G.R. No.

L-129 December 19, 1945 We believe and so hold that the petition for habeas corpus is untenable. It seeks no discharge of petitioner
from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not
TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA, petitioner, confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military
vs. measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.
WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.
Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military Commission
Col. Harry E. Clarke and Lt. Col. Walter C. Hendrix for petitioner. is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no
Maj. Robert M. Kerr for respondent. order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo appeared as amici curiae.
Furthermore, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be joined as
respondent. As we have said in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), ". . . an attempt of our civil courts
to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be
considered as a violation of this country's faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold."
MORAN, C.J.: (Emphasis supplied) We have said this in a case where Filipino citizens were under confinement, and we
can say no less in a case where the person confined is an enemy charged with the most heinous atrocities
Tomoyuki Yamashita, erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army committed against the American and Filipino peoples.
in the Philippines, and now charged before an American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes
ever committed against the American and Filipino peoples, comes to this Court with a petition for habeas True that the rule was made applicable in time of war, and there is a conflict of opinion as to whether war
corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army has already terminated. War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
Forces, Western Pacific. It is alleged therein that petitioner after his surrender became a prisoner of war of hostilities, incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. "An important
the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an incident to a conduct of a war is the adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and
accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to
General Styer; and he now asks that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the thwart or impede our military effort to have violated the law of the war." ( Ex parte Quirin, 317 US., 1; 63
Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him, upon the following grounds: Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed, the power to create a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals
is an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a Military Commission "has jurisdiction so long
(1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction; as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to
the effective date of a treaty agreement." (Cowles, Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar

(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the Military Commission cannot Association Journal, June, 1944.)

exercise jurisdiction therein;

Upon the other hand, we have once said (Payomo vs. Floyd, 42 Phil., 788), — and this applicable in time of

(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial against war as well as the time of peace — that this Court has no power to review upon habeas corpus the

petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore, the Military proceedings of a military or naval tribunal, an that, in such case, "the single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.

Commission has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner; That being established, the habeas corpus must be denied and the petitioner discharged." (In re Grimley, 137
U.S., 147; 11 Sup. Ct., 54; 34 La. ed., 636.) Following this rule in the instant case, we find that the Military

(4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of war; and Commission has been validly constituted and it has jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner and
over the offenses with which he is charged.

(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission purports to be acting
denied the petitioner a fair trial.

1
The Commission has been validly constituted by Lieutenant General Styer duly issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army Force Pacific, in accordance in authority vested in him
and with radio communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as shown by Exhibits C, E, G, and H, attached
by petition. Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the Land Welfare a Military Commission for the trial and
punishment of the war criminals must be designated by the belligerent. And the belligerent's representative in
the present case is none other than the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific.
According to the Regulations Governing the Trial of the War Criminals in the Pacific, attached as Exhibit F
to the petition, the "trial of persons, units and organizations accused as a war criminals will be the Military
Commissions to be convened by or under the authority of the Commander in Chief, United States Army
Forces, Pacific." Articles of War Nos. 12 and 15 recognized the "Military Commission" appointed by military
command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of the war not
ordinarily tried by court martial. (Ex parte Quirin, supra.) And this has always been the United States military
practice at since the Mexican War of 1847 when General Winfield Scott took the position that, under the
laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a Military Commission. This
is upon the theory that since the power to create a Military Commission is an aspect of waging war, Military
Commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.
The Military Commission thus duly constituted has jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner and over
the offenses with which he is charged. It has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by reason of his
having fallen into the hands of the United States Army Forces. Under paragraph 347 of the Rules of the
Land Warfare, "the commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are
committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."
As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over war crimes, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as
including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status rights
and duties and of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. By the Articles of War, and
especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that
military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces,
has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by
sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons
and offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly
the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.)
2
Petitioner is charged before the Military Commission sitting at Manila with having permitted members of his
command "to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States and of
its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines," crimes and atrocities which in the bills of particulars,
are described as massacre and extermination of thousand and thousands of unarmed noncombatant civilians
by cruel and brutal means, including bayoneting of children and raping of young girls, as well as devastation
and destruction of public, or private, and religious property for no other motive than pillage and hatred. These
are offenses against the laws of the war as described in paragraph 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare.
It is maintained, however, that, according to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the
Pacific. "the Military Commission . . . shall have jurisdiction over all of Japan and other areas occupied by
the armed forces commanded by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific" (emphasis
supplied), and the Philippines is not an occupied territory. The American Forces have occupied the Philippines
for the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and the creation of
a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war of
liberation.
It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice before trial was
begun against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But there is
nothing in that Convention showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of Military Commissions
appointed by victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the unconditional surrender of Japan and her
acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Ultimatum are a clear waiver of such a notice. It may be stated,
furthermore, that Spain has severed her diplomatic relation of Japan because of atrocities committed by the
Japanese troops against Spaniards in the Philippines. Apparently, therefore, Spain has ceased to be the
protecting power of Japan.
And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of procedure and evidence being followed by the Military Commission
in the admission of allegedly immaterial or hearsay evidence, cannot divest the commission of its jurisdiction
and cannot be reviewed in a petition for the habeas corpus. (25 Am. Jur., 218; Collins vs. McDonald, 258 U.
S. 416; 66 Law. ed., 692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).
For all foregoing, petition is hereby dismissed without costs. lawphi1.net
Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, PETITIONER, VS. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OPPOSITOR.
D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lover court a petition for naturalization, accompanied with supporting
affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the
hearing. The petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was not held on that date
because the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case remained pending
until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March, 1945. The case was
declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947) and the evidence was presented on August 28 and September 30,
1947. On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.
Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the witnesses for the petitioner, he
did not file an opposition or presented any evidence. The lower court made the findings of fact in the
following paragraphs of its resolution:
"Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship by naturalization under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 473 as amended by Act 535.
"The record shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization supported by the affidavits of
ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of Camarines Sur. In the preceding year,
in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of this country. Notice
of the hearing was published as required by law.
"It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian, having first seen the light of
day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct
Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. World War I found him in the military service of this
Government. In 1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy and was sent to the Navy AviationyfSchool.
He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was later transferred to the eastern front in Poland, and much
later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor. In the latter part of the war, but before the Bussian capitulation,
he was transferred to the British Air Force under which he served for fourteen months. When the revolution
broke out in Russia in 19175 he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the
Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to
join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he found
his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in
March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he
resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his
permanent residence since May 1925. He has remained a resident of this municipality, except for a brief
3
period from 1942 to July, 1945 when by reason of his underground activities he roamed the mountains of
Caranoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present
time.
"The applicant is married to a Filipina by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son
named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in Saint Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school
duly recognized by the Government.
"The applicant is shop superintendent of A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, with about eighty Filipino
employees working under him. He receives an annual salary of £13,200 with free quarters and house
allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.
"The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles with the Filipinos,
attending parties, dances and other social functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any crime. On the
other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period
of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the community.
"Although he could have lived in ease by maintaining good relations with the enemy by reason of his being
Russian-born during the years preceding the declaration of war by Russia against Japan, the applicant of his
own volition choosed to cast his lot with the guerrilla movement and fought the enemy in several encounters
in the Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with rank of major.
Upon the arrival of the forces of liberation he was attached to the American Army from April to June, 1945.
"Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present
Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State,
much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He
is not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine
opposing all organized governments. He does not believe in the necessity of propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a
believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious
disease."
Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed resolution. We will consider them separately.
I
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of intention to become a Filipino
citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a basis for the petition of naturalization. The question
calls for the application of the following provision of Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Laws:
"No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate
showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued."
Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to establish the fact that appellee
had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.
In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be read:
"I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as shown by the attached certificate
of arrival or landing certificate of residence."
The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a Filipino citizen were
filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and the certificate alluded to
has not been reconstituted.
Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a declaration
finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the above-quoted section 5 of the Commonwealth Act uses
the words "has been issued."
Appellee suggests that we should not consider the question here raised by appellant, the latter having failed
to raise it in the lower court and points out that there is testimonial evidence showing appellee's arrival in
March, 1923, and that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and the testimony of petitioner has
not been refuted. Appellee alleges that the office of the President has certified that it is a matter of record
that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered the Philippines under the command of Admiral
Stark, the facts regarding arrival of the latter fleet being a matter of common knowledge, widely publicized
in the newspapers at the time, of which this Court may properly take judicial notice under Section 5 of Rule
123. When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a US destroyer and personally investigated
by Governor General Wood who, later, took the matter up with the authorities in Washington in lengthy
correspondence, and the 1,200 persons manning the fleet were allowed to land and to remain in the
Philippines or proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were allowed to go to the United States
and given free transportation on the naval transport "Meritt." The ships of the fleet were sold in the Philippines.
The undisputed fact that petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25 years,
without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have been regularly performing their
duties and would have arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be
taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival has been
issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration of July,
1940, that the certificate had actually been attached to the declaration, because it cannot be supposed that
the receiving official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as attached
thereto.
4
We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under Section ? of the Naturalization Law, failure to
reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document intended to prove may
be shown by other competent evidence.
II
The second assignment of error touches upon two questions, that the lower court erred (1) in not finding
that appellee has not established a legal residence in the Philippines, and (2) in not finding that he cannot
speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages.
The first question has already been disposed of in the above discussion. Perusal of the testimonies on
record, leads to the conclusion that petitioner has shown legal residence in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten years as required by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473.
As to the next question, appellant alleges that in the oral test at the hearing, it was demonstrated that
petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the Filipino language that petitioner alleges to know, and he cannot
speak it as he was not able to translate from English to Bicol questions asked by the court and the
provincial fiscal, although, in the continuation of the hearing on September 30, 1947) "surprisingly enough, he
succeeded answering correctly 1 in Bicol the questions propounded by his counsel, however, he fumbled and
failed to give the translation of such a common word as 'love' which the fiscal asked of him."
The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English and Bicol and there seems
to be no question about the competency of the judge who made the 'pronouncement, because he has shown
by the appealed resolution ;and by his questions propounded to appellee, that he has command of both
English and Bicol.
The law has not set a specific standard of the required ability to speak and write any of the principal
Philippine languages. A great number of standards can be set. There (are experts in English who say that
Shakespeare has used in his works 15,000 different English words, and the King's Bible about 10,000, while
about 5,000 are used by the better educated persons and about 3,000 by the average individual. While there
may be persons ambitious enough to have a command of the about 600,000 words recorded in the Webster's
International Dictionary, there are authorities who would reduce basic English to a few hundred words. Perhaps
less than one hundred well selected words will be enough for the ordinary purposes of daily life.
There is reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken considering the fact that, after
he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol
region, took part in encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla until
the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol was able to get along
with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance movement, we believe that his knowledge of
the language satisfies the requirement of the law.
But appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support petitioner's allegation that he
can write too in the Bicol language. There is, however, on record circumstantial evidence from which it can
be concluded that petitioner ought to know also how to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the important
Philippine language?,uses the same alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to write Bicol than
English, because it is phonetic. Vowels and consonants have in them single and not interchangeable phonetic
values, while English words deviate very often from the basic sounds of the alphabet. The ability to write
cannot be denied to a person like petitioner, who has undergone the exacting technical training to be able
to render services as flier in the Russian Naval Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the British Air Forces
during the first World War. The difference between the Cyrillic alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our
Roman alphabet, cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the ability to use the latter. A person who has shown
the command of English which can be seen in his testimony on record can easily make use of an alphabet
of twenty or more letters universally used in this country where he has been residing continuously for 25
years.
III
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding pppellee stateless and not a Russian citizen and in
not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine citizenship under section
(h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and character of the
Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious
to require further evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no
allegiance to the Russian Communist government and, because he has been at war with it, he fled from
Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative
job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the
freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness
he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his
release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and
misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any
bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.
IV
The fourth and last assignment of error need not be discussed, it being only a sequel of the other
assignments and has necessarily been disposed of in their discussion.
The appealed resolution is affirmed.

It is contended that petitioner failed to show that tinder the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian
citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof. The controversy centers on the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian citizen or is
stateless.

Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His testimony
supports the lower court's pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless refugee in this country. Appellant points
out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is a citizen or subject of the Empire of
Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to exist since the Czars were overthrown in 1917 by the
Bolshevists, and petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government established after the
overthrow of the Czarist Government.

We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony, besides
being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorships has
scattered throughought the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country
and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort
to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate
ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the
hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.