Spec Pro Comparative Case Analysis 2

Julie Tanya Pimentel-Lanzar SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS THURS 7-9 February 01, 2018
 COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS
i. As to the facts of the case
In the case of Luis Parco et.al. vs CA, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a
guardianship proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya. On December 20, 1966, respondent
Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez),
hereinafter referred to as private respondent, the sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista, hereinafter referred to
as the petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and 4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT Nos. 16939 and
18035, respectively, for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of the ward
Soledad Rodriguez.
On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of private
respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by TCT No. 16944 containing an area of 63,598 sq.
meters, more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of the three (3) lots being absolute, new transfer
certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners.
On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the sale of Lot Nos. 3437,
4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial
District, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, praying that an order be immediately issued
requiring petitioners to appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in
question.
In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others, that the three lots have
been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which were duly approved by the guardianship court.
Thus a petition for review on certiorari was filed, petitioners seek to set aside the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 1 which revived and declared in full force and effect its decision on August 20,
1970 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732, entitled "Luis Parco,
et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the decision
dated April 15, 1969 3 and all subsequent orders 4 issued by respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First
Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be declared as null and void.
While in the case of Patricia Paciente vs Hon. Dacuycuy, Leonardo Homere,s in 1972, died leaving his wife,
Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3085-G
situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, covered by TCT No. 12138. This lot which he had inherited from his deceased
father, Felizardo Homeres, has an area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square meters.
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita Dumdum for P10,000.00. On
November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and estate of the minors.
The petition was granted on August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as guardian on September 13, 1977,
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had been titled in her name under
TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria Paciente was
issued TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On December 27, 1978, the petitioner
mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed a manifestation informing
respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered
in the name of the petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued an order on November
14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to appear
before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land co-owned
by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority
from the court.
Page 1 of 22
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation did
not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained to the respondent court that
she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the petitioner without obtaining the approval of the
court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the minors. On the same date,
the respondent court again issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure
judicial authority before disposing of the said property.
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband, apprised the court that the petitioner was
an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. Respondent court then issued the questioned order.
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
ii. As to the issues
In both cases they raise the same issue, whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to
order the reconveyance of the properties to the ward?
iii. As to the ruling of the Court
In the first case, the High Court ruled in the negative ---
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on the basis alone of the
pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels
of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the properties in
question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on selling and
encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the
original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of petitioners herein regarding the alleged
concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24,
1969 asked for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first two
lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject to
condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales were
all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were issued in
their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed
properties. This, We believe, requires the determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land
in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a
separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio:
this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily,
is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging
to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the
ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been
already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In effect, there can
only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where
the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said
to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings.
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private respondent finds no application in the
instant case. As differentiated from the case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title of the ward to the property
Page 2 of 22
in dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated to her through compromise agreement approved
by the court which title had the authority of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the
properties in question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a separate ordinary action.
In the second case, however, the court ruled in the affirmative declaring that –
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable. They inherited a
part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother
without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not exceed its jurisdiction but
merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.
The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional consideration of P10,000.00 is a different
matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property but the time frame
for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the additional amount, the second order
directing the cancellation of the petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first order. The
second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land inherited by Leandro Homeres from his late father
with each heir getting title to one-third of the property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of
violations of due process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under
guardianship, the respondent court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable
price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent with the
rights of all parties involved.
II. CASE DIGEST OF GUARDIANSHIP CASES
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,

vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed
LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamed
LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
FACTS:
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia
L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed
by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without
prejudice however to the children demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the
sale of such property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting
with the two elder children not being notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were already above
14, as pointed out and stressed in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective
power of this Court. The original decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights
of the children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court, there is a
corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo. The
vendor was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of whom later assailed the
validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that despite the order of the guardianship court authorizing
the sale of the lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they contended that the guardianship proceeding
was conducted without notifying the two older siblings although they were already more than 14 years of age at
that time.
Page 3 of 22
The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of the property likewise intervened in the action. The
lower court adjudged them the owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to be null and void.
The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the spouses (as to
the 3/4 portion) by the guardian is valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their mother their
participation in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the
children of the deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorize the sale of the property
HELD:
What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was the lower court and not the
respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in
the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other
general or special notice thereof to be given."8 The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional
character. These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the
incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian."9
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a 1915 decision. As was therein
made clear: "There is no need for interpretation or construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is
so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning
with which the English language has endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would
accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge
words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful.
That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand
and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference
by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction.' " 11
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption that the probate court could have
authorized the sale in question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower court
that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may
be affected, its solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their stage of
immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have
a claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811,
in Salunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an "interest opposed
to that of her children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts
as found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were notified as
is required by law. If there is any occasion then why there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress
of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth
in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary
to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves." 14
Page 4 of 22
______________________________
THIRD DIVISION
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, Petitioner,
- versus-
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 151243
Facts:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M.
Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave
[Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando]
alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan (Contract to Sell) was entered into by
and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when
the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did
not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered
to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision.
Cesnando Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific Performance with
Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land which the former alleged was the subject of a
'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged on their agreement when she refused to accept
the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings.
Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In June 1988, Nave
was declared therein to be incompetent.
The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found incompetent
since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the
Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated February 20, 1984. Hence
this petition.
Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she
subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.
Thus Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 10 April
2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,[3] dated 19 December 2001 of
the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed
Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave
(Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings)
over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the Decision,[4] dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.[5] The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different
parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the
subject property to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.
Issue:
Page 5 of 22
1. Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata

2. Whether or not it was necessary to give notice
HELD:,
As to the first issue, Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no

application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian
over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter
being described as a person suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.[14]
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding
therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the
latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of
Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition
with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was
whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the
Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two separate times,
one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that
she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,[22] the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared
mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not
prove that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot
be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting
he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.[23] The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual
relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed.[24]
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started
hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a
Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such
as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February
1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely
on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-
C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she
executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
Page 6 of 22
As to the second issue, A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual
parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the
title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no
named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the names, ages, and
residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those
residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing
on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is
to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably
assume that the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to
and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province
and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise
identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed
minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts
and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian,
it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
_______________________________
G.R. No. L-3071 May 29, 1950
SALVACION LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TEODORO, Sr., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, EULALIO LOPEZ, Jr., and JESUS
JALBUENA, respondents.
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
Eulalio Lopez, Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez, Jr., was the exclusive and
absolute owner of an hacienda in Silay, Negros Occidental, having a total area of over 100 hectares. On September
3, 1948, the Court of First Instance, acting upon a motion of Senen L. Gamboa and Adelaida Gamboa filed in the
proceedings for guardianship, ordered the guardian to pay the movants P7,312 plus 12 per cent interest from
August, 1944, amount which represented loans properly authorized by court. The order provided that if the
guardian did not have funds to pay those debts, he should take the necessary steps for the sale of some of the
property of the guardianship.
In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the above tract of land, the only property of which the
incapacitated was possessed, on January 11, 1949, to Jesus bound himself to pay the mortgage debt and other
obligations aggregating P22,34;6.30, and to satisfy the balance in two installments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is required to direct the next of kin of the ward and all persons in the estate to
appear to show cause whether or not a sale should be granted?
HELD:
Page 7 of 22
It is admitted that in authorizing the sale of some of the property of the incapacitated, the court did not follow
the requirement of section 2 of Rule 96 to the effect that the court shall direct the next of kin of the ward, and all
persons interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable time and place to be specified in the order, to show
cause why the prayer for the sale should not be granted. Nor did the court specify, as provided by section 4 of the
same Rule, whether the sale should be effected publicly or privately.
Although Eulalio Lopez, Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under the actual care and
custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing that the sale was prejudicial to her brother's interest, Salvacion
Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order authorizing said sale, and upon the motion being
denied, she brought this petition for certiorari and mandamus, contending that the sale was null and void by
reason of the court's failure to adhere to Rule 96, and praying that the orders of the respondent court be corrected
and the said court directed to revoke the sale.
Without deciding the legality or illegality of the sale, or whether this matter should be ventillated in an ordinary
action instead of in a proceeding for certiorari, it is evident that appeal and not certiorari or mandamus is the
proper remedy. Unquestionably, the court of first instance in which the guardianship proceedings were pending
had jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. The court's jurisdiction is not disputed. Nor was there an abuse of
discretion, judging from the averments in the answers. It appears that the outstanding indebtedness of the
guardianship properly and legally incurred amounted to P36,833.66, part of which was due the petitioner for the
support and maintenance of the incapacitated.
The petitioner insist that she is next of kin. She is in error. "Next of kin" within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives
whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. (33 C.J., 930-931.) "Next of
kin" is also defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., as to mean not the next of kindred but those relatives who
share in the estate according to the statute of distribution including those claiming per stripes or by
representation.
None of the children of the incapacitated is or was opposed to the sale sought to be set aside. Only these had an
interest in the land of their father, besides the creditors, and only they or the creditors who may have been
prejudiced by the sale have a right to object thereto.
_________________________________
G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,
vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Parañaque City, Branch 260;
and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.
FACTS:
[O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed before [the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City]
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom [Joycelyn]
allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddler’s Discovery Center in
Parañaque City) when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early February 2002[.] x x x [O]n April 2,
2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort] heard the ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. x x x
[B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms.
Page 8 of 22
Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x x Judge; x x x documentary evidence [was] also presented[.] x x x [O]n April
3, 2002, x x x [the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly read x x x:
‘x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that [Joycelyn] took their minor child with her to
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Parañaque City.
Despite effort[s] exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the child are at present staying with
the former’s step-father at the latter’s [residence] at Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
‘Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct
surveillance on [Joycelyn] and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relations with one Noreen
Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
‘The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated
that [the mother] does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she
saw [Joycelyn] slapping the child.
the Court hereby awards custody of the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto Rafaelito
G. Gualberto V.
First issue:
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyn’s Petition by mail is governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, which we quote:
"SEC. 3. Manner of filing. – The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other
papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such personally to the clerk of
court or by sending them by registered mail. xxx In the second case, the date of mailing of motions, pleadings and
other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt,
shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
records of the case.
"x x x x x x x x x
"SEC. 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed
envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known,
with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10)
days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender of the addressee, service
may be done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CA’s August 30, 2002 Decision on September 9, 2002. On
September 17, she filed before this Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. This Motion was granted,11 and the deadline was thus extended until October 24, 2002.
A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of the Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties by
registered mail12 at the Biñan, Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is the date clearly stamped on the
face of the envelope13 and attested to in the Affidavit of Service14 accompanying the Petition. Petitioner Joycelyn
explained that the filing and the service had been made by registered mail due to the "volume of delivery
assignments and the lack of a regular messenger."15
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been filed on October 24, 2002, its mailing date as shown by the
post office stamp on the envelope. The last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of the Rules provides that the date of
filing may be shown either by the post office stamp on the envelope or by the registry receipt. Proof of its filing,
on the other hand, is shown by the existence of the petition in the record, pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 13.16
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88, which shows the date November 2, 2002, merely
discloses when the mail matters received by the Biñan Post Office on October 24, 2002, were dispatched or sent
to the Central Mail Exchange for distribution to their final destinations.17 The Registry Bill does not reflect the
actual mailing date. Instead, it is the postal Registration Book18 that shows the list of mail matters that have been
registered for mailing on a particular day, along with the names of the senders and the addressees. That book
shows that Registry Receipt Nos. 2832-A and 2832-B, pertaining to the mailed matters for the Supreme Court,
were issued on October 24, 2002.
Page 9 of 22
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often
over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody
pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years old.30 On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on
Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues
that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be awarded custody of the
child.
Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise."
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the
custody of their child.32 Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure."(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison
d’etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care.33 In explaining the rationale for Article
363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus:
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from
her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception
allowed by the rule has to be for ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare,
if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment
and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction
will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603).34
Article 17 of the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the child’s custody under various circumstances,
specifically in case the parents are separated. It clearly mandates that "no child under five years of age shall be
separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so." The provision is reproduced in its
entirety as follows:
"Ar t. 17. Joint Parental Authority. – The father and the mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental
authority and responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the father’s
decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
"In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise
parental authority over such children, unless in case of the surviving parent’s remarriage, the court for justifiable
reasons, appoints another person as guardian.
"In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to do so." (Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the
language of these provisions that Article 21135 was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article 17;
Article 212,36 from the second sentence; and Article 213,37 save for a few additions, from the third sentence. It
should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child below seven
years should not be separated from the mother.38
Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code
Page 10 of 22
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,39 the Court held that the use of "shall" in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the
observations made by the Code Commission underscore the mandatory character of the word.40 Holding in that
case that it was a mistake to deprive the mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of seven,
the Court stressed:
"[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless
such a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court."41
In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 642 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
has been held to connote a mandatory character.43 Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in
which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal
separation or a de facto separation.44 In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."45
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that
in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount
consideration.46 Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing
on the children’s well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social
situations of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend
to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.47 Among these factors are the previous
care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home
environment and time availability; as well as the children’s emotional and educational needs
Tender-Age Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in
awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be
ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.48
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.49
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute
a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.50
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact
that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her
minor child.51 To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had
an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.52
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,53 wherein the mother was openly living with her brother-
in-law, the child’s uncle. Under that circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nine-year-old child’s best interest
to free her "from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which the mother
ha[d] placed herself might create in [the child’s] moral and social outlook."54
In Espiritu v. CA,55 the Court took into account psychological and case study reports on the child, whose feelings
of insecurity and anxiety had been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child
revealed, among other things, that the latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother hugging and kissing a ‘bad’
man who lived in their house and worked for her father." The Court held that the "illicit or immoral activities of
Page 11 of 22
the mother had already caused the child emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values x x x."
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a
lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex
in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such
a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order
that she had found the "reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling"56 as to suffice as a ground for separating
the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of them, both in the
courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him
firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the child’s behavior in the presence of
each parent, should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has
been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus and Preliminary Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and
the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus may
be issued only when the "rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,"57 a
situation that does not apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because
Crisanto’s right to custody has not been proven to be "clear and unmistakable."58 Unlike an ordinary preliminary
injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond the maintenance of the status quo.59 Besides, such an
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been decided on its merits.60
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254 is
DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda
L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the
other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March
25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the
father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition docketed as Special
Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to
sell the same (Annex B). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of
her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She
signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also
alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several
hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically
Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
Page 12 of 22
The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex C) finding the petition
in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991.
The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her
two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.
On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex D), finding that
it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the
petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code.
WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated and unable to participate in the
administration of conjugal properties;
2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties;
and
3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and
covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings
standing thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32
in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been
rendered on the case by public respondent.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all
its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced
by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991,
Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale on the
grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of the
petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege
that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the decision in
Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex I). The
case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex M) denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration and approving respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said
court ruled that:
After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well
as its supplements filed by oppositor, Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and
so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has
properly observed the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in
rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that oppositor Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the
personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition,
belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
Page 13 of 22
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed decision and ordering
the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.[5]
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[6] however, on March 29, 1993, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision.[7]
ISSSUE:
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke,
a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage
their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under
Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve
million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter
and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable
to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the
proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent,
under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for
judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a).
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings
under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of
stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct.[9] In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's
administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.[10]
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must
observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the
trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show
cause why the petition should not be granted.
Page 14 of 22
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the
trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due
process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.[11]
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.[12] A
decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard.[13] A
void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action,
or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.[14]
______________________________________
FIRST DIVISION
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470
MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-
SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-
VILLA ABRILLE[1] and NATIVIDAD Present:
CRUZ-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ.
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
x---------------------x
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 169217
MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-
SAGUN and TERESA C.
HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE,
Petitioners,
-versus-
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,[2]
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 7, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and
Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's
death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C.
Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties
from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).
Page 15 of 22
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying
at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached
Grade 5.
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.[3] Nevertheless, because Lulu
did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties.
Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various
projects involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an
undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.[4] In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-
hectare Montalban, Rizal property[5] was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney[6] (SPA)
believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly
authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.[7] Thereafter,
Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete
Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos,
after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in
the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her
food and medication.
Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out
that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not
been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent
brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis,
rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.[8]
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.[9]
However, the demand was ignored.
On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate
because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her
health.[11] Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,[12]
she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity).
Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and
fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001,[13] the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental
condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared
Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million
bond.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure Lulus
P50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.[14] The motion, however, was denied.[15]
On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).[16]
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.
On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the
petition for guardianship) in toto.[17] Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.[18]
Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two
housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina
apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER)
division of the Philippine National Police.
Page 16 of 22
The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite
their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform
them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.[19]
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in the CA alleging that petitioners
abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was
entitled to her custody. [21]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12,
2005.[22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was
consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
ISSUE:
The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment
of a judicial guardian over her person and property.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity
of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.[27] Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with
her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.[28] The observations of the
trial judge coupled with evidence[29] establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.[30] Here, the
trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,[31] persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without
outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the
CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her
ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a
reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of
questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.[32] We thus adopt the factual
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of
respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.[33] We therefore affirm her appointment as such.
Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.[34]
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody
of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.[35] Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-
bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu.
Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.[36]
 CASE DIGEST ON ADOPTION CASES
FIRST DIVISION
IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93
Page 17 of 22
ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM, Present:
MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
Petitioner. CARPIO,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.
ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE
P. LIM,
Promulgated:
MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner. May 21, 2009
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo
Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She
was born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date
of birth is 1 August 1983.[4]
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive
schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No.
8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.[7]
Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioners husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.[10] The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.[11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried,
can singly adopt.
Page 18 of 22
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of
RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular
office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Page 19 of 22
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country
as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.[13] The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.[14] Even the remarriage of the
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person
to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.[15]
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
years of age[16] emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.[17] However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known;
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.[18] Therefore, even
if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights[19] of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled[20] such as support[21] and successional rights.[22]
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
[G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL
ROBER;T DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
FACTS
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City[1] to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger
siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided
Page 20 of 22
at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They
have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin
and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.[2] Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded
the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and
fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law
would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.[3] The
court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral
character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not
qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Spouses Dye are qualified to adopt when the one of the adopters is an ailien and the other is
a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt the latter’s relatives – sibligns
HELD:
The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code
which states:
"Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law."
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors
Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the
law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt
his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed,
thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married
to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an
exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own. Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband
and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained
the Civil Code provision[4] that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by
scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code
provides:
"Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's
child but her brother and sister.
Page 21 of 22
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien husband with a former Filipino
wife seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.[5] Although the
wife in said case was qualified to adopt under Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks
to adopt a relative by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under Article 185 because he
was an alien ineligible to adopt here in the Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of children.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose.[6]
The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.[7] Regrettably, the Court is not
in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that
the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.
Page 22 of 22

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Julie Tanya Pimentel-Lanzar SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS THURS 7-9 February 01, 2018

 COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS

i. As to the facts of the case

ii. As to the issues

II. CASE DIGEST OF GUARDIANSHIP CASES

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,

G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 151243

1. Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata

As to the first issue, Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no

G.R. No. L-3071 May 29, 1950

SALVACION LOPEZ, petitioner,

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,

CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.

G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,

Timeliness of the Petition

Custody of a Minor Child

Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides:

Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code

The Best Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration

No Grant of Habeas Corpus and Preliminary Injunction

[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470

MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-

SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-

VILLA ABRILLE[1] and NATIVIDAD Present:

Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 169217

MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-

SAGUN and TERESA C.

JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,[2]

Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.

We find the petition to be without merit.

 CASE DIGEST ON ADOPTION CASES

IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93

MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.

ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE

Petitioner. May 21, 2009

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Hence, the present petition.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

[G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997]

"Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

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