x The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic by GEORGE DIGIOVANNI 1 ‘The immediate aim ofthe presene study is the relatively narcow one of anayzing a section of Hegel's “greater Logic” which deals with the ‘modal categories in order co understand what Hegel means by “com Fingeney”, The study should be viewed, however, in the context of a problem which is as old as the history of Hegelian criticism; but whieh recently has been brought again to the centee of scholarly attention be cause of new research done on the development of Heels thought du ing the crucial formative year ofthe Jena period. I shall now tty to i dicate che problem, and co show how the study that follows relates to le appears that even at che beginning of his tay at Jena, when Hegel was closely collaborating with Schelling, he had already assumed an at tieade cowards philosophy thar sec him quite apart from his mentor, and even put him on the side of Fichte. In the Diffeencichrfi Hegel hhad assigned co philosophy (noe to ar, as Schelling had) the function, of reconciling thought with nature, reflection with immediacy." How ever, as Heinz Kimmerle has eightly poineed our, in taking, this step Hegel had in fact accepted Fichte’s criticism of Schelling.? He hed admitted to the futility of trying to gain a standpoint that transcends the limits of reflection. Schelling’s Philosophy of Natute still e- ‘mained philophy; and his appeal to art was done from the side of thought and in order to resolve a problem created by reflection. At best Schelling had mediaced the chought of thought with the baught of ‘nature. He had lee untouched the issue of how reflection can overcome ‘he disproportion that separates ie from the fact of nature. Te does not follow, of course, chat Hegel could have accepted Fichte’s notion of ac 9osoruy ght, For recognize to Schel- fegel the Deeween dine of ree Logie and introduce ve realiea- ale one '. Hegel red ittoa which herefore, 's philos- on of the of being though. ro recog the cr: ranted (0 sdeniable No op- seure and concept hhed only > Hegel’s od incon 9 System tends 10 lete. The Aewice of material | THE CATBGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIC 18) 1 am ready to inegoduce at this poine the theme ofthe paper. In clas sical metaphysics contingency has always denoted a limitation of re son. A contingent event (as contingent) isan element of reality imper- vious co full rationalization, Is occurrence must be accepted wiehour explanation; and any theory suggesting that itis possible to account for it would in fact be denying that “contingency” has objective mean: ing. However, as Dieter Henrich has so well argued in an article of 1958, Hegel’ philosophy is unique in that ie maintains the necessity of contingency.” Ie claims thae it is possible to compechend it in thought. Hegel thus tries to avid the classical alternative posed contingency (viz., either “contingency” has only subjective meaning ‘or reality is nor Fully rational) in the same way in which he eres € te Solve the impasse reached by che idealism of his contemporaries. He re-ineroduces within reason what would otherwise appear as 2 limita affecting it from without. And this move is only to be expected For contingency is the essential feature chat distinguishes the face of nature from the thought of i. And if Hegel's System is eo comprehend the fact of nature, it must be able eo comprehend it precisely as con tingent The case of contingency thus offers an excellent test by which to measure the seriousness of Hegel’s claim to "complete mediation’. It also provides, however, a crierion by which to judge the accuracy of whatever notion ww might have of what Hegel means by that claim. If Hegel ean show thae contingency need noe be merely presupposed, bur od; moreover, if he that che inevitability of ts presence can be underst can show that in hus comprehending contingency, he does nat reduce it ro necessitythen Hegel has managed to break fece from the circle of idealistic thoughe, He has dem strated that it is possible co recog nize the malty of contingency without having to step outside the limits of logical reflection. Bur a reflection that accomplishes 2 fear of this sore must be of a very special kind. And one can enquire in all faieness whether, rather than bringing t0 its logical conclusion the idealism of his contemporaries, Hegel has not in point of fact grounded it on a completely new basis.” There ae indications that cleaely point in the later direction. Con. sider, for instance, how thoughe develops in the Logic. ts movement Jepends on the tension creaced within each category beeween what the category tend: €0 signify (or signifies formally, or explicitly), and what ie signifies m staal fact (or impiety). Lee me elaborate on this pointART AND LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PHILOSO1 Using an example which will also allow me to introduce the ewo ‘categories of sibility and actuality with which we shall be concerned later. * Consider how these two categories differ from two others vie, ‘he categories of asence and immediacy, which appear at an eatlier stage of the Logic. There is obviously very much in common between the {wo sets of categories. Both presuppose, asa condition for signifying an object, that a distinction be recognized between the preenee of the object as mere face, and che rflection which justifies its being peesene However, the degree co which the distinction has become part of the formal signification ofthe four categories diers consserably From one set to the other. The explicie intention of essence and immediacy i to cach signify one side of the distinction to the total exclusion of the fother. Essence incends «0 signify the object exclusively as reflection Within itself: as pure explanarory ground; immediacy, for its pat, in tends co signify it exclusively as mete ct. But the formal intention of the two categories is clearly self-defeating, For if ie were ever realized, ie would destroy upon realization the context within which alone ic makes sense o refer to an object a either essence of mere fact. The ¢wo categories, therefore, are made to suler a strange fate at the hands of Hegel's dislectic. Although each mons to expeess one side alone of the distinction, in actual fact both ate shown co signify one side as well as the other. Essence can just as well be mere fact, while any fact can be taken as che basis for an explanation, In the course of che dialectic, in other words, a disproportion is revealed between the jormal intention of che two categories and what chey signify inact! fact ® With actuality and possibility, the situation is quite different. The ‘object they both signify is one which, on presenting, itself to an observ ing subject does not remain mere face bue proffer a reason for es pes cence. Bue possibility refers co the object taking its starting poine from the explanatory ground which the object would offer were it to become actually present. Actuality, on the otber hancl, refers ta ie starting from the opposite dicection. Tt signifies che object as alteady pre senebut with a presence achieved on the basis of a ground which al bie not obvious in some cases) can in principle always be adduced. The relacion that holds beeween the two categories is eaplicitlyembign us. Their meaning is definitely nor identical. On the conetary, itis ‘ue to say hat tothe extent that an object is only possible, it s not ac tual; and to the extent chat itis actual, i fs no longer merely possible THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY INTHE HEGELIAN LOGIC 183, The meaning of one category excludes that of the other. Yer, it is exqually true (0 say that the two categories are complementary —that cach points to the other as completing. its own line of signification Actuality i still possibility: bue possibility as achieved; and possibility is already actuality: bue actuality as merely adumbrated. One can also legitimately claim, therefore, thae ehe more possible something is, che closer itis to being actual; and the more actual, the more entitled to the clair of being possible Possibility and actualiey chus overcome the abstractness of essence and immediacy. hey include in thei formal signification the ambi. lence which for the other set of categories had been a dé festo result. In this way they manage to express formally what they would otherwise signify only in actual fact; and ate no longer subject, therefore, (at least, not in the same sense) «0 the same pracess that his reduced to mete abstractions the previous expressions of the logical object. Now, a discrepancy erween the intention of any given category in the Logic, and the determination which it actually brings to the logi- cal object, manifests itself under one form or another at every stage of the Logic. The discrepancy conditions the logical development by in jecting ince it an element of immediacy. Ido not mean to say chat the ‘movement of thought in the Logic is subject to the same historical vicissitudes as che development of consciousness in. the Phenomenology. The Logic is the science of pure choughe, From be- Binning co end ic is nothing but a reflection of thought upon ieself However, I must stress that for Hegel even pure thought is at first pre senc co itself only immediately. In fact, its appearance atthe beginning of the Logic is so immediate thar it can be articulated only ind rectly.!" Moreover, until the final reflection takes place which re incerprets all che categories chat have appeared up ro that poine as the content of the Idea,"® the logical movement tends to fall because of the immediacy by which i is affected) into a series of abserace thoughe expressions only implicitly connected with one another. The sense of the whole movement is made explicit only by the comments provided by the concrete subject engaged in the Logic—viz.. che philosopher The whole effore of the Logic is ditected at shaking. off the immed acy of its beginning, and at incorporating within the explicit concent of the Idea all che unofficial comments made along the way by the Philosopher. Ie would be weong, however, co take lightly either the‘GEL'S Prntosority © introduce the ewe ve shall be concerned om two others—viz., far at an ealice stage ‘ommon between the dition for signifying cen the preerie of the ies its being presene + become part of the onsiderably from one and immediacy i ro ‘cal exclusion of the ssively as reflection acy, for its pat, ine formal intention of were ever realized, thin which alone i mere fact. The ewo fae at che hands of ne side alone ofthe ‘one side as well as nile any face can be of the dialectic, in vite different. The itself reason for ies prese farting point from fers co it starting as already pre ‘ground sehich (al- says be adduced explicitly ambiga he contrary, itis sible, i is nor ac- merely possible THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIC 183, The meaning of one category excludes thae of the other. Yet, it is cqually true to say that the two categories are complementary —that tach points to che other as completing is own line of signification, Actualty is sell possibilicy: bur possibility as achieved: and possibiliey is already actuality: bue accuality as merely adumbrated. One can alse legitimately claim, therefore, rhae ehe more possible something i, the closer i¢ is to being actual; and the more actual, the more entitled to the claim of being possible Possibility and actuality thus overcome the absreaceness of estence and immediacy. They include in their Formal signification the ambivec Fence which for the other set of caregories had been a de fasta result. In this way they manage co express formully what they would otherwise signify only in actual fact; and are no longer subjece, therefore, (at least, noe in che same sense) to the sime process that has reduced to mere abstractions the previous expressions ofthe logical objecr Now, a discrepancy between the intention of any given category in the Logic, and the determination which ie actually brings tothe loge, «al object, manifests iself under one form or another at every sage of the Logic. The discrepancy conditions the logical development by in Jecting into it an element of immediacy. I do not mean to say thas the movement of chought in the Logic is subject co the sime historical vicissitudes as the development of consciousness. in. the Phenomenology" The Logic is the science of pure thought. From be- sinning co end it is nothing bue a reflection of ehoughe upon scselt However, I must stress that for Hegel even pure thought sat first pre sen co itself only immediately. In face, its appearance atthe beginning of the Logic is so immediate that i can be articulated only indi rectly."" Moreover, until the final reflection cakes place which re interprets all the categories thae have appeared up ta that point 25 the content of the Idea,"® the logical movement tends to fall (because of the immediacy by which it is affected) into a series of abstract thought expressions only implicitly connected with one another. The sense of the whole movement is made explicit only by the comments provided by the concrete subject engaged inthe Logic~viz_, the philosopher The whole effort ofthe Logic is directed at shaking off the immedi acy ofits beginning, and at incorporating within the explicie conten of the Idea all che unofficial comments made along the way by the Philosopher. Ie would be wrong, however, to take lightly either the1EL's PHILOSOPHY red; oF the presence rovide the link bee System. I should in- vosition with regard tin the experience history and nature tom a priori princi- ich seand outside of ‘common with the + of either Fichte or fe-emactment in the already been lived vessed inthe logical ‘mn effore asa histone acy of natuce. [eis tes is Finally under- -ogic operates from dd ehae iis noe ine ibiliey. The teansi- zel’s Logie is sup- {he appear eo be at C because with his hich has begun in F contingency. For vvement is affected dacingent. The es- sency co which its ves Hegel mean by This s the ques- stages common to vis frse stage, th uae, the formal means THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN Locie 185 four concepts are considered in abtracto~only inasmuch as they form a system of related meanings and provide the basis for ehe choughe of an object in general, At the second stage, a distinction is introduced between the object and the categories. The object thus begins to function as a material co which the categories bring particular decerminations. In the thied and final stage, an atcemp is made at overcoming the distinction introduced in the second. The meaning of the categories is so reformulated as to allow chem to regain the zenesality they enjoyed at the firse stage, but without losing. the concreteness they gained when opersting in relation to an assumed T have already commenced inditectly on the formal meaning of actuality and possibility. [ have poinced out that the ewo categories have independent meaning; yet each expressly points co the other for the fulfllmenc of its own signification, The existence of what is actual should be justifiable; and what is justifiable, should be actual However, ie does not necessarily follow from the face that something is possible, thac it will actually exist. Nor does i follow from the fact that it exists chat an explanation for is existence can actually be given ‘Ac the formal level of analysis, the transition from one category to the ‘other (even though expressly fequired by both) remains immediate. It must be performed on he strength of considerations extrinsic to the logical play of the categories. Hegel argues, moreover, that the immediacy is due co the present abstractness of the two categories, Possibility signifies a mere self-reference on the pare of an abject (a justification only in principle), and actuality, a mere presence, Neither category characteties an object concretely enough to reveal just bu fon being possible, it must be actual; and on being actual, possible And the abstractness of each is directly related to the abstractness of the other." Ie is because the possibility of an object is a mere possibility, chat ehe object will appear only as a “possible” (". .. nur fin MOgliches . ..")the sore of actual, in other words, that mighe as well have not been, Conversely, i i because an actual is (as Hegel pues it) an immediate fira'®(i.e., something merely present and still open to determination) that the possibility ie establishes remains formal The first resule, therefore, of the dialectic of actuality and Possibility isan ambiguity regarding the character of the object which the cwo categories sigeify, and which they are both expected to186 ART AND LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PatLosorny determine, The object is neither quite actual yee, nor possible; o asuin, itis at once actual and possible, precisely because itis neither of them determinedly. This ambiguity is expressed by Hegel with the category of contingency: “The unity of possibility and actuality. contingency." Task you eo look at this texe carefully, because it is ia passages like this that one can appreciate the distance that separates Hegel's Logi from classical metaphysics. In classical metaphysics, contingency wes thoughe to be the result of a discrepancy becween possbilicy. sod actuality. Hegel now defines ie a5 the unity (die Einftt) of the two Implied by this move is a radical innovation in the understanding of the nature of possibility, and also of the relationship chat thoughe (othich expresses the possibility of reality) holds eo reality itself, For Hegel, possibility is noc a ground that eranscends actuality. It is not it {may make my own a comment of G. RG. Mute)" likes teservoat of vet unrealized being upon which God chooses either to draw or not to straw. It is instead a determination of formal actuality. Ie is actualicy inasmuch as i is expected to eesult in yet mote actuality. And formal Possibility is a determination of aceuality. It is aceuality inastnuch 4 ic is still open to determination. For Hegel, in other words, the distinction between actuality and possibility falls exclusively within the limits of phenomenal existence, and is a characteristic of fee Phenomenality. To express the possibility of reality in choughe therefore, does not mean ro cranscend its immediate appearance (as if chere were anything co reality except its appearing), but to give a description in pure thought form of its structure precisely a6 ap pearance. The formal play of the categories af possibility and sceuh ity which Hegel has just unfolded muse be understood as the or ceptual expression of the unrest of phenomena which leave unde. termined on their Fist appearing exactly what form they will finally take Hegel proceeds, therefore, ro develop che concep of contingency in terms of the ambiguity inherent in all phenomenal existence ™ A Phenomenon, upon is first appearing, cuts itself off from the process that has led up to ie. As Hegel puts it it abstracts from the refleceion that establishes its possibility. For this eeason insofern sie Lviz., the reflection} in thm aufgehoben ist - .."), it appears wm something which has no ground. Like anything which de fre is, ie ‘THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LGIG 187 parades itself as self-sufficient. Ie has its own presence to guarantee for ‘es possibility; and seems ro dispense, therefore, with any reference to anything outside of ic justifying is existence. Ie is, simply because it is. However, a simple selEreference is hardly «satisfying juseification for the existence of anything. The same abstraction, cherefore, that brings out che itrevocability of a phenomenon once ie has occurred also deeraces from the completeness of its appearance. It bestows upon it the character of something, the reality of which is still in need of developing (The phenomenon is thus a mere possible which muse find its fulfillment in something else (in Getetstam). Now. this ambiguity inherene in the frst appearance of anything ies cutcing, itself loose from justifying grounds, and yet its need for such grounds is what the category of contingency signifies ‘The ambiguity of phenomenal existence is not, however, altogether lunmiigated. After the analysis ofthe category of contingency, Hegel oes on to argue that anything contingent is in principle something fecessay.!” His argument can be re-phased in this way. The simple self-reference of immediae existence, in spite of the ambiguicy that it senerates, is nonetheless a real one, However abstract and admiteedly insufficiene a8 a principle of explanation, i entails areal distinction within a given event beeween the event “in itself” and a manifold of determinations which, although belonging to it, cannot be identified with i¢ tout cunt. Te also eneals a real distinction becween the given event and some other possible one, And on the basis of these distinctions, one can begin co relate one determination co another, and the event to yet another event; and obcain thereby @ more satisfactory ‘explanation for the presence of the original event than any previous appeal eo ies mere self-reference; The immediate presence of the event fon its first appearing can thus be developed into an explanatory system~vir. a system of explanatory references such asthe category of Hegel's first explicit statement, therefore, on the nature of contingency and necessity is chat both follow with equal seeengeh from the ineerplay of formal actuality and possibiliy.*" Contingency isthe resule of the absteactness of the two categories which makes theit determination ofan object a meze adumbration ~the frst sketch for an jobject rather than a concrete determination. Contingency, however, does nor stand exclusively for irrationality. For the ambiguiey withSPHILOSOFIy THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIC 187 or possible; or | parades itself as selsufficien. Ic has its own presence o guarantee for ssc itis ncither of es possibility: and scems co dispense, cheefore, with any reference 0 Hegel with the | gnything ourside of it justifying it existence. Ie, simply because it and actuality iss” However, a simple selfeference is hardly a satisfying justification for che existence of anything. The same abstraction, therefore, thst 5 in pasuges like | rings out the itrevocabilty of a phenomenon once i has cccurted also es Hegel's Logic detracts from the completeness ofits appearance. It bestows upon it contingency was | the character of something, the reality of which is still im ned of Possibility and developing. The phenomenon is thus a mere possible which mst find fet) of the wo, gs fulfillment in something else (iw Gesetstetn), Now, this ambiguity anderstanding of herene in the fist appearance of anything is cutting itself lose ip hac uught from justifying grounds. and yee is need for such gtounde.is woe cality self. For ee category of contingency signifies aly. Ie is not Gif The ambiguity of phenomenal existence is not, however, altogether ikea reserwir of | unmicigaced. After the analysis of che category of contingency, flegel 8 deaw oF aot fo | goes on to argue that anything contingent is in principle something ¥, eis actuality | cesar. "* His argument can be r-phased in chi way 2? The simple ity. And formal | sett-reference of immediate existence, in spite of the ambiguity that it aality inasmuch | generates, is nonetheless 4 real one. However abstract and admittedly {her words, the insufficient as a principle of explanation, it entails real distinction lusively within ichin a given event beeween the event “in itself” and a manifold of acteristic of its determinations which, although belonging to i, cannot be identified ty i thought, | with ie taut cart, Ie alao entails a real distinction berwcen the given appearance @s event and some other possible one. And on the basis of these ', bur to give a | distinctions, one can begin to relate one determination to another, and vevsely & 4p he event co yet another even and obtain thereby a more satiny icy and actual- | explanation for che preseace of the original event chan any previous sod as the con | appeal co ies mere sel-eference The immediate presence ofthe event Bh Teave unde | on its first appearing can hus be developed into an explanatory Yey will finally | syscem=viz,a system of explanatory references such asthe category of | necessity signifies. contingency in Hegel's first explicit statement, therefore, on the nature of txistence.!® A’ | contingency and necessity i that both follow with equal strength rom dim the process che interplay of formal actuality and possiblity?" Contingency i the ‘the reflection | result of the absteactness of the «wo categories which makes thelr insofera sie | Gerecmination ofan object a mere adumnbration~the frst sketch for an Ke appeats as | object rather chan a concrete determination. Contingency, however 4 fain isi does not stand exclusively for seationality. For the ambiguity with re ese eeELS PHILOSOPHY sare already presene 1. Contingency isthe far, io other words, tthe decerminacion they define ensures explanation for its nat form such an to yield the iden of the absteaceness of cond stage of the feat to which the lied. Ia being thus + concretized, and te world the paper to this "the function thar Hegel subsumes vee che content is, owever, as applied “indifference to ach inditferent to of actuality: and hin ie the fiese to the extent shat fan when ehey are sibility and real ‘ain all che notes the immediate to a process of itsell Ges lack of » they must also ining principles believes wil Fil with which he the notion of ‘THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LoGiG 189 ‘iecumstance”, with which he replaces the formee possibility. ®" These to new concepts, while sill signifying actuality and possibility, ld to them connotations which the previous two failed to convey on theit own. A power to effect is something actual but with an actuality that «an be measured by given results, And a circumstance 4 source of possibility~bue one immediately related to. particular situstiog What is, moreover, che nature of the relationship. that obtains beeween possibilicy and actuality thus re-interpreted? The crucial question is whether the new relationship can asoid che ambiguity of the previous formal one. Hegel proposes two formulations for ie According co the first, the relation is one of “identity of contene 4 The same manifold of existents which can serve as manifestation of a power (i.e., as teal actuality) cam also be decermined a a set of conditions and cicumstances which occasion certain events to take place (i.e., a8 real possibility). Ie is cleat, however, thie meternt entity cannoe suffice as an exhaustive determination of he telationship for it abstracts altogether from the distinction berwong the ewo notions which itis supposed to relate. When we say thor sven manifold can be determined either as something aleady actual ‘oF 88 « possibility for things to come, we introduce the alternative ip reverting back to the formal level of signification. It is to the formed distinction that we appeal. And che same element of indefiniverccs present at the formal level makes its appearance again. Insofar ashe ‘material content of either one of the rao notions is concerned, it see imacter of indifference which sie ofthe distinction is made to apply The choice remains subjective With the second formulation, Hegel tries to introduce the listinction within the manifold of existents, and eo feee it in this way of its formality, He appeals to the notion ofa sieuation in which all che condicions and ciecumstances are present that fully determine. the coming to be of a cereain event. Apparently Hegel has in mind the case (of a process which is so far advanced as to have become inrevenitle And lies results, therefore, albeit not accally presene, ate alveady ‘srevocably committed to existence.** The determination of a process ‘har has reached such a stage of development would call for bch she concepts of possibility and actuality, The process itself wockd constitute the teal possiblity for certain events to take ples However, since che process is so complete that its eelity is vitallyPutLosorny THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LoGte 189) already presene ‘iecumstance’, with which he replaces the former possbility.29 These singency tthe | wo new concepts, while still signifying accuality and possibility, sel nother words, | _¢o chem connotations which the previous ewo filed to convey on their determination | own. A power to effec is something actual~ but with an actuality that define ensures cam be measured by piven results. And a circumstance is spurce of ination for its | possibility —but one immediately related to a particulae situation jorm such an What is, moreover, the nature of the relationship thar obtains eld the idea of | between possibility and actuality thus reinterpreted? The crucial question is whether che new eelationship can avoid the ambiguity of ibscractness of | che previous formal one. Hegel proposes two formulations for ie od stage of the According to the first, the felation is one of "identiey of eontent”.24 0 which che The same manifold of existents which can seeve as manifestation of a In being hus ower (es, as real actuality) can also be determined asa see_of cretized, and Conditions and circumstances which occasion certain events to take vd, place (j.e.. as real possibility). Ie is clear, however, that material paper «0 this entity cannot sulfice as an exhaustive determination of the Fonction eh Bel subsumes relationshipfor ic abstracts altogether from the distinction between ‘he ewo notions which ic is supposed co relate. When we say that 2 he content is given manifold can be deceemined either as something alecady actual er, as applied ‘Fas a possibility for things co come, we introduce the alternative by dilference to reverting back to the formal level of signification. It is to the formal different ro distinction that we appeal. And the same element of indefisiteness vctuality and Present at che formal level makes its appearance again. Insofar as the ie the firse material concent of either one of the two notions is concerned, itis extent that matter of indifference which side of the distinction is made to apply. The choice remains subjective. then they are With the second formulation, Hegel tries 10 introduce the lity and real distinction within the manifold ofexistents, and to free ie in this way of all ehe notes its formality. He appeals co the notion of situation in which all the immediate conditions and circumstances are present that fully determine the 4 process of | coming ro be of certain event, Apparently Hegel has in mind the case Fars lack of of a process which is so far advanced as to have become iereversible oy must also And its results, therelore, albeit noe actually present, are already principles ‘ereweably committed co existence. ‘The determination of a procese | that has reached such a stage of development woud call for buch the ves wil il oncepes of possibilicy and actualiey. The process itself would i 1 which he constitute the real possibility for certain events t0 take place > notion of However, since the process is so complete that its reality is vietuallyHuLosopny 2sed to usher the process therelore, a ina relative 8 ushering, mmediately preting ie as quired full an its whole ae, for ies vean effect. ue chey are s exhausted 1, é€ would hae binds fined, real When the primacy of ibility or ality #6 the ve after ies lingency.*7 appearance sed by the al Kiries ‘een power rinsically, ved limes ‘ld is noe which che utside the THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIC. 191 immediate limits of any such occurrence, the manifold remains an aggregate of material elements which might have been or might yet be sxtual cause or effece, but which are per se neither cause nor effect, The ceterminations of accuality and possibility apply ¢o them only foemally Real necessity is equivalent, therefore, to an indefinite series of ‘vents —none of which counts as uleimate limit. The “reality” of any of them is recognizable only on the strength of an abstraction ~ ive. only on condition chat an observer limi his field of observation ro a given seuation, and consider i a if it were a complete world. Hegel argues tat real necessity is essentially celative. I¢ 1s predicated only on the assumpcion ofa sieuation, the presence and limies of which remain in point of face contingent ‘The sicuation, cherefore, at the end of the second stage of the dalectic of actuality and possibility stands as follows: the formal categories of actuality and possibility have provided the limits within sshich any objece can be determined ix principle. They have provided the basis for a system. However, exactly which world (in terms of individual, actual objects) is che system they establish an expression of, sill remains an open question. In the first stage of the dialectic, in other words, che possiblity of derorminizewt im general has been stablished —noe of individual determinations. Inehe second stage, on the other hand, the real categories of actuality and possibility have indeed provided the basis for the conceptual determination of individually recognizable objecesbut only on condition that the larrer be taken as single events which never quite amount in actual fact twa complete world, Ache end of che second stage ofthe dialectic, we ate faced by the unhappy choice between a world which is complete as, world, bur must remain only a possibility; and an indefinite number of situations which are eecognizably real, but which do noe necessarily belong toa world of which we recognize the possibility Contingency erupts, therefore, at every level and in every respect of the dialectic, The world of which the formal categories are the ‘expression is such thar no distinction within i€ has more than a merely momentary (ve., stricely relative) significance. The structure for which the real categories provide the schema admie of sharpness of decal only on condition thae the backgeound be blocked out, In either cose, the connection between any category and the reality i intends toPurLosopny lompletion the + Logie) whose al. Tianslaced sical noces we y work of a he essence of sncepts which and aleeraates very object at sm of certain sults from ies uations ie has would poine 'stem and the flection, and 1 of fac cits vusy work of od analysis of oplies for the fiese and the Bue ies erue now se, it nigh expect bothering eo cess of its unnoticed ring else but vresence chat vr experience THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIG 195 of ¢ should not be looked upon as deeracting from rationality, but as providing for ie che limie which alone makes it possible. Reality isthe immediate presupposicion Vorawst2ung) from which all our reasoning ‘must start; end which, upon returning eo i as the esuleGusetstein) of a reasoning process (setzen), will appear precisely as chat which necessitated our presupposing it (seest al wranigetzt).*® Or again, reality would not be conceived absolutely were ie not understood both as the source as well asthe resolution of any problem of determination, (Qua absolute, ie must generate its own ireationality vie, the need for explanation. The ultimate test of any system of thought is not whether ie dispels ierationality, but whether i¢ shows thae irrationality is contained within eality itself In actual fact, therefore, by dhe end of the Fest stage of the dialectic of actuality and possibiliey, the point has alzcady been made thae the relation thae holds berween the two categories isa constant source of indecerminacion because the two categories have indeed defined reality absolucely~nor because (as hitherto assumed) they sell fall short of a ‘ue system of thought. Still needed, before the point is accepted as oficial docerine, is only a change in expectation as to what it means to decermine reality absolutely. It does not mean ro enumerate exhaustively the ceady-made qualities which supposedly make up ies content, bur 10 define it precisely as generating its own problems of ‘determination. Or again, ie means to define the terms of the general problem of determining it; and to establish, therefore, che limits within which any particular problem of determination must remain in ‘order to be a significant problem. ‘The new awareness of what choughe accomplishes in determining the concept of reality is forcefully brought home at the end of the second stage of the dialectic. At that poine, the Frusteation that the philosopher doing the Logic can envisage as following upon the endless process of overcoming the contingency that re-asserts itself at the end of any process of explanation forces a change in expectations. It leads to the realization that the contingency docs not derive from factors extrinsic to whatever line of necessity has been established, Ie is instead the result of such a line hating been established. As Hegel puss i, che philosopher sees that contingency Jecomes in necessity; chat itis the contingency of necessiy." ‘The category of absolute necessity which is thereupon introducedssopny shat ie is pos. he com- tie al its due shension the end (be itof ina sys he Logic of inde the con- istoriog- + gained Ut the that the reacting 1 conse Mf reality ognivion rords, in ing that does not ‘gory of “of real- THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN LOGIC. 195 We are now in a position to understand why Hegel could start the second stage ofthe dialectic we have been examining (in fac, the see ond stage of che dialectic in aay section ofthe Logic) with the notion of eontent which he claims eo derive from the incerplay of formal Categories just completed in the frst stage. The move has a first acer {ain ai of mystification abour i.e gives che impression chat Hegel is trying t0 conjure up a material eference our of purely formal consider acions by a play of conceptual trickery. Yet, all misgivings disappear fonce we understand exactly what Hegel docs ar che first stage of every dialectical cycle. He simply defines reality (with varying degrees of texplicitness) as the inescapable contexe within which all problems of Xetermination muse fall. Bue once we have understood reality in this tay, we can proceed without further ada ta precappoee if as fit: and todtevise techniques which will bring out the ationality impliic in it ‘Oragain, once we have understood why reality must appear as fic, we have comprehended ie absolutely. And there is nothing left for us 10 do except to deal with the problems that its immediacy presents, The pont is indeed obvious. But i¢ is noe erivialfor losing sighe of ic ‘might lead co the ilusionary belief that choughe needs fulfilling (as thought) in a medium other than conceptual; or conversely, to the ‘squally ilusionary belie ehat the fulfillment of ehought on reflective terms alone would render superfluous any non-conceprual apprehen- sion of eealty ‘As the dialectic of acuality and possibility concludes, therefore, che philosopher detects « new order emerging ove of che apparent state of disarray into which the logical process had landed itself by the end of the second stage. At that point, the intention of the formal categories (which was to provide a complece determination of reality) seemed checked by the immediacy thae erupted feom within their play. And the real categories, which were expected eo remedy the abstractness of the formal ones, seemed in fact t0 lose sight of any systematic plan Now, ae the end of the third stage, the singleness of purpose ofthe log ical process ce-asserts itself, It is clear now chat the intention of the formal categories has indeed been realized ~ but not in the manner one ‘might have hitherto expected. It has been realized by che formulation of complete disjunction (e.g. something is ether possible or actual), the terms of which define the limits of any significant problem of de- termination, As for the real categories, our busy consciousness (coe twin once more to it) was not altogether misguided when ie believedsoruy veion of ¥ fled nd real ady ex special reality ve play her re- made «edly salt of fn face of the as the vanied ‘ought Burin ality ficial ale ‘flee. \s the their a the the sity the THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN Loci 197 necessity that accompanies the cyclical movement of the heavenly, spheres; and a necessity which follows upon the indeterminacion of rmutter~ i.e. the blind necessity of chance. The ¢wo meanings (I must xd) ae for Aristotle quite disparate Now, if 1 were asked to state in a few words the result of che dialectic of actuality and possibility, and also what I believe 0 be the main thesis developed by Hegel throughout the Logic, I would say that Hegel has shown the interdependence of the two meanings of necessity. Both are cequited in order to conceive reality as a self-contained process, For Hegel ealty would not be self-sufficient if it did ot contain its own ierationaity. The only order which ic exhibits is one which cakes shape out of the contingency of facts; and which, upon being realized, leads to a renewal of immediacy. And rhe ‘only wisdom possible lies in the eecognition that there is no situation to imtional co serve as the basis for & new order, and no degece of oer which does noe generate its own oppositece ae THE CATEGORY OF CONTINGENCY IN THE HEGELIAN Loci 199 Hegel era ek ho