Henry Rasemzont, J1:

sc-~nalloyalty, and day-to-day work rciaeions as it clearly dcscs on replacing in-

stitutional, Lcgat, and political arrangerncnts.19

Some coslcrcse instances of de-personalizing the moral: The homeless

man with outstretched hand does not 11ave a riK_hr to trly spare change, no
claim against me, so 1 nerd not feel a moral obligalion to him. Uou and 1 get
on the subway; you are eight and a half monrhs pregnant, o r carrying heavy
packages, or using crutches; I nevertheless take the last sear in the car, be-
cause your burdm does not give you a right to that seat. Note also that, for
all the rights you d o indeed have, 99 percenr of the rime I can fully respect
those rights simply by ignoring you,
Similarly for de-moralizing the personal. In contemporary Western uni-
versalist moral theories, it is entirely possible for us to be obtuse, uncaring,
insensitive, clumsy, even disgusting in much of our behavior, and yet escape
moral censure, because the behavior is sccrr as private. If at those times
when an appropriate moral situation arises (how we are to recognize such
moments is ncver made clear) we take account of the situat;on, invoke our
lavoritc theory, turn on our moral computer for a decision procedure, and
then act on the decision, we will all of us be moral agenrs, no matter how
boorish, aimless, reyulsive, or empty our '"rivatc~." "lives may otherwise be,
7iuu migiizl be tempted here to object that what 1 see as civil and sensitive
behavior on my part may be interpreted by others as rude and uncaring;
after all, wasn't it a great human step forward when tolerance for diversity
of manners and private tastes and bcfraviors accompanied tbe rise of the
bourgeoisie in late seventeenth-century Holland, then spread throughout
Euroye! In reply, I would suggest that the tolerance gained at the expense
of de-moralizing the personal may not be worth the price demanded, be-
cause the tolerance all too easily begets moral astigmatism.
If you eschew any real judgments about how I live my life when I am not
making moral choices-&at is, about 98 percent of che tirne-you are de-
priving yourself of judginents of your own possibilities. Indeed, when any
of us adapts an altogether nonjudgmental stance about the ostensibly pri-
vate (nonmoral) conduct of nthers, wc run a serious risk of living an aimless
life. If de grrstiblts non est disputandrtm is literally true, where could we pos-
sibly look for human guidelines to establish human goals worth striving
for2 My respect and affection for Chinese culture is great; does toicrance
also oblige me to be sympathetic to foot-binding?
There is an even more basic question to ask of modern moral philosophy
along these lines: NamclX if a person is indeed obtuse, insensitive, boorish,
and so on, how o r why can we have any confideslce that she or he will evell
perceive correct1y those exceptional circumstances supposedly calling for
moral choice when they arise? Any set of circumstances can be seen in a va-