Hadloc_Venue vs Jurisdiction

Nocum and Philippine Daily Inquirer V. Tan

Facts:

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Lucio Tan against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo
Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC of Makati seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. ALPAP and UMALI alleged, among
others, that: the venue was improperly laid. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of
the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous
article was printed and first published.Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, Tan filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. RTC then admitted the
amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal. Petitioners then state that
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on
the RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the
complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office.
They argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the
latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first
published, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.Ruling:

Issue:
W/N the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint.

Ruling:

Yes.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. Jurisdiction is differentiated from venue as
follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is
to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. In the case at
bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed
and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. It is
elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it
does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.Petitioners argument that
the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the
libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a
criminal case.
Leano_Venue of real actions

PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
V. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179018 June 18, 2012

FACTS
PAGLAUM is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in Cebu, which are co-owned by
Dy, the president of HealthTech, his mother and siblings. Union Bank extended HealthTech a credit line
in the amount of P10M. To secure this obligation, PAGLAUM executed 3 Real Estate Mortgages on behalf
of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. It must be noted that the Real Estate Mortgage, on the
provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection therewith, originally
stipulates that the venue of all suits and actions in connection with the mortgage shall be in Makati.
However, under the other two Real Estate Mortgages, it stipulated that the venue of all suits shall be in
Cebu City, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the absolute
option of the Mortgagee.
HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent renewals and increases in the credit line, with
the total amount of debt reaching P 36.5 M. Unfortunately, due to the 1997 financial crisis, HealthTech
was unable to meet its obligations with Union Bank. Thus, both parties entered into a Restructuring
Agreement, which states that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Despite the Restructuring
Agreement, HealthTech failed to pay its obligation, Union Bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged
properties. The bank, as the sole bidder in the auction sale, was then issued a Certificate of Sale.
Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title.
Consequently, HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction. RTC Makati City issued in favor of
PAGLAUM and HealthTech a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining Union Bank from proceeding with
the auction sale of the three mortgaged properties.
Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
issuance of the injunctive relief; (b) improper venue; and (c) lack of authority of the person who signed
the Complaint. RTC dismissed the motion and likewise denied the subsequent MR filed by PAGLAUM and
HealthTech. PAGLAUM and HealthTech elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the Order and denied
the MR.

ISSUE: WON Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage.

HELD
Yes. Rule 4, Sec 1 provides that actionsaffecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. However, under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 , the
general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have
validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however,
is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue
that should be followed is that contained in the Real Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or
that in the Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court rules that the
venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.
The provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal
the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the
principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The phrase "waiving any other venue" plainly shows that
the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the Restructuring
Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is
exclusive.
Considering that Makati City was agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions arising out of
or in connection with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well as the Real Estate Mortgages
executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-
1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper venue.
Leonardo_Venue of personal actions

Theodore and Nancy Ang, etc. v. Spouses Alan and Em Ang

G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012

FACTS:
On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount
of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang
(petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioners
wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the
petitioners. Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking
them to pay their outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen
Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23),
inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan
obligation. On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California,
United States of America (USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of
Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against
the respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint
for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint in the grounds of improper venue and
prescription asserting that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the place
where either they or the petitioners reside. Respondent reside in Bacolod while petitioner reside in
LA.
RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. Since Atty. Aceron is the duly appointed attorney
in fact of petitioners, venue of the action may lie where he resides as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 4, of the
1997 Rules of Court.
Respondents claim that Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not a
real party in interest in the case; hence, his residence should not be considered in determining the
proper venue of the said complaint.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the case should have been filed in Bacolod City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint must be dismissed on the ground that the venue was not proper.

HELD: YES
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience
of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue
of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The
petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing
where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or
(2) where the defendant or any of the defendant must be residents of the place where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of
the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
If the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed
in the court of the place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial
Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526(1916), the Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing
of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may
only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.
 Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by substantive law, has the right
sought to be enforced.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on venue, like the other procedural rules are
designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the
plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition.
The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff’s whim or caprice. He may be impelled by some
ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not allowed by the rules on
venue.
Magabilin_DEFAULTofVENUE

THEODORE and NANCY ANG vs SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG

G.R. NO. 186993 - August 22, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of US$300,000.00 from
Theodore and Nancy Ang . On even date, the respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the
petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to
pay the petitioners.

The petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding debt which, at
that time, already amounted to US$719,671.23, inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual interest that
had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents
still failed to settle their loan obligation.

Thereafter, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of America
(USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Atty. Aceron for the purpose of
filing an action in court against the respondents. Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a
Complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.

The respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners on the grounds of
improper venue and prescription. Insisting that the venue of the petitioners action was improperly laid,
the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the place
where either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the
petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the
complaint against them in the RTC of Quezon City was improper.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. ACERON’S RESIDENCE IS MATERIAL TO THE VENUE OF FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT.

HELD:

NO. Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his residence is immaterial
to the venue of the filing of the complaint.

Contrary to the petitioners claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not
a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced. ςrνll

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as
he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the
petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint
against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights
of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. Being merely a representative of the
petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below
against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real parties in
interest.

The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty.
Aceron is likewise a party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Nowhere in the rule is it stated or, at
the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in interest. The said
rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative,
the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the
case.
Mallari_When Rules on venue do not apply

PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES,

INCS. VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 179018. June 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner PAGLAUM is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in the Province of
Cebu. These lots are co-owned by Benjamin B. Dy, the president of petitioner Health Marketing
Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech), and his mother and siblings.

On 3 February 1994, respondent Union Bank extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of
₱10,000,000. To secure this obligation, PAGLAUM executed three Real Estate Mortgages on behalf of
HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. The venue in the real estate mortgage was stipulated to be in
Makati, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located (Cebu), at
the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.

HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent renewals and increases in the credit line, with
the total amount of debt reaching ₱36,500,000. Unfortunately, according to HealthTech, the 1997 Asian
financial crisis adversely affected its business and caused it difficulty in meeting its obligations with
Union Ban. Thus, on 11 December 1998, both parties entered into a Restructuring Agreement,
which states that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Despite the Restructuring
Agreement, HealthTech failed to pay its obligation, prompting Union Bank to send a demand letter dated
9 October 2000, stating that the latter would be constrained to institute foreclosure proceedings, unless
HealthTech settled its account in full.

Union Bank foreclosed the properties through an auction sale, bought it as the sole bidder as
secured a Certificate of Sale. Healthcare filed a complaint for annulment of sale and titles on the RTC of
MAKATI. The RTC ruled in favour of Health tech and restrained restraining Union Bank from proceeding
with the auction sale. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss citing lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
RTC of Makati granted Union Banks motion to dismiss. CA affirmed Makati RTC. Hence this appeal to SC.

ISSUE:
whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate
mortgage.

HELD:
YES.
Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the
extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action.
Being a real action, the filing and trial of the Civil Case No. 01-1567 should be governed by the following
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court (the Rules):
Rule 4: VENUE OF ACTIONS:
 Section 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Sec. 3. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply

A. In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

B. Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive
venue thereof.

However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be commenced and tried
in a court other than where the property is situated in instances where the parties have
previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the
parties claim that such an agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that should be
followed is that contained in the Real Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the
Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court rules that the venue
stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.

The provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal
the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the
principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The phrase waiving any other venue plainly shows
that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the
Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly
defined as such, is exclusive.

Even if this Court were to consider the venue stipulations under the Real Estate Mortgages, it must
be underscored that those provisions did not contain words showing exclusivity or restrictiveness. In
fact, in the Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994, the phrase parties hereto waiving from the
entire phrase the parties hereto waiving any other venue was stricken from the final executed contract.
Following the ruling in Sps. Lantin, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the venue stipulation
should only be deemed as an agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction on a specified
place.

Considering that Makati City was agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions
arising out of or in connection with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well as the Real
Estate Mortgages executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper venue.
Panganiban_When the rules on venue do not apply

Polytrade Corp v. Blanco

GR No. L-27033 October 31, 1969

Facts: The case, having four causes of action, involved the recovery the purchase price of rawhide delivered by
petitioner to respondent. Petitioner has its principal office and place of business in Makati and Rizal while
respondent is a resident of Bulacan. The respondent moved to dismiss the case upon the ground of improper
venue. He claimed that the suit can only be lodged in courts of Manila in view of their stipulation.

Issue: Whether or not venue is properly laid in Bulacan where defendant is a resident

Held: Yes. Section 2(b), Rule 4 provides that actions may be commenced where defendant resides or where
the plaintiff resides, at the election of plaintiff. Qualifying this provision is Section 3 of same Rule which states
that venue may be stipulated by written agreement. In the case, parties stipulated that “The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila”.

The stipulation was included only in contracts which were the basis of third and fourth causes of
action. The first two causes of actions will be governed by the general rule since there was no stipulation;
hence, venue properly laid in Bulacan. With regard to the third and fourth action, the stipulation will apply.
However, an accurate reading of such revealed that it does not preclude filing of suits in residence of plaintiff
or defendant. The plain meaning is that parties merely consented to sue and be sued in Courts of Manila.
There were no qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the proper
venue. The stipulation does not have an effect of transfer or change of venue because it is simply permissive.
There was no waiver of the right to pursue remedy in courts mentioned in Section 2(b), Rule 4.
Questin_When rules on venue do not apply

SWEET LINES, INC. v. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978, SECOND DIVISION, (Santos, J.)

FACTS

Tandog and Tiro, contractors by profession, bought tickets at the branch office of Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI), a
shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Tandog and Tiro were to
board M/S Sweet Hope bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding
to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, Tandog and Tiro per advice, went to the branch office for proper
relocation to M/S Sweet Town. Because M/S Sweet Town was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide
at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Tandog and Tiro alleged that they
were, during the trip, exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, and
that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for
other tickets. Thus, they sued SLI for damages and for breach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00
before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.

SLI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition
printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads:

14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions
of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu.

The motion was denied by the trial court. SLI moved to reconsider the order of denial, but no avail. Hence, this
instant petition for prohibition and for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE

Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of SLI’s passage tickets purchased by Tandog and Tiro, which limits the
venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable?

RULING

NO. Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same
will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different parts of the country who, under Condition No.
14, will have to file suits against SLI only in the City of Cebu.

For, although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in
writing pursuant to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically
negates the action of the claimants, such as Tandog and Tiro herein.

The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as
well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside
of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at
all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, SLI has branches or
offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places.

Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will not cause
inconvenience to, much less prejudice, SLI.
Reonico_Kinds of Pleadings – Answer

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

FACTS
Republic filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to R.A. No. 1379 or “An
Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor”. It sought for the declaration of
356M US dollars deposited in escrow in PNB, as ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses; and the forfeiture of
25M US dollars and 5 US dollars in treasury note, which exceeded the salaries and other lawful and
legitimate income of the Marcos spouses. The former was previously held by five account groups in
certain Swiss bank while the treasury notes were frozen at Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
A global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family was agreed upon by the Marcos children and
PCGG Chairman before the case was set for pre-trial. In such agreement, it was specified that the Republic
obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal and that the 356 US dollars had illegal origins. The
Republic filed a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings before the Sandiganbayan. It was denied
on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement took precedence over the motion
for summary judgment and that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove
that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the
record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. Hence, the
Republic filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Marcoses raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify
or negate summary judgment.

RULING
No. The Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Hence, on the motion
of petitioner Republic, summary judgment would take place as a matter of right. Summary judgment is
proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for
petitioner Republic.
As to the pleadings. Respondents lame denial of the allegation was: “Respondents specifically DENY
paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in
Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.” This particular denial is
called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.

In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not
specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22
of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a denial
pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts: (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and (2)
that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits
in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer,
were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure: “Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied.” Hence, the Court granted the petition.
Santos_Kinds of pleadings

MANUEL C. BUNGCAYAO, SR. V

FORT ILOCANDIA PROPERTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170483 April 19, 2010

FACTS
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who introduced
improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its
construction in the area. Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the
foreshore area. They later formed themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Association, Inc.
(DSierto).
In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (Calayad) were transferred, ceded, and conveyed
to the Philippine Tourism Authority pursuant to PD 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was erected on the
area. In 1992, petitioner and other DSierto members applied for a foreshore lease with the CENRO and
was granted a provisional permit.
On 31 January 2002, Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation filed a
foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-hectare
portion applied for by DSierto members. The foreshore applications became the subject matter of a
conflict case between respondent and DSierto members. In an undated Order, DENR Regional Executive
Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto members, including
petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within
the foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The DSierto members appealed the denial of their
applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun denied the
appeal on the ground that the area applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on
the final verification plan.
Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the meeting, manifested that
he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he
accepted the payment and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[6] in favor of
respondent.
Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract. They alleged that his son had
no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him.
The trial court confirmed the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and the return of P400,000 to respondent. Petitioners counsel, however,
manifested that petitioner was still maintaining its claim for damages against respondent.
Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution on summary
judgment. Thus, in its Order dated 28 November 2003, the trial court considered the case submitted for
resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he
was withdrawing his earlier manifestation submitting the case for resolution. Respondent filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondents counterclaim is compulsory

HELD

Yes. A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have
against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in
the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set
up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same?;
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the
compulsory rule;
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as
well as defendants counterclaim?;
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.

In this case, the only issue in the complaint is whether Manuel, Jr. is authorized to sign the Deed of
Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent without petitioners express approval
and authority. In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court confirmed the agreement of the parties
to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and the return of P400,000 to
respondent. The only claim that remained was the claim for damages against respondent. The trial court
resolved this issue by holding that any damage suffered by Manuel, Jr. was personal to him. The trial
court ruled that petitioner could not have suffered any damage even if Manuel, Jr. entered into an
agreement with respondent since the agreement was null and void.

Terre_Kinds of pleadings

PHILTRANCO v. PARAS

FACTS: Paras, a buyer and seller of fish products, was on his way back to Bicol aboard the bus of Inland
Trailways, Inc. During the trip, the bus of Philtranco crashed into the rear of the Inland bus, which
resulted in the latter to smash into a cargo truck parked along the highway. The driver of Inland bus died,
while several passengers were injured, including Paras. Paras suffered several fractures in his body and
he underwent surgery. He sued Inland for damages for breach of contract of carriage. However, Inland
filed a third-party complaint, impleading Philtranco and their driver as defendants, since it was their
driver that was negligent.

The RTC ordered the third-party defendant to pay plaintiff damages;

ISSUE: W/N Paras can recover damages from a third-party defendant for breach of contract of carriage.

HELD: YES. As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated on a
breach of contract because such action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as one of the
actions in which moral damages may be recovered. The exceptions are: (a) where the mishap results in
the death of a passenger and (b) where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith.

Although this action does not fall under either of the exceptions, the award of moral damages to Paras
was nonetheless proper and valid. There is no question that Inland filed its third-party complaint against
Philtranco and its driver in order to establish in this action that they, instead of Inland, should be directly
liable to Paras for the physical injuries he had sustained because of their negligence. The apparent
objective of Inland was not to merely subrogate the third-party defendants for itself, but rather to obtain
a different relief whereby the third-party defendants would be held directly, fully and solely liable to
Paras and Inland for whatever damages each had suffered from the negligence committed by Philtranco
and its driver. Impleading Philtranco and its driver through the third-party complaint filed on March 2,
1990 was correct.

Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet
be a party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the
original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant must be
based upon the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting
to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.

As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the third-party
defendant must be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive law on which the right of Inland
to seek such other relief through its third-party complaint rested were Article 2176 and Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

Paras cause of action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage) did not need to be the same as the
cause of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver (tort or quasi-delict) in the impleader. It is
settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants those who may be liable
to him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff. Nor was it a pre-
requisite for attachment of the liability to Philtranco and its driver that Inland be first declared and found
liable to Paras for the breach of its contract of carriage with him.
Lucero_Verification

I.SHORT TITLE: Felix Martos v New San Jose Builders

II. FULL TITLE: Felix Martos, et al.,petitioners v. New San Jose Builders, respondents,
October 24, 2012

III. TOPIC: Civil Procedure – Parts of Pleading; Verification

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Felix Martos, et al. alleged that on various dates, New San Jose Builders, Inc. hired them on different
positions for its San Jose Plains Project (SJPP), also known as the "Erap City." Sometime in 2000, New San
Jose Builders, Inc. was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works on the SJPP project due
to lack of funds of the National Housing Authority. Thus, the workers were informed that many of them
would be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other projects. Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell
Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael Villa, and Melvin Garay were laid off. While on the other hand, Felix Martos,
Ariel Dominguez, Greg Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric Castrence,
Anthony Molina, and Roy Silva were among those who were retained and were issued new appointment
papers to their respective assignments, indicating therein that they are project employees. However, they
refused to sign the appointment papers as project employees and subsequently refused to continue to
work.

On different dates, three (3) Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the
NLRC by the employees.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Felix Martos (Martos) was illegally dismissed; and dismissed the claims of
other complainants. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed San Jose Builders, Inc.s
appeal and partially granted the appeal made by the other complainants.

On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. The CA
explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners
despite their failure to verify the same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position
paper and his counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure the verification of the others.
With respect to Martos, the CA ruled that he was a regular employee and his termination was illegal.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Questioned in this Petition for Review is the July 31, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June
17, 2010 Resolution, which reversed and set aside the July 30, 2008 Decision and October 28, 2008,
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission; and reinstated the May 23, 2003 Decision of the
Labor Arbiter.

VI. ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not the CA is correct in dismissing the complaints filed by the petitioners who
failed to verify their position papers

2. Whether or Not Felix Martos should be reinstated

VII. RULING:

1. YES. The Court agrees with the CA. The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct. The absence of a proper verification is cause to
treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible. The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the
same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.
2. No. Martos reinstatement is no longer practicable. He Court agrees that the reinstatement being sought
by him was no longer practicable because of the strained relation between the parties. Thus, the Court
deems it fair to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. In addition to his separation pay, Martos is
also entitled to payment of full backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and attorneys
fees

The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no
longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise
be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.

Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable
alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such
payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other
hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a
worker it could no longer trust.

VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Acosta_Verification

ESTEL V DIEGO, SR. AND DIEGO, JR,

G.R. No. 174082 January 16, 2012
FACTS: This case originated from a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and
Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the MTCC of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental against petitioner. The MTCC
rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondents. The RTC and CA affirmed the MTCC’s Decision.
Petitioner’s MFR was denied, hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not recognizing that the RTC failed to make a finding of fact
that the complaint states no cause of action because the verification is defective (that it should be
based on respondent’s knowledge or authentic record and not simply upon “knowledge,
information and belief.”) and, as such, the complaint should be treated as an unsigned pleading.

HELD: NO. This issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised
before the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the
outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding
verification.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides:
Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and
belief” or upon “knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.

A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule.
Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct
based on their personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own
personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the
respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal
knowledge.

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

Barrieta_Certification against forum shopping

Atty. Emmanuel Agustin, et al. v. Alejandro Cruz-Herrera

G.R. No. 174564, February 12, 2014

FACTS
The complainants filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims and damages against Podden
and Herrera. They engaged the services of Atty. Emmanuel D. Agustin (Atty. Agustin) to handle the case
upon the verbal agreement that he will be paid on a contingency basis at the rate of ten percent (10%) of
the final monetary award or such amount of attorney’s fees that will be finally determined.

The complainants, thru Atty. Agustin, obtained a favorable ruling before the Labor Arbiter (LA). No
appeal was taken from the foregoing judgment hence, on February 2, 1999, a motion for execution was
filed.

Herrera filed a Manifestation and Motion to deny issuance of the writ stating, among others, that Podden
ceased operations on December 1, 1994 or almost four years before judgment was rendered by the LA on
the illegal dismissal complaint and that nine of the eleven employees have executed Waivers and
Quitclaims rendering any execution of the judgment inequitable. Atty. Agustin opposed Herrera’s motion
but the latter was sustained by the NLRC. On appeal, CA denied Atty. Agustin’s motion. Hence, this appeal
before the SC.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Agustin’s appeal should be given due course.

HELD
The petition is dismissible outright for being accompanied by a defective certification of non-forum
shopping having been signed by Atty. Agustin instead of the complainants as the principal parties. It has
been repeatedly emphasized that in the case of natural persons, the certification against forum shopping
must be signed by the principal parties themselves and not by the attorney. The purpose of the rule rests
mainly on practical sensibility. As explained in Clavecilla v. Quitain:

The certification (against forum shopping) must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties
and not by the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the
principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously it is the petitioner, and not
always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the
best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Hence, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.

The Court has espoused leniency and overlooked such procedural misstep in cases bearing substantial
merit complemented by the written authority or general power of attorney granted by the parties to the
actual signatory. However, no analogous justifiable reasons exist in the case at bar neither do the claims
of Atty. Agustin merit substantial consideration to justify a relaxation of the rule. It is apparent that the
complainants did not seek the instant review because they have already settled their dispute with
Herrera before the CA. It is Atty. Agustin’s personal resolve to pursue this recourse premised on his
unwavering stance that the joint compromise agreement signed by the complainants was inequitable and
devious as they were denied the bigger monetary award adjudged by a final and executory judgment.
Atty. Agustin ought to be reminded that his professional relation with his clients is one of agency under
the rules thereof “[t]he acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within
the scope of his authority.” It is clear that under the circumstances of this case, Atty. Agustin is acting
beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement between the complainants,
Podden and Herrera.
Bataller_Certification against forum shopping

PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRAMO WAKAS NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 144880, November 17 2004

FACTS:
The Director of the Land Managment Bureau (LMB) granted the petition of respondent, The Members of the Tramo
Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc. (TRAMO WAKAS) which prayed for the grant of ownership over 3 parcels of land
situated in Paranaque City. The same property is being claimed by petitioner Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI appealed
the said decision to higher adjudicatory bodies but was denied and dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals (CA)
likewise dismissed the petition on the ground of Infirm Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping for the same
does not show proof that the persons who signed therein (Pascual and Lombos) were duly authorized by the corporation.
The Court further ruled that the petition has not been filed on time, but a day after the period petitioner corporation
expressly sought. As indicated in its Petition for Time, petitioner corporation asked for an additional fifteen (15) days, or
until March 2, 2000, within which to file its petition, however, despite approval thereof, petitioner corporation filed the
same only on MARCH 3, 2000 as indicated by the date stamped on the envelope which contains the petition for review.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the persons who executed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to PSI‘s petition were
authorized to do so
2. W/N PSIS manifestation/petition for Review was filed within the reglementary period

HELD:
1. YES.
Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court mandates that a petition for review shall
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping. For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43
provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof. This requirement applies even to corporations. Having no powers, it exercises its powers through its
board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors.

It is undisputed that when the petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, there was no proof attached thereto that
Lombos and Pascual were authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification. However, subsequent
to the CAs dismissal of the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to which it attached a certificate issued by
its board secretary stating that on February 11, 2000 or prior to the filing of the petition, Lombos and Pascual had been
authorized by petitioners board of directors to file the petition before the CA. The subsequent submission of proof of
authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation justifies the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its
petition to be given due course.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum shopping.

2. YES.
Registry Receipt Nos. 185-188 covering the envelopes bearing the copies of the petition which were sent to the CA indicate
that such copies were filed by registered mail at the Domestic Airport Post Office (DAPO) on March 2, 2000. The Affidavit
of Service filed by the person who did the mailing of the petition in behalf of petitioner states that such petition was filed
by registered mail by depositing seven copies thereof in four separate sealed envelopes and mailing the same to the Clerk
of Court of the CA through the DAPO on March 2, 2000. The affidavit likewise states that on even date, the petition was
served on counsel for respondents, the DENR and the OP by depositing copies of the same in sealed envelopes and mailing
them to said parties respective addresses through the DAPO. And in the Certification dated October 26, 2000 issued by
Postmaster Cesar A. Felicitas of the DAPO, he states that the registered mail matter covered by Registry Receipt Nos. 185-
188 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the CA was posted at their office for mailing on March 2, 2000, but that it was
dispatched to the CMEC on March 3, 2000 for proper disposition. This could very well explain why the latter date was
stamped on the envelope received by the CA containing the petition.

At all events, strict adherence to rules of procedure must give way to considerations of equity and substantial justice
where, as in this case, there is evidence showing that the appeal was filed on time.
Canape_Certification against forum shopping
Carillo_Certification against forum shopping

VIVIAN T. RAMIREZ, v. MAR FISHING CO., INC., MIRAMAR FISHING CO., INC.,

FACTS:
On 28 June 2001, Mar Fishing sold its principal assets to co-respondent Miramar Fishing Co., Inc. through public
bidding. In view of that transfer, Mar Fishing issued a Memorandum on October 23, 2001, informing all its workers
that the company would cease to operate by the end of the month, thereafter, it also notified the DOLE of the
closure of its business operations.

Mar Fishing labor union, Mar Fishing Workers Union NFL and Miramar entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
which provides that Miramar, shall absorb Mar Fishing regular rank and file employees whose performance was
satisfactory, without loss of seniority rights and privileges previously enjoyed. Unfortunately, petitioners, who
worked as rank and file employees, were not hired or given separation pay by Miramar. Thus, petitioners filed
Complaints for illegal dismissal.
The NLRC imposed liability only on Mar Fishing.

Despite the award of separation pay and back wages, petitioners filed a Rule 65 Petition before the CA arguing that
both Mar Fishing and Miramar should be made liable for their separation pay, and that their back wages should be
up to the time of their actual reinstatement. However, finding that only 3 of the 228 petitioners signed the
Verification and Certification against forum shopping, the CA instantly dismissed the action for certiorari against the
225 other petitioners without ruling on the substantive aspects of the case.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing their Petition for Review on the ground that their pleading lacked
a Verification and Certification against forum shopping?

HELD: The decision of the CA dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The Rules of Court provide that a petition for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping. Failure to comply with these mandatory requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

Because of petitioner’s noncompliance with the requirements governing the certification of non-forum shopping,
no error could be validly attributed to the CA when it ordered the dismissal of the special civil action for certiorari.
The lack of certification against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of a complaint, but shall be a
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. Indeed, the general rule is that subsequent compliance with
the requirements will not excuse a party's failure to comply in the first instance. Thus, on procedural aspects, the
appellate court correctly dismissed the case.
Castro_Effect of signing by a person not authorized to sign

Atty. Fe Q. Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles

G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012

FACTS:

Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Sampaloc, Manila. The subject
parcel of land was occupied by Galiga as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador alleged
that she bought the subject parcel of land from Galiga who represented that he was the owner, being one
in possession. Salvador remained in possession of the property. Angeles sent a letter to Salvador
demanding that the latter vacate the subject property which was not heeded by Salvador. Angeles, thru
one Rosauro Diaz, Jr., filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the MeTCof Manila. The
MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Angeles. On appeal, Salvador alleged that Diaz, who filed the
complaint for ejectment, had no authority from Angeles at the time of filing of the suit. Both RTC and CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of a complaint filed by one who has not proven his authority to represent a
plaintiff in filing an action?

RULING:

The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was Rosauro Diaz who
executed the verification and certification alleging that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. However,
there was no copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the
authority supposedly granted to him. More than a year after the complaint was filed, respondent attached
to his Reply an SPA supposedly executed by respondent in favor of Diaz. However, said SPA was executed
only more than a month after the complaint was filed appearing to have been notarized by McGuire of
Santa Clara County. However, there was no certification that said person is indeed a notary public in
Santa Clara County.

If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the
court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the
plaintiff. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's
jurisdiction. Hence, since no valid complaint was filed with MeTC, the court never acquired jurisdiction
over the case and all proceedings before it were null and void.
De la Rosa-Reid_Manner of Making allegations

[G.R. No. 139539. February 5, 2002]

CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D.
SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS: Plaintiff filed a case of injunction and damages, with preliminary injunction against the
defendant. In the complaint, Ceroferr prayed that Santiago and his agents be enjoined from - claiming
possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, Quezon City, that Santiago and
his agents be prevented from making use of the vacant lot as a jeepney terminal; that Santiago be ordered
to pay Ceroferr P650.00 daily as lost income for the use of the lot until possession is restored to the
latter; and that Santiago be directed to pay plaintiff Ceroferr moral, actual and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, plus expenses of litigation.

In the course of the proceedings, there was a verification survey, followed by a relocation survey,
whereby it would appear that the vacant lot is inside Lot No. 68. While both parties have been
brandishing separate certificates of title, defendant asserted a superior claim as against that of the
plaintiff in that, according to defendant, his title has been confirmed through judicial reconstitution
proceedings, whereas plaintiffs title does not carry any technical description of the property except only
as it is designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision.

At this point, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention that
the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing over the conflicting claims of
ownership of the parties over the disputed portion. The trial court concluded that it could not proceed to
decide plaintiffs claim for damages and injunction for lack of jurisdiction because its judgment would
depend upon a determination of the validity of defendants title and the identity of the land covered by it.

ISSUE: Whether Ceroferrs complaint states a sufficient cause of action

HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate
facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of
action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action.

These elements are present in the case at bar. The complaint alleged that petitioner Ceroferr
owned Lot 68 covered by TCT No. RT-90200 (334555). Petitioner Ceroferr used a portion of Lot 68 as a
jeepney terminal.
The complaint further alleged that respondent Santiago claimed the portion of Lot 68 used as a jeepney
terminal since he claimed that the jeepney terminal was within Lot 90 owned by him and covered by TCT
No. RT-781 10 (3538) issued in his name.

A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, as in this case,
hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid
judgement upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to
the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the
defendants
De Leon_Manner of making allegations

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. LOURDES K. MENDOZA

G.R. No. 176949 June 27, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent Lourdes K. Mendoza, the sole proprietor of Highett Steel Fabricators, filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money against petitioner Asian Construction and Development Corp., who purchased various
fabricated steel materials and supplies amounting to P 1,206,277.00 from petitioner.

Petitioner moved for a Bill of Particulars on the ground that no copies of the purchase orders and
invoices were attached to the complaint to enable petitioner to prepare a response pleading to the
complaint.

Respondent presented testimonies of Highett Salesman Artemio Tejero who confirmed the delivery of the
supplies and materials, and Highett General Manager Arvin Cheng. Presentation of evidence of the
petitioner was deemed due to repeated non-appearance before the court.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner argued that a charge or sales invoice is not an actionable document, thus petitioners’ failure to
deny under oath its genuineness and due execution does not constitute an admission thereof. She further
argued that respondent failed to prove her claim as the invoices were not properly authenticated by the
witnesses.

Respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition, contending that petitioner’s arguments were a mere
rehash of those presented and passed upon the CA. She also maintains that the charge invoices are
actionable documents. The witnesses testified that the said invoices were properly identified and
authenticated, as they were stamped received by petitioner’s employee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge invoices were actionable documents.

HELD:
NO. A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such instrument or document.

Sec. 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:

“SEC. 7 Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading,
and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to
be a part of the pleading, or said copy with like effect be set forth in the pleading.”

In the case, the Charge Invoices are not actionable per se as these only provide details on the alleged
transactions. These documents do not need to be attached attached or stated in the complaint as these
are evidentiary in nature. The respondent’s cause of action is not based on the documents but on the
contract of sale between the parties.
However, although the Charge Invoices are not actionable, these are sufficient to prove that the materials
and supplies were purchased by and delivered to the petitioner. In civil cases, only a preponderance of
evidence is required. In this case, no other evidence was presented by petitioner to refute the
respondent’s claim. Thus the Court agrees with the CA that the evidence preponderates in favor of
respondent.
Del Rosario_Manner of making allegations

Spouse Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos vs Lolita Alcazar

GR No. 183034 March 12, 2014
Facts:
Respondent Alcazar is the proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC). She executed a Complaint for
a sum of money against the petitioner spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos in order to collect the
value of paint and construction materials obtained by them from LCC amounting to 1,456,000 pesos
which remained unpaid. Respondent’s cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando acknowledging his obligation in
the mentioned amount. On the other hand, petitioners contested that the Acknowledgement should not
be admissible as evidence since what was presented was a mere photocopy when the original document
was available.

Issue: whether or not the mere photocopy of the Acknowledgement should be admissible in evidence

Held: Yes, said photocopy of Acknowledgement is admissible in evidence

While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is
no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally
offered in evidence by the party proponent.
Mere presentation of the photocopy of Acknowledgement was a mere procedural inadvertence
that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners’ cause in any manner. As conceded by them and
as held by the CA, the original exists and was made part of the records of the case when respondent’s
evidence was first taken. Though respondent now claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed
that the document resides in the record. This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her
possession; it is with the court as an exhibit.
More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and
due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. With the consequent admission engendered
by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper
authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners’ admissions in
paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that
judgment may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts and other
documents to prove the claimed indebtedness.
However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable for the judgment
amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the Acknowledgment. She may be held
liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as admitted by her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer.
DIOLA_Ultimate Facts

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages on the theory that:
(1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants (Ferdinand Marcos, Romualdez and
Imelda Marcos) in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder, extortion, blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of
power;
(2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, and/or
stockholder of corporations beneficially held or controlled by the principal defendants;
(3) he took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with
grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with
defendants, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds; and
(4) he acted as dummy and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating
ill-gotten wealth through government concessions prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator,
director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants in order to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a
complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and
legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts
allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff
furnish him the particulars sought therein.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution which
denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of
particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035
should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the
respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed resolutions.

HELD: YES.

The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate facts", and the second, the
"evidentiary facts."

The term "ultimate facts" was defined, as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as the essential
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts
which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal,
determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests.

On the other hand, the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined as: those facts which are necessary for
determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are
based.

Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action,
otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause
of action

However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the
proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars
In the case at bar, the complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner
allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do
with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover,
the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director,
member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear
in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some
Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore,
deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual
premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can
be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that
the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be
prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition is
granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are ordered to
prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise,
respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-
mentioned civil case.

Dizon_Ultimate Facts

D.M. FERRER & ASSOCIATES CORPORATION vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

G.R. No. 189496 February 1, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner and University of Santo Tomas Hospital, Inc. (USTHI) entered into a Project Management
Contract for the renovation of the 4th and 5th floors of the Clinical Division Building, Nurse Call Room
and Medical Records, Medical Arts Tower, Diagnostic Treatment Building and Pay Division Building.
Petitioner demanded from USTHI the payment of the construction costs amounting toP17,558,479.39.
However, the University of Santo Tomas (UST), through its rector, Fr. Rolando V. Dela Rosa, wrote a letter
informing petitioner that its claim for payment had been denied, because the Project Management
Contract was without the required prior approval of the board of trustees. Thus, petitioner filed a
Complaint for sum of money, breach of contract and damages.
Petitioner posited in part that UST may be impleaded in the case under the doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil," wherein respondent UST and USTHI would be considered to be acting as one corporate
entity, and UST may be held liable for the alleged obligations due to petitioner. Subsequently, UST filed its
Motion to Dismiss. It alleged that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action, and that the claim was
unenforceable under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. Judge Fernandez of Branch 97 RTC Quezon
City granted the motion and dismissed the Complaint insofar as respondent UST was concerned. The
Court held that respondent was not a real party-in-interest, and that it was not privy to the contract
executed between USTHI and petitioner.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the RTC Order and filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition on the ground that Judge Fernandez was an alumnus of respondent UST. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 76 presided by Judge Balut who dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner, upholding the initial findings of Judge Fernandez.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA wherein it was
dismissed on the ground that a petition under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy to question the RTC’s Order
that completely disposes of the case. Instead, petitioner should have availed itself of an appeal under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Resolution. It pointed out that the present case falls under
the enumerated exceptions of Rule 41, in particular, while the main case is still pending, no appeal may
be made from a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints.
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, hence this petition
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari by failing to consider the exception in Sec. 1(g)
of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court;
W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the Complaint stated no cause
of action.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Jan-Dec Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of an action against one of the parties while the main
case is still pending. This is the general rule in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 1(g). In that case, ruled thus:
Evidently, the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari from the Order of the RTC
dismissing the complaint against respondent. While Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case,
it also provides several exceptions to the rule, to wit: (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final
order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and
third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In the foregoing instances, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent is a final order
because it terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule
since the case involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint against
Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by petitioner
before the CA was proper and the CA erred in dismissing the petition.
2. Yes, the Court with petitioner that the Complaint states a cause of action against respondent UST. While
it is admitted that respondent UST was not a party to the contract, petitioner posits that the former is
nevertheless liable for the construction costs. In support of its position, petitioner alleged that (1) UST
and USTHI are one and the same corporation; (2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of USTHI by
virtue of the latter’s Articles of Incorporation; (3) respondent controls the business of USTHI; and (4)
UST’s officials have performed acts that may be construed as an acknowledgement of respondent’s
liability to petitioner.
Obviously, these issues would have been best resolved during trial. The RTC therefore committed grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case against respondent for lack of cause of action. The trial
court relied on the contract executed between petitioner and USTHI, when the court should have instead
considered merely the allegations stated in the Complaint.
The Court ordered the reinstatement of respondent University of Sto. Tomas as a defendant in the case.
Dona_Alternative causes of action

LA MALLORCA v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
FACTS:
Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a Pambusco Bus, owned
and operated by the defendant, La Mallorca. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children
alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The
father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded. His daughter Raquel
followed him unnoticing. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to
give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was
run over and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff holding defendant liable for breach of contract of
carriage. La Mallorca contended that when the child was killed, she was no longer a passenger and
therefore the contract of carriage terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it
nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages,
for the negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA ordered
defendant to pay herein respondents Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel
Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that
respondents complaint was one for breach of contract.

RULING:
Yes. The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter,
was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on
the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved during the trial.
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. In the
present case, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very
cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The presence of said passengers Mariano
Beltran and family near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads —
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter,
was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on
the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible
with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New
Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible
with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and
determined.

Duquilla_Pleading an actionable document

LEDDA vs. BPI

G.R. No. 200868 November 12, 2012

FACTS: A collection suit was filed by respondent BPI against Ledda for the latter’s unpaid credit card
obligation. The trial court ruled in favor of BPI. On appeal, the CA rejected Ledda’s argument that the
document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is an actionable
document.

ISSUE: Whether or not the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the issuance and
use of the credit card is an actionable document.

HELD: No. The Rule on action or defense based on document applies when the action is based on a
written instrument or document. In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money
arising from Ledda’s default in her credit card obligation with BPI. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based
on Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail
services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such credit card
transactions, despite demands. In other words, BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the document
containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda.
Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is
not an actionable document. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the
complaint.
Eisma_Pleading an actionable document

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and DEV. CORP. vs. LOURDES MENDOZA

G.R. No. 176949 June 27, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent, who is the sole proprietor of Highett Steel Fabricators, filed before the RTC a complaint for a
sum of money against petitioner-corporation. Mendoza alleged that petitioner refused to pay the various
fabricated steel materials and supplies amounting to P1,206,177.00, exclusive of interests upon demand.
Petitioner moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that no copies of the purchase orders and invoices
were attached to the complaint. The RTC denied the motion. Accordingly, petitioner filed its answer with
counterclaim denying liability while asserting of lack of cause of action. The presentation of evidence for
petitioner, however, was deemed waived and terminated due to the repeated non-appearance of
petitioner and its counsel.

Petitioner argued that a charge or sales invoice is not an actionable document. Thus, petitioner’s failure
to deny under oath its genuineness and due execution does not constitute an admission. And lastly, the
invoices offered as evidence were not properly authenticated by her witnesses.

RTC: ruled in favor of respondent

Court of Appeals: affirmed with modification as to the reckoning point for the computation of interest.

ISSUE: WON the charge invoices are actionable documents.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

The charge invoices are not actionable documents.

Section 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading,
and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to
be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or
document. The charge invoices are not actionable documents per se as these "only provide details on the
alleged transactions." These documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these are
evidentiary in nature. In fact, respondent’s cause of action is not based on these documents but on the
contract of sale between the parties.

Although they are not actionable documents, these together with the purchase orders are sufficient to
prove that petitioner indeed ordered supplies and materials from Highett and that these were delivered
to petitioner, moreso properly identified and authenticated by a witness. It bears stressing that in civil
cases, only a preponderance of evidence or "greater weight of the evidence" is required.
Fabon_Failure to plead defenses and objections

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013

FACTS:

In 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita
filed an Answer, and thereafter filed an Amended Answer in which she alleged that her husband and co-defendant
Manuel is already dead since the year 1995.

Respondent Lolita then claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the RoC, and that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita in accordance with Section
6, Rule 86 of the Rules.

Petitioner contends that respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. (YES)

HELD:

Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was
filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to
raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively
participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

Petitioner’s argument failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely:

(1) jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) jurisdiction over the parties;
(3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and
(4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.

The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the
CFI to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money amounting to P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts.

In subsequent cases that cited Tijam, the SC barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned
over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction
over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case.
Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

The RoC provide:

RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim.

RULE 15
MOTIONS

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.

Based on the foregoing provisions, the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in
a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be
waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."

Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not
deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is
filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue
of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the RoC.

The CA erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that "issue on jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent
timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising the question of
jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same
is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the
defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be
asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."
Fajardo_Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and crossclaim

FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION

vs
FORBES PARK ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 133119 August 17, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged by USSR as constructor for buildings to be built in its parcel of land in
Forbes Park Village. The village has an existing regulation authorizing only the construction of a single-
family residential building. The regulation was violated by petitioner, which prompted respondent to
disallow the entrance of personnel and materials to the said village. Because of this petitioner filed a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages against Forbes Park. The latter in turn filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that petitioner has no cause of action. The dismissal was upheld until the case reached the
Supreme Court, which also affirmed the dismissal in G.R. No. 79319.
Following the finality of the said case, Forbes Park now filed a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner for its violation of the rules and regulations praying that the latter be ordered the removal or
demolition of its buildings. Petitioner now questions the court for not dismissing the complaint filed by
Forbes Park despite the fact that the alleged claims and cause of action are barred by prior judgment
and/or deemed waived for its failure to interpose the same as compulsory counterclaim in G.R. No.
79319.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Forbes Park’s claim shall be dismissed.

HELD:
YES. The complaint shall be dismissed.
The claim is barred due to Forbes Park’s failure to set it up as compulsory counterclaim.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the opposing party’s claim. If it is within the jurisdiction of
the court and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed by
the opposing party. Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it
should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise
to it. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following
tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Affirmative
answers to the above queries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
G.R. No. 79319 and the present case arose from the same occurrence – the construction work by
petitioner; the issues of fact and law in both cases are identical – whether the structures erected are in
violation of the rules. The logical relation between the two cases is patent and it’s obvious that
substantially the same evidence is involved in the said case.
Nonetheless, even if Forbes Park had filed the compulsory counterclaim in G.R. No. 79319, the
same will still be barred because of the Motion to Dismiss filed by it.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives it
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party
filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is
improper and it must be dismissed. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the
dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the
complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion
ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim. The filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up
of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies.
Ferrer_When default is proper

NATIVIDAD LIM vs NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,

SPOUSES ROBERTO LL. ARCINUE and ARABELA ARCINUE
[G.R. No. 178789; 14 November 2012]

Facts:
On February 8, 1995 respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) filed an expropriation suit against
petitioner Natividad B. Lim (Lim) before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 37 in
Civil Case 17352 covering Lots 2373 and 2374 that the NPC needed for its Sual Coal-Fired Thermal Power
Project. Since Lim was residing in the UnitedStates, the court caused the service of summons on her on
February 20, 1995 through her tenant, a certain Wilfredo Tabongbong.2 On March 1, 1995,upon notice to
Lim and the deposit of the provisional value of the property, the RTC ordered the issued writ of
possession in NPC’s favor that would enable it to cause the removal of Lim from the land.

On April 24, 1995, however, Lim, represented by her husband Delfin, filed an omnibus motion to dismiss
the action and to suspend the writ of possession, questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over Lim’s person
and the nature of the action. She also assailed the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The
RTC denied the motions.

On December 6, 1996 respondent spouses Roberto and Arabela Arcinue (the Arcinues) filed a motion for
leave to admit complaint in intervention,6 alleging that they owned and were in possession of Lot 2374,
one of the two lots subject of the expropriation. On January 7, 1997 the RTC granted the Arcinues’ motion
and required both the NPC and Lim to answer the complaint-in-intervention within 10 days from receipt
of its order. When Lim and the NPC still did not file their answers to the complaint-in-intervention after
10 months, on December 7, 1998 the Arcinues filed a motion for judgment by default.8 Lim sought to
expunge the motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite explanation why the Arcinues resorted to
service by registered mail rather than to personal service. At the scheduled hearing of the motion, Lim’s
counsel did not appear. The NPC for its part manifested that it did not file an answer since its interest lay
in determining who was entitled to just compensation. On March 1, 1999 the RTC issued an order of
default against both Lim and the NPC. The RTC pointed out that the Arcinues’ failure to explain their
resort to service by registered mail had already been cured by the manifestation of Lim’s counsel that he
received a copy of the Arcinues’ motion on December 7, 1998 or 10 days before its scheduled hearing.
Lim filed a motion for reconsideration10 to lift the default order but the Court denied the motion,
prompting Lim to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 52842.

On March 23, 2007 the CA rendered a decision13 that affirmed the RTC’s order of default. Lim filed a
motion for reconsideration14 but the CA denied it, prompting her to file the present petition for review.
OnSeptember 24, 2007 the Court initially denied Lim’s petition17 but on motion for reconsideration, the
Court reinstated the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Order of Default that the RTC
entered against Lim

Held:
No, there was no grave abuse of discretion when the CA affirmed the Order of Default by the RTC. SC
DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS CA Decision that upheld the orders of the RTC. SC DIRECTS the RTC to
proceed with its hearing and adjudication of the case.
Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an
answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order
admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the
former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the required
answer can give rise to default.

Lim points out that the RTC should have ordered the Arcinues’ motion for judgment by default expunged
from the records since it lacked the requisite explanation as to why they resorted to service by registered
mail in place of personal service. There is no question that the Arcinues’ motion failed to comply with the
requirement of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. —
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation, why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation
of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

But the above does not provide for automatic sanction should a party fail to submit the required
explanation. It merely provides for that possibility considering its use of the term "may." The question is
whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not going for the sanction of striking out the
erring motion.

The SC finds no such grave abuse of discretion here. As the RTC pointed out, notwithstanding that the
Arcinues' failed to explain their resort to service by registered mail rather than by personal service, the
fact is that Lim's counsel expressly admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment
by default on December 7, 1998 or 10 days before its scheduled hearing. This means that the Arcinues
were diligent enough to file their motion by registered mail long before the scheduled hearing.

Personal service is required precisely because it often happens that hearings do not push through
because, while a copy of the motion may have been served by registered mail before the date of the
hearing, such is received by the adverse patiy already after the hearing. Thus, the rules prefer personal
service. But it does not altogether prohibit service by registered mail when such service, when adopted,
ensures as in this case receipt by the adverse party.
Hadloc_Effect of an order of default, effect of partial default

Magdiwang Realty Corp. V. The Manila Banking Corp.

Facts: The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC) filed a complaint for sum of money against herein
petitioners before the RTC. Instead of filing a responsive pleading with the trial court, the petitioners filed
on October 12, 2000, which was notably beyond the fifteen (15)-day period allowed for the filing of a
responsive pleading, a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Dismiss.
TMBC, via its Opposition, then asked that the petitioners be declared in default for their failure to file
their responsive pleading within the period allowed under the law. The RTC conceded.

Issue: W/N declaration of petitioners in default is proper.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioners failed to file their answer to TMBC’s complaint within the reglementary period
allowed under the Rules of Court. The validity of the trial court’s declaration of their default is a settled
matter. The petitioners’ default by their failure to file their answer led to certain consequences. Where
defendants before a trial court are declared in default, they thereby lose their right to object to the
reception of the plaintiff’s evidence establishing his cause of action. This is akin to a failure to, despite due
notice, attend in court hearings for the presentation of the complainant’s evidence, which absence would
amount to the waiver of such defendant’s right to object to the evidence presented during such hearing,
and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein.
Leano_Relief from an order of default, extent of relief

SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUEL v. ONG

G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014

FACTS

Ong filed with RTC a complaint for accion reivindicatoria against the petitioners. The sheriff, Ong’s
counsel and Laureano attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address
but the sps. requested that service be made at another time considering that Sandra Manuel's mother was
then critically ill. Another attempt at personal service was made. After Sheriff Sales had personally
explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused
to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely
tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their answer
within 15 days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they
be declared in default, which the RTC granted. Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of
evidence, which the RTC also granted.

Then Sps. Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default. They alleged that it is the siblings of Sandra
Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Thus, summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address. The RTC
denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default. It noted that, first, their motion was not
sworn to, as required, and, second, they did not show that their failure to timely file an answer "was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which dismissed their petition for lack of merit. MR was also denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: WON the Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the RTC’s order of default.

HELD: NO

As a preliminary matter, a valid service of summons was made on the sps. Manuel. This is so because
personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Sales.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Sec.6.

Although they did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriff’s return but claimed that
no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan,
Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons was made. The sps. Manuel cannot capitalize on the
supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where
summons is served. A defendant’s address is inconsequential.

As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Sps. Manuel, pursuant to Rule
11, Sec. 1, to file their answer within 15 days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they were
rightly declared to be in default.

Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as the pleading may warrant
should a defendant fail to timely file his or her answer. However, a court may decline from immediately
rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff to present evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party
declared to be in default shall nevertheless be "entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings," although he
or she may no longer take part in the trial.

As explained in Spouses Delos Santos v. Carpio, "there are three requirements which must be complied
with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default: (1) the claiming
party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending
party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the
defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule."

All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon Ong. Not only were the requisites for
declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was also shown
to be procedurally infirm.

Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b), "the remedy against an order of default is a motion to set it aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence." However, it is not only the motion to lift
order of default which a defendant must file. A motion to lift order of default must "be appended an
affidavit showing the invoked ground, and another, denominated affidavit of merit, setting forth facts
constituting the party's meritorious defense or defenses."

Three requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in order "to warrant the setting aside of an order of
default for failure to file answer, are: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has
knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a
meritorious defense."

In this case, the CA noted that the Sps. Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was not made under oath.
The Court add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts which
would show that their non-filing of an answer within fifteen 15 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.

Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses
Manuel’s motion to lift order of default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.

Apart from their failure to make their motion to lift order of default under oath and to attach to it an
affidavit of merit, the CA also noted that they set their motion to lift order of default for hearing on the
same date that they filed it. Thus, they also violated Rule 15, Sec. 4, which requires that service of a
motion upon an adverse party must be made in such a manner that ensures receipt by the latter "at least
three days before the date of hearing. . . ."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

Leonardo_Relief from an order of default, extent of relief

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY vs. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.,

G.R. No. 176628 March 19, 2012

FACTS:

On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster
and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the
Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine
Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).

On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven Million
Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos (P11,820,550.53), plus interest,
for the construction of the golf course. Despite the RTC’s liberality of granting two successive motions for
extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a
judgment of default. On July 11, 2005, PTA filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment was premised on the argument that the gross
negligence of PTA’s counsel prevented the presentation of evidence before the RTC. The CA dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment of default rendered by RTC against PTA was proper

HELD: YES

The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an
orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the
negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since
every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that a client is
bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique and unless such acts
involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had
been the latter’s acts.

In LBC Express - Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo, the Court held that gross negligence is characterized
by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected. This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in
submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served
upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003. Thus,
in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was
correct in declaring PTA in default.
 Moreover there was no extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent. Under the doctrine of this cited case, they do not see the acts of PTA’s counsel to be
constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

The records reveal that the judgment of default was sent via registered mail to PTA’s counsel.
However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default. Since the failure of PTA
to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not
err in declaring PTA in default.
Magabilin_Relief from an order of default, extent of relief

LETICIA DIONA etc, vs. ROMEO A. BALANGUE et. al

G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013

FACTS:

Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage. When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.
Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint.

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October 15,
1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorney’s Office, they filed
a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, respondents failed to
file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and
allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely
appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC’s Decision

ISSUE:

(1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A
SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL

HELD:

NO. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s
own neglect in promptly availing of the same.

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, a final and executory
judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for
having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly
negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s
property without due process of law.
 The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the cause of his client was
already present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a
Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing
an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by
the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision A
simple reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant
and unconscionable rate of interest. Had the counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his
attention and compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But he did
not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Worse, he even allowed the
RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief
therefrom

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies
through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which
prevented them from pursuing such remedies.
Mallari_Effect of appeal by defaulted defendant
ARQUERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 168053 : September 21, 2011

FACTS:

Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, wherein several were converted into national
schools and integrated with the Palawan National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa, Province of
Palawan, as branches thereof. The law also provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS)
shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointed by the
Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (now the DepEd).

However, no VSS was appointed. Instead, then DECS Region IV Office designated then PNS
Principal Eugenio J. dela Cuesta in a concurrent capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the PINS. After the
retirement of Dela Cuesta, petitioner took over as Secondary School Principal of the PNS.

Director Rexs successor, Pedro B. Trinidad placed all satellite schools of the PINS under the direct
supervision of the Schools Division Superintendent for Palawan. This directive was later approved by the
DepEd. Petitioner was instructed to turn over the administration and supervision of the PINS branches or
units. In another memorandum, Schools Division Superintendent Portia Gesilva was designated as OIC of
the PINS. These events prompted different parties to institute various actions restraining the
enforcement of the DepEd orders.

Dr. Giron withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining her from submitting
to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel movement involving the PNS and the satellite
schools. Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission assailing the withdrawal of her designation
as OIC of the PINS. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification before the Office of
the DepEd Secretary as to the designation of private respondent.

Dr. Giron filed a formal charge against petitioner who continued to defy the orders issued by the
Regional Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS despite the designation of
private respondent as such. The administrative complaint charged petitioner with grave misconduct,
gross insubordination and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public and private respondents. The
Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her
function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure.

Respondents failed to file their Answer. Hence, on motion of petitioner, the Court declared
respondents in default in an Order dated December 15, 2003. In the same order, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.

RTC rendered a Judgment by Default, declaring petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero as the lawful Principal
and Head of the Palawan Integrated National High School who is lawfully entitled to manage the operation
and finances of the school subject to existing laws.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondents have the right to appeal the RTC decision having been declared in
default.

HELD:

YES.

In Martinez v. Republic, the Court has clearly discussed the remedies of a party declared in default in
light of the 1964 and 1997 Rules of Court and a number of jurisprudence applying and interpreting said
rules. Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the above-mentioned remedies, to wit:

A. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3,
Rule 18)

B. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of
Rule 37;
C. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

D. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him.
(Sec. 2, Rule 41)

The Court explained in Martinez that the fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule
41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not
hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant
may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Moreover, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the
defending party declared in default:

It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and
his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from
the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the
judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party
declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision
on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he
would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial
court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the
petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence
submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.

Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by
default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default
except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence. The appellate court, in turn, can review the
assailed decision and is not precluded from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff.
Panganiban_Manner of Filing

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, Cosalan, & Benguet Electric Cooperative Board
Members
GR No. 89070 May 18, 1992

Facts: Private respondent Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of petitioner. He received
memorandum from COA noting cash advances received by officers and employees of petitioner.
Petitioner received the COA Audit Report which enumerated irregularities in utilization of funds
amounting to P37 Million. Cosalan initiated implementation of remedial measures. The respondent
members of the Board, through Board Resolutions, abolished the housing allowance of Cosalan; reduced
his salary; directed him to hold all personnel disciplinary actions; and struck his name out as principal
signatory to transactions.

Cosalan filed complaint with NLRC against respondent member of the Board and later on
impleaded petitioner. Labor Arbiter favored Cosalan. Respondent Board members appealed to NLRC by
way of Memorandum of Appeal. Petitioner did not appeal, but moved to dismiss appeal filed by
respondent board members and execution of judgment. NLRC modified the award. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course
to respondent board members’ appeal although it was filed out of time

Held: Yes. The decision of Labor Arbiter was received on April 21, 1988. They had only up to May 2, 1988
within which to perfect their appeal since May 1 is a holiday. The Memorandum of Appeal was posted by
registered mail on May 3 and was received by NLRC the following day. Clearly, it was filed out of time.
The Court disagreed with the view of respondent board member that they filed on time because it was
delivered for mailing on May 1 to a licensed private letter carrier. The rule is that the transmission
through a private letter carrier, instead of Philippine Post Office, is not a recognized mode of filing
pleadings. The date of filing of a pleading is not the date of delivery of such to a private carrier, but the
date of actual receipt by the court.
Questin_Mode of service of pleadings

SALVADOR O. MOJAR, ET AL. v. AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY AGENCY

G. R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012, SECOND DIVISION, (Sereno, J.)

FACTS

Mojar, et al. were employed as security guards of Agro Commercial Security Agency (Agro) and assigned to the
various branches of the Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur.

In separate office orders, Mojar et al. were relieved from their respective posts and directed to report to their new
assignments in Metro Manila effective 3 June 2002. They, however, failed to report for duty in their new assignments,
prompting Agro to send them a letter dated 18 June 2002. It required a written explanation why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them, but the letter was not heeded. Thus, Mojar, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Agro and the Bank of Commerce Dagupan Branch before the NLRC.

The LA found that Mojar, et al. were validly dismissed. Agro appealed to the NLRC, but it was dismissed for lack
of merit. Agro filed its petition for certiorari before the appellate court. The CA issued a Resolution noting that no
comment on the petition had been filed, and stating that the case was now deemed submitted for resolution. Finding merit
in the petition, it found the orders transferring Mojar, et al. to Manila to be a valid exercise of management prerogative.

Mojar filed a manifestation before the CA, stating that he and the others had not been served a copy of the CA
Petition. He also said that they were not aware whether their counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, was served a
copy thereof, since the latter had already been bedridden since December 2007 until his demise on 25 February 2008.
Neither could their new counsel, Atty. Mario G. Aglipay, enter his appearance before the CA, as they failed to get the folder
from the office of Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer be found.

Mojar, et al. then filed a motion to annul proceedings, which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Was there valid service of the petition for certiorari to Mojar, et al.?

RULING

YES.

The Court in Cendaa v. Avila held that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual addresses of all the
petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. The failure to comply with that requirement is a sufficient ground for the
dismissal of a petition. This rule, however, is not absolute. In Santos v. Litton Mills Incorporated, the Court ruled that
where the petitioner clearly mentioned that the parties may be served with the court’s notices or processes through their
respective counsels, whose addresses have been clearly specified as in this case, this act would constitute substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The Court further observed that the notice required by law is
notice to counsel if the party has already appeared by counsel, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

In its Petition before the CA, Agro clearly indicated the following:

THE PARTIES
2.0. The petitioner AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC. (hereafter petitioner AGRO), is a corporation existing
under Philippine laws, and may be served with process thru counsel, at his address hereunder indicated; private respondents (1)
SALVADOR O. MOJAR; (2) EDGAR B. BEGONIA; (3) JOSE M. CORTEZ; (4) FREDDIE RANCES; (5) VIRGILIO MONANA; (6)
RESTITUTU [sic] GADDI; and, (7) EDSON D. TOMAS, are all of age, and during the material period, were in the employ of petitioner
AGRO as security guards; said respondents may be served with process thru their common counsel, ATTY. JOSE C. ESPINAS at No. 51
Scout Tuazon, Quezon City; on the other hand, respondent National Labor Relations Commission, 1st Division, Quezon City, is the agency
having jurisdiction over labor disputes in the Philippines and may be served with process at offices in Quezon City.

The foregoing may thus be considered as substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.

Section 3, Rule 46 provides that the petition for certiorari should be filed together with the proof of service thereof
on the respondent. Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if service is made by registered mail, as in this case,
proof shall be made by an affidavit of the person mailing and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Section 3,
Rule 46 further provides that the failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition.

Indeed, while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made on the other party, it is
nonetheless essential to due process and the orderly administration of justice.

Be that as it may, it does not escape the attention of the Court that in the CA Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the
appellate court stated that their records revealed that Atty. Espinas, Mojar, et al.’s counsel of record at the time, was duly
served a copy of the following: CA Resolution dated 20 February 2008 granting respondents Motion for Extension of Time
to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring Mojar, et al. to file their Comment on the CA Petition;
and CA Resolution dated 30 June 2008, submitting the case for resolution, as no comment was filed.

Such service to Atty. Espinas, as Mojar, et al.’s counsel of record, was valid despite the fact he was already deceased
at the time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire,
during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist
lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm.

It is the duty of party-litigants to be in contact with their counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress of their case. It is likewise the duty of parties to inform the court of the fact of their counsels death. Their failure
to do so means that they have been negligent in the protection of their cause. They cannot pass the blame to the court,
which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel.
Reonico_Amendment as a matter of right

Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs BDO, et. al.

G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012
FACTS
Spouses Soriano are stockholders of petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI). The spouses in their
personal capacity obtained loan from respondent BDO. And without authority from LEI, the spouses
made the property purchased by LEI as security (real estate mortgage). They falsified the document
making it appear that LEI authorized the mortgage. However, BDO failed to investigate and verify the
genuineness of the signatures appearing in the said authorization. In order to remedy the defects in such
mortgage, the spouses signed a document denominated as Deed of Assumption of Loans and Mortgage
Obligations and Amendment of Mortgage where LEI was made to assume the personal indebtedness of
the spouses with respondent BDO. When the fraudulent and unauthorized mortgage was discovered, LEI
filed a case before the SEC against the spouses.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoined BDO from proceeding
with the auction sale of the subject property. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial
court denied such and the motion to admit amended complaint. It held that no new argument had been
raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address the facts of plaintiffs’ failure to allege
in the complaint that the one board member made demands from to protect the interest of the
corporation. It
further ruled that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the same absolutely
changed petitioners' cause of action. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the amendment could be admitted.

RULING
YES. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, “Amendments as a matter of right. − A party
may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Sec.
3. Amendments by leave of court. − Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano
and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint, and the
claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed,
amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of
right. However, the courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in
the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the
case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
Amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend
such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order
dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper
had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so
would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues
among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally
determined. Respondent BDO should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they
pointed out a defect in the original complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been well aware
that due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially
alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would
redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of action is
now allowed under the new rules. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to
admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same.

Santos_Supplemental pleadings, distinction between amendment and supplemental pleadings

BARBA v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba was the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of respondent Liceo
de Cagayan University, Inc., a private educational institution with school campus located at Carmen,
Cagayan de Oro City Petitioner started working for respondent on July 8, 1993 as medical officer/school
physician for a period of one school year or until March 31, 1994. In July 1994, she was chosen by
respondent to be the recipient of a scholarship grant to pursue a three-year residency training in
Rehabilitation Medicine at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC).
After completing her residency training with VMMC in June 1997 petitioner returned to continue
working for respondent. She was appointed as Acting Dean of the College of Physical Therapy and at the
same time designated as Doctor-In-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic of the Rodolfo
Petitioner’s appointment as Doctor-In-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic was renewed and she was
appointed as Dean of the College of Physical Therapy by respondent’s President, Dr. Jose Ma. R. Golez.
In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in the
number of enrollees from a total of 1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only 29 students in
the first semester of school year 2003 to 2004. This worsened in the next year or in school year 2004 to
2005 where a total of only 20 students enrolled. Due to the low number of enrollees, respondent decided
to freeze the operation of the College of Physical Therapy indefinitely.
Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased operations on March 31, 2005, and petitioner went on
leave without pay starting on April 9, 2005. Barba was ordered to returned to work but as a professor in
the college of Nursing. Barba filed a case for constructive dismissal. He filed two cases, the issue of the
first case was whether there was constructive dismissal committed by respondent. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil case pending before the RTC is whether petitioner was guilty of breach of contract

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of forum shopping.

HELD:
Yes, the respondent was not guilty of forum shopping. The respondents failed to inform the appellate
court of the pendency of Civil Case No. 2009- 320, a complaint for breach of contract filed by respondent
against petitioner, we rule in the negative. Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. While there is identity of
parties in the two cases, the causes of action and the reliefs sought are different. The issue raised in the
present case is whether there was constructive dismissal committed by respondent. On the other hand,
the issue in the civil case pending before the RTC is whether petitioner was guilty of breach of contract.
Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping

Terre_Effect of amended pleading

Sps. Villuga v. Kelly Hardware & Construction Supply, Inc.

FACTS: Herein respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against herein
petitioners for non-payment of the principal amount plus interests of construction materials the latter
bought from the former. In their answer, petitioners said they have bought construction materials but
were unaware of the total sum they owe because of the absence of documents evidencing the purchase.
Petitioners also said that they have already paid P110,301.80 and P20,000. They agreed to pay the
principal amount stated by respondent on installment basis but without interests. Respondent agreed but
insisted that the interests be paid.

Respondent filed two amended complaints with leave of court:

The first amended complaint stated that the petitioners owe an aggregate value of which is P279,809.50;
that only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50. They also filed a Request for
Admission, for petitioners to admit as to the total amount of their indebtedness, to which the latter
objected in their comment.
The second amended complaint modified the period covered by the complaint, and also confirmed
petitioners’ payment of the P110,301.80 but was said to be applied to petitioners’ other obligations.

Respondent also filed a motion to expunge petitioners’ comments on the request for admission and for
summary judgment. Petitioners opposed because the request for admission should be deemed dispensed
with and no longer taken into account as it only relates to the Amended Complaint, which was already
abandoned when the Second Amended Complaint was filed; and that summary judgment is improper and
without legal basis, as there exists a genuine controversy brought about by petitioners' specific denials
and defenses.

RTC granted the motion and ordered petitioners to pay their balance. CA affirmed.

In the petition to the Supreme Court, petitioners contend that the motions based on the original
complaint should not be considered anymore because of the amended complaint.

ISSUE: W/N respondents waived their request for admission when they filed a second amended
complaint.

HELD: NO. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that respondent's Second Amended Complaint
supersedes only its Amended Complaint and nothing more.

Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends.
However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and
claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or
withdrawn by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.
Lucero_Summons

I.SHORT TITLE: PDB vs. Chandumal (2012)

II. FULL TITLE: Planters Development Bank, petitioner, vs. Julie Chandumal, respondent. Gr. No.
195619, September 05, 2012.
III. TOPIC: Civil Procedure – Summons

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. BF Homes then sold to PDB
all its rights and interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of
notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDP against Chandumal.

Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was unavailing as she was always
out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by serving the
same through Chandumal's mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare Chandumal in
default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default maintaining that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the
same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion which was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and
ineffective substituted service of summons.

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Planters Development Bank questions the
Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution dated February 16, 2011,
denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 82861. The assailed decision
nullified the Decision dated May 31, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Pinas City, Branch 255 in Civil
Case No. LP-99-0137.
VI. ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not there was valid substituted service of summons
2. Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
3. Whether or Not there was proper rescission by notarial act of the contract to sell

VII. RULING:

1. NO. There was no valid substitute service of summons. The Return of Summons does not
specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the
officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.

2. YES. Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states "The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons"

When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she
effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one
seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction
over the defendant’s person.

3. NO. There is no valid rescission of the contract to sell by notarial act.

The allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for payment is not an excuse as the twin
requirements for a valid and effective cancellation under the law, i.e. notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash surrender value, is mandatory.

VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, as well as
its Resolution dated February 16, 2011, denying the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 82861
are AFFIRMED in so far as there was no valid service of summons. Further, the Court DECLARES that
there was no valid rescission of contract pursuant to R.A. No. 6552. Accordingly, the Decision dated May
31, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 255 in Civil Case No. LP-99-0 137 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and is therefore, DISMISSED for lack of merit.