CIR vs.
PRIMETOWN the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President
of Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of
the income tax which they have paid on 1997.
According to Yap, the company accrued losses
amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabled
them to be exempt from paying income tax, which
respondent paid diligently. Respondent was
therefore claiming a refund.
Respondents submitted requirements but the
petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000,
respondents filed a review in the Court of Tax
Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the
petition stating that the petition was filed beyond
the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial
claim for tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be filed
after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the
payment of the tax regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment. Respondents
paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998.
Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year
is considered 365 days; months 30 days; days 24-
hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore,
according to CTA, the date of filing a petition fell
on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive
period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period
ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was on
April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be
repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap8 Book 1 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law
impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall
apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil
Code, which states that a year shall compose 365
days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a
year shall be composed of 12 months regardless of
the number of days in a month. Therefore, the two-
year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000.
Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which
is the last day prescribed to file a petition.
CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY
Doctrine:
- The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents within which
to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of input
vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the
CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of
the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR
fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit,
of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
- A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by
authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the
principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of
taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases,
a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a
refund but also his compliance with the procedural
due process.
- As between the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987, it is the latter that must prevail being
the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex
posteriori derogat priori.
- The phrase “within two (2) years x x x apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” under
Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to
applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and
not to appeals made to the CTA.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat
in relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division
partially granted respondent’s claim for
refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative
and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-
year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided
for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He
reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year,
the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He
cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which
provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner
argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes
Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.
According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a “condition precedent”
before a judicial claim can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated
to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was
affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of
the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the
claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not
fatal because what is important is that both claims
are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In
support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130
Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that “if the CIR
takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of
two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding
must be started in the CTA before the end of the
two-year period without awaiting the decision of
the CIR.”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed
within the prescribed period
2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes
Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior
filing of an administrative claim, and violates the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Held:
1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation
(G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year
period should be reckoned from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the
Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent
to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987,
which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar
months, it is the latter that must prevail being the
more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex
posteriori derogat priori.
Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-
year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for
the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002
expired on September 30, 2004. Hence,
respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.
2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with
the CTA premature.
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the
CIR has “120 days, from the date of the submission
of the complete documents in support of the
application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to
grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial
denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file
an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from
receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after
the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the
application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the
taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA
within 30 days.
Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that
“any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two
years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input
tax due or paid attributable to such sales.” The
phrase “within two (2) years x x x apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” refers
to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR
and not to appeals made to the CTA.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is inapplicable as the tax
provision involved in that case is Section 306, now
Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply
to refunds/credits of input VAT.
The premature filing of respondent’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants
a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was
acquired by the CTA.
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF LUNA
Facts:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death,
married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot
seven children, including Gregorio. After two
decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed
to live separately as husband and wife, and
executed an Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement” whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January
2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican
Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with
several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty.
Luna obtained a condominium unit which they
bought on an installment basis. After full payment,
the condominium title was registered in the names
of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares. When the
law office was dissolved, the condominium title
was still registered in the names of the owners, with
Atty. Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna
established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz.
After Atty. Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the
condominium unit, his law books and furniture
were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first
marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium
was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint
against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him,
the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her
during their marriage, and because they had no
children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2
being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of
Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the
properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage, except for the foreign law books, which
were ordered turned over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books
to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida
alleged that the CA erred in holding that the
Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is
ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not
dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered
it by way of determining whether the divorce
decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid,
which will decide who among the contending
parties were entitled to the properties left behind
by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was
void:

“From the time of the celebration of the first
marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not
been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos
has remained even under the Family Code, even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.
Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.”
No judicial approval of the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement:
“Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
the property regime of the spouses in the event that
they had not entered into any marriage settlement
before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of
the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime.
In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.”
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous,
and void from the very beginning, hence, their
property relations is governed by the rules on co-
ownership:
“In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the
Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant
no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to
a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of
the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterous union is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.”
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence
of ownership of the properties subject of the case,
the subject properties were awarded in favour of
the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
Petition denied.
BAYOT vs CA
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca,
an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982
in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was
docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the
dissolution of the marriage. The same court also
issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's
conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.
She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal
partnerships of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed
that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the
amount of P 220,000.00.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's
incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought
to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since
the marriage between the spouses is already
dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she
applied for the decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by
Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her
divorce was an American citizen and remains to be
one, being born to American parents in Guam, an
American territory which follows the principle of
jus soli granting American citizenship to those who
are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder
of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and
represented herself as an American citizen, as
shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth
certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican
Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by
the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce.
The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the
Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the
ex-couple's property relations.
The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, the divorce decree must be
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American
citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.
Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by
the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the
October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a
divorce is secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of
the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
ORIONS SAVINGS BANK VS SUZUKI
FACTS:
Suzuki a Japanese national bought a property
(condominium unit and a parking lot) from Mr.
Kang, a Korean national through his agent Soneja. A
deed of absolute sale was executed, however even
after several demands from Mr Suzuki to have the
titles of the properties delivered by Mr Kang, still
he failed to deliver the documents. Later he found
out that Kang has already left Philippines, this
prompted Suzuki to verify the status of the
property.
Suzuki learned the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained
under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through
Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified
that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit.
No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42. The title to the
condominium unit had no existing encumbrance,
except for annotation which provided that any
conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall
be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA). Although the title to the
condominium contained an annotation
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for
a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry
No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of
the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties
remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 with the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then demanded
the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles.
Thereafter, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s
counsel dated stating that Kang obtained another
loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang
failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated
February 2, 2003, in favor of Orion covering Unit
No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion
en Pago, until October 15, 2003. The registration
was made only after Suzuki’s demand for the
delivery of the titles to the properties.
Suzuki thus then executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim over Parking Slot No. 42. Suzuki filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages
against Kang and Orion. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled in favor of Suzuki’s right over the properties
in litigation, contending that he was a buyer in good
faith and the dacion was belatedly registered, only
two months after the sale has been executed. Orion
elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending
that the deed of sale executed was null and void for
under the Korean law the sale of a conjugal
properties should be made with the consent of both
spouses.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern in the case at bar?
RULING:
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real
property.
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the
issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal
consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a
well-settled principle that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention
of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20 To
consider these belated arguments would violate
basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due
process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the
issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end
to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial
of the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.21 The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property —
its immobility. Immovables are part of the country
and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined by what
is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from
one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation and transfer of immovable property and
the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the
person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus,
an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to
land if the person making it is incapacitated by the
lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between
spouses are governed principally by the national
law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the
law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the
conjugal nature of the property shall be governed
by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to
prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of
the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
showing that it was properly authenticated by the
seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of
Rule 132
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang
‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is
the owner of the properties as they are registered
in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun
Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we
have held that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not negate the
possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof
that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no
reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM
Foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum.
Facts:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland.
Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a
promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son
in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the
facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien.
ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING:
Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine
law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is
not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on
the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is
incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their
child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is UST Law
Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of
the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the
non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
Land Bank vs. Ong
Facts:
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and
Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank
Legazpi City in the amount of PhP 16 million. The
loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five
(5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan
agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would be
short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997,
while the balance of PhP 10 million would be
payable in seven (7) years. The Spouses Sy could no
longer pay their loan which resulted to the sale of
three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP
150,000 to Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s
mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.
Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later
went to Land Bank to inform them about the sale
and assumption of mortgage. Land Bank Branch
Head told Alfredo that there was nothing wrong
with agreement with the Spouses Sy and provided
him requirements for the assumption of
mortgage. Alfredo later found out that his
application for assumption of mortgage was not
approved by Land Bank. On December 12, 1997,
Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of
money with damages against Land Bank, as
Alfredo’s payment was not returned by Land Bank.
Alfredo said that Land Bank’s foreclosure without
informing him of the denial of his assumption of
the mortgage was done in bad faith and that he was
made to believed that P750,000 would cause Land
Bank to approve his assumption to the mortgage.
He also claimed incurring expenses for attorney’s
fees of PhP 150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and
PhP 250,000 in moral damages.
This prompted Alfredo to file a case with RTC
against Land Bank .On its decision to the case, RTC
held that the contract approving the assumption of
mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit
investigation conducted on Alfredo where he was
disapproved.. As such, it ruled that it would be
incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation under
Article1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank
was not bound by the Deed between Alfredo and the
Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo
and Land Bank’s active preparations for Alfredo’s
assumption of mortgage essentially novated the
agreement.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not
apply and in finding that there is novation.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals
misconstrued the evidence and the law when it
affirmed the trial court decision’s ordering Land
Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00 with
interest at 12% annum.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification to
the appealed decision that recourse against Land
Bank. Land Bank contends that Art.1236 of the Civil
Code backs their claim that Alfredo should have
sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of
Land Bank. The court agreed with Land Bank on the
point mentioned as to the first part of paragraph 1
of Art. 1236. However,. Alfredo made a conditional
payment so that the properties subject of the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage which Land
Bank required from him would be approved. Thus,
he made payment not as a debtor but as a
prospective mortgagor. Furthermore, the contract
between Alfredo and Land Bank was not perfected
nor consummated because of the adverse
disapproval of the proposed assumption. The
Supreme Court did not agree with the Court of
Appeals that there was novation in the contract
between the parties because not all elements of
novation were present. The court further stresses
that the instant case would not have been litigated
had Land Bank been more circumspect in dealing
with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment
from Alfredo even before a credit investigation was
underway and also failed to informed him of the
disapproval. The court found that there was
negligence to a certain degree on the part of Land
Bank in handling the transaction with Alfredo. A
bank as a business entity should observe a higher
standard of diligence when dealing with the public
which Land Bank neglect to observe in this case.
The petitioner’s appeal was denied by the Supreme
Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed with modification in that the amount of
PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per annum and
the total aggregate monetary awards will in turn
earn 12% per annum from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
UP vs. PHILAB Industries
Facts:
In 1979, UP decided to construct an
integrated system of research organization known
as the Research Complex. As part of the project,
laboratory equipment and furniture were
purchased for the National Institute of
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH)
at the UP Los Banos Providentially, the Ferdinand E.
Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came forward and agreed
to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture,
including the fabrication thereof. Dr. William
Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of
BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory
Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the
BIOTECH Building Project, to be paid by FEMF.
Padolina assured Lirio, Executive Assistant
of FEMF, that the contract would be prepared as
soon as possible before the issuance of the
purchase orders and the downpayment for the
goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF as
soon as possible. Despite the absence of any sample
contracts, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office
and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having
been duly inspected by their representatives and
FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Moreover, in 1982,
FEMF proceeded to remit various sums of money to
PHILAB as part of the downpayment, for which the
latter issued official receipts.
Later in the year 1982, a Memorandum of
Agreement between FEMF and UP was executed
which affirms FEMF’s obligation to grant financial
support and donate sums of money to the Research
Complex as may be necessary. A year later,
Navasero, the President of PHILAB, promised to
submit the contract for the installation of lab
furniture to BIOTECH by January 12, 1983. PHILAB
failed to do so. In response to repeated requests for
a sample contract, PHILAB just sent
accomplishment reports and asked for payment, to
which FEMF obliged.
For the last installment payment, FEMF
failed to remit the required sum of money despite
repeated demands from PHILAB. FEMF never
responded to the demands of PHILAB. As one of its
remedies, PHILAB sought payment from BIOTECH,
even if the same was to be paid in installment basis.
As its final recourse, PHILAB filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages against
UP. In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged
that PHILAB had no cause of action against it
because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of
the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that
the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to
the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory
furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to
pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by
PHILAB.
The CA ruled that UP is liable under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not UP is liable to
pay for the unpaid balance
2. Whether or not the CA erred in
basing its judgment on the
doctrine of unjust enrichment
Held:
1. No. The Supreme Court explained that a
contract implied in fact is one implied
from facts and circumstances showing a
mutual intention to contract. It arises
where the intention of the parties is not
expressed, but an agreement in fact
creating an obligation. It is a contract, the
existence and terms of which are
manifested by conduct and not by direct or
explicit words between parties but is to be
deduced from conduct of the parties,
language used, or things done by them, or
other pertinent circumstances attending
the transaction. To create contracts
implied in fact, circumstances must
warrant inference that one expected
compensation and the other to pay. An
implied-in-fact contract requires the
parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is
a true contract. The conduct of the parties
is to be viewed as a reasonable man would
view it, to determine the existence or not of
an implied-in-fact contract. The totality of
the acts/conducts of the parties must be
considered to determine their
intention. An implied-in-fact contract will
not arise unless the meeting of minds is
indicated by some intelligent conduct, act
or sign.
In this case, PHILAB was aware,
from the time Padolina contacted it for the
fabrication and supply of the laboratory
furniture until the go-signal was given to it
to fabricate and deliver the furniture to
BIOTECH as beneficiary that the FEMF was
to pay for the same. PHILAB knew that UP
was merely the donee-beneficiary of the
laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor
was it liable for the payment of the
purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and
statement of accounts of the respondent,
for which the latter unconditionally issued
receipts to and under the name of the
FEMF.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court rejected the ruling
of the CA based on unjust enrichment. In
order that accion in rem verso (action based
on unjust enrichment) may prosper, the
essential elements must be present: (1) that
the defendant has been enriched, (2) that
the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just
or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff
has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
The essential requisites for the
application of Article 22 of the New Civil
Code do not obtain in this case. The
respondent had a remedy against the FEMF
via an action based on an implied-in-fact
contract with the FEMF for the payment of
its claim. The petitioner legally acquired
the laboratory furniture under the MOA
with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the
laboratory furniture.
WILLAWARE vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent
filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction
to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the
petitioner from manufacturing and distributing
plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris
Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged
that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products, with principal office at No. 100
Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its
registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing
Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan
plant and distributing throughout the Philippines
plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware Products
Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware
items made of plastic and metal has its office near
that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company.
Respondent further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of petitioner’s office to
respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that
some of the respondent’s employees had
transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed
familiarity with respondent’s products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent]
discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products
at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made
automotive parts and to the same customers.
Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of
plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of
automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye
bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber
bushing, center bearing cushions, among others.
[Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive
parts with plastic material was taken from
respondent’s idea of using plastic for automotive
parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied
[respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute
unfair competition, is and are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy and have
caused [respondent] damages in terms of lost and
unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of
the date of respondent’s complaint.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under
human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the
part of Jesichris?
2. Consequently, if there is no unfair competition,
should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
3. Whether or not the addition of nominal damages
is proper although no rights have been established?
Held:
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method
shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being
sought to be prevented is not competition per se
but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed
methods which may deprive others of a fair chance
to engage in business or to earn a living.
Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition
and not competition where the means use dare fair
and legitimate.
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted
and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the
attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified
and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
LIWAYWAY VINZONS – CHATO vs. FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654,
which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55%
provided that the maximum tax shall not be less
than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA
7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
“Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured
by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC,
Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule
violated its constitutional right against deprivation
of property without due process of law and the
right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to
dismiss that respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted
merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore
the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She
also contended that the complaint states no cause
of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad
faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was
elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise
even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad
faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued
in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of
his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied
instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public
officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she
heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune
from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle
of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative
Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a
superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the
same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a
public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public
officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the
performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive
provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative
Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in
American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of
an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental
state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances
under which the motive of the defendant has been
rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given
for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of
the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would
determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence
of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that
is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent
CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. MONTANO
FACTS:
Rolando, an employee of Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporaton (Continental) and a
member of the Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions
in the Philippines For empowerment and Reforms
(Union) filed a claim for paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and accident insurance for
dependent, under the provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the company and
the union. The claim was based on the death of
Rolando’s unborn child, when his wife Marivic had
a miscarriage in her 38th week of pregnancy. The
company immediately granted Rolando’s claim for
paternity benefit but denied his claim for
entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits. The union then resorted to the grievance
machinery under the CBA to reverse the denial of
the claims, but no settlement was reached, hence
the union filed a Notice to Arbitrate with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board, with the
parties agreeing on the sole issued to be resolved
on whether Rolando is entitled to death benefits
under the provisions of Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.
In their pleadings, the Union averred that Rolando
is entitiled to bereavement leave and death
benefits, as the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have been first born alive or
acquired juridical capacity so that his subsequent
death could be covered by CBA benefits, and cited
the case of other employees of Continental’s sister
companies who were granted the benefits. They
also invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code which
mandated that all doubts should be resolved in
favour of labor. On the other hand, the company
argued that the express provisions of the CBA did
not provide for a still born child; and two elements
must be present so that the benefits may be availed
of: a) death; and b) status as legitimate child of the
employee, none of which existed in Rolando’s case.
Relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code,
Continental argued that only one who acquired
juridical capacity could die. Thus an unborn child
could not die because it never acquired juridical
capacity at all; a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person and could not
have acquired the status of a dependent, since it
never needed any support nor did it acquire the
right to be supported.
Atty. Montano, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in
favour of Rolando and the Union, ruling that the
fetus acquired the right to be supported by the
parents from the moment he/she was conceived.
Therefore the fetus was already a dependent even
though he/she died during delivery or childbirth.
There was also no question that Rolando and his
wife were married, hence the fetus was a legitimate
dependent.
The company filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to reverse the ruling of the
Voluntary Arbitrator, averring that what the CBA
contemplated was the death of a legal person not a
fetus, bolstered by the wording in the CBA that the
term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child
could only be determined upon said child’s birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had.
The CA affirmed Atty. Montano’s ruling, holding
that a dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
anything less than “loss of human life”, especially
for the expectant parents. Bereavement leave and
death benefits are meant to assuage the employee
and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them
solace and support, rather than an act conferring
legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
Continental Steel filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the CA
decision and arguing that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning
of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired
a juridical personality.
RULING:
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for
bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations
of the dependent to the employee. The requisites
for death and accident insurance under Article
XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a
parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or
a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
and (4) presentation of the proper legal document
to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated
assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of
the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its
fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s
claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms “death” and
“dependent” as used in the CBA. If the provisions of
the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then
there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental
Steel itself admitted that neither management nor
the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during
the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant
herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to
Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the
unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity
and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is
not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations
prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do
not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation
of life[1]. Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception[2] that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else.”
Under said general definition[3] even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s
child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister
of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the
child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers.
Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the
dependent child’s status in relation to his/her
parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya[4] we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.” (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel[5], we identified an
illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children — legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived
and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and
the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed
that Hortillano and his wife were validly married
and that their child was conceived during said
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon
her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was
able to comply with the fourth element entitling
him to death and accident insurance under the CBA,
i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his
unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for
bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should
have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other
death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational
life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive
but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA
provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life
to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor
Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt
in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor[6]. In the same way, the CBA and CBA
provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission[7], we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of
the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
“when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro
and the forces are equal on both sides, the same
must be stilled in favor of labor.” While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation
of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of
labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract
between private persons. What petitioner has lost
sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined
in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise,
sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are
to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-
balanced by sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services
Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be
resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20
November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death
benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00),
respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn
child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC
Manila. His name was registered as “Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
“male.” He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. His
attempts to transform himself to a “woman”
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female
and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to
“Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
petitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first
name from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.The
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not the entries on the Birth
Certificate of the petitioner can be changed.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Person’s First
Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment. The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that “No
person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.”
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The determination of a person’s sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides
that “No entry in the civil registershall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order.” For these
reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes
the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As
to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the
petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to
Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to
male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital AdrenalHyperplasia
which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew
up with secondary male characteristics. To further
her petition, Cagandahan presented in court
the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and
female.” The lower court decided in her favor but
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in
her birth certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate
calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of
the availale evidence presented in court including
the fact that private respondent thinks of himself
as a male and as to the statement made by the
doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give
respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for
the ordinary person. The Court added that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons and the consequences that will follow.
RONULO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On March 29, 2003, Joey Umadac and Claire
Bingayen were scheduled to marry one another. On
the day of the wedding, at the Roman Catholic
Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the priest
refused to marry them when he learned that the
couple did not have a marriage license. Instead, the
couple, already dressed in their wedding attire and
with their parents and friends, proceeded to the
Aglipayan church and requested Petitioner, an
Aglipayan Priest to marry them to which he
proceeded to marry the couple.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the
RPC, was filed against the petitioner before the
MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing
an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner pleaded “not guilty” and while he
admitted that he conducted a ceremony, denied
that his act of “blessing” the couple was tantamount
to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated
by law.
The MTC found petitioner guilty of violating Art.
352 of the Revised Penal Code for conducting an
illegal marriage ceremony. The RTC affirmed as did
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner conducted a “blessing”
and not an [illegal] marriage ceremony.
HELD:
Petitioner conducted an illegal marriage
ceremony. The crime as provided for in Art 352 of
the RPC refers to the performance of marriages
under Articles 3 and 6 of the Family Code which
reads:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
xxx
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
xxx
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be
contained in the marriage certificate which shall be
signed by the contracting parties and their
witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
The Supreme Court explained that what made the
petitioner's act a marriage ceremony and not just a
mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed
form or religious rite, all that was required was “for
the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife.”
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted
that the parties appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of witnesses, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they
take each other as husband and wife. Thus, it is
clear that petitioner conducted a marriage
ceremony and not a mere blessing.
The marriage ceremony was also illegal. The
Supreme Court stated that:
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the
essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the
“blessing” of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the
marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage
set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of
the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the
lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of
determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint
against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not make this an element of the crime.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Imbong vs Ochoa
FACTS
On December 21, 2012, the Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress.
14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention
were filed by petitioners praying for the declaration
of the RH Law as unconstitutional on the grounds,
as alleged by the petitioners, that it violates:
1. Rights to life
2. Rights to health
3. Freedom of expression and speech
4. Privacy of families
5. Academic freedom
6. Due process of law
7. Equal protection and
8. Against involuntary servitude.
Petitioners also contended that RH law
intrudes in the autonomy of local governments and
the ARMM, and violate the natural law, and that
delegation of authority to the FDA is invalid.
On March 15, 2013, the RH law took effect
but on March 19, 2013, after considering the issues
and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), which effected a 120-day
halt on the implementation or until July 17, 2013.
The Status Quo Ante generally states that
the government has already supported this kind of
law even as early as 1966 until August 2009. The
Status Quo Ante shows the series of laws enacted
which concludes the RH Bill is just an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women's health and
population control.
Despite the legislative measures in the past,
the population of the country kept on galloping at
an uncontrollable pace. The RH Law role is to make
it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education.
To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain
acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a
preliminary conference with the counsels of the
parties to identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues
were to be discussed in the oral arguments.
On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6,
13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument.
On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within sixty
(60) days and, at the same time posed several
questions for their clarification on some
contentions of the parties.
Petitioners prayed to maintain the status
quo.
ISSUES
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is
unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemment/ARMM
RULING ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Whether the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review over the
controversy.
YES. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review
their collective wisdom but to make sure that they
have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:
Judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
All requisites were met.
2. Whether on Not there is an Actual
Case or Controversy
Yes. An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.
Considering that the RH Law has already taken
effect and that budgetary measures have already
been passed, the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
3. Whether or not the court my apply
Facial Challenge
Yes it can. This Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch of the Government.
4. Whether or not the Petitioners have
Locus Standi
Yes. The petitioners invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi. The Court cannot exercise judicial restraint
at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To
do so, when the life of either the mother or her child
is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
5. Whether or not Petitioners are
praying for Declaratory Relief
YES. The respondents also assail the petitions
because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of
the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and
so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition.
6. Whether or not the One Subject-One
Title is violated
NO. The RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule: The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
RULING ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Does RH Bill violate the Right to life? No.
This issue relies on the answer as to when
life of a fetus begins in order to define life. It was
established that life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life.
After study of the deliberation of the
framers of the law, it was established that life
begins at fertilization, so that when there is no
union yet of the sperm and egg, there is no life to
speak of and there is no right to be protected yet.
Contraceptives that kill the ovum (fertilized
egg) are banned. Only those that prevent the union
of the egg and sperm are permitted to be used.
2. Does RH Bill violate The Right to Health? No.
In the distribution by the DOH of
contraceptive drugs and devices, the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729 ensures that the contraceptives to be
procured shall be from a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be
protected by all possible means.
3 –Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
Does RH bill violate Right to Freedom of
Religion? No.
The state may still pursue its objectives
without being dictated by policies of any religion.
To allow any religion to dictate the state would be
unconstitutional. By seeking the declaration that
the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are
asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning
methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.
Does RH Law violate Right to Free Speech?
Yes.
RH law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and
2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service even
against their beliefs. As the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Law provides, skilled
health professionals who are public officers such
as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal
Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff
nurses, public health nurses, or rural health
midwives, who are specifically charged with the
duty to implement these Rules, cannot object as
they are considered as conscientious objectors,
thus suppressing the right of free speech.
4-Does the RH Law violate constitutional
provisions on the Family and the Right to
Privacy? Yes
RH law violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy by giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband
and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity. So as
debarment of parental consent in cases where the
minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Even if
she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority
is already cut off just because there is a need to
tame population growth.
5 – Does RH Law violate constitutional provisions
on Academic Freedom? Undecided.
At this point, suffice it to state that any
attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.
While the Court notes the possibility that
educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law
on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
6 – Does RH Law violate constitutional provision
on Due Process? No.
The RH law is not vague and confusing.
“Private health care institution” is the same with
“private health care service provider”. The same
with “service” and “methods”.
7-Does RH law violate constitutional provisions
on Equal Protection? No.
Pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing
the health development of the people. RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. It also sanctions abortion as Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
8- Does RH law violate constitutional provisions
on Involuntary Servitude? No.
While petitioners aver that requiring
private and non-government health care service
providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro
bono reproductive health services amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will, it
can hardly be considered as forced labor, as
reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro
bono services.
9-Whether or not the Delegation of Authority to
the FDA is valid. Yes.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by
R.A. No. 9711 states that powers and duties of the
FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out
the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of
food and medicines available to the public, the FDA
was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective.
10- Does RH Law Infringe Autonomy of Local
Governments and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)? NO.
Unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of
the LGU.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows
that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health
professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will
provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH
Law.
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe
upon its autonomy.
11 - Natural Law
The Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis
for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived
as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does
not sanction the taking away of life. It does not
allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks
to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
HELD:
Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails
and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding
prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the
RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July
16, 2013 is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been
herein declared as constitutional.
ALCANTARA vs. ALCANTARA
Facts:
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of
marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that on
December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing
the required marriage license, went to the Manila
City Hall for the purpose of looking for a “fixer”
who could arrange a marriage for them before a
certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same
day. Restituto and Rosita went through another
marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March
26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of
the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its
entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity
of their marriage and maintains that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite; that Restituto has a mistress
with whom he has three children; that Restituto
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has
filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. The requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence
of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered
the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this
case, the marriage contract between the
parties reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the
fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the
probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court still holds
that there is no sufficient basis to annul
the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior
to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that
do not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
REPUBLIC vs. OBERCIDO
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros
Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had
a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned
from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had
obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under
Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding
Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
TOMAS
Facts:
Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino
citizen who became a Canadian citizen through
naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner
married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a
Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner
went back to Canada due to work commitments;
however, when he came back he was shocked to
discover that the respondent is having an affair
with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8,
2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved
on and found another woman that he wants to
marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the
petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the
petitioner that the marriage between him and the
respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law
and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4,
Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The
RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its
conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given
the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by
the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the
foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of
a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petitions for its recognition. Even though, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the
complementary statement that his conclusion is
not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed
by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute
an action before our courts for the recognition of
the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according
to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country.” This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself. The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If
the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
 appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were
it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
Facts:
 Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization
 He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City
 Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he
returned to the Philippines he found out that his
wife was having an affair with another man
 He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the
same was granted
 After two years from the effectivity of the divorce
decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love
 Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and
registered the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate
 Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce before the RTC
 RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Art.
26(2) of the Family Code
Issue
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Ruling
 The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art.
26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
 The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is “to avoid
the absurd situation whre the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse”. The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree
 Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to the rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse
 An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the
court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree) whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
 The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip the alien spouse
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree
 The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to
Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgment (Please
see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,
particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the
recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto.
Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No
judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree, thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of
the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry of Civil
Status -Act No. 3753)

So what should Gerbert do in order to have the the
foreign divorce be recognized?
File a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
(Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil
Registry). And in that petition, he can raise an issue
for the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
At this juncture, the SC ruled that the registration
of the divorce decree by the Pasig Civil Registry is
wrong. The Civil Register cannot do that without a
court order. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares
that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order.”
Likewise, in the event that a proper petition for
judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree is
filed, say for example if in this case, the person who
filed the petition was Daisylyn, and the same was
granted – such judicial recognition alone is not
sufficient to cause the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry. The SC ruled that a separate
petition under Rule 108 must still be had.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able
to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC for the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage.
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared
voidab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC
to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on
the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active
civil docket. The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that
the petition was in "gross violation" of the
provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny
petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays
for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal,
i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to
file their comment on the petition for review. The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He
prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in
the trial court for further proceedings. The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is
no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro and Nil v. Bayadog which declared that "the
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the
Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition. Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied
that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition. She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.
HELD:
RTC decision is reversed.
REMEDIAL LAW: Proof of foreign judgments
relating to the statues of a marriage where on of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country; AM
02-11-SC not applicable to petition for
recognition of foreign judgment
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country,
the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a
petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition, the service of summons,
the investigation of the public prosecutor, the
setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the
trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on
the merits. In Mijares v. Rada, this Court explained
that "if every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."
CIVIL LAW: remarriage of a Filipino citizen whose
alien spouse divorces him or her
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction
on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a
corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose
laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based
on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of
the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice
to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On
June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr.William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis,
one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for
inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be
filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that
a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van
Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be
remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated
to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
REX M. TUPAL, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO
FACTS:
Rex M. Tupal filed a complaint against Judge
Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge
Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the
required marriage license. He instead notarized
affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the
contracting parties.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
HELD:
YES.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the
judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they
submitted. The parties must have complied with all
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage
license. A marriage license is issued by the local
civil registrar to parties who have all the
qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage. Before
performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Instead, the
parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation
sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing
officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together
as husband and wife for at least 5 years and the
absence of any legal impediment to marry each
other. The judge must also execute a sworn
statement that he personally ascertained the
parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot
FACTS:
On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa
Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of
a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit
attesting that both of them are legally capacitated
and that they cohabited for atleast five years when
in fact they only barely known each other since
February 1986. On 1993, Jose filed a complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage contending that their marriage was sham,
as to no ceremony was celebrated between them;
that he did not execute the sworn statement that he
and Felisa had cohabited for atleast five years; and
that his consent was secured through fraud. His
sister, however, testified as witness that Jose
voluntarily gave his consent during their marriage.
The complaint was dismissed on Regional Trial
Court stating that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it
took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Jose’s
action had prescribe. It cited Art 87 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment
must be commenced by the injured party within
four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose
appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
decision declaring their marriage void ab initio for
absence of marriage license. Felisa sought a
petition for review praying that the Court of
Appeal’s Amended decision be reversed and set
aside.
Issue:
(1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of
marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of marriage.
(2) Whether or not the action for nullity
prescribes as the case here where Jose
filed a complaint after seven years from
contracting marriage.
Held:
(1)Yes. The intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage, will not salvage
the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The Court protects
the fabric of the institution of marriage and at the
same time wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in the law. The case
cannot fall under irregularity of the marriage
license, what happens here is an absence of
marriage license which makes their marriage void
for lack of one of the essential requirement of a
valid marriage.
(2) No. An action for nullity is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated san a marriage license. The right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE
ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. When the couple went back
to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed a false affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a
child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. On 4 June
1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. In her complaint, respondent alleged
that she is married to petitioner and that the latter
has “reneged on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her “as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child.” Petitioner denied that he is
married to respondent, claiming that their marriage
is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated
by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage
contract to save her from embarrassment and
possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get
parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived
together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father
of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted
by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has
been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity
of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to
undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and
filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness
should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he
is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate
court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent
as null and void in the very same case. There was
no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there
is no collusion between the parties, as required by
the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity
of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a
matter that can be raised in an action for
declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision
is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s
name for a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect;
in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who
had been married to Estela Galang, asked petitioner
to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old
widow then, married Santos. Four months after the
solemnization of their marriage, Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for
bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included
as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she
had been under the belief that Santos was still
single when they got married. She also averred that
for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second
marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal
case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that
she met Galang only or after she had already
married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that
petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, the
CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses'
narration.
ISSUE:
Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there
to be a conviction for bigamy?
HELD:
YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner
and Santos took place without a marriage license.
The absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which
reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this fact. Although the records do not
show that they submitted an affidavit of
cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family
Code, it appears that the two of them lied before
the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that
they had actually cohabited for at least five years
before they married each other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and
Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
contract marriage without a license. Petitioner now
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied
the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,
petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. It will be the height of absurdity for
this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act
to escape criminal conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides that
"marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." It must be safeguarded from the whims
and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
Enrico vs. Heirs
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad
Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and
Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot
seven children, herein respondents. On May 1,
2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite
of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six
months later. They argued that Article 34 of the
Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman
who have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing
a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner
and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage
of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the
latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio
to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious
illness which made its performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and
Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. She further contended that
the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized
by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense,
she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while
living who can file an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio
and Lolita
 RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow
it.
The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls
within the ambit of the order. The order declares
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. But it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
CARLOS V SANDOVAL
Doctrine: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to
sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
FACTS:
· Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.
· Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon
Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered in the
name of Teofilo) were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad.
· In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action
against respondents for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license.
· On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial
court. But before the parties could even proceed to
pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment.
· Petitioner opposed the motion for summary
judgment and lodged his own motion for summary
judgment.
· RTC rendered judgment: defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted
and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license.
· In the appeal, respondents argued that the trial
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.
· CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1) Whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. NO
2) Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an
action for nullity of marriage. Yes if the marriage
was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family
code and the plaintiff is a real party-in-interest.
HELD:
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known
as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in
cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall
personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court
has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the
State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between
the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered.
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that
the court should order the prosecuting attorney to
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage
when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is
no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if
there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation
of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no
collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial
on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication
of evidence.
Truly, only the active participation of the public
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity
of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec. 2(a)]. The
innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
sets forth a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of
the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not
apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003 is prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage
in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place. The marriage
having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage? NO. The absence of a provision
in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license
for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Such person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC
DOCTRINE:
The plaintiff must be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate
a “proper interest” can file the action.
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC
in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having
been solemnized without a marriage license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at
any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that petition is filed out
of time and that petitioner is not a party to
marriage. Motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on
the ground that the action must be filed by the
proper party, which in this case should be filed by
any of the parties to the marriage. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in
the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother?
HELD:
Yes. The applicable law when marriage was
contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on
December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in
effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to
the marriage as having the right to initiate the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely
no application to the petitioner. The case was
reinstated and its records returned to RTC for
further proceedings.
Ratio:
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SCexplicitly provides the limitationthat
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. This specifically extends
only to marriages covered by the Family Code,
which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed
himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only
the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest”
can file the action. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is
not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible
on the ground of lack of cause of action.
JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano
married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del
Sur.In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil
status was indicated as divorced.
Private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
It was further alleged that since Zorayda and
deceased were married when the NCC was already
in effect, the subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio since divorce is not allowed under the
NCC. Moreover, the deceased did not and could not
have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking
the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple
reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally
and factually, to have been one contracted under
Muslim law.
Instead of filing an Answer, Estrellita filed a motion
to dismiss. The trial court denied Estrellitas motion
and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the SC
questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss
which was referred to and subsequently denied by
the CA. This prompted Estrellita to file a petition
for review on certiorari before the SC (GR No.
126603)
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision,
the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence
but she asked for postponement. Unhappy with the
delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and
Adib moved to submit the case for decision,
reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has
not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the
outcome of G.R. No. 126603.
The RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment
declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as
void ab initio. On appeal to the CA, Estrellita argued
that she was denied due process as the RTC
rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 126603. The CA denied the appeal as she was
given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Estrellita was denied due
process
Whether or not the marriage of Estrellita and
Tamano was bigamous
HELD:
Remedial Law- "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of."

Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to
the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the
trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was
deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively
participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating
that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case. In fact, the trial court
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and
only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC
again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us
by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial
court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.
126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal
to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit
from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party.
Civil Law- A new law ought to affect the future,
not what is past
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But
we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13
of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on
February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda.
VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After
some time, Eduardo discovered that petitioner was
married to a Gina Gaerlan on July 1987, before the
Family Code became effective. She then filed for
bigamy.
The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA
affirmed that decision. In his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner argues that there is no
bigamy as there was no proof of existence of an
essential requisite of marriage in the first marriage
which was the marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether the essential requisites of marriage was
present in the first marriage.
RULING:
YES.
The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of
bigamy. The SC stated that “petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice.”
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the
requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:
No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
“The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is
issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides. The marriage license represents
the state’s “involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.”
“To prove that a marriage was solemnized without
a marriage license, “the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties.”
“Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office
of the Civil Registrar” but the SC held that the
Certification “does not prove that petitioner’s first
marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage
License No. 8683519 does not exist.”
“Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of
his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife. The first marriage
contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the
existence of petitioner’s first marriage.”
“A different view would undermine the stability of
our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to
negligence or consideration.”
“In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating
the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the
parties to the marriage as well as by their
solemnizing officer. The first marriage was
celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage
was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a
span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17
(seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending,
no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words,
petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage
license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.”
“Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first
marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy.
Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.”
“As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v.
Relova, that parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.”
“The commission that drafted the Family Code
considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article
40 of the Family Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.”
KHO vs. REPUBLIC
Facts:
Raquel filed a petition for declaration of his
marriage to Veronica, presenting a Certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record
nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner
and respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972. Veronica, the
respondent opposed the petition, arguing that the
petition should be outrightly dismissed for lack of
cause of action because there is no evidence to
prove petitioner’s allegation that their marriage
was celebrated without the requisite marriage
license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner
and respondent personally appeared before the
local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was
solemnized.
After trial, the RTC granted Raquel’s petition, but
the Republic and Raquel appealed to the CA.
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties, there
is a presumption that a marriage license was issued
for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that
the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a
mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties’ marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared
null and void for lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code.⁠2 Hence, the Civil Code governs
their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage
as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.⁠
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.⁠4 Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular
marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation;
(5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage
does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence
of the marriage contract.5⁠ The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity
to contract marriage.⁠6 Stated differently, the
requirement and issuance of a marriage license is
the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
of which the general public is interested.⁠7
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and
petitioner were able to secure a marriage license
which they presented to the solemnizing officer
before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption
is always in favor of the validity of marriage and
that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such
validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this
principle as well as of the Constitutional policy
which protects and strengthens the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony
of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence
to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt
to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño.⁠8 There, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no
record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license.⁠9 It was further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
the parties had been overcome, and that it became
the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured⁠
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor copy
of any marriage license ever issued in favor of
Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata
[respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on
June 1, 1972.”⁠11 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage
of petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove
that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was
not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their
alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of
Marriage⁠12 issued by the officiating priest does not
contain any entry regarding the said marriage
license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of
their marriage contract from the National Archives
and Records Section, where information regarding
the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and
license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with
approval, the RTC’s agreement with petitioner’s
observation that the statements of the witnesses for
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest
to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted
but neither one of them testified that a marriage
license was issued in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Indeed, despite respondent’s
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able
to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present
evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.⁠
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to
the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was
a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that
respondent failed to prove that the subject
marriage license was issued and the law is clear that
a marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner’s evidence, the
OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court’s
ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,⁠14 the certification
issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to
the absence in its records of a marriage license,
must categorically state that the document does not
exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,⁠15 this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification
of due search and inability to find the record or
entry sought by the parties despite the absence of
a categorical statement that “such document does
not exist in their records despite diligent search.”
The Court, citing Section 28,⁠16 Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, held that the certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the civil
registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case
of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,⁠17 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her
deceased husband as void ab initio as the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent
case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.⁠18
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v.
Abbas,⁠19 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA⁠20 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court
relied on the Certification issued by the local civil
registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner’s
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this
Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court does not require a categorical statement to
this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court
ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction
or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. x x x⁠21
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear
and unequivocal finding of the absence of the
subject marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties.⁠
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that
a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license.⁠23 As cited
above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except
marriages of exceptional character under Articles
72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated,
petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul
his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure – that he seeks a way out
of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair
with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, an essential requisite under the
Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
TE vs. TE
Facts:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu at a Filipino-Chinese gathering at a school
campus. They did not have interest with each other
at first but they developed a certain degree of
closeness due to the fact that they share the same
angst with their families. In 1996, while still in
college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they
should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the
ground that he was still young and jobless. But due
to Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing
with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared
and they found themselves forced to return to their
respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two before a court and had had them
be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena
stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was
treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to
come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One
month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was
hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later
contacted Rowena urging her to live
with his parents instead. Rowena however
suggested that he should get his inheritance
instead so that they could live together separately
or just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon
knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they
live separate lives from then on. Four years later,
Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of
his marriage with Rowena. Rowena did not file an
answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation,
submitted that he cannot determine if there is
collusion between the two parties. Eventually, the
case was tried. The opinion of an expert was sought
wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The
said relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is
said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-
founded. The break-up was caused by both parties’
unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his
fate and fighting boredom, while Rowena was still
egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court
ruled that the marriage is void upon the findings of
the expert psychologist. The Solicitor General
(OSG) appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the
psychological incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable (Molina case).
The clinical psychologist did not personally
examine Rowena, and relied only on the
information provided by Kenneth. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. All these were requirements set forth
in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expert opinion of the
psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the
guidelines established in the landmark case
of Molina.
HELD:
Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that
admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately
imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining
Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So
much so that the subsequent cases
after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine
set therein. And that there is not much regard for
the law’s clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as “courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.” The SC however is not
abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely
reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The
principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And,
to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and
Rowena is null and void due to both parties’
psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding
of the expert psychologist. Both parties being
afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others. He is too
dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the
essential marital obligations as well due to her
intolerance and impulsiveness.
SUAZO vs. SUAZO
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married
when they were 16 years old only. Without any
means to support themselves, they lived with
Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and
Angelito refused to work and was most of the
time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but
this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after
their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito
thereafter found another woman with whom he has
since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36
Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the
alleged physical beating she received. The expert
witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically
incapacitated. However, B was not personally
examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito
is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such
as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise
peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person
lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but
the CA reversed it and held that the respondent
may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is
still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise
that was clinically or medically identified. The
theory of the psychologist that the respondent
was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show
that the behavior of the respondent was due simply
to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which
are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or
the failure or refusal to work could have been the
result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt
that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The
CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish
Angelito’s psychological incapacity.
The psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias
for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The
psychlologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion
or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
While the report or evaluation may be conclusive
with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition,
this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth
and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from
a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s
report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito’s purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously
silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or
the particulars that gave rise to the characterization
she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony
regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicative
of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s
personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the
part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN
FACTS:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo
Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes
Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented
by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City
in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her
late father’s estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was
married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident
of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the
petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix
of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together
as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court
of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas
City.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the
proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be
administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should
be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased
persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the
statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles,
the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid
in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement
of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who
stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just
a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on
her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
Braza v Civil Registrar
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on
April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his
remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille
Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and
Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries
with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patrick’s
birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been
acknowleged by Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January
13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of
subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998
at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick
Titular Braza.
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage
contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-
petitioners (her three legitimate children with
Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the
Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been
legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed
for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of
the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of
the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia
and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of
the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the
declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick
as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille
and Pablo as bigamous.
TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which
is not acting as a family court under the Family
Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul
the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action.
MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an
action to correct entries in the civil registrar. (WON
substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of
a petition under Rule 108)
Held:
NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.
Ratio:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412
of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an
entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake
in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as
a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of
a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek
the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as
void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be
filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack such as the petition filed before the court a
quo.
Petition Denied.
Cited cases:
Petitioners’ cited these cases to bolster their action
but the court ruled that reliance on these cases are
misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second
wife against the first wife for the return of one-half
of the death benefits received by the first after the
death of the husband. Since the second wife
contracted marriage with the husband while the
latter’s marriage to the first wife was still
subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the
two marriages, it being essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
contrary to the contention that the petitions filed
by the therein petitioners before the lower courts
were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was
not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their
records of birth but to establish that they are not
the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to
impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That
is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the
name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother
and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who
is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as
adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule
108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners
themselves who sought the correction of the entries
in their respective birth records to reflect that they
were illegitimate and that their citizenship is
"Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were
never legally married. Again, considering that the
changes sought to be made were substantial and
not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the
proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in
nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the
petition.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L.
OLAYBAR
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with
her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof,
she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24,
2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is
not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation
of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
The RTC granted Olaybar’s petition and directed
the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in
the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration
of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for
it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of
all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio. The motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this Petition for
Review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding.
HELD:
YES.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under
Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son
Sune, as parties–respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of
the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings.
More importantly, trial was conducted where
respondent herself, the stenographer of the court
where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well
as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the
trial court found that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage certificate was different from
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards.23 The
court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate
was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such
evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of
such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only
“evidence” of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that
Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of.
VICTORIA S. JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435, 29 September 2009, THIRD
DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
FACTS:
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael
Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
in Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both newlyweds celebrated
a second wedding, this time a church ceremony, in
1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Out of the
union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo,
however, contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy celebrated through a
civil ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy
exchanged marital vows in a church wedding in
Manila. In 1999, Uy filed a civil case for annulment
against Jarillo. On the basis of the foregoing, Jarillo
was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Alocillo in
2000. The trial court rendered the assailed
decision, holding Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy.
Jarillo posits, as defenses, that her marriage
to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman
at the time of the celebration of their marriage, that
her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were both null and
void for lack of a marriage license, and that the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed
the ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the
RTC where Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo
rendered judgement declaring Jarillo’s marriage to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Jarillo, in her
motion for reconsideration, invoked the ruling of
the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter
denied reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of
the crime of bigamy
HELD:
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages
to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity
of petitioner’s marriage tojurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to
Uy make any difference.
As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x
A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.”
MOTANEZ vs. CIPRIANO
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates
Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence
of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity as defined under Article
36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent
with Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May
14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez,
Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed
with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for
Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano
alleged that her first marriage was already declared
void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution
argued that the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated when respondent filed her petition
for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent on the ground that both wedding were
governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute
nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's
first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.
HELD:
NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the
respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial
declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy
charges against her.
ANTONE V. BERONILLA
DOCTRINE:
As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40 of
the Family Code has been established as a new
provision expressly requiring judicial declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage for purposes of
remarriage. Therefore, a person who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-
Complaint,filed in March 2007, that she and Leo
were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a
second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The
prosecution filed the Information in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of
Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo
moved to quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because his marriage with Myrna was
declared null and void as of April 2007 and became
final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that
since the marriage had been declared null and void
from the beginning, there was actually no first
marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first
marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do
not constitute the crime of bigamy. The
prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and
Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second
marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already
been committed before the court declared the first
marriage null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying
on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of
the first marriage only after contracting the
subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of
bigamy.
HELD:
Yes.
RULING:
Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the
previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the
Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy
based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper
because there is no need fora judicial decree to
establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid;
and (b) a marriage declared void ab initiohas
retroactive legal effect such that there would be no
first valid marriage to speak of after all, which
renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed
in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family
Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a
bigamy case because, by then the crime had already
been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated
after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado,
the first marriage was actually solemnized,
although later declared void ab initio. While
in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed
by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, because
what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage
contract through a private act. Thus, there is no
need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity
before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage.
The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.
Tenebro v. CA
DOCTRINE:
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts
a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
3 Marriages, 1 Husband:
W1 – Hilda Villareyes (1986)
 W2 - Leticia Ancajas (1990)
W3 – Nilda Villegas (1993)
On 10 April 1990, Veronico Tenebro married
Ancajas before the judge of MCTC Lapu-Lapu City.
They lived together until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to Villareyes on 10 Nov 1986.
He showed her a photocopy of the marriage
certificate, and thereafter left their conjugal
dwelling.
On 25 Jan 1993, Tenebro contracted another
marriage, this time with Villegas, before the judge
in RTC Cebu City.
When Ancajas learned of this 3rd marriage, she
verified Tenebro’s marriage with Villareyes. The
latter confirmed through a letter.
Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against
Tenebros.
Tenebro’s Defense:
- Admitted that he cohabited with Villareyes but
denied that they were validly married.
- He claimed that there was no marriage
ceremony that took place. He merely signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get
the allotment from his office in connection with
his work as a seaman.
- The Civil Register in Manila has no record of his
marriage to Villareyes.
RTC - Tenebros guilty of bigamy
CA - Affirmed.
Meanwhile, the marriage between Tenebros and
Ancajas (marriage #2) was declared null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
W/N the absolute nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, prior to its
judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
defense in a criminal action for bigamy.
HELD:
NO. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
RATIO:
- Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not
per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes "any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
- Thus, as soon as the second marriage to
Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it
is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity, at least
insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting
the institution of marriage are in recognition of
the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent character
of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.
- Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity.
- Although the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it
is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is
therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy.
GO – BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN
FACTS:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married
Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside
the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic
relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was against
this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced
Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in
March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and
Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an
action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as
non-existent. To prove the existence of their
marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally
and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The
marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever
issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely
in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous
marriage to speak of.
Capili vs People
FACTS:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the
crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3)
the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
RULING:
NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo
City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage between petitioner and
Private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Valdez vs. Republic
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January
1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was
unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita
and her child waited until in May 1972, they
decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years
have passed without any word from Sofio until in
October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed
to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and
had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes
in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
naturalization in US was denied because
petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a
petition seeking declaration of presumptive death
of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is
valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption
of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code
governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at
least 7 consecutive years of absence is only
needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry
Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted
the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking
of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
the spouse present so believes at the time of the
celebration of the marriage
Republic v. Cantor
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his
wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent
quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or
hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband.
She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for
her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find
him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied
with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry
was dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the Family
Code?
HELD:
Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that
his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique
circumstance of each case and that there is no set
standard or procedure in determining the same.
Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose
when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give
her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she
did not find Jerry’s name in the patient’s directory
whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that
Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in
hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was
not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was
far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the
RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death
should have been recalled and set aside for utter
lack of factual basis.
Republic vs Tampus
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante
L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days
thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a
member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had
no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her
efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from
him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
ISSUE:
W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead
RULING:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has
been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two
(2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil
Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the
present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the
law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is
still alive, failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors
as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also
did not know where to find him. Other than making
said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called
or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so.
She did not even seek the help of the authorities or
the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own
pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on
a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the
AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To
the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively
look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's
parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the
strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. TERESITA JARQUE
VDA. DE BAILON
Where a person has entered into two
successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor
of the validity of the second marriage, and the
burden is on the party attacking the validity of
the second marriage to prove that the first
marriage had not been dissolved.
FACTS:
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted
marriage. More than 15 years later, a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed
before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
which has been granted. Bailon, subsequently,
contracted marriage with respondent Teresita
Jarque and designated her the Social Security
System (SSS) beneficiary of the former.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita
Jarque of her monthly pension for death
benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its
legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted during the subsistence of
Bailon’s marriage with Alice.
Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly
pension for death benefitsasserting that her
marriage with Bailon was not declared before
any court of justiceas bigamous or unlawful. Hence,
it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents
and purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of
Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the
absent spouse of Bailon
HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person with
an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only
the competent court that can nullify the second
marriagepursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code
and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse,
which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3,
1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of
the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent
marriage shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee‘s mere
reappearance, even if made known to
the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not
terminate such marriage. Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of
the spouse‘s physical reappearance, and by fiction
of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify,
in accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s
marriage prior to the former‘s death in 1998,
Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
Santos vs. Santos
Statement of the Case:
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J.
Santos assails the Court of Appeals' resolutions
dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition for the
annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring
her presumptively dead.
Facts of the Case:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent
Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo
remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao,
Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's
whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12
years from the date of his Regional Trial Court
petition since Celerina left. He believed that she
had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's
petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her
day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge
of her true residence, misrepresented to the court
that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to
Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune
Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.
This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal
dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptively
dead.
Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo
were fraudulent, that she never resided in Tarlac
and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad.
Further, she also claimed that it was not true that
she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in
Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit
executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations in
his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition
because it had never been published in a
newspaper. She added that the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated
November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition
for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode
of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing
Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry declaring her reappearance as stated in
Article 42 of the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when
the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction.
This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos
v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or
where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which
prevents a party from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.
The choice of remedy is important because
remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of
absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present
spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. The
Family Code also provides that the second marriage
is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she
reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire
Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact
and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the
fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined. The existence of these
conditions means that reappearance does not
always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the
absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the
termination of the subsequent marriage only when
all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code
are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may
still subsist despite the absent or presumptively
dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage
has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of
the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no
notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact
of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of
law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already
dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance
of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the
person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important
for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse
who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was
absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first
subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present: (1) The prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years; (2) The
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead; (3) There must be
a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and (4)
There is a court declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith,
even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The
first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by
law. Therefore, the party who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent
marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
against marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage still applies.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code
as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse
who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage
may also be terminated by filing "an action in court
to prove the reappearance of the absentee and
obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination
of the subsequent marriage.
Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of
the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed
subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such
marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouses in such marriage
will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of
the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death
is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina
is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited
or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to
her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating
the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and
the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit
of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment
will, therefore, lie.
Disposition:
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity or annulment of the first
marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SIOCHI V. GOZON
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land.
The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila
and is registered in the name of
“Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to
Elvira Gozon (Elvira).”
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of
Cavite City a petition for legal separation against
her husband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992, Elvira filed a
notice of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT no. 5357.
While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
agreement to buy and sell (agreement) involving the
property for the price of P18 million.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario,
Alfredo failed to comply with the stipulations
provided in the agreement. After paying the P5
million earnest money as partial payment of the
purchase price, Mario took possession of the
property. On September 6, 1993, the agreement
was annotated on TCT no. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC
rendered a decision in the legal separation case,
which granted the same. The RTC ordered among
others that, the conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses is hereby declared dissolved and
liquidated. As regards the property, it held that it
is deemed conjugal property.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the
property in favor of their daughter, Winifred
Gozon. Later on, Alfredo through an SPA executed
by his daughter Winifred, sold the property to IDRI
and the latter paid the purchase price in full. A new
TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of
IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint
for specific performance and damages, annulment
of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
RTC: Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to
buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and
declared voidhe sale by Alfredo and Winifred to
Inter-Dimensional.
CA: Court of Appeals said agreement between
Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered
into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife;
and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been
forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal
separation by the Cavite RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal
property, being the sole administrator of the same
without obtaining the consent of Elvira?
Held:
NO.
This case involves the conjugal property of
Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the
property occurred after the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article
124 of the family code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment
of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to the recourse to the court
by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely
void. As regards Mario’s contention that the
Agreement is a continuing offer which may be
perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and
then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was
already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share
of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in
favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling
of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The
Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of
the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending
spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits
and the same is awarded to Winifred.

IN THE EVENT THAT ONE SPOUSE

IS INCAPACITATED OR OTHERWISE
UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES, THE OTHER SPOUSE MAY
ASSUME SOLE POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATION. THESE POWERS DO
NOT INCLUDE THE POWERS OF
DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE WHICH
MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF THE
COURT OR THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF
THE OTHER SPOUSE. IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUCH AUTHORITY OR CONSENT, THE
DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE SHALL
BE VOID. HOWEVER, THE TRANSACTION
SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS A CONTINUING
OFFER ON THE PART OF THE CONSENTING
SPOUSE AND THE THIRD PERSON, AND MAY
BE PERFECTED AS A BINDING CONTRACT
UPON THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER
SPOUSE OR AUTHORIZATION BY THE COURT
BEFORE THE OFFER IS WITHDRAWN BY
EITHER OR BOTH OFFERORS. (EMPHASIS
SUPPLIED)

In this case, Alfredo was the sole

administrator of the property because Elvira, with
whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the
property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property
without the written consent of Elvira or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or
authority, the sale is void. The absence of the
consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale
void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other
spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required
by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into
by Alfredo and Mario was without the written