is better than a Mercedes. The arguments runs as follows:
Premiss 1: Nothing is better than a Mercedes
Premiss 2: A VW is better than nothing.
Ergo: A VW is better than a Mercedes.
An abuse of the principle of the excluded middle (tertium non datur) can
“prove” that the Moon is made out of cheese:
Premiss 1: The Moon is either made of cheese or it is not made of chesse
Premiss 2: We all know the Moon is not made of cheese (and since there is no
third option)
Conclusion: Therefore the Moon is made of cheese.
The equivocation in the first argument is found in the ambiguity of the word
“nothing” whereas the second one misinterpreted the connection between ne-
gation and the absence of a third option.
Particularly in the fallacy of inconsistency the logical principles of identity
and non-contradiction directly applies. Of course the acceptance of (logical)
principles presupposes the distinction between the law side (in this case: norm
side) of an aspect and the factual side correlated with and subjected to it.1
Moreover, the idea of modal analogies discussed in Chapter 3 can now be dif-
ferentiated by distinguishing between analogies on the law side or norm side
and analogies at the factual side.
For example, the first law of thermodynamics, known as the law of energy-
conservation, solely intends to state that energy cannot be created or annihi-
lated, i.e., that the amount of energy in the universe will remain the same, it
wil stay constant. However, we noted that constancy reflects the core meaning
of the kinematic aspect, and that it prompted Einstein to postulate the con-
stancy of the velocity of light in a vacuum. Whereas the term conservation
may mislead us to think of an energy-input (“holding-on-to”), the phrase en-
ergy constancy exactly expresses what this law is supposed to claim. On the
law side of the physical aspect this main law therefore embodies a retroci-
patory analogy of the foundational kinematic aspect.
On the norm side of the analytical aspect a numerical analogy is represented
by the awareness of a logical unity and multiplicity. The positive side of this
analogy provides the ultimate (modal-analogical) foundation for the logical
principle of identity (whatever is distinctly identified is identical to itself).
1 In all the post-sensitive modal aspects their law-sides are known as their norm-sides.
83
Based upon what is distinct the logical principle of contradiction demands that
whatever is distinct ought not to be considered as being identical. Clearly, the
numerical analogy on the norm side of the analytical aspect articulates both
unity and multiplicity and in doing that it provides a foundation for the two
mentioned logical principles underlying every analytical act of identification
and distinguishing. The freedom of choice evinced in the human ability to
identify and distinguish may identify and distinguish properly (correctly) or
improperly (incorrectly). The former is achieved when acts of identification
and distinguishing conform to the logical principles of identity and non-con-
tradiction, while the latter prevails whenever the normative appeal of these
principles is violated. The unity and diversity within reality thus make possi-
ble all identification and distinguishing – guided by the normative demand to
identify A with A and to distinguish A from non-A. Therefore, taking into
account their direct ontic foundation, the primary formulation of these two
principles may be phrased as follows (cf. PDD:300-303):
1) Identity: Within what is analyzable A is always identical to A.
2) Non-contradiction: Within what is analyzable A is never identical to
non-A.
As long as one merely considers the logical principles of identity and non-
contradiction (whether or not amended by the principle of the excluded mid-
dle), no material criterion of truth is available (i.e., regarding the content of an
argument), for in terms of these principles, one can at most (formally) affirm
that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time and
within the same context. Kant clearly understood this:
Therefore the purely logical criterion of truth, namely, the agreement of
knowledge with the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason,
is no doubt a condition sine qua non, or a negative condition of all truth. But
logic can go no further, and it has no test for discovering error with regard to
the contents, and not the form, of a proposition (Kant, 1787-B:84).
What refers thought irrevocably beyond logic is the principium rationis suffi-
cientis (also known as principium rationis determinantis and principium
reddendae rationis) – in English formulated as the “principle of sufficient rea-
son.” Dooyeweerd points out that this principle embodies, on the law side of
the logical-analytical aspect, an analogy from the physical aspect where the
relation between cause and effect is found (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:119).
The analytical principium rationais sufficientis, which rules the logical pro-
cess of concluding as its norm, is a real analytical principle of causality and
shows an inner retrocipatory meaning-coherence with the relation of cause
and effect in its original physical sense.
From the few examples contained in our present discussion a very important
insight emerges:
Every modal analogy (retrocipation or anticipation) on the law side of the nor-
mative aspects (from the logical up to and including the certitudinal aspect)
unveils a distinct modal principle.
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Chapter 5
Consider for a moment the foundational position of the sensory mode for logi-
cal analysis in the light of considerations of solidarity and critique.
5.7 Critical solidarity
The calling to be critical is perhaps one of the most influential legacies of the
18th century, also known as the era of Enlightenment. In the Preface to the first
edition of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Immanuel Kant appreciated his
own time as the true age of criticism:
Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything
must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its sanctity, and law on the
strength of its majesty, try to withdraw themselves from it; but by doing so
they arouse just suspicions, and cannot claim that sincere respect which reason
pays to those only who have been able to stand its free and open examination
(Kant, 1781:A-12 – translation F.M. Müller).
In practice being critical more often than not simply means that when you
read a scientific article or book or when you listen to a scholarly presentation
that you then notice differences of opinion. Picking up a book and finding
something you do not agree with within the first couple of pages is not all that
difficult. However, in order to be able really to benefit from the exercise of a
critical spirit, one first has to observe something more fundamental than cri-
tique, namely showing solidarity.
It is indeed much more difficult to highlight what is worthwhile in the
thought of a specific thinker, particularly if we accept the challenge to account
for it in terms of our own (different) perspective. In other words, if I want to
criticize Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Marx, I have to be able to appreciate posi-
tively what they have unveiled before it is meaningful to criticize the way in
which they have accounted for their constructive discoveries.
The import of these considerations is clear – without a sense of solidarity
the exercise of criticism is “cheap.” For that matter, a much larger effort is re-
quired if one really wants to understand a thinker good enough to be able to
appreciate positively what is worthwhile in the thought of such a person. In
other words, critique is only meaningful when it is embedded in solidarity.
Therefore the popular motto of critical thinking ought to be altered into the re-
quirement of critical solidarity – reflecting the emotional (sensitive) retroci-
pation on the norm side of the logical aspect.
It should be kept in mind that according to Dooyeweerd the principles
norming human life are neither human constructions nor are they local and in-
dividual. They are universal in the sense of not being restricted to any time or
place. Meaningful scholarly discourse and interaction are therefore also
normed by supra-individual standards or principles.
5.8 The possibility of Christian scholarship
Consider the following argumentation against the possibility of divergent
standpoints within scholarly disciplines – an argument rooted in the belief that
85
scholarship ought to be ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’. It runs as follows (cf.

PDD:287 ff.):
With an implicit appeal to the later Wittgenstein's idea of “language games”
one can argue that only those participants who accept the “rules of the game”
are allowed to join the realm of science. When it is asked which “rules” ought
to be followed, the mentioned three logical principles are specified.
However, we have noted that intuitionistic logic does not accept the universal
validity of the logical principle of the excluded middle.1 However, intuitio-
nistic mathematics and logic reject the idea of an infinite totality and without
accepting it the principle of the excluded middle loses it universality validity.
The crucial question here is: does intuitionism (with its logic) constitute a
valid standpoint in mathematics?
Suppose we apply the yardstick of the three mentioned logical principles to
this situation, that is, let us assume that only those who accept all three logical
principles qualify to play the game of science. Then the principle of the ex-
cluded middle implies that intuitionism either is or it is not a valid mathemati-
cal standpoint – there is no third possibility. Yet what is presupposed in this
application is an implication of the principle of non-contradiction, namely that
affirming and negating the scholarly status of intuitionism cannot both be true
at once. However, on the basis of the three given logical principles one does
not find sufficient grounds for the truth or falsity of two contradictory
statements.
On the basis of the initial argument, holding on to the first three logical
principles, the only other option left (next to disqualifying intuitionism as an
acceptable mathematical standpoint), is to accept it as a valid standpoint in
spite of the fact that it partially truncates the principle of the excluded middle
(thus implicitly applying the principle of the excluded middle, for here there is
no reference to an infinite totality). In other words, if the answer to the ques-
tion: whether or not intuitionism is a valid standpoint in mathematics? is affir-
mative, then the principle of non-contradiction is violated, and when it is ne-
gated, a new problem arises. Why it is not the case that intuitionism represents
the valid mathematical standpoint rather than the Cantorian (or axiomatic
formalistic) orientation? Is it unacceptable because the majority of mathema-
ticians are not intuitionists?
Unfortunately this option introduces a new “principle,” namely the major-
ity.2 Nonetheless it is simply impossible to provide a justification for the ma-
jority principle. At most recourse could be taken to a regressus in infinitum:
1 It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein followed Brouwer [see Wittgenstein, 1968:112 (par.352);
cp. p.127 (par.426)] and that the well-known analytical philosopher Dummett also supported
the intuitionistic approach (see Dummett, 1978) – not to mention prominent mathematicians
such as Weyl, Heyting, Van Dalen and Troelstra who continued to work within the legacy of
the intuitionistic mathematics of Brouwer.
2 Amongst the “rhetorical ploys and fallacies” discussed by Bowell and Kemp the “fallacy of
majority belief” is also mentioned (Bowell and Kemp, 2005:131 ff.).
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Chapter 5
Did the majority decide that what the majority believe is true? And: Did the
majority decide that the majority decide that what the majority decide is true?!
… and so on ad infinitum.
Clearly, although it is inevitable to accept the existence of universal princi-
ples for thinking, this does not entail that there is no room left for disagree-
ment about specific principles of reasoning. But the argumentation that we
have pursued demonstrates an instance of what is known as immanent criti-
cism, for it has shown that the claim concerning the objectivity and neutrality
of scholarship is self-defeating. Let us now explore the different types of criti-
cism that ought to guide meaningful scholarly communication in some more
detail. At the outset we mention the following types of criticism in order to
elucidate the requirements of meaningful and constructive scholarly commu-
nication: (a) immanent criticism; (b) factual criticism; and (c) transcendental
criticism.
5.9 Immanent criticism
The first and most basic meaning of immanent criticism is given in the task to
put yourself, so to speak, “in the shoes” of your conversation partner or oppo-
nent and then attempt to highlight the inconsistency or inconsistencies of that
position. It frequently happens that intellectual communication derails on the
basis of what is known as transcendent criticism. It amounts to critique for-
mulated in terms of one's own perspective without an attempt to involve the
perspective of one's conversation partner in the argument. The fruitless out-
come of transcendent criticism is aptly captured in the proverbial: “You say
this, and I say that, so what?” A few examples of immanent criticism may help
us to understand it better.
5.9.1 Examples
5.9.1.1 Descartes' proof for the existence of God
In his Meditations III Descartes posits as general rule, that all that is very
clearly and distinctly apprehended (conceived) is true. To the question what
guarantees the truth of clear and distinct thought? Descartes answers that God
will not deceive us and he then proceeds to argue that of all the ideas in the hu-
man mind the idea of God is the clearest and most distinct (see Descartes,
1965:95-96; 100) This results in begging the question (circular reasoning),
for the existence of God is dependent upon the truth of clear and distinct
thinking, while the truth of clear and distinct thinking depends upon (the exis-
tence of) the non-deceiving God. We noted above that this kind of argument,
where the conclusion is presupposed in one of its premises, is also known as a
petitio principii.
5.9.1.2 Postmodernism
The motive of logical creation was dominant in nominalistic trends of
thought since Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant explored its rationalistic
87
implications.1 Early modern philosophy elevated human reason to become the

(formal) law-giver of the world. Impressed by Galileo's ability to derive the
law of inertia from a thought-experiment – concerning a body in motion that
will continue its motion endlessly if the path is extended into infinity – Im-
manuel Kant drew the radical conclusion: if, from the spontaneous subjectiv-
ity of human thought, one can derive the law of inertia and apply it to the mov-
ing “objects” in nature, then the laws of nature must be present in human
thought a priori (i.e., before all experience). Kant explicitly states: “Under-
standing creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to na-
ture” (Kant, 1783, II:320; § 36). The irrationalistic side of nominalism, em-
phasizing the unique individuality of events, inspired the idea of the “social
construction of reality” – a line moving from Kant and Husserl to Schutz,
Berger and Luckmann.2 Consequently, the contemporary “postmodern” idea
that we create the world we live in (either through thought or through lan-
guage) merely continues core elements of (early) modern philosophy!
This entire development hinges on the ambivalent nature of modern nomi-
nalism – outside the human mind it rejects all universality – universality is
only immanent to human consciousness, either as universal concepts or as
universal words. Outside the human mind things and events in their unique
contingency, singularity and individuality are found.
The following immanent criticism can be raised against the stance of nomi-
nalism. In order to make its claim nominalism implicitly had to hang on to one
element of universality outside the human mind – the being individual of ev-
erything! Being individual is a universal property applying to every individ-
ual.
5.9.1.3 Relativism and Historicism
The relativist statement: “There is no truth” is famous for its self-defeating na-
ture. Ernst Gellner underscores it with his remark: “Notoriously there is no
room for the assertion of relativism itself in a world in which relativism is
true” (Gellner, 1985:85).
The position of relativism is reinforced by modern historicism in its claim
that everything is caught up in the never-ceasing process of (historical)
change, including legal practices , moral convictions, aesthetic standards, and
economic principles. However, immanent criticism points out that only that
which is not intrinsically historical in nature can have a history. Therefore, if
everything is history, nothing is left that can have a history and thus
1 Thomas Hobbes is particularly known for his totalitarian view of the state as it is developed in
his book Leviathan (1651).
2 In Husserl's thought this idea of construction was still conceived of in a rationalistic way. Ex-
istential phenomenology (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre), on the other hand, trans-
formed Husserl's rationalism into an irrationalistic perspective.
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Chapter 5
historicism achieves the opposite of what it aimed for. Instead of historicizing

everything nothing historical is left.1
5.9.1.4 Moral commandments and natural law
Within modern Roman Catholic moral philosophy the conviction is found that
from the moral law (the “decalogue”) rules of “natural law” could be derived
(see in this connection Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:162-163). Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274) holds that derivations such as these could be made by using com-
mandments like “You shall not murder,” “You shall not commit adultery,”
and “You shall not steal.” What he did not realize is that the concepts murder,
adultery and steal presuppose unlawfulness in a jural sense. The prohibition
of murder requires that one ought not to show such a lack of love and care to-
wards one's neighbour that the desire to intentionally slay such a person
arises. But when it is attempted to reduce the moral meaning of this com-
mandment to the jural an antinomy appears, since the meaning of morality
presupposes the jural sense of unlawfulness. In order to side-step this
antinomy, Victor Cathrein suggested that it is forbidden to murder unlawfully
(Cathrein, 1909:223). However, since the concept “murder” presupposes the
jural element of unlawfulness (murder = unlawful killing), this escape-route
continues to be antinomic. The possibility of an unlawful “murder” entails
that its opposite is also possible: “lawful murdering.” But since murder = un-
lawful killing the construction of “lawful murdering” boils down to the fol-
lowing entailed logical contradiction: “lawful-unlawful killing.”
The last example introduced a new term, the term antinomy, to our discus-
sion. It is not meant to be synonymous with a contradiction. As an example of
a contradiction Cassirer refers to a “rundes Viereck” (a “round square”) (Cas-
sirer, 1910:16), thus slightly altering the original example given by Kant in
1783.2 The implication of this difference is that the confusing two spatial fig-
ures is merely contradictory, because circles, squares and triangles are all ap-
pearing within one aspect of our experience – the spatial aspect.
However, when two distinct aspects are confused something worse hap-
pens, for then we meet a clash of laws. For this reason the attempt to reduce
one aspect to a different one inevitably results in an antinomy (anti = against;
nomos = law). An antinomy necessarily expresses itself in contradictions, but
not all contradictions presuppose an antinomy. The classical example of an
antinomy was mentioned above – it has already surfaced in the school of Par-
menides in Greek thought where Zeno, an adherent of Parmenides, argued
1 A comprehensive critique of historicism and pragmatism is found in Clouser 2005. His clos-
ing statement reads: “Therefore I find that Rorty has failed to rescue historicism from the
incoherencies native to it. Its central claims are still self-referentially, self-assumptively, and
self-performatively incoherent, and Rorty's additions to them only compound the difficulties
by being mutually inconsistent” (Clouser, 2005:19).
2 Immanuel Kant mentions the illogical concept of a “square circle” (Kant, 1783:341; § 52b).
Remember that contraries like logical – illogical, polite – impolite, legal – illegal, etc. are all
founded on the logical principle of non-contradiction.
89
against multiplicity and movement (see above pages 77-78). The antinomy in-
volved in Zeno's arguments resulted in the elimination of the meaning of mo-
tion, for it turned out that something (identified with the place it occupies) can
move if and only if it cannot move. Since we have referred to the aspects of
our experiential world as modes of being or as modalities, it is clear that
whereas a contradiction is always intra-modal in nature, an antinomy is al-
ways inter-modal. Moreover, recognizing an antinomy presupposes an in-
sight into unique (and irreducible) modal aspects – without denying their mu-
tual coherence. However, these considerations transcend the scope of the first
three logical principles for they make an appeal to the ontological principle of
the excluded antinomy (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:37 ff.).
5.9.2 Does the first three logical principles provide a material
criterion of truth?
The logical principles of identity and non-contradiction (whether or not
amended by the principle of the excluded middle), do not provide a material
criterion of truth, that is, regarding the content of an argument. In terms of
these principles, one can at most (formally) affirm that two contradictory
statements cannot both be true at the same time and within the same context
(see PDD:285-286). Kant clearly understood this:
Therefore the purely logical criterion of truth, namely, the agreement of
knowledge with the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason,
is no doubt a condition sine qua non, or a negative condition of all truth. But
logic can go no further, and it has no test for discovering error with regard to
the contents, and not the form, of a proposition (Kant, 1787-B:84).
What refers thought irrevocably beyond logic is the principium rationis suffi-
cientis (also known as principium rationis determinantis and principium
reddendae rationis) – in English described as the “principle of sufficient rea-
son.”
This principle, originally formulated by Leibniz, was subjected to an exten-
sive investigation by A. Schopenhauer in 1813. He called it the principle of
sufficient ground of knowledge (principium rationis sufficientis cognoscen-
di):
As such it asserts that, if a judgement is to express a piece of knowledge, it
must have sufficient ground or reason (Grund); by virtue of this quality, it then
receives the predicate true. Truth is therefore the reference of a judgement to
something different therefrom. This something is called the ground or reason
of the judgement ... (Schopenhauer, 1974:156).
People are often tempted to think that logic is decisive when a “good argu-
ment” is mentioned. Since an argument by itself merely links premises and
conclusions – either in a valid or in invalid way – the “goodness” of an argu-
ment does not convey an assessment regarding the reliability of the premisses
or the conclusions. The latter requires proper distinctions in respect of the
ontic nature of the diversity within reality – and the said distinctions ulti-
mately reflect the worldview of a person.
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Chapter 5
If the principium rationis sufficientis refers thinking beyond the limits of

pure logicality, the logical principle of non-contradiction is founded in an un-
derlying ontical principle, namely the principle forbidding inter-modal reduc-
tions – where the latter invariably result in antinomies (see Dooyeweerd,
1997-II: 36 ff.). This principle is ontical in nature and should be called the
ontical principle of the excluded antinomy (principium exclusae antinomiae).
The perennial philosophical problem of explaining the coherence of what is
unique and irreducible (the “coherence of irreducibles”) therefore opens the
way to an acknowledgment of the foundational position of the principium ex-
clusae antinomiae in respect of the logical principle of non-contradiction –
and at once explains why the distinction between antinomy and contradiction
is not purely logical. The principium exclusae antinomiae not only depicts the
limits of logic, but also underscores the significance of a non-reductionistic
ontology transcending the confines of logic. Ontological reductionism vio-
lates the principium exclusae antinomiae and it leads to disastrous conse-
quences, entailing all kinds of logical contradictions. Even if we disregard
possible underlying antinomies, a negation of the principle of non-contradic-
tion is equally devastating. Hersh remarks: “From any contradiction, all prop-
ositions (and their negations) follow! Everything's both true and false! The
theory collapses in ruins” (Hersh, 1997:31).
The alternative to (antinomic) reductionism is given in an analysis of inter-
modal connections presupposing their irreducibility. One of the richest impli-
cations enclosed in such an analysis is the fact that it is possible to come to a
theoretical articulation of modal norms on the basis of analyzing analogies
(retro- and antecipations) on the norm side of the normative aspects of reality.
Questions
1. Why does the definition of an academic discipline not belong to the descipline defined?
2. Explain the uniqueness and coherence of modal aspects with referencee to the physical and bi-
otical aspects of reality.
3. IIlustrate the indefinability of the meaning-nucleus of an aspect with reference to number, space,
movement, analyticity, meaning, the aesthetic and the jural.
4. What are the requirements for meaningful scholarly discourse?
5. How can one argue for the possibility of Christian scholarship?
6. Discuss examples of immanent criticism.
7. Why are the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and the excluded middle incapable to
secure the truth of an inference?
91
92
The Nature and succession of
Modal Aspects
Chapter 6
A brief sketch of the key elements contained within the structure of a modal
aspect is followed by a more extensive explanation of the order of succession
between the varous modal aspects of reality. The numerical aspect does not
have any retrocipations because it is foundational to all the other aspects of re-
ality. For this reason both the idea of spatial dimensions (one, two, three and so
on) as well as spatial magnitude (length, surface, volume) can only be con-
ceived on the basis of our awareness of the one and the many (number). The
two basic meanings of infinity – the successive infinite and the at once infinite
– only became clear through an analysis of the connections between number
and space. The well-known combination of constancy and change is con-
nected to the main contours of philosophy and the discipline of physics, and
ultimately constancy and change relate to the uniqueness of the kinematic and
physical aspects. Likewise the foundational positions of the other aspects of
reality are subsequently discussed, with a slightly more extensive elaboration
of some arguments supporting the succession between the logical-analytical,
the cultural-historical and the sign-modes of reality.
6.1 Characterizing an aspect
By following the footsteps of Dooyeweerd in his exploration of the intercon-
nections between different aspects, reflected in the analogical basic concepts
of the various academic desciplines, we are exploring the opportunity to pres-
ent his systematic philosophy from a different angle. While acknowledging
the inseparability of uniqueness and coherence, expressed in the principles of
sphere sovereignty and sphere universality, Dooyeweerd explored their rela-
tionship from the perspective of their intermodal coherence, foremost elabo-
rated in the elementary or analogical basic concepts of the science of law.
From the existence of these analogies it is clear that the idea of a modal as-
pect has to include them as structural elements within its general structure.
From our analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we know that within each aspect one
can distinguish between its law side (norm side) and factual side. The core
meaning of an aspect, its meaning nucleus, qualifies all the interconnections
between a specific aspect and the other aspects.
These interconnections are differentiated into two distinct groups, namely
those pointing backwards and those point forwards, respectively designated
as retrocipations and anticipations (see Chapter 4). The exceptions are the nu-
merical and fiduciary aspects – the former only has ancitipations and latter
only retrocipations.
93
The important implication entailed in the nature of retrocipations and anti-

cipations is that the modal aspects of reality are not given at random, for they
are structured in an irreversible order of succession. Only if some are earlier
and others later in the order of aspects does it make sense to speak of retroci-
pations and anticipations. In this Chapter we shall concentrate on the succes-
sion of aspects and in Chapter 7 the order of succession between will be re-
lated to Dooyeweerd's philosophy of (cosmic) time.
6.2 The order of succession between the aspects
If there is such an order of succession between aspects, then it will be constitu-
tive for those structural elements within each aspect referring to the other as-
pects, either as retrocipations or as anticipations. A brief analysis of this order
of succession will therefore be crucially dependent upon the mentioned analo-
gies.
In Chapter 5 we have seen that Dooyeweerd suggested that the core mean-
ing of the numerical aspect should be indicated as discrete quantity. Apart
from the ability to count, made possible by this aspect, our everyday aware-
ness of the one and the many primarily reflects the irreducible meaning of
number. At the same time it is clear that discreteness is different from continu-
ity. Yet, continuity only reveals its meaning while analogically reflecting the
meaning of number. The same is not true of number, for the one and the many
does not presuppose continuous extension.
Continuous extension is normally measured by assigning a number to it, for
example when a line is said to be three centimeters long. This line represents
one dimensional extension (it is a sptial subject), which ought to be distin-
guished from extension in other dimensions (such as the size of a surface or a
volume). Of course a line is not the measure of its extension, which means that
it is mistaken to say that a line is the “shortest distance between two points.”
Distance is an analogy of number within space. Likewise, specifying the order
of extension reveals a numerical analogy (on the law side) of space – such as
one or more dimensions. Without the foundational coherence between space
and number the numbers 1, 2 and 3 cannot be used to speak of one dimen-
sional space, two or three dimensional space. In addition, the successive divi-
sions, allowed by a continuously extended spatial subject, not only shows its
infinite divisibility, but also analogically reflects the numerical meaning of the
(successive) infinite.
That both these aspects are presupposed within the structure of the kine-
matic aspect of uniform motion, can be seen from the thought experiment
used by Galileo in 1638, where he contemplated the movement of a body on a
path that is extended into infinity. Clearly the terms “path” and “extended”
designate the spatial foundation, while the term “infinity” captures the numer-
ical foundation of the kinematic aspect.
Regarding the relation between the kinematic and physical aspects we al-
ready argued that change can only be detected on the basis of constancy –
showing that the kinematical aspect is foundational to the physical aspect.
94
Chapter 6
It is interesting to note in his Isagogè Philosophiae from 1930, Vollenho-

ven had already distinguished between the mechanical and the physical
(energetical) aspects, but in the 1936 edition, this distinction no longer ap-
pears (cf. Bril, 1973:216).1 Eventually, round about 1950, Dooyeweerd again
introduced this distinction. However, as early as 1930 Dooyeweerd appar-
ently already had contemplated this distinction (Dooyeweerd, 1930:249).
The distinction between the kinematic and the physical (energetic) is fairly
common in natural scientific circles. Max Planck, for example, sharply and
correctly distinguishes between a “mechanical” and an “energetical” view of
nature (Planck, 1973:65). In a different context, Janich also draws a clear dis-
tinction between phoronomic and dynamic statements (Janich, 1975:68-69).
The discovery of the irreducibility of the kinematic function of reality actu-
ally occurred in an indirect way, because it was concealed in Plato's intellec-
tual struggle with the relationship between constancy and change. Early
Greek philosophy has already challenged the awareness of the persistence of
entities – the fact that entities endure over time – by arguing that, whatever
there is, is in constant flux (Heraclitus, see Diels-Kranz, B Fr.90). It was
Cratylus, a younger contemporary of Socrates and associate teacher of Plato,
who caused the latter to come to a one-sided understanding of the view of He-
raclitus. Cratylus interpreted Heraclitus to say that all perceivable things are
in a process of change and that they are therefore unknowable. In order to se-
cure the possibility of knowledge Plato had to postulate the enduring essential
(ontic) being of things (their static eidos) – which is supposed not to be subject
to change (Cratylus, 439 c – 440 a). Without an awareness of endurance (per-
sistence), the very notion of change becomes problematic, for the difficult
question then is: ‘what’ changes? Someone ageing can only claim to be age-
ing because there is a constant reference to the same ageing person.
Clearly, as we have seen above, one can detect changes only on the basis of
constancy. This is the brilliant insight of Plato's theory of ideas. While we may
distance ourselves from the speculative (metaphysical) construction of tran-
scendent ideal forms (static essences), we still have to account for the insight
that change rests on constancy.
Once the kinematic mode is acknowledged, it is realized that asking about
the cause of motion is just as meaningless as the classical opposition of rest
and motion, for “rest” and “motion” are both “states of motion” (see Stafleu,
1987:58).2 Alternatively, it will not help to consider “space” and “motion” as
“opposites,” because two irreducible modal functions (such as the spatial and
the kinematic) are never opposites.
1 In 1968, Vollenhoven says that he has “no objection against the succession of the mechanical
as the lower and the energetical as the higher” (Vollenhoven, 1968:3). He holds that, in addi-
tion to force (causing acceleration or deceleration), something else is at stake: a change of di-
rection.
2 In a letter to Moritz Schlick (June 7, 1920) Einstein writes: “Rest is a dynamic event in which
the velocities are constantly zero, one that for our consideration is, in principle, equivalent to
any other event of motion” (Einstein, 2006:186).
95
Thus far we have formulated arguments to substantiate the order of succes-

sion of the first four modal aspects, namely the quantitative, the spatial, the ki-
nematic and the physical. That the biotical aspect succeeds the physical is eas-
ily seen as soon as the fact is contemplated that all living entities display their
biotic functioning only on the basis of their physico-chemical constituents –
often referred to as their ”building blocks.” This foundational interconnection
provides the basis for the disciplines of biochemistry and biophysics, for they
are interested in the biotically directed functions of the physical constituents
of living entities, and, at least in principle, therefore,1 should not merely inves-
tigate the macromolecular structures of the complex conformations found in
living entities.
The foundational role of the physical aspect in respect of the biotical func-
tion of reality implicitly challenges the most basic claim of vitalistic and neo-
vitalistic trends in modern biology, because the claim that there is something
“immaterial” responsible for the uniqueness of vital phenomena is contra-
dicted when this “immaterial entelechie” is designated as a “vital force.” In
displaying a constitutive interconnection between the biotical and the physi-
cal aspects this expression cannot capture an “immaterial reality” simply be-
cause the term “force,” as we noted (see pages 31, 32, 33, 71 above), analogi-
cally reflects the meaning of the foundational physical aspect.
Being alive, getting ill and dying are also expressed within the physical as-
pect of reality. Yet, the latter in principle cannot capture the unique (and irre-
ducible) meaning of the biotic aspect. Von Bertalanffy points out that
macromolecules, such as DNA molecules, proteins, and enzymes, are subject
to physical and chemical laws. Yet, the physics of macromolecules cannot tell
the difference between a living, sick or dead dog, “none is better, healthier or
more normal than the other” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:146).
Sensitivity presupposes sense organs but cannot be reduced to the organic
functioning of such organs. Senses are embedded in consciousness and they
are related to feelings and emotions. As such they form the basis of all those
aspects in which human beings alone actively function as subjects. Animal
experience of the world is restricted to that which is negotiable and not nego-
tiable, edible and inedible and solely pertains to animals of the same sex and
those of the opposite sex, as well as what is experienced as comforting or
alarming. The absence of a nervous system in plants shows that animals, as
sentient creatures, are characterized by the sensitive (psychic) mode of reality.
This also supports the insight that the latter aspect succeeds the biotical aspect
within the cosmic order of aspects.
The logical-analytical aspect is the first normative aspect. Logical norms or
principles can be obeyed or violated and in that sense this aspect is founda-
tional to all the post-logical aspects. Concepts are logical-analytical configu-
rations. A concept comes into existence through a logical act of identification,
and always entails a claim to universality. Recall the concept of a triangle,
which applies to any and all triangles – wherever and whenever. Concepts are
1 In practice, biochemists actually also do what ought to be done by organic chemistry.
96
Chapter 6
either logically sound or they are illogical. Because contraries other than the
analytical ones (such as polite – impolite, legal – illegal, moral – immoral, and
so on) are founded in the logical-analytical aspect, all the other normative as-
pects succeed the logical aspect in the order of modalities.
The first aspect after the logical aspect is the cultural historical mode.
Within this aspect of formative power and control (culture), it is necessary to
identify means and ends and to distinguish between them. Culturally forma-
tive activities therefore presupposes the analytical ability to identify and dis-
tinguish means and ends.
The nuancefulness (many-sidedness) displayed by signs (and their lingual
usages) is responsible for the peculiar semantic domains of words in a specific
language. The free formative (human) imagination, embodied in language,
causes similar words in different languages to develop different semantic do-
mains, and this reality is one of the main difficulties involved in translation.
What is important for language is that any given word, with its own semantic
domain, is always dependent upon other words “surrounding” that word, ow-
ing to a lingual coherence making possible language as a sign system (this
phrase represents an analogy of space within the sign mode).
According to De Saussure there are no similarities in language. He claims
that “in language there are only differences” (De Saussure, 1966:120). This
view coheres with his conviction that “[L]anguage is a system of interdepen-
dent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simulta-
neous presence of the others” – this intrinsic coherence within language as a
system opposes the view that “language could be reduced to a simple naming
process” (De Saussure, 1966:114). The latter may appear within the sign
mode when it functions in an undisclosed way, i.e., not yet opened up towards
the modal function succeeding it within the cosmic order, namely the social
aspect. The core meaning of the sign mode concerns the as-sign-ment of
meaning. However, once this assignment is shared by a linguistic community
(that is to say, when the social aspect has deepend the meaning of the sign
mode), language in its socially disclosed meaning is encountered.
However, at this point we have to point out that the attentive reader may
question the order of succession between the logical, cultural-historical and
sign modes of reality.
6.2.1 The order relation between the logical, cultural-historical
and the lingual aspects
Let us commence by quoting a few succinct remarks found in the 15th edition
of the Encyclopedia Britannica on metaphor. It is first of all described as a
“figure of speech” based upon “an implicit comparison of two unlike entities”
(Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, 1975:831). The specification “unlike”
precludes entities of the same type but does not deny that similar (kinds of) en-
97
tities are still distinct.1 This article proceeds by saying that a “metaphor makes
a qualitative leap from a reasonable, perhaps prosaic comparison, to an identi-
fication or fusion of two objects,” that is, “to make one new entity partaking of
the characteristics of both.” While the words “like” or “as” marks the explicit
comparison present in a simile, the word “is” designates the subtle identifica-
tion present in a metaphor. But do we really get a new entity?2 It is therefore
not surprising that this Encyclopedia Britannica article records that many
“critics regard the making of metaphors as a system of thought antedating or
bypassing logic.”
Of course the decisive question is: what kind of “identification” takes place
in metaphorical language use? If it is understood in a strictly logical sense, the
inevitable conclusion would be that something illogical is involved. Max
Black discerns something similar in a metaphorical statement: “So perhaps
the ‘mystery’ is simply that, taken as literal, a metaphorical statement appears
to be perversely asserting something to be what it is plainly known not to be”
(Black, 1979:21). What Black calls “taken as literal” could be rephrased by
pointing out that asserting the impossible appears to be prominent when meta-
phorical language is understood in a strictly logical sense. This suggests that
the logical mode of identifying and distinguishing is intimately connected to
metaphors even if it cannot be equated with it. How are we to disentangle the
thought and lingual elements co-conditioning metaphorical language use?
It does not help to argue that thinking and speaking function in all aspects of
reality, because this insight does not elucidate the order relation between the
logical and the lingual as such. However, we are getting closer to an under-
standing of this problem when we consider the fact that the logical sense of
children appears to develop more rapidly than their linguistic abilities and
competence. Consider the following striking example. A little girl, who first
notices a pigeon and learns its name, can abstract “concretely,” for instance
when she shortly thereafter refers to a shrike as a pigeon. The child actually
designates the concept “bird” with the name (verbal sign) “pigeon”. This is
only possible because, from the concrete sensorially perceived image of a pi-
geon, the girl has lifted out certain bird-characteristics, e.g. a beak, wings,
feathers, while simultaneously relinquishing the specific characteristics that
distinguish a pigeon from a shrike.
This kind of abstraction is part of our everyday life, since ordinary people
are continually classifying (identifying) all sorts of entities by placing them
within certain categories. Otherwise, how would one be able to identify a par-
ticular horse as a horse (= belonging to the category of horses), or a particular
car as a car? Without general concepts, such as cars and horses (in which the
1 Suppose we consider the category of “flying entities,” then one may encounter the metaphor
in which reference is made to the “wing” of the aero plane. It seems as if we have a higher
level similarity and a lower level difference – “flying” encompasses both natural and artifi-
cial flying entities.
2 When a metaphor is understood as a form of predication then the problem of “illogical” iden-
tification disappears (see Köller, 1975).
98
Chapter 6
detail of particular cars and horses are relinquished), this would be impossi-
ble.
This example shows that within the intellectual development of human be-
ings, logical concept formation precedes matching lingual abilities. Viewed
from the perspective of the distinctness and coherence between modal as-
pects, language use is built upon the basis of logical skills. 1
All language, including metaphorical language use, is based upon the abil-
ity of lingual identification and lingual distinguishing. The elements of identi-
fication and distinguishing, as we have mentioned above, indeed point at the
nature of the logical aspect. Confusing spatial figures is contradictory – con-
sider the classical, above mentioned (see page 89) example of Immanuel Kant
of a “square circle.” Yet, in a lingual context, we may find a “square circle” in
the well-known metaphor of a “boxing ring”!
In a different context, Dooyeweerd advances another argument for posi-
tioning the cultural-historical aspect (and the lingual aspect) after the logi-
cal-analytical aspect. He refers to instances in which the process of meaning
disclosure manifests itself within the cultural-historical and post-cultural-his-
torical aspects, without affecting a deepening of non-theoretical thought to the
level of the systematic mastery of a given cognitive domain. Because forma-
tive control (mastery) reveals the nuclear meaning of the historical aspect, and
since scholarly reflection requires this deepened meaning of analysis, it must
be clear that the rise of truly scientific thought is dependent upon the disclo-
sure of the logical-analytical mode, anticipating the meaning of the historical
modality as an aspect coming after the logical aspect in the order of cosmic
time. It is therefore also striking that the historicistic mode of thought accepts
science as a “cultural factor” – to the exclusion of non-scientific thought
(Dooyeweerd, 1938:33; cf. p. 61, footnotes 49 and 50).
6.2.2 Communication – the “marriage” between the
sign mode and the post-lingual aspects
The nature of communication, which is often characterized as a sharing of
meaning, clearly shows that the social aspect has its foundation in the sign
mode of reality. On the other hand we can infer that it comes before the eco-
nomic function since the relative scarcity of economic means always reveals
itself within an inter-human context – making possible the concept of eco-
nomic value (eventually captured by the term “price”).
1 Within the language Afrikaans, a quite interesting example of this foundational relationship
is found. The double negation in the Afrikaans language generates a logic peculiar to the lan-
guage itself. It is found that relatively young children (3-5), who display a clear sense of logi-
cal consistency and logical soundness, answer questions phrased in terms of the double nega-
tion with “yes,” where older children and adults, who matured lingually to such an extent that
they are “at home” with the (apparently ‘illogical’) double negation of Afrikaans, would say
“no.” In Afrikaans one may ask: “Is jy nie honger nie?” [“Aren’t you hungry?”] A young
child will answer yes whereas more mature language users would say no.
99
The possibility of assigning certain meanings to particular verbal sounds or

letter combinations enable lingual acts of naming. But it is only when such
signs are shared by multiple sign users in mutual communication, that lan-
guage as such emerges. Language is therefore inherently dependent upon the
social disclosure of the sign mode – as Wittgenstein argued, there is no “pri-
vate” language.
Societal differentiation is reflected in the lingual differentiation of various
lingual domains, such as scientific language, legal language, economic lan-
guage, the language of faith, and so on. The growing complexity of languages
eventually benefit from the deepened meaning of lingual economy – evi-
denced in “sign frugality,” such as found in the employment of morphemes.
Since the use of morphemes enables the creation of new words on the basis
of existing ones, the lingual economy achieved by doing this relieves human
memory of impossible burdens (also see the remarks of Van Heerden,
1965:37). A thorough systematic analysis of this anticipatory moment is
found in Weideman 2007.
In the development of rhyme, alliteration and assonance, a disclosure of
the meaning of the sign mode under the guidance of the aesthetic aspect takes
place. The jural antecipation within the sign mode binds the lingual use of
words and phrases to their proper contexts, requiring the choice of appropri-
ate options. Choices like these provide the jural grounds for lingual honesty in
the formation of phrases and lingual expressions, emphasizing that words
ought to be faithful1 to the meaning nuances constituting their semantic do-
mains2 – setting limits even to the metaphorical use of words.
Within the aesthetic aspect, there are three antecipatory moments. If a work
of art does not do justice to the nuancefulness of created reality in an aesthetic
sense, it displays an un-aesthetic trait. Likewise, an artwork lacking aesthetic
integrity and aesthetic honesty (moral antecipations within the aesthetic
mode) can never be convincing in an aesthetic sense (the certitudinal ante-
cipation).
Highlighting the anticipations within the sign-mode implicitly gave expres-
sion to the order of succession prevailing between them – as briefly made ex-
plicit below.
Avoiding excesses in an aesthetic sense, furthermore, shows that the eco-
nomic aspect is foundational to the aesthetic mode. The jural aspect, in turn,
finds its immediate foundation in the aesthetic mode, because the jural mean-
ing of law in a public legal sense (bound to the typical nature of the state) rests
on the basis of a harmonization of a multiplicity of legal interests within the
territory of the state. Since the quantitative analogy in the jural aspect is given
in the nature of a legal order (a unity in the multiplicity of legal norms), and
since the legal system is integrated into a ju(ridic)al whole with its jural parts
(the spatial analogy), it must be clear that the term ‘harmonization’ cannot be
1 Note the certitudinal antecipation within the sign mode.
2 A semantic domain represents a spatial retrocipation within the sign mode.
100
Chapter 6
seen as an analogical reflection of the aspects of number and space within the
jural aspect. The only meaningful seat of this analogical term is given within
the aesthetical aspect.
Moreover, the jural aspect itself precedes the moral aspect, because those
kinds of moral wrongs familiar to human societies, such as theft, murder, etc.,
always inherently bring with them the (analogical jural) element of unlawful-
ness. The way in which an unethical action differs from an unlawful deed will
be explained when we investigate the relationship between law and morality.
Finally, the certitudinal aspect, as the limiting aspect of the modal cosmic or-
der, finds its immediate modal foundation in the ethical aspect. The modal
structure of the faith aspect presupposes all the foundational cosmic modali-
ties, and at the same time it points beyond them to what is believed to be the ul-
timate origin and destination of the universe.
Questions:
1) How does the retrocipatios and anticipations between aspects serve our understanding of the or-
der of succession between the first four asppects?
2) Which arguments are used in an account of the succession between the biotic and sensory
modes?
3) Is it possible to substantiate the foundational order bwteeen die logical-analytical, the cul-
tural-historical and the sign modes?
4) In what sense can one see communication as a ‘marriage’ between the sign mode and the social
mode?
101
102
Time and Modal Aspects
Chapter 7
Traditionally the the problem of time considered the contrast between time
(associated with succession) and eternity (associated with simultaneity) (from
Parmenides, and via Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Kierkegaard up to Witt-
genstein and what theologians presuppose without being aware of it). It may
appear as if time measurement can help us to understand what time is. How-
ever, the historical development of time measurement alternatively explored
different routes – such as counting the days, weeks, months and years, estab-
lishing relative positions (the sundial), employing the constant movement of a
pendulum (mechanical clock work), and using the irreversibility of radio-ac-
tive decay (atomic clocks). However, our awareness of time exceeds the con-
fines of physical time. Just think of the heterogenous life cycle of living enti-
ties (coming into being, growing, maturing, ageing and dying) that differs
from (homogenous) physical time. Likewise emotional time is different from
physical time, for an hour can feel like five minutes and vice versa. Since
Hegel introduced the concept of “geschichtliche Zeit” (historical time) think-
ers like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, and many others followed this char-
acterization. It will be argued that physical time cannot be elevated to true or
the only genuine time. In order to substantiate this perspective other modes of
time will be discussed – such as jural time. Since it appears that all definitions
of “time” are simply definitions of diverse facets or modes of time, the Augus-
tinian question still remains to be answered: what is time really? A possible
answer to this question finally explores the multi-dimensional nature of time –
acknowledging that there are idneed multiple modes of time and concludes by
highlighting the difference between the diverse concepts of time we may have
and the concept-transcending nature of the underlying dimensions of cosmic
time, that is, the fact that ultimately we can approximate time solely in a con-
cept-transcending idea.
7.1 Time and eternity
When philosophers reflect on the problem of time it is customary to refer to
Augustine who said: “What then is time? I know well enough what it is, pro-
vided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am
baffled” (Augustine, 1983 XI:14). Time is normally associated with what is
known as the “passage of time” – based on the implicit presupposition that the
future passes through the present into the past.
Augustine also stated here: if the present was always present without mov-
ing on (to the past), it would not be time but eternity. This shows that he stands
within the tradition of seeing eternity as the timeless present. Already before
Augustine the distinction between time and eternity was articulated in terms
of the difference between succession and simultaneity. It is found in the B
103
Fragments of Parmenides (520-450) (see Diels-Kranz, B Fr. 8:3-6) and fur-

ther explored by Plotinus (Enneads III:7) where eternity is viewed as the time-
less present – a view that resounded via Boethuis (430-524) in the thought of
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) (eternity as the nunc aeternum, the eternal now)
and Wittgenstein, who said: “If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal
duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the
present” (Tractatus 6.4311).
Although the Bible does not explicitly attribute infinity to God, the theolog-
ical tradition deduces God's infinity from his omnipresence and eternity, with
immutability and timelessness as equally important, and related issues (see
Leftow, 2005:62 ff.). Eternity is understood in terms of two apparently oppos-
ing notions: as an endless period of time or as timelessness. These two notions,
on the one hand, may be related to the so-called Platonic and Aristotelian tra-
ditions, but actually should be appreciated in close coherence with the two
conceptions of infinity operative in the history of mathematics (and theology).
What I have in mind, is the opposition between what is designated as the po-
tential infinite and the actual infinite.1
7.2 The limitations involved in dating an event
Given the seemingly elusive nature of time, an escape route appears to be
available in the idea of time measurement (dating an event), for through it our
civilization managed to develop more familiar concepts in order to “conquer”
time. The history of time measurement provides the follwoing picture. Ini-
tially time was “captured” through counting – the days, weeks, months and
years. Numerical succession forms the basis of this practice. Then our aware-
ness of simultaneity surfaced, such as employed in sundials where the relative
positions of the sun, the dial and the shadows are explored. Subsequently, the
constant movement of the pendulum “ticked” off time duration uniformly
(constantly). Finally, we witnessed the emergence of atomic clocks, depend-
ent upon the irreversibility of radio-active decay (this irreversibility is also
known as the arrow of time). In all four instances of time measurement the im-
plicit presupposition remains that the future passes through the present into
the past.
Yet an account of creation is impossible in principle, for dating the sup-
posed primordial event (the “Big Bang”) to almost 14 billion years ago ap-
peals to time measurement and time measurement always involves the dura-
tion of a process as determined by a specific time order. Dooyeweerd consis-
tently emphasizes that any time duration is always delimited by and subject to
such a specific (correlated – determining and delimitng) time order. There-
1 As alternative designations of the potential and the actual infinite, with a larger intuitive clar-
ity, one may employ terms derived from speculations about God's infinity employed during
the 14th century – the successive infinite and the at once infinite. Compare the expressions in-
finitum successivum and infinitum simultaneum (see Maier, 1964:77-79). See also Strauss,
2009:239 ff.
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Chapter 7
fore, since dating presupposes this time order, the origination of this order it-
self cannot be dated.
7.3 Universal constants and units of measurement
The phases through which time measurement developed, reflecting different
modes of explanation, can be correlated with the units of measurement identi-
fied by Lorenzen in his protophysics. He distinguishes four units which reflect
the four modes of explanation operative in the just mentioned history of time
measurement, namely mass, length, duration and charge (Lorenzen, 1976:1
ff.). This shows that the generally accepted understanding of time, linking it
with duration, is actually embedded within a context embracing diverse
modes of explanation.
Heisenberg, for example, accepts two universal constants (Einstein's pos-
tulate of the velocity of light and Planck's quantum of action).Yet he was
looking for a third universal constant, namely a universal length. He claims
that one has to have at least three units – be they length, time and mass or re-
placed by length, velocity and mass or even length, velocity and energy
(Heisenberg, 1958:165).
However, an analysis of the first four (irreducible) modal aspects of reality
would have helped physicists to realize that four units are indeed needed.
Clearly these four units of measurement reflect the meaning of the four foun-
dational aspects of reality captured in the diagram below, namely number
(‘mass’), space (‘length’), the kinematical aspect (‘duration’) and the physi-
cal aspect (‘charge’). Weinert even mentions that usually physicists “distin-
guish fundamental constants from conventional units” – and he then lists the
kilogramme (number), the meter (space), the second (the kinematic) and tem-
perature (the physical) (Weinert, 1998:230; and see also Lorenzen, 1989).
Lorenzen Heisenberg Heisenberg Heisenberg Heisenberg Weinert

(a) (b) (c) (d)
quantum of tempera-
Physical charge energy
action ture
c (velocity
Kinematical duration time velocity velocity second
of light)
Space length length length length meter
Number mass mass mass kilogram
7.4 Our time awareness exceeds physical time

Moreover, our awareness of time actually exceeds the confines of physical
time (which is homogenous). The French-American biologist, Lecomte du
Noüy, pointed out that the biotic phases of life are accelerating – birth,
growth, maturation, ageing and dying – thus showing that the life cycle of liv-
ing entities is heterogenous and therefore differs from physical time. Bergson
introduced his understanding of psychical duration. Noteworthy is that Hegel
105
and Fichte introduced the concept of “geschichtliche Zeit” (historical time) –

a theme that was followed up by Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, and many
others. In 1949 a Dutch professor in modern philosophy, discussing this new
fashion, entitled his inaugural lecture as “De Mensch als Historie” (The his-
torical nature of being human – Zuidema, 1949).
Since it appears that all definitions of “time” are simply definitions of di-
verse facets of time, the Augustinian question still remains to be answered:
what is time really? Against the fore-going background an alternative answer
to this question will now be explored.
7.5 Do we live in a “space-time continuum”?
We are accustomed to mathematicians and physicists speaking of the space-
time continuum in which we live. What they have in mind is Einstein's theory
of relativity where time is added as fourth dimesion to physical space.
However, we have seen that it is only mathematical space that is continu-
ous, physical space is not continuous (see pages 28 ff. above). The similarity
between mathematical and physical space is that they are both extended, but
within this similarity the difference is at once expressed: spatial extension is
continuous in the sense that it allows for an infinite divisibility, whereas phys-
ical space is not continuous (since it is determined by the quantum-structure
of energy) and is therefore not infinitely divisible. This latter difference was
mentioned already in 1925 by Hilbert (see Hilbert, 1925:164). Bernays also
distinguishes between physical space and mathematical space: “Only through
the contemporary development of geometry and physics did it become neces-
sary to distinguish between space as something physical and space as an ideal
multiplicity determined by spatial laws.”1 Since concrete physical things are
always quantized they cannot be divided ad infinitum. Of course one can re-
vert to an aspectual mathematical description of processes involving energy
(with reference to a continuous variable), but then the concreteness of physi-
cal entities is left behind while taking recourse to a functional mathematical
notion – in which case it is indeed meaningful to hold that such a continuous
variable entails infinite divisibility. Maddy implicitly alludes to this distinc-
tion: “But it is also true that the appearance of, say, a continuous manifold in
our best description of space-time does not seem to be regarded as establish-
ing the continuity of space-time; the microstructure of spacetime remains an
open question” (Maddy, 2005:455).
So, strictly speaking, the popular conception of a space-time continuum is
misplaced for it denies the difference between mathematical and physical
space.
1 “Erst durch die zeitherige Entwicklung der Geometrie und der Physik tritt die Notwendigkeit
hervor, zwischen dem Raum als etwas Physikalischem und dem Raum als eine ideellen,
durch geometrische Gesetze bestimmten Mannigfaltigkeit zu unterscheiden” (Bernays,
1976:37).
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Chapter 7
7.6 Time and the impasse of positivism

Positivism holds that the ultimate source of knowledge and truth is found in
sensory perception. However, as soon as this maxim is tested, for example
with reference to time or to the successive descriptions of matter through the
history of physics, it turns out that the Achilles' heel of positivism is un-
masked. Initially, in Greek culture, matter is described in numerical terms
(“everything is number”), then in terms of space (the starting point of Greek
space metaphysics and the medieval chain of being with God as ipsum esse),
followed by movement as explanatory term (the classical mechanistic world
view of particles in motion), and finally concluded in the acknowledgement of
the characteristic physical nature of material things.
The key question is whether these aspectual terms could be observed in a
sensory way. Can these terms be weighed, measured, seen, touched, tasted or
smelled?1 Likewise we may ask whether time can be observed by the senses –
and if so, by which one(s)? Can we touch time? Can we see it? Can we hear it?
Can we smell it? Every affirmative answer to these questions will be absurd,
showing that these functional terms as well as the meaning of the term time
cannot be observed by the senses. The reason is that neither time nor the vari-
ous aspects of reality are concrete things. It is not difficult to realize that as-
pectual terms refer to a dimension of reality that is different from that of con-
crete (natural and societal) entities and processes. These entities and pro-
cesses function within all the aspects of our experiential universe.
Consequently, the first step positivism had to take in order to digest “sense
data” theoretically, has already eliminated the restriction of reliable knowl-
edge to sense data!
7.7 Ontic time
That time cannot be identified with any single aspect also follows from these
considerations. It is perfectly meaningful to speak of temporal reality, but it
does not make sense to characterize reality exlusively in terms of a single as-
pect (such as the mentioned Pythagorean conviction that everything is num-
ber, the materialistic belief that everything is physical, the historicist claim
that all of reality is historical, or the postmodern view that everything is inter-
pretation).
Dooyeweerd first developed his theory of modal aspects and entitary struc-
tures (designated as individuality structures), and only afterwards (probably
in 1929) arrived at his first (radically new) understanding of what he called
cosmic time. During a disuccion of the philosophy of time at the PSSA Con-
ference held at Monash University (January 19-22, 2010), Richard Sivil sug-
gested that the term time could be used without combining it with the qualifi-
cation cosmic. Since the latter term increasingly acquired a restricted physical
connotation, one option is indeed just to speak of the dimension of time. An-
1 Just contemplate questions such as: What is the colour of the numerical aspect? What does
the spatial aspect taste like? What does the kinematic aspect feel like? and What does the
physical aspect sound like?
107
other option is to employ the phrase “ontic time” – the term ontic after all re-
tained a broad scope, encompassing whatever exists within the universe.
Traditional conceptions of time are constantly identifying time with merely
one aspect of time – for example when “true time” is seen as physical, emo-
tional duration (Bergson), that it is existential in nature (where existence is
understood in a historical sense – Heidegger), and so on.
The mere fact that we do speak of temporal reality rather suggests that time
is a unique dimension of reality, cutting across the dimensions of aspects and
entities in its own way. Every attempt to define time invariably results in
merely specifying one aspect of time – something repeatedly highlighted by
Dooyeweerd in his seminal articles on time. “Understandably traditional phi-
losophy constantly attempted to delimit the time problem in a functionalistic
manner. Time and again it identified universal cosmic time, which expresses
itself at once in all modal aspects of reality because it provides the foundation
for them all, with one of these modal aspects of time” (Dooyeweerd, 1939:6).
7.8 Functional specifications of time
The first remarkable feature of ontic time is that it manifests itself within each
modal aspect in accordance with the inner nature and unique meaning of that
aspect. What is even more remarkable, is that the history of Western philoso-
phy implicitly reveals an insight into different modes of time without having
been able to relate it to a general theory of functional modes. Although Im-
manuel Kant believes that time is a form of (sensory) intuition, this psycho-
logical one-sidedness is transcended in his distinction between three ‘modes’
of time. His striking remark reads: “The three modes of time are endurance,
succession and simultaneity” (Kant, 1787-B:219).
7.8.1 Succession, simultaneity, reversibility and irreversibility
Leibniz juxtaposes time – as “an order of successions,” with space – as “an or-
der of coexistences” (Leibniz, 1965:l99). Kant also realized that one has to
distinguish between succession and causality – for although day and night
succeed each other, it is meaningless to say that the day is the cause of the
night or vice versa. In the 20th century, after modern physics was successful in
transcending its mechanistic restriction, it was realized that physical time is
intrinsically connected with causation, for the effect can never precede the
cause. The numerical order of succession is reversible – manifested in the plus
and minus directions of the system of integers, closed under the operations of
addition, multiplication and subtraction.
Saying that these operations are closed means that applying them to the set
of integers always yield integers from the same set. When any two integers are
added, multiplied or subtracted, the result is always another integer. The sym-
metry of any spatial configuration – allowing being turned upside down or
front-backwards – shows the reversibility of the spatial time order, and the
same applies to the kinematic time order, for the mathematical description of a
constant movement (like the swinging of a pendulum) is equally valid in both
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Chapter 7
directions (a mere switch of the sign provides a description in the opposite di-
rection). Finally, the physical time order is irreversible.
Einstein explains the difference between physical irreversibility and kine-
matic (mechanical) reversibility:
On the basis of the kinetic theory of gases Boltzman had discovered that, aside
from a constant factor, entropy is equivalent to the logarithm of the ‘probabil-
ity’ of the state under consideration. Through this insight he recognized the na-
ture of courses of events which, in the sense of thermodynamics, are ‘irrever-
sible’. Seen from the molecular-mechanical point of view, however, all
courses of events are reversible (Einstein, 1959:43).
According to Janich, the scope of an exact distinction between phoronomic
(subsequently called kinematic by him) and dynamic arguments can be ex-
plained by means of an example. Modern physics has to employ a dynamic in-
terpretation of the statement that a body can only alter its speed continuously.
Given certain conditions, a body can never accelerate in a discontinuous way,
that is to say, it cannot change its speed through an infinitely large accelera-
tion, because this would require infinite force (Janich, 1975:68-69; cf. also
Von Bertalanffy, 1968:45).
We have noted above that the distinct manifestation of ontic time within the
first four modes is evident, particularly in the history of time measurement,
where our general awareness of time concerns earlier and later, simultaneity,
time-flow and irreversibility – all of them well-known modalities of time.
As soon as the meaning of (physical) change is analyzed, its dependence
upon the three foundational modes of time is evident, because change presup-
poses (the modal meaning of) constancy, simultaneity and succession. Hei-
degger is therefore justified in affirming (in 1924) that the invariance [con-
stancy] of Einstein's equations in respect of arbitrary transformations repre-
sent the positive side of his theory.1 In his work on space and time Grünbaum
discusses Einstein's “principle of the constancy of the speed of light” (Grün-
baum, 1974: 376) and points out that it concerns an upper limit that is only re-
alized in a vacuum (Grünbaum, 1974:377).
Einstein's special theory of relativity proceeds from the hypothesis that one
singular light signal has a constant velocity (in respect of all possible moving
systems), without necessarily claiming that such a signal actually exists.
Stafleu remarks: “The empirically established fact that the velocity of light
satisfies the hypothesis is comparatively irrelevant” (Stafleu, 1980:89).
7.8.2 Other non-physical modes of time
Within the biotic aspect, as noted, the homogeneity of physical time is absent
because the time phases correlated with the biotical time order – such as the
duration of birth, growth, maturation, ageing and dying – are accelerated in
1 “Man übersieht leicht über dem Destruktiven dieser Theorie das Positive, daß sie gerade die
Invarianz der Gleichungen, die Naturvorgänge beschreiben, gegenüber beliebiegen Trans-
formationen nachweist” (Heidegger, 1992:3).
109
the sense that the older a living entity gets, the quicker the process of ageing
occurs. The previosly mentioned French biologist, Lecomte du Noüy, con-
firmed this accelerated process of biotical ageing experimentally. Even the
so-called “moment of death” eludes the scope of the physical understanding
of time. Whatever criteria are used by the biologist, only once they have been
applied and the living entity (plant, animal, or human being) is declared
‘dead’, the physicist may look at a physical clock and note the (thus externally
correlated) “moment of death.”
The sensitive mode adds its own unique modal meaning to the experience
of time, for whereas it may feel as if a boring event takes hours, something in-
triguing or capturing one's attention may feel as if time passed very quickly.
Pursuing an argument in a logical sense is only successful when conclusions
are reached on the basis of premises. Even if the physical sequence of words
mentions the conclusion before the premises, the logical time order (prius et
posterius) will always be such that, in a logical sense, the premises precede
the conclusion.
Similarly, within each of the post-logical aspects, the dimension of ontic
time “takes on” the original meaning of that specific aspect. Although the
awareness of past, present and future rests upon a “more-than-modal-histori-
cal” reality, the demarcation of truly historical periods, eras and epochs is de-
pendent on the functional time order within the cultural-historical aspect.
Only when truly modal (and typical) historical criteria are applied, is it possi-
ble to understand the cultural meaning of historical eras. Such an assessment
is always related to what are considered the historically significant events and
tendencies that surfaced – to be distinguished from what is historically insig-
nificant,1 and eventually became direction-giving and dominant within a par-
ticular era. If physical time was the only ‘real’ time, it would have been impos-
sible to speak of peoples who are still living in the age of ‘soft’ cultures (pre-
dating the stone age) today, or about dwelling places of which one could say
that there time “stood still.”
The sign mode in turn reveals the meaning of ontic time in its own way, for
the temporal semantic effects of punctuation marks (or pausing in speech
acts), are all relevant to what language users intend to convey. Likewise an
awareness of social priorities is a reminder of social time – even in the case
where one will allow an important person to go ahead in spite of one's own
haste. Everyone will immediately understand that interest is intrinsic to eco-
nomic time (not to forget the well-known expression: “time is money”).
Within the aesthetic aspect, the dimension of ontic time takes on a nuanced di-
versity of forms and shapes – depending upon the typical nature of different
kinds and genres of art – such as the performing arts (bound to a limited dura-
tion and filling this time-span with a unique aesthetical expression), literature,
and for example painting. But even in spite of the apparent timelessness of
1 The sources of the historian is captured in what is histircally significant: a monument, an in-
scription, and so on.
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Chapter 7
paintings and works of sculpture, they not only objectively endure over time,
but in an internal sense, also bring to expression their own aesthetic presence.
But perhaps hanging on to the “merely physical” nature of time receives its
heaviest blow from the nature of jural time, for within this sphere, one some-
times encounters a different ‘calendar’, recognizing no public holidays and
Sundays in its contractual or legislative “count-down,” and one also has to ac-
knowledge laws with a retroactive effect. Through a declaration of age (venia
aetatis) or as an effect of getting married, the jural time involved in “coming
of age” may differ from the generally specified age of majority in the legal or-
der of Western states.
Courtship and eventually getting engaged and married obey the normative
time order of the moral aspect of love – although the duration of these succes-
sive events may vary considerably. Finally, within the certitudinal aspect,
practically all religions distinguish an order of spiritual growth, correlated
with a factual enrichment and maturation in faith. Through the eye of faith, the
temporal is appreciated with a view to eternity.1
Implicit in the preceding brief discussion of time, is the difference between
the law side (order side) and the factual side of cosmic time (time duration).
Time order at the law side of the various aspects is always correlated with fac-
tual time duration. For example, although all living entities are subjected to
the same biotical time order of birth, growth, maturation, ageing and dying,
the individual life-span of living entities may vary from a factual duration of
one day up to thousand or more years.
We have only addressed the most basic nature of time, which manifests itself
within each aspect of reality in accordance with the uniqueness of the aspect
under consideration, bound to the correlation between time order and time du-
ration. On the one hand this provisional approach pointed out that time ex-
ceeds the boundaries of any aspect of reality because it resides within a dis-
tinct foundational dimension of the (temporal) world – what Dooyeweerd has
called cosmic time and what we now prefer to designate merely as the dimen-
sion of time or as ontic time. Owing to this dimension we are entitled to speak
of temporal reality. However, this possibility implies that we should recog-
nize that the dimensions of time and functional aspects are lying at the basis of
the dimension of concrete (many-sided) entities. No single entity is exhausted
by any one of its functions because it is embedded in the inter-modal and in-
ter-strutural temporality of reality embracing also the just mentioned third di-
mension of reality. These three dimensions are indeed constitutive for our be-
ing-in-the-world, they form the experiential horizon of humankind.
1 Lennox mentions the immunologist, George Klein, who holds that his “atheism is not based
on science, but is an a priori faith commitment.” In response to the accusation that he is an ag-
nostic, Klein says: “I am not an agnostic. I am an atheist. My attitude is not based on science,
but rather on faith... The absence of a Creator, the non-existence of God is my childhood faith,
my adult belief, unshakable and holy” (Klein, 1990:203; see Lennox, 2007:34).
111
It is only within the human selfhood, the human I-ness, that we transcend
the ontic diversity for this radical and central depth dimension opens up the ul-
timate human awareness of and concern for time-transcendent eternity.
Whether or not we are sharing this perspective is not a matter of rational argu-
mentation, but one of ultimate commitment. Affirming the temporality of cre-
ation implicitly assumes the eternity of the Creator.
Remark: Dooyeweerd's view of what is supratemporal (see PDD:206 ff.)
If the biblical view of the eternal destination of the new humanity is accepted,
then it seems as if one may contemplate the idea of a created eternity. This was
done by Scholastic thinking, in which created eternity (the so-called aevum)
was distinguished from the aeternitas increata of God. Time was supposed to
have a beginning and an end, while eternity lacks both. The intermediate posi-
tion of the aevum is then that it does have a beginning, but no end.
Interestingly, before Dooyeweerd developed his philosophy of time he real-
ized that the human being cannot be enclosed within the dimensions of modal
aspects and of entity structures. Dooyeweerd first realized that the human
self-hood is supra-modal and supra-structural, then he developed his theory
of cosmic time underlying and embracing the modal aspects and what he calls
individuality structures – and on this basis then equated supra-modal with su-
pra-temporal. From the fact that humanity has an eternal destination being hu-
man hinges on the boundary-line of time and eternity – justifying some or
other sense of the time-transcendence pertaining to the core meaning of being
human. Ouweneel and Troost both argued that one should explore the latter di-
rection and defended Dooyeweerd against the accusation of (neo-)Platonic or
Scholastic influences. The term “full-temporal” (‘tydsvolheid’ / ‘voltijdelijk’)
is used as an alternative designation of the “supra-temporal” (see Troost,
2004:79 ff.) It is noteworthy that Dooyeweerd sometimes does speak of the
transcending concentration-point of human consciousness (Dooyeweerd,
1939:5).
No one will accuse someone who distinguishes between time and eternity
(creation and Creator) of being dualistic, and the same applies to the distinc-
tion between modal and supra-modal. From a biblical perspective, one is cer-
tainly justified in contemplating what Dooyeweerd called the creaturely con-
centration of the temporal on eternity in the religious transcendence of the
boundary of time (Dooyeweerd, 1939:5) – although this claim does not of ne-
cessity require the idea of an eternal selfhood. Dooyeweerd holds: “Yet, the
supra-temporal concentration-point in human self-consciousness, which can
only actualize itself in the religious concentration of all our functions on eter-
nity, cannot be called eternal as such” (Dooyeweerd, 1939:2).
In his response to Van Peursen's critical remarks on A New Critique of Theo-
retical Thought, Dooyeweerd refers to the sense in which we “do transcend
time in the center of our existence, even though at the same time we are en-
closed within time” (Dooyeweerd, 1960:103). Yet he is not wedded to the term
“supra-temporal,” for in response to the objection raised by Van Peursen to the
term “supra-temporal,” he explains: “Now I am not going to enter once more
into a discussion regarding the question if it is desirable to call the heart, as the
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Chapter 7
religious centre of human existence, supra-temporal. It is sufficiently known

that amongst the adherents of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea there is
no consensus in this regard. Probably the term supra-temporal, with which I
never meant a static condition but merely intended to capture a central direc-
tion of consciousness transcending cosmic time, can best be replaced by an-
other one” (Dooyeweerd, 1960:137). The relative clause “transcending cos-
mic time” refers to the central direction of consciousness without claiming
that consciousness itself transcends time. Although it may mark a change of
view, in another respect it does not, because Dooyeweerd never altered his
idea of the transcendent, central religious dimension of reality, whether or not
designated as supra-temporal.
A few years later, the same issue surfaced in a discussion of the Annual Meet-
ing of the philosophical association founded by Vollenhoven and Dooye-
weerd. In a transcription of the 1964 discussion it is recorded that Steen asked
Dooyeweerd about supra-temporality. Dooyeweerd said that sometimes he
was inclined to “pull the hair from his head” for ever having used those words.
Yet he still affirmed that the human being, in the centre of its existence, tran-
scends the temporal cosmic order. 1
Augustine was right after all – when we do not reflect on time our intuitive
(lived-through) experience of time is integral, natural and unproblematic, but
as soon as we attempt to conceptualize time we find ourselves confronted by
the baffling dispersion of the different ways in which we can distinguish
modal aspects of time. Every time concept, albeit that of the numerical time
order of succession, the spatial awareness of simultaneity, the kinematic time
order of uniform flow, and so on, presupposes the concept-transcending na-
ture of ontic time that lies at the foundation of all our time concepts. The tem-
poral existence (persistence in time) of every individual entity is not the mere
sum of its modal functions, since as such it belongs to another unique dimen-
sion of reality, distinct from but founded in those of modal aspects and cosmic
time.2
Since our concepts of time pressupose this integral and distinct dimension
of ontic time they are always, in a regulative sense, dependent upon our idea of
time (i.e., our concept-transcending knowledge of time). What is indeed baf-
fling about ontic time is that it exceeds every possible concept of time we can
obtain and therefore ultimately it can only be approximated in a concept-tran-
scending idea.
1 The transcription reads: “... waar ik soms de haren uit mijn hoofd trek (you understand?), dat
ik deze uitdrukking ooit zo gebruikt heb, ik geloof niet dat ik deze uitdrukking ooit zo
gebruikt heb. Ik heb wel dit gezegd, dat de mens in het centrum van zijn bestaan de tijdelijke,
de kosmische tijdelijke orde te boven gaat. Dat is wel iets anders” (the Dooyeweerd Archives
available at the “Historische Documentatiecentrum,” Free University, Amsterdam – investi-
gated during March, 2006).
2 This distinction prevents us from either falling prey to a “bundle-theory” or a “substance-the-
ory” regarding the nature of concrete entities.
113
At this point we have reached more explicitly the distinction between con-
ceptual knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge – calling for a more
detailed explanation in the next Chapter.
Questions
1. What are the historical interconnections between the notions of time, eternity, succession, simul-
taneity (timelessness) as well as the link with the theological deduction of God's infinity from his
omnipresence and eternity?
2. Why is it impossible to date creation?
3. How does the universal constants and units of measurement highlight the unique meaning of the
first four modal aspects of reality?
4. Can we restrict time to physicl time?
5. Do we live in a “space-time continuum”?
6. How does time unveils the untenability of restricting knowledge to sense data and sensory per-
ception?
7. How does time come to expression within all the aspects of reality?
114
Concept and Idea
Chapter 8
Since Dooyeweerd entered philosophy from the angle of the special sciences –
he studied law – he immediately had to deal with (basic) concepts and concept
formation in general. his brought him in contact the the boundaries of (theoret-
ical) knowledge and an awareness of these boundaries surfaced in a twofold
way in his thought: (i) he accepted the insight that the core meaning of the vari-
ous aspects ofreality cannot be defined; and (ii) he realized that knowledge
cannot be identified with conceptual knowledge. The indefinability of the
meaning-nuclei of the aspects enabled us, in Chapter 5, to discuss the blow it
entails for the rationalist ideal of conceptual knowledge (see pages 81 ff.).
In this Chapter Dooyeweerd's distinction between concept and idea will
be enhanced and then it will be shown, with examples from the history of phi-
losophy, how significant and fruitfull this distinction is. Some implications for
systematic distinction will also be articulated.
8.1 Philosophy and the distinction between concept and idea
Any student of philosophy sooner or later has to take notice of the term “idea”
– at least in connection with Plato's famed theory of ideas. The most familiar
understanding of this term in the thought of Plato relates to his attempt to
safe-guard knowledge within the sensory world of becoming (change). In
Chapter 4 we saw that Plato realized that if everything changes, then there is
nothing knowledge can hold on to and consequently he postulated supra-sen-
sory, eternal, static, ontic forms to secure (the possibility of) knowledge.
However, these static forms participated in a conceptual diversity which actu-
ally pointed beyond themselves to an original unity in the idea of the good,
seated in the divine Nous (Reason), which is sometimes also designated as the
divine Work-Master (Form-giver). In the development of his epistemological
insights Plato discovered the difference between a distinguishing concept and
a conceptual diversity transcending idea. Dooyeweerd remarks: “What he has
in view is nothing less than the proper relationship between the concept and
the idea. The former is characterized by distinguishing. The latter, without
abandoning these conceptual distinctions, redirects the concept of the diver-
sity of the structures of reality, concentrating it upon the origin and unity of all
structures” (Dooyeweerd, 2004:175). This appreciation does not diminish the
distance between Plato's thought, which is in the grip of the form-matter mo-
tive, and the basic motive of biblical Christianity: “However, in providing a
metaphysical foundation for this epistemological insight, which is genuinely
Socratic, Plato fails to attain to the central point of departure which is the pre-
115
condition of its becoming scientifically fruitful. Here too his idea of the origin
is still burdened with the polar dualism of the form-matter motive.1 The idea
tou agathou is exclusively a form principle and cannot be considered a
principle of creation in the sense of the Christian religion” (Dooyeweerd,
2004:175).
Dooyeweerd developed a new critique of theoretical thought – one in
which he advanced the view that theoretical thinking finds its foundation in
three distinct ideas in which an hypethetical account is given of the cohering
diversity within reality (creation), of the unity, fulness and totality of the
world and of the Origin of whatever exists. Since these three ideas actually
make possible theoretical thinking he employed the word transcendental to
capture their foundational role. For that reason he prefers to characterize them
as three transcendental ideas which, in their mutual coherence, point beyond
themselves to the ultimate commitment of a thinker. Dooyeweerd acknowl-
edges this central commitment also interms of what he designates as the cen-
tral religious dimension of creation. Since central dimension transcends the
diveristy of aspects and entities within which human thinking operates, it is
also designated as the trasncendent-religious dimension – distinct from the
transcendental dimensions of time, the modal aspects and concrete entities
and events.
However, since Plato the distinction between concept and idea played a sig-
nificant role throughout the (a) history of Western philosophy as well as
within (b) the various scholarly disciplines.
An understanding of the historical development and special scientific im-
portance of this distinction will also enhance a better understanding of
Dooyeweerd's philosophy, because it will demonstrate how it inspired inno-
vations that open up new insights and perspectives. By contrast, the signifi-
cance of this distinction, so important in Dooyeweerd's philosophy, will be
elucidated by fosuing on a few historical contours while demonstrating the
meaningfull interplay of historical, systematic and special scientific consider-
ations.
In this discussion we shall explore a deepening of Dooyeweerd's view of a
concept and idea. Dooyeweerd (and Vollenhoven) did not realize that terms
derived from the various aspects of reality can be employed in a twofold way:
in a conceptual way and in a concept-transcending manner. For example,
when we apply our intuitions of number, space, movement and energy-opera-
tion while considering the many-sidedness of a chair (see pages 22 and 81),
we can identify its quantitative properties (its is one and may have four legs),
1 Although Bos questions the way in which Dooyeweerd accounts for the genesis of the motive
of form and matter, and also prefers to speak of the titanic meaning-perspective, he believes
that the extensive analysis of the development of this motive in Dooyeweerd (1949) (see
Dooyeweerd 2004), contains a valid perspective on the inherent dialectic of Greek thought
(see Bos, 1994:220).
116
Chapter 8
its size and shape (spatial), its relative speed and its typical physical character-
istics as well (its strength). Using these terms are not restricted to any speci-
fied group or class of entities. Anything is one and may have a multiplicity of
parts; anything may be extended in more than one spatial dimension; and so
on.
This means that, whenever any person looks through these different (ontic)
points of entry (which are then at once elevated to epistemic modes of expla-
nation) at a chair, the terms generated are used in a conceptual way. As long as
we restrict the use of such terms to the respective ontic domains (modes of ex-
planation), this conceptual focus will always be present – which is actually the
case with all our entitary-oriented everyday concepts (just think about the
concepts we have of entities such as planets, houses, chairs and human
beings).
If these terms, derived from the various modal aspects of reality, are desig-
nated as modal terms, then the following distinction must be drawn. When
modal terms are used to refer to entities that function within the confines of
particular modes of being (aspects), they are employed in a conceptual man-
ner. However, whenever a modal term performs a referential role pointing be-
yond the limits or boundaries of such an ontic domain (aspectual sphere), we
encounter a concept-transcending use of such a term – also designated as an
idea use of such terms.
For example, while merely exploring our quantitative intuition, one can
speak of a chair in its totality, including all its properties. In language, this is
expressed by referring to its individuality, its uniqueness, its being distinct.
The original quantitative meaning of number – captured as a “primitive” in
axiomatic set theory – is evident in these affirmations, and yet they are in-
tended to refer to much more than merely the arithmetical aspect of the chair.
They therefore indeed constitute idea usages of modal numerical terms.
One of Dooyeweerd's students, Jan Dengerink, came very close to a proper
articulation of this state of affairs owing to the absence of the distinction be-
tween a conceptual and a concept-transcending use of modal terms. With ref-
erence to the quantitative aspect and its analogies within other aspects he adds
that it [number] also functions (just like all other aspects) up to the heart of re-
ality (“tot in het hart van de werkelijkheid”), explaining why he alluded to the
(central) unity of the cosmos [“de (centrale) eenheid van de kosmos”]. He re-
alizes that this central unity is not a “mathematical point” although it cannot
be separated from the original meaning of number. The next step, not taken by
Dengerink, would have been to distinguish between a conceptual use and an
idea-use of modal terms. In his final explanation in this context he comes even
closer to this view when he explicitly alludes to the referring nature of an idea.
“Also in respect of the numerical we therefore have to avoid a mathematical
functionalist reduction, that is to say, of identifying the numerical with what
rightfully belongs to the field of investigation of arithmetic. The numerical in
turn stretches far deeper than the numerical in its mathematical meaning. As
117
such it is only possible to be understood in a referring idea” Dengerink,

1986:240).
It is not the numerical that stretches (or functions: ‘fungeert’) “far deeper,”
for the issue is that in order to refer to the (central) depth dimension of reality
one inevitably has to use numerical terms stretched beyond the boundaries of
the quantitative aspect. What is approximated in a “referring idea” is not the
numerical in its deeper stretching than its mathematical meaning, but the said
depth dimension of reality itself approximated by employing the modal quan-
titative term “unity” in a concept-transcending way! Notice that this explana-
tion repeatedly employs two spatial terms, in a concept-transcending way,
namely the terms central and depth.
The inevitability of using modal terms in a concept-transcending manner is
implicitly acknowledged by those trends in philosophy and the special sci-
ences which attempt to escape from the grip of universality by laying all the
emphasis upon what is unique, contingent and individual. What is individual
is indeed known, but it is not conceptually known, for it transcends the limits
of concepts and it should be acknowledged that it is only possible to approxi-
mate it in concept-transcending knowledge. Because knowing what is indi-
vidual can never escape from terms that have a universal scope, their idea-us-
ages are always merely approximating. Nicolai Hartmann once explained the
Kantian notion of a “Grenzbegriff” in a striking way. He says that the notion
of an unknowable “thing-in-itself” (“Ding an sich”) still requires a thought-
form through which it is regarded as unknowable – and this is what a “Grenz-
begriff” intends to capture. Without buying into the role of the so-called
“thing-in-itself” in the philosophy of Kant (cf. the critical remarks made in
Strauss, 1982:133, 141-143), it is therefore important to leave room for a
“form-of-thinking,” an “thought-form,” accounting for knowledge tran-
scending the limits of concept formation.1
Let us now look at some implications of the distinction between concept
and idea in this way for an understanding of the history of philosophy.
8.2 Concept and idea in the history of Western philosophy:
an overview of its main contours
The development of Western philosophy continued to struggle with the dif-
ference between a concept and an idea, even to the medieval extreme of a
so-called negative theology, dependent upon the influence of the Greek sub-
stance concept and running parallel with the speculative theory of being sup-
posedly embraing both God and creature.
1 Normally“Grenzbegriff” is translated as limiting concept. This is misleading, because it gives
the false impression that we deal with knowledge contained within certain limits or confines,
whereas the actual intention of the German term is to refer to a kind of knowledge transcend-
ing the limits of concept formation. This explains why we give preference to the expression
“concept-transcending knowledge.”
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Chapter 8
The concepts of ontic forms (Plato) and universal substantial forms (Aris-
totle) served as the foundation for the substance concept and the distinction
between essesence and appearance – a distinction informed by and in the di-
rection-giving grip of the ultimate Greek basic motive of form and matter.
Dooyeweerd has shown that the dialectical tension in this groud-motive is ir-
reconcilable with the biblical basic motive of creation, fall and redemption.
Therefore both the medieval attempt to synthesize biblical Christianty with
Greek antiquity and the effect of the substance concept upon theological re-
flection on God harbours inherent dialectical tensions – illustrating at the
same time crucial elements of the distinction between concept and idea.
This dialectical legacy continued to exhibit the confusing effect of not
properly distinguishing between concept and idea when an account is needed
of God's unity. The distinction between conceptual knowledge and con-
cept-transcending knowledge also appeared to be intertwined with an encom-
passing analogical concept of being, which subsumes God as highest being
under the same denominator as those creatures participating in being. It im-
plies that according to their highest being all creatures are in God. Eventually
Thomas Aquinas attempted to side-step this implication by emphasizing the
idea that the highest unity of being transcends the diversity within creation.
The question whether Thomas does justice to the biblical revelation regard-
ing creation touches upon his view of the first or primary matter (prima
materia). Closer examination shows that he only relates substances consti-
tuted by form and matter to God's act of creation. Consequently Thomas does
not speak of primary matter in terms of creation. In S.Th. I,44,2 Thomas in the
third Objection raises the argument that it is against the nature of matter,
which exists only potentially, that it is created. However, in his Reply he re-
sponds by arguing that the Objection does not show that matter is uncreated,
but merely that it is not created without form.1 Nonetheless it is repeatedly ar-
gued in S.c.G. that God (as actus purus) brought everything into existence
without pre-existing matter. These statements do not solve the problem for the
question remains: was primary matter created in its formlessness? When, at
the end of S.c.G. II,16, Thomas argues that since God is the cause of all things
(causa omnium), he is also the cause of primary matter (Deus igitur est causa
materiae primae), he still does not provide a direct answer to this question. A
consideration of the mentioned statements of Thomas from S.Th. suggests that
a direct answer in S.c.G. also should have been that God did not create (first)
matter without form. That is to say that God did not cause first matter without
form.
In itself matter does not have being and cannot be known. The focus on the
unknowability of matter simply confirms Thomas's dialectical understanding
of nature. Does God know evil which essentially (esse mali) is a lack of good-
1 Also in S.Th. I,15,3 Thomas alleges that matter is created by God, but not without form.
119
ness (est privatio boni) (S.Th. I,14,10)? Although evil as such is unknowable
(sed malum non est per se cogniscibile) God nonetheless does know it, but
only by means of the good (per bonum). As privatio boni it cannot be deter-
mined (definiri) in itself or known (S.Th. I,14,10).
In his Ouest.Disp. de Ver. 1I1,5 Thomas connects the problem of the
knowability of evil with the knowability of matter and focuses it on the ques-
tion whether God has a cognition of evil and matter. He commences with the
statement that matter is caused by God and therefore has to have an idea in
God, for God has an image of everything caused by him. In its proper sense
the idea of a thing is concerned with its being (cf. also S.Th. I,14,10). Because
matter does not have an actual existence without form, primary matter cannot
have a proper idea in God distinct from the form of the composite image of it.
God does have an idea of things as composed by form and matter, but not of
matter on its own. Only insofar as formless matter bears an image of the first
form (a copy of the first being) it can have an image in God.
Within modern philosophy, owing to the psychologistic turn present in the
thought of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, “ideas” got linked to sensory repre-
sentations, while the a priori element in Plato's epistemology continued to ex-
ert an influence, although twisted by the early modern science ideal of human-
istic philosophy. Locke, in his Essay concerning Human Understanding, par-
tially binds the contents of thought to simple (elementary) sensory representa-
tions (“ideas”). However, according to him on the basis of the elementary sen-
sory impressions thought can operate freely and actively in order to arrive at
compound representations. The distinction drawn by Locke between empiri-
cal factual knowledge and the necessary relations between concepts (cf.
Locke, Essay IV,1,9), as well as his introduction of intuition as basis of exact
scientific knowledge (as found in the demonstrations of mathematics – cf.
Locke, Essay IV,2,1-15) created a split in his psychologistic intentions, for
with the aid of the mathematical method of proof mathematics and ethics can
provide us with apriori knowledge and infallible certainty.
The intermediate era explored another fascinating line in the thought of
Plato, one in which he focuses on the negative side of concept formation, par-
ticularly found in his dialogue Parmenides. The first antinomy discussed by
Plato proceeds from the assumption that the One is absolutely one (that is,
without any multiplicity). But then it is impossible to say that it is a whole, for
a whole is that which contains all its parts, implying that the One then is many
(Parmenides, 137 c 4 d 3). Likewise the One is without limits (Parmeni-
des,137 d 7-8) and formless (neither round, nor straight: Parmenides, 137 d
8-e 1). In the further elaboration of this antinomy the narrator shows that the
One is nowhere (neither in itself, nor in something else), that it does not move
nor prevail in a state of rest, that it is not identical or different from itself, not
similar or dissimilar to itself or anything else, and so on (Parmenides, 138
a-142 a). Thought through consistently, in this sense, nothing positive can be
said of the absolute One.
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Chapter 8
Apart from concentrating a conceptual diversity upon a concept-transcend-

ing unity, philosophical reflection here meets an exploration of the negative
side of concept formation by claiming that whatever is seen as origin exceeds
all positive affirmations. During the middle ages this trend became known as
negative theology – one cannot positively affirm what God is, but only state
what God is not. Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita, in his negative theology, ex-
plores this inverse path, for it starts with the finite nature of the lowest crea-
ture, denying it of God in order to confirm that God, in his transcendance
above all things, is hidden in utter darkness (De Mystica Theologia, 2). What
is immediately striking is that amidst the “utter darkness” there are still (unin-
tended) positive affirmations found – such as speaking of God's transcen-
dence which is above all things. The terms transcendence and above are both
derived from the spatial aspect.
8.2.1 Negative theology and its intrinsic inconsistency
This line of thought was echoed in the contemplations of Pseudo-Dionysius,
the Areopagite, found in his negative theological approach. The path of nega-
tive theology starts with the finite nature of the lowest creature. By contrast,
God, in his transcendence above all things, is hidden in utter darkness. In
terms of this negative approach God is not a being, life, understanding or rea-
son, no body, does not have a place, is formless, without qualities, and not
subject to change (Pseudo-Dionysius, 1980:4). God is not even an ordering or
magnitude, neither is he truth, goodness or spirit. He is neither Father nor Son,
neither darkness nor light, neither falsehood nor truth, for it is not possible to
make general statements about God. As the perfectly unique cause of every-
thing God is elevated above all affirmation and denial (Pseudo-Dionysius,
1980:4). This negative approach completely follows the thought-pattern in-
troduced by Plotinus. Because God transcends all conceptual determinations,
the only possibility to speak of God in a meaningful way is to deny all relevant
conceptual determinations regarding God.1
Clement of Alexandria (150-215) was convinced that statements about God
cannot touch His essence – such propositions merely elucidates what God is
not. In order not to apply the classical understanding of (conceptual) knowl-
edge – as bringing a multiplicity to a unity – to God, Clement holds that the in-
finity of God cannot be seen as combining a multiplicity of parts, therefore
God is unknowable (see Mühlenberg, 1966:74). This simplicity metaphysics
(going back to Xenophanes) postulates an absolute unity (simple and without
multiplicity), similar to the One found in the philosophy of Plotinus (de-
scribed as a-pollon = without multiplicity). Clement argues that from the
“fact” that the infinite does not have parts an absence of shape and determina-
tion follows. Gregory of Nazianzus holds that the “only thing that could be
1 Proclus also completely maintained the Plotinian conviction that every affirmation of the One
(the Good), diminishes the fullness of its reality.
121
comprehended about the incomprehensible divine nature was its ‘boundless-

ness [apeira],’ what it is not rather than what it was” (Pelikan, 1993:41).
Gregor of Nyssa attempts to rely on the language of negation in order to es-
cape from inconsistencies. Pelikan explains that for Gregor of Nyssa all “lan-
guage about the divine was inadequate.” Yet in pursuing this path all prob-
lems do not simply disappear. Pelikan quotes the Cappadocians saying resign-
edly: “But having no other words to employ, we employ what we have.” He
continues as follows: “[they were] protecting such words against blasphe-
mous distortion by means of negation (expressed here by introducing the
Classical rhetorical figure of chiasmus): ‘Thou art called Logos, and thou art
above logos; thou art above light, yet art named light’ ” (Pelikan, 1993:44). 1
An influential position in this legacy is occupied by Gregory of Nyssa
(335– ±394). Within the philosophical and theological tradition he was the
first thinker to introduce the predicate of infinity to God.2 Of importance for
our theme is that Gregory of Nyssa holds that the nature of God is ineffable,
i.e., that it exceeds any adequate verbal description. When Gregory of Nyssa
speaks of what surpasses “all understanding” he has the divine nous in mind
(see Pelikan, 1993:46, 48, 210). One of the key expressions employed in this
connection is therefore the idea of transcendence (see Pelikan, 1993:48, 49,
52, 206-208). Within the domain of language this idea of transcendence is ar-
ticulated in terms of what can be designated and what not. Pelikan remarks
that none of the names for the divine nature conveys its essence – the latter re-
mains ‘unsignified [asemantos].’ “No name was worthy to express the nature
of God” (see Pelikan, 1993:209). The ousia of God (God's substance) tran-
scends all distinct attributes. When Pelikan summarizes this position the sub-
tle underlying distinction is that between God in Himself and God as revealed
to us (ousia and attributes):
It was indeed possible for finite mortals to know, as attributes of God and ac-
tions of God, the greatness, the power, the wisdom, the goodness, the provi-
dence, and the justice of God, but it was not possible for them to know the very
ousia of God. For that ousia was too transcendent to be possessed of any dis-
tinctive attributes (Pelikan, 1993:208).
When it is stated that we “know nothing else of God but this one thing, that
God is,” then this “God is” actually intends the incomprehensible divine
ousia. The words “we know” generated a warning, namely that “by this nega-
tive predication” we do not “understand the subject” since we “are guided as
1 In anticipation of our alternative argument below we may note here that the Cappadocian
stance stumbles upon the twofold use of certain terms – what we shall designate as conceptual
knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge.
2 The determination and delimitation required by concept formation burdened this option, be-
cause the infinite cannot be grasped in a delimiting concept. The ultimate perspective en-
tailed in the theology of Origines (185-254), for example, held that God is delimited (De
Princ. II,9,1 – see Mühlenberg, 1966:26).
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Chapter 8
to what we must not think concerning the subject” – without disclosing “the
transcendent ousia of God.”
Pelikan himself raises a serious concern in this connection regarding the
merits of such a negative theological approach. He writes:
That kind of exegetical argumentation by the Cappadocians inevitably raised
the question of whether this left any room for faith in a reliable divine revela-
tion, together with the question of how a divine being defined in such negative
terms could at the same time serve as the foundation for the Cappadocian doc-
trine of the relation between the one divine ousia and the three divine
hypostases in the Trinity (Pelikan, 1993:214).
An implication of the Cappadocian approach is that a distinction is drawn be-
tween God's knowledge of Himself and God's speaking to us (in whatever lan-
guage). The latter is said to be “accommodated to the language of the day,” –
“recorded and written ‘after human fashion’ ” (Pelikan, 1993:43). Luther also
holds that when God is clothed with a human voice he has accommodated
Himself to what we can understand (see Clouser, 2005:221). Calvin empha-
sizes that the essence of God is incomprehensible (Inst. I, v, 1; Calvin,
1931:17).
The distinction between a positive and a negative theology derives from
certain consequences entailed within the classical concept of substance. The
historically most significant effect of this concept of substance is found in the
frequently mentioned opposition between essence and appearance that seems
to be quite innocent. It inspired the conviction that it is fully biblical to hold
the view that God in Himself is unknowable (incomprehensible) to us and
therefore had to make Himself knowable to us by accommodating Himself to
human language and adapting Himself to our understanding.
How does the distinction between concept and idea help us to disentangle
the inconsistencies of a negative theology?
8.2.2 Preliminary remark on the development of the distinction
between concept and idea
In my dissertation of 1973 the hypothesis guiding the investigation of the dis-
tinction between concept and idea mainly focused on the issue of a (logically
objectified) unity and multiplicity. It was necessary to formulate a provisional
hypothesis to guide an investigation of the different shapes these terms took
on in the past. It had to capture what was more or less a shared element in the
legacy of understanding concepts – and the common element is found in the
bringing together of an analyzable multiplicity, that is in the (synthetical)
unity of a logical concept. In terms of this provisional hypothesis every real
unity in the multiplicity of analyzable moments is said to be within the reach
of true concept formation.
What then is the nature of an idea? My suggestion at this stage was the fol-
lowing one:
However, as soon as the conceptual diversity (conceivable multiplicity) is fo-
cused on something that transcends this diversity but nonetheless can only be
123
approximated in terms of this diversity, we encounter the nature of an idea

concentrating a conceptual diversity (Strauss, 1973:87).
8.3 Are ideas limiting concepts?
The distinction between concept and idea can therefore also be articulated by
employing phrases such as a distinguishing concept and a diversity-concen-
trating idea. From the historical material briefly discussed above it appeared
that every idea directs our thought towards its boundaries and in this sense it
can be characterized as a (regulative) boundary concept or limiting concept.
The related problems that surfaced were mainly elucidated with a focus on the
relationship between a conceptual diversity and the concentration of such a
diversity in a specific idea of an origin – in such a way that particular emphasis
was laid upon the boundary function of an idea (Strauss, 1973:87).
Since not only our experience but also our knowledge of reality are medi-
ated by the various modal aspects of reality, the awareness of the limitations
of conceptual knowledge by itself called for the accompanying awareness of
concept-transcending knowledge.
Normally“Grenzbegriff” is translated as limiting concept. This is mislead-
ing, because it gives the false impression that we deal with knowledge con-
tained within certain limits or confines, whereas the actual intention of the
German term is to refer to a kind of knowledge transcending the limits of con-
cept formation. This explains why we give preference to the expression “con-
cept-transcending knowledge.”
Immanuel Kant employed the German word Grenzbegriff with the ultimate
aim to safe-guard the domain of human freedom. For this reason, according to
Kant, the principles of pure understanding which do not allow an employment
extending beyond the limits of experience (Kant, 1787-B:352-353). When
understanding extends itself beyond its set limits a transcendental illusion
emerges (Kant, 1787-B:352), and this natural and inevitable illusion is exam-
ined in the Transcendental Dialectic. The term transcendental now obtains a
new meaning, referring to that which transcends the limits of experience.
Kant assigns to the ideas of reason only a regulative function – it is only when
they are employed in a constitutive sense that the mentioned transcendental il-
lusion surfaces. Reason ideas can only be applied to the concepts of under-
standing and the latter only to sense impressions. (Kant, 1787-B:185, 310).
Kant also introduced the concept of a noumenon because he had to prevent
“sensible intuition (sinnliche Anschauung) from being extended to things in
themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge”
(Kant, 1787-B:310). For Kant the concept of a noumenon is a limiting concept
(Grenzbegriff) which is meant to restrict the application of sensibility (Kant,
1787-B:310-311).
Of course, the true intention of the term Grenzbegriff is not properly ac-
counted for when it is translated with the phrase limiting concept, for this
translation may suggest that an idea is limited while in fact the aim is to ac-
count for what transcends concept formation. For this reason it is better to re-
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Chapter 8
late an idea in this sense to what transcends conceptual knowledge and the
best way to achieve this goal is to distinguish between conceptual knowledge
and concept-transcending knowledge.
From a systematic point of view it is therefore quite remarkable to note that
the Kantian distinction between concept and idea coincides with the demarca-
tion of the domains of the (humanistic) science ideal and personality ideal. It
is equally remarkable that in his Tractatus Wittgenstein is still concerned with
the same problem of demarcating science: “Philosophy demarcates the con-
tested domain of the natural sciences and at once the unthinkable is delimited
from within what is thinkable” (4.113 and 4.114). Max Black even believes
that the demarcation of the world is the root of Wittgenstein's mysticism
(Black, 1964:307). The connection with Kant is seen in that Wittgenstein's de-
limitation of the world is rooted in his metaphysical mysticism, just as Kant's
demarcation of theoretical thought is rooted in his (metaphysical) ideal of the
supra-sensory moral autonomy of the human being. A new dimension is pro-
vided by Wittgnstein's distinction between saying and showing – which runs
parallel both with the distinction between concept and idea and that between
sience ideal (nature) and personalisty ideal (freedom).
On the boundary of scientific knowledge (of the understanding) and the su-
pra-sensory sphere of the (scientifically) unknowable thing in itself (namely
the human person in its intelligible nature), Kant introduces reason (Ver-
nunft). The transcendental (reason) ideas of the soul, world and God are never
known as sensory appearances. The nature of philosophy in the thought of
Wittgenstein although has an analogous function compared to the function
reason within the thought of Kant. Although demarcating the untinkable from
within, philosophy in the thought of Wittgenstein operates outside the think-
able in nonsensicalness (Unsinn). Just like reason in the philosophy of Kant
approximates the bridging of the domain of nature and freedom, the task of
philosophy in the Tractatus touches upon both the thinkable (‘knowable’) and
what is unknowable (“unthinkable”). This opposition is phrased in terms of
what is sayable and unsayabler, and also in terms of what can be said and what
can only show itself. The German word for showing is zeigen – and the closer
closer we get to the end of the Tractatus the more frequently this terms sur-
faces. Eventually it becomes clear that these distinctions served to delimit the
unsayable from the outside instead of from the inside and this underscores the
problem noted by Max Black: “There is, however, a serious difficulty in try-
ing to say that some specific such and such cannot be said” (Black, 1964:196).
The basic problem is that only of that of which nothing can be said is it said (!)
that it shows itself. But of what nothing can be said one should be silent.
These glimpses on the history of the distinction between concept and idea,
notwithstanding the unexpected forms it took on, constantly hinged on the de-
limitation of conceptual knowledge on the one hand and on what is found be-
yond the grasp of conceptual knowledge on the other. However, if one wants
to account for what lies beyond the limits of conceptual knowledge, the ex-
pression limiting concept actually conveys the opposite of what is intended.
125
What is at stake, as we noted, is what exceeds the limits of conceptual knowl-

edge. For that reason it is preferable rather to speak of concept-transcending
knowledge. But this option rasies the question: which boundaries do we have
in mind?
8.4 The limits (boundaries) of concept-formation
The view that concepts have boundaries or limits follow from the fact that uni-
versality always have been seen as delimiting cognitive configurations. Who-
ever circumscribes something is thought of as having defined it – and to de-
fine something entails that it is grasped in a concept. The first delimitation that
isgiven in the logical subject object relation. A concept is a logical unity in the
multiplicity of a (logically objectified) characteristics. These features are uni-
versal and for this reason every concept has a universal scope. If someone has
a concept of a horse, a dog, a car or a book then such a person will be able to
identify any particular horse, dog, car or book as a horse, a dog, a car or a
book.
These examples of concepts are made possible by the type laws holding for
these different kinds of entties. What ever is individual therefore cannot be
grasped in a concept. Within language the universal and what is individual are
reflected in the articles “a” and “the” (“this” or “that”). The proposition “this
horse is a horse” captures both what is universal and what is individual. Yet, a
more precise account is required, because within the domain of what is uni-
versal one has to distinguish the universality of a law from the universal way
in which what is subject to such a law shows its subjectedness in a unviersal
way – through its law-conformity or orderliness. Within the context of the dis-
tinction between the law side and factual side of reality one therefore has to
differentiate between the universality of a law and the universal side of factual
reality. Concept formation is conditioned by this twofold nature of universal-
ity which at the same time delimits it. In other words, the different kinds of
universality we can discern indeed serve as the limits of concept formation. At
the factual side of reality one also has to acknowledge – as the correlate of its
orderliness – its individual side. Because, as noted, what is individual exceeds
the grasp of a concept, factual individuality also highlights the limits of
concept formation.
Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the temporal identity of any concrete entity –
as an individual whole or totality – always precedes our theoretical knowl-
edge of it. He writes: “The transcendental Idea of the individual whole pre-
cedes the theoretical analysis of its modal functions. It is its presupposition, its
cosmological a-priori” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:65). In its directedness to-
wards the universal, science appears to have serious difficulties in accounting
for knowledge of what is individual. De Vleeschauwer even concludes
that“knowledge of what is individual is simply impossible” – something
about which philosophy, according to him, had clarity since its inception (see
De Vleeschauwer, 1952:213). Although concepts are indeed blind to the
unique, contingent and individual it cannot be denied that we do have knowl-
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Chapter 8
edge of what is unique, contingent and individual. This position of De

Vleeschauwer is therefore actually typical of the rationalistic restriction of
knowledge to conceptual knowledge, that is, to knowledge obtained on the ba-
sis of universality. The best way to formulate this state of affairs is to say that
we know what is individual only in a concept-transcending way. In this case
we once more have a limit – conceptual knowledge – and a mode of knowl-
edge transcending it, concept-transcending knowledge.
Another perspective on boundaries or limits is opened up through our con-
siderations in Chapter 3 regarding the uniqueness of the different modal as-
pects of reality, which is guaranteed by their respective meaning-nuclei. We
argued that each meaning-nucleus is primitive in the sense of being conceptu-
ally indefinable.
8.5 The discovery of a twofold use of modal terms
The question may be asked: what prompted the discovery of the possibility to
use modal terms in a conceptual and a concept-transcending way?
In preparing a contribution to the Festschrift for Van Riessen (in 1980) I
read the work of Sinnige on infinity in the thought of the pre-Socratics and
Plato. Sinnige correctly points out that Parmenides' description of being has
been bound up to a high degree with “spatial images” (Sinnige, 1968:38). This
means that spatial terms acquired a two-directional use, for he says:
it is fairly clear that Parmenides gives us two distinct descriptions of Being.
The first of these is intended to be understood in a metaphysical sense: Being
is determined in all respects (Parmenides, B Fr. 8 verses 26-42), the second is
formulated in cosmological terms: Being is a spatial whole, kept in balance
from within and not bordered upon by another Being (Parmenides, vs. 42-49).
The two descriptions overlap to a certain extent, which means that most terms
have at the same time a metaphysical and a spatial connotation (Sinnige,
1968:86).
The “metaphysical” description mentioned by Sinnige corresponds to verse
4 where the key-idea is: not subject to change (atremes), and it is intended to
deny all movement to being. Evidently, here we are also confronted with
static spatial terms used in a metaphysical idea-context.
The important point to observe is that one can employ terms residing within
the aspect of space in order to characterize (or analyse) spatial states of affairs
or one can stretch the use of such terms to exceed the boundaries of the spatial
aspect. This awareness allows for an alternative significant account of the na-
ture of an idea, in a rudimentary form already present in my PhD from 1973.
What is prominent in the school of Parmenides is not an interest in a geometri-
cal analysis of the way in which different entities function within the spatial
aspect, for this school simply used these spatial notions to develop their meta-
physical theory of being. Nevertheless, in doing this, they actually discovered
and eventually used crucial features of spatial extension – for instance its im-
plied whole-part relation, revealing the infinite divisibility of something
continuously extended.
127
These considerations opened up the possibility to take a step backwards

and realize that every modal aspect allows such a two-directional employment
of terms derived from it. We have argued that the first direction concerns uni-
versal functions of entities in the modal aspects – identified as the lawfulness
or orderliness of their functioning, or it concerns universal modal relations as
such. The second direction is in a certain sense the first one turned upside
down, since in this direction terms which have their original and primitive seat
in a specific mode, in an approximating and referential sense is used to speak
of something transcending the limits of the modal aspect concerned.
In 1981, in a key-note presentation to the Philosophical Association of
Southern Africa (PSSA) at the bicentenary of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(1781), this insight – namely that the meaning of the different modal aspects
not only provides a starting point for concept-formation but also furnishes us
with the possibility of using modal terms in an idea-context – was further ex-
plored while considering the various aspectual functions of a chair – as we
already explained above (see pages 22 and 81).
8.6 Implications of idea-usages of the meaning of the first four modal
aspects
On the basis of an idea-use of the core meaning of the first four aspects of real-
ity it is possible to formulate the four most basic concept-transcending state-
ments that philosophy can articulate about the universe.
(i) Exploring the meaning of the numerical aspect in a concept-transcend-
ing way provides a foundation for the statement that everything is
unique.
(ii) Stretching the meaning of space beyond its boundaries leads to the state-
ment that everything coheres with everything else.
(iii) An idea use of the kinematic aspect underlies the statement that every-
thing remains identical to itself.
(iv) Finally, the physical intuition of change may be stretched beyond its
boundaries, yielding the claim that everything changes.
These propistions would be contradictory only if they were derived from the
same modal aspect. They rather entail and complement each other. By the
same token they illustrate what it means to say that the modal aspects are gate-
ways (“toegangspoorten” – Van Riessen), for by using these four aspects as
points of entry, statements about the entire universe are made possible. Al-
though we had to employ two metaphors (gateway and point of entry) in our
reference to modal aspects, a more precise characterization of aspects is possi-
ble once we revert to a concept-transcending use of modal terms derived from
the first four modal aspects.
That everything is unique translates into what was introduced in Chapter 2
and has become known (since Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper) as
the principle of sphere sovereignty. We saw that within the theory of modal
aspects, this principle implies that each aspect is sovereign within its own
sphere. Likewise we saw that everything coheres with everything else is ex-
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Chapter 8
pressed in the theory of modal aspects through the retrocipatory and anticipa-
tory analogies within each aspect – known as the sphere-universality of every
aspect. The constant (enduring) structure of the modal aspects lies at the foun-
dation of the concrete functions of natural and social entities within the vari-
ous aspects and account for the possibility to speak of change.
If we cahnge our focus slightly while holding on the the conceptual and
concept-transcending possibilities of terms derived from them, we can suc-
cinctly formulate what the idea of a modal aspect entails – while using terms
derived from the first for modal aspects in a concept-transcending way:
Modal aspects are both unique (sphere-sovereign) and mutually cohering
(their sphere universality) while constantly conditioning (making possible)
the functions that natural and social entities and processes have within them.
8.7 Rationality presupposes a more-than-rational foundation
It is interesting to note that although Dooyeweerd fully acknowledged the
indefinabiity of the core meaning of the various aspects, merely intuitively ac-
cessible to us, he never contemplated the possibility of accounting for this in-
tuitive knowledge in terms of the concept-idea distinction.
If we know the (indefinable) core meaning of modal aspects solely in a con-
cept-transcending way, then we have to concede that all concepts ultimately
rest upon the basis of primitive (indefinable) terms. In general we can there-
fore state that concept and definition ultimately rest upon the acceptance and
employment of primitive terms (see pages 74 ff.). Therefore respecting what
is indefinable is the only way in which a regressus in infinitum can be avoided
in the theory of knowledge (epistemology). The key terms involved in a ratio-
nal (conceptual) understanding themselves are not open to (rational) concep-
tual definition!
Rationality in this sense therefore rests upon a non-rational or a more than
rational basis. Yet it should not be confused with something irrational. One
may designate this basis, given in irreducible primitives, as the restrictive
boundary of rationality. As such, it reflects a positive awareness of what may
be called one of the most fundamental perennial issues in philosophy, namely
the quest to account for the coherence of what is irreducible.
Since the structure of a modal aspect embraces its law side, its factual side,
its analogical structural elements pointing backwards and forwards to all the
other aspects of reality, its subject-subject relations and subject object rela-
tions, its time order and factual time duration, as well as its qualifying mean-
ing-nucleus, a proper understanding of an aspect ought to incorporate all these
elements. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the constitutive structural ele-
ments within a modal aspect (retrocipations) and the regulative ones (antici-
pations – the latter require the process of meaning-disclosure). It is therefore
possible to speak of analogical (or: elementary) basic concepts.1
1 In passing it should be mentioned, without arguing it, that concepts are foundational to ideas
in a constitutive sense, while ideas are foundational to concepts in a regulative sense.
129
What is at stake in these concepts is the combination of indicating a particu-

lar aspect as well as the aspect to which the analogy refers. For example, the
ethical meaning of love reveals itself through the coherence between the ethi-
cal and all the foundational non-ethical aspects. The concept of an ethical or-
der (ethical unity and multiplicity) embodies the quantitative analogy within
the structure of the moral aspect of love. Also in the case of typical concepts
the ethical meaning of love may express itself – for instance when we speak of
love of country (patriotism), marital love, and so on, where each one of the
italicized expressions represent typical concepts. Typical concepts account
for the typical way in which entities function within the boundaries of modal
aspects and to this we have added the consideration that whenever modal
terms are used to refer to similar instances of phenomena occurring within the
boundaries of a specific aspect, they are used in a conceptual manner and
when such modal terms are used to refer to whatever exceeds the boundaries
of a modal aspect those terms are employed in a concept-transcending way.
Compound phrases, such as retributive balance (physical analogy within the
jural aspect) or love life (biotical analogy within the moral aspect), represent
modal concepts in spite of the fact that, for example, the terms retribution and
love can only be approximated through an immediate, intuitie idea (insight).
Does this not lead to confusion, for example when we realize that both the
meaning-nucleus of the moral aspect and the central religious commandment
are designated with the term “love” which can only be approximated in an
idea?
Surely both the central commandment and the core meaning of the ethical
aspect can be approximated in ideas of love. The idea of the central dimension
of reality draws upon diverse modal terms (derived from various modal as-
pects) which are employed in a concept-transcending way. Referring to this
dimension as central, as the root-unity (radical unity) of the meaning-diver-
sity where the commandment of love is given, embodies instances of the use
of modal terms where they exceed the boundaries of the aspects from which
they are derived. The term “central” is a spatial term; the term “unity” is a nu-
merical term; the term “root” is a biotical term and the term “love” is an ethi-
cal term. The designation Radical, Central and Total (RCT) – as distinct from
what is Differentiated, Peripheral and Partial (DPP) – contains three modal
terms employed in a concept-transcending way, that is, in a way that exceeds
the boundaries of the aspects where they have their original modal seat.
For this reason the distinction between concept and idea indeed provides an
account of the distinction between the meaning of the religious dimension of
reality and the modal meaning-diversity (including the ethical modality).
Note that the expression “religious dimension” is also dependent upon a con-
cept-transcending use of modal terms, respectively the ceritutinal (“reli-
gious”) and the spatial aspect (“dimension”). There is an important difference
between the (i) religious dimension and the (ii) dimensions of modal aspects
and entities. In respect of (i) we have no option but to employ all the terms
used to refer to this dimension in a concept-transcending way, whereas re-
130
Chapter 8
garding (ii) we can employ both modal and entitary concepts and modal and
entitary ideas. The central command of love and the kernel of the ethical rep-
resent, regarding option (i), ontic realities that can only be approximated in
ideas – and in the case of (ii) they also leave open the possibility of modal and
typical concepts. In other words, also in the case of typical concepts the ethi-
cal meaning of love may express itself – for example where we spoke of love
of country (patriotism), marital love, and so on, where each one of the itali-
cized expressions represent typical concepts.
Owing to the modal universality of modal aspects – what Clouser calls the
“principle of aspectual universality” (Clouser, Myth-2005:254) – no single
typical function within the ethical aspect can ever exhaust the modal meaning
of moral love – all of them merely specify the meaning of this aspect (without
ever being able to individualize it). From the perspective of the norm side of
the ethical aspect these typical functions (and their correlated typical concepts
or type concepts) are indeed specifications of the universal meaning of love
according to the normative structural principles of the different kinds of ways
in which distinct societal relationships (with their type laws – differentiated
into collective, communal and coordinated types of social intercourse) func-
tion within the ethical aspect. The same applies to all the other modal aspects.
Many well-known expressions employed in referring to the religious di-
mension of reality are actually modal terms used in a concept-transcending
manner. Approached from the angle of the fiduciary aspect we meet the ex-
pression religious dimension, from the ethical or moral aspect we speak of the
love command, approximated from the economic aspect we speak of steward-
ship, from the biotic aspect we refer to the root-dimension of reality (or that
dimension which touches the radix of being human), from the perspective of
the spatial aspect we designate it as the central (religious) dimension (or: just
refer to it as the depth-dimension), from the lingual and spatial aspects we ap-
proximate it by referring to the meaning-totality of reality, and so on. These
are all instances of modal terms or perspectives employed in concept-tran-
scending ways (i.e. they are all instances of idea-knowledge – to be distin-
guished from the original modal seat of these terms where they can also serve
instances of conceptual knowledge).
Without an acknowledgement of the distinction between concept and idea the
true meaning of rationality will escape us, particularly regarding the fact that
the crux of rationality concerns concepts and that the key feature of concepts
in this context is given in the fact that we can ultimately only know something
through the employment of primitive terms exceeding the boundaries of con-
ceptual knowledge. This may be called the expansive boundary of rationality.1
1 Regarding the distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending knowl-
edge, see Strauss 2009:13, 64, 176, 178, 182, 193, 195, 205, 360, 369, 416, 430, 447, 449,
455, 460, 463-464, 469, 613-614.
131
The insight that human rationality is in-selfsufficient implies that it is of no

avail to attempt to provide a rational foundation or rational arguments for the
(supposed) autonomy of human reason. Clouser writes: “For surely there can
be no arguments or reasons for the reliability of reason that could avoid using
reason to do so and thus beg the question” (Clouser, 2005:38).
Questions
1) What is the contribution made by Plato to the distinction between concept and idea?
2) In which way can one deepen Dooyeweerd's distinction between concept and idea by distin-
guishing between a conceptual and a cocnept-transcending use of modal terms?
3) What are the main contours of the distinction between concept and idea in the history of philoso-
phy?
4) Why is the project f a negative theology inherently inconsistent?
5) Are ideas limiting concepts?
6) What are the implications of idea-usages of the meaning of the first four modal aspects?
7) Why does rationality presuppose a more-than-logical foundation?
132
The history of Philosophy, Systematic
distinctions and the Special Sciences
Chapter 9
This Chapter commences by highlighting the influence of certain conceptions
found in the humanities upon the thought of Darwin. On the one hand it fur-
ther elaborates the influence of the humanistic science ideal and on the other it
shows that the humanistic freedom ideal also surfaced in contemporary bio-
logical thinking, particularly in Gould's reaction to biological determinism, in
emphasizing “biological potentiality.” He relates determinism to functional-
ism and shows that Darwin accepted Lyell's conflation of gradualism with ra-
tionality itself. It will be argued that the two opposing paradigms are given in
the idea of gradualism versus discontinuous stasis. The expectations of Dar-
win failed in the dominant pattern of the fossil record, stasis. Types appear,
continue to exist unaltered (sometimes for millions of years) and then disap-
pear unchanged. It will be argued that the escape route of an “imperfect” fossil
record is in the grip of the continuity postulate (which also governs the subor-
dinate role of natural selection).
Gould exposed the poverty and theoretical inconsistencies present in the stan-
dard view of evolution as continuous flux and the assumed missing informa-
tion (imperfection). He argued convincingly that this entire project failed –
even measured on its own terms.
In conclusion brief attention is given to the idea of type laws within biology.
We noted that because Dooyeweerd first studied law he acquired a sensitivity

for the importance of special scientific work. This sensitivity inspired the way
in which the current Introduction is structured, for also explained that it con-
tinues to appeal to the test-ground of the special sciences in order to assess the
fruitfulness of general philosophical distinctions. As pointed out in Chapter 1,
these general philosophical insights found expression in Dooyeweerd's origi-
nal Dutch magnum opus (De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee – 1935-1936) and its
eventual translation (A New Critique of Theoretical Thought – 1953-1958)
(see Dooyeweerd, 1935-36 and Dooyeweerd, 1997).
He realized that the special sciences operate on the basis of philosophical
pre-suppositions and that a philosophy, cut off from the dynamics of special
scientific developments, becomes fruitless and stagnant. In this Chapter we
will focus on an issue well-known both to our everyday experience and to
what is relevant to various academic disciplines – an issue intimately related
to our discussion of the difference between physical space and mathematical
133
space in Chapter 2. What we have in mind is the problem of continuity and

discontinuity. An analysis of this relationship will contemplate three related
considerations: concerning the history of philosophy, regarding topical issues
within the special sciences and accounting for the inevitability of making sys-
tematic distinctions in reaction to the history of philosophy that are relevant
for the special sciences.
9.1 A familiar opposition
In everyday parlance it is quite common to speak of continuity and discontinu-
ity. In most instances it is related to an awareness of the temporal process of
coming into being and passing away – with the continuity of a certain period
of time in-between. Apart from individuals also societal institutions evince a
similar coming and going: states are established and may terminate their exis-
tence, through wars or other causes. The relative persistence of individuals
and societal forms of life echoes a consciousness of duration which calls for
an inquiry into the contexts in which one can refer to endurance, persistence,
stability or continuity. Of course one may ask if there is a domain where these
terms are found in their original sense, because we encounter them most of the
time in qualified contexts, such as social constancy, moral persistence, histor-
ical continuity, and so on. What we are looking for is a context within which
these terms are original and primitive, that is to say, indefinable. Once the
original aspectual context of these terms are found, it follows that within dif-
ferent contexts one merely meets analogies of these terms. In Chapter 2 we
discussed Catton's attempt to view the concept of force as a genus concept in
stead of seeing the compound phrase social force as an analogy of the original
physical meaning of the term force.
The same argument applies to the various previosly mentioned terms – en-
durance, persistence, stability and continuity. The primary issue seems to be
the awareness of a uniform movement – as it is associated with the initial for-
mulations of the law of inertia even pre-dating what Galileo had to say about it
(see Maier, 1949).
Classical mechanics, theoretically accounting for (uniform) motion, was
over-extended into an entire world view according to which the universe
ought to be understood as particles in motion. Eventually this view had to give
way to the insight that physical change is equally basic. However, as already
realized by Plato, change can only be affirmed on the basis of something en-
during or persistent, which implies that in its primitive meaning constancy
(endurance or persistence) forms the foundational condition for change. Of
course the core meaning of uniform phoronomic or kinematic motion itself is
dependent on another foundational mode of experience, namely that of space.
Although spatial continuity is static, its meaning is equally basic and unique in
its own right. We shall argue below that in its primary sense spatial continuity
is homogenous, of the same nature on the whole and in all of its parts. Living
entities are also characterized by a relative duration or time-span, bound to the
biotical time-order of birth, growth, maturation, ageing and dying.
134
Chapter 9
9.2 The continuity postulate in modern scholarly thought

Since the Renaissance the intellectual history of the West increasingly ex-
plored theoretical designs in which particular emphasis was laid upon the no-
tion of continuity. One may follow Dooyeweerd and speak of the continuity
postulate of modern philosophy. Via the thought of Darwin this continuity
postulate indeed permeated also biological thought thoroughly, mainly
through the all-pervasive influence of his understanding of evolution as con-
tinuous flux, also known as gradualism. Portmann even characterizes this
mode of thinking (prevailing around 1900) as optmistic and based upon a faith
in continuous advancement, based upon biology: “The mood of the time, one
of optimism [is] based on a biologically grounded faith in continuous advance-
ment …” (Portmann, 1990:113).
The renewed interest in the legacy of Charles Darwin, owing to the influ-
ence of his famous work from the year 1859, On the Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of favoured races in the strug-
gle for life, in a certain sense culminated during 2009 – the year in which his
birth 200 years earlier was celebrated (150 years after his 1859 book ap-
peared). Additional prominence was given to these celebrations by the an-
nouncement of two fossils found in South Africa in 2010, suggested to repre-
sent a new species of Australopithecines, namely Australopithecus sediba.
This single occurrence once more opens up the entire structure of Darwin-
ian evolutionary theory. Darwin assumed that nature does not make jumps,
captured in the long-standing saying, natura non facit saltus (nature does not
make jumps) – a conviction dating back to Greek philosophy and particularly
dominant within modern philosophy since the Renaissance.
The penetrating analysis given by Dooyeweerd of the rise of modern Hu-
manism, during and since the Renaissance, emphasizes that the ideal of a free
and autonomous personality gave rise to the natural science ideal aiming at
reducing all of relaity to the continuity of human thought, guided by whatever
aspect of nature is elevated to become the all-embracing basic denominator
for our understanding of reality (see Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:188 ff., cf.
1997-IV:37-38).
Although the freedom motive gave birth to the natural science ideal, the lat-
ter turned into a real Frankenstein by leaving no room for human freedom and
accountability within the context of a nature which is determined by causal
laws (“laws of nature”):
William Provine from Cornell University, who remarked “that persons who
manage to retain religious beliefs while accepting evolutionary biology ‘have
to check [their] brains at the church-house door’,” explicitly holds such a de-
terministic Darwinian view, excluding human freedom of choice:
“Modern science directly implies that the world is organized strictly in accor-
dance with mechanistic principles. There are no purposive principles whatso-
ever in nature. There are no gods and no designing forces that are rationally de-
tectable. …
Second, modern science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or
135
ethical laws, no absolute guiding principles for human society.

Third, human beings are marvelously complex machines. The individual hu-
man becomes an ethical person by means of two primary mechanisms: hered-
ity and environmental influences. That is all there is.
Fourth, we must conclude that when we die, we die and that is the end of us.
…
Finally, free will as it is traditionally conceived – the freedom to make
uncoerced and unpredictable choices among alternative possible courses of
action – simply does not exist. … There is no way that the evolutionary pro-
cess as currently conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make
choices” (quoted by Johnson, 1991:124-125).
The continuity postulate of modern Humanism, in its naturalistic garb, from

time to time did become suppressed whenever the freedom ideal acquired pri-
macy in Humanistic thought, for example in the thought of Immanuel Kant
and of post-Kantian freedom idealism, and also in existentialism, neo-Marx-
ism and postmodernism. However, the natural science-ideal never stopped
to exert its influence upon the intellectual legacy of the West. Its most im-
pressive success became manifest in the ideal of progress of the 18th century,
which is also known as the era of the Enlightenment. The possibilities of hu-
man reason, as expressed in mathematics and mathematical physics, were
ultimately elevated to become the guide of human life towards an ever-im-
proving future. Of course this immediately reminds one of the famous state-
ment made by Kant: “However, my claim is that in every particular theory of
nature only that much science is found as the amount of mathematics present
in it.”1
Sterelny points out that Richard Dawkins strictly continues the epistemic
ideal of Enlightenment rationality – according to which the scientific descrip-
tion of the universe is “true ... beautiful and complete” (as Sterelny formulates
it – 2007:14).2
It should be noted, nonetheless, that the unity and diversity displayed by re-
ality gave birth to theoretical orientations which attempted to understand re-
ality solely in terms of supposedly discrete “elements.” These atomistic or
individualistic views are usually defended as an alternative to holistic or
1 Einstein apparently opts for the opposite view when he says, “Insofar as the propositions of
mathematics are related to reality they are not certain and in so far as they are certain they are
not related to reality.” [“Insofern sich die Sätze der Mathematik auf die Wirklichkeit
beziehen, sind sie nicht sicher, und insofern sie sicher sind, beziehen sie sich nicht auf die
Wirklichkeit” (Einstein, 1921:124).]
2 One may find it strange that the theologian, Wentzel Van Huyssteen, supports this claim by
saying that our universe “and that all it contains is in principle explicable by the natural sci-
ences” (Van Huyssteen, 1998:75). Yet, flatly contradicting this Enlightenment trust, he also
warns, a mere 40 pages further on in the same work, that we should not overextend rationality
“to explain everything in our world in the name of natural science” (Van Huyssteen,
1998:115).
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universalistic approaches in which (analogies of) continuity (that is, whole-

ness) play an important role.
As counter-balance for his discrete monads, Leibniz explicitly used what
he called the lex continui (the law of continuity – see Leibniz, 1976:397).
During the nineteenth century discreteness once again surfaced within the
discipline of mathematics, particularly enhanced by the development of set
theory and its arithmeticistic claims. However, it did not eliminate the alter-
native emphasis on wholeness found in certain parts of intuitionistic mathe-
matics and in the thought of Frege close to the end of his life (se Chapter 4
above).3
The mentioned aphorism, natura non facit saltus, influenced Linnaeus and
subsequently also Charles Darwin himself. In his Origin of Species one finds
four places where the phrase is employed, although the idea of continuity per-
meates the entire work. Darwin indeed developed his new ideas with an ex-
plicit appeal to this continuity postulate – in an a priori fashion, that is to say,
without the support of empirical evidence, and this caused, as we shall see, se-
rious problems for his theoretical stance.
Darwin's first reference to natura non facit saltus is slightly critical of what
is designated as the cannon in natural history: “It certainly is true, that new
organs appearing as if created for some special purpose, rarely or never ap-
pear in any being;– as indeed is shown by that old, but somewhat exagger-
ated, canon in natural history of ‘Natura non facit saltum’ ” (Darwin,
1859a:116). A few pages further this “exaggeration” is left behind in the
claim that once we broaden our perspective to include the known and un-
known inhabitants of the past time it is “strictly true” (Darwin, 1859a:124).
Later on in this work Darwin continues this confident appreciation of the
continuity postulate:
As natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, favourable
variations, it can produce no great or sudden modifications; it can act only by
short and slow steps. Hence, the canon of “Natura non facit saltum,” which ev-
ery fresh addition to our knowledge tends to confirm, is on this theory [simply
– Darwin, 1859:444-445] intelligible (Darwin, 1859a:307).
He phrases this continuity postulate also in the following terms: “Natural se-
lection acts only by the preservation and accumulation of [infinitesimally –
Darwin, 1859:142] small inherited modifications” (Darwin, 1859a:56).
Remark: The persistent influence of the continuity postulate
Soon after Darwin's Origin of Species appeared this continuity postulate was
further elaborated by the Marburg school of neo-Kantian thought. Herman
3 “So an a priori mode of cognition must be involved here. But this cognition does not have to
flow from purely logical principles, as I originally assumed. There is the further possibility
that it has a geometrical source. ... The more I have thought the matter over, the more con-
vinced I have become that arithmetic and geometry have developed on the same basis – a geo-
metrical one in fact – so that mathematics in its entirety is really geometry” (Frege,
1979:277).
137
Cohen, in particular, the founder of this school, emphasized the connection

between continuity and the movement of human thought. Of course this con-
tinuity of the movement of thought has already been identified by Leibniz.
Maimon continued this legacy of Leibniz and at once assigns a greater cre-
ative power to human understanding: “It [namely understanding] can within
an object only accepts with certainty that which itself has put into it (in that it
brought forth the object according to a rule that it prescribed), but not as
something that in it came from somewhere else” (Maimon, 1790:59-60). Al-
ready in the logic of origin, developed by Cohen, he attributed to human un-
derstanding the ability to bring forth from thought as origin every content:
“What must become the first request of thought is to put into thought itself
the origin of every content that it can bring forth.” A few pages further Cohen
writes: “By virtue of continuity all elements of thought, insofar as they may
serve as elements of knowledge, must be brought forth from the origin” (Co-
hen, 1883:92). As in the case of Leibniz the so-called infinitesimal method of
mathematics plays a decisive role in this view of the principle of continuity.
The infinitely small as movement principle (in the treatment of the tangent
problem) leads to the basic principle of continuity: “And this positive mean-
ing, this motive of the infinitely small as a principle of movement which is
fruitful for the geometrical determination, ..., leads to the genuine principle
of this approach, the principle of continuity” (Cohen, 1914:82).
Darwin's a priori trust in the validity of the continuity postulate builds upon
the idea of “infinitesimally small inherited modifications,” that is to say, upon
a view analogous to the idea that a line could be seen as a continuum of points.
This continuity postulate is so deeply rooted in Darwin's entire approach, that
he is willing to equate a refutation of this claim with the absolute break down
of his entire theory: “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ ex-
isted, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive,
slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down” (Darwin,
1859a:109). Gould reminds us that “my theory” here specifically refers “to
the mechanism of natural selection (and not simply to the assertion of evolu-
tion)” (Gould, 2002:150).4 Moreover, Gould calls upon Gruber, Barrett and
Mayr who also noted the centrality of gradualism in Darwin's thought and
even remarks that by following his chrief guru, Charles Lyell, Darwin equated
gradualism with rationality.5
In passing we may note that Darwin did not attempt to give an account of
the origination of the first living entities. At the end of his Origin of Species he
actually used the kind of language found in the long-standing vitalistic tradi-
4 Dawkins also adheres to the orthodox Darwinian view by believing that the power of selec-
tion slowly and incrementally build the exquisite and intricate outfit of living organisms. This
conviction clearly shows a prejudiced and premature pre-occupation by Darwin and his fol-
lowers with change which prevented modern (neo-)Darwinian biology to come to terms with
the fact that change always presupposes something constant.
5 “Gradualism had been equated with rationality itself by Darwin's chief guru, Charles Lyell.
All scholars have noted the centrality of gradualism, both in the ontogeny (Gruber and
Barrett, 1974) and logic (Mayr, 1991) of Darwin's thought” (Gould, 2002:151).
138
Chapter 9
tion within biology, dating back to Aristotle. According to vitalism “life” is an

immaterial force acting upon lifeless matter. Darwin wrote:
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one (Darwin,
1859a:459-460).
The constantly increasing natural scientific knowledge regarding the com-
plexity of the smallest living entities makes it all the more difficult to provide
a rational account of the supposed origination of living entities. While Darwin
still (inconsistently) reverted to a “life-breathing” Creator, present-day neo-
Darwinists, for the sake of their physicalistic starting-point, simply proceed
from the assumption that living entities indeed “evolved” from non-living ma-
terial configurations, most probably “self-duplicating” molecules. Any subse-
quent attempt to explain the transition from the non-living to the living then
becomes sircular, because the ultimate conviction is already in place: living
things DID in fact evolve from non-living things. Such a position begs the
question. It is a good example of a petitio principii where one accepts as a
given what one wants to demonstrate.
Initially the emphasis was on the so-called “building blocks” of living
things, directed at DNA molecules. Soon it was clear that the “hardware”
needs the “software”, the information (entailed in the genetic code). Yet the
random origination of this information runs into serious statistical problems,
apart from the fact that DNA and protein mutually presuppose each other.
Furthermore, we know that the 20 different amino acids serve as the basis for
multiple enzymes responsible for catalyzing reactions in the various meta-
bolic pathways within the cell (there can be up to 100 000 enzymes in a single
cell). One such an enzyme, phosphatase, catalyzes reactions taking place in a
hundredth of a second – reactions that otherwise (in the absence of this en-
zyme) would take a trillion years (see Lang, 2003 and Sarfati, 2010:241).
ATP synthase is the smallest motor in the world (ATP = adenosine
triphosphate – the energy currency of the cell as it is also called). Sarfati re-
marks: “This motor is unique in that it uses electricity to turn a rotor, which
squeezes two components of ATP (ADP and phosphate) at high enough en-
ergy to form ATP. Then it throws off the ATP and prepares to accept new
ADP and phosphate. This motor turns at about 10,000 revolutions per minute,
and each rotation produces three ATP molecules” (Sarfati, 2010:242). At-
tempting to explain the origination this motor, viewed as the result of random
interactions between atoms and molecules, exceeds all odds. It is undoubtedly
an instance of a complex biotic motor (organ) that cannot be explained in
terms of incremental, slight changes, sufficient to answer to a condition ac-
cording to which Darwin's whole theory would break down. Darwin wrote:
“If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not
possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my
theory would absolutely break down” (Darwin, 1859b: 109).
Perhaps the most amazing feature of these little motors is that there are so
many of them within the human body. Using many trillions of these motors
139
the human body everyday generates ATP equivalent to the mass of the human
body (see Sarfati, 2010:242).
It is important to reiterate that Darwin's trust in the continuity postulate is
not supported by the required empirical evidence. He alludes to the “natura
non facit saltum” principle but at the same time is completely honest about the
lacking evidence, for in connection with the “hoped-for” intermediate links of
the fossil record he writes: “But just in proportion as this process of extermi-
nation has acted on an enormous scale, so must the number of intermediate va-
rieties, which have formerly existed, be truly enormous” (Darwin, 1859a:
196). To this statement he adds the significant question on the same page:
“Why then is not every geological formation and every stratum full of such
intermediate links?”
Although this question appears to be nothing but a “neutral statement of
fact,” the subsequent “explanation” uses the word “imperfection,” which
demonstrates the hidden assumption of gradualism (the continuity postulate)
expressed in it: “Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely-graduated
organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection
which can be urged against the theory.6 The explanation lies, as I believe, in
the extreme imperfection of the geological record.” When Darwin says that he
believes in the “extreme imperfection of the geological record” it means that
he believes that there has been a perfect continuity but that this perfect conti-
nuity just did not show up in the fossil record. Compare his following words,
still resounding his positive hope that intermediate forms will be found: “But
we continually overrate the perfection of the geological record, and falsely in-
fer, because certain genera or families have not been found beneath a certain
stage, that they did not exist before that stage” (Darwin, 1859a:210).
In spite of his equally basic belief that, owing to the continuity in descent,
the (assumed) actual random process must have been going through “an inex-
tricable chaos of varying and intermediate links,” he had to concede that the
existing diversity of living entities portrays a real discontinuity (Darwin,
1859a:102).7 Being aware of this diversity initially, as we noted above, caused
6 Hundred and forty years later Jones echoes the problem: “The fossil record – in defiance of
Darwin's whole idea of gradual change – often makes great leaps from one form to the next.
Far from the display of intermediates to be expected from slow advance through natural se-
lection, many species appear without warning, persist in fixed form and disappear, leaving no
descendants. Geology assuredly does not reveal any finely graduated organic chain, and this
is the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against the theory of evolution”
(Jones, 1999:252).
7 Darwin writes: “To sum up, I believe that species come to be tolerably well-defined objects,
and do not at any one period present an inextricable chaos of varying and intermediate links;
first, because new varieties are very slowly formed, for variation is a slow process, and natu-
ral selection can do nothing until favourable individual differences or variations occur, and
until a place in the natural polity of the country can be better filled by some modification of
some one or more of its inhabitants” (Darwin, 1859a:102).
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Chapter 9
a slight relativization of the continuity postulate, namely when he refers to it,

as “somewhat exaggerated.”8
In spite of this modesty, his deeply rooted belief in the continuity of descent
convinced him that once the picture is extended to include the assumed conti-
nuity of the fossil record, it is not any longer necessary to speak of an exagger-
ation. In other words, when Darwin stretches his imagination beyond the lim-
its of the available evidence by including what he expects from the paleon-
tological record, his unbridled faith in the seemless transitional continuity
dominates the core convictions of his work on the Origin of Species. Just re-
call his previosly mentioned statement: “On the theory of natural selection we
can clearly understand the full meaning of that old canon in natural history,
‘Natura non facit saltum.’ This canon, if we look to the present inhabitants
alone of the world, is not strictly correct; but if we include all those of past
times, whether known or unknown, it must on this theory be strictly true”
(Darwin, 1859a:124).
It is therefore not surprising that, in spite of lacking evidence, he repeatedly
re-affirmed his trust in this principle of continuity, for example where he
states: “Natural selection acts only by the preservation and accumulation of
small inherited modifications” (Darwin, 1859a:56).
9.3 Discontinuity
The last fifty to sixty years witnessed an increasing challenge to the classical
Darwinian conception of a gradually and continuous transition through num-
berless incremental small changes over millions of years. This challenge
flows from what Gould and Eldredge characterized as the dominant theme of
the fossil record, namely stasis (constancy or fixity). One may capture the core
of this issue by employing the opposition of continuity versus discontinuity.
The clear predominance of an empirical pattern of stasis and abrupt geological
appearance as the history of most fossil species has always been acknowl-
edged by paleontologists, and remains the standard testimony… of the best
specialists in nearly every taxonomic group. In Darwinian traditions, this pat-
tern has been attributed to imperfections of the geological record that impose
this false signal upon the norm of a truly gradualistic history. Darwin's argu-
ment may work in principle for punctuational origin, but stasis is data and can-
not be so encompassed (McGar 2006: 242).
Of course the problem of continuity and discontinuity cannot be restricted to
any academic discipline because it appears in all special sciences. The only
question to be asked, as we have seen, is where the original meaning of this
opposition is located in order to be able to discern the similarities and differ-
ences between its primtive domain and other domains where it appears ana-
logically – just remember the difference between social force and physical
force, and physical space and mathematical space.
8 Remember his words: “as indeed is shown by that old, but somewhat exaggerated, canon in
natural history of ‘Natura non facit saltum’ ” (Darwin, 1859a:116).
141
As we argued in Chapter 3 (see page 29 above), that David Hilbert, in an ar-

ticle on the infinite, pointed out that the discovery of quanta of energy on the
one hand and Einstein's theory of relativity on the other, eliminates the possi-
bilities of the infinitely large and the infinite small. The crux of his analysis is
found in the distinction between mathematical space and physical space. He
pointed out that in a purely abstract and functional perspective mathematical
space is both continuous and infinitely divisible. However, physical space is
neither continuous nor infinitely divisible. Since it is bound to the quantum
structure of energy, physical space cannot be subdivided ad infinitum. Energy
quanta indeed represent the limit of the divisibility of energy.9 These develop-
ments within the discipline of physics therfore uprooted the classical (but
previosly mentioned speculative) claim that nature does not make jumps
(natura non facit saltus).
However, at the time (1859) when Darwin elaborated his basic convictions,
this modern continuity ideal still reigned almost unchallenged. Darwin writes:
If numerous species, belonging to the same genera or families, have really
started into life at once, the fact would be fatal to the theory of evolution
through natural selection. For the development by this means of a group of
forms, all of which are descended from some one progenitor, must have been
an extremely slow process; and the progenitors must have lived long before
their modified descendants (Darwin, 1859a:210).
We have seen that during and after the Renaissance modern Humanism was
driven by the ideal to proclaim the freedom and autonomy of humankind – as
a law (nomos) unto itself (autos). This autonomous freedom was supposed to
flow from the sovereignty of human reason. The first half of the 17th century
had already clearly manifested the basic motive of what the Renaissance initi-
ated during the 14th and 15th centuries. It concerns this ideal of an all-encom-
passing natural science (physics) as the intrument in the hand of the ideal of
autonomous freedom. Since Descartes, the ideal of such an encompassing nat-
ural scientific control of all of reality started to dominate the scene. In order to
proclaim its autonomy (being a law unto itself) and its freedom, the human
person had to master reality with the aid of the newly developing natural sci-
ences. In the mould of this new spiritual climate, the “world”no longer en-
closes the human being. Rather, the world is recovered as an “object” at the
disposal of the autonomously free rational human being with its all-determin-
ing natural scientific abilities.
In his discussion of the thought of Descartes, Von Weizsäcker reveals a
penetrating understanding of this orientation: “This state of affairs is charac-
teristic of modernity. It is not the world in which I find myself that guarantees
my existence. This guarantee is not lost, for when I recover the world then it is
9 An aalogy is present whenever differences are shown in what is similar. In this case: both
mathematical space and physical space are extended (their similarity), but in being discontin-
uous and not infinitely divisible (their differences), the latter differs from the former.
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Chapter 9
as the object of my self-assured thinking, that is to say, as an object which I

can manipulate.”10
We use the expressions “naturalistic science ideal,” “rationalistic science
ideal” and “science ideal” as synonyms, all of them bringing to expression
that they manifest the humanistic science ideal (the nature motive of modern
Humanism). In its supposed autonomy sovereign human thought is “entitled”
to eliminate every boundary and subsume whatever there is under one, all-en-
compassing continuity perspective. However, since the world in which we
live is given in diverse aspects or modes of explanation, the choice to be made
merely concerns which functional perspective (aspect or mode of being) will
be chosen as basis for these continuity claims. Descartes still subsumed (natu-
ral) reality under a spatial denominator. Hobbes, by contrast, chose for move-
ment.
9.4 “Imperfection” of the fossil record?
One section of Darwin's Origin of Species has the title: “On the Absence of
Numerous Intermediate Varieties in any Single Formation.” In the light of
several considerations Darwin remarks that “it cannot be doubted that the
geological record, viewed as a whole, is extremely imperfect; but if we con-
fine our attention to any one formation, it becomes much more difficult to un-
derstand why we do not therein find closely graduated varieties between the
allied species which lived at its commencement and at its close” (Darwin,
1859a:203-204).
Ever since Darwin pointed at the “imperfection” of the fossil evidence,
gradualist followers of him continued to safeguard their faith in the continu-
ous line of descent with an appeal to this alleged imperfection of the fossil re-
cord. For example, when the neo-Darwinist, George Gaylard Simpson, had to
explain gaps in the fossil record, he claims that if we had all the intermediate
fossils there would be no gaps. Thus, instead of explaining the gaps, he simply
denies that they exist, owing to the gradualist belief in the “imperfection” of
the fossil record (see Simpson, 1961:359 ff.). By contrast, Gould states: “The
extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record persists as the trade se-
cret of paleontology. The evolutionary trees that adorn our textbooks have
data only at the tips and nodes of their branches; the rest is inference, however
reasonable, not evidence of fossils” (Gould, 1980:179 ff.)
Insisting that the fossil record is “imperfect,” according to no one less than
Gould, is not a stance supported by data. The powerful assumption upholding
this prejudice of “perfection” is a faith in slow, incremental (“infinitesimal”),
continuous change (flux). Two things must be noted in this respect. (i) First of
all, that the continuity postulate, known as “gradualism,” indeed serves as the
basis of Darwin's thought, and (ii) secondly, that this assumption is not
10 “Dies ist ein charakteristisch neuzeitlicher Sachverhalt, Nicht die Welt, in der ich mich
vorfinde, garantiert mein Dasein. Diese Garantie geht nicht verloren, und wenn ich die Welt
wiederfinde, dann als Gegenstand meines selbstgewissen Denkens und darum als Objekt, das
ich hantieren kann” (Von Weizsäcker, 2002:130-131).
143
merely peculiar to a biological conception following from the operation of

natural selection. Let us quote what Gould said in both these respects:
(i) “Gradualism may represent the most central conviction residing both
within and behind all Darwin's thought” (Gould, 2002:148);
(ii) “I believe, therefore, that Darwin's strong, even pugnacious, defense of
strict gradualism reflects a much more pervasive commitment, extend-
ing far beyond the simple recognition of a logical entailment implied by
natural selection – and that this stronger conviction must record such
general influences as Darwin's attraction to Lyell's conflation of gradu-
alism with rationality itself, and the cultural appeal of gradualism dur-
ing Britain's greatest age of industrial expansion and imperial con-
quest” (Gould, 2002:151).
The significant element in Gould's analysis of Darwin's position is that he
draws attention to the fact that for Darwin natural selection does not repre-
sent his core conviction – this position is occupied by the continuity postu-
late. Moreover, it is important for those interested in intellectual history
(“the history if ideas”) to realize that the primacy given in Darwin's thought
to the continuity postulate (nature does not make jumps), evinces the root-
edness of his thought in the modern humanistic science ideal. Just as Leibniz
struggled with the relationship between his discrete monads and his lex
continui (law of continuity), Darwin had to reconcile the discreteness dis-
played in the currently living nature (the “Natural System” in terms of Bio-
logical Systematics), and the incremental, step-by-step (i.e., continuous)
transitions assumed to have happened in the past. But we have seen that Dar-
win had the honesty to formulate the most serious objection that anyone can
raise against his theory. Let us give the full quotation of what was partially
mentioned above (see page 140):
But just in proportion as this process of extermination has acted on an enor-
mous scale, so must the number of intermediate varieties, which have for-
merly existed, be truly enormous. Why then is not every geological forma-
tion and every stratum full of such intermediate links? Geology assuredly
does not reveal any such finely-graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is
the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory
(Darwin, 1858a:196).
It is at this point where Darwin then introduces his “explanation,” namely
that the absence “of such intermediate links” follows from the “imperfec-
tion” of the geological record: “The explanation lies, as I believe, in the ex-
treme imperfection of the geological record” (Darwin, 1859a:196).
This idea of the “imperfection” of the fossil record is synonymous to Dar-
win's belief that evolutionary change took place by means of minute, incre-
mental (continuous) change over long periods of time. At the time when his
book appeared in print, in1859, this belief at once embodied a serious hope,
namely that fossils of the continuously changing transitional forms will be
found through continued paleontological research and the discovery of new
fossils. But let us see what Ernst Mayr, one of the key figures in the “New
144
Chapter 9
Synthesis” of Darwinism (that gave rise to the label neo-Darwinism) had to

say after more than 130 years: “Paleontologists had long been aware of a
seeming contradiction between Darwin's postulate of gradualism … and the
actual findings of paleontology. Following phyletic lines through time
seemed to reveal only minimal gradual changes but no clear evidence for any
change of a species into a different genus or for the gradual origin of an evolu-
tionary novelty. Anything truly novel always seemed to appear quite abruptly
in the fossil record” (Mayr, E. 1991:138). 11
Excursion: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith and Charles Darwin
The modern humanistic science ideal directed political theory and economic
theory. The view developed in the Leviathan of Hobbes (1651), where the
“state of nature” is portrayed as a battle of everyone against everyone (bellum
omnium contra omnes), forms the background of Darwin's idea of a “struggle
for existence.” Via the political philosophy of Locke and the classical school
in economic theory, the discreteness element, i.e. individualism, made its con-
tribution to Darwinism. It should be kept in mind that Locke's orientation to
the science ideal caused him to construct society through a social contract,
with (equal and sovereign) individuals as elements. The state of nature is sim-
ply continued, with the exception of two rights that had to be given up, namely
“to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others
within the permission of the law of Nature,” and the “other power a man has in
the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that
law” (Locke, 1966, § 128). The individualistic (atomistic) underpinnings of
his contract theory is found in his starting point – the equality of “kings.” In the
“state of Nature” “man” is the “absolute lord of his own person and posses-
sions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody.” In the state of Nature “all
being kings as much as he, every man his equal” (Locke, 1966, § 123).
Clearly, the political philosophy of John Locke (based upon his atomistic con-
tract theory) and the ideas of the classical school in economics (Adam Smith
and his followers) were both in the grip of the natural science ideal of modern
Humanism. Viner's characterization reveals this direction-giving science
ideal: “The claim to fame of Smith in the first place therefore appears to have a
foundation, because he has applied the conception of a uniform, natural order
just as comprehensively to the world of economics; an ordering that functions
on the basis of a natural law and, if left to its own functioning, will be benefi-
cial to humankind” (Viner, 1956:92).
Against the argument of Paley about the good design and the harmony of eco-
systems, assumed to illustrate God's existence and benevolence, Darwin re-
verted to the quasi-Hobbesian atomistic view of struggle, supported by his dis-
covery of Malthus in 1838, according to which this simply follows from natu-
ral causes operative amongst struggling individuals. As Gould explains Dar-
11 Already in 1982 Mayr wrote: “What one actually found was nothing but discontinuities. All
species are separated from each other by bridgeless gaps; intermediates between species are
not observed. … The problem was even more serious at the level of the higher categories”
(Mayr, E. 1982:524).
145
win's view: “But his interpretations could not have been more askew – for
these features do not arise as direct products of divine benevolence, but only as
epiphenomena of an opposite process both in level of action and intent of out-
come: individuals struggling for themselves alone” (Gould, 2002:124).
In following the analysis of the physicist and historian of science, Silvan S.

Scheber, Gould advances the following strong claim: “In fact, I would ad-
vance the even stronger claim that the theory of natural selection is, in essence,
Adam Smith's economics transferred to nature” (Gould, 2002:122).
Analogous to the thought of Leibniz, with the inherent tension between the
discrete monads and the law of continuity, also Darwin had to cling to both el-
ements: the overall dominance of the continuity postulate in his thought and
his simultaneous emphasis on a struggle between individual living entities:
“First, and foremost, we grasp the theoretical centrality of Darwin's conclu-
sion that natural selection works through a struggle among individual organ-
isms for reproductive success” (Gould, 2002:125).
Of course the problem of discreteness, in an equally fundamental sense, re-
lates to the “bio-diversity” presently found and accounted for in the “Natural
System,” as well as to the discontinuous appearance of fossils, as noted above.
These two problems are explicitly mentioned in a recent work on evolution.
Coyne refers to discrete clusters of living entities known as species: “And at
first sight, their existence looks like a problem for evolutionary theory. Evolu-
tion is, after all, a continuous process, so how can it produce groups of animals
and plants that are discrete and discontinuous, separated from others by gaps
in appearance and behavior?” (Coyne, 2009:184). Coyne designates a dis-
crete cluster of sexually reproducing organisms as a species, and continues on
the same page by saying that the discontinuities of nature are “not arbitrary,
but an objective fact” (Coyne, 2009:184) (Coyne, 2009:184).
In other words, while Darwin advanced a typical nominalistic view in re-
spect of living entities (see Strauss, 2009:25, 226), Coyne reverts to a realistic
idea of (currently!) living entities. This view approximates the idealistic ori-
entation of Wilhelm Troll, who believes that it is not descent that decides over
morphology, but the other way around. 12
The acknowledgment of discreteness is irreconcilable with the notion of
evolutionary continuity – unless one subscribes to the intrinsically antinomic
stance of emergence evolutionism. The latter idea fits the spirit of the irratio-
nalistic leg of nominalism, rejecting any structural or typical feature belong-
ing to “reality out there.” However, faithful to the inherent inconsistency of
nominalism (being rationalistic and irrationalistic at the same time), Coyne, at
once, acknowledges that species have “an objective reality and are not simply
arbitrary human constructs” (Coyne, 2009:186). From what is asserted on the
previous page, it is clear that in the thought of Coyne primacy is given to the
12 “Es ist nicht die Deszendenz welche in der Morphologie entscheidet, sondern umgekehrt: die
Morphologie hat über die Möglichkeit der Deszendenz zu entscheiden” (see Zimmermann,
1968:19).
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Chapter 9
irrationalistic side of nominalism, because it is the continuous process of evo-

lution that produces discrete groups: “For years after publication of The Ori-
gin, biologists struggled, and failed, to explain how a continuous process of
evolution produces the discrete groups known as species” (Coyne, 2009:186).
However, without being an adherent of the view of an idealist morphology,
it is still possible to give primacy to the natural system, that is to say, to dis-
creteness. After the neo-Darwinian “New Synthesis” was well established
Portmann, who wrote a standard textbook on the comparative morphology of
the vertebrates (see Portmann 1969) maintains: “Many biologists practically
never any longer contemplate the fact that systematics forms the foundation of
the entire theory of descent, that it is what is certain, that what we know, while
the theories of evolution are what we conjecture” (Portmann, 1965:10). 13
Moreover, both in the thought of Darwin and Coyne the ultimate primacy is
given to the continuity postulate of the science ideal. Coyne holds that evolu-
tion is a continuous process while Darwin assigned to his gradualism (conti-
nuity postulate) even a more central role than natural selection. Gould clearly
saw this:
… gradualism stood prior to natural selection in the core of his beliefs about
the nature of things. Natural selection exemplified gradualism, not vice versa –
and the various forms of gradualism converged to a single, coordinated view
of life that extended its compass far beyond natural selection and even evolu-
tion itself (Gould, 2002:154-155).
Gould stumbled upon what Dooyeweerd designated as die continuity postu-
late of modern Humanism, which represents just the one pole of the modern
humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom. It is clear that the primacy
assigned to this nature pole in Darwin's thought, directed his core scientific
belief that there simply must have been an incremental (infinitesimal) continu-
ous development stretched over a very long period of time.
Fossil evidence for human origins?
Regarding the origin of human beings, Lyall Watson (a former Assistent of
Raymond Dardt, highlighted the scarcity of fossil material in 1982:
The remarkable fact is that all the physical evidence we have for human evolu-
tion can still be placed, with room to spare, inside a single coffin. … Modern
apes, for instance, seem to have sprung out of nowhere. They have no yester-
day, no fossil record. And the true origin of modern humans … is, if we were to
be honest with ourselves, an equally mysterious matter (Watson, 1982:44).
In 1990 Richard Leakey, perhaps the most famous paleo-anthropologist in the
world, honestly confessed that regarding human origins “all we have is a huge
question mark” (PBS Documentary, 1990).
During the early seventies of the previous century, with the discovery of
Homo habilis and the fossil which received the registration number 1470, it
13 “Gar mancher Biologe denkt kaum mehr daran, dass die Systematik die Grundlage der
ganzen Abstammungslehre ist, dass sie das Sichere ist, das, was wir wissen, während die
Entwicklungstheorien das sind, was wir vermuten.”
147
seemed as if the picture may be captured in the succession of Australopithe-

cus, Homo habilis, Homo erectus, Homo sapiens, with the 14 million-year-
old Kenyapithecus as a probable member of the hominidae family. However,
the latter turned out to be nothing more than an ape and the tests of Spoor and
his friends have shown that Homo habilis habitually did not walk upright at
all. Eventually also the Australopithecines lost the race, explaining why
Gould argued for “the removal of the different members of this relatively
small-brained, curiously unique genus Australopithecus into one or more par-
allel side lines away from a direct link with man” (Gould, 1992:60).
And ten years later Gould in a humorist fashion stated in respect of human
origins:
Needless to say, no true consensus exists in this most contentious of all scien-
tific professions – an almost inevitable situation, given the high stakes of sci-
entific importance and several well known propensities of human nature, in a
field that features more minds at work than bones to study (Gould, 2002:910).
In an issue of National Geographic (August 22(2)2011:120-133) Josh Fish-
man wrote an article: Part Ape, Part Human, A new ancestor emerges from
the richest collection of fossil skeletons ever found. The finding of Australopi-
thecus sediba occupies the centre of attention in it. Fishman remarks that the
origins of the genus Homo are “murky” because only “a few scattered and
fragmentary fossils older than two million years have been argued to belong
to the genus” (Fishman, 2011:131). He then mentions two to three possible
Homo species, such as Homo habilis and Homo erectus (the latter contempo-
raneous with Homo habilis), followed up by the question where did all these
characters come from? He writes:
Attempts to look deeper into the past only increase the frustration, says Wil-
liam Kimbel, a plaeoanthropologist at Arizona State University and Director
of the Institute of Human Origins there. “There are only a handful of speci-
mens. You could put them all into a small shoe box and still have room for a
good pair of shoes,” he says.
The biggest problem with sediba is timing. “If two-million-year-old sediba is
indeed the true ancestor of Homo, how could it give rise to those even older
fossils assigned to Homo in Bill Kimbel's shoe box? A fossil cannot be ances-
tral to something older than itself any more than a daugther can give birth to
her own mother. One possibility is that the Malapa specimens represent a late
stage of an enduring species that gave rise to Homo at an earlier date. But
Berger's team questions whether that shoe box really contains any Homo fos-
sils in the first place – after all, they're just fragments” (Fishman, 2011:133).
9.5 Conclusion
Darwin proceeded from the ultimate commitment of the modern humanistic
science ideal with its inherent aprioristic continuity postulate, leveling all
boundaries between distinct creatures. Gould did realize the deeply rooted
and all-pervasive impact of this motive in the thought of Darwin and its ef-
fects upon neo-Darwinism. This postulate burdened the practice of paleontol-
148
Chapter 9
ogy severely and at the same time demonstrates that theoretical thought can-
not escape from a foundational theoretical view of reality. We shall pursue
this issue further in respect of the philosophical underpinings present in the
idea of continuous flux.
Questions
1) How does the relation of coming into being and passing away relate to our experience of endur-
ance, persistence, stability and continuity on the one hand and our awareness of change and
variation of the other?
2) What does the continuity postulate of modern philosophy entail?
3) How did the modern philosophical idea that nature does not make jumps (natura non facit saltus)
influence Darwin?
4) Does discontinuity imply tha tthe fossil record is ‘incomplete’?
5) Why can it be said that Darwin's theory is not a truly natural scientific theory but one predomi-
nantly rooted in the humanities?
6) Why can it be said that the origin of human beings, judging from lacking fossil evidence, is a
mystery?
149
150
Philosophical Assumptions behind the
Evolutionary Idea of Continuous Flux
Chapter 10
Darwins is indebted to the views of Hobbes (who portrayed the hypothetical
state of nature as a battle of everyone against everyone – continued in the idea
of a struggle for existence) and Malthus (his Essay on the Principle of Popula-
tion). As an outcome of the humanistic science ideal the continuity postulate
informed the dominating gradualist trend in neo-Darwinian thought. In oppo-
sition the genetic determinism Gould advances a position that opts for human
freedom. Present-day biology, furthermore, is divided by the split between
gradualism and discontinuous stasis. Gould emphasizes that stasis is “data”
and poses a serious problem for the idea of natural selection, because stasis
over millions of years points at the ineffectiveness of natural selection. Atten-
tion is also given to the (neo-)Darwinian rejection of the idea of type laws. Ac-
cording to Dooyeweerd such laws belong to the law side of reality and are
therefore constant and not themselves subject to change. A brief indication is
given of alternative trends of thought in 20th century biology and this Chapter
is concluded with Gould's insight that the most dangerous of mental traps is
given in a hidden assumption which is depicted as self-evident is recognized at
all. What Gould has in mind is the basic definition of evolution as continuous
flux. The basic patter of discontinuity (in the paleontological record and
within the natural system of currently living entities) justifies the remark of
Sterelny that we are confronted with a mystery.
10.1 Background
In the previous Chapter the problem of continuity and discontinuity was dis-
cussed and we have seen that Darwin's thought is ultimately in the grip of the
humanistic natural science ideal with its inherent continuity postulate. Be-
cause Darwin's epoch-making book of 1859, The Origin of Species, is nor-
mally appreciated as a natural scientific work, scholars may be surprised to
learn from the preceding Chapter that nonetheless some of the chief im-
pulses of his theoretical approach are derived from disciplines within the hu-
manities.
Recall for a moment Gould's assessment regarding the influence of the
classical school of economics and the thought of Adam Smith in particular:
“In fact, I would advance the even stronger claim that the theory of natural se-
lection is, in essence, Adam Smith's economics transferred to nature” (Gould,
2002:122).
A broader picture emerged from the fact that Darwin is also indebted to
Hobbes's idea of the social contract which proceeded from a hypothetical
151
“state of nature,” seen as a battle of everyone against everyone (bellum om-

nium contra omnes). These ideas of Hobbes were mediated by the thought of
Malthus. In 1798 Malthus (1766-1834) published the following work: “An
Essay on the Principle of Population and its Effects of the Future Improve-
ment of Society.” It is generally acknowledged that Malthus influenced Dar-
win's thought. Although Sober remarks that “the degree to which Malthus
changed the direction of Darwin's thought remains controversial” (Sober
1987:15), Gould explored this issue once more in his last big work of 2002,
where he argues that the two main themes of Darwin's thought, namely the
idea of a struggle for existence and the idea of natural selection, are derived
from Malthus (and – as pointed out – Adam Smith). Gould remarks: “Dar-
win, after all, had also read Malthus” (Gould, 2002:120). Two pages further
he elaborates the effect of this thrust more extensively:
The link of Darwin to Malthus has been recognized and accorded proper im-
portance from the start, if only because Darwin himself had explicitly noted
and honored this impetus. But if Darwin required Malthus to grasp the central
role of continuous and severe struggle for existence, then he needed the related
school of Scottish economists – the laissez-faire theorists, centered on Adam
Smith and the Wealth of Nations (first published in the auspicious revolution-
ary year of 1776) – to formulate the even more fundamental principle of natu-
ral selection itself (Gould, 2002:122).
The continuity postulate of the modern science ideal turned out to be one of
the basic beliefs that permeated the thought of most of the contemporary ad-
herents of Darwin's thought. It also serves as the foundation of the entire
neo-Darwinistic dominant gradualist trend in modern biology since the “New
Synthesis.” Just recollect the words of William Provine, where he denies that
anyone adhering to the theory of Darwin can defend the view that human be-
ings truly have a freedom of choice (see the preceding article and Johnson,
1991:124-125). Interestingly Gould, who rejects the gradualist view, also
wants to uphold genuine human freedom! In his thought the dialectical ten-
sion between nature and freedom is found in his reaction against the biologi-
cal determinism of the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson (see Wilson, 1975). On the
one hand Gould upholds the basic thesis that humans are animals. However,
for him this statement does not “imply that our specific patterns of behavior
and social arrangements are in any way directly determined by our genes”
(Gould, 1992:251). For that reason he answers the question regarding the “ev-
idence for genetic control of specific human social behavior” totally in the
negative: “At the moment, the answer is none whatever” (Gould, 1992:252).
He explicitly states that he rather opts for freedom: “Better to stick resolutely
to a philosophical position on human liberty: what free adults do with each
other in their own private lives is their business alone” (Gould, 1992:267).
Gould mentions a statement of Wolfgang : “It follows from evolutionary
theory that the genes run the individual in their own interest.” Gould's reaction
is radical: “I confess I cannot regard such a statement as much more than met-
aphorical nonsense” (Gould, 1992:269). However, the question is: how does
152
Chapter 10
Gould reconcile his view that humans are animals with the freedom and lib-
erty of humankind?1 Clearly, the basic humanistic motive of nature and free-
dom gives direction also to “biological” thought. Gould believes that “the is-
sue is not universal biology vs. human uniqueness, but biological potentiality
vs. biological determinism” (Gould, 1992:252). Potentiality here represents
the humanistic freedom motive and determinism the classical humanistic sci-
ence ideal. In reaction to the meaningless speculations of sociobiologists
Gould therefore posits human flexibility with a vast range of potential behav-
iour.2 In the final analysis Gould attempts to maintain a relative balance be-
tween the dialectically opposed poles of the ground motive of nature and
freedom.
Gould refers to the fact that one has to accept Darwin's entire conceptual
world: “To accept Darwin's full argument about the creativity of natural selec-
tion, one must buy into an entire conceptual world – a world where externali-
ties direct, and internalities supply raw material but impose no serious con-
straint upon change; a world where the functional impetus for change comes
first and the structural alteration of form can only follow. The creativity of natural
selection makes adaptation central, isotropy of variation necessary, and grad-
ualism pervasive” (Gould, 2002:158-159). The gradualist position of
neo-Darwinism is also characterized as being functionalist in nature. But at
this point Gould raises questions in defense of an alternative position “that se-
riously challenges the predominant functionalism of classical Darwinism”
(Gould, 2002:159 – he has his own theory of punctuated equilibrium in mind).
Gould points out that “Lyell's conflation of gradualism with rationality it-
self” attracted Darwin, but generated the serious criticism of his friend Huxley
who complained: “You have loaded yourself with an unnecessary difficulty in
adopting Natura non facit saltum so unreservedly” (quoted by Gould,
2002:151).
10.2 The two opposing paradigms: gradualism versus
discontinuous stasis
Darwin was convinced that “natural selection acts solely by accumulating
slight, successive, favourable variations,” that is to say it cannot produce
“great or sudden modifications” because “it can act only by short and slow
1 Rousseau already stated: “Nature commands every animal, and the brute obeys. The human
being experiences the same impulse, but recognizes the freedom to acquiesce or to resist; and
particularly in the awareness of this freedom the spirituality of humankind manifests itself. ...
but in the capacity to will, or much rather to choose, and the experience of this power, one en-
counters nothing but purely spiritual acts which are totally inexplicable through mechanical
laws” (Rousseau, 1975:47).
2 “We are both similar and different from other animals. In different cultural contexts, empha-
sis upon one side or the other of this fundamental truth plays a useful social role. In Darwin's
day, an assertion of our similarity broke through centuries of harmful superstition. Now we
may need to emphasize our difference as flexible animals with a vast range of potential be-
havior. Our biological nature does not stand in the way of social reform” (Gould, 1992:259).
153
steps.” His high expectations about every “fresh addition to our knowledge” is
seen in one of the four places, quoted more extensively in the previous article,
where he posits the idea that nature does not make jumps: “Hence, the canon
of “Natura non facit saltum,” which every fresh addition to our knowledge
tends to confirm, is on this theory [simply – Darwin, 1859:444-445] intelligi-
ble” (Darwin, 1859a:307).
Unfortunately the subsequent “fresh addition to our knowledge” did not
confirm his a priori belief in short and slow steps over long periods of time.
Eldredge states: “The fossil record flatly fails to substantiate this expectation
of finely graded change” (Eldredge, 1982:163). Instead, prominent paleontol-
ogists during the past forty years had to acknowledge openly that they all the
time knew that the fossil record contradicts Darwin's expectations. What
Eldredge said is quite embarrassing in this context: “We paleontologists have
said that the history of life provides support for the interpretation of gradual
development through natural selection while all the time we knew that it was
not true” (see Van den Beukel, 2005:105).
Darwin indeed succeeded to burden all his followers with the a priori faith
in continuous or gradual change, a conviction that resulted in what is known
as gradualism. However, as Berlinski remarks, “[M]ost species enter the evo-
lutionary order fully formed and then depart unchanged” (Berlinski, 2003:
158).1 Jones articulates this state of affairs more extensively: “The fossil re-
cord – in defiance of Darwin's whole idea of gradual change – often makes
great leaps from one form to the next. Far from the display of intermediates to
be expected from slow advance through natural selection, many species ap-
pear without warning, persist in fixed form and disappear, leaving no descen-
dants. Geology assuredly does not reveal any finely graduated organic chain,
and this is the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against
the theory of evolution” (Jones, 1999:252). Eldredge adds the remark: “and
this destroys the backbone of the most important argument of the modern
theory of evolution” (as quoted by Van den Beukel, 2005:106).
Gould tells the story of an example of this burden as it is displayed in the ac-
ademic career of one of his Ph.D. advisors, John Imbrie. The latter was a dis-
tinguished paleontologist who accepted the “canonical equation of evolution
with gradualism.” Gould explains that his conjecture was “that our documen-
tary failures had arisen from the subtlety of gradual change, and the conse-
quent need for statistical analysis in a field still dominated by an “old-fash-
ioned” style of verbal description” (Gould, 2002:760). John Imbrie schooled
himself in these quantitative methods and then applied this “exciting and
1 “The clear predominance of an empirical pattern of stasis and abrupt geological appearance
as the history of most fossil species has always been acknowledged by paleontologists, and
remains the standard testimony … of the best specialists in nearly every taxonomic group. In
Darwinian traditions, this pattern has been attributed to imperfections of the geological re-
cord that impose this false signal upon the norm of a truly gradualistic history. Darwin's argu-
ment may work in principle for punctuational origin, but stasis is data and cannot be so en-
compassed” (McGar, 2006:242).
154
Chapter 10
novel” method of analysis “to the classic sequence of Devonian brachiopods

from the Michigan Basin – where rates of sedimentation had been sufficiently
slow and continuous to record any hypothetical gradualism.” Gould mentions
that he “studied more than 30 species in this novel and rigorous way.” How-
ever, he found “that all but one had remained stable throughout the interval,
while the single exception exhibited an ambiguous pattern.” The effect was
that Imbrie became so “disappointed at such ‘negative’ results after so much
effort” that he “buried his data in a technical taxonomic monograph that no
working biologist would ever encounter (and that made no evolutionary
claims at all) – and eventually left the profession for something more ‘produc-
tive’)” (Gould, 2002:760).
The general attitude of those “infected” by the continuity postulate (gradu-
alism) of Darwin was to view stasis “as just another failure to document evo-
lution” (Gould, 2002:759) – normally camouflaged by stating that the fossil
record is “imperfect.” Yet Gould claims that every paleontologist all the time
new that stasis existed abundantly: “Stasis existed in overwhelming abun-
dance, as every paleontologist always knew” (Gould, 2002:759). His confes-
sion is honest: “But this primary signal of the fossil record, defined as an ab-
sence of data for evolution, only highlighted our frustration – and certainly
did not represent anything worth publishing. Paleontology therefore fell into a
literally absurd vicious circle. No one ventured to document or quantify – in-
deed, hardly anyone even bothered to mention or publish at all – the most
common pattern in the fossil record: the stasis of most morphospecies
throughout their geological duration” (Gould, 2002:759-760).
The prejudice of a continuous transition therefore met with fierce resistance
from the paleontological record because the latter did not conform to Dar-
win's expectations – neither during his own life-time nor now, a hundred and
fifty years later. The clash between the factual state of affairs and Darwin's
expectation is confessed by himself: “But I do not pretend that I should ever
have suspected how poor was the record in the best preserved geological sec-
tions, had not the absence of innumerable transitional links between the spe-
cies which lived at the commencement and close of each formation, pressed
so hardly on my theory” (Darwin, 1859a:209).
The followers of Darwin who accepted his a priori continuity postulate
(“gradualism”) by and large tend to settle for the escape-explanation claim-
ing that the fossil record is “imperfect.” The assumed continuity postulate
caused Gould to remark that we often fail to realize “how much of the Origin
presents an exposition of gradualism, rather than a defense of natural selec-
tion” (Gould, 2002:151). However, if natural selection is the chief agent
causing (incremental) change, then the dominant pattern of the paleon-
tological record, given in stasis which, in many instances, stretches over a
time-span of millions of years, generates a serious question. The constancy
of fossil forms – which most of the time appear fully formed and remain un-
changed until they disappear – must be assessed against the ever changing
natural conditions. Constancy (stasis) over millions of years inevitably had
155
to face numerous “attacks” from environmental changes, providing natural

selection with ample chances to cause visible (and in the long run or some-
times: drastic) changes to the adapting species. The empirical (paleonto-
logical) fact that this is not the case does not bypass the sharp insight of
Gould where he writes: “… if stasis merely reflects excellent adaptation to
environment, then why do we frequently observe such profound stasis dur-
ing major climatic shifts like ice-age cycles (Cronin, 1985), or through the
largest environmental change in a major interval of time (Prothero and
Heaton, 1996)?” (Gould, 2002:878).
The priority of the continuity postulate in the thought of Darwin made it
impossible for him to accept the fossil record on face value. Instead he ad-
vanced arguments intended to secure his prejudice, of which the strongest
one is the claim that the fossil record is imperfect. What ought to be ex-
plained is, in Darwin's own words, why “we do not find interminable variet-
ies, connecting together all extinct and existing forms by the finest graduated
steps”? (Darwin, 1859a:232).
Apart from the unsurmountable difficulties in explaining the genesis of the
first living entities, the subsequent picture also does not support the continuity
postulate. The hope that the Precambrian era will disclose a picture of contin-
uous transition was in vain. Gould remarks:
Paleontologists have now established a good record of Precambrian
life. The world did swarm indeed, but only with single-celled forms and
multicellular algae, until the latest Precambrian fauna of the Ediacara
beds (beginning about 600 million years ago). The explosion of
multicellular life now seems as abrupt as ever—even more so since the
argument now rests on copious documentation of Precambrian life,
rather than a paucity of evidence that could be attributed to imperfec-
tions of the geological record” (Gould, 2002:154).
Although he is just as much attached to the continuity postulate, Simpson
had to acknowledge abrupt appearance:
It is a feature of the known fossil record that most taxa appear abruptly.
They are not, as a rule, led up to by a sequence of almost imperceptibly
changing forerunners such as Darwin believed should be usual in evolu-
tion. ... These peculiarities of the record pose one of the most important
theoretical problems in the whole history of life: is the sudden appear-
ance ... a phenomenon of evolution or of the record only, due to sam-
pling bias and other inadequacies? (quoted by Tax, 1960:149).
This state of affairs explains why paleontologists avoided evolution. The ob-
servation of Eldredge is striking: “No wonder paleontologists shied away
from evolution for so long. It never seemed to happen. Assiduous collecting
up cliff faces yields zigzags, minor oscillations, and the very occasional slight
accumulation of change over millions of years, at a rate too slow to account
for all the prodigious change that has occurred in evolutionary history. When
we do see the introduction of evolutionary novelty, it usually shows up with a
bang, and often with no firm evidence that the fossils did not evolve else-
156
Chapter 10
where! Evolution cannot forever be going on somewhere else. Yet that's how
the fossil record has struck many a forlorn paleontologist looking to learn
something about evolution” (Eldredge, 1995:95).
The crucial issue in this regard is that the conviction that the fossil record is
imperfect does not have a foundation in factual evidence. Stasis, however, is
based upon actual fossil findings, that is to say, on data and not on the absence
of data. Of course one has to realize that the prejudice of gradualism “forced”
Darwin to interpret the fossil record in such a way that its obvious discontinu-
ity is denied.1 The fundamental question is if one can refute gradualism “from
within”? Once again Gould captures this key issue adequately: “For the data
that should, prima facie, rank as the most basic empirical counterweight to
gradualism – namely the catalog of cases, and the resulting relative frequency,
for observed stasis and geologically abrupt appearances of fossil morpho-
species – receive a priori interpretation as signs of an inadequate empirical
record” (Gould, 2002:758).
Gould and Eldredge are therefore fully justified in emphasizing that stasis
is data and in getting frustrated with many colleagues who failed to grasp this
evident point. To help these colleagues “a mantra or motto” is suggested – to
be said “ten times before breakfast every day for a week” so that the “argu-
ment will [surely] seep in by osmosis: ‘stasis is data; stasis is data ...’ ” (Gould,
2002:759). Gould further elaborates by suggesting: “sample a species at a
large number of horizons well spread over several million years, and if these
samples record no net change, with beginning and end points substantially the
same, ... then a conclusion of stasis rests on the presence of data, not on ab-
sence!” (Gould, 2002:759). 2
The standard “incompleteness-response” to stasis and abrupt (dis)appear-
ance did not realize that this interpretation of the “facts” is embedded in the
continuity postulate. Also here Gould shows that he has digested the impor-
tant results of the developments within the philosophy of science of the previ-
ous century: “Facts have no independent existence in science, or in any human
endeavor; theories grant differing weights, values, and descriptions, even to
the most empirical and undeniable of observations. Darwin's expectations de-
fined evolution as gradual change. Generations of paleontologists learned to
equate the potential documentation of evolution with the discovery of insensi-
ble intermediacy in a sequence of fossils. In this context, stasis can only re-
cord sorrow and disappointment” (Gould, 2002:759).
Gould is therefore justified in asking how gradualism could face stasis as
the “most prominent signal” from the fossil record, something that could not
1 Darwin acknowledges that he only understood the extreme imperfection of the geological re-
cord when paleontological evidence of stasis and abrupt appearance threatened to confute the
gradualism that he “knew” to be true.
2 Concerning groups of invertebrate animals even Dawkins had to acknowledge: “And we find
many of them already in an advanced state of evolution the very first time they appear. It is
though they were just planted there, without any evolutionary history” (Dawkins, 1987:229).
157
“be explained away as missing information?” The answer to this question re-
veals an embarrassing perspective, because Gould believes that “this project
could not even succeed in its own terms, for gradualism occurs too rarely to
generate enough cases for calculating a distribution of rates” (Gould, 2002:
761-762). He continues by pointing out that alternatively “paleontologists
worked by the false method of exemplification: validation by a ‘textbook
case’ or two, provided that the chosen instances be sufficiently persuasive.”
At this point the irony of side-stepping stasis as data turns into something
tragic: “And even here, at this utterly minimal level of documentation, the
method failed”. Yet this is not the end of the story, for the few examples that
did enter the literature were “replicated by endless republication in the time-
honored fashion of textbook copying” (Gould, 2002:759-760).
The most striking of these “examples” are Simpson's story of the horse and
the untrue story about the peppered moths in England.1 Gould (1996:68)
quotes Prothero and Shubin, who wrote in connection with the supposed evo-
lution of the horse: “This is contrary to the widely held myth about horse spe-
cies as gradualistically varying parts of a continuum, with no real distinctions
between species. Throughout the history of horses, the species are well-
marked and static over millions of years” (Gould, 1996:68 and Gould, 2002:
846-847). Raup remarks: “We actually may have fewer examples of smooth
transitions than we had in Darwin ‘s time, because some of the old examples
have turned out to be invalid when studied in more detail” (quoted by
Johnson, 1991:171).
And then Gould formulates the final verdict in respect of the false method
of exemplification pursued by gradualists:
But, in final irony, almost all these famous exemplars turned out to be false on
rigorous restudy (Gould, 2002:761-762).
Stasis over millions of years – THE dominant fact of paleontology up to date –
questions adaptation and natural selection, for in spite of multiple environ-
mental changes types simply remained constant over millions of years – as we
have seen above this impasse is explicitly acknowledged by Gould (2002:
878)!
10.3 The rejection of type laws
The majority of neo-Darwinists are still fully in the grip of the a priori conti-
nuity postulate that dominated Darwin's thinking. Most of the time they do not
realize that this postulate is assumed to be true prior to an investigation of
whether it is supported by any empirical evidence.
All in all the problem of continuity and discontinuity not only highlights
some of the most pressing intrinsic inconsistencies within modern (neo-Dar-
winian) biology, but also calls for an alternative approach in which the reality
of discontinuous types – as evinced both in the stasis-stamped paleontological
record and the current natural system of plants and animals – is recognized.
1 Interestingly Gould still believed the peppered moth story (see Gould, 1994:257).
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What is beyond the scope of the evolutionistic emphasis on evolution as a

random process, caught up in continuous flux, is an acknowledgement of or-
dering types, that is type laws, which delimit different types of plants and ani-
mals without themselves turning into transient entities subject to such tye
laws. In 1959 Dooyeweerd wrote an article on creation and evolution in which
he alluded to the “successive realization of individuality-structures as order-
ing-types of the plant and animal world.”
The structural types of plants and animals as such are indeed not individual
subjects that originate in the temporal process of becoming, for much rather
they are ordering types belonging to the law side and not the factual side of our
empirical world. They can only realize themselves in transient individual liv-
ing beings, but as ordering types they necessarily bear a constant and founda-
tional character in the time order. This is the case because they make possible
our experience of the plant and animal world irrespective of the way in which
we theoretically envisage the process of origination of living beings
(Dooyeweerd, 1959:132).
His account of the central biblical perspective regarding humankind reads as
follows:
The Scriptures reveal God's act of creation. In their statement of this basic
truth, which transcends all theoretical thought, they do not primarily appeal to
certain temporal cognitive functions of man, but to ourselves in the religious
root of our existence. They do not use theoretical scientific concepts, but by
means of their central basic motive they appeal to the heart of man in the lan-
guage of naïve experience.
And then they impress two things in our minds: man does not make his appear-
ance in time until the whole foundation for the normative functions of tempo-
ral reality has been laid in the creation; and at the same time: in man the whole
‘earthly’ temporal cosmos finds its religious root, its creaturely fullness of
meaning. Adam's fall into sin is the fall into sin of the whole ‘earthly’ world,
which is not independent of the religious basic relation between God and the
human race (in any of its temporal functions).
For that very reason the metaphysical conception of a natural reality in itself,
independent of man, is un-biblical. The religious basic motives which gave
rise to it, are incompatible with the Biblical one (Dooyeweerd, 1997-II:52-53).
Of course modern biology is not exhausted by neo-Darwinism, it indeed hosts
various diverse schools of thought. In addition to the problem of continuity
and discontinuity – as we argued a conceptual contradistinction originally
found only in the spatial aspect of reality (see the previous chapter in this re-
gard) – alternative modes of explanation are explored by the different trends
of thought in modern biology. In the case of Eisenstein reality is subsumed un-
der the classical mechanistic denominator of motion; among supporters of the
general synthetic theory of evolution in principle understood in terms of a
physical denominator in which apparent (but not principled) recognition is
given to higher structural levels; in vitalism, holism, and organicism a biotical
denominator is employed; in the pan-psychistic identism of Rensch a sensi-
159
tive-psychic denominator is chosen, and in the personality ideal-oriented

thought of Jonas the denominator of freedom serves as guiding principle.
Emergence evolutionism wants to have it both ways – by recognizing a conti-
nuity of descent on the one hand and a discontinuity of being on the other.1
The choice of a mode of explanation or a denominator implies (with onto-
logical necessity) that all other facets of the diversity of reality must be re-
duced to the chosen denominator which, as an absolutized perspective, is sup-
posed to encompass all aspects and other dimensions of reality.
What is particularly striking is that all these mentioned diverse approaches
continue to be confronted with the diversity of reality which can be logically
identified and distinguished. No single understanding of continuity succeeded
in denying the differences between material things, plants, animals, and hu-
mans, or the differences between movement, the physical, biotical, the sensi-
tive, and the post-psychical aspects – they simply describe these different fac-
ets and structures as non-essential since apparently they can be reduced to one
or another denominator.
The basic question remains whether this diversity of choices in denomina-
tor has any “objectively factual” foundation. It cannot be denied that the in-
herent diversity in reality offers a point of departure for this diversity in per-
spectives, but the belief that all of this diversity can be reduced to one particu-
lar facet which would, as basic denominator, encompass all others, undoubt-
edly indicates fundamental theoretical presuppositions – theoretical-philo-
sophical presuppositions which exist since theoretical logical thought by na-
ture requires an idea of the diversity in reality, while these theoretical presup-
positions themselves are being directed and determined by supra-theoretical
convictions – such as the continuity postulate of modern humanistic philoso-
phy which took hold of the thought of Darwin. No single perspective in
modern biology can avoid one or another basic motive which directs the
course of its theoretical articulations, just little as it can avoid an underlying
theoretical view of reality.
The equation of evolution with continuous flux, an outcome of the humanis-
tic science ideal with its continuity postulate, operates as an uncritical as-
sumption in neo-Darwinian thought in such a way that most neo-Darwinian
thinkers are not even aware of this theoretical prejudice. Gould once again
saw this in his own way:
They start with the most dangerous of mental traps: a hidden assumption, de-
picted as self-evident, if recognized at all – namely, a basic definition of evolu-
tion as continuous flux (Gould, 2002:913).
In 1992 Jeffrey S. Levinton writes in “The Big Bang of Animal Evolution”:
Evolutionary biology's deepest paradox concerns this strange discontinuity.
Why haven't new animal body plans continued to crawl out of the evolutionary
1 For an overview of these various biological trends of thought see Strauss 2005 (Chapter 4)
and Strauss 2009 (Chapter 7 and in particular pp.470 ff. and 479 ff.).
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cauldron during the past hundreds of millions of years? Why are the ancient
body plans so stable? (Levinton, 1992:84).
Ultimately these questions challenge the speculative certainties still dominat-
ing the general thought-pattern of neo-Darwinism. Having in mind what
Gould holds to be the case, Sterelny remarks that since the Cambrian no “new
plans have been invented” and “no old ones have been massively modified.”
He continues: “If Gould is right about this basic pattern of history, he is surely
right in thinking we are faced by a mystery” (Sterelny, 2007:131).
Dobzhansky uses the word transcendence (or: emergence) as designation
for this mystery, for what he considers to be the two most striking turning
points in the history of the earth, namely the origination of the first living enti-
ties and the origination of human beings: “The origin of life and the origin of
man were evolutionary crises, turning points, actualizations of novel forms of
being” (Dobzhansky, 1967:32). 1
Simply assuming the accidental origination of the first living entities is an
act of thought equally guilty of trampling on one of the unsolved mysteries of
modern science. Without a meaningful answer to this most basic and funda-
mental mystery, namely the origination of first living things, no one is justi-
fied in claiming any final certainty regarding the other mysteries. In particular
one may also think of the questions still surroundig the Cambrian explosion2
and those regarding the origination and existence of humankind.
Questions
1) How did the humanistic science ideal inform the continuity postulate dominating the gradualist
trend of neo-Darwinian thought.
2) Why did Gould oppose genetic determinism?
3) Did he accept the standard neo-Darwinian position of gradualism?
4) Why does the data point at the ineffectiveness of natural selection?
5) Why does Darwinism rejects type laws ?
6) What is Dooyeweerd’s view of type laws?
7) Which are the non-Darwinistic trends in 20th century biology?
8) What is, according to Gould, the most dangerous of mental traps?
9) Does the basic patter of discontinuity (in the paleontological record and within the natural system
of currently living entities) justify the remark of Sterelny, namely that we are confronted with a
mystery.
1 Dobzahnsky approximates the idea of sphere sovereignty when he states: “Stated most sim-
ply, the phenomena of the inorganic, organic, and human levels are subject to different laws
peculiar to those levels” – to which he adds: “It is unnecessarty to assume any intrinsic
irreducibility of these laws, but unprofitable to describe the phenomena of an overlying level
in terms of those of the underlying ones” (Dobzhansky, 1967:43).
2 In the ‘Cambrian explosion’, we find segmented worms, velvet worms, starfish and their al-
lies, mollusks (snails, squid and their relatives), sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals
appearing all at once, with their basic organization, organ systems, and sensory mechanisms
already operational. We do not find crude prototypes of, say, starfish or trilobites. Moreover,
we do not find common ancestors of these groups (see Sterelny, 2007:116).
161
162
Humankind
Chapter 11
In the first Volume of his trilogy on Reformation and Scholasticism in
Philosophy Dooyeweerd has shown that Greek philosophy is in the
grip of the dualistic ground-motive of form and matter. Although
questioning Dooyeweerd's account of the genesis of the motive of
form and matter, Bos believes that the extensive analysis of the devel-
opment of this motive in Volume I of Reformation and Scholasticism
in Philosophy is still valid. Via its substance concept Greek philoso-
phy influenced the (medieval) Roman Catholic view of soul and body,
until modern humanism gave a new content to the idea that a human
person is a spiritual-ethical being. Descartes elevated clear and dis-
tinct thought to be the infallible guide to knowledge and truth. What-
ever is clearly and distinctly observed is true, because God would not
conceive us. However, he now proves through clear and distinct
thought that god does exist, which clearly is a circular reasoning.
Dooyeweerd expanded our understanding of the human body by ac-
knowledging that we function bodily (subjectively) within all aspects
of reality. In this Chapter we have expanded this analysis by focusing
on th eypical way in which humans function within a number of modal
aspects (such as the physical, biotic, sensitiveand the lingual mode). It
concludes with highlighting the anatomical limitations preventing ani-
mals from speaking.
At the end of Volume 3 of his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought Dooye-
weerd points out that the question “What is man's position in the temporal cos-
mos?” urged itself upon him at the outset of his enquiry and that it returned at
the end of his trilogy (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:781). In the first Volume of an-
other trilogy – Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy – he extensively
analyzed the dialectical development of Greek thought up to Plato by showing
that it is in the grip of the dualistic ground-motive of form and matter. Al-
though Bos questions the way in which Dooyeweerd accounts for the genesis
of the motive of form and matter, and prefers to speak of the titanic mean-
ing-perspective, he nonetheless believes that the extensive analysis of the de-
velopment of this motive in Dooyeweerd (1949) (see Dooyeweerd 2003),
contains a valid perspective on the inherent dialectic of Greek thought (see
Bos, 1994:220).
11.1 The influence of Greek culture
In the thought of Socrates the Greek question regarding the nature of being
human underwent a deepening and became internalized. He wants to know
who he is himself: is he related to the many-headed animal TIPHON (the myth-
163
ological symbol of the flowing stream of life without any set limit or form), or
does he share in a more measured, simple divine nature (the prominence of the
form motive in Greek thought)? The maxim guiding Socrates' thought is
found in the urge: “Know Yourself.” Dooyeweerd phrases it as follows: “The
question as to whether primacy was to be ascribed to the motive of form or to
that of matter was expressly viewed by Socrates in the light of critical self-
knowledge. According to the testimony of Plato in the dialogue Phaedrus –
which, if not authentic, nevertheless suits the Socratic spirit perfectly – Socra-
tes wished to know, if his ego was related to Typhon, the wild and incalculable
God of destructive storms (a genuine mythological symbol of the matter-mo-
tive), or whether he was in possession of a simple (Apollinian) nature, to
which form, order, and harmony are proper” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-I:534).
The dominant Roman Catholic and Protestant views on the relationship be-
tween body and soul can be traced to Greek thought. The faculty of reasoning
or understanding (rationality) traditionally was usually seen as uniquely hu-
man, as it is still found in the currently prevailing biological classification,
homo sapiens, the “wise man.” In comparing humans and animals this legacy
gives prominence to a striking difference between them. Darwin maintains the
view that rationality (“reason”) is the outstanding feature of the human
“mind.” In his Descent of Man he writes: “Of all the faculties of the human
mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason stands at the summit” (Dar-
win, 1870). This view is deeply seated in the history of philosophy. Darwin
and neo-Darwinism at the same time argue for a continuity between lower ani-
mals, higher animals and human beings regarding their mental capacities:
“We must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power be-
tween one of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher
apes, than between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up by numberless
gradations” (Darwin, 1871). The word “gradations” gave rise to one of the
general characterizations of Darwin's view, gradualism.1
11.2 The Greek dialectic of matter (body) and form (soul)
The close link between rationality (nous in Greek) and what was designated as
the human soul resulted in the expression rational soul (anima rationalis in
Latin). Aristotle distinguishes between a plant soul (anima vegetative), an ani-
mal soul (anima sensitiva) and the mentioned anima rationalis.
Initially Plato advanced a view of the human soul as something non-com-
posite (simple) and indestructible. In his dialogue Phaedo, he explains that ra-
tional contemplation is only possible of what is invisible and constant. By
contrast what is visible and changeable can only be observed through the
senses. When the soul investigates without the mediation of the body, it is di-
rected at the world of the pure and eternal, immortal and unchanging, con-
stant and equally-natured things (Phaedo 79d). The soul exhibits the greatest
similarity to the divine, immortal, conceivable, simple, indissoluble, constant
and “self-identical,” while the body bears the greatest similarity to the human,
1 We have discussed Darwin's gradualism in the previous Chapter.
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Chapter 11
mortal, multifarious, non-conceivable, dissoluble and never-constant

(Phaedo 80b:1-6).
The soul is not only seen as the form and live-giving principle of a living en-
tity, but also as an indivisible whole – the contribution of Aristotle's substance
concept.1 The latter's hulè-morphism requires that the unity of being human is
accounted for in terms of form and matter. In Fragment B 12 the pre-Socratic
philosopher Anaxagoras portrays the nous2 as eternal (Fr. 14) and as having
(autonomous) dominion over the disordered matter-germs because it is not in-
termingled with them. The nous possesses all knowledge and the greatest
power (pavnton nou'" kratei'), and its rule is extended over the rotating move-
ment to which it gave the first impetus.
After Plato introduced his idea of the human soul in his dialogue Phaedo he
proceeded in Politeia (436 ff.) by dividing the soul up into three parts, namely
the logistikon, thumoeides and epithumétikon, i.e., thought, fervor and desire.
During the middle ages thought, will and feeling continued to be appreciated
as faculties of the soul. More recently we may compare it with Hitler's estates
in Nazi Germany, the id, ego and superego in the depth psychology of Sig-
mund Freud or the general view that the true, beautiful and good sedimented
in human culture as science, art and religion (see Von Bertalanffy, 1968:22).
This three-fold conception of the soul provides the basis for Plato's theory
of the state and lays the foundation for his understanding of the first three car-
dinal virtues he distinguishes. According to this, wisdom (sophia) is the virtue
of the rational part of the soul, courage (andreia) is the virtue of the spirited
part, while temperance as virtue represents – under the rule of the rational part
– the union of the thumoeides and the epithumétikon. Justice, as general vir-
tue, embraces the former three, and thus also has a bearing on the ideal state as
a whole (cf. Politeia, 433A-C). Justice prohibits the transgression of the legal
domain of the different parts of the soul, i.e., it demands avoiding any legal
excess – which also applies to the three estates within the state (cf. Politeia,
443 ff.).
Aristotle considers the nous to be separated from the body, yet the eternity
of the nous does not coincide with the human soul and understanding residing
in it. Ter Horst points out that in the thought of Aristotle the active nous threat-
ens to break apart the substantial unity of form and matter, the unity of the
human substance.
1 Bos points out that the word ‘organikon’ in Aristotle's thought has always been misunder-
stood. See Bos, 2003a:85 ff., 93-94, 107-108, 162, 174, 200. The word “organikon” is used in
the sense of “instrumental” or “serving as an instrument.”
2 According to Anaxagoras the nous is not determined by any limits; it is not intermingled with
germs of matter, and it is self-sufficient, for itself (Diels-Kranz, 1959-1960, B Fr. 12): nou'"
dev ejstin a[peiron kai; aujtokrate;" kai mevmeiktai oujdeni crhvmati, ajlla; movmo" aujto;" ejp!
ejwutou' ejstin .
165
11.3 The Medieval synthesis – the substance concept

The after-effect of Greek philosophy during the middle ages is particularly
found in the dualistic understanding of human beings, in the view that an im-
material soul is joined to a material body. The original Aristotelian view was
that only the combination of soul (essential form) and body (matter) consti-
tutes a substance, the human being. The substantial unity of the human being
is therefore composed of form and matter.
This dualism became explicit in the view of Thomas Aquinas, for the latter
accepted an active immaterial instance, the active understanding (Ter horst,
2008:23). Aristotle at least intended to defend the unity of form and matter
(body and soul). However, in order to accommodate the Roman Catholic
church doctrine, Thomas Aquinas had to acknowledge the “indestructibility”
of the human soul as an independent substance. Still adhering to the initial
view of Anaxagoras, Thomas Aquinas also holds that the intellectual princi-
ple can only know (material) bodies if it is not intermingled with them:
“Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained within itself the nature of
body, it would be unable to know all bodies.”1 To this he adds: “Therefore the
intellectual principle, which we call the mind or the intellect, has essentially
an operation in which the body does not share. Now only that which subsists
in itself can have an operation in itself. … We must conclude, therefore, that
the human soul, which is called intellect or mind, is something incorporeal
and subsistent” (Pegis, 1945-I:685). The attempt to synthesize the Aristote-
lian substance concept with his own view, according to which the soul is sup-
posed to be an independent substance and at the same time merely the form of
the material body, resulted for Thomas in serious problems. He accepted, after
all, the Aristotelian view that “all things that are many in number have matter”
(Metaph. 1074 a 33-34; Aristotle, 2001:884). So, if the soul is immaterial and
if there is a multiplicity of souls, then “being many in number” entails that the
immaterial souls must have matter (see Dooyeweerd, 2011a:325 ff.)
In line with the Aristotelian view the relationship between soul and body is
seen as that between act and potency. To Aristotle act and potency are not
only instantiated as form and matter, for they are eternal, supra-temporal and
without becoming, indeed mutually irreducible principles. For this reason Ar-
istotle's God, equated with pure activity (from Thomas Aquinas up to Jaspers
and Barth also designated as actus purus), is just a final cause and not a Cre-
ator in the biblical sense of the word (see Ter Horst, 2008:29).
The “simple” soul of Plato, the indivisible form of Aristotle, and the sub-
sisting soul substance in the thought of Thomas Aquinas continued to play a
role also in modern philosophy. The context in wich the Cartesian cogito (I
think) is positioned, embodies the switch from Greek-Scholastic realistic
metaphyics to the modern nominalistic orientation motived by the ideal to be a
free and autonomous personality while using a deterministic understanding of
reality.
1 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, Q.75 Art.2 and Pegis, 1945-I:685.
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11.4 The transition to modern Humanism

The prominent position of reason as qualification of the soul and as faculty of
the mind all the way harboured an implicit reification of reason as such. Par-
ticularly since the Renaissance this over-estimation surfaced in a growing
trust in the power of human thinking. Dooyeweerd consistently desiganted
this trust as the dogma of the autonomy of (theoretical) reason and he spent a
significant amount of time, particularly in the last part of his life, in develop-
ing and refining his so-called transcendental critique of theoretical thought as
a challenge to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought.
Even before the transcendental critique was developed, Dooyeweerd ar-
rived at basic distinctions anticipating what eventually took shape within the
domain of the philosophy of science during the later part of the previous cen-
tury. The internationally renowned Dutch philosopher (who practically
throughout his life-time was a critical conversation-partner radically differing
from Dooyeweerd), C.A. Van Peursen, by the end of his life remarked that
many books written within the domain of philosophy of science should not
have been written had the authors first read what Dooyeweerd wrote (see Van
Peursen, 1995:79-94).
The said dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought took its starting
point in the “I think,” the cogito. Descartes, with his well-known methodical
skepticism, affirmed this dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought as the
ultimate starting point for philosophical thought and thus paved the way to-
wards the modern trust in reason. He carried through the consequences of de-
nying any universality outside the human intellect. The most important im-
plicit implication of this nominalistic orientation is that it does not acknowl-
edge any order transcending the human being as such. A universal law-order
for creatures and also the orderliness of such creatures (which are subjected to
creational laws), are transposed to the human mind. The seemingly innocent
remark that “number and all universals are only modes of thought” (Des-
cartes, The Principles of Philosophy, LVIII – see Descartes 1965:187) con-
tains the radical reorientation caused by nominalism. Descartes is no longer a
realist.
In the mould of this new spiritual climate the “world” no longer embraces
the human being. Rather, it is projected and seen as an entity, an object, at the
disposal of the autonomously free rational human being. The vicious circle
present in the proof used by Descartes for the existence of God actually dem-
onstrates his ultimate trust in human reason. Having found his point of depar-
ture in the cogito (I think) he proceeds under the guidance of the maxim that
rational thinking ought to be clear and distinct. In his Meditations III he takes
as a “general rule, that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended (con-
ceived) is true.” However, the fundamental question is: What guarantees the
truth of clear and distinct thought? (Descartes, 1965:95-96 – see page 87
above.)
Descartes answers:
167
And the whole force of the argument of which I have here availed myself to es-
tablish the existence of God, consists in this, that I perceive I could not possi-
bly be of such a nature as I am, and yet have in my mind the idea of a God, if
God did not in reality exist,—this same God, I say, whose idea is in my
mind—that is, a being who possesses all those lofty perfections, of which the
mind may have some slight conception, without, however, being able fully to
comprehend them, – and who is wholly superior to all defect [and has nothing
that marks imperfection]: whence it is sufficiently manifest that he cannot be a
deceiver, since it is a dictate of the natural light that all fraud and deception
spring from some defect (Descartes, 1965:110).
If God cannot be a “deceiver,” how do we know that he really does exist? In
order to answer this question Descartes once again appeals to the maxim of
clear and distinct thought:
… the idea by which I conceive a God [sovereign], eternal, infinite [immuta-
ble], all-knowing, all-powerful, and the creator of all things that are out of
himself, – this, I say, has certainly in it more objective reality than those ideas
by which finite substances are represented (1965:100).
As long as one thinks clearly and distinctly (and do not allow the will to dis-
tract one from this path), one cannot be deceived and whatever is apprehended
is always true – because it will not deceive us. Of all the ideas in the human
mind the idea of God is the clearest and most distinct of all of them, hence God
must exist. The vicious circle is ‘clear(!)’: that God exists is seen through clear
and distinct thinking. Why is clear and distinct thinking true? Because God
ensures us that clear and distinct thinking will not deceive us. Thus the exis-
tence of God is dependent upon the truth of clear and distinct thinking while
the truth of clear and distinct thinking is dependent upon the non-deceiving
God! Von Weiszäcker has a sound understanding of the spirit of modernity
operative in Descartes' approach. Descartes reaches certainty about God not
by considering the world, but by focusing upon himself (cf. Von Weizsäcker,
2002:130). In addition Von Weizsäcker says: “This state of affairs is charac-
teristic of modernity. It is not the world in which I find myself that guarantees
my existence. This guarantee is not lost, for when I recover the world then it is
as the object of my self-assured thinking, that is to say, as an object which I
can manipulate.”1
This circle actually unveils the fact that Descartes merely used his idea of
God to impregnate his new mathematical method of analysis with the feature
of infallibility. Underneath the methodical doubt leading to the conclusion: “I
think, therefore I exist” (cogito ergo sum), one finds his deeply rooted modern
trust (“faith”) in the rationality of “reason.” Unfortunately his argument is
self-defeating. While doubting whatever otherwise seems to be true, he “dis-
covered” that he cannot doubt that he is in doubt – which is a form of thinking
1 “Dies ist ein charakteristisch neuzeitlicher Sachverhalt, Nicht die Welt, in der ich mich
vorfinde, garantiert mein Dasein. Diese Garantie geht nicht verloren, und wenn ich die Welt
wiederfinde, dann als Gegenstand meines selbstgewissen Denkens und darum als Objekt, das
ich hantieren kann” (Von Weizsäcker, 2002:130-131).
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– and from that basic fact he came to the affirmation of his own existence as a
thinking being:
Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to
suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and be-
cause some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the sim-
plest matters of geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other,
rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and
finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which
we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep,
while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects
(presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them
no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I ob-
served that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely
necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that
this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no
ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capa-
ble of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first
principle of the philosophy of which I was in search (Descartes, 1965:26-27).
His argument disqualifies every possible perception or observation and all ar-
guments formerly taken to be reliable and true. Yet he then says: “But imme-
diately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false
...” This remark demonstrates that amongst all the doubtful observations he
suddenly elevated one observation above all doubt, thus revealing his ulti-
mate trust in reason!
This deep trust in reason inspired the 18th century German philosopher, Im-
manuel Kant, in the Foreword to the first edition of his Critique of Pure Rea-
son (1781), to explain the penetrating aim of rational critique. We have seen
that he holds that not even law in its majesty or religion in its sanctity are al-
lowed to withdraw themselves from the critical scrutiny of reason, for reason
can only show respect to that which has withstood its critical assessment:
“Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism and everything
must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its sanctity, and law on the
strength of its majesty, try to withdraw themselves from it; but by doing so
they arouse just suspicions, and cannot claim that sincere respect which rea-
son pays to those only who have been able to stand its free and open examina-
tion” (Kant, 1781:A-12 – translation F.M. Müller – see Kant 1961:21).
We have also noted how this resulted in the extreme rationalistic conviction
that human understanding is the a priori law-giver of nature (see page 88
above).
11.5 To be human: a rational-ethical being?
Both within the West and the East the assumed rational soul or mind was
combined with another distinctive feature: morality. The outcome of this
combination is that a person is characterized as a rational-moral being –
where the domain of morality is supposed to encompass all forms of norm-
169
ativity. From the perspective of Dooyeweerd's new philosophical insights and

distinctions two points should be raised in this regard.
(i) the normativity of human life cannot be restricted to what is traditionally
designated as the “moral,” and
(ii) merely lifting out the “rational” and the “moral” does not do justice to
the truly multi-aspectual normative functioning of human beings.
Re (i) – Can the normativity of life be restricted to the “moral”?
In respect of (i) Dooyeweerd realized that there are different kinds of norms or
principles and that one therefore cannot identify normativity with the moral or
ethical. In Chapter 5 it was argued that the logical-analytical aspect precedes
the cultural-historical and sign modes. As logical configurations concepts, al-
though they can be named or designated, are not lingual in nature. For this
reason they cannot be translated. Only the words designating a concept can be
translated into a different language. A concept or an argument (inference) is
“grasped,” or “understood”. It depends upon immediate insight. Whereas lan-
guage is formed, presupposing the immediate functional foundation of the
cultural-historical aspect, concepts are acquired and this acquisition occurs
on the basis of intuitive insight: one either obtains this insight or one does not.
For this reason the well-known expression that we form a concept actually
represents a metaphorical mode of speech.
Since concepts unite a multiplicity of (logically objectified universal) fea-
tures, they are subject to logical principles, such as the principle of identity
and non-contradiction. Concepts are blind towards the individual. Language
have access to the designation of universal concepts but in addition it can
point at what is individual, known as the deictic function of language. The
same capacity is inherent in our (human) perception – just consider the con-
struction of an “identity-kid” in criminal investigations. “Seeing” is of course
also an ability of animals, although the latter lack the possibility to (logically)
identify a criminal and (lingually) pointing at the criminal as a criminal.
Human thinking can conform to or may disobey these principles and this
possibility underlies the difference between logically sound and antinorm-
ative identification and distinguishing manifested in the contrary between
what is logical and illogical. This normative contrary underlies the contraries
found in all the post-logical aspects, such as historical – un-historical, polite –
impolite, economic – un-economic, legal – illegal and moral – immoral. The
post-logical contraries therefore analogically reflect the meaning of the logi-
cal principle of (non-)contradiction.1 Although there may be contrasting opin-
ions regarding what is appreciated as economically norm-conforming or eco-
nomically antinormative, these differences of opinion presuppose accepting
1 We have seen that an analogy embodies a difference shown in what is similar or a similarity in
what is different. The difference is that an illogical concept is not the same as wasting your
money. Yet what is similar in both instances is that what is illogical and un-economic are both
antinormative. In other words, in both instances norm-conformity and antinormativity are at
stake. Through in this similarity the difference is shown.
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the contrary between what is economically norm-conformative and economi-

cally antinormative, i.e., between frugality and what is excessive. Generally
speaking the same applies to all the contraries presenting themselves within
the post-logical aspects.
Re (ii) – The multi-aspectual functioning of human beings
The first two paragraphs of Chapter 2 made it clear that Dooyeweerd's theory
of aspects and entities enables the acknowledgment of the multi-aspectual
functioning of human beings because they are embedded within the diversity
of aspects of our experiential world. Of course the same can be said in respect
of animals, plants and material things, for they also function within all aspects
of reality. Does this imply that material entities, plants and animals are not dif-
ferent from humans? Certainly not, but explaining these differences needs im-
portant distinctions. The brief remarks at the beginning of Chapter 2 highlight
the normativity of human life and briefly discerned the subject functions of
human beings within all aspects. From these remarks it follows that although
humans share subject functions with material things within the first four as-
pects of reality, with plants up to the biotic aspect and with animals up to the
sensory mode, humankind nonetheless differs from these three natural realms
in an important sense. Every natural realm is characterized by its specific
qualifying function, which at once is also its highest subject function – respec-
tively the physical (material things), biotic (plants) and the sensory (animals).
In each case the realm under consideration has (latent) object functions within
all the aspects succeeding its qualifying function. Therefore none of the three
realms of natural things has subject functions within the post-sensory aspects.
Understanding the uniqueness humankind may pursue two avenues. The
first one is to investigate those aspects in which we share subject functions
with things, plants and animals with a view to what is distinctively human in
this functioning. Subsequently we shall return to the (distinctive) typical nor-
mative subject functions of human beings.
11.6 The typical physical function of living entities
The smallest entity displaying the ability to live as an independent entity is the
cell. Although the aspect of life qualifies the cell as a biotic unit, the vital func-
tions of the cell have their foundation in the material building blocks found in
all living entities, namely atoms, molecules and marcomolecules. Yet, where-
as the cell has a geometrically defined (macroscopic) surface, even the largest
macromolucules are not delimited by a surface (Trincher, 1985:336). In addi-
tion Trincher distinguishes four macroscopic characteristics evincing the phy-
sical uniqueness of a living cell (Trincher, 1985:336):
1) Spatial macroscopy, which defines the cell as a spatially delimited sur-
face;
2) Temporal macroscopy, which determines the finite time in which the en-
ergy cycle of the cell occurs;
171
3) The isothermal nature of the cell, which is responsible for the constancy
of temperature throughout the cell; and
4) The persistent positive difference between the higher internal tempera-
ture of the cell and the lower external temperature of the environment
adjacent to the cell surface.
After Von Bertalanffy expanded the second main law of thermodynamics to
encompass open systems as well, the famous physicist, Erwin Schrödinger,
wrote a book with the title: What is life? The physical aspect of the Cell
(1955). This work explores the perspective that from a thermodynamic point
of view living entities are open systems and therefore this feature does not
highlight a distinctive trait of such entities, because a fire, glacier or even an
idling motor vehicle are examples of thermodynamic open systems.
Modern genetics enabled us to reach a new level of understanding in this re-
gard. As a scholarly discipline it benefits from the developments within the
fields of organic chemistry and biochemistry. These two disciplines succeed-
ed in analyzing the intricate macromolecular conformations found within liv-
ing entities, while realizing that as such these macromolecules are not alive.
Obtaining knowledge of the structure of any macromolecule in principle falls
within the field of investigation of organic chemistry. Only when those func-
tions of such molecules are considered that are directed towards the biotic
functioning of living entities, biochemistry should enter the scene – as it did
with the spectacular unveiling of the multiple metabolic pathways present
within the cells of every living entity. The molecular structure of the nucleo-
tides operative inside living things is not sufficient for an understanding of bi-
otic processes, because the decisive factor is found in the arrangement in
which they are configured. The patterns required in these configurations point
at information and the latter appears to confront any conjecture regarding the
assumed (accidental physical) origination of the first living entity with
insurmountable problems.
Even Simpson concedes that molecules and macromolecules are not alive
and therefore they do not have a subject function within the biotic aspect.
Since it is scientifically clear that no single molecule, however complex its
structure, is alive, Simpson had to admit that the expression “molecular biol-
ogy” is self-contradictory: “Since biology is the study of life and molecules,
as such, are not alive, the term ‘molecular biology’ is selfcontradictory”
(Simpson, 1969:6).
11.7 Physicalism eliminates original biotic terms
Molecules are not “healthy” or “sick” – which means that as soon as it is at-
tempted to reduce the biotic aspect of reality to the physical aspect, the terms
healthy and sick loose their meaning. Von Bertalanffy explicitly uses the dis-
tinction between physical and biotic terms to indicate the limitations of
(evolutionistic) attempts to understand living entities in physical terms only.
He points out that “in biology, the behavioral and social sciences, we encoun-
ter many phenomena which are not found in inanimate nature and for which
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Chapter 11
no concepts are provided in the system of physics” (Von Bertalanffy, 1968:

37).
He writes that physics cannot even indicate the difference between a living
and a dead dog: “The laws of physics do not tell a difference. They are not in-
terested in whether dogs are alive or dead”. He continues on the same page
that this remains true even if we take into account the most recent scientific
advances: “One DNA molecule, protein, enzyme or hormonal process is as
good as another; each is determined by physical and chemical laws, none is
better, healthier or more normal than the other” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973: 146).
When humans are ill it involves a defect in their biotic functioning. It can be
the result of a shortage of necessary chemical elements, defects in particular
(biotic) organs, or it may even be psycho-somatic (tension, worry, excitement,
and so forth). Primarily the duality illness-health has its origin in the biotic as-
pect of reality – physics does not deal with these original biotic terms. There-
fore, Von Bertalanffy once more emphasizes that from “the viewpoint of
physics, there is no difference between physical and chemical processes tak-
ing place in a living organism or those in a corpse; both follow the same laws
of physics and chemistry – and that’s all that can be said from the standpoint
of conventional physics . . . To the biologist, however, there is a lot of differ-
ence between processes so ordered as to maintain the system, and those run-
ning wild to destroy it” (Von Bertalanffy, 1968:37).
Since Descartes modern philosophy and biology is familiar with a machine
model of living entities. Although we may think that this model constitutes a
straightforward reduction – even of the human being – to “nature,” the im-
plicit technicistic undertones of this model are lost sight of. The nature of a
machine ought to be scrutinized first, because a machine only came into being
in the course of human civilization. Van Weizsäcker is therefore correct when
he states:
Thinking nature – and with it the human being – as a machine, subjects nature
and with it the human being to a specific industrial mode of thought, the ability
of what can be designed. Not the reduction of the human being to nature is the
mistake here, but the reduction of nature to the structural properties of a very
specific human artifact (Von Weizsäcker, 1993:38).
Yet the mechanistic point of view in addition explored the physicalistic view
according to which a living entity has a physico-chemical identity constituted
by its atoms, molecules, and macromolecules. The question then is: which of
these physico-chemical components should be considered constitutive of this
supposed physico-chemical identity of living things? Could it be those atoms,
molecules, and macro-molecules currently present in it, those present years
ago, or those which will be present a few years hence!? When living things are
reduced to their material constituents, their biotical identity is necessarily lost
– since the supposed elements of identity continually vary.
Jones et al points out that all “the atoms of our body, even of our bones, are
exchanged at least once every seven years. All the atoms in our face are re-
173
newed every six months, all our red blood cells every four months and 98% of
the protein in the brain in less than a month. Our white blood cells are replaced
every ten days and most of the pancreas cells and one-thirteenth of all our tis-
sue proteins are renewed every 24 hours” (Jones, 1998:40).
11.8 The typical biotic functioning of humans
From a “similarity-perspective” it is certainly true that plants, animals and hu-
man beings are all alive for they share an active functioning within the biotic
mode. When the Swiss biologist, Adolf Portmann, investigates higher devel-
oped mammals in comparison with human beings, his focus equally involves
what is similar and what is different between them. While similarities are nor-
mally lifted out, he in addition restored the reality of differences, a “differ-
ence-perspective.” This led him to a new and remarkable appreciation of the
ontogenetic uniqueness of humans.
11.8.1 The ontogenetic uniqueness of humans
Portmann points out that “the theoretical trains of thought that have been trig-
gered by theories of evolution have often obstructed more true insight into the
human race than they have revealed” (Portmann, 1990:6). In addition, accord-
ing to him, “it is a grave error to believe that the basis for evaluating human
existence can be found with certainty by studying animal behavior” (Port-
mann, 1990:16). His investigations considered the impression that the “help-
less newborn human reminds us of similar developmental states in mammals
and birds” which made “the animal mother seem more human to us, more
closely related than the animal would otherwise appear to be” and this mis-
leading assessment gave rise to his following statement that can be seen as
outlining his research program: “This impression of accord goes so deep that
it is scarcely noticed how unusual the nature of the human baby actually is,
how much it deviates from what is the rule for higher mammals” (Portmann,
1990:19).
11.8.2 Nesthocker and Nestflüchter
Flowing from the findings of his research in this respect Portmann introduced
a distinction between two different ontogenetic types, namely Nesthocker
(altricial – literally: “nest-squatter”) and Nestflüchter (precocial – literally:
“nest-fleer”). The term Nesthocker is normally applied to birds, such as song
birds and woodpeckers (which also have “naked early stages with closed
eyes”). But there are similar developmental states in mammals. It includes the
“development of mammals whose body structures show little specialization
and whose brains are only slightly developed” and they are “usually charac-
terized by short periods of gestation, a large number of young in each litter,
and the helpless condition of the babies at the moment of birth.” In their early
stages these animals are “usually hairless, their sensory organs still closed,
and the temperature of their bodies still completely dependent on warmth
from an external source (insectivores, many rodents, and small carnivores –
the marten, in particular)” (Portmann, 1990:20).
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Chapter 11
Amongst the more highly organized mammals a totally different picture of

their developmental levels is found. Their “body structures are more special-
ized” and their “brains are more complex (ungulates, seals, whales, prosimi-
ans, and apes)” (Portmann, 1990:22). Portmann explains that for “these crea-
tures, development within the uterus lasts quite a while, the number of young
in each litter is reduced to two or one, and the newborn are well developed, ap-
pearing much like adult animals in both form and behavior. Again, chickens,
ducks, snipe, and other similar birds produce well-developed young, and the
usual term applied to the latter, Nestflüchter (nidifugous, precocial), is also
extended to cover the corresponding developmental state of mammals”
(Portmann, 1990:22).
The newborn primates are Nectflüchter for at birth their eyes are open and
their sensory organs are well-developed. They have special clinging instincts
dominating their early behavior. Portmann remarks that this compulsion
causes their hands and feet to be completely geared towards holding on (the
mother serves as the first “tree”). While the human baby appears to be much
more “helpless” at birth, it displays a remarkable free play of the limbs “which
gives our infant possibilities so much richer than those available to the newborn
ape” (Portmann, 1990:25). Comparing the Nestflüchter with the human baby at
birth in terms of bodily proportions is surprising. The young of higher mam-
mals, from their birth, “maintain bodily proportions close to those of the adult
forms”:
Thus, on the first day of their lives, foals, fawns, young whales, and small har-
bor seals are already miniature versions of their parents, …; in the same way,
the newborn ape is similar to the adult in the size ratio of limb to torso. Anthro-
poids also follow this rule. The long limbs of orangutan or gorilla fetuses are
immediately conspicuous. If fetuses of different ages are depicted as being
equal in overall length, such a series exhibits exactly the same length ratios be-
tween torso, arms, and legs even at very different ages; … (Portmann, 1990:
38).
Portmann makes a plea for seeing “the human aspect of the entire body
more clearly” given the “forceful attraction exerted by the head.” Theories of
descent have often been taken up with the head exclusively: partly because we
are partial to that focal point of the human phenomenon; partly because our at-
titudes are compelled by evidence that consists mostly of skull fragments”
(Portmann, 1990:40-41).
When the respective growth-patterns of anthropoids and humans are com-
pared a “numerical expression of this important difference between anthro-
poids and humans” is provided (Portmann, 1990:38).
175
Comparison of lengths between anthropoids and humans

(at birth : at maturity)
Chimpanzee Human
torso 1 : 1.95 1 : 2.65
arm 1 : 1.69 1 : 3.20
leg 1 : 1.69 1 : 3.04
At birth the Nesthocker type displays a rather immature developmental stage,

whereas the figures for ungulates and primates show that in Nestflüchter the
brain at birth is pretty close to its mature state (Portmann, 1990:44). This explains
why Nesthocker evinces an increase-factor of more than 5 and Nestflüchter one of
less than 5.
During their fetal stage humans go through a period of eye and ear closure
(also found amongst large ungulates), as if preparing for an early birth similar
to an altricial infant. Portmann continues his analysis by showing that humans
do not obey the same “Bildungsgesetze” (developmental laws) as the highly
organized groups of mammals. The newborns of the latter are all Nestflüchter
with sensory organs well functioning and developed. By and large these new-
borns are “miniature versions of the mature form, and their behavior and locomo-
tion are to a large extent the same as [those of] their parents” (Portmann,
1990:50). These infants have command “of the means of social communication
that are typical for its species” – “this is the state at birth for ungulates, seals, and
whales, as well as for anthropoids” and it also applies to the great apes (Portmann,
1990:50).
The question is what a “true human-mammal” (“Tiermensch” or “Mensch-
tier”) would have looked like at birth? Portmann answers:
In accordance with this definition, a true mammal of the human type would
have to have a newborn whose bodily proportions are similar to those of the
adult, one that can assume the erect posture appropriate to its species, and that
has command of at least the rudiments of our communication system—lan-
guage (and the language of gestures). This theoretically necessary stage does
in fact exist during the course of our development: the stage is reached about a
year after birth. After one year, the human attains the degree of formation in
keeping with its species that a true mammal must have already realized by the
time of its birth. Therefore, if the human were to arrive at this state in the true
mammalian mode, our pregnancy would have to be longer than it is by about
that one year; it would have to last for about twenty-one months (Portmann,
1990:51).
Portmann deduces as preliminary conclusion “that the actual length of human
pregnancy is much less than it should be for typical mammalian development at
our level of organization” (Portmann, 1990:51). However, he has to remark that
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Chapter 11
the true significance of this “physiological early birth” of humans has been “been
blurred by the suggestive power of the commonalities that link humans and the
great apes” – therefore a frame of reference is needed to make more distinctly vis-
ible what is unique about the human ontogeny.
The postfetal growth taking place during the first year of humans is twice as
rapid and intense as that of the great apes. The weight of the former increases
at a relatively constant rate during this year. After this first rapid the develop-
mental curve is smooth up to the 8th or 9th year when the second rapid occurs
(puberty: 8-15 years), after which it is again smooth until maturity is reached
(20-22 years). The growth curve of comparable animals is smooth and contin-
uous, lacking the two phases of accelerated growth found in the human
growth pattern.
Remark: The fraudulent embryological sketches of Haeckel
On the basis of similarities between the embryos of humans, apes and dogs
Haeckel formulated his biogenetic basic law in 1868. According to this law
every individual human being (from conception up to maturity) manifests
those phases through which the species went in its phylogenetic development.
Although his theory immediately obtained general acceptance, it was soon (al-
ready by the end of the 19th theory) realized that it is not valid. Two of his con-
temporaries accused him of drawing up fraudelent sketches, namely the
embrioloigist Wilhelm His (in 1874) and the anatomist Carl Semper (in 1875).
Haeckel, for example, described ancestral micro-organisms found nowhere
because they certainly do not exist. The embryologist, Erich Blechschmidt,
repuditated Haeckel “law” and consider it to be one of the most serious errors
in the history of biology (see Blechschmidt, 1977:32). Another embryologist
and Nobel Prize winner, Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, in an interview with the
German weekly Newspaper Die Zeit, said: “Ernst Haeckel acted fraudulently
(gefälscht). Many of his pictures are merely inventions to confirm his theory.
Haeckel actually acknowledged that perhaps six to eight percent of his draw-
ings were ‘gefälscht’! In the absence of the required observational material he
hypothetically bridged the gaps” (see the work of Di Trocchio, 1999). 1
The human embryo is from its inception fully human. It does not go through
successive phases in which the human being is first a fish, then an amphibian,
then a reptile and then a mammal (see Blechschmidt, 1977). By contrast
Portmann emphasizes that the dominant “zoological interpretation of early
human development is inadequate and in many respects misleading.” He
rather speaks of “an independent human type of development before birth”
which implies that even “the early prenatal development is the ‘ontogeny of a
human,’ not a kind of schematic primate formation in which the stages of ani-
mal systems appear in sequence, as in a graduated classification” (Portmann,
1990:64).
The larger mammals by and large evince a rapid increase in weight practi-
cally reaching their final (fully mature) weight between one and two years.
1 Haeckel did not merely “acknowledge” his fraudulent behaviour, he confessed to have done
it. He used the German expression “ich bekenne,” which means: “I confess”!
177
Growth during the subsequent years (varying from three to six years) is very
slight.
All mammals (other than humans) grow very rapidly right from the start of
their independent lives, and have the major part of their growth behind them
by the time they become sexually mature. Any growth still to come is slow and
slight. In humans, on the contrary, growth processes experience a marked in-
crease in intensity at the very moment of sexual maturation, and it is during
this late phase that a significant part of the total growth takes place (Portmann,
1990:101).
From the analysis of Portmann it follows that human beings are not fitting
within either the Necthocker or the Nestflüchter type. With the Nesthocker it
shares being helpless at birth, at birth being disproportionate to mature hu-
mans and not being able to move as adult humans. With Nestflüchter it shares a
relatively long gestation period, relatively small offspring, an increase of the
brain size factor of less than five, and coming into this world with open ears
and eyes. Moreover, the growth pattern of human is not matched by either of
the Nesthocker or the Nestflüchter. The uniqueness of the human ontogenetic
type expresses itself also in what Portmann calls the extraunterine time of hu-
mans. Compared to the Nestflüchter humans are born one year too soon. Whereas
the higher mammals, immediately after birth, commences to move and perceive
in accordance with species behavior, the human being, by contrast, at birth has
“not yet attained the type of movement, the body posture, or the power of com-
munication typical of its species at maturity” (Portmann, 1990:81-82).
11.9 The typical way in which animals and humans function
within the sensory mode
There are significant differences between animals and humans in respect of
their respective functioning within the sensory mode of reality. Portmann dis-
tinguishes between animals and humans as follows: “Constrained by environ-
ment and protected by instinct: simply and briefly, that is how we can describe
the behavior of animals. In contrast, human behavior may be termed open to
the world and possessed of freedom of choice” (Portmann, 1990:79). 1
The way in which animals experience reality remains enclosed within the
scope of the physical, biotic and sensory aspects. These aspects constitute
their basic concerns in life. Their world is restricted to what is accessible and
what is inaccessible, what is edible and inedible, to an awareness of same sex
and of the opposite sex. Finally, and this represents the highest subject-func-
tion of animals, their ultimate concern is in what is comforting and what is
alarming or endangering.
1 A more literal translation of the original German expressions reads as follows: “Umwelt-
gebunden und instinktgesichert” = “restricted to an ambient and secured by instincts”; and
“weltoffen und entscheidungsfrei” = “open to the world and free to choose.” Eibl-Eibesfeldt
holds that currently a human person is seen as a “cultural being” with a “life history” and re-
duced instincts (the human being is an “Instinktreduktionswesen”) (Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
2004:673).
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Chapter 11
This explains why animals are very selective in what they see. From what is
present within their visual field they make only a limited selection. The other
side of the coin is that various kinds of animals have observational capacities
exceeding the sensory abilities of human beings by far. We know of animals
that can register supersonic waves, that can see ultraviolet rays as light and
can discern the difference between polarized and non-polarized light (bees).
Some fishes, on the basis of a self-produced electrical field, utilize an electri-
cal orientation (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:139). There are birds capable of using
the magnetic poles of the earth to aid their navigation. These abilities are lack-
ing in humans (cf. Portmann, 1970:200 ff.). Notwithstanding their poor eye-
sight, bats can hear ultra sound inaudible to us. Through the echo of their own
call they form a copy of their environment (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:139).
Within the visible field human beings can perceive much more than what
they are actually noticing. Moreover, whatever is noticed deepens and en-
riches their visual field, because those things that are noticed are grasped in
conceptual representations. The acquisition of genuine concepts, however, is
absent in animals. Therefore we have to differentiate between sensitive intelli-
gence and rational intelligence. Instinctively secured animals are sentient
creatures, qualified in a sensitive way. They can locate many things within
their environment (Umwelt) and avoiding fire shows that experience can exert
a controlling influence on later behaviour, supported by the continuity of their
associative abilities. Yet all of this remains enclosed within their distinct sen-
sitive qualification. For this reason Overhage is justified in stressing that the
practical intelligence of animals never exceeds the sensory-perceptive domain
(Overhage, 1977:117). Empirical research revealed that animals are restricted
to particular forms perceived by them. It is appropriate to distinghuish be-
tween senstive and rational intelligence. On the basis of their sensitive intelli-
gence, animals are able to detect similarities and differences. Yet the signs
taught to Sarah, Washoe, Moja and Lana never exceeded sensory sound-like
and image-like modes of locating the relevant similarities.1 Surely human be-
ings also participte in this perceptive dimension – but humans are not
confined to or qualified by this sensitive fashion of dealing with similarities
and differences.
On the basis of investigations stretching over years with anthropoids and
many apes, having 60 different natural and cultural objects at hand, Koths
concludes that the constructive abilities of animals are qualitatively different
from what humans can achieve when they make a completed end-product
with a persistent function. Anthropoid intelligence is qualitatively different
from the conceptual thinking of humans (see Overhage, 1972:275-276). Ac-
cording to Rensch the deep gap between animals and humans is given in logi-
cal thinking (Rensch, 1968:147). Logical thinking does not merely entail
causal coherences but also concepts for logical connections, such as conse-
1 See Eibl-Eibesfeldt where he summarizes the research done by R.A. and B.T. Gardner re-
garding the use of signs by Chimpansees – Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:216 ff.
179
quently, because, when, in case, and so on. This constitutes a difference in

principle between the anthropoids and humans. Such a deep abyss is not
present between the lower apes and the anthropoids.
What Portmann designated as the instinctively secured nature of animals
manifests itself in inherited behavioural action patterns. Particular stimuli or a
combination of them may set in motion an action pattern that precedes any
prior experience. It appears to be an inborn disposition. The American Robin,
a migrating songbird, known as Turdus migratorius, or North American
Robin, shows how a fake or dummy can still trigger such an inborn pattern of
behavior. In German this is designated as an “angeborene Auslösemechanis-
mus” (AAM) which does not require any conceptual understanding.
The Robin has a bright red breast and con-
trols its own domain. The bright red breast of
other species members activates the desired
protection action pattern. Every trespasser en-
tering this domain will be attacked. However,
the absence of any conceptual understanding is
clearly seen from what Lack did in 1943. He
placed a dummy Robin (without the red breast)
within the domain of a Robin and interestingly
no attack was activated. But when an artificial
Robin with a red breast was constructed, the attack once again commenced!
The same result was reached in 1960 when Peiponen investigated the behav-
ior of blue breast Robins (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:162-163).
This clearly shows that the Robin does not have a concept of a Robin as a
bird! It therefore differs from human perception, for when humans perceive a
Robin it is immediately recognized (identified) as a bird. In other words, hu-
man perception is cognitively opened and deepened, to the level of what we
have called conceptual representations.
Dooyeweerd points out that the knowledge of animals remains “limited to
their biotic and sensitive environment” while serving “the instinctive biotic
urges, also insofar as they cannot be explained by knowledge.” To this he adds
that the “identification of properties, which is the essence of logical analysis,
is altogether lacking both in animal intelligence and in instinctual distinction.”
And then he mentions Grünbaum who reports that a “certain number of vibra-
tions of the threads of its web (49 per second) are to the garden spider the sig-
nal for the presence of a prey in the web.” Yet this spider knows so little of the
“prey in the net” that it also attacks a tuning fork which vibrates 49 times per
second. Dooyeweerd concludes: “From this it is clear that this instinctive
knowledge is of a sensitive nature, and remains limited to the immediate biotic
environment.” For the more highly developed animals Dooyeweerd does ac-
knowledge a “sensory ‘intelligence’ ” (Dooyeweerd, 2011:158-159).
Buytendijk supports this basic distinction between animal and human intel-
ligence and he considers action on the basis of judgment absent in animals. He
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describes this difference as follows: “Therefore, one defines animal intelli-

gence as the concrete experiential and senso-motoric structuring of practical
behaviour, whereas human intelligence displays itself as a rational-logical,
categorically judging conceptualization of the task-setting nature of the con-
crete situation and the discovery of a solution which does not follow from the
immediate sensory effect of the situation” (Buytendijk, 1970:97; cf. Over-
hage, 1977:118).
11.10 Sensitive openness
Besides the fact that human perception is opened up towards the logical-ana-
lytical aspect, human sensitivity in general could be disclosed by anticipating
the various normative aspects of reality. Through their senses human beings
orientate themselves within the surrounding world. The senses enable an im-
mediate awareness of our environment. We observe the movement of a dove
flying from the branch, we hear the roar of an approaching vehicle, we feel
biting cold in the winter wind and we taste salt water when we swim in the sea.
Although we can focus our attention on specific things in our sensory envi-
ronment, the basic functioning of our sensory orientation is free from rational
deliberation.
On the basis of this sensory equipment, we are slotting into the different
normative dimensions of our socially differentiated existence. We read the re-
sult of an examination which fills us with happiness or sorrow; we hear of a
planned social happening and we feel excited about everything we can possi-
bly experience and enjoy, and so on.
One may distinguish between feelings and emotions. According to De
Graaff all the different types of feelings reflect their own distinctiveness, ex-
tent, durability, intensity and vitality which are simultaneously open towards
of the normative subject functions of human beings. He holds that our feeling
reactions are a direct response to that which we sense. In our awareness of
something we experience pleasure or discomfort, we like it or disapprove, ex-
perience acceptance or rejection and even the good and bad. That is why he
holds that to feel is intrinsically linked to appreciation. When we taste some-
thing bitter, we feel rejected, when we enjoy a nice warm bath, we feel re-
laxed, etc. In distinction from our feelings, he argues that emotions show the
total bodily agitation which we experience as our reactions to a particular situ-
ation: “emotions are immediate, spontaneous, overwhelming, intense reac-
tions that deeply affect our entire physical and organic functioning. They mo-
bilize the whole person and make us pull away from or move toward someone
or something. In our emotions we live out here and now and surrender bodily
to how we feel in a particular situation” (De Graaff, 1980:141-142).
Emotional openness is linked closely by De Graaff to the way in which we
react in emotional disclosure within the context of a differentiated diversity of
normatively-marked societal contexts. The joy which we experience is not,
for instance, purely psychic-sensitive by nature. It is the joy with which we
approach an old friend at a meeting (social joy), or it is the joy which we expe-
181
rience when we listen to a good musical performance (aesthetic joy). Simi-

larly, the anger we experience is not just a psychic phenomenon because it is
always about the feeling of injustice of someone who is wronged, or the
bodily scar which someone inflicted on you purposefully, etc. That these dif-
ferent emotional reactions are always imbedded in the normatively-differenti-
ated human reality is evident in our ability to react in an appropriate emotional
way. Someone who laughs in reaction to the serious warning of a friend is
considered to be irresponsible; someone who bursts into tears when hearing a
good joke is considered socially abnormal, etc. In reality it is a fundamental
requirement for every person who is educated to differentiated maturity, to
possess the full spectrum of emotional reactions. Actually, it is often a first
sign of emotional-psychic disturbance if a person is no longer able to experi-
ence the full spectrum of human emotions. Each person's emotional health is
not only dependent on the possibility of the emotional spectrum of fury, an-
ger, offense, feeling touched, feeling neutral, feeling excited, experiencing
happiness, reacting positively, exultant and even having an ecstatic experi-
ence, but also to the active living out of all these “escape valves”. Disclosed
maturity cannot do otherwise but to lean on and be supported by a healthy
emotional disclosure and the appropriate emotional reactions accompanying
it.
Thus far we have focused on those aspects in which humans share subject
functions with material things, plants and animals, that is to say on similarities be-
tween us and the different realms within nature. Yet we have shown that in spite
of these similarities there are nonetheless striking differences to be noted within
each of these shared dimensions. The human type law determines the typical way
in which the human being functions within the physical, biotical and sensitive
modes of reality. Since things, plants and animals do not subjetively function
within the normative aspects of reality, the mere acknowledgment of this fact al-
ready highlights important diffferences between human beings and the entities
we encounter in nature.
The traditional body-soul dualism actually proceeds from a reification of a few
normative functions. The view that humans are rational-ethical beings is just one
(pretty dominant) example of such a reification. Views such as these raise the
question if it is possible to characterize humans in terms terms of one or perhaps a
few modal aspects.
11.11 How do we characterize humans?
Is it posible to characterize humankind merely by employing a combination of
two aspects (such as found in the view that humans are rational-ethical beings)?
In the history of economic theory the novel Robinson Crusoe (by Daniel Defo
published in 1719) is sometimes seen as an illustration of the theoretical orienta-
tion of the classical school in economics, where an individual will act in a purely
rational-economic way, apart from the normal economic surroundings of produc-
tion, money, trade and prices. The assumption of classical economic theory was
that humans act as if they are consistently and solely guided purely by choosing
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the optimal rational-economic option. This view therefore advanced the idea of
“man” as homo economicus, according to which humans are actually qualified by
the economic aspect of reality. In addition to the long-standing depiction of
“man” as “homo sapiens” humans are sometimes designated as social beings
(homo socuis), homo laborans (“working man”), homo ludens (the “playing
man”), homo faber (“man the maker”) or homo symbolicus (capturing the lingual
ability of humans).
When Von Bertalanffy explains his view of symbolism as the distinctive hu-
man characteristic he does that by down-playing morality: “man's moral instincts
have hardly improved over those of the chimpanzee” (Von Bertalanffy, 1968:15).
He continues: “Symbolism, if you will, is the divine spark distinguishing the most
perfectly adapted animal from the poorest specimen of the human race” (Von
Bertalanffy, 1968:20). Ironically he adds a strange dialectical twist to this appre-
ciation of language, because he disqualifies this distinctive feature by depreciat-
ing it at once to be the root-sin of humankind: “But man's Original Sin precisely
was what the Bible says it was; eating from the tree of knowledge; that is, in mod-
ern parlance, invention of smbolic universes” (Von Bertalanffy, 1968:25).
In the case of material things, plants and animals the distinctive feature is given
in their respective unique qualifying functions, namely the physical, biotic and
sensitive modes.
Sometimes the realization that humans are involved in multiple normative con-
texts helps to broaden an understanding of the multi-aspectual nature of human
beings. Kugel, for example, wrote a work on the philosophy of the body, pre-
sented as a philosophical perspective on human behaviour.1 He distinguishes
four kinds of norms, namely the economic norm, the jural norm, the ethical
norm and the norm of harmony (the “aestehtical” norm) (Kugel, 1982:
280-283). The first obvious omission is the logical-analytical aspect within
which the contrary logical-illogical is found. Our remarks on the norma-
tivity of life (Chapter 2, see page 18 above), include the other omissions as
well, namely the cultural historical, the lingual, the social and the certi-
tudinal. But there is something else lacking in the choice of Kugel. His mode
of speech suggests that there is just one norm in each case, because he al-
ludes to the economic norm, the jural norm, and so on.
At the end of Chapter 4 a brief remark highlighted the fact that it is possi-
ble to come to a theoretical articulation of modal norms on the basis of ana-
lyzing analogies (retro- and antecipations) on the norm side of the normative
aspects of reality. The normative meaning of the core of each normative as-
pect qualifies these analogies which entails that every normative aspect
gives shelter to multiple modal norms – exactly the opposite of Kugel's “sin-
gular-aspectual-norm” view. Merely contemplate the nature of logical prin-
ciples such as the principles of identity, non-contradiction and the excluded
middle. The first two principles are made possible by the intermodal coher-
1 In Strauss, 2009:476-479 a brief critical evaluation of the current distinction between up to
five kingdoms/realms within living entities is given.
183
ence between the logical-analytical and the arithmetical aspects. The numeri-
cal retrocipation found on the norm side of the logical aspect underlies every logi-
cal unity and multiplicity. On the one hand it provides the foundation for the logi-
cal principle of identity (whatever is distinctly identified is identical to itself).
Moreover, what is distinct underlies the logical principle of contradiction which
demands that whatever is distinct should not be considered as identical. In other
words, the numerical analogy on the norm side of the analytical aspect explores
the two sides of unity and multiplicity, and thus serves as the basis of the two most
basic logical principles underlying every analytical act of identification and dis-
tinguishing. The principle of the excluded middle in fact is a retrocipation to an
antecipation, because it presupposes the retrocipation from the logical-analy-
tical mode to the arithmetical mode, which in turn anticipates towards the fac-
tual spatial whole-parts relation in subjection to and determined by the spatial
time order of simultaneity (only in the case of an infinite totality is the bifurca-
tion A and non-A viable – see Strauss, 2009:303-306).
As long as we attempt to find one aspect to explain the uniqueness of the hu-
man being, our efforts will continue to be dispersed within the diversity of norma-
tive modal aspects. No single human being is solely involved in just one kind of
modal functioning: no one acts just in a logical-analytical way, or just in an eco-
nomic way (as homo economicus), or just in a social fashion (hom socuis), and so
on. All of us can switch from one guiding normed functioning to another. The one
moment a man can buy something, the next moment he can talk cordially to a
good friend encountered at the shop, then arrive home to join his family where he
may have to fix something (requiring some technical skills).
If human beings have the normative flexibility to act successively under the
guidance of any normative aspect, then no single one of them can exclusively be
elevated to be the sole guiding principle in all human activities. Interestingly,
even Dooyeweerd himself struggled with this issue, and initially opted for a mis-
taken solution, which he soon had to leave behind. His first article in Philosophia
Reformata on the problem of time in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea
states that that the spiritual bodily structure is qualified by the function of faith.1
The Dooyeweerdian idea of the mutual coherence of everything within cre-
ation had significant implications for the traditional understanding of the hu-
man being in terms of a material body substance and a spiritual soul sub-
stance. By and large this view included the idea that the human soul can “act” in-
dependently of the material body, thus performing purely spiritual acts. Just re-
call the earlier quotation from Thomas Aquinas where he states that the intellec-
tual principle, which he calls the mind or the intellect, essentially operates inde-
pendently of the body, from which he concluded “that the human soul, which is
called intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent” (see Pegis,
1945-I: 685). Sometimes this dualism was tempered by introducing something
bridging the gap. In an attempt to overcome the dualism between his two sub-
1 See Dooyeweerd, 1940:222 where he refers to the “z.g.n. geestelijke (door de geloofsfunctie
gequalificeerde) lichaamsstructuur.”
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stances (space and thought, res extensa and res cogitans), Descartes accepts the
physical effect of a small cerebral gland influencing human consciousness (the
parva glandula). Even during the 20th century we still see the influence of this
dualistic understanding, for example in the thought of George Herbert Mead for
whom mind possesses “ a world of representation which is simply a duplication
of the physical world, leaving ‘the connection between this world and the physi-
cal world’ a ‘mystery’ ” (Mead, 1945: 360).
It turned out that holding on to “immaterial” acts of thought ran into a dead end
because continued natural scientific investigations made it clear that even the
slightest thought-act can only take place on the basis of brain processes which
have their foundation in physical functions. Although the brain as organ occupies
merely 2% of the total body mass of a mature human, 25% of the total metabolism
of the human body takes place within the brain (see Plamenac, 1970).
The human brain cannot be identified with anyone of the enkaptically
bounded bodily structures, although it can be accessed through the point of
entry of any aspect. The complexity of this multifunctional existence of the
human person explains why it is still impossible to discern, for example, the
precise connection between logical concepts and the brain as an organ. In
spite of the highly specialized knowledge currently available in neurology
(and cognitive science) with regard to neurons, synapses and many more de-
tail elements of the nervous system and brain, it is still not possible to locate or
correlate the concept “dog” or “triangle” with givens accessible through the
gateway of any pre-logical aspect.
11.12 The new integral view of Dooyeweerd – the structural
interlacements present within the human body
Although the key position of the theory of modal aspects in Dooyeweerd’s
thought should not be underestimated, it should be kept in mind that he always
knew that the intermodal and transmodal nature of individual entities exceeds the
scope of any single modal aspect. Sometimes the problem in this regard is desig-
nated in terms of the opposition between a so-called substance theory versus a
bundle theory. The idea of individuality structures as it was developed by Dooye-
weerd side-steps both these extremes. No single natural or social entity is merely
the combination of a “bundle” of modal aspects, and the modal universality of the
aspects prevent them from merely being properties of some or another substance.
The temporal identity of individual entities, their persistence through time, con-
stantly specify, in a typical way, the modal universality of the aspects in which
they function. But this specification does not turn what is universal into some-
thing individual.
Yet Dooyeweerd still wrestled with the relationship between universality and
what is individual. He implicitly identifies the universal side of what is individual,
namely its law-conformity (“wetmatigheid”) with the universal “law for” its exis-
tence. The implication is that the factual side of reality is then stripped of any form
of universality – every subject is strictly individual. What is not realized is that
“being individual” is itself a universal trait holding for whatever is individual (see
185
page 88 above where this view is traced to nominalism)! The effect is an ambigu-
ity in Dooyeweerd's understanding of “individuality structures” (see Strauss,
2009:449-453). He started in 1931 by frequently using the phrase “individual
structure” (see Dooyeweerd, 2010:ii). When the switch is made to individuality
structure the question concerning the relationship between what is individual and
what is universal arises. Are they two ends of a continuum? If they were, the dis-
tinction between them would collapse. If the move from “individual” to “individ-
uality” intends to acknowledge the universality of a law holding for subjects, then
the phrase individuality structure refers to the law side of reality. To be sure, the
term “structure” contains a similar ambiguity, because it may refer to the con-
struction of something (best expressed by referring to the “structure of”) or to the
law for (“structure for”) something.
Therefore, neither (universal) individuality structures nor (universal) modal

aspects could be individualized. Yet, appearing at the factual side of reality, con-
crete entities function in a twofold way within modal aspects:
(i) In a concrete individual way (this entity and not that entity);
(ii) In a concrete universal way (this type of entity and not that type of entity –
manifested in the orderliness or law-conformity of factual reality).
The task of explaining the nature of the human being does not belong to a special
science, but to philosophical anthropology as a totality science. For this reason
Dooyeweerd argues that “no single special science as such can give us an idea of
human nature, since man is a whole, which, in its temporal manifestation, com-
prises all aspects of reality within a typical hierarchy of individuality-structures”
(Dooyeweerd, 2011a:134). The structural configuration of the human being is
therefore in need of a theoretical investigation proceeding beyond the mere rec-
ognition of the different modal aspects in which humans function.
The recognition of the physical aspect of our human existence reveals the en-
tity structure (individuality structure) of the material building blocks of living
things. The realm (kingdom) of material entities is qualified by the physical as-
pect. In terms of our present knowledge of atoms the distinct number of elemen-
tary particles within them are ordered in a typical spatial and kinematic way, re-
flected in the structured electronic orbits that configure the atom as an individual
physical-chemical micro-totality. In order to understand that molecular structures
have their foundational function within the spatial aspect of reality, we only have
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Chapter 11
to look at the following isomeric forms, for they will show that the same number
of atoms, depending upon alternative spatial configurations, may yield different
chemical properties.
In alternative structurations the H COOH H COOH
following atoms C3H6O may yield C
C
chemically distinct configurations:
CH3.CH2.CHO or CH3.CO.CH3.
C C
Another example is C4H4O4. In dif-
ferent spatial configurations these COOH H
COOH
twelve atoms constitute the chemi- H
cally different acids: maleic acid Maleic acid Fumaric acid
and fumaric acid. Merely taking cis trans
the number of atoms into account

cannot explain this situation (see Strauss, 2009:465 ff.). It is only when the spatial
patterns are considered that we can do justice to the chemical difference at stake.
Interestingly, the largest macromolecules known to us are about one million times
smaller than the smallest living cell.
While material things – atoms, molecules, macro-molecules and macro-sys-
tems – clearly belong to the realm of physically-qualified things, human existence
is by no means excluded from this sphere. Surely our physical existence is bound
to the presence of those physical entities necessary for our bodily functioning –
from the four ‘organic’ elements (hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen) up to
the variety of inorganic substances that make an equally necessary contribution to
our existence.
Yet, when we consider the “material building blocks” of living things, it is in-
correct to speak of “living matter” (or: “non-living matter” / “dead matter”).
Atoms, molecules, macro-molecules and macro-systems are not alive – and if
they are not alive they cannot be “dead” later on! The German physicist, Von
Weizsäcker, is therefore fully justified in introducing the new term “unbelebt”
(“non-living”) designating that which is not, and has never been, alive (Von
Weizsäcker 1993:32). He writes: “Stones are ‘unbelebt’. But one should not say
that they are dead. Only something that actually once lived could be dead.”
In addition to the subject functions of material things within the first four as-
pects, living entities also have a modal subject function within the biotic aspect. In
principle they have also latent object functions within all the post-biotic aspects.
Surely the biotic aspect presupposes the aspects of number, space, movement and
energy-operation, but it cannot be reduced to these foundational aspects. The
modal concepts of function employed by physics do not include terms derived
from the original meaning of the biotic aspect, such as life, growth, differentia-
tion, integration, adaptation, goal-directedness (finality), and so on.
Dooyeweerd developed a new structural theory to account for the inter-
lacement between the material substrate of living entities and the organic nature
of such entities. The term organism is actually derived from the presence of “or-
gans,” and the latter are indeed fully alive. Therefore the meaning-nucleus of the
187
biotic aspect could best be designated as life instead of organic life. The latter
phrase rather reflects an interconnection with the numerical aspect in the presence
of a multiplicity of organs.
Dooyeweerd introduced the term enkapsis to account for all those kinds of
(entitary) interlacements where the intertwinement does not terminate the inner
structural properties of what is interlaced. He followed the biologist Heidenhein
in this regard, but added the idea that differently-natured structures are interwo-
ven in such a way that each retains its unique character. The constitutive physical
configuration of living things do not lose their physical-chemical qualification
when they are functioning within living entities. Thus we can say that such enti-
ties are functioning enkaptically – that is, retaining their physically qualified na-
ture – within living things. Similarly both the material components and the biotic
organs in a human being are enkaptically interwoven in the total bodily existence
of a person.
With this new understanding flowing from the term enkapsis Dooyeweerd at
once surpassed the limitations of the whole-parts relation – a relation that appears
in its original modal meaning within the spatial aspect (see page 42 above). Sup-
pose we ask whether or not Sodium and Chlorine are genuine parts of table salt.
Surely every division of table salt must continue to display the NaCl structure of
table salt. But what happens when the process of division reaches a single salt
molecule? Once such a molecule is divided, one is left with a Sodium atom and a
Chlorine atom – and it is evident that real parts of salt will still possess the same
chemical structure of salt, namely NaCl. The critical question is whether Sodium
and Chlorine each has a salt structure, i.e., are Sodium and Chlorine true parts of
salt? The answer is self-evident, because neither on its own has a NaCl structure.
In this case, the internal sphere of operation of the atoms remains intact although,
through a chemical bond, they were taken up in the table salt molecule.
Within the realm of physically qualified entities, we therefore encounter differ-
ent geno-types. Atoms are, for instance, geno-types within the radical type
(realm) of material things. Within different bonds, the same atom displays varia-
bility types. When an atom engages in chemical bonding, a characteristic en-
kaptic totality emerges: (i) besides the internal sphere of operation of an entity
there is (ii) an external enkaptic sphere of operation in which the enkaptically-
bound entity serves (iii) the encompassing enkaptic totality.
The factual configuration of a water molecule thus exists on the foundation of
the geno-type of the chemical bond between the oxygen and hydrogen atoms.
Without these atoms, a water molecule cannot exist. They therefore serve water in
the sense of a unilateral foundational relation. Does this imply that the atoms be-
come parts of the chemical bond that exists within the molecule? Not at all, be-
cause the bond applies only to the binding electrons and not to the whole atom.
Besides, the atom nucleus is not just a specific characteristic of the atom, but pre-
cisely that nuclear part of an atom that determines its physical-chemical geno-
type (compare the atomic number = the number of protons of the nucleus), as well
as the atom's place within the periodic table.
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Chapter 11
According to Dooyeweerd the biotic substructure “governs the so-called au-

tonomous nervous system with the muscular and glandular tissues insofar as they
are innervated by this system: the so-called smooth muscles of the eye, the hair,
the bronchi, the intestines and the striated muscles of the heart” (Dooyeweerd,
2011a:146).
The physical and biotic substructures, in turn, are enkaptically bound within
the sensory substructure with its sensitive qualification. This structure serves as
the foundation for human consciousness, feeling life, desires and the human will.
But it remains an enkaptically bounded substructure, retaining its internal sphere
sovereignty without becoming an integral part of the human body: “In its internal
sphere sovereignty this third individuality-structure dominates those functions of
the sensory and motor nervous system – particularly those of the brain (the sen-
sory brain), the spinal cord, and the gland system (including the endocrine
glands) – which in their being typically directed by the subjective sensitive func-
tion fall outside the domination by a person's acts of will, at least up to a certain
point” (Dooyeweerd, 2011a:146).
By and large traditional anthropological views identified the human body with
its physical substructure, or at most with the first three, previosly mentioned sub-
structures. Dooyeweerd realized that the normative functions open up the reality
of recognizing yet another bodily structure, namely the act-structure. With a view
to the foundational substructures Dooyeweerd describes this fourth structure as
follows:
This third individuality-structure in turn, and in combination with both earlier in-
dividuality-structures, functions enkaptically within a fourth individuality-struc-
ture, which I wish to call the individuality-structure of the human acts or act-indi-
viduality-structure of the body. By the word “acts” – differentiated in their basic
dimensions of knowing, imagining and willing – I understand those activities
which issue from the human selfhood but function within the enkaptic body indi-
viduality-structure. Through them, one orients oneself intentionally (i.e., with a
purpose) towards states of affairs in temporal reality – or in the world of one's
imagination – under the guidance of normative points of view. One internalizes
these intentional (or intended) states of affairs by relating them to one's I-ness.
Their “innerness” is involved in the intentional character of the “acts” (Dooye-
weerd, 2011a:146).
The specification regarding “the guidance of normative points of view” entails
that humans can vary their actions constantly, they do not need to be involved in
just one kind of action all the time. Any normative aspect may guide human ac-
tions. Through this reality the idea of a distinct qualifying aspect for human acts is
ruled out. On the one hand, typical normatively guided human acts in principle
function in all aspects of reality, which implies that being human is never ex-
hausted merely by functioning in one or another aspect. On the other this insight
makes it plain that although typically normative human actions belong to the
highest bodily structure, this structure cannot be seen as being qualified by any
one of these normative points of view. In other words, the act-structure is the
qualifying bodily structure which is unqualified in itself.
189
In the light of the preceding considerations we can circumscribe a human being

as a religious personality. The term religious does not refer to the aspect of faith,
but to the central root dimension of reality which determines the ultimate direc-
tion in life. The term personality embraces the three substructures as well as the
qualifying act-structure of the human body. Every person has its own unique
tempo (expressing the role of the physical substructure), its own dispositions (the
contribution of the biotic substructure), its own temperament (senstive sub-
structure) and character (the manifestation of the in-itself-unqualified, qualifying
act-structure. The human character is a normative type which is sometimes asso-
ciated with specific roles within society or with peculiar ways in which modal
normativity takes shape.
The dominant normative inclination of being human reminds us of the view
that culture is not the second nature of human beings, but their first nature.
Likewise, one can appreciate the freedom to choose, within the matrix of
modal and typical norms, as the first nature of being human. Eibl-Eibesfeldt
points out that only humans can act against their nature: “Only the human be-
ing can ultimately act against its nature, in what is good and in what is evil”.1
11.13 ‘Body’ and ‘soul’: between temporality, supratemporality
and eternity
When Dooyeweerd objects to the (metaphysical) idea of the human soul, con-
ceived of as a combination of normative (bodily!) functions elevated and op-
posed to the “material body,” he does not want to avoid the biblical reference
to the “inner person” or the human soul. The duality entailed in traditional
views of opposing two “function complexes” (most of the time reified into
two substances), breaks apart the temporal unity of human functioning within
all the modal aspects of reality. But the intrinsic unity of being human tran-
scends this diversity. According to Dooyeweerd the “soul is the ‘inner person’
itself, in the Pauline sense, just as the body is the person in its external mani-
festation (the ‘outer person’).” As a result he holds that in “the soul the entire
human existence is concentrated as the spiritual unity; in the body this same
total existence is broken through time, as through a prism, into a diversity of
functions and individuality-structures” (Dooyeweerd 2011a:139).
For this reason Dooyeweerd does not view the soul as a “part of human na-
ture, no more than the body can be characterized as such.” He writes:
The soul constitutes the inner totality of a person, which differentiates itself in
the body within the horizon of time. It can be such a totality only because it is a
spiritual unity beyond all temporal diversity, which is the reason why it also
transcends our conceptualization. If it were merely a structural unity, a unity
within temporal diversity, or a part of such a unity, it could never lay down the
body nor continue the existence of a person beyond the grave. However, be-
cause it is of an entirely different order, of a spiritual or religious order, it sim-
ply cannot be approached by the traditional “dichotomy.” If we wish to keep
1 “Nur der Mensch kann schließlich gegen seine Nature handeln, im Guten wie im Bösen”
(Eibl-Eibesfedlt, 2004:745).
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Chapter 11
speaking of a “dichotomy” from a Scriptural viewpoint, then this word must

assume an entirely different sense than it possessed in scholastic theology
(Dooyeweerd 2011a:139).
Vollenhoven states that the biblical sense of “immortality” means “not being
subject to the power of death – in the Scriptural sense of this term”; that before
the first death human immortality is not mentioned; that the Bible never
speaks of an immortal part of a person (it does not know the expressions “im-
mortal soul” and “immortal spirit”) and that the Bible solely knows of immor-
tality of those who, after their death, are in Christ. Immortality means more
than “continue to exist” while “being subject to death” does not mean annihi-
lation (Vollenhoven, 1933, Separate Appendix with the footnotes, pages 5-6,
note 40).
In passing it should be noted that there is an element of ambiguity in
Dooyeweerd's thought regarding the idea of the “supra-temporality” of the
human heart.
In his extensive reaction to the critical “marginal” remarks made by Van
Peursen (on A New Critique of Theoretical Thought) Dooyeweerd relativized
his initial designation of the central religious dimension as “supra-temporal.”
In his response Dooyeweerd refers to the sense in which we “do transcend
time in the center of our existence even though at the same time we are en-
closed within time” (Dooyeweerd, 1960:103) and later on in this article he ex-
plains that he is not wedded to the term “supra-temporal” for in response to the
objection raised by Van Peursen to the term “supra-temporal” he says:
Now I am not once more going to enter into a discussion regarding the ques-
tion if it is desirable to call the heart, as the religious centre of human exis-
tence, supra-temporal. It is sufficiently known that amongst the adherents of
the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea there is no consensus in this regard.
Probably the term supra-temporal, with which I never meant a static condition
but merely intended to capture a central direction of consciousness transcend-
ing cosmic time, can best be replaced by another one (Dooyeweerd, 1960:
137).
Note the difference between “supra-temporal” and “a central direction of con-
sciousness transcending cosmic time” – in the latter case the (temporal) hu-
man self-hood reveals a “central direction of consciousness transcending cos-
mic time.”
11.14 Human bodily actions: the normative structure
In view of the fact that typical human actions are always guided by one or an-
other normative point of view, it may be preferable to designate the act-
sructure as the normative structure, because it directly captures what is charac-
teristic of this structure, namely enabling human actions to life out the normativity
of life.
Dooyeweerd distinguishes between three basic directions (grondrichtingen) of
the act-structure, namely knowing, willing and imagining. Although the terms
knowing, willing and imagining appears to be, if anything, activities, the idea of a
191
basic direction suggests the steadiness of a path. Perhaps we may discern a con-
nection between willing and the sensitive mode, knowing and the analytical mode
and imagining and the cultural-historical mode, keeping in mind that every possi-
ble human act (or: action) exceeds the modal boundaries of any and all aspects in
which such an act functions. It also exceeds any and all normative aspects guiding
such acts. This means that the depth-layer of every human act exceeds any single
modal aspect and therefore can only be approximated in terms of concept-tran-
scending knowledge.
The term knowing may be used in a concept-transcending way. Then it
does not imply that the original conceptual context of thinking (analysis =
identifying and distinguishing) is left behind. Likewise, human willing (origi-
nally referring to the sensitive-psychic aspect where human desires, feelings,
emotions and strivings have their modal seat) and human imagining (to my
mind originally referring to the free formative fantasy of human beings and
perhaps reflecting a mode of knowing directed at the entities within reality)
could be appreciated in their close connection to the modal aspects of reality.
While all four of the human bodily structures have, apart from their enkaptic
interweaving, a characteristic internal functional sphere of operation, it is impos-
sible to delimit any one of them morphologically, that is to say, to localize them in
a particular part of the human body. The foot, hand, leg or the brain of a human
being is never purely physical, biotic or sensitive-psychic. The whole human per-
sonality, in all four of its enkaptically interwoven substructures, is expressed in
every part of the body. At the same time the traditional dualism of a material body
(substance) and a rational soul (substance) is now clearly superseded: “The hu-
man being is not a ‘unity of soul and body’, but the body, as the form of one's en-
tire temporal existence, only arrives at its intrinsic unity in its religious root, in the
soul or spirit of a person” (Dooyeweerd, 2011a:139).
11.15 Enkaptic interlacement: an example of ramifications for
all four bodily structures
The presence or absence of particular chemical bonds undoubtedly may have im-
portant implications for normal human functioning. Think of the important role
of iodine in the nature and function of the thyroid gland. The thyroid gland
(glandula thyreoidea) is placed around the lower part of the human larynx and the
beginning of the wind pipe. It is responsible for the secretion of the important thy-
roid gland hormone (thyroxine) which, probably via an influence on the process
of oxidation (oxidative phosphorilation) in the mytochondria initiates the ex-
change of substances throughout the body's cells. This is essential for normal bi-
otic growth as well as emotional and psychic health. Iodine itself is qualified
physically-chemically in terms of its own inner structure. While retaining this in-
ner structure it is however enkaptically bound into the biotic functioning of the
thyroid gland.
Only the thyroid gland functions subjectively in the biotic aspect of reality (it is
alive) while it depends on the enkaptically bound iodine for the production (inter-
nal secretion) of the thyroid gland hormone. This biotic function – with its influ-
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Chapter 11
ence on the physical-chemical substructure in the human body – is itself

foundationally enkaptically interwoven with the psychic-sensitive substructure
and qualifying normative structure of the human being – as proven by its impor-
tance for the healthy emotional and normative life of a human being. A hyperac-
tive thyroid gland causes excessive energy-use which can lead to a faster heart-
beat and a general unease, with accompanying heightened nervous sensitivity. It
is clear that the interwoven iodine and thyroid gland plays a role within the inte-
grated functioning of the entire human being. The theory of enkaptic structural
wholes attempts to understand this enkaptic functioning of a human being as a
whole, keeping in view the complex substructural interweaving also present in
the structure of our bodies.
Our inital discussion of the relation between animals and human beings was
focused on aspects of nature in which both have subject functions. However, this
similarity does not conceal the typical differences which are still present when an-
imals and humans are compared, as we have shown with reference to the physi-
cal, biotic and sensitive modes of reality. When we now proceed and briefly look
at the post-sensory aspects, that is, from the logical-analytical aspect up to the
certitudinal aspect, it is no longer possible to compare subject functions because
animals do not function as subjects within these normative aspects. What human
and animals share in this regard is merely the fact that they are both functioning
within these normative aspects, albeit as subjects or objects.
However, when one proceeds from the a priori faith in the continuity postulate
of the modern humanistic science ideal, then the temptation is strong to attempt to
ascribe normative subject functions to animals – just consider the recent call for
acknowledging animal rights and even the rights of plants (see Strauss, 2009:
388-391). Of course the strongest attack on the discontitnuity between animals
and humans beings normally comes from the claim that animals, like humans, are
capable of obtaining concepts, that they do make and use tools, and that they do
have language.
11.16 The functioning of animals and humans within the
normative aspects
In a relatively simplistic way we have become accustomed to the distinction
between nature and culture. The former encompasses material things, plants,
animals and what they can produce (such as the web of the spider, the nest of
birds, and so on). Owing to the so-called linguistic turn it often happens that a
pretty reduced understanding of culture is advanced, such as found in the
thought of Dikovitskaya who circumscribes culture as a “representational,
symbolic and linguistic system” (Dikovitskaya, 2006:48). Znanieki captures
much more in his employment of the term culture: “The concept which this
term symbolizes includes religion, language, literature, art, customs, mores,
laws, social organization, technical production, economic exchange, and also
philosophy and science” (Znanieki, 1963:9, cf. p.374). Although this defini-
tion practically touches upon every normative aspect of reality, from the logi-
cal-analytical up to the fiduciary or certitudinal aspect, it may be wise to avoid
193
making culture just another basket-term for all forms of normativity, similar
to what happened to the ethical.
There is no highest genus of normative aspects, such as the concept of cul-
ture, with the specific aspects as the various species of this genus. Dooye-
weerd always pointed out that the sphere sovereignty of the various modal as-
pects precludes an application the the traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic
method of concept formation, namely that of a genus proximum with its
differentia specifica.
The a priori continuity postulate of neo-Darwinism suggests that since ani-
mals and humans are basically “similar,” they ought to have comparable ca-
pacities in respect of thinking, tool-making and language. Yet even leading
neo-Darwinists, such as Bernard Rensch (as we have noted), had to admit that
animals lack argumentative logical skills. Others maintain that animals are ca-
pable of forming unnamed concepts or partaking in unnamed thinking. A sim-
ple test, refuting this entire enterprise, is to ask if animals and in particular the
anthropoids (orangutan, gorilla, chimpanzee and gibbon) are capable of ac-
quiring illogical concepts, such as that of a square circle? (see page 89 above).
An attempt at Münster to get chimpanzees to copy drawings of squares and
triangles lasted six months, and met with no success. How then could a chim-
panzee be brought to acquire the concept of a “square circle”, or even to real-
ize that it is illogical?!
This shows that the discontinuity between animals and humans is given in
the normativity of the post-sensory modes of experience (aspects). By virtue
of the normative structure of the logical and post-logical aspects subject func-
tions within them presuppose an accountable free will, the freedom to choose
(see the formulation of Rouseau quoted earlier on page 153). Accountability
embodies a retrocipation within the logical sphere to the causal relation pres-
ent in the foundational physical aspect. Contraries such as logical – illogical
(see pages 89, 97, 170, above) mark the irreducibility of the normed structure
of human actions taking place under the guidance of any normative aspect.
We have pointed out that non-scientific concepts are actually conceptual
representations (see page 179 above) and that animals lack the ability to form
genuine (logical or illogical) concepts. In addition they lack the uniquely hu-
man capacity of imaginativity. Humans are even able to convert what is not
visible into conceptual representations. Eibl-Eibesfeldt speaks of the spatial
intelligence of human beings which, for him, highlights the ability to “grasp”
spatial relationships in a centered way. He holds that our thinking is spatial,
combined with the ability to translate invisible relationships into conceptual
representations (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:747). This opens up the way to indi-
viduality. Mäckler mentions the following definition of art by Benedetto
Croce: “Art is intuition, intuition is individuality and individuality does not
repeat itself”1 (Mäckler, 2000:30). Human knowing appears to be co-condi-
tioned by the two fundamental dimensions of reality, the knowing of modal
1 “Kunst ist Intuition, Intuition ist Individualität, und Individualität wiederholt sich nicht”
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Chapter 11
aspects and knowledge of entities. The former is known through functional re-
lations and the latter through imaging that takes on the shape of imagining in
the uniquely human acquaintance with the world. These two legs of knowing
– modally directed and entitary directed – imply each other and open the way
to account for our knowledge of universality and individuality. Just compare
the conceptions of Croce. He states that knowledge has two forms:
. . . it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained
through the imagination or knowledge obtained through the intellect; knowl-
edge of the individual or knowledge of the universal; of individual things or of
the relations between them: it is, in fact, productive either of images or of con-
cepts (the italics are mine – DFMS – Croce, 1953:1).
Surely imaginativity, as the manifestation of a specific directedness of human
knowing towards the dimension of (individual) entities, extends across this
entire dimension and cannot be restricted to aesthetic imaginativity alone – as
suggested by Seerveld (Seerveld, 1968:45, 1979:284, 1980:132, 2001:175).
Eibel-Eibesfeldt mentions that Arnold Gehlen is justified in calling the human
being a “Phantasiewesen,” a being characterized by the ability to imagine
(Eibel-Eibesfeldt, 2004:755).1
In addition, the flexibility of human understanding allows for a cross-utili-
zation of the two dimensions of human experience, since the modal aspects
serve as points of entry to an understanding of entities whereas the nature of
the modal aspects can only be explained with the aid of metaphors – the result
of imaginatively relating different kinds of entities through predication
(sometimes mediated by images depicting relationships between entities and
aspects or aspects and entities).
Although neo-Darwinists claim that animals and humans are similar be-
cause animals not only use tools but make them as well, archeologists empha-
size the human formative imagination which is capable to invent something
different from what is presented to the senses (see Narr, 1976). This view is
complementary to Kant, who defines the Einbildungskraft (imagination) as
the capacity to have a representation of an object without its presence to the
senses (Kant, 1787-B:151). This enables human beings to have a historical
awareness: memory (historical past) and expectations or planning (historical
future) – while animals are said to live in the present, the now.
From the fact that animals not only use tools but also “manufacture” them it
may look as if animals actively function within the cultural-historical aspect.
The distinct way in which human tool-making differs from animal tool-mak-
ing follows from a second meaning attached to the word imagination, namely
the ability to imagine something that is present to the senses different from the
way in which it is given. Both forms of the imagination have their foundation
is the typical human free formative fantasy. Applied to the problem of tool-
1 Just as little as willing and thinking could be identified, respectively with the sensory and log-
ical modes, is it possible to identify imagining with the cultural-historical aspect. Yet we have
suggested that willing, thinking and imagining are intimately related to these three aspects.
195
making the archaeologist Narr specified three distinct criteria in order to high-
light what is typical human in respect of human tool-making. The form, func-
tion and manner of production ought not to be suggested by what is given –
like stripping the leaves from a branch (cf. Narr, 1974:105 and Narr, 1976:
99-101).
11.17 Is language uniquely human?
It is commonly assumed that because animals have different forms of commu-
nication they actually use language. Suppose a magnate is used to make a
non-magnetic piece of iron magnetic? In this case the magnetism of the mag-
net is communicated to another piece of iron. Does this mean that two physi-
cal subjects employed language? Likewise, when the genetic code is dupli-
cated to offspring, does it mean that we may here identify a kind of biotic lan-
guage between different living entities? And what about the dance of the
bees? The latter is indeed quite remarkable, because by means of the (i)
tempo, (ii) direction and (iii) angle of the figure eight performed, the (i) dis-
tance, (ii) location, and (iii) direction of the source is depicted (see
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:258 ff.). Eibl-Eibesfeldt does provide an addition al ex-
planation. The speed of the wind is incorporated in the dance tempo – if the
bees have to fly against the wind the dance is slower, indicating a larger dis-
tance. The distance-indication is neither related to the real distance, nor to the
duration of the flight, but to the effort (force) needed to achieve the goal
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:259).
The first point to be observed is that in the communication between bees the
elements of the dance are always identical, they always have the same “mean-
ing.” All human utterances, by contrast, can signify a number of different
things, depending on the context, intention, or even, in the case of written lan-
guage, the punctuation.
Language therefore presupposes responsible and free human activities, it
requires accountable choices between multiple options. This is absent
amongst animals. Eibl-Eibesfeldt states that that “which, by contrast, regard-
ing animals, is generally designated as ‘language’, exclusively moves within
... the domain of interjection, of the expression of moods lacking insight.”1 He
also categorically affirms that “the capacity of lingual communication is spe-
cifically human” and that “nothing really comparable is found in the realm of
animals” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:214). The logical-analytical mode with its
freedom of choice is presupposed in language because the interpretation
needed presupposes freedom of choice (cf. Nida, 1979:203; De Klerk,
1978:6; and Lyons, 1969:89).
Eibl-Eibesfeldt also holds that the sharing of emotional conditions does not
need a word-language, but that speaking presupposes a certain distancing
from emotions (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:753).
1 “Das, was man beim Tier dagegen als ‘Sprache’ zu bezeichnen pflegt, bewegt sich, von den
letztgenannten Beispielen abgesehen, ausschließlich auf dem gebiet der Interjektion, der
uneinsichtigen Stimmungsäußerung.” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2004:214).
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Chapter 11
11.18 The anatomical limitations precluding animal speech

Post-mortem studies of the upper respiratory tract in mammals, as well as
cineradiographic studies, have shown that the position of the larynx is crucial
in determining the way in which an individual breathes, swallows and vocal-
izes (Laitman, 1985:281). This implies that there are certain anatomical pecu-
liarities that go hand in hand with the contribution of brain functioning in the
production of human speech; in particular the gradual descent of the larynx af-
ter the post-natal period (cf. Portmann, 1973:423).
The ‘humanlike’ apes (anthropoids, i.e. the orangutan, gorilla, chimpanzee,
and gibbon), are, as a result of anatomical shortcomings, born incapable of
speech. In order to provide the newborn human suckling with a milk tract sep-
arate from the respiratory tract, the position of the human larynx at birth is the
same as that of mammals. In the period between the first and second year, this
highly positioned larynx starts its descent in the neck. This downward move-
ment creates the pharynx cavity, necessary for the articulation of the richer
voice disposition in human beings. Laitman declares that the precise time this
shift occurs, as well as the physiologic mechanisms that underlie it, are still
poorly understood (Laitman, 1985:282). As soon as the larynx reaches its des-
tined low position, it can no longer lock into the nasopharynx. Consequently,
the respiratory and digestive pathways cross above the larynx. This creates the
possibility of suffocating, which surely is, evaluated in itself, something nega-
tive. However, it is precisely this expanded pharynx that provides human be-
ings with the unique potential to produce a rich variety of speech sounds. The
palate between the mouth and nose cavities serves as basis for the resonance
of the sounds produced. Goerttler even mentions the fact that, in the third
month after conception, a distinctively human structural element develops
(the vocal chord ‘blastem’ – Goerttler, 1972:250).
It is interesting in this connection that Laitman informs us that the basi-
cranial similarities between the australopithecines and extant apes suggest
that their upper respiratory tract was also similar in appearance. Conse-
quently, as with living non-human primates, the pharynx portion for sound
modification in these early hominids would have been greatly restricted:
As a result, these early hominids probably had a very restricted vocal reper-
toire as compared with modern adult humans. For example, the high larynx
would have made it impossible for them to produce some of the universal
vowel sounds found in human speech patterns (Laitman, 1985:284).
If we define a speech organ as that bodily part which exists solely in service of
the production of speech sounds, then a surprising fact is that there are no hu-
man speech organs. Let us enumerate possible candidates: the lungs, larynx,
mouth cavity, palate, teeth, lips and nose cavity. Without exception, all these
organs perform primary functions that would continue to function in their nor-
mal way even if human beings never uttered a single word (Overhage,
1972:243)! Human language simply takes hold of all these different organs in
197
the production of speech sounds (“body language” or “sign language” em-

ploys different parts of the body).
This highly developed and subtle cooperation, especially of three organs so

heterogeneous in character as the mouth, the larynx and the brain, integrated
in the production of human speech sounds, makes it rather difficult, if not
hopeless, to provide us with a causal evolutionary explanation of this aston-
ishing phenomenon. The question arises, what number of miraculous changes
should have occurred to produce the articulation conditions necessary for
truly human language formation? Overhage states:
Such an unfathomable process of change affecting so many differently struc-

tured organs and organ complexes, closely correlated with each other, should
have proceeded harmoniously as a total change, if it was to come to the un-
precedented perfection of human speech (Overhage, 1972:250).
In the next Chapter we shall investigate the fruitfulness of Dooyeweerd's anal-

ysis of human society for an understanding of how human beings function in a
multiplicity of social roles.

A systematic analysis of the uniqueness of the human person bought us now to
the point where we can provide a provisional but encompassing characteriza-
tion of being human.
The human being is indeed a religious personality, which, in its bodily shape,
displays and interweaving of four interlaced substructures, qualified by the
normative structure, which in itself is not qualified by any normative aspect,
and centered in die human self-hood or I-ness (the “heart”).
Questions
1) How does the basic Greek motive of form and matter, the medieval ground motive of nature and
grace and the humanistic ground motive of nature and freedom directed the understanding of be-
ing human?
2) How did Dooyeweerd expand out understanding of the manysidedness of the human body?
3) What are they unique ways in which humans function within the aspects of nature (the physical,
biotical and sentivie)?
4) Why are animals incapable of producing human speech?
198
Human Society
Chapter 12
Initially Dooyeweerd contemplated sociology as a special science in-
vestigating reality from the angle of the social aspect. Later on he de-
fended the view that sociology has a social-philosophic point of view.
What he maintained in both views was what is called the transcenden-
tal-empirical method – a method that focuses of those ontic conditions
making possible our human experience of societal entities and events.
Subsequently attention is given to social action (personal freedom)
versus social order (collective structures), explaining how we have to
understand sociological individualism and sociological universalism.
The general philosophical assumptions of a meaningful philosophy of
society has to come to terms with the age-old opposition of individual
and society. Since humans function in all aspects of reality (including
the social) and because an individual plays a distinct role in diverse so-
cietal entities without being fully absorbed in any modal function or
any social role – and without being transformed into a “sphere of life”
on its own – the distinction between “individual” and “society” turned
out to be untenable and in fact is burdened by a serious and misleading
category-mistake.
12.1 Society and sociology
One of the unique conditions of being human is given in the capacity of hu-
mankind to reflect upon its own exceptional position in the world, which in-
cludes a view on how human beings are organized in different societies. From
the outset Dooyeweerd realized that human societal relationships are embed-
ded within all the aspects of reality. Although the same applies to being hu-
man, we have argued in the previous Chapter that the (bodily) existence of hu-
man beings are not qualified by any (normative) aspect – because the norma-
tive bodily structure is the qualifying, though in itself unqualified, structure of
the human body. It may seem pretty self-evident to identify distinct societal
entities, such as states, business enterprises and sport clubs, that are guided by
specific modal functions, such as the jural, the economic and the social.
Yet a prominent sociologist and economic thinker of the early 20th century,
Max Weber, thought that from a sociological perspective there is no essential
difference between a business enterprise and the state – the state is just a large
“enterprise” (Weber, 1918:15 – see Dooyeweerd, 2010:131). But Weber
gives another step in which he denies the communal or totality character of
any societal institution or social entity. According to him it is always possible
to understand “communal human actions” as being reducible “to the actions
of the individual human beings (Einzelmenschen) concerned” (Weber,
199
1973:439). The latter approach is normally, within sociological literature, de-

fined as an individualistic or an atomistic orientation. The intention of socio-
logical individualism is to deny the reality of any supra-individual communal
whole of collective institution. Those who advance the latter view are seen as
universalistic or holistic thinkers. They subordinate individuals to societal
collectivities, seeing them as mere parts of some or another larger societal
whole or totality – which could the nation, the state, the church or even
“society.”
Suddenly reflection on human society has to face more complicated prob-
lems:
1) What is the relation between individual and society?
2) Is society merely to be seen the interaction between (autonomous) indi-
viduals or should we rather give priority to one or another social collect-
ivity, elevated to be the encompassing societal whole?
3) Is sociology the discipline responsible for studying human society and if
so, what is the relationship between sociology, social philosophy and the
other so-called “social sciences”?
Initially Dooyeweerd contemplated the possibility to view sociology as a spe-
cial science alongside all the other (modally delimited) special sciences. In his
work on the The Crisis of Humanist Political Theory (1931; 2010) he writes:
In our opinion, sociology as a normative special science is possible to the ex-
tent that it tries to grasp human society functionally in the modal sense of
sociation [omgang]. In this sense we may speak of a social law-sphere, whose
law-side is formed by that exceedingly differentiated set of norms for social
interaction (norms for civility, propriety, fellowship, play, fashion, tact, and so
on) which was investigated for the first time (albeit in a methodologically un-
satisfactory manner) by von Jehring in the second volume of his Der Zweck im
Recht. But even in this functional sense a sociological discipline remains de-
pendent upon the foundation of a cosmological theory of organized communi-
ties [verbandstheorie] in the sense we discussed earlier (Dooyeweerd, 2010:
121; 1931:139).
Later on he changed this approach. In the Dutch edition of his Magnum Opus,
De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-36), as well as in the eventually expand-
ed English translation of this work, published as A New Critique of Theore-
tical Thought (four volumes – 1953-1958 – see Dooyeweerd, 1997), Dooye-
weerd opted for a different distinction, that between philosophical sociology
and positive (or empirical) sociology. This shift is evident in the ten lectures
which Dooyeweerd gave at Delft in 1946 on the discipline of sociology. They
were published as “A Christian Theory of Social Institutions” in 1986. Here
the distinctive field of sociological inquiry is explained as follows:
(1) Sociology is the theoretical analysis of particular structural types or typical
structural principles. These structural types or principles are part of the com-
munity relationships that form society. They are manifest in diverse social
forms, which they themselves makes possible. Sociology is also the inquiry
into the mutual relationships and connections between these types and princi-
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Chapter 12
ples. This is the task of philosophical sociology. None of the special social sci-
ences as such can take its place. Where these sciences encounter typical struc-
tural totalities in their field of inquiry, they must gain insight into these struc-
tures precisely from philosophical sociology. (2) Sociology is also the investi-
gation of the variable forms in which these particular structural types manifest
themselves in temporal society and of the various ways in which they interact
and influence each other. This is the task of positive sociology as opposed to
philosophical sociology (1986:59-60).
The new distinction between philosophical sociology and positive sociology
assigns a “social philosophic” task to the discipline of sociology:
So we must conclude that, as a science of human society in its total structures,
positive sociology has no specific scientific but only a social philosophic
viewpoint. But although determined by the latter, its field of research is differ-
ent from that of social philosophy (1997-III:264; cf. 1962:96).
However, rather advancing the idea that “positive sociology” has a field of in-
quiry determined by a social philosophic viewpoint generates serious system-
atic problems. If positive sociology possesses a social philosophic viewpoint,
then it has to be seen as an integral part of social philosophy – which is noth-
ing but a sub-discipline of social philosophy.
In addition this new option chosen by Dooyeweerd withdraws sociology
from the array of modally delimited special sciences. By chosing this path he
also departed from the approach articulated in his Encyclopedia of the Science
of Law. While he developed in this multi-volume work an account of the ele-
mentary (analogical) basic concepts, compound basic concepts, categorial
relationships as well as typical concepts of the science of law, he never con-
templated something similar for the discipline of sociology.
12.2 The significance of the transcendental-empirical method
Yet Dooyeweerd's social philosophy and philosophical sociology remained
faithfull to the transcendental-empirical method lying at the foundation of his
entire philosophy. Instead of restricting the meaning of the term transcenden-
tal to our human cognitive abilities, that is to say to features inhering in the hu-
man subject (as Kant intended to do), he refers to the dimensions of time, the
modal aspects and natural and social entities as that which in the first place
make possible our experience of concrete societal phenomena. These under-
lying (transcendental) conditions are universal and constant and therefore
they serve as the foundation for the variable shapes and forms these condi-
tions (structural principles) can assume throughout history. What guides our
theoretical analysis is the philosophical hypothesis conjecturing an irreduc-
ible though mutually cohering multiplicity of modal aspects encompassing
the functional conditions for all things, events and societal collectivities, as
well as the multiplicity of type laws making possible the existence of multi-as-
pectual concrete (natural and societal) entities. The entire creation only exists
in the unbreakable correlation between the determining and delimiting law
and what is factually subjected to it.
201
Within the development of modern sociology theoretical stances are found

that come very close to the the transcendental-empirical method employed by
Dooyeweerd. Let us briefly mention just two authors in this regard, namely
Talcott Parsons and Anthony Giddens.
Parsons has a clear awareness of the relationship between what is constant
and universal on the one hand and what is dynamically changing in our expe-
rience of the world. Johnson et al., explains:
Rather he [Parsons] suggests that while these concepts do represent universal,
constant features of human action, the particular values or contents they have
vary historically, and are problems of empirical research (Johnson et al.,
1984:72).
If we relate these “universal, constant features of human action” to the order
for creation the view of Parsons would be close to that of the transcenden-
tal-empirical method. From a biblical perspective the transcendental-empiri-
cal method also entails an account of the directional antithesis between good
and evil, operative in the root dimension of creation, because disobeying
God-given (modal and typical) principles cannot transcend the set limits of
God's creation order. This is also true of the differentiated manifestation of
this antithesis in different normative aspects and with regard to diverse soci-
etal principles delimiting the possibilities of societal institutions and social
forms of life. Some facets of the terminology used by Giddens closely
resemble some of these these distinctions. He writes:
In analyzing social relations we have to acknowledge both a syntagmatic di-
mension, the patterning of social relations in time-space involving the repro-
duction of situated practices, and a paradigmatic dimension, involving a vir-
tual order of ‘modes of structuring’ recursively implicated in such reproduc-
tion (Giddens, 1986:17).
The distinction between “syntagmatic” and “paradigmatic” could be com-
pared with the distinction between a principle and its concretization (positivi-
zation). Look at the similarity between this distinction and Giddens's differen-
tiation between “structural principles” and “institutions”:
The most deeply embedded structural properties, implicated in the reproduc-
tion of societal totalities, I call structural principles. Those practices which
have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be referred to
as institutions (Giddens, 1986:17).
From his elucidation of these distinctions elsewhere, it is clear that he does
want to convey an idea of “structural principles” that are positive in the nor-
mative sense of opening up different possibilities. He rejects the identification
of structure with constraint, “structure is both enabling and constraining”
(Giddens, 1982:37). Moreover, he believes that there is a direct connection
between what he has to say about structuration and the “moral frameworks of
human existence” (Giddens, 1982:26) – an acknowledgement that brings him
close to our idea of the normative conditions/principles underlying human
existence.
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12.3 Inevitable presuppositions

Although it is quite normal that methodological considerations would not pay
attention to the fact that scientific knowledge merely deepens and discloses
our non-scientific experience of reality in its diversity, this does not detract
anything from the fact that prior to developing a method serving the investiga-
tion of reality from the vantage point of any specific aspect, every special sci-
entist must already have a non-scientific insight into the nature of her field of
inquiry. The designed method could never provide or substitute this presup-
posed knowledge. The unique nature of whatever is investigated determines
every method aimed at acquiring knowledge about it.
In general one can point at epistemological and ontological pre-supposi-
tions operative in current debates. According to Alexander the “problem is
that most of these contemporary debates ignore the most general nonempirical
level of all. I will call this the level of presuppositions. ... By presuppositions, I
refer to the most general assumptions that every sociologist makes – what he
‘presupposes’ – when he encounters reality” (Alexander, 1987:10). Johnson
et.al. relate this to the following questions (see Strauss, 2006:18 ff.):
(i) “what is the nature of social reality?” and:
(ii) “how can we best obtain knowledge of it?”
In order to treat these basic issues the following pairs of opposites are dealt
with:
(i) “material or ideal?” (Johnson et.al., 1984:13-15) and
(ii) “nominal or real?” (Johnson et.al., 1984:15-18).
Answers to these questions may, according to Johnson et.al., produce the po-
sitions respectively defended by materialism, idealism, nominalism and real-
ism [MINR]. When these options are combined in pairs Johnson et.al. suggest
that the following alternatives arise: empiricism (combine nominalism and
materialism: example – Parsons), substantialism (combine realism and mate-
rialism: examples – Husserl, Weber and Schutz), subjectivism (combine
nominalism en idealism – example Marxism) and rationalism (combine real-
ism en idealism – example Durkheim) (Johnson et.al., 1984:19).
These stances have their own implied criteria of validity: experience, prac-
tice, convention and logic (consistency) (Johnson et.al., 1984:185-187).
Although these combinations indeed appear to pertain to an understanding
of social reality, they display striking shortcomings. Given the prominent role
played by the previosly mentioned opposing extremes of atomism (individu-
alism) and holism (universalism), one should expect that the basic MINR clas-
sification would be able to accomplish this, but unfortunately it is not the case.
Asking whether or not social reality should be understood in terms of individ-
uals in interaction or rather in terms of societal totalities encompassing par-
ticipating individuals as integral parts, is not answered by taking recourse to
the MINR-scheme. It is possible to be either an individualistic materialist or a
universalistic materialist, and equally to be either an individualistic material-
ist or a universalistic idealist.
203
Consider a (partially) “idealist” thinker, such as John Locke, as well as the

intellectual giant of the 18th century, Immanuel Kant, and you have two exam-
ples of atomistic idealists.1 Yet, Thomas Hobbes is just as “atomistic” in his
thought, but in terms of the classification of Johnson et.al. Hobbes is a “mate-
rialist,” since he attempts to capture all of reality under the denominator of a
moving body. Similarly, there are idealistic thinkers who are in the grip of a
holistic approach, such as Hegel and his followers who proceed from a su-
pra-individual communal spirit which totally and fully encompasses the indi-
viduals absorbed within this societal whole.
If the distinction between material and ideal does not provide us with a suf-
ficient understanding, then we have to investigate an alternative view. A more
encompassing option is to contemplate the problem of unity and diversity. A
non-reductionist ontology will be inclined to affirm the uniqueness and irre-
ducibility of diverse aspects of reality as well as the uniqueness of the various
societal entities, whereas all monistic isms, such as physicalism, organicism,
psychologism, historicism, and so on, will deny this irreducibility. Within the
domain of theorizing about human society the first and most basic issue there-
fore concerns the quest for a basic denominator, a principle of comparison.
Viewed from the perspective of this issue the question regarding the nature
of (social) reality present in the opposition of atomism and holism therefore
addresses the quest for a basic denominator. Inevitably the choice of such a
basic denominator (explanatory device employed in the comparison and ex-
planation of whatever there is) always entails an account of the mutual coher-
ence and diversity within reality – amply captured in the statement that it con-
cerns an account of the “coherence of irreducibles” (see pages 54 and 91
above). Distinguishing the material and ideal is just one particular (rather un-
refined) response to this basic question.
However, once again the issue is further complicated as soon as we realize
that the distinction between nominalism and realism is concerned with a re-
lated but different problem, namely that of the relationship between univer-
sality and individuality (uniqueness – see pages 88 and 146 above). Yet, in or-
der to understand this issue one in addition needs a more extensive definition
of two equally well-known isms, namely rationalism and irrationalism (see
page 81).
Since Aristotle rationalism accepts universality as the only source of valid
knowledge. Irrationalism, by contrast, considers knowledge of what is unique
and individual as the only true knowledge of reality. The classical legacy in
the West regarding concept-formation holds that conceiving takes place on
the basis of universal features.2 One can therefore say that rationalism abso-
1 Both of them wanted to construe human society from its simplest elements, the individuals
(aided by the social contract theory of modernity).
2 Closely related to this heritage a concept is seen as combining a multiplicity of (universal)
features/properties into a logical unity (see page 81 above and Strauss, 2009:174-182, 194,
151, 174, 255).
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Chapter 12
lutizes conceptual knowledge or that it identifies knowledge with conceptual

knowledge. Although it is indeed correct to say that concepts are “blind” to
what is unique and individual, this identification of knowledge with concep-
tual knowledge is incorrect. We certainly know the unique individuality of en-
tities and events, and we know our own uniqueness and unique experiences,
but the full scope of knowledge simply transcends the limits of concept
formation.
However, it is exactly this concept-transcending side of knowledge, di-
rected at what is unique and contingent, which is (one-sidedly) appreciated by
irrationalism – at the cost of conceptual knowledge. Kant designated this kind
of knowledge by using the term “Grenzbegriff,” limiting concept. It concerns
knowledge transcending the limits of concept formation (sometimes, in this
technical sense, also designated as an idea). Although we cannot concept-
ualize what is unique and individual, we do know it in a concept-transcending
manner (i.e., by means of idea-knowledge).
When Johnson et.al. relates rationalism to the “desire to contemplate the
harmonies and universalities of Reason” (Johnson et.al., 1984:189) they in-
deed touch upon the crucial element of this ism as we have described it. None-
theless they often confuse universality with totality (i.e., rationalism with ho-
lism). In order to substantiate their claim that Durkheim ought to be seen as a
rationalist, they mention his holistic statement that society as a whole is more
than the sum of its parts (Johnson et.al. 1984:154). Similarly, it is not proper
to juxtapose nominalism and rationalism as it is done by Johnson et.al. Al-
though the nominalist does acknowledge universality (concepts and/or
words) within the human mind – the decisive feature of rationalism – it also
claims that whatever exists outside the human mind is particular and contin-
gent. Thus at once, in this regard, it adheres to the position of irrationalism. It
is clear, therefore, that nominalism has both a rationalistic and an irratio-
nalistic side, which means, in terms of the classification of Johnson et. al., that
it encompasses both their categories of subjectivism and of rationalism. It is
incorrect to identify nominalism with individualism (atomism) although in
most cases nominalist convictions are presented within an individualist
framework.1 because Theodor Litt, in his work Individuum und Gemeinschaft
(1919), advances a nominalistic stance which is holistic.
It is typical of nominalism to claim that the state, the firm, the church, and
other societal totalities are mere concepts or names (nomina) through which
our understanding, in a substituting manner, refers to that which only truly ex-
1 Giddens (1986:213) quotes a similar statement made by Weber not long before his death: “if I
have become a sociologist … it is mainly in order to exorcise the spectre of collective concep-
tions which still lingers among us. In other words, sociology itself can only proceed from the
actions of one or more separate individuals and must therefore adopt strictly individualistic
methods” (quoted in an article written by W. Mommsen: Max Weber’s political sociology
and his philosophy of world history, International Social Science Journal, Vol.17, 1965, p.25
– cf. Giddens, 1986:225, note 14).
205
ists in reality, namely individuals.1 In his discussion of the basic theses of

methodological individualism Giddens mentions the “assertion that only indi-
viduals are real” (Giddens 1986:214).2 In connection with the views of the
Marxist Althusser, Giddens explicitly depicts the connection between nomi-
nalism and methodological individualism: “For Althusser believes that ‘struc-
ture’ exist only within theoretical domains, not in reality itself; hence this
stance resembles the nominalism of methodological individualists” (Giddens,
1986:218). Yet, when he attributes a “curious mixture of nominalism and ra-
tionalism” in Lévi-Strauss's understanding of structure it is clear that he does
not realize that nominalism has a rationalistic side (cf. Giddens, 1983:63).
Popper also adheres to the perspective of methodological individualism,

which according to him “rightly insists that the “behavior” and “actions” of
collectives, such as states or social groups, must be reduced to the behaviour
and to the action of human individuals” (Popper, 1966-II:91). 3
At this stage our conjecture is that all forms of atomism (individualism) are
ultimately attached to an employment of the meaning of the one and the many,
of a discrete multiplicity in the quantitative sense of the term (or at least ana-
logical usages of this quantitative meaning within the context of other modes
of explanation). All variants of holism (universalism), by contrast, in the final
analysis proceed from the employment of the concept of a whole (totality)
with its parts – the whole-parts relation (or analogies of it) serves as the guid-
ing star, dictating that the social relations among human beings must be cap-
tured by this mould. After general systems theory permeated social theory
since the thirties of the 20th century, we find the distinction between system
and subsystems as the equivalent of the whole-parts relation, for example in
structural functionalism.
The recurring theme, which arguably manifests one of the core issues of re-
flection on human society, concerns the complexity of the ways in which hu-
man beings are involved in societal interaction.
1 We noted that nominalism accepts universality merely within the human mind. In his Princi-
ples of Philosophy Descartes says that “number and all universals are only modes of thought”
(Part I, LVIII – see page 167 above). Outside the human mind nothing but pure individuality
is found. What is not realized, however, is that this, in an internally antinomic way, leaves
nominalism with at least one universal outside the human mind, namely the property of “be-
ing individual”!
2 He proceeds on the same page: “Thus it seems to be held by some writers that any concepts
which refer to properties of collectivities or social systems (one might again instance “struc-
tural parameters”) are abstract models, costructions of the theorist, in some way that the no-
tion of the ‘individual’ is not.”
3 In a brief excursus on methodological individualism Giddens refers to a similar statement
made by Popper on page 98 of The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.II (cf. Giddens,
1983:94-95 and note 84 on page 272).
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Chapter 12
12.4 Social action (personal freedom) versus social order

(collective structures)
Does the “existence” of societal collectivities entail that there is not any room
left for the personal freedom of social actors? Do we have to accept the con-
trast between “action” and “order” as a strict either/or? What about the numer-
ous less fixed and less durable relationships occurring when people interact
on an equal footing – be it in cooperation or in competition – with each other
or opposed to each other?1 Is our understanding of social collectivities (totali-
ties) merely an extrapolation of “individuals in interaction” which is nothing
but (an unreal) mental construct (the stance of nominalism, as we have seen)?
Prominent contemporary sociological theorists indeed look at these prob-
lems from the angle of the opposition between action and order. It turns out,
however, that anyone proceeding from the concept of action may not be able
to provide a meaningful account of the concept of social order. Even when
behavioral patterns are related to values and symbols, and when roles and role
expectations are introduced in order to account for social relationships and the
nature of social interaction, it may still turn out that sociological thinking falls
prey to a reduction of social forms of life to the actions of individual human
beings.
Apparently because Bierstedt understood these shortcomings in action the-
ories, he explicitly declares that he does not want to proceed from the concept
of action – an approach present in the thought of both his former teachers,
Talcot Parsons and Florian Znanieki:
I would contend that no one who begins with action ... can easily arrive at a no-
tion of the social order (Bierstedt, 1970:ix).
12.5 Sociological individualism versus sociological universalism
Whenever sociologists exclusively put the individual in the center of their
analysis of societal interaction, we meet core elements of what we have sug-
gested to be designated as an atomistic or individualistic theoretical design.
Since Democritus introduced his philosophy of nature, the term atomism
was either used in a rather restricted sense or in a broader ontological sense. In
the former sense it indicated the attempt to explain the material world in terms
of last indivisible elements (“atoms”). In the latter (broader ontological) sense
it was employed to point at ways of understanding reality from its supposed
last units. Since 1825 Saint-Simon and his followers (amongst them Auguste
Comte) employed the term individualism in order to capture the social philos-
ophy of the 18th century as a whole – the view in which society was broken
apart into isolated individuals.
The theoretical acknowledgement of a social unity and multiplicity does
seem to constitute an indispensable basic concept of sociology. All variants of
individualism, however, seem to over-emphasize this awareness which is, as
we have suggested above, ultimately connected to the numerical nature of the
1 These kinds of interaction are often purely incidental.
207
one and the many (cf. Homans, 1964; Friederichs, 1970; and Opp, 1979).
Such an atomism consistently attempts to explain all social phenomena in
terms of the interaction of a multiplicity of individuals. As a consequence,
consistent individualistic thinkers refuse to speak positively about social
totalities.
In his conflict sociology, considered by Alexander (1987:128) to be “the
prototypical model of conflict theory,” John Rex believes that society is really
composed out of independently acting individuals (cf. Rex, 1961:93 and Al-
exander, 1987:145). To Alexander it seems obvious “that the first thing a stu-
dent of social life presupposes is the nature of action” (Alexander, 1987:10).
The implicit supposition of this “assumption” is that it concerns individual ac-
tion. Strangely enough Alexander juxtaposes “action” and “order” in such a
way that the following question apparently does not fit in this scheme quite
well: can we speak about collective action? Consider his statement:
Yet to answer the central question about action is not enough. A second major
issue needs to be presupposed. I will call this the “problem of order.” Sociolo-
gists are sociologists because they belief there are patterns to society, that
there are structures separate from the individuals who compose it (Alexander,
1987:10-11).
Directly opposed to this notion of structures as being separate from the com-
posing individuals, Anthony Giddens would stress their mutuality. Layder ex-
plains it as follows:
Giddens' work represents the view that agency and structure are mutually con-
stituted – that they cannot be understood as separate entities in any sense
(Layder, 1994:210).
This explains an initial question asked by Giddens:
In what manner can it be said that the conduct of individual actors reproduces
the structural properties of larger collectivities? (Giddens, 1986:24).
His answer to this question unfolds on two levels: a logical and a substantial
one (Giddens, 1986:24). In his continued opposition of “actors” and “collec-
tivities” his conception clearly is very close to that element of Alexander's
thinking in connection with which we have asked whether it is really possible
to speak about collective action. Neofunctionalism, nonetheless, without any
hesitation does speak about “groups as collective actors.” 1
Surely if action is individual and if collectivities are constituted as supra-
individual patterns or totalities, then, strictly seen, the notion of collective ac-
tion is precluded. Giddens explicitly addresses this issue when he poses the
question: “are collectivities actors?” (Giddens, 1986:220). Although he con-
cedes that descriptions of actions and accounts of interactions cannot be given
“purely in terms of individual predicates,” he emphatically holds that “only
individuals, beings which have a corporeal existence, are agents” (Giddens,
1986:220). Giddens says that a statement like “the government decided to
1 Just compare the commentary of Münch, 1985:226-229.
208
Chapter 12
pursue policy X” is a “shorthand description of decisions taken by individuals

(I am emphasizing – DFMS)” (Giddens, 1986:221).
Layder accentuates the fact that “sociological thought have understood in-
dividuals and society to be intertwined and inextricably fused” (Layder,
1994:207). Yet, he vehemently denies that social theory may be trapped in a
false opposition:
The idea that some authors or schools of social theory are entrapped in a false
notion of an individual-society split is therefore quite misleading. The impor-
tant question is not whether some sociologists posit a solitary individual cut
off from society. ... The question is, which of the accounts most adequately ex-
presses the fundamental connectedness of the individual and society? One of
the most persistent problems that has arisen from this basic issue has been how
to understand the social connectedness of individuals. In what ways are they
intertwined with the social processes of which they form a part? (Layder,
1994:208).
Yet, even in this case the subtle atomistic assumption continues to surface: in-
dividuals are individuals, though not thought of in isolation, since they are as-
sumed to be connected (fused) with something different – namely society. So-
ciological individualism, by departing from a reductionist understanding of
being individual, implicitly denies the ontic status of the constitutive social
function of being a human individual – a function which is only accounted for
in the second place.
In opposition both to mechanistic monism and vitalistic dualism as biologi-
cal theories, the term holism was introduced by J.C. Smuts in 1926. In this nar-
row sense it aimed at a dialectical synthesis which can do justice to the sup-
posedly highest concrete totality (an idea coming from the other prominent
holist thinker of the 20th century, Adolf Meyer: Ganzheit – cf. Meyer, 1964
and 1965). An expanded connotation is given to holism when it is used in the
sense of (sociological) universalism, an approach which, in opposition to (so-
ciological) individualism, wants to account for the meaningful coherence and
mutuality within societal institutions, i.e. for wholeness or totality as an essen-
tial trait of social collectivities. Understanding society in a universalistic fash-
ion goes back to the Romantic Movement at the beginning of the 19th century.
The modern idea of human autonomy combines two elements: autos and
nomos (the subject or self and the law). The transition from the 18th century to
the 19th century was mediated by early Romanticism and it revealed the ambi-
guity between autos and nomos in a striking way. The Enlightenment was
both atomistic (individualistic) and rationalistic. Early Romanticism switched
to an emphasis on the self (autos) entailing that law loses its universal scope
and merely reflects the unique individuality of a specific autonomous person.
Reiss explains that actions are solely moral when they conform to the particu-
lar personality of an individual person. “For the German Romantics universal
laws, valid for all humans at all times, did not hold (Reiss, 1966:10). Initially
this irrationalism continued to be atomistic. It was only after the anarchistic
consequences of the individualistic irrationalism was contemplated that
209
post-Kantian freedom idealism (Schelling, Hegel and Fichte) attempted to

bind all individuals by absorbing them within a larger, encompassing societal
whole. This move from atomism to holism did not change the irrationalistic
orientation, for according to this new irrationalistic holism each supra-indi-
vidual “folk” community, with its own national spirit (Volksgeist), remains
strictly its own law – in a typical irrationalist fashion. According to the irratio-
nalistic conception of Romanticism every people contains within itself its own
model (original example). In his Fragments on German Literature Herder
writes: “The peoples of Germany who did not corrupt their noble character
through mixing with other peoples are unique, true and original nations which
are their own original images” (Kluckhohn, 1934:21). This new emphasis ac-
complished the additional switch from atomism to holism – as it was antici-
pated by Rousseau in his view of the general will: “Every one of us places col-
lectively his/her person and all his/her power under the final guidance of the
general will (volonté générale), and we receive each member as an insepara-
ble part of the whole” (Rousseau, 1975:244).
By the end of the 19th century the German sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies,
wrote an influential book with the title: Gemeinscahft und Gesellscahft
(1887). These two terms were employed in the spirit of universalism (Ge-
meinschaft) and individualism (Gesellschaft). Subsequently Franz Oppen-
heimer (1922 and 1926) as well as the philosopher, sociologist and economist,
Othmar Spann (1930 and 1934), continued the universalist legacy into the 20th
century. During the second half of the 20th century the universalist trend in so-
ciology was carried on in the thought of Parsons, Alexander, Münch and
others.
However, at this point it should be realized that the continued clash be-
tween individualistic and universalistic theories of society cannot be ex-
plained apart from an account of the elementary basic concepts of the disci-
pline of sociology.
12.6 The need for an analysis of analogical basic concepts
If individualism explores our basic awareness of the one and the many, then it
is important to analyze the interconnections between the social and numerical
aspects. Such an undertaking must account for the (analogical) basic concept
of a social order, of a unity in a multiplicity of social norms, which is corre-
lated with a multiplicity of factual social relationships. But the numerical
properties of a multiplicity (such as a sequence of numbers) cannot account
for the nature of wholeness or of a totality.1 Since the whole-parts relation and
the nature of a totality has a spatial connotation, which cannot be reduced to a
mere numerical multiplicity, the only way in which the idea of wholeness or a
totality can feature within the numerical aspect is by “borrowing” it from
1 We noted in Chapter 3 that the whole-parts relation is original in the spatial aspect – see page
above 42. Weyl points out that within the context of only accepting the successive infinite
(potential infinite – as an open field of possibilities) – there cannot be found any motif urging
us to exceed the successive infinite (Weyl, 1931:17-18).
210
Chapter 12
space. It is seen in the familiar way in which mathematicians and non-mathe-

maticians speak of whole numbers (integers). On a more advanced level we
merely have to point at Cantor's characterization of a set, as being constituted
by a multiplicity of properly distinct elements bound together into a whole
(Ganzheit) (see Cantor, 1962:282 and page 63 above). In Chapter 3 we men-
tioned that Gödel even spoke of sets as “quasi-spatial” – to which Wang added
the remark that he is not sure if Gödel would say the “same thing of numbers”
(Wang, 1988:202).
The next step would be to analyse those analogical basic concepts reflect-
ing the intermodal conherence between the social aspect and the spatial as-
pect, focused on elementary concepts such as social sphere, social super- and
subordination, social stratification, social coordination (next-to-each-other)
and the social whole-parts relation.
We noted that performing this task for the discipline of sociology was not
suggested by Dooyeweerd because he departed from acknowledging that the
social aspect of reality does make possible a legitimate special science in this
regard, namely the special science of sociology. However, an extensive analy-
sis of the elementary, coumpound and typical concepts of sociology is found
in Strauss, 2006. In this context we shall restrict ourselves to the employment
of those basic concepts that are necessary for an understanding of Dooye-
weerd's philosophy of society, for an account of the different ways of social
interactiond present within a differentiated society and for a new view of the
relationship between individual and society.
Since a prominent mathematician such as Paul Bernays objected to the
arithmetization of continuity by acknowledging its totality character (see page
43 above), we have to note once more that the following terms are all synony-
mous: coherence, totality and wholeness. Continuous extension, which char-
acterizes the uniqueness (and irreducibility) of space, entails that what is con-
tinuous in a spatial sense is connected, coheres in all its parts which are consti-
tutive for it as a whole, in its entirety, as a totality.1
Consequently, whereas (sociological) individualism ultimately elevates
our awareness of a discrete multiplicity to serve as explanatory principle for
an understanding of human society, (sociological) universalism (holism) pro-
motes the spatial whole-parts relation to the same level.2 Notions of a multi-
plicity of individuals in social interaction (individualism) merely analogically
reflect the meaning of number while conceptions of encompassing societal
wholes (totalities) similarly analogically reflect the primary meaning of spa-
1 Bernays also remarks: “It is in any case doubtful whether a complete arithmetization of the
idea of the continuum could be justified. The idea of the continuum is any way originally a
geometrical idea” (Bernays, 1976:188).
2 Note that the following terms are all synonymous: coherence, totality, wholeness. Continu-
ous extension, which characterizes the uniqueness (and irreducibility) of space, entails that
what is continuous in a spatial sense is connected, coheres in all its parts which are constitu-
tive for it as a whole, in its entirety, as a totality.
211
tial relationships (universalism). Sociological functionalism, in turn, explored

the whole-parts relation by introducing the (functionalistic) terms system and
subsystems – exemplified in the thought of Parsons, Merton and Alexander.
12.7 “General assumptions”?
In its strict sense the word “general” refers to what is considered to be univer-
sal. However, within contemporary postmodern trends the positive employ-
ment of the term universality is questioned. The “incredulity” towards “grand
metanarratives” (Lyotard) apparently also entails a threat to any defence of
universality. This negative assessment of universality is closely connected
with what became known – since the sixties of the previous century – as the
“linguistic turn.” Autonomous (universalising) reason, progress and science
in its broadest sense are features of modernity challenged by the postmodern
spirit. Appleby et al remark that the (communal) structure of language re-
places the logical and emotional understanding of being human:
Human consciousness, either logical and reasoned or intuitive and emotional,
is no longer the point of contention. Through a renewed focus upon linguistic
structure, language, rather than the powers of the human being, is seen as the
focal point of the human world (Appleby, 1996:388).
Unfortunately the implied “choice” between the lingual and the logical does
not constitute a strict either-or. Any utterance displays both a logical-analyti-
cal and a lingual side – and therefore may be assessed from the perspective of
both of these modes of explanation. Viewed from its logical-analytical side an
utterance appears as a statement – and viewed from its lingual side it appears
as a sentence.1 What is distinctive about a statement is that it admits an assess-
ment of its truth or falsity. Affirming the truth of a statement is equivalent to
denying its negation (or: contradictory) – presupposing the correlated logical
principles of identity and non-contradiction.2 The distinction between truth
and falsity is meaningless if these (and other) logical principles do not hold
universally. This remark does not intend to elevate any specific theoretical ac-
count of universality itself to be universally valid per se, but it also does not
justify avoiding an account of universality altogether either.
Postmodernism finds itself in the self-contradictory position that its denial
of universality is based upon the assumption of universality. Rejecting all
“metanarratives” and every universal way of addressing issues simply use
universality in order to deny it. The “enemy” is not universality as such, but
the rationalistic prejudice that conceptual thinking furnishes us with abstract,
1 While the logical contents of a concept or a statement remain the same, it may acquire a lin-
gual expression that differs from language to language – demonstrating the foundational po-
sition of the logical-analytical mode with respect to the lingual aspect.
2 When Quine explains that the “peculiarity of statements which sets them apart from other lin-
guistic forms is that they admit of truth and falsity” (1950:1) his implicit assumption is still
that statements are “linguistic forms.” Our contention is that an utterance functions at once in
two different modes and that the logical-analytical mode cannot be subsumed under the lin-
gual mode.
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a-historical insights not in need of or subject to changing interpretations. The

suggested distinction between the logical-analytical and the lingual functions
of an utterance ultimately makes an appeal to certain conditions determining
and delimiting human existence, namely logicality and linguisticality. We
have just now also mentioned historicity as another condition for human exis-
tence. As soon as an attempt is made to promote or elevate one such a condi-
tion to become the only and the all-encompassing one, the inevitable outcome
will be a fundamental distortion (and even denial) of other equally important
conditioning moments.
Remark about the “social construction” of reality
Since the 15th century modern nominalism inspired the idea that “reality”
ought to be “constructed”. Initially, exemplified in the extreme position of
Kant, this ideal of “construction” triumphed in elevating human understanding
to the level of the (universal) formal law-giver of nature (cf. Kant, 1783, § 36
and page 88 above). However, since the 19th century this extreme rationalism
was – through the emergence of historicism and the “linguistic turn” – gradu-
ally replaced by the domination of the irrationalistic side of nominalism, thus
manifesting an original nominalistic conviction: God created nature, but
“man” constructed the “human world”. Owing to his thorough study of Kant
during the first decade of the 20th century Edmund Husserl launched his phe-
nomenological program in the spirit of the original rationalistic side of nomi-
nalism by embarking on the idea of a “constituting intentionality” which con-
verted the world into a mere correlate of the intentional consciousness. Within
the development of 20th century sociological theory this stance inspired the
idea of the social construction of reality (see Schütz, & Luckmann, 1973, and
Schütz, 1932 and 1967).
Our argumentation thus far highlighted the opposition of individualism and
universalism and focused on the numerical and spatial analogies within the
social aspect to explain the one-sidedness entailed in both these ismic orienta-
tions. What is here decisive is an acknowledgement of the ontic status of the
social aspect and in particular its modal universality. This idea of modal uni-
versality underscores the perceptive that the various aspects of reality provide
a constant (transcendental) “framework” within which concrete (natural and
social) entities function. The diverse functions of entities within these univer-
sal modes (modal aspects) are known to us as their (modal) properties.1 These
properties are made possible by the underlying and conditioning role of the
modal aspects of reality, by their ontic universality.
Without using the phrase modal universality, Peter Berger indeed explores
something of its crucial role when he accounts for the delineation of the field
of study of the discipline of sociology:
The sociologist finds his subject matter present in all human activities, but not
all aspects of those activities constitute this subject matter. Social interaction
1 Simple everyday questions highlight such properties. The question: how many? brings to
light quantitative properties; the question: how large? makes explicit particular spatial prop-
erties; and so on.
213
is not some specialized sector of what men do with each other. It is rather a
certain aspect of all these doings (italics are mine – DFMS). Another way of
putting this is by saying that the sociologist carries a special sort of abstraction
(Berger, 1982:39-40).1
The social aspect of reality thus evinces its own modal universality. As a “cer-
tain aspect” of “human activities” it has a universal scope which is not limited
to any type of social interaction in particular. That is to say, the modal (func-
tional) meaning of the social facet of reality holds universally for whatever
there is (in an entitary sense – including all different kinds of events). Al-
though material things, plants and animals are not agents (with an account-
able freedom like human beings), they may acquire an object-function within
the social aspect. Such an object-function is always correlated with the activi-
ties of social subjects (individual human beings or, as we shall argue below,
societal collectivities according to their social subject-function).
We have seen that whereas modal laws hold universally for whatever there
is, laws for typically different kinds of entities have a limited scope only. The
laws for different kinds of entities are solely relevant for a particular type of
entities and are therefore preferably designated as type laws. The law for be-
ing an atom or for being human only applies to atoms and human beings re-
spectively – but they do not apply to any other kind of entity.2 In order to dis-
cover the nature of typical laws, empirical investigation is needed.
Since typical laws can only be discovered by means of empirical investiga-
tion we have to grant the empiricist tradition the legitimacy of this insight. The
weak point of the empiricist tradition, however, is that it denies the inevitabil-
ity of employing modal concepts in order to articulate what empirical investi-
gation could teach us about typical regularities and laws. It is exactly this in-
evitability of employing modal concepts that constitutes the “empirically
non-falsifiable” structural core of a basic theory. The specific articulation and
configuration in which modal terms are “positioned” within the overall
framework of a foundational theoretical perspective turn out to constitute the
decisive “frame of reference” of that particular theoretical position.
Since modal terms – with their implied modal universality – obtain a crucial
and determining position within this core-element of a theoretical paradigm,
its centrality can be highlighted by designating it as the modal skeleton of any
theoretical approach. An example of what is meant by this modal skeleton is
found in the thought of Parsons. His four function paradigm combined key
terms and perspectives stemming from the spatial, the kinematical, the physi-
cal and the biotical modes. Subsequently this modal skeleton is then used by
1 One can argue that lifting out a certain aspect as point of entry delimiting the angle of ap-
proach of a particular discipline – while disregarding other aspects as modes of explanation –
indeed constitutes the distinctive feature of scholarly activities, designated as modal abstrac-
tion (see Strauss, 2001:11-15).
2 A type-law evinces a specified universality. The law for the type of entity known as an atom
holds universally – in the sense that it applies to all atoms. But at the same time it is specified
(i.e., restricted to atoms only) – not everything is an atom.
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Chapter 12
him as his overall ontological design in terms of which an account is given for
everything.1
The abstract construction of a “state of nature” in modern theories of natu-

ral law and in social contract theory (Thomasius, Pufendorf, Wolff, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau and Kant – revived by Rawls) begins with an “abstract indi-
vidual” which only in the second place has a “social function.” Nonetheless
every modal function – in a primary and fundamental sense – inherently
co-conditions the existence of human beings. During the last three centuries
modern philosophy successively stressed the conditions of logicality (En-
lightenment), historicity (the 19th century) and linguisticality (since the transi-
tion between the 19th and 20th centuries). The history of one-sided accen-
tuations at least in one respect ought to be appreciated positively: every one of
them indeed did see something within reality that is worthwhile and truly “out
there” – something every theoretical view has to account for, albeit without
falling prey to the distortions present in specific one-sided accounts of those
ontic “givens”.
If human beings inherently function in the social aspect (amongst others),

i.e., if the social aspect co-conditions being human, then one should not hesi-
tate to analyze the intermodal meaning-coherence in which the social aspect is
fitted within reality. Within social theory this coherence first of all manifests
itself in the inevitability of employing certain elementary (analogical) con-
cepts. In the approach of Parsons three of these analogical structural moments
received special attention, namely the numerical, spatial and the biotic analo-
gies. The first two were superficially explored merely in service of a charac-
terization of atomism (individualism) and holism (universalism), while the
analysis of the third (the biotical analogy) penetrated a bit deeper into the orig-
inal meaning of biotical phenomena – such as biotical growth, differentiation
and integration – in order to bring to light what we have designated above as
the four function modal skeleton lying at the basis of Parsons’ entire
sociological theorizing.
No single “observable social fact” can be described without explicitly or

implicitly alluding to the (previosly mentioned elementary basic) concept of a
social order (social unity and multiplicity). Social functioning “by definition”
engages more than one (i.e., a multiplicity of) human being(s). Furthermore,
being human in a societal context transcends the one-dimensional specializa-
tion found in animal life. Hart states it with concise clarity:
1 He distinguishes between the behavioral system (in reaction to the contributions made by
Victor and Charles Lidz, Parsons finally decided to use the expression ‘behavioral system’ in
stead of ‘behavioral organism’ – cf. Parsons, 1977:106), the personality system, the cultural
system and the social system. He analyzes the social system in terms of subsystems, namely
society dealing with the functional problem of pattern-maintenance (latency) and integration,
while the polity and the economy are respectively geared towards collective goal-attainment
and collective adaptation – cf. Parsons, 1961:30, 34).
215
A worker ant is just that – and all its functions are geared to being a worker ant.
A human being, on the other hand, has multiple roles to play and is not ex-
hausted in any of them (Hart, 1984:146).
As soon as the sociologist sets out to analyze and understand the “multiple
roles” human beings may play within society, they encounter the reality of so-
cial unity and multiplicity in a twofold way.
(i) First of all, they see the different roles human beings fulfill within soci-
ety.
(ii) Secondly, they realize that each one of these differentiated roles is inte-
grated by a differently specified social unity – depending upon the
unique and distinct nature of the societal collectivity in which it occurs.
The role of a citizen within a modern state is co-determined by the public legal
order prevalent in that state – a legal order integrating the multiplicity of soci-
etal legal interests manifest in the different social roles of its citizens. Every
societal institution requires for its durable identity such a “social unity within
a multiplicity.” At this point we meet a further complication. The second way
in which the sociologist has to recognize the meaning of social unity and mul-
tiplicity involves other (though) related expressions, such as social differenti-
ation and social integration. Clearly, although we are involved in analysing
the meaning of the quantitative (arithmetical) analogy within the structure of
the social aspect, we at once have used the biotical (analogical) terms differ-
entiation and integration. Does this imply that the analysis of any particular
analogical basic concept can only be performed when other analogical terms
are brought into play as well? Let us look at an example in order to find an
answer to this question.
Suppose we want to explicate in more detail what is entailed in the concept
social order and then produce an explanation such as the following one:
The nature of a social order requires that there are competent organs (office
bearers) that effectuate and continue the unity in the multiplicity of social rela-
tions within a specific social sphere by binding together the positive social
norms regulating human action within that particular social collectivity.
This description uses terms not merely reflecting the coherence between the
social aspect and the numerical aspect of reality. The terms competency and
office concern power over persons and may therefore be related to the cul-
tural-historical aspect in which power formation (encompassing both cultural
objects and fellow human beings – cultural subjects) finds its original modal
meaning. The term effectuate derives its modal meaning from the physical as-
pect of energy operation with its accompanying causes and effects. The term
“continue” brings to light the core meaning of the kinematical aspect, ex-
pressed in the awareness of a uniform (continuing) motion. Finally the
phrases social sphere and social collectivity (totality) are used – echoing the
original meaning of spatial extension.
If these phrases merely expressed metaphors they could have been replaced
by other (different) ones – but as basic analogical concepts they are irreplace-
216
Chapter 12
able. At most one can provide synonyms for them, still expressing the mean-
ing of the same modal analogy.
It therefore turns out to be the case that the analysis of a particular elemen-
tary basic concept is only possible in a complex manner – making use of other
analogical basic concepts (in this case not yet analyzed). In addition these
intermodal connections partake in the same general feature of all modal as-
pects – modal universality (lying at the basis of a theoretical description of
empirical reality but not derivable from “sense experience”).
Johan Mouton mentions the striking dilemma present in an emphasis on
empirical data with reference to the thought of Emile Durkheim. On the one
hand Durkheim accentuates the “objective” and “factual” nature of social
phenomena studied by him, and on the other hand he uses specific “theoretical
terms” which do not possess any direct empirical equivalent:
The contribution Emile Durkheim made to the development of the positivistic
tradition is foremost of a twofold character: on the one hand his emphasis on
the objective and factual nature of social phenomena, and, on the other hand,
his attempts to explore the positivistic image of science in his research. The
same tension between his holistic interpretation of social facts and the require-
ments of an empirical sociology clearly comes to the fore, amongst other
things, in his use of the concept of social integration – a term which does not
refer to any directly observable entity or phenomenon (Mouton, 1987:11). 1
In respect of the relationship between “individual” and “society” particularly
those sociologists inclined to pursue an atomistic (individualistic) stance find
it unacceptable to acknowledge certain spatial analogies within the structure
of the social aspect. We have seen that sociological atomism questions any
reference to or an acknowledgement of social wholes or social totalities.
What is at stake in this context is the unbreakable connection between the so-
cial aspect and the spatial aspect.
Let us now briefly investigate the ideas of contemporary scholars on humn
society.
12.8 An appraisal of some contemporary theoretical approaches
to an understanding of human society 2
The systematic distinctions offered by the philosophy of Dooyeweerd enables
a penetrating assessment of the position of prominent contemporary social
thinkers, such as Giddens, Sztompka and Habermas. These thinkers are pretty
explicit about what the basic issues of social theorizing are. Giddens, for ex-
ample, in an interview stated that his theory of structuration is an attempt to re-
solve problem of individual and society (Giddens, 1998:75). He does not want
1 In his research on the occurrence of suicide Durkheim found that it happens more frequently
in protestant areas than in catholic parts of society – due to a lesser measure of ‘social cohe-
siveness’ in the former. The expression ‘social cohesion’ analogically reflects the meaning of
the spatial aspect where the terms continuity and coherence/cohesion have their original
(non-analogical) seat.
2 Cp. Strauss, 2007 and Strauss, 2009 – Chapter eight.]
217
to start either with the “individual” or with “society” because he discerns a dy-
namic flow of manifested in “recurrent social practices.”1
12.8.1 A dynamic social field theory
Sztompka advanced a similar stance in the name of a dynamic social field the-
ory, keeping in mind that he wants to surpass the limitations of the systems
model (Sztompka, 1993:9 ff.). His aim is to develop a sociology of social
change superseding the doubtful validity of “organic-systemic models of so-
ciety” as well as the very “dichotomy of social statics and social dynamics”
(Sztompka, 1993:9). His aim is to explore Whitehead’s “processual image”
which claims that “change is inherent in the very nature of things” (Sztompka,
1993:9).
Ontologically speaking, society as a steady state does not and cannot exist. All
social reality is pure dynamics, a flow of changes of various speed, intensity,
rhythm and tempo. It is not by accident that we often speak of ‘social life,’ per-
haps a more fitting metaphor than the old image of a hide-bound, reified
super-organism. Because life is nothing else but movement, motion and
change, when those stop, there is no more life, but an entirely different condi-
tion – nothingness, or as we call it death (Sztompka, 1993:9).
Unfortunately Sztompka did not analyze the primitive meaning of change –
an undertaking that would have tempered his extreme “dynamistic” approach.
Without something persistent it is impossible to notice genuine changes. His
rejection of the old dichotomy of “social statics and social dynamics” did not
help him to appreciate the mutual coherence between constancy and change.
However, that change pre-supposes something constant is implicitly ac-
knowledged in his use of the expression “social field.” The four levels which
he distinguishes within the “socio-cultural field” (ideal, normative,
interactional and opportunity) serve as persistent frameworks which are “un-
dergoing perpetual change.” Implicitly this affirms the constancy of each
level which lies at the basis of all the changes taking place within them (cf.
Sztompka, 1993:10-11). Without constancy (and identity) no meaning could
be attached to the word change. Yet Sztompka still thinks that he only deals
with the dynamics of constant changes!
His assertion that life is “nothing but movement, motion and change” is
practiacally the same as a denial of the reality of phenomena characterized by
the biotical aspect, i.e., of anything alive. Why then does he not hold that the
“social” changes into something else? In maintaining the persistent qualifying
function of the term social (in expressions such as the “social field” and “so-
cial life”), Sztompka implicitly acknowledges the (ontic) constancy of the so-
cial aspect of reality. If the structure of this aspect itself is subject to change
(i.e., inherently transient), then its qualifying role has to be substituted by
whatever non-social phenomenon it changed to! Such a one-sided emphasis
on change cannot but end in insurmountable antinomies.
1 “I wanted to place an emphasis on the active flow of social life” (Giddens, 1998:76).
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Chapter 12
12.8.2 The dualism between action and system (order)

Habermas distinguishes three worlds:
1. The objective world (as the totality of all entities about which true state-
ments are possible);
2. The social world (as the totality of all legitimately regulated interper-
sonal relations);
3. The subjective world (as the totality of the experiences of the speaker to
which she has privileged access (Habermas 1984:100).
The “objective world” is understood in terms of (objective) entities while the
social world and the subjective world respectively are described in terms of
relations and experiences.
What is implicit in the ontology of Habermas is therefore that he does not
recognize ontic1 modes of being embracing the three worlds distinguished by
him. Consequently he does not connect social relations to a social mode of be-
ing making possible all the different kinds of social interaction distinguish-
able in an ontic sense. The implication is that even what Habermas does rec-
ognize as uniquely human acts, in addition to their functions within the nor-
mative aspects of reality, in principle also functions within the natural sides of
reality (his first world). In passing we may note that in an amazingly uncritical
way he adheres to a metaphysical legacy reaching back to Greek antiquity. In
early Greek philosophy, within the school of Parmenides, emphasis was laid
upon unity and truth. Eventually, in the thought of Socrates and Plato, the
beautiful and the good were added, leading to the four transcendental determi-
nations of medieval metaphysics: unity, truth, beauty and goodness (supposed
to embrace God – as the highest being or ipsum esse – and creatures analogi-
cally). Habermas simply continues three of these, namely the cognitive, the
aesthetic and the moral (see for example Habermas, 1995-2:374).
The anthropological view that accompanied this heritage looked at the hu-
man being as a so-called rational-moral being. But Habermas’s own view is
dependent upon his basic dualism between instrumental actions and commu-
nicative actions, since this dualism sets apart the domain of subject-object re-
lations (being “instrumental”) from that of communicative actions (restricted
to subject-subject relations).2
Since Habermas does not have a theory of modal functions belonging to a(n
ontic) dimension of experiential reality distinct from (but intimately cohering
1 In Strauss 2002 and 2004 the term “ontic” designated that which truly exists. Although the
term “ontic” is usually restricted for entitary existence we have consistently applied this term
throughout this Introduction also to refer to the reality of the fundamental modes, functions or
aspects of reality.
2 Habermas differentiates rationality in two domains: from “one perspective the telos inherent
in rationality appears to be instrumental mastery, from the other communicative understand-
ing” (Habermas 1984:11).
219
with) the dimension of (natural and social)1 entities, he does not realize that all
subject-subject relations are founded in subject-object relations and that
therefore it is unsound to attempt to separate instrumental and communicative
actions. Moreover, although he constantly speaks about “social entities,” such
as tribal societies (‘Stammesgesellschaften’), institutions, families, and even
societies organized by the state,2 his only recourse to a theory of social entities
is found in a fusion of his theory of communicative action with the system the-
ory of Parsons – keeping in mind that he distinguishes between system and
life-world.3
Waters summarizes this move as follows:
Habermas now proceeds to integrate his own arguments about communicative
action with Parsonsian system theory. First, he argues that Parsons’ ‘systems
within systems’ elaboration is not much more than a semantic exercise. Action
is not an environment for society but its content – culture, personality and so-
cial interaction are the substance of the lifeworld. Moreover, such constructs
as the ‘relic system’ and ‘ultimate values’ are abstractions from lifeworld ac-
tivity. The only ‘real’ systems are the structural responses to the AGIL impera-
tives originally proposed by Parsons and Smelser – economy, polity, societal
community, and fiduciary. These are now reinterpreted in the terms of the sys-
tem/lifeworld couplet … The economy and the polity are steering agencies,
focused on system integration and organized along the lines of strategic ac-
tion. Societal community and fiduciary are the public and private sectors of the
lifeworld, focused on social integration and characterized by communicative
action. Note that in undertaking this reinterpretation, Habermas moves system
integration to A/G from I and renders I/L the shared location for social
integration (Waters, 1994:163).
The mere fact that Habermas speaks about “societies organized by the state”
reveals the implicitly totalitarian consequences of his own affinity to system
theory. In this frame of mind the functions of society in its totality4 are viewed
in terms of a differentiation between political and non-political subsystems as
diverse action systems.5 Through the medium of money and money-exchange
the economic function of society as a whole is handed over by the state to the
capitalistic economic system which forms the specialized foundation for a
1 Clearly, Habermas excludes ‘entities’ from the social world, for the latter is characterized by
“relations” only.
2 “… staatlich organisierten Gesellschaften …” [“societies organized by the state”] (Haber-
mas, 1995-2:253).
3 The structural components of the life-world are “culture, society and personality” (“Kultur,
Gesellschaft und Persönlichkeit” – Habermas, 1995-2:229). This scheme is generally found
amongst sociologists such as Parsons, McIver and Sorokin.
4 “Die gesamtgesellschaftlich relevanten Funktionen” [“Those functions relevant for society
in its totality”], Habermas, 1995-2:255.
5 “… nicht-staatliche subsysteme” [“non-state subsystems”], Habermas, 1995-2:255.
220
Chapter 12
subsystem that outgrew the normative context of the state.1 From this it clearly
follows that Habermas does not acknowledge the modal universality of the
economic aspect of reality.2 The differentiation of economic life and the emer-
gence of the business enterprise merely specify the general modal meaning of
the economic aspect – without monopolizing it exclusively, for along-side the
non-political spheres of societal life (where each one of these spheres in its
own way continues to function within the economic aspect), also the state
continues to specify the meaning of the economic mode in a way typically dif-
ferent from that of the firm and other societal forms of social life. The striking
additional perspective that Habermas wants to advance, is that through the
medium of money-exchange a whole domain of “norm-free sociality” is insti-
tutionalized.3
Although Habermas does react critically to the whole-parts scheme as such

(see Habermas, 1998:65) he appears not to realize that social system theory
1 “Die gesammtgesellschaftliche relevanten Funktionen verteilen sich auf verschiedene
Handlungssysteme. Mit Verwaltung, Militär und Rechstprechung spezialisiert sich der
Staatsapparat darauf, über bindende entscheidungen die kollektiven Ziele zu verwirklichen”
[“The functions relevant for society in its totality differentiates into different action systems.
Through administration, the military and jurisprudence the state apparatus specializes in the
realization of binding decisions and collective aims.”] [According to Parsons the “polity” is
also geared towards “collective goal-attainment” – DFMS]. “Andere Funktionen werden
entpolitisiert und an nicht-staatliche Subsysteme abgegeben. Das kapitalistische Wirtschafts-
system markiert den Durchbruch zu dierser ebene der Systemdifferenzierung; es verdankt
seine entstehung einem neuen Mechanismus, dem Steuerungsmedium Geld. Dieses Medium
ist auf die vom Staat abgegebene gesamtgesellschaftliche Funktion des Wirtschaftens
spezialisiert und bildet die Grundlage für ein normativen Kontexten entwachsenes Subsys-
tem” [“Other functions are depoliticized and handed over to non-state subsystems. The capi-
talist economic system signifies the break-through to this level of system differentiation; it
owes its genesis to a new mechanism, the guiding medium money. This medium specializes
in a function of society in its totality delegated to the economy and it constitutes the founda-
tion of a normative context of a separated subsystem.”] (Habermas, 1995-2:255-256).
2 Giddens displays a more articulated intuition in this regard when he describes the “economic”
in a way closely approximating the modal universality of the economic aspect of reality:
“Rather, the sphere of the ‘economic’ is given by the inherently constitutive role of allocative
resources in the structuration of societal totalities” (Giddens, 1986:34). Rephrased in terms of
the idea of the many-sided functioning of societal entities, one can say that Giddens uncov-
ered the fact that every societal collectivity has a function within the economic modal aspect
of reality.
3 “Die kapitalistische Wirtschaft läßt sich nicht mehr wie der traditionale Staat als insti-
tutionelle Ordnung begreifen – institutionalisiert wird das Tauschmedium, während das über
dieses Medium ausdifferenzierte Subsystem im ganzen ein Stück normfreier Sozialität
darstellt” [“The Capitalist economy cannot be understood as an institutional order like the tra-
ditional state. What has been institutionalized is the medium of exchange, while the subsys-
tem embracing this medium manifests an overall piece of sociality free from norms”]
(Habermas, 1995-2:256). The phrase “normfreier Sozialität” suggests that economic activi-
ties are not subject to economic norms – contradicting the ever-present normative contrary
economic – un-economic.
221
indeed also gives shelter to this scheme. The least one can say is that his
thought is ambivalent in this regard, because he does not proceed from a strict
modal delimitation (what we will designate as the qualifying function below)
of the structural task of the state. This explains why he considers it to be the
main burden of law within modern societies to bring about social integration
(Habermas, 1998:60). Every societal form of life has to attain its own specific
“social integration.” The juridical integration of a multiplicity of legal inter-
ests into a public legal order (within the territory of the state) differs from the
social integration of changing fashions.
There is another subtle 20th century intellectual background practically cut-
ting across all the different sociological schools of thought of this century –
and still found (in one or another variant) in the thought of Weber, MacIver,
Parsons and Habermas (to mention just a few). In spite of peripheral differ-
ences, they all adhere to the transformation which the Kantian dualism be-
tween ‘Sollen’ (‘ought’) and ‘Sein’ (‘is’) acquired in the Baden School of
neo-Kantian thought where it resulted in an assessment of society in factual
terms while norms, values and beliefs are located within the sphere of ‘cul-
ture’.1 The latter lacks an ontic character, for ‘culture’ is the result of (autono-
mous) human construction.
12.8.3 The step from modal to typical concepts
By contrast our discussion of coordinational, communal and collective forms
of social interaction consistently wants to acknowledge ontic normativity –
not only in the context of modal normative contraries (such as logical-illogi-
cal, economic – un-economic, polite-impolite, legal-illegal, and so on), but
also in respect of distinct social ‘entities’. The idea of communal and collec-
tive societal structures proceeds from the distinction between modal aspects
and the dimension of (natural and social) entities – where the latter are ac-
knowledged in their multi-aspectual existence for they have a (subject-)func-
tion2 within each modal aspect of (ontic) reality. This step transcends the do-
main of modal (elementary and compound) basic concepts, for now type con-
cepts (including concepts of type laws) are required. In Strauss (2004:172,
174 ff.) the distinction between modal laws and type laws was introduced.3
1 One of the founding philosophers of the Baden school, Heinrich Rickert, did start with ideal
values having a timeless validity (culture originates through relating “nature” to “values, ” i.e.,
through “Wertbeziehung”) – but soon the effects of 19th century historicism and the linguistic
turn relativized this view (up to contemporary postmodern views where every individual is
supposed to choose her own values at will – in their mission formulation contemporary orga-
nizations are sometimes prompted to consider the acceptance of “new values”).
2 Within every sphere of (a differentiated or undifferentiated) society societal objects are found
that are correlated with societal subject functions – just think about the firm (production and
means of production), the school (teachers and pupils on the one hand and textbooks,
over-head projectors, computers and school buildings on the other), the state (governmental
and subjects and the cultural domain of the state, the Houses of Parliament and jails). etc. etc.
3 We have pointed out earlier that whereas modal laws hold universally for whatever there is,
laws for typically different kinds of entities have a limited scope only.
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The type laws for different kinds of entities only hold for a particular type of
entities. Type laws manifest therefore a specified form of universality. The
type law for being a state (a societal collectivity), for example, has its own
universality for it applies to all states, although this universality is specified
(i.e., limited), since not everything within the universe is a state – there are
also others kinds (types) of (natural and social) entities. 1
In order to differentiate further between societal collectivities, displaying
both a solidary unitary character and a durable relation of super- and sub-ordi-
nation (such as the state, the firm, the club, the nuclear family, and so on), one
has to exceed the confines of the social mode of reality by looking at that spe-
cific modal aspect stamping, characterizing or qualifying the type law under
consideration. This idea of a qualifying function rests upon the given unique-
ness of such a modal function, as well as a continued acknowledgement of the
modal universality of every modal function as such. Furthermore, every soci-
etal entity also has a typical foundational function.
In order to distinguish between those collectivities mentioned in the previ-
ous paragraph (namely the state, the firm, the club and the nuclear family) one
may start by specifying their respective qualifying functions. The state, for ex-
ample, is qualified by the jural aspect (it is a public legal institution destined
to harmonize and balance the multiplicity of legal interests within its jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the monopoly over the “power of the sword”2 within its
territory). The firm, by contrast, is qualified by the economic aspect while the
nuclear family finds its qualifying function in the moral aspect of love. Be-
cause each of these societal collectivities still function at once in all (other) as-
pects of reality, the acknowledgement of their respective qualifying functions
does not terminate any other modal function they may have.
The universal modal economic principles of frugality address whatever
functions within this mode – be it a state, the firm, a university or a church de-
nomination, for in all these cases it is recognized that the wasting of money is
un-economic (economically antinormative). Yet, as soon as the respective
type laws of these societal collectivities are brought into the picture, it be-
comes clear that the way in which they function within the economic mode
differs in each case – in the sense that their subject function within the eco-
nomic mode is ‘coloured’ by their respective unique type laws (stamped by
their distinct qualifying functions). For example, whereas the firm – as an eco-
nomically qualified social entity – sets out to be profitable (without side-step-
ping its social accountability), the modern state has to budget for its expenses
through a complicated tax system. Maintaining a police force or fighting a war
is not ‘profitable’ in the sense of business economics, although by performing
these duties a state still has to observe modal economic principles in order to
ensure that money is not wasted.
1 We explained that the atomness of an atom is the universal way in which this atom evinces
the fact that it is conditioned by (subject to) the (universal) law for being-an-atom.
2 Internally the police force and against external threats/attacks the military force (infantry,
navy and air force).
223
From this perspective the inadequacy of the Parsonian system theory is ob-
vious, because (as we have explained in Strauss 2002:110 ff.), the AGIL
scheme is constituted as an ontological design which is based upon a four
function paradigm (adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and latency) ex-
ploring only three elementary basic (i.e., analogical) concepts of sociological
theorizing – namely the spatial opposition of inner and outer, the analogy of
thermo-dynamical open systems (physical analogy – “pattern maintenance”)
and the biotical analogies reflected the terms adaptation, goal-attainment,
and integration. Unfortunately these aspects (modal functions) are shared by
all communal and collective social entities, making it impossible to differenti-
ate them in this way theoretically. Parsons attempts to solve this problem by
speaking about collective goal-attainment – regarding the ‘polity’ – in order to
distinguish it from the ‘economy’ (supposedly concerned with ‘adaptation’).
But the ‘economy’ and the ‘polity’ both have to cope with these two func-
tional problems of adaptation and goal-attainment in their respective typical
ways – entailing that what is typical about them as societal collectivities is
presupposed and cannot be derived from coping with these two problems.
Prior to these shortcomings, system theory has elevated the original spatial
whole-parts relation in a universalistic way as principle of explanation, such
that society as a whole is captured in this reductionistic, holistic scheme. As
long as priority is given to such a whole-parts scheme the ‘individual’ will al-
ways be sacrificed to whatever societal reality is chosen as the encompassing
whole. Therefore, whoever wants to buy into system theory and at the same
time tries to uphold a theory of agency, inevitably ends up in the conflict be-
tween atomistic and holistic views of society (cf. Waters, 1994:168 ff.).
Do we find a solution for the tension between individualism and universal-
ism in the theory of structuration developed by Giddens?
12.8.4 Structuration: the theory of Giddens
In order to proceed we have to introduce two additional fundamental system-
atic distinctions, because they relate to the heart of the theory of Giddens. The
idea of ontic normativity, i.e., the acknowledgement of underlying principles
that are not the result or product of human action but its very condition, entails
the distinction between a principle and its application (giving it a positive
form, positivizing it). Also Habermas explicitly uses this term, for example
where he speaks about “the positivization of law” (Habermas, 1996:71).1
As such the concept of a principle is also a complex basic concept of those
scholarly disciplines involved in a study of reality from the perspective of
some or other normative aspect – be it the logical-analytical (logic), the cul-
tural-historical (the science of history), the sign mode (semiotics, linguistic
and semantics), the social aspect (sociology), the economic function (eco-
nomics), the aesthetic (aesthetics), the jural (the science of law), the moral
1 Compare Habermas, 1998:101 where he discusses “die Positivierung des Rechts” [“the
positivization of law”].
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Chapter 12
(ethics) or the fiduciary (theology or a comparative study of religion).1 This

consideration entails that in order to articulate the meaning of a principle one
has to employ terms derived from multiple aspects. Think about the social
principle of showing respect. This principle is universal in the sense that there
is no single human society in which one does not encounter some or other
form of respect and at the same time it is constant as well. But principles are
not per se valid (in force), for they need the intervention of humans to make
them valid, to enforce them (see Derrida, 2002:233 ff.). Therefore, a principle
is a universal, constant, starting point for human action that can only be made
valid (en-forced) by a competent organ with an accountable (free) will capa-
ble of giving a positive shape to such a starting point in varying historical cir-
cumstances in the light of an appropriate interpretation of the relevant cir-
cumstances and resulting in a norm-conformative or antinormative posi-
tivization of the underlying principle. Note that this formulation is related to
different aspects, namely the numerical (a starting point); the spatial (univer-
sal); the kinematical (constant); the physical (making valid, enforce); the bi-
otical (organ); the sensitive-psychical (will); the logical-analytical (norm-
conformative or antinormative); the cultural-historical (shaping, giving form
to, positivization); and the sign mode (interpretation). Since these terms are
derived from multiple aspects the concept of a principle is a compound or
complex basic concept.
Against this background a distinction ought to be drawn between the prin-
ciples norming humanactivities and the norm-conformative (or: antinorm-
ative) ways in which human beings can respond to underlying principles. In
the case of societal entities and processes there is always a difference between
“structures for” and “structures of.” For example, the scope of the structural
principle for being a state cuts across all past, present and future states wher-
ever they may be found – whereas any concretely existing state – in its being a
state – exhibits the reality that it is a state. Being a state is the universal way in
which this state shows that it is subject to the structure for being a state. The
modern idea of autonomy as well as the idea of the social construction of the
world reified the human freedom to positivize, while denying the existence of
universal and constant principles underlying every human act of shaping and
form-giving (positivization).
Anthony Giddens wrestled with these issues in his own way when he intro-
duced his theory of structuration in order to emphasize the actuality of tempo-
ral societal processes through which societal structures are produced and re-
produced. According to him a “double hermeneutic” is implied in all forms of
sociological theorizing because the scholar is participant and analyst at once
(see Calhoun et.al., 2002:222). The acknowledgement of the “subject-de-
pendency” of societal structures explains why Giddens prefers to speak about
1 It should be kept in mind that according to Dooyeweerd every (natural and social) entity or
process functions within all modes of reality, the scope of each of these disciplines is as wide
as the universe itself – it is only the respective modes of explanation that differentiate these
special sciences from each other – not the (natural and social) entities within the world.
225
‘structuration’ in stead of merely speaking about ‘structure’. Although he al-

ludes to “primitive terms” he does not have a clear understanding of what we
have called the indispensable elementary (analogical) basic concepts of soci-
ology as a discipline. In fact his sociological thought shows a remarkable am-
biguity towards the use of modal analogies.
On the one hand, for example, he wants to discard altogether any reference
to the phrase social adaptation, but simultaneously concedes that there may
be legitimate usages of this expression – but then he once again fears that such
usages may be too vague and diffuse (Giddens, 1986:233-236, 270-271). In
different contexts he simply uses the terms (social) differentiation and inte-
gration without realizing that they reflect the biotic analogy within the struc-
ture of the social aspect (Giddens, 1986:181 ff.). He has a fairly negative as-
sessment of the meaning of “social causation” (see Giddens, 1983:80 and
Giddens, 1996:65).
In the absence of well-known “abuses” of modal analogies comparable to
those found in 19th century “organic models,” the structure of the logical as-
pect – and its possible analogies within the context of sociological analysis –
apparently does not pose a similar threat to Giddens. Consider his treatment of
the “concept of contradiction”:
It is commonly remarked that the concept of contradiction should remain a
logical one rather than being applied to social analysis. ... Given that it is used
with some care, however, I think the concept to be an indispensable one in so-
cial theory (1986:193).
What a mixed picture in the thought of one of the leading sociologists of our
day regarding the admissibility and status of what we have called the elemen-
tary basic concepts of sociology: from rejection (“social adaptation”), hesi-
tance (“social adaptation”; “social causation”) and unawareness (“social dif-
ferentiation and integration”) to positive acceptance (“social contradiction”)!
Of course there is no systematic treatment of analogical concepts in the sociol-
ogy of Giddens. Where he does refer to the ‘primitive’ terms of “social sci-
ence” only three are lifted out: meaning, norm and power:
Processes of structuration involve an interplay of meanings, norms and
power. These three concepts are analytically equivalent as the ‘primitive’
terms of social science,1 and are logically implicated both in the notion of in-
tentional action and that of structure: every cognitive and moral order is at the
same time a system of power, involving a ‘horizon of legitimacy’ (Giddens,
2002:230).
Although the term ‘meaning’ resides in the sign-mode of reality,2 which, in a
modal-functional sense presupposes (as we have noted) choice and requires
interpretation, it is usually (in modern sociological theory) “loaded” with
1 In a different context Giddens suggests “that structure, system and structuration, appropri-
ately conceptualized, are all necessary terms in social theory” (Giddens, 1983:62).
2 The phrase “social meaning” in the first place reflects an analogy of the sign-mode within the
structure of the social aspect and therefore belongs to the domain of elementary basic con-
cepts of sociology.
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Chapter 12
connotations that are related to beliefs, values and norms. It is therefore not
surprising that Giddens indeed does relate meaning and norm. But in doing
this he does not realize that whereas the primitive sense of the term meaning
marks an analogical sociological concept, the complex nature of the term
norm represents a complex or compound basic concept of sociology. Further-
more, since the core meaning of the cultural-historical mode of reality is given
in power (control, mastery), also the notion of social power (social control,
social mastery) refers to a modal historical analogy within the structure of the
social aspect and therefore it belongs to the domain of elementary basic con-
cepts of sociology.
But, as we have pointed out repeatedly, the discipline of sociology is based
upon the use of many more elementary basic concepts – such as numerical
analogies (social order – the unity in a multiplicity of social norms, correlated
with the unity in the multiplicity of social roles assumed by human subjects
within human society), spatial analogies (social super- and subordination, so-
cial stratification, social distance), kinematic analogies (social constancy, so-
cial stability), physical analogies (social dynamics, social causes and effects),
biotic analogies (social life, social differenttiation, social integration, social
growth, social adaptation), sensitive analogies (social awareness, social sensi-
tivity, social desires/will), logical-analytical analogies (social identification –
‘we’ and ‘they’ – social consensus, social conflict, social contradiction, social
antinormativity). In addition sociology (implicitly or explicitly) employs
complex or compound basic sociological concepts, constituted by peculiar
configurations of elementary basic concepts. The only two that we have expli-
cated were those regarding different ways of social interaction (coordina-
tional, communal and collective modes) and the nature of a norm or a princi-
ple. In addition the meaning of social subjects and social objects can also only
be accounted for in terms of complex basic concepts. In passing it should be
noted that Giddens is not consistent with his correct emphasis on the sub-
ject-dependent nature of (continuously functioning) social entities, for if he
was he would have realized that ‘society’ (or any social form of life intended
by coordinational, communal and collective relationships) is not a social ob-
ject, for social entities in this sense always function subjectively1 within all as-
pects of reality, including the social aspect.2
Finally, an account of the inevitable type concepts used by sociologists re-
quires the typical concept of type laws as well as that of communal and collec-
tive subjectivity (where social entities are understood in terms of their typical
1 The term ‘subjectively’ does not convey the connotation of arbitrariness, but simply refers to
one pole of the ever-present subject-object relation within human societal interaction.
2 Giddens writes: “According to this conception, the same structural characteristics participate
in the subject (the actor) as in the object (society)” (1983:70). Social objects, strictly speak-
ing, are those products brought into being through the cultural-formative activities of human
beings (think about the furniture of a living room – social objects; test tubes in the laboratory
– scientific objects; tools – technical objects; jails – juridical objects; etc.) – always correlated
with “societal-human-subjectivity”.
227
totality character, distinctly demarcated by their respective foundational and

qualifying functions).1
O’Brien mentions that Giddens wants to avoid the term “structure” and
rather articulates the idea of “the ‘structuring properties’ of social interaction”
(O’Brien, 1998:10). For Giddens the concept of structuration involves what
he calls the “duality of structure” which, according to him, “relates to the fun-
damentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual de-
pendence of structure and agency” (Giddens, 1983:69):
By the duality of structure I mean that the structural properties of social sys-
tems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute
those systems. The theory of structuration, thus formulated, rejects any differ-
entiation of synchrony and diachrony or statics and dynamics. The identifica-
tion of structure with constraint is also rejected: structure is both enabling and
constraining, and it is one of the specific tasks of social theory to study the
conditions in the organization of social systems that govern the interconnec-
tions between the two. … Structure forms ‘personality’ and ‘society’ simulta-
neously – but in neither case exhaustively: because of the significance of unin-
tended consequences of action, and because of unacknowledged conditions of
action (Giddens, 1983:69-70).
The analysis of social relations concerns both “the patterning of social rela-
tions in time-space involving the reproduction of situated practices” and “a
virtual order of ‘modes of structuring’ recursively implicated in such repro-
duction” (Giddens, 1986:17). Moreover, according to the theory of structu-
ration “the production and reproduction of social action” draw upon “rules
and resources” (Giddens, 1986:19). Calhoun remarks:
Giddens defines structure as the ‘rules and resources’ that act as common in-
terpretive schemes in a particular social system. Giddens argues that structures
are related to practices as language is related to speech – in fact, language is an
example of what Giddens means by structure. Structures organize practices,
but at the same time, structures are enacted and reproduced by practices. Al-
though we experience structures as forces external to us, they have only a ‘vir-
tual’ existence – they cannot be directly observed except through their effects
on practices (Calhoun, et.al., 2002:223).
These distinctions are close to what we have said about “structures for” and
“structures of” – although the main difference is given in our previosly men-
tioned account of (modal and typical) principles in their ontic givenness. As
universal, constant starting points of human action, modal and typical princi-
ples make possible what is ‘structured’ through formative human actions of
positivization, of giving form and shape to the typical principles for diverse
coordinational, communal and collective forms of social life within human
society. The relative constancy (stability) of these forms (which are acknowl-
1 We shall return to the fact that the state, for example, is qualified by the jural aspect of reality.
Its foundational function is given in the cultural-historical aspect of power-formation. Of
course the type of power formed by the state differs from that found in a firm (power of capi-
tal) or the power of scholarly knowledge found at a university.
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Chapter 12
edged by Giddens)1 reflect (in a universal way) that societal entities are condi-
tioned by underlying (modal and typical) principles.2 The orderliness exhib-
ited by the “production and reproduction” of societal practices is a feature of
what should be designated as ‘norm-conformative’ factual realities, for only
that which is subjected to a universal (natural) law or (normative) principle
can be appreciated as functioning in a ‘law-conformative’ or ‘antinormative’
way.
Understood in terms of these distinctions structuration coincides with the
on-going process of positivizing those (modal and typical) principles, making
possible all coordinational, communal and collective forms of social life. Un-
fortunately, since the Renaissance and the rise of modern nominalism, the in-
tellectual legacy of the West departed from the idea of ontic normativity and
implicitly or explicitly adheres to the modern ideal of an autonomously free
personality – in the spirit of Jean Jacques Rousseau who, as we have briefly
noted earlier, describes freedom as obedience to a law that we have prescribed
to ourselves (Rousseau, 1975:247). As a result of the motive of logical cre-
ation – initially advanced by Hobbes and – as we have pointed out – brought
to its ultimate rationalistic consequences by Kant in his view of understand-
ing as the (a priori) formal law-giver of nature – historicism and the linguistic
turn explored the irrationalistic side of nominalism by elevating the human
subject to be the sole (re-)source of culture and society. At most this construc-
tive capacity of being human is related to nature that is transformed into
culture. Giddens writes:
Sociology is not concerned with a ‘pre-given’ universe of objects, but with one
which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects. Human be-
ings transform nature socially, and by ‘humanizing’ it they transform them-
selves; but they do not, of course, produce the natural world, which is consti-
tuted as an object-world independently of their existence. If in transforming
that world they create history, and thence live in history, they do so because
the production and reproduction of society is not ‘biologically programmed’,
as it is among the lower animals (Giddens, 2002:229).
Instead of considering the ontic status of normative principles, a view is de-
veloped regarding the transformation of nature into the world of history which
is equated with the production and reproduction of society! Traditionally it
was affirmed that culture arises from a transformation of nature, but for
Giddens the transformation of nature results in ‘society’. Furthermore, if the
“production and reproduction of society is not ‘biologically programmed’, as
1 Calhoun remarks that Giddens acknowledges stable patterns that are “observable in interac-
tions” and “also suggests that structures are generally quite stable, but they can be changed”
(Calhoun, 2002:223).
2 In his distinction between social integration (face-to-face interaction) and system integration
(regarding connections between “those who are physically absent in time and space”),
Giddens speaks of “systemness” (Giddens, 1986:28), similar to our earlier example of
“atomness” as the universal side of an atom. See also Strauss, 2006:21 ff., 268-270 and
Strauss 2009: 9, 26, 79, 177, 193, 374, 400, 417, 434, 439, 449, 492, 517.
229
it is among the lower animals,” how do we account for the normative account-
ability of human beings in a way that transcends “biological programming”?
Surely, the relationship between a principle and its application concerns an is-
sue that is totally different from the relationship between ‘individual’ and ‘so-
ciety’. Yet Giddens believes that the main purpose and outcome of his theory
of structuration is to resolve the problem of ‘action’ and ‘structure’. Giddens
explains:
In the past it was usually seen as a dualism between individual and society, or
the actor and the social system. Thinking about this traditional question of the
relationship between the individual and society lay at the origin of the idea of
structuration (a remark in the interview published by Pierson, 1998:75).
Although there are constructive elements present in the thought of Giddens
for effectively resolving the issue of ‘individual’ and ‘society’, the absence of
an articulated account of the elementary, complex and typical basic concepts
of sociology as a discipline prevents him from arriving at an alternative in a
satisfactory way.
12.9 The category-mistake implied by the opposition
of individual and society
At the end of Part I we have summarized a number of arguments highlighting
crucial shortcomings in the opposition of individual and society. What re-
mains to be explained is what the heading of this paragraph portrays – the cat-
egory-mistake present in this opposition.
As a starting point for our assessment the familiar opposition of “individual
and state/government” is instructive. In this practice the state is identified with
the government of a state and then opposed to the individual. Two serious
mistakes are present in this view. The first one is that the state this opposition
does acknowledge that the state is constituted by citizens and that only within
this general category a distinction can be drawn between those citizens elected
to function in the office of government and those citizens who are subjects of
the state – in the sense of being subject to the power or authority vested in the
office of government. Of course there are in all modern states a differentiation
of governmental functions – of which the best known are the legislative, the
judiciary and the executive functions. But even if these functions would have
been performed by the same state-organ the requirement would remain that
they ought to be distinguished. Furthermore, no person occupying a certain
office – be it the president of the state, any minister, judge, military general or
police authority – solely functions in this capacity. All of them are at once also
subjects supposed to obey the laws of the state – no one is elevated above the
constitution and the laws of the state. In addition we have seen that being a cit-
izen is just one amongst a multiplicity of societal functions of human beings.
In other words, the correlate of those citizens acting in some or other gov-
ernmental capacity is not an unspecified and undifferentiated ‘individual’, but
merely other citizens in their capacity as subjects to the government of a state.
Given the sphere sovereignty of the state, structurally limited through its qual-
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Chapter 12
ification by the jural aspect of reality, this entails an all-important limitation,

for it means that the authority of the government of a state is limited to the
function of an individual within a state – and this “state-function” has to be
designated as “being a citizen.”
The multiple functions that an individual person has within other social en-
tities, such as within the school, the nuclear family, marriage, a social club or a
business enterprise, are falling outside the scope and limits of governmental
authority. The public legal order of the state is supposed to protect the public
legal interest of each citizen in the integrity of its body and possessions – ex-
plaining why theft and murder constitutes offences against public legal inter-
ests. The domain of civil law is a coordinational sphere of law where persons
and social entities are functioning next to or sometimes in opposition to each
other (always on equal footing) – but it remains qualified by the jural aspect
and it is dependent upon civil courts and an independent civil jurisprudence
capable of administering an impartial system of civil law practices, backed up
the sword power of the state for the official execution of juridical decisions.
It is only the legal interests involved in participating in non-state spheres of
life that are integrated into the public legal order of the state and not those
non-political collectivities and communities as such. For that reason there is a
fundamental difference between public legal freedoms, civil freedoms and so-
cietal freedoms – for all these freedoms ought to be respected by a constitu-
tional state under the rule of law. Yet this very idea of differentiated spheres of
law within a differentiated society entails the insight that the authority of a
government is limited and does not stretch over or encompass every facet of
being human.
However, the moment the state is identified with its government this identi-
fication entails that being a citizen is equated with the undifferentiated notion
of “an individual.” In doing this we have squarely positioned ourselves (pos-
sibly against our best intentions!) within the legacy of a totalitarian and abso-
lutist view of the state. For an unspecified and undifferentiated notion of the
individual embraces every possible societal function of such a person – imply-
ing that the government indeed has authority over every facet of such a
person’s life.
Once this basic error has been made, namely the error of identifying state
and government and the error of viewing as subject to this government not a
citizen (in its function as subject within the state) but an “undifferentiated in-
dividual,” then the ‘individual’ has to commence its battle against the con-
ceded competence of the ‘state’ to rule over every domain (possible societal
function) of being an individual. The tragic truth is that this struggle is lost be-
fore it started, because once, by implication, the government has been given
authority over an ‘individual’ understood in an undifferentiated sense, it is no
longer possible to revert this totalitarian perspective by whatever measures.
Right at the beginning one has to differentiate and distinguish between the
different societal functions that an individual person may have within diverse,
231
sphere-sovereign, societal entities, of which the state is just one amongst

many others (see the sketch below).
The same point could be made in respect of the relation between an ‘indi-
vidual’ and any other societal collectivity or communal relationship, because
in no one of these forms of life within a differentiated society do we encounter
‘individuals’ – we only find in them specified typical functions of an individ-
ual – such as those highlighted in the sketch.
Since the term ‘society’ is usually meant to designate what we have identi-
fied as collective and communal societal entities, it must be clear that oppos-
ing ‘individual’ and ‘society’ boils down to a fundamental category-mistake.
It is meaningful to distinguish between various social entities precisely be-
cause they fall within the same category – the category of social entities. But
the individual human being is not a social entity. An individual does function
within all aspects of reality, and owing to its functioning within the social as-
pect of reality such an individual has a differentiated multiplicity of societal
functions within collective, communal and coordinational relationships. But
this does not in any sense transform a person into a “social entity” on a par
with states, firms, universities or social clubs.
Therefore the entire opposition of ‘individual’ and ‘society’ is based upon a
category-mistake.
12.10 Summarizing the argument regarding individual and society
Looking back at all the articles dedicated to the problem of individual and so-
ciety the basic thrust may be summarized as follows.
1) The dilemma between individualism and universalism (atomism and ho-
lism) dates back to Greek antiquity and is determined by a one-sided an-
swer to the fundamental philosophic question regarding the basic de-
nominator in terms of which the unity and diversity within reality is to be
understood.
2) Ultimately these two ismic stances take recourse to the elevation of dis-
tinct modes of being employed in explaining the entire meaning of real-
ity – respectively oriented to an over-estimation either of the quantitative
meaning of the one and the many or of the original spatial meaning of a
whole and its parts (sociologically also articulated in terms of the idea of
an encompassing system – mostly thought of as society – and its subsys-
tems).
3) Particularly since the Renaissance modern nominalism permeated the
intellectual spirit of the West to such an extent that the human being was
elevated to the level of rational autonomy (and eventually to a self-con-
structing autonomous freedom). This attitude has no room for ontic
normativity.
4) Some of the most prominent scholars operative in the shaping of sociol-
ogy during the past two centuries by and large did not succeed in tran-
scending the impasse between atomism and holism – including sociolo-
gists such as Comte, Spencer, Tönnies, Von Wiese, Durkheim, Spann,
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Weber, Parsons, Sorokin, MacIver, Alexander, Münch, Sztompka,

Habermas and Giddens.
5) On the way to an alternative approach attention is required for the
uniqueness and ireducibility of the various modal aspects of reality –
first of all in respect of the numerical and spatial aspects, because atom-
ism and holism (theoretically) attempted to come to an artificial separa-
tion of the two aspects in order to elevate one of them to an encompass-
ing ontological principle of explanation.
6) On the basis of accepting the coherence of multiple irreducible modal as-
pects also sociological theory is confronted with the necessity and inevi-
tability of employing analogical basic concepts – such as social order,
social stratification, social constancy and dynamics, social differentia-
tion and integration, social consiousness, social sensitivity, social identi-
fication and distinguishing, social power and control and social
significance, symbol and interpretation.
7) In addition to these elementary (analogical) basic concepts sociology
also has to operate on the basis of complex or compound basic concepts,
constituted by alternative configurations of elementary basic concepts
resulting in modal totality concepts, such as the concept of a principle –
a universal, constant starting point for human action that can only be
made valid by a competent organ with an accountable free will capable
of giving a (normative or antinormative) positive shape to such a princi-
ple in varying socio-cultural circumstances, and the modal totality con-
cepts of coordinational, communal and collective societal relationships.
8) Once the elementary and complex basic concepts are articulated it is
possible to move to an explanation of typical basic concepts – entailing a
specification of the unique foundational and qualifying functions of so-
cietal entities (because a full treatment of typical concepts would require
a separate study, we had to be satisfied with a few brief hints in this
regard).
9) Implicit in all the foregoing considerations lies the basic insight that the
existence of an individual human being transcends the multiplicity of
functional modes conditioning being human, for if individual human be-
ings function in all facets of reality, including the social aspect, it entails
that no connection between individuals and society is required. One can-
not “connect” individuals to that which already is constitutive for their
existence, namely their functioning within the social dimension of real-
ity!1
10) Giddens is sensitive to the extreme consequences of sociological holism
by saying that “societies” are “not necessarily unified collectivities”
(Giddens, 1986:24). We may support this cautiousness from a different
1 Without articulating it in terms of basic ontological distinctions, Luckmann and Berger stress
the same perspective: “Solitary human being is being on the animal level (which, of course,
man shares with other animals). As soon as one observes phenomena that are specifically hu-
man, one enters the realm of the social. Homo sapiens is always, and in the same measure,
homo socuis” (Luckmann & Berger, 1967:51).
233
perspective: “society” could be seen as the interdependence of diverse

social collectivities and social processes without requiring the supposi-
tion that it functions as an all-embracing totality. One implication of this
alternative is the recognition of the fact that the “unit of comparison” in
an analysis of society should never be sought in “individuals” stripped
from their social function. And as soon as we include the “ontically con-
stituted” social functionality of humans in our analysis of society, the
primary focus becomes the different social spheres in which human
beings take on different roles.
11) Everyone of the different societal functions, societal ties or societal roles
of the human person is by definition always partial in the sense that it
never encompasses all the societal activities of a person totally. Being a
colleague, being a friend, being a citizen, and so on, are simply ways in
which we designate the diverse, differentiated, societal functions and
roles of persons.
12) Since no single individual human person as such is to be seen as a soci-
etal collectivity or entity, it is meaningless to compare and juxtapose an
individual (which is not a societal entity but merely has a social func-
tion) with society or with any societal entity (such as the state, the firm,
the nuclear family, and so on).
13) The implication of the preceding insights is explored by the idea of inte-
grated spheres of life with their “own inner laws” which is the equiva-
lent of the idea of sphere sovereignty. Althusius for the first time realized
that one has to acknowledge the limitations of the whole-parts relation in
order to arrive at a proper understanding of the nature of a differentiated
society – where only municipalities and provinces are genuine parts of
the state – and not also every non-state societal collectivity as well (such
as business enterprises, schools, families and sport clubs).
14) Ultimately the opposition of individual and society is therefore a serious
“category-mistake.” The broader Western heritage tends to identify any
societal collectivity with its office bearers (for example, the term “state”
is frequently simply understood to refer to the “government”) without
realizing that the state is constituted by the ‘public’, i.e., by citizens (al-
beit in the role of government or as subjects).
Since humans function in all aspects of reality (including the social) and be-
cause an individual plays a distinct role in diverse societal entities without be-
ing fully absorbed in any modal function or any social role – and without be-
ing transformed into a “sphere of life” on its own – the distinction between
“individual” and “society” turned out to be untenable and in fact is burdened
by a serious and misleading category-mistake.
Questions
1) What are the basic problems facing any theory of society?
2) How did Dooyeweerd change his view on the nature of sociology?
3) What is the significance of the transcendental-empirical method?
234
Chapter 12
4) What are the shortcomings in the inevitable presuppositions discussed by Johnson et al.?
5) What are the basic assumptions of methodological individualism?
6) Discuss the shortcomings of the opposition between social action and social order and relate
them to the difference between sociological individualism and sociological universalism.
7) What is the value of analyzing analogical basic concepts?
8) What does the switch from modernism to postmodernism entail?
9) Analyze the difference between modal laws (with their modal universlity) and type laws holding
for a limited group of entities only.
10) Describe the main contours of the conceptions of Sztompka and Habermas.
11) What is entailed in the step from modal to compound and typical concepts?
12) In which way does the philosophy of Dooyeweerd enhances a critical understanding of the
structuration theory of Giddens?
13) Relate the compound nature of the concept of a principle to the impasse of the humanistic idea of
autonomy (the “social construction of the world”).
14) What is the category-mistake implied by the opposition of individual and society?
15) Summarize the fourteen points of the argument supporting an alternative view on the relationship
between individual and society.
235
236
Law, State and Society
Chapter 13
Noch suchen die Juristen eine
Definition zu ihrem Begriffe vom Recht
(Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft,

1787, page 759 – footnote)
In spite of claims to the contrary, relations of super and subor-
dination are known throughout the history of humankind.
Within ancient Greece the cosmic scope of the terms nomos and
logos eventually became restricted to human society and the
state, although subsequent developments within natural law in
the midst of a changeful reality maintained the idea of an immu-
table, incorruptible and non-arbitrary universal law which
holds or is valid per se. Thomas Aquinas continued the key ele-
ments of natural law, but this view was challenged by the denial
of universality outside the human mind in the nominalism of
Ockham and Jandun - entailing that ultimately all law is turned
into positive law. From the urge to be free and autonomous, mo-
dernity (since the Renaissance) employed the natural science
ideal which aimed at a rational reconstruction of the universe
from its simplest elements, individuals, which, in the case of
human society, took shape in social contract theories recon-
structing society from its elements. The subsequent reflection
on the nature of law appeared to be in the grip of the inherent
tension between the science ideal and the personality ideal.
This applies to theories of natural law, Kant and Hegel, as well
as to the historical school, legal positivism and the subsequent
developments in the 19th century. A follow-up article will de-
velop a systematic account of the key issues which presented
themselves through the history of the reflection on law. Particu-
lar attention will be given to the meaning of normativity within
human society (constancy and change); the uniqueness of the
jural aspect of reality in its unbreakable coherence with all the
other aspects; to the relationship between law and morality and
the limits of state law; to the the difference between legal power
(competence) and the sword power of the state, and the sources
of law. The views of prominent 20th century scholars will be in-
corporated in this analysis.
239
13.1 The universality of political order

In a presentation in Munich from the year 1906 Karl von Amira points out that
there is a tendency amongst those who reflect on the nature of law to restrict
themselves to what is considered to be civilized nations, particularly in their
most recent levels of development. In addition this focus is further restricted
to those forms of organization known to us as the state (Amira, 1906:70). Yet,
the earliest human societies exhibit rule-determined conduct, connected to re-
lations of super and subordination. Oppenheimer (1907, 1922, 1926), in fol-
lowing Marx and Engels (see Engels, 1884), attempted to argue that the earli-
est human societies did not display any element of what later on surfaced in
the formation of states. However, his view cannot account for the presence of
social structures capable of defending such societies against attacks. Kammler
points out that although it may sometimes be difficult to locate the locus of
control, such a defensive organization, in the light of the available
ethnographical material, shows that the “political element” is universally
present within traditional societies (Kammler 1966:31).
13.2 Greek conceptions
Within early Greek philosophy the terms logos and nomos were used to desig-
nate the meaning of law. However, the word logos had a scope exceeding the
jural meaning of the term law. In the course of time the term law obtained a
closer relationship with what became known as Politeia (portrayed in Plato’s
work bearing this name, Politeia – his Republic).
Both in its encompassing and more restricted meanings, the term law was
open to alternative interpretations. The broadest contrast is found in the oppo-
sition between a supposedly eternal and unchanging order on the one hand
and a changeful and temporal ordering on the other. Within Greek philosophy
the former view is found in the line from Parmenides to Plato and Aristotle,
whereas Protagoras and the Sophists represent the alternative view.1
In Politeia Plato considered a proper knowledge of the ideas (the transcen-
dent ontic forms) to be sufficient for obedience within the ideal state, but in
his later work on “The Laws” (Nomoi), law was meant to protect the principle
of temperance, although it continued to encompass, as in the Politeia, the
whole of society incorporated within the state.
In this respect Aristotle followed the view of Plato because the human be-
ing was seen by him as a “political animal” (zoon politikon). The rational-ethi-
cal essential form of human beings comes to fulfillment within the state,
1 Below we shall see that this problem continued even up to the opposition
among contemporary theories of natural law and legal positivism. In pass-
ing we note that both Plato and Aristotles employed the whole-parts
scheme to society - with the state as the encompassing whole (see Plato’s
Politeia as a whole and Aristotle, 1894:149).
240
Chapter 13
which takes the individual from desire to the good.1 Von Hippel points out
that ancient Greece proceeded from a metaphysical determination of an or-
dered state of the community, in which the individual is only of interest as a
part and function of the measure of a group. 2
Both Plato and Aristotle collapses law and morality - they conceive justice
as a moral virtue. Aristotle was the first thinker who distinguished between
natural law and positive law.3 In its broad moral sense justice (dikaion
politikon) remains attached to the state and at once embraces all virtues (such
as courage, moderateness, friendliness, and so on).Yet in a strict sense justice
concerns jural norms and their obedience.
13.3 Cicero and the Stoics
The Stoa accepts nomos as a universal, natural and moral law. Cicero orients
himself to an immutable, incorruptible and non-arbitrary universal law which
holds (which is valid) per se. In his dialogue De legibus (On the laws - written
during the last years of the Roman Republic), Cicero speaks of the highest law
which was present from eternal times - even before written laws or the foun-
dation of a state (Cicero, 1852, I, 6, 19). Cicero holds that true law (in agree-
ment with nature), is “of universal application, unchanging and everlasting”
(De republica, III, xxii, 33).
Jones points out that in addition to an objective universal order (flowing
from divine reason) Cicero takes the ius naturale to comprise “those half-le-
gal, half-ethical rules which express the principles of human justice, because
they have a bearing upon the relations of men living in society and upon their
duties to one another and to the gods” (Jones, 1956:99). Yet Cicero’s views do
not simply reflect the influence of the Stoa, for it is actually a fusion of the Ro-
man view of state and law and the Stoic understanding of the iusnaturale.4 In
Cicero’s work on The Laws, Marcus asserts that “we have been made by na-
ture to receive the knowledge of justice one from another and share it among
all people” (De legibus I, 33; and Cicero, 1999:117).
Yet, although Cicero distinguishes between public law (ius publicum) and
private law (ius privatum) this does not mean that he obtained a proper under-
standing of the state as a public legal institution. In his dialogue “De
1 Human life is realized in a hierarchy which stretches from the nuclear family (the germ-cell of
society), via the village community up to the polis (city-state) as the highest whole encom-
passing all other communities as mere parts. In the polis the form-perfection of the individual
is given at once.
2 “So ist für das Griechentum die Gemeinschaft ein Ordnungszustand, der sich als solcher
metaphysisch bestimmt, während der Einzelne im wesentlichen nur als Teil und Funktion
eines Gruppenhaften interessiert” (Von Hippel, 1955:197).
3 John Finnis points out that in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas “the whole law
of a political community may be considered philosophically as positive law” (Finnis,
2004:10).
4 The stature of the Roman republic after the final victory over the Carthage empire became the
model for Cicero’s moderate view of the state.
241
republica” Cicero combines the concerns of the public (res publica) with the
position of the people in a state (constituo populi), as it is captured in the
words: “estigitur res publica res populi” (Circero, 1978, I, 25, 39)1 and in ad-
dition he distinguishes between a bond of blood and the “lex civilis” as legal
community.2
Nonetheless, by following the Stoic theory of natural law he accepts civil
private law solely as a limit to state power. The lack of delineating the commu-
nal interests (communis utilitas) supposedly constitutive for the ius publicum
of the state, therefore does not provide us with a norm to delimit the public
domain of the state.
13.4 Augstine and Thomas Aquinas
In his large work, Civitas Dei (The City of God), Augustine does distinguish
between divine law and natural law. On the one hand he accounts for the bibli-
cal distinction between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of darkness, but
owing to the influence of neo-Platonism on the other he adds to it an un-bibli-
cal twist. As a mere copy of the city of God, the earthly state is negatively por-
trayed as Babylon, while its monarch is designated as Diabolus. This exerted a
significant influence upon the subsequent struggle between church and state
during the middle ages.
Both the Greek polis and the Holy Roman Empire were still appreciated in
the Aristotelian perspective of an all-encompassing, self-sufficient commu-
nity (societas perfecta). In the thought of Thomas Aquinas, the lower societal
communities have a relative autonomy but, nonetheless, still function as part
of a larger whole. This continues the Aristotelian view which embraces all
branches of society according to the mutual relationship of a means to an end,
of matter to form. What is new in the conception of Thomas Aquinas is that
the state merely serves as the lower portal for the church - whereas the state
ought to bring its citizens to their highest temporal fulfillment, namely moral
perfection. The church as supra-natural institute of grace aims at eternal bliss
(ad finem beatutidinis aeterna - Summa Theologica, I, II, 91, 4).3 This hierar-
chical relation between nature and grace is therefore reflected in the distinc-
tion between lex naturalis (a natural law which in a cosmic sense embraces
humans in their rational-moral nature as well) and a divine law (lexdivina) be-
longing to a supra-natural realm (also see Von Hippel, 1955:312-313). In his
work on the governance of the rulers (De reginime principum, I, c, 1) even cit-
1 Although the Latin word “res” literally means “thing,” the phrase res publica is best trans-
lated as “public affair.” The quoted Latin phrase (estigitur res publica res populi) thus says:
consequently, the public affair is of the people.
2 Cicero, 1978, I, 32, 49: “cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum.”
3 Thomas Aquinas remarks that “if man were ordained to no other end than that which is pro-
portional to his natural ability” no addition to natural and human law would have been
needed. “But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness, . . . it was necessary that, in
addition to natural and human law, man should be directed to this end by a law given by God”
(see also Pegis, 1945:752-753).
242
Chapter 13
ies and provinces are designated as perfect communities (see Hommes,

1961:37, note 6).
Thomas Aquinas defends a key element present in theories of natural law in
that it is valid for all times and places. He states that “natural law needs no pro-
mulgation” and that the “binding force of law extends even to the future”
(Summa Theologica, I-II, XIII, Q. 90, Art. 4, Obj. 1 - see Pegis, 1945:746).
By and large Thomas Aquinas continues the Greek understanding of law.
In a broad sense justice embraces the moral virtues, but in a restricted sense it
continues to serve as one of the four moral virtues (next to wisdom, temper-
ance and courage). Justice “tributes” to a person what legally belongs to that
person - the background of our notion of (re-)tribution. Thomas Aquinas also
continues the Aristotelian distinction between commutative and distributive
justice – with equality respectively viewed in terms of an arithmetical and a
geometrical yardstick. In addition to commutative and distributive justice he
adds legal justice (iustitia legalis). This form of justice assigns particular legal
duties to a person (amongst which military service). Natural law forms the ba-
sis of all positive law – when a positive legal stipulation contradicts natural
law it loses its legal validity. Objective natural law (valid for humanity as a
whole) can be derived from the teleological ethical basic principle: “Do what
is good and avoid what is bad.” Subjective natural law includes those legal
competencies which belong to a person by virtue of objective natural law
(such as the right on life, integrity, acquisition of property, etc.). As encom-
passing virtue, general justice -a la Aristotle - has to direct all the other virtues
towards the communal good (bonum commune).
Ultimately Thomas Aquinas wanted to synthesize the Aristotelian lex
naturalis (with its dual teleological order) with certain fundamental biblical
motives. The result was that the Aristotelian-Thomistic view denatured the
meaning of law. It is merely a means in service of the goal of the moral perfec-
tion of being human, as the stepping stone towards eternal (supra-natural)
bliss. Therefore the good, in a dual sense (regarding temporal moral perfec-
tion and eternal bliss), continues to subsume all of society fully within the
state and the church.
13.5 Transition to the modern era
However, this entire edifice of Thomas Aquinas soon had to face new devel-
opments during the 13th and 14th centuries. Dante relativized the power claims
of the church and advanced the idea of a just world monarch - which actually
should be God - although he still maintained the dualism between nature and
grace (philosophy and theology-see Von Hippel, 1955:328 ff. 334). But then
it was, as Windelband phrased it, “the very faithful sons of the church who
once again widened the split between philosophy and theology and finally
made it unbridgeable” (Windelband, 1935:271). This period witnessed the
emergence of what became known as the nominalistic movement which intro-
duced the idea of the arbitrariness of the human will as well as the idea of pop-
ular sovereignty as sources of law.
243
Nominalism denies any universality outside the human mind and therefore
undermined the meaning of both law and morality for ultimately it does not
leave room for supra-individual (normative) standards of conduct. In his
Sententien Ockham advanced the view that universality “is only in die soul
and therefore not in the things” (I, d. 2, q. 7 G -see Von Hippel, 1955:354). On
the next page Von Hippel points out that denying what is universal logically
entails that ultimately all law is turned into positive law. It entails that the
bindingness of positive law derives from the will of a highest legislation.1
This opened the way for state positivism which was further thought through
by Marsilius of Padua. The latter clearly distinguished the particularity of the
political sphere from both religion and morality. Law is no longer seen as
something universal and immutable- and as being valid in itself. One serious
implication is that the church was thus reduced to be nothing more than a col-
lection (set) of believers.2 Jean of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua completed
their mentioned book, Defensor Pacis (In Defense of Peace) in 1326 and pre-
sented it in that year to the emperor. According to them all forms of authority
derive from the people, which imply that law is an expression of the will of the
majority. Only the majority can make a law, change it, withdraw it or interpret
it (Kates, 1928:37).
In addition all legal competencies were centred in the state, justifying Von
Hippel’s conclusion: “But when the worldly power in this way absorbs also
the spiritual competencies in the modern sense it becomes a total state, that is
to say, the political sphere becomes the sole power over all areas of life.”3
Marsilius thus paved the way for the doctrine of an unbridled popular sover-
eigntyand it made room for the subsequent Lutheran view, namely that the (in-
ternal) legal order arrangements of the church belongs to the state - a view that
also underlies the entire legacy of assigning a quasi public legal status to the
church - compare the nature of the German and Austrian Staatskirchenrecht
(“state-church law” - see Campenhausen,1983; Friesenhahn & Scheuner,
1974 and Link, 1973).
The early fourteenth century therefore saw the contest between Boniface
VII and Philip the Fair and between John II and the spokesman of Louis of Ba-
varia, Marsilius of Padua (see Kates, 1928:8). The nominalistic movement
was the starting point for modern philosophy as well as modern political and
legal thought. During the Renaissance the dominant role of the Pope and the
Roman Catholic church started to diminish. This process made room for indi-
1 “Für den Rechtsbereich hat die Leugnung der Universalien zur logischen Folge, daß alles
Recht zuletzt zum positivem wird, d.h. seine Verbindlichkeit aus dem Willen einer höchsten
Gesetzgebung erhält” (Von Hippel, 1955:354).
2 “Et quod sic Christus intellexerit ecclesiam, id est credentium seu fidelium universitatem”
(Defensor Pacis, II, e. VI, 13; quoted by Von Hippel, 1955:362).
3 “Wie aber so der weltliche Gewalt auch die geistliche Befugnisse zuwachsen, wird sie im
modernen Sinne zum totalen Staat, d.h. der politische Bereich erlangt die Allzuständichkeit
über alle Lebensgebiete” (Von Hippel, 1955:363).
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Chapter 13
vidualistic (atomistic) theories of human society, the state and law. The reality
of supra-individual communities was denied.
13.6 Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes
The Renaissance era witnessed an exploration of the unlimited possibilities of
human reason. This new spirit was exceptionally impressed by the successes
of the rising natural sciences - mathematics and physics. Liberated from the
restrictions imposed upon society by the Roman Catholic church (with its
doctrine of sin) and from the Greek idea of fate, the modern Renaissance per-
sonality came into its own, enthroning the human being as such and in doing
that it at once elevated the newly developing natural sciences to become a
means in service of proclaiming the majesty and dignity of human beings who
emerged as a law unto themselves.
During and after the Renaissance the assumed unlimited possibilities of
recreating reality in a rational way were reinforced by the achievements of the
mathematical and physical natural sciences. The latter became a means in ser-
vice of proclaiming the autonomous freedom of human beings. The Greek di-
alectical motive of matter and form and the medieval dialectical basic motive
of nature and grace were now transformed and absorbed into the new basic
motive of modern Humanism, that of nature and freedom. The nature motive
aimed at establishing an all-encompassing natural science capable of explain-
ing whatever there is in causal natural scientific categories. The freedom mo-
tive actually gave birth to this science ideal and it manifested itself in the per-
sonality ideal, that is, the ideal of an autonomous human personality. Yet, as
soon as reality is entirely comprehended in terms of exact (natural causal)
laws, then ultimately the human personality itself is also reduced to a mere
phenomenon of nature – an atom among atoms, a cause among causes and an
effect among effects – fully determined by the law of causality and therefore
stripped of all freedom!
The driving force of the science ideal soon captured the reflections of
Machiavelli (1469-1527), Bodin (1530-1596) and Hobbes (1588-1679).They
attempted to understand society completely in terms of the actions of individ-
ual human beings. The radical ideas of Machiavelli reflected the society in
which he lived, stamped by a continuous power-struggle and guided by
amoral political practices, accompanied by astounding instances of corruption
also manifesting themselves in diplomacy. The humanist urge to deny any
God-given world-order, caused Machiavelli to view the state as an artificial
creation that can be constructed, changed and adapted to the needs of the day.
The authority of state-government was captured by Bodin in the concept of
sovereignty. Yet his understanding of the state still adhered to the traditional
(universalistic) perspective which holds that the state is the encompassing
whole of society. In Book III (Chapter 7) of his work on the state, he explicitly
245
characterizes the relationship between the family, corporations and colleges

to the state as that between the whole (the state) and its parts.1
Bodin opposed the views of Machiavelli by accepting that the government
of a state is bound both to natural law and divine law. The implication was
that he accepted the classical principle of natural law, namely pacta sunt
servanda (contracts ought be respected and kept). Unfortunately he believed
that the state has an absolute and original competence to the formation of law
within its territory.
In the thought of Thomas Hobbes the modern science ideal served as the
basis for the rational reconstruction society by means of a social contract - on
the basis of the atoms of the state, the individuals. When a multitude of indi-
viduals are united, a Common-Wealth or Civitas emerges on the assumption
that every individual gives up the right of self-governance while authorizing
one person who has sovereign power (Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 17 - see
Hobbes 1651:227-228). This Agreement or Covenant, instituted by everyone
with every one, authorizes the representative of the multitude “every one, as
well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it” - to which Hobbes adds
the remark that the multitude “shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements,
of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own”
(Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 18 - see Hobbes 1651:228-229).
Hobbes holds that “because the major part hath by consenting voices de-
clared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is
be contended to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by
the rest ... or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he
might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever” (Leviathan,
Part II, Chapter 18 - see Hobbes 1651:228-229). 2 Since every person “volun-
tarily entered into the Congregation” such that “the major part hath by con-
senting voices declared a Soveraigne” those who “dissented must now con-
sent with the rest” - refusing to do this would be unjust (Leviathan, Part II,
Chapter 18 - see Hobbes 1651:231).
The outcome of the political theory of Hobbes is therefore totalitarian and
absolutistic - no one can ever complain because the unlimited power of the
Soveraigne derives from those who authorized all his deeds to be their own
actions.
13.7 Locke and Rousseau
The development of modern thought produced many thinkers who aimed at
advancing theories of law and the “just state” - with the intention to guarantee
various basic (civil) rights. A key element in these theories is found in the
1 “… sowie zwischen diesen und dem Staat verhält es sich ähnlich wie mit dem Unterschied
zwischen dem Ganzen und seinenTeilen” (Bodin, 1981:521).
2 The theories of a social contract hypothetically assume a state of nature. For Hobbes this
state of nature, preceding the civil state, was characterized by a “Warre of every one against
every one” (Leviathan, Part I - Hobbes, 1651:185). The Latin phrase is: bellum omnium con-
tra omnes.
246
Chapter 13
above-mentioned autonomy ideal which is, as we noted, embodied in the new

ideal of freedom (the personality ideal). Rousseau explicitly defines freedom
in the spirit of this idea of autonomy: “freedom is obedience to a law which we
prescribe to ourselves” (Rousseau, 1975:247). 1
John Locke continues the natural law tradition and explicitly identifies it
with human reason: “The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1690:119 -
Chapter II, §6). Later on he adds the qualification of being eternal to the law
of nature: “Thus the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men” (Locke,
1690:185 - Chapter XI, §135).
His portrayal of “man in the state of Nature” is that such a person is free and
is the “absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest
and subject to nobody” (Locke, 1690:179 - Chapter IX, §123). This emphasis
on individual autonomy - the absolute lord - evidently opposes every form of
super- and subordination between human beings. On the same page it prompts
Locke therefore to ask “why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and
subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?” He does that
against the background of his follow-up remark that within the state of nature
all is coordinated equally as kings: “for all being kings as much as he, every
man his equal.”
The only reason Locke can provide for leaving the state of nature is that this
state is very unsafe and insecure and is “constantly exposed to the invasion of
others,” threatening “the enjoyment of the property he has in this state”
(Locke, 1690:179 - Chapter IX, §123). In the final analysis it turns out that
Locke does not terminate the state of nature when, via the social contract, the
civil state is entered (on the basis of a majority decision - see Locke, 1690:165
- Chapter VIII, §97). Only two rights are given up, relative to two particular
powers “man” has in the state of nature. These powers are (i) “to do whatever
he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission
of the law of Nature” and (ii) “the power a man has in the state of Nature ... to
punish the crimes committed against that law” (Locke, 1690:179 - Chapter
IX, §128). Only so “much as the law of Nature gave him for the preservation
of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to the
commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power” (Locke, 1690:179 - Chap-
ter XI, §135).
The civil state is therefore merely a continuation of the state of nature, di-
rected at civil freedom, but not accounting for freedom and equality in a pub-
lic legal sense. Locke does make an appeal to the salus publica, but he fails to
give a delimited content to the idea of the public good, in spite of his guide-
line: “Salus populi suprema lex is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that
1 Remember that the term autos means “self” and nomos means “law.”
247
he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err” (Locke, 1690:197 - Chap-

ter XIII, §158).
However, the problem is that no precise delimitation is given to the salus
populi or to the public good. Locke frequently speaks of life, liberty and prop-
erty. The latter actually embraces all the subjective rights of an individual and
the end of government is to protect the members of society in their lives, lib-
erty and property. The legislative is appreciated as “supreme power” (Locke
1690:182 - Chapter IX, §131) that can only govern by the consent of society
and by the “authority received from them.” This notion of “society” does not
specify any limits to the supreme legislative power: “and therefore all the obe-
dience, which by the most solemn ties anyone can be obliged to pay, ulti-
mately terminates in this supreme power” (Locke 1690:184 - Chapter XI,
§131). Stating on the next page that this “power in the utmost bounds of it is
limited to the public good of the society” merely underscores the problem: the
supreme power can do anything in the name of the (unlimited) public good.
Notwithstanding his view that all human beings are born free and equal,
Locke’s classical liberal idea of the state does not support universal suffrage.
He is satisfied with the restriction of the right to vote to the privileged classes,
as was the case in the British monarchy of his time. The implication is that for
Locke democracy is merely a means in service of the protection of the inalien-
able human rights of the citizens, without containing a guarantee for public le-
gal freedom and equality. Although he intends to restrict the government to do
as little as possible, in order to provide the citizens with a maximum of free-
dom, he did not come up with a criterion demarcating unlimited actions of the
government on behalf of the “public good.” Apart from the two rights given
up, the civil state merely continues the state of nature and thus at most opts for
civil freedom. It was Rousseau who appeared to have given the decisive step
to the domain of public law, embodied in his aim to secure public legal
freedom.
In the thought of Rousseau the theme of popular sovereignty, in its connec-
tion to the idea of law as an expression of the general will, coccupies a central
position in his famous Contrat Social (1762). Analogous to Locke’s views,
Rousseau holds that the Sovereign has no force other than the legislative
power and that laws are “solely the authentic acts of the general will” (Rous-
seau, 1762:74 - Book II, Chapter XII). At the same time Rousseau transcends
Locke’s understanding of the social contract and what it produced. According
to Rousseau all human rights are surrendered by entering into the social con-
tract, which then provides the basis for all the rights obtained in the civil state:
“For the State, in relation to its members, is master of all their goods by the so-
cial contract, which, within the State, is the basis of all rights” (Rousseau,
1762:17 - Book I, Chapter IX).
Although both Locke and Rousseau proceeds from an atomistic (individu-
alistic) understanding of the state of nature, their ways part when the result of
the contract is assessed, because for Rousseau the contract gives rise to a
248
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transpersonal collectivity, the general will as sovereign. It is made possible in

that each participant “gives himself absolutely.” Yet, “[A]t once, in place of
the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association cre-
ates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assem-
bly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity,
its life, and its will” (Rousseau, 1762:13 - Book I, Chapter VI). Through the
contract the atomistic individuals are transformed into indivisible parts of the
new whole, the general will: “Each of us puts his person and all his power in
common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate
capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Rous-
seau, 1762:13 - Book I, Chapter VI). In other words, the social contract trans-
forms the individualistic (atomistic) condition of the state of nature into the
universalistic (holistic) whole embodied in the volonté générale - which
unerlies his view that law is “purely the declaration of the general will” (Rous-
seau, 1762:79 - Book III, Chapter XV).1 He even identifies the general will
with law by speaking of “the general will or the law” (Rousseau, 1762:49 -
Book III, Chapter I).
The crucial question is: Are there any limits to the law-making power of the
general will? The key to answering this question is found in Rousseau’s con-
ception regarding the power of the general will: “As nature gives each man
absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body poli-
tic absolute power over all its members also” (Rousseau, 1762:24 - Book III,
Chapter IV).
Social contract theory is inspired by the modern natural science ideal, aim-
ing at a rational reconstruction of society and law in terms of autonomous in-
dividuals within the (hypothetically) assumed state of nature. However, moti-
vated by the personality ideal of modern Humanism, Rousseau hoped to
safe-guard human freedom within the civil state. Yet, in the final analysis his
construction of freedom inevitably terminated in a totalitarian view. If law
flows from the general will which can only come to expression within the
state, then the distinction between state law and non-state law is eliminated
The internal law of every societal form of life distinct from the state then turns
out to be subjected to the general will, for Rousseau’s approach does not ac-
knowledge the internal legal relationships of religious groups. marriages, ed-
ucational institutions and the like. Rousseau’s view therefore contains no
guarantee that the law intrinsic to schools, firms, marriages, families, and
1 According to Rousseau most of the time there exists a big difference between the will of ev-
eryone (‘la volonté de tous’) and the general will (‘la volonté générale’). The “latter considers
only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more
than a sum of particular wills” (Rousseau, 1762:23 - Book II, Chapter III). See Article 6 of the
Declaration on Human Rights of the French revolution: “Law is an expression of the general
will.”
249
churches is protected against infringements from the state. Law remains of

one kind only: state law.1
While Rousseau strived to liberate himself from the enslaving grip of the
dominant natural science ideal of his time by envisioning, through the social
contract, the establishment of a new and higher civil state in which public
freedom and equality would reign, the personality ideal in the final analysis
lost the battle, as it is clearly seen in the central line of argumentation running
through his Contrat Social:
(1) Freedom is obedience to the law which we have prescribed to ourselves.
(2) Through the social contract the abstract individuals are transformed into
indivisible parts of the collective whole - which emerges from the con-
tract as the general will with its own communal unity, life and will.
(3) The contract serves as the basis of all rights within the civil state and en-
tails that the general will is the true will of each participating individual
(which is different from the “will of all”).
(4) Dissent by any minority in fact opposes the general will, which is sup-
posed to be the own will of each indivisible part of it.
(5) Those who are not conforming to the general will are actually not obey-
ing their own will and is therefore not free - for freedom solely exists
when we obey the law which we have prescribed to ourselves.
(6) Finally, on the basis of the “absolute power [of the general will] over all
its members” Rousseau draws the ultimate totalitarian conclusion - dis-
senters should be forced to be free: “... ce qui ne signifie autre chose
sinon qu’on le forcera à être libre” (see the original French text -Rous-
seau, 1975:246)!2
The inner structure of Rousseau’s view of (state) law is just as totalitarian as
the view portrayed by Hobbes in his Leviathan - the only difference is that
Rousseau substituted the monarch of Hobbes with the general will- but the le-
gal power of both is unlimited.
13.8 Kant and Hegel
Immanuel Kant (1724-1801) restricted the classical humanistic science ideal
to the world of sensory experiences (phenomena - theoretical reason) in order
to open up room for the primacy of the personality ideal of autonomous moral
freedom (practical reason - the human personality as an ethical end-in-itself).
He equates freedom with being “independent from the coercive arbitrariness
of another person” (Kant, 1797-1798, AB:45). If my action can co-exist with
1 For example, Rousseau advocates a civil religion (“la religion civile”) with dogmas deter-
mined by the sovereign. In this respect he is just as intolerant as the churches of his time:
“While it can compel no one to believe them - it can banish from the State whoever does not
believe them” (see Rousseau, 1975:334-335; Rousseau, 1762:114 - Book IV, Chapter VIII).
2 Rousseau did not remember that he appreciated force negatively since it cannot create right.
Therefore he distinguished it from “legitimate powers”: “... force does not create right, and
[that] we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers” (Rousseau, 1762:6 - Book I, Chapter
III).
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the freedom of every other person according to a general law, then, according
to Kant, we encounter the general principle of law (Kant, 1797-1798, B:33).
In this general formulation nothing specific of the jural aspect of reality is
present. Much rather the ideal of autonomous freedom here opts for
coordinated relations while rejecting relations of super- and subordination.
Every injustice is an obstacle of freedom according to general laws. An in-
justice can only be restored when a force is installed against this injustice.
Such a prevention of an impediment to freedom is in agreement with freedom
according to general laws (Kant, 1797-1798, B:35). But this solution gener-
ates a tension with Kant’s ideal of autonomous (juridical) freedom, for this as-
sumed autonomy is identical to the independence from the arbitrariness of an-
other person. Consequently, this deified freedom is incompatible with every
form of jural coercion. Moreover, because every impediment of freedom gen-
erates an injustice, the recourse taken to force entails that what is just actually
emerges from the hindrance of a hindrance.1 Thus justice is supposed to
emerge from the injustice done to an injustice. This looks like two minuses
yielding a plus - but how can justice arise when an injustice is done to an
injustice?
In the part treating legal theory (Rechtslehre) Kant accepts the general idea
of a social contract by referring to a non-jural (nicht-rechtlichen) condition
from which the step is taken into a civil state which is determined by laws and
a sufficient external power (Kant, 1797-1798, B:193-194). The atomistic
starting-point present in the theories of state and law of social contract theo-
rists is continued in Kant’s definition of the state: “A state (civitas) is the un-
ion of a collection of people under legal laws” (Kant, 1797-1798, B:194-195).
In following Rousseau he teaches that the legislative power only applies to the
united will of the people.
The possibility is always present that by taking a decision against someone
else such a person causes an injustice. But this is not possible when such a per-
son decides over himself or herself (volenti non fit iniuria). Consequently,
only the consenting and united will of all, insofar as everyone decides over all
and all over everyone, that is to say, only the general united will of the people
could be legislative (Kant, 1797-1798, B:195-196). Since Kant continues to
assign the legislation to freedom to the general will, it becomes impossible for
him to avoid the totalitarian and absolutistic consequences entailed in the
thought of Rousseau (and Hobbes).
Hegel derived one of his central thought-patterns from the natural scientific
discovery of electricity -positive, negative, spark. He employed it in the form
of thesis, antithesis, and (higher) synthesis (the latter incorporates and tran-
scends both thesis and antithesis). Art (Anschauung) and religion
1 “Folglich: wenn ein gewisser Gebruach der Freiheit selbst ein Hindernis der Freiheit nach
allgemeinen Gesetzen (d.i. unrecht) ist, so ist der Zwang, der diesen entgegengesetzt wird, als
Verhinderung eines Hindernisses der Freiheit mit der Freiheit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen
zusammenstimmend”(Kant, 1797-1798, B:35).
251
(Vorstellung) were incorporated in philosophy (pure, free concept) as the final

synthesis. Law belongs to the objective spirit which reveals itself in (abstract)
law, morality and ethics - the three main parts of his philosophy of law. Ethi-
cal life was the higher synthesis encompassing both law and morality. In
speaking of “law as such” and about “law in its universality,” disregarding
particular interests, he approximates the functional universality of the jural as-
pect of reality (Hegel, 1821:179 -Part I, § 81). Yet he holds that only
positivized law (Gesetz) is binding (has Verbindlichtkeit). The lawfulness of
positive law is the source of our knowledge of what is right or according to
law (Hegel, 1821:353 - Part III, § 212).
Civil society, according to Hegel, aims at the particular and common inter-
ests generated by the needs of individuals embraced by their externally orga-
nized association. The external state incorporates within its constitution pub-
lic life dedicated towards the aim and reality of what is substantially universal
through an external ordering regarding their particular and shared interests
(Hegel, 1821:301 - Part III, § 157).The state is to be viewed as being differen-
tiated and properly organized (“der Staat [ist] als ein gegliederted und
wahrhaft organisierter anzusehen”). (Hegel, 1821:396 - Part III, § 260). Hegel
here proceeds by applying the philosophical idea that a part should be ob-
served in its relation to the whole, also to the dependence of private legal laws
on the specific character of the state (Hegel, 1821:396 - Part III, § 261). This
encompassing appreciation of the state acquires its ultimate totalitarian state-
ment in Hegel’s following claim: “The people as state is the spirit in its sub-
stantial rationality and immediate reality, therefore the absolute power on
earth” (Hegel, 1821:486 - Part III, § 331).
The thought of Hegel (as well as those Fichte and Schelling) breathed the
spirit of a new appreciation of history. The latter highlights the tension be-
tween nature and freedom in the form of distinguishing the two sides of the
particular national character of a people (Volk) - its historical development
(seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung) and natural necessity
(Naturnotwendighkeit). (Hegel, 1821:65 - Introduction, § 3).The primacy as-
signed to the motive of freedom (the personality ideal) is clear from his con-
viction that within the highest truth (truth as such) the opposition of freedom
and necessity, spirit and nature, knowledge and object, law and drive, opposi-
tion and contradiction as such, whatever form it may assume, does not any
longer have any power (Hegel, 1931:149). The idea, the absolute Spirit,
which within nature merely is in itself, that is, not yet “in its truth” (Hegel,
1931:141), nonetheless has its highest determination in freedom: “Freedom is
the highest determination of the spirit” (Hegel, 1931:148)! 1
13.9 The Historical school and legal positivism
During the transition from the 18th to the 19th century the rise of historicism on
the one hand gave rise to a form of legal positivism which at once also chal-
lenged the long-standing legacy of natural law with its trust in eternal and im-
1 “Die Freiheit ist die höchste Bestimmung des Geistes.”
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mutable legal standards. In the first Volume of the newly established Journal
for Historical Legal Science (Zeitschrift für geschichtliche
Rechtswissenschaft) Von Savigny wrote in 1815 that law is a purely historical
phenomenon and that there is no immutable and eternal legal system of natural
law next to or above positive law (see Von Savigny, 1948:14 ff. - between
1840 and 1849 he published an eight volume work: System des heutigen
Römischen Rechts). In the first Volume of the latter work Von Savigny traces
the ultimate source of law to the “Volk” [nation] with its communal
“Volksgeist”. Positive law lives within the communal consciousness of the
dynamic life of the “Volksgeist”. Law is not brought forth by the arbitrariness
of the single members of the nation. Much rather positive law is generated by
the living and acting Volksgeist which is, not accidentally but of necessity, the
same law for the consciousness of each individual.1
In the subsequent development of legal thinking during the 19th century the
scene was dominated by two wings within the Historical school - the
Romanistic school of thought (Von Jehring and Puchta) and the Germanistic
school of thought (Otto von Gierke and his followers). Of course the emer-
gence of historicism within the science of law did not eliminate the natural law
tradition. However, another trend of thought also surfaced during the 19th cen-
tury, namely that of legal positivism. Jeremy Bentham is considered to be an
early legal positivist although John Austin is accredited for being the founder
of analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism.
Although Von Jehring commenced from the irrationalistic romanticism of
the historical school with its organic holism in his first phase (1842-1852), he
eventually, in his third phase (particularly since 1859 - in the third Volume of
his Geist des römischen Rechts), reverted to an individualistic understanding
of law and society. Kant identifies the competence to coerce with law.2 Hegel
added the role of the human will to the concept of law (see Hegel, 1821:179 - §
81). Von Jehring acknowledges these two elements but points out that it is
mistaken to allow the concept of subjective right to be absorbed by the will,
because the will does not in itself contain a measure and end. Without the lat-
ter it will, from a physiological point of view, be nothing but a force of nature,
and from an ethical perspective nothing but arbitrariness.3
The fact that neither an individualistic (atomistic) nor a holistic (universal-
istic) view of society succeeds in providing a foundation for the limited legal
power of the state, is clearly seen from the view defended by Von Jehring. It
1 “Esist dieses aber keinesweges so zu denken, alsob es die einzelnen Glieder des Volkes
wären, durch deren Willkür das Recht hervorgebracht würde; ... Vielmehr ist es der in allen
einzelnen gemeinschaftlich lebende und wirkendeVolksgeist, der das positive Recht erzeugt,
da also für das Bewußtseyn jedes Einzelnen, nicht zufällig sondern nothwendig, ein und
dasselbe Recht is” (Von Savigny, 1840:31).
2 “Recht und Befugnis zu zwingen bedeuten also einerlei” (Kant, 1797-1798:37).
3 “[W]enn hinter dem Willen nichts anderes steht, das ihm Maß und Ziel setzt, so ist er
physiologisch nichts als eine Naturkraft, ethisch nichts als die reineWillkür” (Von Jehring,
1865:165-166).
253
already appears in his formulation of the accepted view of law: “Law is the
sum-total of coercive norms which are valid within a state.” This definition
contains two key elements: norm and coercion. Since the state alone is to be
seen as the bearer of the Zwangmonopol, i.e., the monopoly of coercive
power, Von Jehring holds that only those norms affectuated by the state qual-
ify to be seen as legal norms. This says nothing more and nothing less than
that “the state is the sole source of law.”1 In this view there is no room left for
any original non-state competence to the formation of law.
The reaction of legal positivism during the course of the 19th century was
directed both against traditional natural law and against certain views of the
historical school. The criticism of natural law exercised by the latter is cen-
tered in the emphasis upon the outcome of historical development (the
“geschichtlich gewordenen”) as opposed to human-made law. Beling there-
fore refers to this view as “customary law positivism”
(Gewohnheitsrechts-Postivismus).2 In the orthodox sense of the term legal
positivism, which solely accepts positive law as a source of law, holds that all
positive law [Gesetz] is unqualified law [Recht], and finally that only
state-law counts.3
It is tempting to observe in legal positivism a reification of positive law.
However, different trends of thought acknowledge the reality and importance
of positive law for an understanding of law. What is typical of legal positivism
is that it overemphasizes the arbitrary element present in giving shape or form
to law- while abstracting from its material content. It disentangles the process
of law formation from any supra-individual or non-arbitrary jural principles.
In his work on the Province of Jurisprudence Determined from the year
1832, John Austin continues essential elements present in the thought of
Hobbes and Bodin, for he holds that “every positive law ... is set, ... by a sover-
eign individual or body, to a member or members of the independent political
society wherein its author is supreme” (Austin, 1832:350).
During the first decades of the 20th century two neo-Kantian schools of
thought not only dominated the philosophical landscape of the West for some
time, for they also had a significant influence on the philosophy of law. The
Marburg school was represented by Rudolph Stammler and Hans Kelsen,
1 “Nur diejenigen von der Gesellschaft aufgestellten Normen verdienen den Namen des
Rechts, welche den Zwang, oder, da, wie wir gesehen haben, der Staat allein das
Zwangsmonopol besitzt, welche den Staatszwang hinter sich haben, womit den implicite
gesagt ist, daß nur die vom Staate mit dieser Wirkung versehenen Normen Rechtsnormen
sind, oder daß der Staat die alleinige Quelle des Rechts ist” (Von Jehring, 1877:176).
2 In respect of the historical school he says:“indem sie die Würde des ‘geschichtlich
gewordenen’ im Gegensatz zum ‘gemachten’ Recht betonte, vertrat sie einen
Gewohnheitsrechts-Postivismus” (Beling, 1931:133).
3 For positivism it is the case that “nur das Gesetz Rechtsquelle ist; daß alles Gesetz
bedingungslos Recht is, und schließlich, daß nur das Staatsgesetz in Betracht kommt, so
haben wir den Positivismus im, wenn ich so sagen darf, orthodoxesten Sinne vor uns”
(Beling, 1931:134).
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Chapter 13
while Wilhelm Windelband, Heirich Rickert and Emil Lask belonged to the
Baden school.
In his critical positivism Kelsen continues key elements of the legal positiv-
ism of the 19th century, particularly the formal element which strips law from a
normative content. In his work on the philosophical foundations of the theory
of natural law and of legal positivism, reprinted without any alterations in
1928, he acknowledges that behind positivism a relativistic world-view hides
itself which cannot acknowledge absolute norms for human action. 1
In his discussion of legal positivism and the sources of law Raz explains
that the “moral value” or “moral merit” of law is fully dependent upon the
“contingent ... circumstances of the society to which it applies” (Raz,
1979:37). In the thought of Kant the split between Sein (is) and Sollen (ought)
is an expression of the basic conflict between nature and freedom (science
ideal and personality ideal) in the development of modern philosophy since
the Renaissance. In the Baden school of neo-Kantian thought this split as-
sumes the form of that between fact and value. Legal positivism gave its own
shape to this dualism, sometimes portrayed in the opposition of “social fact”
and “moral values or ideals.” Compare the way in which Raz characterizes the
“social thesis” of legal positivism: “Since the social thesis is that what is law is
a matter of social fact, and the identification of law involves no moral argu-
ment, it follows that conformity to moral values or ideals is in no way a condi-
tion for anything being a law or legally binding. Hence, the law’s conformity
to moral values and ideals is not necessary” (Raz, 1979:38). It is clear that le-
gal positivism thus eliminates the element of normativity from law, entailing
that the form of a law is combined with an arbitrary (social-historical varying)
content.
Add to this that the influence of legal positivism largely relies on a fairly
wide-spread conviction, namely that there are only two fundamental sources
of law - positive law (backed up by the state sovereign) and customary law
(subordinated to the former), and then it is clear that the eventual outcome of
these views will be both state absolutistic and a form of legal arbitrariness.
This legacy contributed substantially to the erosion of the modern idea of the
“just state” [Rechtsstaat], as it is found in the general theory of law advanced
by Hans Kelsen. In his doctrine of the sovereignty of law he dissolves the state
into a functional complex of legal norms.2 His conception is structured in such
a formal way that it is stripped of every idea of material normativity. This en-
ables him formally to appreciate an absolutistic dictatorship still as a
“Rechtsstaat” [just state]. In a different work, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin,
1 See the remark of Dooyeweerd (1967:257, note 1) as well as the Foreword of Kelsen’s work
on the problem of sovereignty and the theory of international law. In this Foreword, written
for the first edition of 1920, where he acknowledges legal positivism and explicitly mention
the relativity of a system of positive law (Kelsen, 1928a:VIII).
2 In his theory of pure law (“Reine Rechtslehre”) he identifies state and law [Recht]. Paragraph
41 states: “Die Identität von Staat und Recht” (Kelsen, 1960:289).
255
1925) we can observe how he struggles with the divide between formal
normativity and the fusion of “Rechtsstaat” and “Machtstaat” [just state and
power state]. He writes:
For a positivistic view, which does not absolutize the law [das Recht]
in natural law, the state is a King Midas, for whom whatever he
touches, turns into law. From a strict positivistic standpoint excluding
every form of natural law every state must be a “Rechtsstaat” in this
formal sense,... must be a coercive ordering. ... This is the concept of a
“Rechtsstaat” which is identical with the state as well as with law
(Kelsen, 1925:44).1
He also states that from a particular point of departure the entire coercive or-
dering of the state must be qualified as an organization of power. But the op-
position between power and right [Macht und Recht], which comes to expres-
sion in the juxta-positioning of the legal aim and the power aim, is not at all
appropriate for subdividing the possible contents of state order, for the sake of
providing a material typification of states themselves. For it precisely belongs
to the essence of the state that in it power becomes law.2
Kelsen’s position is further complicated by the underlying dialectic of na-
ture and freedom. He holds that as a natural (physical) law, the law of causal-
ity applies to whatever factually occurs. Instead of exploring what is caused
by our will he argues for the objective causal determination of the human will
(Kelsen, 1960:100). And Kelsen indeed considers it undeniable that the hu-
man will is objectively determined by the law of causality (see Kelsen,
1991:24 ff.).3
Beling distinguishes between a “positivistic natural law” and an “absolute
natural law” but states that the dividing line between these two conceptions of
natural law does not coincide, without any further qualification, with that be-
1 “Für eine positivistische Betrachtung, die das Recht nicht im Naturrecht verabsolutiert, ist
der Staat ein König Midas, dem alles, was er ergreift, zu Recht wird. Und darum muß, vom
Standpunkt des Rechtspositivismus ausgesehen, jeder Staat ein Rechtsstaat in demSinne
sein, das alle Staatsakte Rechtsakte sind, weil und sofern sie eine als Rechtsordnung zu
qualifizierende Ordnung realisieren”
2 “Ja, von einem gewissen Standpunkt aus muß man die ganze Staatliche Zwangsordnung,
...als Machtorganisation qualifizieren. Der Gegensatz von Macht und Recht, der in der
Gegenüberstellung von Rechts- und Macht-Zweck [zum Ausdruck kommt], ...ist gänzlich
ungeeignet, eine Einteilung der möglichen Inhalte staatlicher Ordnung und so hin eine
materielle Typisierung der Staaten selbst zu liefern. Denn das ist ja gerade das Wesen des
Staates, daß in ihm die Macht zum Recht wird” (Kelsen, 1925:43-44).
3 According to him factual events are subject to the law of causality and they belong to the do-
main of is ‘Sein’. The sphere of the ought (Sollen) is characterized by Geltung (having ef-
fect). The equivalents of this term that he mentions are: “in Kraft” (“in force”). Kelsen holds
the view that the science of law does not operate with factual statements - rather it employs
Soll aussagen, statements of ought to be. In a follow-up article we shall show that the way in
which Kelsen uses the terms Geltung and in Kraft is antinomic.
256
Chapter 13
tween the “eternity” or “changefulness” of opinions regarding natural law

norms.1
Since Greek philosophy reflections on the nature of law had to account for the
relationship between constancy (which persists over time) and change. We
noted that more recently, in 1931, Beling still partially distinguished two
trends within legal positivism in terms of what is eternal and what is change-
ful. Throughout the history of philosophical contemplation on what law is, the
idea of order assumed a central place. Various specifications surfaced, such as
natural law (lex naturalis / ius naturale), divine law (lex divina / ius divina),
lex civilis, ius publicum, and so on. The initial connection with a universal
cosmic law (logos) eventually obtained a more specific focus, directed at the
function of law within human society. One or another view of the relationship
between individual and society also constantly accompanied the understand-
ing of law, initially with a universalistic (or: holistic) emphasis on the state as
highest whole of human society (supposed to accomplish the moral perfection
of humankind), and later on, in medieval scholasticism, on the church as
supra-natural institute of grace, taking humankind to eternal bliss.
An understanding of the jural nature of law was constantly hampered by the
confusion of law and morality, mainly caused by the identification of all
forms of normativity with morality. What was even more serious is the identi-
fication of law with state law. Those who defended the latter view never suc-
ceeded in avoiding state absolutism and totalitarianism.
Since the Renaissance the ideal of an autonomously free personality gave
birth to the modern science ideal which aimed at a rational reconstruction of
reality from its simplest elements. In this way human society was constructed
from autonomous individuals. This gave birth to the idea of a hypothetical so-
cial contract. However, the various theories of a social contract never suc-
ceeded in escaping from the impasse of atomistic and universalistic views of
state and society.
Subsequent theoretical reflection continuously struggled with the inherent
tension between nature and freedom, for this basic motive of modern philoso-
phy directed the understanding of law during the last few centuries, high-
lighted in our preceding analysis of the thought of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and
Hegel, as well as the dominant trends of thought of the 19th century.
In order to arrive at a understanding of the state we must now proceed with
a discussion of the age-old question: What is Law?
1 “Die Schnittlinie zwischen diesen beiden Naturrechtsauffassungen ... fällt nicht unbedingt
zusammen mit dem Gegensatz der Meinungen über ‘ewigkeit’ oder ‘veränderlichkeit’ der
Naturrechtsnormen” (Beling, 1931:137).
257
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Foreword

There are many works on Dooyeweerd's philosophy available. However,

General Remark on how to read this book

Dooyeweerd‘s Inaugural Address

Unity and Diversity

Number and space:

Discerning Modal Aspects

The Nature and succession of

Communication – the “marriage” between the

Time and Modal Aspects

Concept and Idea

The history of Philosophy, Systematic

Philosophical Assumptions behind the

Inevitable presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Law, State and Society

In 1917 Herman Dooyeweerd completed his legal studies on a dissertation en-

1920s he broadened his perspective by contemplating general philosophical

of specialization), before he ventured to make public its general philosophical

uished from both Roman Catholicism and modern Humanism. However,

2.1 The early intellectual development of Dooyeweerd

teachers, Fabius, emphasized the divine character of law. While considering

In 1922 Dooyeweerd was approached by the Dutch Minister of Defence,

Colijn and Idenburg wanted to pursue an option of the Statutes of the

2.2 The main contours of the Inaugural Address

The prominence of the root-dialectic directing humanistic thought, causing

Re (a): the heuristic function

As illustration of the peculiar character of analogies in the legal sphere, con-

(positivization) of law [cultural-historical analogy]; juridical meaning and ju-

In addition to this Dooyeweerd also provided a detailed analysis of what he

The other important legacy of the Inaugural Address is found in the

than-logical diversity within creation, it simply would have been impossible

3.4.1 The modal aspects of reality

3.4.2 Uniqueness and coherence

and an omission, from a juridical perspective, are jural acts! Consequently,

3.4.3 Sphere sovereignty and sphere universality

bolism and catabolism), growth (differentiation and integration), adaptation,

economic life, we may observe examples of analogies between different as-

relationship between humans and what is considered to be divine. Economic

In his reflections on the notion of infinity the famous German mathemati-

3.5.2 More about analogies of force, validity, causality and life

Hobbes (1588-1679), Thomasius (1622-1684), Rousseau (1712-1778) and

Faith aspect Jural/legal certainty (“good faith”)

Ethical aspect Jural/legal morality (fault, equity, etc.)

Jural aspect [Meaning nucleus: retribution]

Aesthetic aspect Jural/legal harmony

Economic aspect Jural/legal economy (avoiding excess)

Social aspect Jural/legal interaction

Lingual aspect Jural/legal signification and interpretation

Cultural-historical aspect Jural power / Legal competence

Logical-analytical aspect Jural lawfulness and unlawfulness

Sensitive aspect Jural/legal feeling (desire, will)

Botical aspect Jural/legal life/jural organ

Physical aspect Jural/legal dynamics (causality)

Kinematical aspect Jural/legal constancy

Spatial aspect Jural/legal sphere (domain)

Arithmetical aspect Jural/legal order (unity and multiplicity)

As a result, Fichter's philosophical prejudice, convincing him that sociol-

Bernays was a full-blown mathematician who studied under formidable fig-

Gödel, who grew up in Austria, is rated in the first place as an outstanding

tality of all existing things into two categories” (quoted by Yourgrau,

Eudoxos has already approximated the discovery of the modern calculus

4.2 Key distinctions in the mathematical thought of Paul Bernays

He reflected on what is universal and what is individual, on what is discrete