The pronouncement in Co v.

Militar was later reiterated in Spouses

Pascual v. Spouses Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome
Boneo, et al.,[21] wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person
who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[22]

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established
fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous
possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of
ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these
circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession
through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case
against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful
detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious
means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession
of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the
property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will
not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented
proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession
of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make
out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the
persons withholding from another of the possession of the real
property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the formers right to hold possession under the
contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer
case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such
possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of
the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was

1
 initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be
proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued

possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father,
except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established
when respondents possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite
for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the

sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action
as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real

property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature,

jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year
from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right
to physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by

contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice

by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters
right of possession;

2
 (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to

vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with
the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer
Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have
consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession of
the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in
the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful
detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father

engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case
show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he
acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name
under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their
possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to
initiate any action to fortify their ownership.

CORPUZ VS. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012

X======================================x

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio),

where one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Here, the issue of
rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the defendant is
the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.[7] The
essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue
of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the
possessors right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the
possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the
right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or
comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the

3
action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received
by the defendant.
Xxxxxxxxx

To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must
then be established. With the averment here that the respondent’s possession was by mere
tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of
tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her
or her predecessor’s tolerance, or her co-heirs’ permission for him to occupy the disputed
property.31 But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not
clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely tolerated by
Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for review indicates:

Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioner’s tolerance of the respondent’s possession of
the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal
from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the
Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry because the
complaint contained no allegation thathis entry in the property had been by force,
intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

QUIJANO VS. ATTY. AMANTE, G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014

X------------------------------X

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful
detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, the defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for
unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.25

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction
of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In
the absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26

In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in support of his
unlawful detainer complaint:

3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned
and registered in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.

xxxx

6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale,
thereafter the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his
name.

4
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever,
much less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful
and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.

8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff

referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the
defendants to vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx
hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."

9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to
vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)

The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the requirements for
unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied
contract.

In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from
the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the
defendant’s possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to
vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph
8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand
letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful
withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as
the alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.

The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents occupied
the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint nor any
supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the respondents entered the property
or who had granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the
bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.

In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s definition and
characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to
do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s
property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits
them out of friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a
person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his
property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a
well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be
acquired by prescription." Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is
tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By
virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of
possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-
existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied]

The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must have been
present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29

It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a complaint for
unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the
defendant’s possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s
allegation that the entry to the subject property was unlawful from the very beginning. The
Court then ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.

5
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when a
complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In
Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
the plaintiff; and (2) the respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by
mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they did
not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the
occupation of the property by the defendant:

These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that its cause of action is
for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of
the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be
present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.

As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation of the premises has
not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — an action that
had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of
defendant’s actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32

Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack of knowledge
of the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation that there had been
tolerance.

In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant of
permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance,
but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally
wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about." It
stated that:

Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical
possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up to the
present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession only
on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title
presupposes their having been in possession of the property at one time or another.35

Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the
validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved.

As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint
which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to
occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible
entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the
required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry
can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff
will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion
is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible

6
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit
is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)

Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the respondents of
possession over a property that they have held for at least eight years before the case was
filed in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the
word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.

JOSE V. ALFUERTO, G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012

X-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

We ruled thus in Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals:[11]

Article 1592 of the New Civil Code, requiring demand by suit or
by notarial act in case the vendor of realty wants to rescind does not
apply to a contract to sell but only to contract of sale. In contracts
to sell, where ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass
until the full payment, such payment, as we said, is a positive
suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or
serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. To argue that
there was only a casual breach is to proceed from the assumption
that the contract is one of absolute sale, where non-payment is a
resolutory condition, which is not the case.

The applicable provision of law in instant case is Article 1191 of

the New Civil Code which provides as follows:

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is

implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment

and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment
of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the
latter should become impossible.

The Court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless

there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the

rights of third persons who have acquired the thing,
in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the
Mortgage Law. (1124)

7
 Pursuant to the above, the law makes it available to the injured party
alternative remedies such as the power to rescind or enforce
fulfillment of the contract, with damages in either case if the obligor
does not comply with what is incumbent upon him. There is nothing
in this law which prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause
its cancellation even without court intervention. The rationale for
the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already
deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory
act. Moreover, the vendors right in contracts to sell with reserved
title to extrajudicially cancel the sale upon failure of the vendee to
pay the stipulated installments and retain the sums and installments
already received has long been recognized by the well-established
doctrine of 39 years standing. The validity of the stipulation in the
contract providing for automatic rescission upon non-payment
cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a
party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach
without need of going to court. Thus, rescission under Article 1191
was inevitable due to petitioners failure to pay the stipulated price
within the original period fixed in the agreement.

The trial court erred in applying R.A. 6552,[14] or the Maceda Law, to the
present case. The Maceda Law applies to contracts of sale of real estate on
installment payments, including residential condominium apartments but
excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants. The
subject lands, comprising five (5) parcels and aggregating 69,028 square
meters, do not comprise residential real estate within the contemplation of the
Maceda Law.[15] Moreover, even if we apply the Maceda Law to the present
case, petitioners offer of payment to Dela Cruz was made a year and a half
after the stipulated date. This is beyond the sixty-day grace period under
Section 4 of the Maceda Law.[16] Petitioners still cannot use the second
sentence of Section 4 of the Maceda Law against Dela Cruz for Dela Cruzs
alleged failure to give an effective notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission because Dela Cruz merely sent the notice to the address supplied
by petitioners in the Contract to Sell.

It is undeniable that petitioners failed to pay the balance of the purchase price
on the stipulated date of the Contract to Sell. Thus, Dela Cruz is within her
rights to sell the subject lands to Bartolome. Neither Dela Cruz nor Bartolome
can be said to be in bad faith.

8
GARCIA vs. CA, G.R. No. 172036, April 23, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------x

In the case at bar, while there was no written agreement evincing the intention of the parties
to enter into a contract to sell, its existence and partial execution were sufficiently established
by, and may be reasonably inferred from the actuations of the parties, to wit: (1) the title to
the subject land was not immediately transferred, through a formal deed of conveyance, in
the name of respondent Rowena prior to or at the time of the first payment of $1,000.00 by
respondent Rowena to petitioner Aurora on January 25, 1995;28 (2) after this initial payment,
petitioners received 22 intermittent monthly installments from respondent Rowena in the sum
of $500.00; and, (3) in her testimony, respondent Rowena admitted that she had the title to
the subject land transferred in her name only later on or on July 23, 1997, through a deed of
sale, because she believed that she had substantially paid the purchase price thereof,29 and
that she was entitled thereto as a form of security for the installments she had already paid.30

Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. x x x

As a general rule, "rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the
contract, but only for such breaches as are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the
object of the parties in making the agreement."41

In the case at bar, we find that respondent Rowena’s act of transferring the title to the subject
land in her name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-
payment of the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the
contract to sell. As previously noted, the main object or purpose of a seller in entering into a
contract to sell is to protect himself against a buyer who intends to buy the property in
installments by withholding ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment
therefor.42 As a result, the seller’s obligation to convey and the buyer’s right toconveyance of
the property arise only upon full payment of the price. Thus, a buyer who willfully
contravenes this fundamental object or purpose of the contract, by covertly transferring the
ownership of the property in his name at a time when the full purchase price has yet to be
paid, commits a substantial and fundamental breach which entitles the seller to rescission of
the contract.43

Indeed, it would be highly iniquitous for us to rule that petitioners, as sellers, should continue
with the contract to sell even after the discovery of the aforesaid breach committed by
respondent Rowena, as buyer, considering that these acts betrayed in no small measure the
trust reposed by petitioners in her and her mother, Reynalda. Put simply, respondent
Rowena took advantage of the SPA, in the name of her mother and executed four years prior
to the contract to sell, to effect the transfer of title to the subject land in her (Rowena’s) name
without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of the full price.

We, thus, rule that petitioners are entitled to the rescission of the subject contract to sell.

TUMIBAY vs. lopez, G.R. No.171692 June 3, 2013