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Criminal Law (S.300)
Criminal Law (S.300)
Criminal Law (S.300)
Contain 3 Limbs:
1. Intention of causing death (S.300a)
OR
2. Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (S.300b & c)
OR
3. Knowledge that he is likely to by such act to cause death. (S.300d)
(b) Intention of causing such bodily injury and KNOWS to be likely to cause death.
R v Govinda: ‘Pin prick murder’ where ‘the offender knows that the particular
person injured is likely, either from peculiarity of constitution, or immature age,
or other special circumstance, to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily
cause death.’
Accused was sufficiently aware of the victim’s disorder to know death was likely
outcome without intention to kill.
(c) Intention of causing bodily injury AND such bodily injury is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Ike Mohamed Yasin bin Hussin v PP: The words ‘sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature’ mean that the probability of death occurring should be assessed
by reference to the inherent nature of the injuries and not by reference to the
possible effects of medical intervention.
S.299 second limb used the word ‘likely’ which indicates a lower threshold
compared to s.300(c).
The question to ask would be: Whether the particular victim, with his or her
susceptibilities, was likely to die (s.299) and, if so, whether s.300(c) was also
satisfied.
S.300(c) would only be satisfied if the injuries were likely to cause the death of a
victim of ordinary strength and capacity, taking account of the size, age and sex of
the deceased. (Rationale: Give effect to the rejection of felony murder rule where
it would be unduly draconian and at odds to impose liability for murder where the
accused committed a relatively minor assault but the victim’s peculiar sensitivities
led to death, and otherwise it will be identical to S.300(b).)
Bharat Singh v Emperor: Despite the victim was an old man, there is no
evidence showing that the accused knew of his infirmity and peculiar
susceptibility which lead to the victim death. The accused was merely convicted
with voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
This subsection is partly subjective (the accused intended to cause a bodily injury)
and partly objective (such injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death).
Tan Chee Hwee v PP [1993]: Accused were committing a burglary when the
maid returned home unexpectedly. She died after the cord of an electric iron was
pulled around her neck. The court substituted the conviction with culpable
homicide not amounting to murder because if the accused had really intended to
‘silence her forever’, he would have hit her with the iron rather than trying to tie
up a ‘violently struggling maid or even to strangle her’. The injury inflicted was
therefore not intentionally.
PP v Lim Poh Lye [2005]: Attention must focus on whether the accused intended
the injury that cause death. If the accused only intended to cause a particular
‘minor injury’ which is not fatal in the ordinary course of nature but that minor
injury caused a different injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, S.300(c) is not applicable. However, if the intended ‘minor injury’ turned
out to be a fatal cause then the accused will be liable.
What is meant by saying that a person can intend a ‘particular’ injury even if he
or she does not intend the ‘precise’ injury?
Explanation:
(1) ‘Particular’ connotes something less specific than ‘precise’. In Lim Poh Lye, it is
sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to stab in the region
of the upper leg, no need to prove the accused intended to stab the specific part of the
thigh that is actually stabbed.
(2) Prosecution need to prove more specifically that the accused intended the
particular injury of stabbing V in the part of the thigh where he was stabbed, but that
it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew of the effects of such an injury,
namely severing of the artery. The accused need not know the consequences of the
intended injury to be inflicted.
(d) (KNOWS the act is so imminently dangerous) (that it must in all probability cause
death OR bodily injury as is likely to cause death) AND commits (without any
excuse.)
Seah Kok Meng v PP [2001]: An act which falls within S.300(d) is essentially the
doing of a dangerous act and that act need not necessarily be of an extreme degree.
“Without Excuse”
This limb is not used widely because S.300(c) has been interpreted in such a way that
it will cover most of the cases where there is no intent to kill and that S.304A or the
offences under the road traffic legislation will be used in cases involving lower levels
of risk taking.