1. BABCOCK v.
JACKSON – Reyes  In this case, New York has the greater and more direct
FACTS: Miss Babcock (as guest) went with Mr. and Mrs. Jackson
(as hosts) to Canada for a weekend trip using the Jackson’s car. (All
are residents of Rochester, New York). Mr. Jackson was driving
along Ontario, Canada when he lost control of the car and went off
the highway. Babcock was seriously injured and consequently sued
Mr. Jackson for Tort/ Damages in NY court. Jackson moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law of the place where
the accident occurred should govern. The law of Canada states that
any owner or driver of a vehicle is not liable for any bodily injury
(except if in the business of common carrier).
ISSUE: What law should be applied in this case?
HELD: New York law should apply.
 The traditional view of Lex Loci Delicti (“Law of the place
where the tort was committed”) or the Vested Rights
Doctrine has already been discredited because it fails to take
account underlying policy considerations. It affects to decide
concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the
practical considerations involved. More particularly, as
applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which
jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may
have in the resolution of particular issues.
 Citing Auten v. Auten (1953), the traditional view has been
abandoned and has applied what has been termed the "center
of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict
of laws.
 This is applied by giving controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with
the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with
the specific issue raised in the litigation.
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concern than Ontario. The present action involves (1)
injuries sustained by a New York guest (2) as a result of the
negligence of a New York host (3) in the operation of an
automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in
New York. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with
the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that
the accident occurred there.
 New York's policy of requiring a tortfeasor to compensate
his guest for injuries caused by his negligence cannot be
doubted. This is attested by the fact that the State Legislature
has repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or limiting
recovery in such cases.
2. GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
COMPANY v. WILLIAMS – Solomon
DOCTRINE: According to previous cases, Wilkinson v. Vigilant
Ins. Co. and Tinsley v. Worldwide Ins. Co., uninsured motorist
insurance is available where it is impossible for the plaintiff to obtain
judgment against an insured motorist for reasons unrelated to the
facts of the accident.
FACTS: On October 4, 2000, Natalie Williams was involved in a car
accident with a vehicle operated by Megan Habel in Tallahassee,
Florida. The car driven by Mabel was insured by Cincinnati
Insurance Company. Following the accident, Williams made a
demand on Cincinnati for damages she sustained in the accident,
which it declined to pay because Williams did not present evidence
sufficient to satisfy the tort threshold of Florida’s no-fault statute.1
1
In car accident cases only, Florida follows a no-fault insurance system,
which means that after most traffic accidents, an injured person's own
insurance policy (specifically, their "personal injury protection" coverage)
On July 12, 2002, since Williams cannot sue Habel because Florida’s
statute2 precluded her from doing so, Williams filed a personal injury
action and served Farm Bureau as her uninsured motorist carrier,
contending that since Cincinnati “legally denied coverage” under its
liability policy, she is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits from
Farm Bureau. At no time however has Cincinnati claimed that it did
not provide liability coverage to Habel in connection with the
accident.
Farm Bureau in turn filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that Williams could not recover uninsured motorist benefits as a
matter of law because she failed to prove that she was legally entitled
to recover damages from the alleged uninsured motorist. (TC denied
the motion.)
ISSUE: Whether the uninsured motorist coverage issued in Georgia
can benefit the policyholder (Williams) when she cannot recover
against a motorist (Habel) who is granted immunity by the law of the
jurisdiction (Florida) where the accident occurred? – Yes, Williams
can recover uninsured benefits from Farm Bureau.
will provide compensation for certain out-of-pocket losses like medical
expenses and lost income, no matter who was at fault for the accident.
You can't hold the other driver liable after a car accident in Florida (via a
third-party insurance claim or personal injury lawsuit) unless the crash
resulted in "serious injury" to you. (Case didn’t specify the degree of
William’s injury, but presumably it is not serious since it falls under the no -
fault statute.)
2 3
Which precludes bodily injury claims arising out of the ownership, use,
and maintenance of an automobile unless the injury consists in whole or in
part of (a) significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function;
(b) permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
other than scarring or disfigurement; (c) significant and permanent scarring
or disfigurement; or (d) death.
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HELD: Yes, Williams can recover uninsured benefits from Farm
Bureau.
At first glance, it may seem that Williams may not be able to recover
because to recover under uninsured motorist provisions in Georgia,
the injured party has to prove two things: (1) that the tortfeasor was
uninsured; and (2) that the tortfeasor was liable. In the instant case,
the affidavit of Cincinnati’s Dean Deloach plainly states that the
alleged tortfeasor was insured and that Cincinnati never denied
coverage. Moreover, under Florida law, the alleged tortfeasor cannot
be sued and found liable because of the no-fault provisions of the
Florida Statute. Williams admitted that she did not sue Habel
because the Florida statute precluded her from doing so. Hence,
presumably, Williams cannot recover under the uninsured motorist
provisions in Georgia.
However, according to previous cases, Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins.
Co3 . and Tinsley v. Worldwide Ins. Co4 ., uninsured motorist
insurance is available where it is impossible for the plaintiff to obtain
judgment against an insured motorist for reasons unrelated to the
facts of the accident.
In the case at bar, the reason no judgment can be obtained is not
because of the facts of the accident, but because of the public policy
and statutes of the place where the accident occurred (Florida’s No-
Fault Act).
One of the goals of uninsured motorist legislation is to protect
innocent victims from the negligence of irresponsible drivers.
Because uninsured motorist statutes are remedial in nature, they must
be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative purpose. In light
In this case, uninsured coverage was made available where the alleged
tortfeasor is insured, but for some reason no recovery can be obtained
against her insurance carrier.
4
In this case, following Wilkinson, the plaintiffs were not barred from
seeking damages from their uninsured motorist carrier where the tortfeasor
was protected by sovereign immunity.
of this purpose, the Court is unwilling to allow Farm Bureau to
escape liability based on considerations unrelated to the incident.
Therefore, Williams must be allowed the opportunity to establish all
sums which she shall be legally entitled to recover as damages,
caused by the uninsured motorist.
3. HATAWAY v. MCKINLEY – Umangay
FACTS: Grady Hataway died as a result of injuries he sustained
during a scuba dive in a North Little Rock, Arkansas, rock quarry.
The dive was supervised by Robert McKinley and conducted as part
of a scuba class taught at Memphis State University (Tennessee).
Hataway’s parents filed wrongful death action in the Shelby Country
Circuit Court.
The case was tried before a jury on the basis of Arkansas’s
wrongful death statute. The jury’s verdict is for the defendant. The
trial court used Arkansas law, pursuant to the doctrine le loci delicti,
although both the deceased and the Mckinley were Tennessee
residents and the diving trip was part of a diving class taught at the
Tennessee.
SC granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal
limited to the issue of whether the trial court correctly applied
Arkansas law to this case.
ISSUE 1: Whether there is a conflict between Arkansas and
Tennessee law? YES
DIFFERENCE: Both Arkansas or Tennessee law is predicated on
negligence, which is the failure to use reasonable and ordinary care
under the circumstances which proximately causes the plaintiff’s
injuries. However, once the negligence of a defendant has been
demonstrated, there is a major difference between the defenses that
can be asserted by a defendant under Arkansas and Tennessee tort
law.
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NEGLIGENCE LAW:
Arkansas is a comparative fault state meaning that an Arkansas
plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the amount of his fault. A plaintiff
is not barred from recovering damages from a defendant unless his
fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s fault.
Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff is completely barred from
recovering damages if he was contributorially negligent, even if his
negligence was of a lesser degree than the defendant’s. The only way
to recover is if a jury finds that his conduct was too remote in time
and place to be considered a proximate cause of his injuries.
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES:
Arkansas: recovery for the pecuniary injuries and mental anguish
resulting from death, to the surviving spouse and net of kin of the
deceased person.
Tennessee: allows recovery for the mental and physical suffering,
loss of time, and necessary expenses resulting to the deceased from
the personal injuries, and also the damages resulting to the parties for
whose use and benefit the right of action survives from the death
consequent upon the injuries received.
ISSUE 2: Whether the lex loci delicti conflicts-of-law doctrine
should continue to be followed in tort cases in Tennessee.
NO. The doctrine of lex loci is outmoded because of changes in
society, causing a consequential development of modern law.
The court adopted the “most significant relationship” approach of the
Restatement (Second).
Under this approach, a court applies the “law of the state where the
injury occurred unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties.”
ISSUE 3: Whether Arkansas or Tennessee law should be applied?
The Tennessee law should apply. The only contact the parties had
with the State of Arkansas was that the injury occurred in that state.
Both the decedent and the defendant were life-long residents of
Tennessee and neither owned any property in Arkansas. The parties’
relationship was centered in Tennessee because the relationship was
formed and continued as a result of the decedent’s participation in
the scuba class taught at Memphis State by the defendant. The Court
thinks that the fact that the injury occurred in Arkansas was merely a
fortuitous circumstance and that the State of Arkansas has no interest
in applying its laws to this dispute between Tennessee residents.
Under the facts presented, the Court concludes that although the
injury occurred in Arkansas the State of Tennessee has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
factors and contacts set out in Section 6 and 145 of Restatement
(Second).
4. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. HEFFERNAN –
Uson
DOCTRINE: Depecage refers to the process that different
substantive issues could be properly decided under the laws of
different states, when the choice-influencing considerations differ as
they apply to the different issues.
FACTS: Mallory Heffernan and Curtis Jones had been passengers in
a vehicle driven by John McMahon, Jr., also a minor, and owned by
his mother, Angela McMahon. The accident occurred when John
McMahon, Jr. apparently fell asleep at the wheel and collided with a
tractor-trailer. At the time of the accident, the Decedent resided
with her parents, Edmund and Diane Heffernan, in Queenstown,
Maryland. The driver, John McMahon, Jr., and the other passenger,
Curtis Jones, were step-brothers who resided with Mr. McMahon's
father and Mr. Jones's mother in Ingleside, Maryland. At the time of
the accident, the Decedent's parents, Edmund and Diane Heffernan,
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carried a Pioneer Family Auto Policy and a Personal Catastrophe
Policy with [Erie]. These are Maryland policies, designed to
comply with Maryland mandatory insurance requirements, which
were issued, sold and delivered in Maryland to Maryland residents,
Edmund and Diane Heffernan. The Heffernans (parents) seek
damages pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage
provisions in two insurance policies issued by Erie. The auto policy
provides uninsured/ underinsured motorists benefits in the amount of
$300,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. A second policy, the
personal catastrophe policy, provides an additional $1,000,000 in
uninsured/underinsured motorists benefits. The parties were unable
to come to an agreement on issues of liability and damages. As a
result, the Heffernans filed suit against Erie in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City. Erie removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland.
ISSUE: Whether Maryland law or Delaware law shall govern the
claim of the Heffernans?
HELD: Delaware law shall govern.
Maryland law is clear that in a conflict of law situation, such as the
one presented in the case sub judice, “where the events giving rise to
a tort action occur in more than one State, we apply the law of the
State where the injury-the last event required to constitute the tort
occurred”. This principle is lex loci delicti. Consistent with the
principle of lex loci delicti, because the automobile collision
occurred in Delaware, under Maryland law, a Maryland Court would
apply the substantive tort law of Delaware to determine what the
claimants are “entitled to recover” in an action for uninsured motorist
benefits. We conclude, pursuant to Maryland law, that an action by
an insured against his insurance company for uninsured motorist
benefits is a contract action. Although principles of lex loci
contractus apply to contract disputes, because the uninsured motorist
statute and the insurance policies, by the incorporation of the phrase
“entitled to recover,” references tort law, the substantive tort law of
where the accident occurred applies, generally, to the issues of fault
and damages.
We concluded, therefore, as we do in the case sub judice, that
Delaware law should apply to certain aspects and Maryland law to
other aspects, depending upon the issues raised in the proceedings.
Our decision in this case embraces the concept of “depecage.”
Discussing depecage, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that ‘[i]t
has always been understood that different substantive issues could be
properly decided under the laws of different states, when the choice-
influencing considerations differ as they apply to the different issues.
Erie warns against this Court's adoption of depecage. According to
Erie, the depecage framework is inappropriate in this case because it
would act to “legitimize a smorgasbord approach which inures only
to the benefit” of the Heffernans. To the contrary, our holding today
presents a clear framework for resolving choice of law issues such as
the one presented in the instant case. This determination will allow
insurers and insureds to predict with reasonable certainty the law that
will apply in a breach of contract action against the insurer on the
basis of an uninsured/ underinsured motorist claim. Specifically, all
parties to a contract which provides uninsured/underinsured motorist
benefits can anticipate that, absent a contractual choice of law
provision, any dispute as to the validity of the policy or the meaning
of its terms will be resolved based on the law of where the contract
was made, but that the substantive tort law of the place where the
automobile collision occurred will control what the claimants are
“entitled to recover.”
5. BAUER v. CLUB MED SALES – Vargas
DOCTRINE: Governmental Interests Analysis. — California's
choice of law analysis involves a three-step process. In the first step
of the analysis, the court must determine whether the substantive
laws of California and the foreign jurisdiction differ on the issue
before it. Second, if the laws do differ, then the court must determine
5 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
what interests, if any, the competing jurisdictions have in the
application of their respective laws. To determine what interest a
jurisdiction has in the application of its law, the forum court
examines the particular law and asks whether those policies will be
served by applying that law in the action before the forum. When
only one of the jurisdictions has an interest in the application of its
law, then there is only a "false conflict" and the law of that
jurisdiction applies. It is only when both jurisdictions have a policy
interest in the application of their laws that a "true conflict" exists.
California courts then proceed to the third step in California's
governmental interest analysis known as the "comparative
impairment" test. At this stage a court must determine which
jurisdiction's interest would be most impaired if its policies were
subordinated to those of the other jurisdiction.
Comparative Impairment Test. — Under the comparative impairment
test, the court must determine which jurisdiction's interest would be
most impaired if its policies were subordinated to those of the other
jurisdiction. This analysis, however, is very different from a
"weighing process." The court does not weigh the conflicting
interests, but instead, attempts to determine the appropriate scope of
conflicting state policies.
FACTS: Rudolph James Bauer, decedent of plaintiffs, a California
resident, purchased a vacation package for the Club Med del Hotel
Club located in Mexico. On April 12, 1994, sometime after his
arrival in the hotel, it was observed by the Club Med Sales, Inc.
(defendant) through its employees that Mr. Bauer began consuming
alcoholic beverages from at least 8:00 p.m. until the very early
morning hours of next day immediately preceding his death.
Defendant avers that Mr. Bauer was visibly intoxicated in the
discotheque and was observed carrying a "liquor bladder.”
On April 13, 1994, Mr. Bauer began ascending a staircase leading
from the discotheque to an elevated area where his accommodation
was located. According to plaintiffs, as Mr. Bauer ascended the
staircase, he stumbled and tried to recover his balance by grabbing
onto a light post. Plaintiffs alleged that because the staircase had no
handrail or other protection and because the light post was not firmly
secured to the wall, Mr. Bauer fell from the top of the staircase
approximately six feet to the ground below. Mr. Bauer sustained
injuries which resulted in his death.
Hence, Decedent's mother Margaret E. Bauer, citizen of Florida;
William, citizen of South Carolina; and, Mary Kathleen, citizen of
Virginia, (plaintiffs) filed an action against defendant Club Med
Sales, Inc., asserting therein negligence, dangerous condition and
breach of warranty in the Superior Court of the State of California.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the staircase was in a dangerous and
defective condition and additionally, that the staircase was
negligently designed and maintained. The alleged deficiencies
include the failure to provide a means of prevention and assistance
on the staircase to prevent a fall to the ground below, and the failure
to provide adequate lighting to prevent guests from falling over the
side.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS OF MEXICO OR
CALIFORNIA GOVERN THE DETERMINATION OF
LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PREMISES AND WRONGFUL
DEATH DAMAGES.
RULING: Mexico law shall govern the issue of liability for
defective premises and California law shall govern the issue of
wrongful death damages.
Under the government interest analysis, California will apply its own
law unless it is shown that there is a compelling reason to displace
forum law. California's choice of law analysis involves a three-step
process: In the first step of the analysis, the court must determine
whether the substantive laws of California and the foreign
jurisdiction differ on the issue before it. Second, if the laws do differ,
the court must determine what interests the competing jurisdictions
have in the application of their respective laws. In determining the
interest of the jurisdiction, the forum court examines the particular
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law and asks whether those policies will be served by applying that
law in the action before the forum. It is deemed that there exist a
“true conflict” only when both jurisdictions have a policy interest in
the application of their laws. Third, the court must apply the
"comparative impairment" test. It is at this stage a court determines
which jurisdiction's interest would be most impaired if its policies
were subordinated to those of the other jurisdiction.
Liability for Defective Premises
It was asserted by the defendant that the stairwell had applicable
building codes for Mexico. It contended that under Mexico law no
restraining handrail was required at the point where Mr. Bauer fell
over the stairwell. In contrast, California law requires the
construction of a handrail at the same point.
Defendant argued that the government of Mexico has set its own
policy by virtue of its building code standards and safety allowances
with regard to stairwells, and that this is a sovereign decision which
"should not and cannot be" interfered with by the State of California.
Nonetheless, defendant also recognized the interests of the State of
California in applying its own building code standards in order to
protect California citizens travelling abroad. Hence, true conflict
exists.
Although California may have cognizable interest in the application
of its own stringent building and construction standards to protect its
citizens travelling abroad, California's interests are subordinate to
Mexico's sovereignty interest in enforcing its own construction
standards within its borders. At that, if Mexico’s building and
construction laws were subordinated, Mexico's interest would be
most impaired, it is henceforth necessary that Mexico law govern the
issue of defective premises liability.
Wrongful Death Damages
The parties agreed that a significant difference exists between the
laws of California and Mexico governing the recovery of damages
for wrongful death. California law allows recovery without limitation
for all damages proximately caused by a tort as well as for punitive
damages. While, the law of Mexico prescribes a maximum recovery
limit for wrongful death.
Plaintiffs contend that Mexico has no interest in applying its
wrongful death statute restricting damages and therefore a "false
conflict" exists. Accordingly, plaintiffs assert that California law
should control. In response, defendant submits that Mexico has a
legitimate interest in the application of its statute because the
accident giving rise to plaintiffs' wrongful death action occurred in
Mexico and because Mexico has an interest in promoting tourism
within its borders.
While Mexico's tourism interest may be served by Club Med Sales'
presence, Club Med Sales, nevertheless is a United States
corporation of which benefits from that presence. Neither Mexico's
nor California's interest is served by limitations on damages for
California citizens when a United States corporation is found
negligent. Since plaintiffs and the decedent are United States citizens
and Club Med Sales is an American corporation, Mexico has no
interest in having its damages rules apply.
6. GRIFFITH v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. – Bacani
DOTRINE: Ordinarily, the place of the injury may have an interest
in the compensation of those who render medical aid and other
assistance to the injured party. However, where death is immediate,
as on the present facts, that state has no such interest.
FACTS:
 George H. Hambrecht, a Pennsylvania domiciliary,
purchased a ticket from United Airlines, Inc. [United] in
Philadelphia for a flight from Philadelphia to Phoenix,
Arizona, and return.
7 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
 United is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Chicago. It regularly does business and maintains
operational facilities in Pennsylvania.
 On July 11, 1961, he boarded a United DC-8 bound for
Phoenix.
 In the course of landing at Denver, Colorado, a scheduled
stop, the plane crashed, causing Mr. Hambrecht's immediate
death.
 Decedent's will was probated in Pennsylvania.
 In July, 1962, the executor of the Hambrecht estate
commenced an action in assumpsit against United and
certain of its employees in the Court of Common Pleas No. 6
of Philadelphia County.
 The complaint alleged, in substance,
1. That United had contracted to transport safely
plaintiff's decedent from Philadelphia to Phoenix
and return;
2. That in breach of this contract, certain of
United's named employees, in the course of their
employment, had negligently operated,
managed, maintained, inspected and controlled
the airplane, from which negligence the crash
and death resulted; that the action was brought
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Survival Act
(contained in the Fiduciaries Act) of April 18,
1949, P.L. 512, § 603, 20 P.S. § 320.603;
3. That as a result of said breach, decedent and his
estate have suffered substantial damages
including loss of accumulations of prospective
earnings of the deceased.
  United and the individual defendants filed preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer, in which they asserted
1. That the complaint alleged a breach of
warranty without alleging a valid basis
therefor,
2. That the complaint failed to allege any
contractual relationship between the
decedent and the individual defendants,
and
3. That although the complaint alleged
crash and death in Colorado, the action
was brought under the Pennsylvania
survival statute.
 The court of common pleas sustained the cause of action as
having been brought under a valid contract of carriage but
dismissed as to the individual defendants.
 However, the court held that the law of the place of the
injury, Colorado, not the law of the forum, Pennsylvania,
controlled on the matter of damages, and granted leave to
amend.
 No amendment having been filed, the complaint was
dismissed.
 Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal as to United.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N Strict Lex Loci Delicti Rule should be applied in favor
of the Pennsylvania Law?
2. W/N Colorado or Pennsylvania has greater governmental
interest?
8 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
HELD: No. After careful review and consideration of the leading
authorities and cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci
delicti rule should be abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more
flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests
underlying the particular issue before the court. "The merit of such a
rule is that `it gives to the place "having the most interest in the
problem" paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a
particular factual context' and thereby allows the forum to apply `the
policy of the jurisdiction "most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation".'
It must be emphasized that this approach to choice of law will not be
chaotic and anti- rational. "The alternative to a hard and fast system
of doctrinal formulae is not anarchy. The difference is not between a
system and no system, but between two systems; between a system
which purports to have, but lacks, complete logical symmetry and
one which affords latitude for the interplay and clash of conflicting
policy factors." Moreover, in evaluating qualitatively the policies
underlying the significant relationships to the controversy, our
standard will be no less clear than the concepts of "reasonableness"
or "due process" which courts have evolved over many years.
We are at the beginning of the development of a workable, fair
and flexible approach to choice of law which will become more
certain as it is tested and further refined when applied to specific
cases before our courts.
2. The state in which injury occurred, as such, has relatively little
interest in the measure of damages to be recovered unless it can
be said with reasonable certainty that defendant acted in reliance
on that state's rule. Moreover, where the tort is unintentional, the
reliance argument is almost totally untenable.
Ordinarily, the place of the injury may have an interest in the
compensation of those who render medical aid and other
assistance to the injured party. However, where death is
immediate, as on the present facts, that state has no such interest.
 The absence of Colorado's interest on the specific point is amply
illustrated by the statute which limits recovery to damages
incurred prior to death.
An examination of the policies which apparently underlie that
Colorado statute tends to indicate that state's lack of interest in
the amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court.
Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery, on the other
hand, is great.
From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that on the complaint
before us (the facts of which must be accepted as true on
preliminary objections), a valid cause of action in assumpsit has
been stated and that the law of Pennsylvania is properly
applicable to the issue of damages .
Therefore, we must reverse the court below and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
7. IN RE: AIR DISASTER AT LITTLE ROCK, SATTARI
v. AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. – Carloman
FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo
Burca — "as possessing all qualifications and none of the
qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for
the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of
Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to
Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc
City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of
Nationalist China; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit,
Surigao.
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries
a Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage -
automatically become a Filipino citizen.
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Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a
citizen of the Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15
of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in
accordance to the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-
à-vis the Constitution of the Philippines.
HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in the
Revised Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for
failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as, among others,
petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply
therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of
First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action
by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or
otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice
— certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is
also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit,
Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that
presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however,
she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she
took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should
state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence
encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically
resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes
within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the
petition of present and former places of residence is that "information
regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be
provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". And the
State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence
do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former
place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating
that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is
not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act".
Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office
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addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce
at the hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be
overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses are. The
State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their
background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the
community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who
could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable
insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must
fail.
8. QUINICHETT v. WAGGY’S TOWING, LLC – Manzo
DOCTRINE: Lex fori (law of the forum) governs procedural laws.
Emergency Digest: In this auto-accident case, a Prince William
Circuit Court recognizes a split of authority but declines to apply the
Maryland cap on non-economic damages because the court finds the
cap does not affect substantive rights in a wrongful death, but merely
affects the remedy.
FACTS: Waggy’s Towing filed a motion to apply the Maryland
non-economic cap on damages in a wrongful death suit. The parties
agreed in argument that no further facts are required to decide the
Motion, and that the substantive law of Maryland applies. The issue
is whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is
substantive or procedural.
In short, an accident happened in Maryland but the case was filed in
Virginia. Defendant wants to apply Maryland law (cap on damages)
to put a limit to what it has to pay.
(Facts weren't discussed in the case so this is mainly just a digest of
the issue and the court's decision.)
ISSUE: Whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is
substantive or procedural.
(If it is procedural, then lex fori (procedural law of the forum)
governs. If so, the Virginia court will not be required to put a limit to
the damages Waggy’s has to pay. However, if it deemed substantive,
lex loci (substantive law of the place of the wrong) applies, putting a
limit to what may be recovered from Waggy’s.)
HELD: Waggy's Towing's motion to apply the Maryland cap on
non-economic damages is DENIED. The Court held that the cap is
procedural and according to Virginia's well-settled conflict of law
rules, lex fori governs the application of all procedural rules.
The parties in this case correctly point out that the Virginia Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue of whether the cap on non-
economic damages is substantive or procedural in nature. However,
two Virginia Circuit Courts have considered it and have reached
conflicting outcomes.
In Hoilett v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the lower court held
that Maryland's cap on non-economic damages was substantive while
in Norwood v. Henry's Wrecker Service, it was held that the same
was procedural.
This Court agreed with the holding in the Norwood case , that the
subject law is procedural, for the following reasons:
1. The Maryland cap does not affect the basis of the right of actions.
Application of the cap does not prohibit any party from bringing a
wrongful death action. Thus, the substantive rights of the parties are
not affected because the cap does not affect the right to bring the
action, or the trial's proceeding because the jury is not to be
instructed of the cap. Consequently, the cap does not affect the right
to bring the action, but simply affects the remedy as it "merely
lessens the maximum amount recoverable."
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2. Had Maryland's Legislature intended to include the cap in the
wrongful death statute, they would not have included it in a separate
title of the Maryland Code.
3. The test is not whether the cap is substantive or procedural under
Maryland law, but rather whether it is under Virginia Law, which is
the forum of this case.
4. The Holiett decision is not persuasive because it relies in part on a
dicta in another case which the court does not find applicable here.
The Holiett decision cites a "test" for distinguishing substantive and
procedural law under Virginia law, which states that "while the right
to recovery and the limits of recovery are substantive law, the
distribution of the recovery is remedial law." However, the "test"
referenced in this case is a mere dicta as the question did not actually
involve any cap on damages or limit on recovery but rather the
determination of who was entitled to distribution of wrongful death
proceeds.
Furthermore, the court disagrees with Waggy's Towing as it held that
the cap is not so entwined with the action as it does not substantively
affect one's right to bring a wrongful death suit. Consequently, the
cap does not act as a limit on the right to recover; it only serves to
lessen the amount recoverable, if and only if, the cap is reached.
5. The Court also took notice that Maryland's sister state of Delaware
has found under its conflict rules that Maryland's fee cap is
procedural, not substantive, and refused to apply the cap in a case
where all of the relevant acts occurred in Maryland but the defendant
was a Delaware entity. Although the Delaware decision does not
materially aid the decision in this case, it serves to point out that
different conflicts rules require different analysis which can lead to
different results.
For the foregoing reasons, Waggy's Towing's motion to apply the
Maryland cap on non-economic damages is denied because the court
does not find that the cap affects one's substantive rights in a
wrongful death action, but rather merely affects one's remedy, and as
a result, it is merely procedural. Consequently, because the cap is
procedural, pursuant to Virginia's conflict of law rules, lex fori
governs and the Maryland cap does not apply to this action.

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