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Cerberus Protection Concept
Cerberus Protection Concept
Protection concept
Introduction
This brochure is intended as a guideline for the project engineer and should help to de-
sign protection concepts for any type of premises. It can by no means replace a proper
risk analysis, but it can help to find a quick solution where time for a thorough analysis is
not available.
The brochure provides a number of PARTIAL CONCEPTS which can be put together like
the pieces of a puzzle. The peculiarity is, that this puzzle will never quite fit. Every project
is unique and has to be treated as such, in order to avoid weak spots in the concept. The
gaps between the prefabricated puzzle pieces will have to be filled individually and the
pieces themselves will eventually have to be modified to fulfill their purpose correctly.
These partial concepts can be considered as the building blocks used to construct a
house. They hold together only by the mortar that is put in between, and they sometimes
have to be shaped to purpose. Sometimes specially made elements are required where
the prefab blocks are insufficient.
The partial concepts provided in this brochure are no more and no less than a collection of
ideas. For each particular case, the applicable items must be picked out and eventually
be supplemented by additional measures.
This brochure comes in two volumes : Volume 1 contains basic knowledge. Volume 2
provides tha actual partial concepts. Please note that the brochure makes some as-
sumptions which cover the majority of applications. However, to avoid pitfalls by not rec-
ognizing the exceptional case, there is a prerequisite:
– You should be familiar with the generalities of security planning which are treated in
other documents of the CRP. The chapter ” THE WAY TO THE PROTECTION CON-
CEPT ” in this brochure provides an overview of this process.
There is no such thing as ” the typical museum ” or the ” typical threat situation ”, every
project is an individual. Therefore it is not possible to make standard concepts for banks,
hotels etc. What is possible, however, is to standardize partial concepts which can be put
together like a mosaic.
– To learn how to assemble this mosaic, read the chapter ” HOW TO ASSEMBLE THE
PUZZLE THAT NEVER FITS ”.
You will find the pieces of that puzzle in Volume 2 ” PARTIAL CONCEPTS ”.
Now, when this has set you on the right road and you’re in the middle of your work,
– never forget that the these partial concepts can only cover some prevalent threats
and risks. Others might be present which must be recognized and considered.
– For each particular case, the applicable items must be picked out and possibly be
supplemented by additional measures.
It is very easy to forget little details which can be very important for security.
AVOID PITFALLS,
THINK
!!!
Corporate Corporate
objectives operations
Risk
examination
Risk evaluation
(Acceptability of risks)
Laying–down of priori–
SECURITY ties for dealing with
PLANNING the risk
Increased Protection
risks requirements
Protection concept /
Protection plan
RISK
REDUCTION Protection realized
ETC.
GAS
TECH.HAZARDS
FIRE
INTRUSION
COUNTER OPERATION
OPERATIVE INFOR–
SITUATION MEASURES TRAINING
MEASURES MATION
In the present context, it is assumed that the global security objectives are established
and available. Sometimes, the risk analysis has also already been done and the priorities
set. If not, it is of the utmost importance to do this now.
Risk analysis is a very complex and demanding matter which can not be treated in suffi-
cient detail in the context of this brochure. Literature is available about the subject and
should be consulted extensively. The following very brief outline should help to under-
stand the subsequent chapters:
The first thing to do is therefore the definition and qualification of the assets to be pro-
tected, noting also their geographical location within the premises. The EFFECT in case
of loss or damage should be estimated and quantified.
The next thing will be the assessment of possible THREATS and their probabilities. This
is an extremely difficult task, since we cannot normally know who will attack at which time
and with what kind of equipment. Since knowledge of the expected threat is crucial to
define the necessary countermeasures, we must at least try to make a good guess.
The local criminal and political situation should be given consideration and the exposure
of the enterprise (politically and geographically) should be estimated. This will give at
least certain clues about possible aggressors. We must try to get an idea about their mo-
tives, mentality, group size, equipment and training, since this will considerably influence
the selection of protection equipment.
With the above knowledge it is now possible to estimate the RISKS. It has become possi-
ble to define risk levels and assign priorities.
DISASTER TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE
MAJOR RISK
MEDIUM RISK TO BE
DETERMINED
SMALL RISK
ACCEPTABLE
MINOR RISK
Risk evaluation
GLOBAL
OBJECTIVES
SUMMARY
RISK RECOGNITION
AND
ASSESSMENT RISK MATRIX
RISK EVALUATION
(ACCEPTABILITY)
DETAILED OBJECTIVES
PRIORITIES
FOR
RISK REDUCTION
PRIORITY LIST
SECURITY
PLANNING
RISK REGULATIONS
REDUCTION
LEAKS,WEAK POINTS OPERATIONAL REQUIREM.
EXISTING SHIELDS ACCESSABILITIES
EXISTING BARRIERS POSSIBILITY FOR
INTERVENTION
PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS,
SECURITY ANALYSIS
MEASURES
SYSTEM CONCEPT
ZONING
PROTECTION
CONCEPT /
PLAN
Zoning scheme
(Example)
OWNER PROTECTED
CONTROLLED
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
HIGH SECURITY
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ SI
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
A A
CP
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
O
SI
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ A+
LEGAL DEMARCATION
BARRIER + DETECTION
ÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊ STRONG BARRIER (DELAY)
CP CHECKPOINT
O CONTROLLED ENTRY
PERMANENT SURVEILLANCE
BARRIERS
SHIELDS
THREAT,
ACTION EFFECT
LIKELIHOOD
PROTECTION
PLANS
MEASURES
REQUIRE–
MENTS
OBJECTIVES
RISKS
Given enough time, any physical or electronic protection can be penetrated. And the best
electronic burglar detection brings nothing if not backed up by the necessary physical
protection in order to delay the intruder until intervention can arrive.
It is therefore obvious, that a good level of security can only be obtained by striking a care-
ful balance between physical and electronic protection. But there are also strong eco-
nomic reasons to match the two types of protection, because only this way the available
money can be applied optimally.
Although this is no substitute for careful detailed planning, categorizing physical and
electronic protection can provide some help to achieve a well balanced concept. The fol-
lowing chapter provides one such categorizing scheme which has proved its practical
value in many cases.
Hinder
– simple, forced
access to protected
assets
Burglary Theft
10
Burglary Theft
Alarm
or CMS
11
Burglary Theft
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
Alarm
CMS
12
Burglary
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
Alarm
Intervention force
13
In the ideal case, physical and electronic protection categories should match. If either
type of protection cannot be implemented as desired, e.g. because an existing building
cannot accommodate the required modifications to its structure, this lack can to some
extent be compensated for by additional means in the other type. (As an example this
could be faster, more comprehensive electronic detection as compensation for a wall
which can not be reinforced as necessary.)
In any case, proper application of this principle leads automatically to a zoning scheme
with protection categories increasing from the outside of the protected premises towards
the object to be protected. This confirms the principle stated in the chapter ” Security
Planning ”.
Cat.1 Cat.1
Cat.2
Cat.2
Area or object to
be protected
Cat.3
Cat.2
Cat.2
Cat.1
Cat.0
14
A Perimeter surveillance
B Peripheral surveillance
C
C Volumetric surveillance
D
D Object surveillance
B
E
E Holdup alarm
F Access control
C
C
Objective:
Report intrusion into surrounding premises.
15
Objective:
Report an attack on the periphery of a building
Objective:
Report movement within a room
– Simple installation
16
Objective:
Report movement within certain areas of a room
Objective:
Report attack on individual objects
17
Objectives:
Silent or audible alarm in case of a threat
Visual recording of the threat
Objectives:
Restrict access to certain areas to certain persons at certain times
18
Before security planning can begin, the Security Policy must have been established
(usually by the owner of the premises to be protected or by his security consultant). This
provides the Global Objectives. If these are not available, we have to gather the neces-
sary information direct. If there is no time (no money) available to make a thorough analy-
sis, this can also be done in a quick and simple way. There is only one question we have to
answer:
The answers to the first WHAT can fill many pages. They will inform us about the type,
location, size and value of the objects to be protected, about existing security elements,
operational requirements, accessibilities, intervention possibilities etc., etc. If in any way
possible, this should include plans of the premises and it is very helpful to have photos of
the most sensitive areas.
But even more important are the answers to the second WHAT: What is the threat?
These are very often hard to get. Frequently we have to make ”educated guesses” based
on our own knowledge of the local level of criminality, the exposure of the premises and
probably some previous attacks to that particular customer’s premises.
A checklist can be a great help to assemble this data, but be aware that no checklist can
ever be complete. Use it as a guideline only and supplement it with your own ideas.
The most sensible thing to do now, is to take the overall plans and mark them with a secu-
rity zoning scheme. Ideally, these zones should be concentric, with the highest security
zone being the innermost. This way every outer zone provides protection (obstacles for
the intruder) for the inner ones. If you do this three dimensionally (or as a series of over-
lays for the different floors) you will be able to pinpoint inter–floor weak spots (zone
boundaries jumping more than one zone level per partition).
Since the security level is bound to increase from an outward lying public area towards
the innermost zone with the highest security requirements, one possible guidance for
creating the zoning scheme are the protection categories explained in earlier chapters.
19
Cat.1 Cat.1
Cat.2
Cat.2
Area or object to
be protected
Cat.3
Cat.2
Cat.2
Cat.1
Cat.0
For every zone the protection category increases by one. A minimum of three security
zones is recommended.
Of course your zoning scheme should later also consider the boundaries of your partial
concepts, but it may also be necessary to modify the partial concepts to fit the zoning !
This will be dealt with in step 5.
The only direct equivalent you would find, is the DATA PROCESSING. But the VAULT
concept might give you some ideas about how to protect the dangerous materials storage
and the MANAGEMENT FLOOR concept could help for protection of the development
offices.
20
etc.
PROTECTION CONCEPT
Private Residence
Military etc.
Data Processing Cashiers
Museum Shops
Bank Vault
– Vault VIP Office
– Cashiers Warehouse
– Data processing
Data Processing partial concepts
– VIP Office
SYSTEMS CONCEPT
The sensible thing to do, is to select the closest fit and adapt it to the actual situation. This
is the next step. But what, if there is none which would at least partially fit ? For that part
you will have to start from scratch and build your own partial concept. Of course you will
use the same structure as you find in the existing ones. This is described in the next chap-
ter.
– First comes a typical floor plan marked with a typical arrangement of detectors. You
will of course have to replace this with the actual plan of your project, a copy of which
you should attach if you use the concept sheet as a working tool.
21
Technical plant
Computer room
VIP Office
Archive
Entry checkpoint
22
When this is done and you have marked the plans with the necessary details, you can
start ”to put the mortar between the tiles”, i.e. to fill the gaps with the necessary security
items which are not yet included in the partial concepts (additional detectors, cameras,
security windows, insurance policies etc.). Of course this work should follow the same red
line as you have by now experienced using the partial concepts. There are no fixed rules
for this. Try to be smarter than the expected intruder, and use a lot of common sense.
THINK !
At the end, if there remains time, it is a good thing to edit an overall concept as a summary
of the partial ones. This has two advantages:
– First of all, it gives you a chance to think things over, to simplify and standardize. If you
find your partial concepts to differ too much, re–edit them and find a common line. The
simpler the solution, the better it will be, because it will be easier to understand and to
handle.
– The second benefit is, that you have something to give to the customer which proves
that you have tried to solve his problem and not only to sell him a system. Again: The
simpler the solution, the easier to understand and the better the chances that the cu-
stomer will buy.
This is worth while. You might find weak spots you have overlooked before, but this is not
the main reason for it. The actual problem is, that intruders, like everybody else, always
go the easiest way.
With your protection concept you have put up some obstacles. This means that you have
eliminated the old weak spots, but new ones have appeared now that formerly were not
there.
It is very important to achieve a uniform level of protection. If the intruder does not
know where to attack because no spot is weaker than the others, he will most probably
not attack at all and look for an easier target. Moreover this also results in a uniform, and
therefore most economic, application of the available funds.
23
The result of steps 1...6 is the protection concept. Nothing has been determined so far as
to types of detectors and their application. Neither have control units, or their operating
concept been touched. These are the topics documented under the title ”Systems Con-
cept” in the CRP. They closely tie the concept to specific features of a certain hardware.
There are, however, interactions between the features of the hardware and the protection
concept which should be kept in mind. This is of special importance, if several types of
systems must be integrated, like CCTV, Fire Detection, Access Control etc. The diagram
below gives an overview of the entire planning process. Never forget, that the weakest
link determines the strength of the entire chain!
There is a very close relation between protection concept and systems concept. The pro-
tection concept can stand alone, but the systems concept must always be based on the
protection concept. Both concepts together should accompany any proposal to a cus-
tomer, so that he is able to see how we intend to solve his security problem.
24
etc. etc.
SYSTEMS CONCEPT
Access Control Seismic detectors
Holdup US detectors
Object PIR detectors CCTV
Volumetric Surv.contact Access control
Periphery – electromech. Intrusion
Perimeter – magnetic control unit Accessories
– Surveill. Contact etc. Alarm Devices
– Fence Detection IR Barriers Op. Terminal
Fence Detection Control Unit
appl. rules
– Microph.Cable
– Vibr.Detectors
– Cut through
Installation
Wiring
INSTALLATION CONCEPT
Location
Comm.Report COMMISSIONING
User Training
Proj. File
Tests
– Wiring
– Detectors
– Cntl Unit
– Alarms
Maint.rules MAINTENANCE
Maintenance
contract
25
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Siemens Buildingno.
Document Technologies
e003009b Manual Back
CRPI
Fire & Security Products 07.2002
Edition 07.2002 Section 4