British Monarchy Must Apologize on 70th Year of Independence for Colonizing Sri

Lanka

By Pitasanna Shanmugathas and Chamindra Weerawardhana PhD

"A nation which colonizes, a civilization which justifies colonisation, and therefore force, is already a sick
civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased, that irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to
another, one repudiation to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment."
Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 1955

NB: In this article, we use Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive practice of placing certain terms
deemed inadequate and/or problematic yet necessary sous rature [under erasure]. We use sous
rature by crossing colonially-imposed names of settler and crown colonies [e.g. United States of
America, USA, Canada, Australia, Ceylon]. In the context of an article focused on a ‘decolonial’
discourse of apologies and reparations, this practice helps highlight the violence inherent in
colonisation, and the present-day ramifications of such violence. We reiterate with the utmost
clarity that the use of sous rature in this article is NOT intended at being offensive towards any
individual, state, and/or organisation.

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In Sri Lanka, unlike the Portuguese and Dutch who were, respectively, the first and
second Western colonial occupiers, the British succeeded in conquering the entire island, and
for the longest period than any other power, from 1796 to 1948. Unlike India, Sri Lanka gained
Dominion Status within the Commonwealth [which is largely interpreted as ‘independence’] in a
relatively peaceful manner. However, this peaceful transition, in many ways, soon turned out to
be the calm before the storm. It is not only the successive Sinhalese nationalist governments
who are to be blamed for the ethnic conflict. Most significantly, the British were largely
responsible for sowing the seeds of lasting ethno-national contention.

The necessity of an Apology

The politics of reparations for past atrocities form a priority area in managing relations
between oppressors and the oppressed. Colonisation is a phenomenon based on a logic of
exploitation, of looting, of claiming other people’s lands, bodies, waterways and natural
resources as one’s own. To reiterate a universal truth, there is nothing positive or
constructive in any form of coercive colonisation, or, for that matter, on-going neo-
colonial domination.

In the sphere of global governance, what Stephanie Wolf describes as a ‘redress and
reparation movement’ is fast becoming an essential element of national as well as international
policy formulation. Reparation politics are on the forefront of discussions on large-scale
atrocities in the West, such as the Holocaust. In the territory of Turtle Island that we know as

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Canada, a much-needed discourse on reparations, apologies and redress is taking shape, albeit
at a relatively slow pace. The Indigenous communities of these territories faced [and in many
aspects, continue to face] high levels of violence, torture, murder, deprivation and systemic
discrimination. Apologies, compensation and reparations for atrocities such as the system of
‘Indian Residential Schools’, to give but one example, are very much an ongoing process.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of Sri Lanka securing Dominion Status within the
Commonwealth. Ceylon was the first Crown Colony outside the ‘Old Commonwealth’ [white
settler-colonial places such as Canada, Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand] to obtain
Dominion Status. The paradoxes and contradictions inherent in the socio-political life of post-
1948 Sri Lanka are such that we refer to the day on which we were given Dominion Status [with
the British monarch continuing to be our head of state] as our ‘Independence Day’. In terms of
national sovereignty, it would be more justifiable to consider the 22nd of May, the day on which
the Constitution of the First Republic was promulgated in 1972, as Sri Lanka’s ‘Independence
Day’, if not ‘National Day’. The 1972 Constitution marked the most poignant expression of ethnic
outbidding that came to being as the primary consequence of the British-induced constitution-
making and institution-building experiment in Sri Lanka. It was a truly majoritarian constitution
that shamelessly shunned minority rights. Not even the namesake minority safeguard in the
Soulbury Constitution, namely its Section 29, was spared. In this sense, 22 May 1972 marks the
ultimate entrenchment of ‘divide and rule’ tactics on our colonised soil and mindsets. Having
that day as National Day would give us more food for thought annually, on the importance of
national unity, reconciliation and building solidarities across the diverse mosaic that is the Sri
Lankan people.

Most importantly, discussions on ‘independence’, ‘national sovereignty’, and ‘self-

government’ in Sri Lanka are totally devoid of any focus whatsoever on the adverse
effects of colonialism. We seldom collectively reflect upon the fact that the impact of
colonial rule is continuously felt to the present-day and beyond. The consequences of
three centuries of Western colonisation, especially the 150 years of British colonisation,
are very much of ‘contemporary’ relevance. Colonial mindsets, colonial hangovers,
colonially induced stereotypes wield an extremely powerful influence in all aspects of
public life as well as in the personal spheres of many of our fellow citizens.

In this article, we contend that the British government and the British monarchy must
apologize for its colonisation of Sri Lanka, for their decisive role in raising ethnic tensions that
eventually led to a long civil war, and continuing politics of ethno-national antagonism. The
apology should be made, preferably, by the British monarch or by the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom. The Prime Minister or the monarch, in their apology to the people of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, must explicitly mention the role that they played as
colonisers in provoking ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka.

Most notably, Britain must apologize for its disregard towards minority leaders of
Sri Lanka, whose repeated pleas for adequate minority safeguards were largely ignored
in British constitutional experiments.

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 If the British, in their apology, take responsibility for their role in aggravating ethnic
tensions, it can provide a much-needed starting point towards inter-ethnic reconciliation in Sri
Lanka. It will be helpful in publicly coming to terms with the fact that Britain’s colonial policies
were significantly responsible for setting up the institutions which paved the way for ethnic
outbidding in the post-independence era. By way of reparations, Britain could, for example,
provide funding directed towards building new homes for Sri Lankans at the lower echelons of
the social ladder [especially of ethnic minority communities] displaced by the thirty-year war,
while providing assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in restoring infrastructure in the war
affected North and East. However, the reality is that no financial payment is sufficient as
reparations for the misery and bloodshed caused by the persistent effects of Britain’s colonial
policies in Sri Lanka.

The fact that colonisation in any shape or form is deeply problematic, that it is a process
of control and repression, does not require any reiteration here. As we shall highlight below, the
evolution of constitutionalism and governance in Sri Lanka is directly intertwined with the
oppressive legacy of British colonisation. We cannot talk about constitution-making, law making,
or even the ‘mace’ in the Parliament of Sri Lanka without referring to Britain and British rule of
the island. Over the years, Sri Lankans as a people have somewhat failed to adequately take
stock of the destructive legacy of colonisation, and what it did to the socio-political fabric of the
land. Instead, Sri Lankans of all ethnicities and faith traditions, especially those of the
socioeconomic and political elite, have been perpetuating colonial structures of oppression that
the British introduced, in some cases overtly and in many others covertly, in the guise of
conforming to practices of democratic governance.

In the section that follows, we shall engage in a very brief discussion of some aspects of
the constitutional and political decision-making-related errors made by the British in the early
decades of the last century, which have had a lasting adverse impact on ethno-national politics
in Sri Lanka. This discussion is by no means extensive, nor does it encompass a fully
comprehensive discussion of constitutionalism, which would be beyond the remit of this article.
This article also does not touch upon the multitude of socio-economic, culturally genocidal and
highly exploitative aspects of colonisation that imperatively call for an apology. Instead, the
objective here is to provide an überblick of the deeply problematic nature of Eurocentric
constitutional experimentation on a non-Western socio-political and cultural context. This salient
reality alone warrants an abject and unambiguous apology from the colonising power.

Constitutional blunders: a continuing quagmire

After the Cameron-Colebrook reforms of 1833, the British transferred political power to
Sri Lanka [then Ceylon] in two main stages: in 1931 via the Donoughmore Commission, and in
1948 via the Soulbury Commission. These two stages of Western constitutional reform were
central to setting up the framework for ethno-nationally motivated discrimination against minority
communities by successive Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated governments.

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 A system of ‘communal representation’ was in place from 1915 to 1931, with a certain
number of seats assigned to English-speaking elite Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Burghers, etc. In
1931, Donoughmore reforms abolished communal representation. This strengthened the hands
of the political class of the majority Sinhalese community. The Donoughmore Commission
created Executive Committees, where the local population had a considerable role in
administration (except in reserved prerogatives such as finance and defence). It extended the
franchise and allowed elections based on universal suffrage. Upon abolishing communal
representation in executive councils, the Donoughmore Commission turned out to be a failure
with respect to the fact that it did not suggest any alternative such as a workable form of
federalism to contain communalism and ensure adequate political representation of the minority
communities.

To recapitulate a well-known fact, prior to 1931, the Tamil minority were overrepresented
in the civil service commensurate to population statistics. Under British rule, Professor Neil
DeVotta reports that “the Tamil population held 33% of civil service jobs, 40% of judicial service
jobs and 31% of university students, figures that are much higher than their representative
share.” The post-Donoughmore constitutional landscape was conducive to what came to be
known as ‘Sinhalisation’, which involved more opportunities in the state sector to Sinhalese
people. Under British rule, the Tamil minority had a significant economic advantage over the
Sinhalese majority, significantly due to educational opportunities in the northern part of the
country, where the first Christian mission schools – a core element of physical, social, linguistic,
cultural and psychological colonisation – were established. Tamils who had undergone
missionary education had more access to “clientelistic networks” set up by the British than the
average Sinhalese person. The abolition of communal representation by the British marked the
beginning of a gradual process that would significantly threaten to reverse the economic and
societal privilege held by Tamils.

Ensuring more opportunities for Tamils in the Civil Service under British rule was
not intended at empowering Tamil people. It is also naive to assume the oft-repeated
claim that Tamils, especially those from northern Sri Lanka, were better workers than the
Sinhalese [or Tamils elsewhere]. The bottom line of this policy was none other than the
usual ‘divide and rule’ tactics upon which the entire monstrosity known as the British
Empire was built. This is why it is perfectly justifiable to claim that British policies of
favouritism towards one group of people over another [in this case one ethno-national
group over others] were instrumental in sowing the seeds of long-lasting ethnonational
tension and antagonism.

The Donoughmore Saga

The Donoughmore Report was, by and large, exemplary of the way in which the British
acted throughout all of its colonies. They imposed policies with a blatant disregard to genuinely
incorporate the views of local stakeholders. The report’s condemnation of communal
representation on the one hand, and avoidance of adequately addressing the concerns of

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minority groups on the other, happened to be crucial in bringing repressed ethno-national
tensions to the surface.

The Donoughmore dispensation created a situation in which divisive and toxic

ethnonational concerns became the primary preoccupation of local leaders. Many Sinhalese
politicians, for example, were upset that franchise had been extended to Indian plantation
workers [who were force-migrated to Sri Lanka as indentured labourers under British rule]
almost on the same terms as the indigenous population. Sinhalese politicians were concerned
that an extension of franchise to Indian plantation workers would increase the influence of the
European planters, the employers and profiteers of indentured Indian labour. Furthermore,
Sinhalese politicians feared that the Indians would henceforth undermine Sinhalese interests in
plantation districts where the Indians were by then dominant in terms of demographics. In post-
1948 Sri Lanka, Sinhalese politicians took action based on these fears and prejudices, by
enacting the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 which made Indian plantation workers stateless.
In sum, this Act created two types of citizenship: citizenship by descent and citizenship by
registration. In both cases, substantive documentary evidence was required from applicants.
However, most Indian Tamil workers were illiterate and very few actually had documentary
proof. This requirement of documentary evidence, such as registration of birth, is indicative of
how the anglicised Sri Lankan elite had come to consider features of European social
organisation as the status quo. Over 700,000 Indian Tamils were thus rejected citizenship,
making them stateless.

Minority leaders such as Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, on behalf of Tamils, and T.B.
Jayah, on behalf of Muslims, made pleas to the British that the Donoughmore Commission is
unacceptable to the interests of their respective communities. The implementation of the
Donoughmore reforms effectively removed the “weightage for the minorities to compensate for
the numerical superiority of the Sinhalese” and left the nation devoid of any adequate checks
and balances to prevent discriminatory majoritarian policies from being enacted by Sinhalese-
majority governments. Although the Donoughmore constitution did introduce welfare
provisions, a rarity for an exploitative British colony, these provisions are unimpressive
considering a backdrop in which adequate political representation among the pluralistic
communities was not established in any reasonable measure.

On a par with regional and global developments of the day, Sri Lankan leaders involved
in campaigns for self-government began calling for enhanced constitutional provisions by the
early/mid 1940s. Subsequently, the British concocted the Soulbury Commission in 1945. The
Soulbury Commission Report introduced a model of Westminster-style bicameral government.
Once again, the minority protections it offered were far from adequate.

Soulbury Sequence: deeper into the abyss of ethnic outbidding

The Soulbury Report contained a clause which later became Section 29 (2) in the 1946
Constitution, prohibiting any legislation “infringing on religious freedom or discrimination against
persons of any community or religion.” It also stipulated that a two-thirds majority was required

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for any changes in the constitution or any piece of legislation aimed at discriminating against a
racial or religious minority. Nevertheless, these minority safeguards were inadequate, in that
they did not, in any reasonable measure, correspond to the demands put forth by the Ceylon
Tamil and Ceylon Indian leadership. In February of 1944, for example, GG Ponnambalam of the
All Ceylon Tamil Congress, voiced a proposal before the Soulbury commissioners that called for
balanced representation known as “fifty-fifty” which advocated for an equal proportion of seats
between the majority and minority communities.

Despite such pleas, the British ruled that minority communities already constituted “a
large and powerful enough block” to counter any extremist legislation. The Soulbury Report
ensured that the Governor-General would exercise his discretion on any bill that evoked serious
opposition by any racial or religious community and that, in his opinion, was likely to involve
oppression or serious injustice to any such community.

Campaigns for self-rule in Sri Lanka, if not anticolonial struggles, were very different
from such struggles across the Palk Straits. Unlike India, Sri Lanka lacked a cohesive mass-
based national movement. Instead, mobilization for self-rule took place in the form of what has
been described as “fragmentary associations”. Subsequently, ‘most political parties [like the
United National Party] were formed in anticipation of the 1947 elections.’ In fact, as asserted
by constitutionalist Sir Ivor Jennings himself, “the constitution which Sri Lanka had until 1947
was designed to suit a legislature without parties and therefore actively discouraged them.” The
British were confident that a political system drafted to conform to Western interests, a system
that, according to them, “worked well for centuries in Britain” can be applied to Sri Lanka’s
pluralistic society, and that loyal, anglicized Sinhala elites can be trusted to protect minority
rights. Speaking of the Soulbury Constitution, SWRD Bandaranaike (who eventually deployed
ethnonational politics to make his way to Premiership in 1956), echoed these sentiments,
asserting:

“There was no fight for that freedom which involved a fight for principles, policies and
programmes which could not be carried out unless that freedom was obtained. No. It just
came overnight. We just woke up one day and were told, you are a dominion now.”

Persistent blunders: the reason for the call for a formal apology

In 1948, Sri Lanka gained Dominion status, which was hitherto the exclusive reserve of Old
Commonwealth possessions such as Canada and Australia. The Dominion State had to bear
the brunt of problematic British policies implemented prior to 1948. The model in place was one
that was easily conducive to triggering ethno-national tensions. Very soon, politicians from all
ethno-national backgrounds came to terms with a reality that applies to Sri Lankan politics to
this very day – that arousing ethno-national antagonisms among the masses is a sure strategy
to access and reinforce political power. The entire political saga of the Dominion State, of the
Republic of Sri Lanka and of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, has been marked
by this inclination to steer, rather than contain, ethnonational tensions. The roots of this political
culture of spewing division among the masses lie in the constitutional experiments and fatal

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political miscalculations of the British. The consequences and ramifications of these problematic
policies continue to be felt to this very day, and they will shape the political landscape of Sri
Lanka for many more decades to come.

Hence the present call for a formal apology from the British Crown and the British
Government, to the Government and the people of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka. It is a first step in developing a discourse on reparations, and in recognising the sheer
magnitude of colonial atrocities and their present-day ramifications, both of which are some
seven decades overdue.

Late, is indeed better than never.

***
Pitasanna Shanmugathas is a human rights activist and Director/Lead Curator of the social
media group, Stop Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka.

Chamindra Weerawardhana PhD (@fremancourt) is a gender justice activist and political

analyst.