BELGICA vs.

OCHOA, JR (Executive Secretary)

November 19, 2013 || PERLAS-BERNABE, J
FACTS
· These are consolidated petitions which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System
Pork Barrel System – an appropriation of gov’t spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district
- 1982, under the General Appropriations Act (GAA), Support for Local Development Authorities (SLDP), the
practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began
- 1990 GAA created the Countrywide Development Fund ‘2.3B for small local infrastructure & community
projects’ however the CDF was removed from GAA in 1999
- 2000, Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA, which required prior
consultation with respective District Representative before PDAF funds were released, which allowed for
realignment of funds to any expense category
- 2002 PDAF Article ordered release of funds directly to the implementing agency or LGU concerned without
further qualifications
- 2005 PDAF provided that it shall be used to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of
Nat’l gov’t and introduced the Program Menu Concept, which is a list of general programs from which a
particular PDAF project may be chosen by the identifying authority
- 2010 PDAF allowed for realignment of funds, so as long as it is within the same implementing unit and
project category, and request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned
- 2012 PDAF states that identification of projects and designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, but it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from said list
- 2013 PDAF now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies, and legislators were allowed to
identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district, and all realignment of funds and revisions were
required to be favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriation and Senate Committee on Finance
· July 2013 NBI began its investigation into allegations by sworn affidavits of 6 whistle-blowers that Janet
Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from public coffers for “ghost projects” using no less than 20
dummy NGOs
August 2013 Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a 3-year audit investigation which showed that
(1) the total releases amounting to Php8.3B for PDAF, (2) amounts released for projects significantly exceeded
allocations, (3) amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts, (4) infrastructure projects
were constructed on private lots without turnover to gov’t, (5) significant amounts were released without gov’t
endorsement, (6) funds were transferred to NGOs without any appropriation law or ordinance, (7) and selection
of NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations
· *Samson Alcantara, President of Social Justice Society filed a petition seeking to declare “Pork Barrel
System” unconstitutional and sought to permanently restrain the Senate President, Speaker of House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for “Pork Barrel System”
*Belgica Petition also sought the same, furthermore praying for Court to order that respondents release the
complete schedule/list of legislators who availed of PDAF from 2003 to 2013
*Nepomuceno also filed a petition seeking the same but that a cease and desist be ordered restraining President
Noynoy Aquino and Secretary Abad from releasing funds to Members of Congress

ISSUE/S
W/N there exists an actual case or controversy – YES
W/N there was a violation of the principle of separation of powers – YES
W/N there was a violation of non-delegability of legislative powers – YES
W/N PDAF renders useless the President’s power of item veto – YES
W/N PDAF violates the principle of local autonomy – YES

HOLDING
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Entire 2013 PDAF Article, all provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, previous PDAF and
CDF, all informal practices of similar import and effect, as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Temporary injunction is declared PERMANENT, prohibiting the disbursement/release of remaining PDAF funds for
2013 and all those concerned ENJOINED
RATIO
1. Yes, because there is an alleged violation of the Constitution with respect to separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability, and local autonomy. And also because it
is a matter of public interest and the preparation and passage of a national budget is an affair of annual
occurrence, and the Court finds the CoA Reports to be sufficient in validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy. Lastly, there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality.
2. The PDAF grants legislators the post-enactment authority in areas of fund release and realignment, and to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. These post-
enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight and allow legislators to intervene or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Informal practices through which
legislators have effectively intruded into proper phases of budget execution are deemed as acts of grave abuse
of discretion.
3. 2013 PDAF confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators and violates the
principle of non-delegability since legislators were effectively allowed to individually exercise power of
appropriation, by being given a personal lump-sum and the freedom to decide how much would go to a specific
project or beneficiary which they themselves may determine.
4. President’s veto power (ART 6, SEC 27) “have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the items to which he does not object”. The
PDAF system where there is a lump-sum appropriation, legislator’s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA, denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. The item veto power of the
President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting and Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which renders the constitutionally-granted power of the President useless. This fosters a “budget
within a budget” and subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and impairs President’s power of item
veto. It forces the President to either (1) accept the entire P24Billion PDAF allocation without knowing specific
projects of the legislators
(2) reject the whole PDAF to the detriment of legislators with legitimate projects
5. PDAF allows for district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development. Insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and subvert genuine local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely
on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.