3) RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-accused Velasco is guilty of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
483 SCRA 649
February 28, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning, private
complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his
owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan
City when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo
Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant
and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The
accused missed with his first shot but the second one hit the
complainant in the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the
ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the accused
continued firing at him but missed.
Accused-petitioner Rodolfo C. Velasco was convicted of Attempted
Murder. According to the Information filed against him, the
complainant-accused Velasco, being then armed with a gun, with
treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon Frederick Maramba by shooting him, hitting him on
the left upper arm, the said accused having thus commenced a
felony directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of murder, by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, to the damage and prejudice of complainant
Maramba.
Velasco alleged that he must not be convicted of attempted
murder but only attempted homicide as there was no treachery
since private complainant was still able to observe or focus his
eyes on him for a period of 10 seconds until he drew his .45
caliber pistol and fired at Maramba. After the first shot, the victim
was able to run away.
attempted murder.
HELD: YES. Velasco is guilty of attempted murder.
In accordance with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, Velasco’s
acts, having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing
to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by
reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
constitute an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his
attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private
complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant
sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause
his death. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on
the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts
of execution that would have brought about death.
Petitioner’s asserted that he has no motive to harm, much less kill
the latter, he being a total strange. Motive is not an element of
the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. Even in the
absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive
is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the
identity of the culprit. Motive assumes significance only where
there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. In
the case at bar, since petitioner has been positively identified as
the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of consequence.
4) NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
559 SCRA 461, 473
July 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three daughters,
Marianne, Mary Ann married with petitioner-accused Nover Bryan
Salvador and the victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the
petitioner herein. They all live together at 550 Coloong
I, Valenzuela City. Their residence had three bedrooms one for
the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and Arlene; and the
last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with
Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of Ernesto’s
mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene,
stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner Salvador, at that time,
asked permission to attend a birthday party. At about 9:00 in the
evening, Salvador, accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned
home to get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday
party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed there
until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and
Marianne arrived home. Marianne proceeded to the room which
she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered
stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlene’s body, the Zuiga
spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While
Mary Ann proceeded to Arlene’s room, petitioner stayed at
the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and
telling her that he was innocent.
The police found no forcible entry into the house; no valuables
were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house
except Arlene’s room. They likewise discovered, on top of the
kitchen table, petitioners underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and
short pants. They further found hair strands on Arlenes
bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for
examination. It was found that Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds
produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was sharp
like a balisong or a kitchen knife.
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide on the basis of the
evidences: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the scene
of the crime; 2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence
of bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room; 4)
petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in
stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type O human blood on
petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive result of the DNA
analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners shirt and briefs;
and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after the discovery of the
victims lifeless body.
Petitioner questions the sufficiency of each and every
circumstance enumerated above and denied such accusations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Salvador is guilty of
homicide.
HELD:
YES. Salvador is guilty of homicide.
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules
of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felonies free and
deny proper protection to the community.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
All the circumstances must be consistent with one another
that the accused is guilty. Thus, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Thus, in the
present case, all circumstantial evidences were proved against the
accused and such can conclude the guilt of the accused Salvador.
Ill motive was shown by petitioners previous act of peeping
through the bathroom and Arlene’s room on two occasions while
she was taking a bath and while she was inside the room with
Marianne.
More importantly, intent to kill was duly established by the
witnesses when they testified relative to the peeping
incident. Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual
advances, such incident manifested petitioners evil motive. It is a
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred. Motive and intent may be considered one and the same,
in some instances, as in the present case.
7) EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
485 SCRA 331
March 24, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On the late night of October 18, 1996, petitioner-accused SPO2
Eduardo Baxinela was in Superstar Disco Pub was already drinking
with INSP. Regimen and SPO4 Legarda. After witnessing an
altercation between SGT Ruperto Lajo and another customer, on
Lajo’s way out, Baxinela decided to confront him. Baxinela
approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left
shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service
firearm with the other and accosted Lajo why he had in his
possession a firearm Lajo respond "I am a MIG, Pare". Then,
when Lajo was about to get his wallet on his back pocket for his
ID, SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela anticipated that the victim was
drawing his firearm on his waist prompting said policeman to
shoot the victim. Baxinela then got a gun from Lajo’s waist and
handed it over to Regimen. Afterwards Baxinela held both of
Lajo’s arms, who was still standing, and pushed him against the
wall and repeated his question. Lajo answered "Why did you
shoot me? I am also a military." At this point Lajo got out his
wallet and gave it to Baxinela. Baxinela opened the wallet and
looked at an ID. Afterwards Baxinela and Regimen just left and
did nothing to aid Lajo. Lajo was pronounced dead due to
cardiopulmonary arrest and severe bleeding caused by the
gunshot wound.
On defense, Baxinela alleged that he, together with Regimen,
proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in response to the
information given by Romy Manuba that there was an armed
drunken man creating trouble inside the pub. He introduced
himself as a policeman and asked the man why he had a gun with
him. The man did not respond and, instead, suddenly drew out
his gun. Baxinela then drew his sidearm and was able to fire first,
hitting the man on his upper left arm, critically wounding him.
When the man fell down, Baxinela took his gun and wallet and
handed them over to Regimen. Regimen then stated that he
enlisted the services of the pub’s security guard to bring the
wounded man to the hospital. Thereafter, Baxinela and Regimen
went to the Kalibo Police Station to report the incident and turned
over the wallet. Next, they proceeded to Camp Pastor Martelino
and also reported the incident to Col. Bianson.
The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the
prosecution’s version of what happened, Baxinela can claim the
justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of a duty
or lawful exercise of a right or office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Baxinela can claim the
justifying circumstances of self defense or in the alternative the
lawful performance of official duty under Article 11, paragraphs 1
and 5, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No. Baxinela cannot claim the justifying circumstances of self-
defense or the lawful performance of official duty under the
Revised Penal Code, Article 11.
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent
and repel and aggression. By invoking self-defense, Baxinela, in
effect, admits killing Lajo, thus shifting upon him the burden of
the evidence on these elements.
The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense.
It is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete. On this requisite alone,
Baxinela’s defense fails. Unlawful aggression contemplates an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a
person or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack must be real, or at
least imminent. Mere belief by a person of an impending attack
would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there was no
imminent threat that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment.
Just before Baxinela shot Lajo, the former was safely behind the
victim and holding his arm. It was Lajo who was at a
disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the aggressor
when he grabbed Lajo’s shoulder and started questioning him.
And when Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just turning
around to face Baxinela and, quite possibly, reaching for his
wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed as
unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo.
Next, we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty.
In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown
that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or
office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly
lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo
had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was
what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the
entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to
take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo
who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be
considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed
no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the
pub.
In the present case, the Court finds that there was negligence on
the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was simply turning
around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he identified
himself saying "I am MIG." These circumstances alone would not
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that Baxinela’s
life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting Lajo, to the mind of this
Court, constitutes clear negligence. But even if the Court assumes
that Lajo’s actions were aggressive enough to appear that he was
going for his gun, there were a number of procedures that could
have been followed in order to avoid a confrontation and take
control of the situation. The events inside the disco pub that
unnecessarily cost the life of Lajo did not have to happen had
Baxinela not been negligent in performing his duty as a police
officer.
8) ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, vs
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
482 SCRA 44
February 9, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim
Philip Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in
Crossing Capsay,Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. On their way home,
they crossed paths with petitioner-accused Rollie Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge
against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible
for throwing stones at the Cantres house on a previous
night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly
punched him. While Bulalacao ran away,
petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of
victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked
up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at
victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by
the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his
back. Witness Saano put himself between the victim Cantre and
petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even
convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was
already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and
petitioner Calimutanto just go home. Witness Saano accompanied
victim Cantre to the latters house, and on the way,
victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit
by the stone.They arrived at the Cantre’s house at
around 12:00 noon, and witness Saano left victim Cantre to the
care of the latters mother, Belen.
Calimutan opposed to such testimony alleging that
Cantre refused to calm down at that time and pulled out from his
waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was
looking for trouble, either to kill or be killed. At that point,
petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the
victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear
that the enraged man would turn on him. When he saw that the
victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao,
petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the
victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right
buttock.
A day after, Victim Cantre died. According to his
exhumation and autopsy report conducted by Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez, it was due to internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
lacerated spleen which can be caused by any blunt instrument,
such as a stone. Before such autopsy, victim Cantre was also
examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer
of Aroroy, Masbate and the Post-Mortem Examination Report
stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-
respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning which cannot
be given much weight because there was no showing that further
laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm such suspicion.
 Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had
happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident and knew
that Cantre died the following the day because of food
poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no
personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning
incident.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner-accused Calimutan can be held
criminally liable.
2. Whether or not Calimutan is guilty of an intentional crime
of Homicide.
HELD:
1. YES. Calimutan can be held criminally liable.
In accordance with Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code stating
“Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended,” thus, the accused is criminally liable for
all the direct and natural consequences of the unlawful act even if
the ultimate result had not been intended.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was
able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the
victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. Other than being
stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when
the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument
which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
2. NO. Calimutan is not guilty of intentional crime of
homicide but is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to
the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1)
intentional felonies which was done with deliberate intent to
cause injury, and (2) culpable felonies which is unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice
or as stated in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.
In the case at present, petitioner Calimutan cannot be attributed
to any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot
sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional
crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal.
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful
objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act
was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to
consider that a stone the size of a mans fist could inflict
substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own
strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that
he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or
worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
12) SULPICIO INTOD, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
October 21, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between
them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men,
otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner,
Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya
pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and
her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No
one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by
witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the
premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic)
you were not injured".
Intod was convicted of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from
this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable
only for an impossible crime Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code contending that Palangpangan's absence from her room on
the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Intod is guilty of an impossible crime.
HELD: YES. Intod is guilty of an impossible crime.
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and
thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. Under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make
the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime,
there be a motive, desire or expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; intention to perform the physical act; and
performance of the intended physical act.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was
Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally
liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an
accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.
Petitioner is thus guilty of an impossible crime as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree
of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,.