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British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in The Era of Decolonisation The Example of Malaya
British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in The Era of Decolonisation The Example of Malaya
British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in The Era of Decolonisation The Example of Malaya
Karl Hack
To cite this article: Karl Hack (1999) British intelligence and counter‐insurgency in the era of
decolonisation: The example of Malaya, Intelligence and National Security, 14:2, 124-155, DOI:
10.1080/02684529908432542
KARL HACK
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THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
The main success against the communists was, in fact, won before
Templer's arrival (Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free, 1954)n
History will credit Tempter with bringing the real turning point to the
challenge presented by the communist terrorists" (Harry Miller, The Story
of Malaysia, 1965)13
And, Harry Miller14 added, 'hearts and minds' tactics. For the thrust of
mainstream Emergency historiography is that there were two key elements
in turning the tide. Relative emphases vary, but the elements stressed are:
first, Templer's combination of the roles of Director of Operations and High
Commissioner15; second, the impact of 'hearts and minds' tactics. This
historiographical line can be summarized as follows.
After the June 1948 outbreak of the Emergency, Britain initially failed
to take advantage of a situation in which the MCP's support was limited by
inter and infra-communal patterns. On the inter-communal level, the
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) was 90-95 per cent from
immigrant-descended Chinese. The Chinese were in turn only 40 per cent
of Malaya's growing 1950s population of 5-6 million. The Malays,
meanwhile, formed a bulwark against Communism, seeing it as foreign, and
as rooted in a Chinese community they perceived as an economic and
political threat. In terms of intra-communal patterns, many richer Chinese
opposed Communism, and even the majority of the rural Chinese were seen
by the government not as committed Communists or nationalists, but as
'wind-blown' who would 'give verbal allegiance to whoever brings the
greatest pressure to bear upon them'.17
126 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
intensified. New Villages received schools and medical care. For both Short
and Stubbs, then, the Emergency turned in 1952-54 as Templer's reforms,
or hearts and minds measures, gradually became effective.
There is, however, another interpretation, which this article endorses.
This sees the Templer era not as a turning point, but as a period in which
previous gains were consolidated and efficiency maximized. Briggs'
population control approach had already brought the MCP to recognize they
could not win.28 The MCP in its October 1951 Directives had admitted that
it could not defeat resettlement (Mawai was one of only a handful of New
Villages abandoned). This doomed the MCP's military campaign to
dwindle, despite the government's 1951 leadership crisis.29
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insurgencies, that the army and police have each its own modus operandi
and generate and need different types of information.'4 The MIOs
'translated' police into army intelligence, just as interpreters converted
MRLA documents and SEP interrogations, from Mandarin, Hokkien or
other Chinese dialects into English.
With these improvements, the era of Templer, Young, Morton and
Madoc saw a peak in SB efficiency.65 As DOI, Morton even spent many
informal evenings with Templer at King's House in Kuala Lumpur.66 This
period thus saw the solution to a central problem of intelligence in low-
intensity warfare, that of no single authority capable of coordinating all
agencies.67 At the top Templer as Director of Operations, being also High
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The MCP had already suffered serious betrayals to the much-hated wartime
Japanese occupation forces. The root reasons for the scale and nature of these
betrayals included the Malayan Chinese identity as descendants of
immigrants; and many insurgents' personal and economic, rather than
ideological and nationalist, commitment to the revolution.74 Now British
tactics further encouraged surrender, by using air-dropped safe-conduct
passes, and by giving rewards for betraying colleagues. SEP rates rose from
under 5 per cent of the MRLA in 1950, to around 8 per cent in 1953.75
SEP statements eventually enabled British forces to use voice-aircraft
and leaflet drops to address personalized messages to groups in the jungle.76
They also helped match insurgent units with their supporting squatters. An
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MRLA unit and its area could then be subjected to combined food control
and military measures, providing of course that resettlement had already
been carried out.77 Food controls not only blocked MRLA supplies, but gave
New Villagers an 'excuse' to deny the MRLA foodstuffs by saying it was
impossible to buy them, or to get them past checkpoints.78
However, SEP provided insufficient information. Agents - people who
were in current contact with the MRLA — were also needed, who could give
information on future rather than past MRLA plans. To secure agents food
operations were again crucial. Once intensified food denial had forced
insurgents to use up jungle stockpiles, which took up to three months, they
would be compelled to replenish food.79 Some of their suppliers would then
be uncovered as the MRLA came out of the jungle. Recruited as agents they
would provide information with which the MRLA fighters could be
ambushed.80 As the Director of Operations' Report of 1957 put it, 'Such
ambushes are only likely to be possible if the CTs ['Communist Terrorists']
are forced to contact their suppliers in or near villages or their places of
work in order to obtain food or other supplies.'81 Later on, weak spots might
deliberately be created in food operations, as 'honey-pots' into which
MRLA would re-emerge to be ambushed.82
Such operations also played a vital part in neutralizing Communist
counter-intelligence. For agents risked assassination by the MCP, whose
intelligence was strongest among squatters - before and after resettlement -
and in eliminating 'running dogs'(traitors, informants or government
sympathizers). Sometimes the MRLA would execute these in front of their
families, or mutilate their bodies.83 Execution of 'running dogs' was one
reason why about 100 Chinese a month were being murdered by early
1950.84 To counter this, SB might make mass arrests in New Villages at the
beginning of food operations. Previous arrest as one of many might give
cover to those who were to be 'turned', and arrests might cripple the
MRLA's counter-intelligence by removing its best Min Yuen members.85
The increasing level of government control in resettlements was,
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 133
There is a Chinese adage which says 'Rather be the head of a chicken than
the hindquarters of a bull'. (C. C. Too, ex-psychological warfare expert,
New Straits Times, 3 December 1989)92
grip on populated areas. We also know that by November 1951 the MCP
was espousing the idea of a negotiated settlement.'02 The October Directives
could therefore be seen as reflecting international factors, namely: the
stalemate in Korea; the CCP's growing regional authority; the CCP's 'line'
on a broad united front; and the MCP's perception that it had indeed
committed 'left deviation', by relying on too narrow a class base and too
much on violence.103 So were the October Resolutions more a reflection of
changes in the Communist line - emanating from Moscow and Peking -
than of the MCP's assessment of the situation in Malaya?
There are problems with this international perspective. First, veteran ex-
government psychological warfare chief C. C. Too has downplayed the idea
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The evidence on this issue is therefore mixed. On the one hand, there is
no hard evidence that Communist orders or a line were the main cause of
the October Directives. On the other, it would be foolish to ignore the
combined effect of the CCP line and the international context. These both
suggested regional parties needed to prepare for a long haul. For by 1951, a
range of international factors were also working against a continued, high-
level campaign. By this date land reforms and executions in China meant
that - according to a report by the Commissioner-General's office - 'fear of
Communist China now outweighs the feelings of pride and respect ...
formerly excited amongst overseas Chinese'.106 Malaya's geography -
having no border with any country containing significant Chinese or
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Communist forces - also continued to leave the insurgents with little hope
of outside assistance. Finally, the Korean War, where there was a military
stalemate and a start to negotiations by mid-1951 - saw a halt to what had
looked like a 'Red' tide sweeping southward through Asia.
If the degree of CCP and international influence on the origins of the
Directives is thus unclear, its influence on the Directives' outcomes is
murkier still. For in 1951 the MCP was already following Chinese
revolutionary models to some degree. It is therefore not enough to say that
the MCP planned to increase their conformity to Chinese prescriptions for
a broad 'united front'. This still begs additional questions. What practical
measures would be involved, both military and political, in implementing
this policy? Was the desire to increase political work intended as a
consolidation of military success, or a response to support and supply
difficulties? Was it intended to be in addition to, or at the cost of, military
effort? Indeed, references to the Chinese model in the October Directives
anyway suggested this not as an inflexible model, but as providing guides
to analyzing the 'concrete'107 conditions in Malaya and the consequent
actions required. Thus, in order to understand the Directives' origins and
consequences, and to answer the above questions, we must look at the
'concrete', domestic situation in Malaya around October 1951.
only discussed them from September, ironically at the same time as the
Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS).109 Thus as the CIS considered the MCP's
Directives, these were probably already driving the dramatic reduction in
incidents and casualties seen by mid-1952, and were likely to consolidate
these tendencies further. By a final twist, however, the MCP Central
Committee was already so concerned by the resulting loss of initiative that
it issued further instructions in October 1952 - which proved futile - to
increase military activity again."0
How did the Malayan government view the MCP's October 1951 change
in tactics? By late 1951 the Malayan government was arguing that a change
of tactics had been forced on the MCP, partly by the failure of their own
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reputation, rather than allow them to show the tide had turned before his
arrival."7
Less controversially, the CIS report portrayed the MCP's October 1951
change in tactics as a reaction to the maturing of the Briggs Plan and
resettlement. These had 'robbed the MCP of the initiative', resulting in 'a
steadily increasing casualty rate' despite security force casualties falling
dramatically, so that 'The situation clearly called for a drastic revision of
tactics.' Resettlement and food control 'had disrupted the then existent
M.C.P. organisation for the supply of food and intelligence'. As a result the
MCP had been 'forced' into an 'orderly and disciplined' withdrawal, had
changed tactics to increase political and supply work and so 'reduced their
overt activity to a remarkable degree'."8
The above CIS conclusions were echoed by police assessments. A
review of 'The Aim and Strategy of the MCP', in Commissioner of Police
Young's lecture notes for the period (c. 1952-53) argued in the same vein. It
suggested resettlement had pushed the MCP to increase work among
Malays, 'whose importance from the supply point of view had been
enhanced'. The MCP switch to more selective violence was 'because the
reverse policy had alienated mass support'. The Directives were seen as
forced on a reluctant MCP, which considered them necessary if the armed
campaign was to be sustained in the long run."9 There was no fundamental
change in MCP aim, no intention to 'call off the shooting war' - the hope
was that increased political work would retrieve a worsening situation and
eventually allow a renewed offensive - but the Directives are seen as having
military origins and implications.
According to another police 'Review of the Security Situation in
Malaya' of around 1952-53, the Directives had direct consequences for
MRLA strength and priorities. They called for a transfer of effort into
planting, into political work, and into protecting the Min Yuen. This report
estimated the resulting transfer of personnel from the MRLA into these
activities would mean a net MRLA reduction of around 1,500. This
140 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
represented over 25 per cent the MCP's average 1952 strength of below
6,000.no
FIGURE 1
EMERGENCY MONTHLY STATISTICS IN 1952121
600 i
Total Incidents
Major Incidents
Estates/Mines
attacked
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- r — Rubber Trees
destroyed ('000s)
100
I I l I l I I I I
In 1950, 1951, and even much later very little resettlement, or regrouping
of labour, could be regarded as effective ... The only hindrance to the
guerrillas was that they might have to walk further to get their supplies
and information (Short, Communist Insurrection, 1975)124
owing to the enemies concentration of and rigid control over the masses
the party is confronted with numerous difficulties ...[with mass
organisations] ...At present, certain difficulties in our procurement of
supplies are closely connected with these weaknesses' (MCP's October
1951 Directives)'25
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Short has rejected both the argument that the October Directives were
inspired by international changes, and that they were caused by military
pressure. For him they reflected mainly internal ideological debate.126 As
early as 1949 Siew Lau (MCP State Secretary in Malacca) had objected to
the MCP tactics of its December 1948 Directives. He had wanted a stronger
bourgeois alliance, advocated nationalizing rubber plantations in order to
encourage peasant support, and criticized over-aggressive tactics at the
expense of the people. But in 1949 these suggestions came up against the
MCP's emphasis on peasant and worker led armed revolution, and on using
economic sabotage to undermine British commitment to Malaya and drive
it out of rural areas. Siew Lau was demoted in August 1949, and executed
in May 1950.127
In the later 'South Johore incident' Lam Swee made similar accusations
in 1949, before being disarmed by the MRLA, and surrendering to the
government in June 1950. As a pre-Emergency Secretary-General of the
MCP-controlled Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, his views
carried weight.128 After surrender, he wrote a government-supported
pamphlet, called My Accusation (Kuala Lumpur 1951). About 100,000
Chinese-language copies of this were published. MRLA units held sessions
to denounce it, but this merely increased curiosity.129 In short, the MCP
faced growing ideological criticism, and eventually responded by agreeing
in the October Directives that it should decrease terrorism, and increase
political work.
Short's version, that the Directives were mainly Malayan and political in
origin and result, sits uneasily beside the CIS and police analyses examined
above. But what do the Directives themselves, treated as a reflection of
Communist intelligence estimates of the campaign, suggest?
First, the documents confirm Stubbs' Korean War Boom thesis. This is
that the Korean War Boom was, by 1951, undermining the MCP's position,
and exacerbating the MCP's difficulty in sustaining its level of terrorism.
142 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The prices of Malaya's rubber and tin exports soared after the outbreak of
the Korean War (June 1950) resulting in stockpiling of these commodities,
causing higher workers' wages, and providing sufficient government
revenue to fund resettlement. The original MCP plan of 1948^9 had been
based on a Maoist three-phase war, first using insurgency to drive the
government out of remote areas and set up bases, second linking up these
bases and surrounding the towns, and third moving to positional war. In fact
populated areas were never liberated for more than a few hours, and the
campaign never got past phase one.
An additional strand, however, was the use of economic sabotage to
undermine Malaya's economic and dollar-earning value, and so British
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intensified political work. The MCP was admitting it had previously failed
to effectively carry out Mao's ideas on 'new democracy', that is to build a
wide united front to support its guerrilla war.
But this was not what was meant by masses organization, the subject of
the new first 'Urgent Task'. Increasing political support and courting the
medium national bourgeoisie, for instance, was only named Ihe fifth of the
'Seven Urgent Tasks', not the first.140 The Directives thus did call for an
increase in political work per se, but not as the first priority. The new first
'Urgent Task' was not to be an increase in political activity, but specifically
to improve masses work, that, is, the recruitment and use of suppliers and
helpers. The Directives explicitly related this to the need to fortify the
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because of the Directives' injunctions to avoid killing the innocent at all costs.
In the context of increasing government control of 'New Villages', the
injunction to avoid killing the innocent would lead to increasing difficulty in
eliminating government agents. None of this meant that the campaign would
not be difficult. The MCP had every intention of intensifying ambushes on
security forces if it could. The new MRLA emphasis on intensifying use of
the orang asli also opened up a new area in which the government needed to
improve intelligence, the deep jungle. Here the government subsequently
built jungle forts, from which orang asli could be given general support, and
could be enlisted in the auxiliary police to provide an intelligence network.145
Overall, however, the MCP's October Directives reveal a party which
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believed much of its previous strategy and tactics were in severe trouble.
But was this assessment correct? The question may prove unanswerable,
but Pye's interviews of SEP seem to confirm the above picture.146 In
addition, the MCP could derive considerable intelligence from the Min
Yuen, contacts during subscription collecting, and relatives outside the
jungle, meaning that it should have been capable of making judgements
about its own cadres and members, and potential supporters. What can be
said with certainty is that at least two interpretations are possible.
First, the MCP may have miscalculated, and by issuing unnecessary
orders reduced incidents and eased the pace in 1952, giving Templer a
window of opportunity in which to reorganize and make a return to previous
levels of insurgency impossible. However, even then the MCP itself seems
to have made a high-level recurrence virtually impossible, regardless of
anything Templer might have done. For it began what came to be viewed as
its version of the CCP's 'Long March', its 'Little "Long March'".147 In 1952
Chin Peng (from Pahang) and the 12th Regiment (from Perak) were the first
to move to the MCP's equivalent to Yen'an, the Betong region in the Malay-
Thai border area.148
Second, the MCP may have been right in calculating that resettlement,
and their excessive reliance on terrorism and sabotage, made continuation
of existing tactics counter-productive. Their phased movement towards the
Thai border may have been necessary for long-term survival. This article
suggests the latter interpretation is right. If this is correct, the irony is that
the MCP saw that a combination of their own weaknesses and mistakes, and
British counter-insurgency, had achieved a turning point despite the
government's material and leadership deficiencies of 1951.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that population control was the crucial additional
ingredient used to improve intelligence flows, as well as the key to winning
146 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
the Emergency, rather than improving intelligence being the key in itself.149
It has demonstrated that by 1951 population control had already persuaded
the MCP to change its tactics. It has also shown that the intelligence
structure built upon this foundation was then perfected by the improvements
made under Templer, Morton and Madoc in 1952-54.
Success in Malaya must thus be ascribed to the application of a
'population control' model, though it should be noted that its success was
only possible because of propitious local and international conditions.
Locally, for instance, Malaya's communal patterns ensured the neutrality or
support of the Malays and of much of the commercially orientated Chinese.
Internationally, developments in China and Korea, as well as Malaya's
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NOTES
I would like to record this article's debt to Leon Comber, Guy Madoc, and various archivists and
librarians at Rhodes House, Oxford for their suggestions, ideas and help. Also to C.C. Chin, for
confirming ideas on the MCP's 'Little "Long March" '. All mistakes and final interpretations are
of course my own.
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1. Documents are from Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, UK, unless otherwise indicated.
The document Air20/10377, 'Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to Aug.
1957', by the Director of Operations (Lt-Gen Bowen), Malaya, 12 Sept. 1957, is used as a
reference. It is hereafter referred to as DOO Report, 1957. Documents labelled ISEAS are
from the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore; and those labelled Rho, from
Rhodes House, Oxford.
2. Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983
(Singapore: Graham Brash, 1984 ed.) pp.183-7, one of the best accounts of Emergency
intelligence, also seems to see the Briggs Plan's population control central as pressurizing
the MCP into an Oct. 1951 change of tactics.
3. The 1957 report concluded a 'supremo' was necessary for maximum efficiency, see DOO
Review, 1957, pp.28-9, para. 105 (c); and T. Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency,
1919-1960 (London: Macmillan 1990), pp.8-10, 13-14, 180-91.
4. Ibid. (note 3) pp.8-10, 180-91.
5. A more complete list of the technique's components would also include: minimum force,
ultimate civilian control rather than martial law, appointing a supremo at least when in
extremis, etc.
6. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency
(Oxford: OUP 1989).
7. 'Operational', 'hot' or 'contact' intelligence means information which can be used to
directly lead to a government-initiated contact with the enemy. See Frank Kitson, Low-
Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber 1971)
Chs.6-7, and p. 198; and Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-Insurgency in
then Twentieth Century (London: Faber 1986) pp.28-30.
8. See Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (London: Cassell 1966) esp. pp.65-78, 100,
for an argument (by a member of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam) that the British
model could have worked if better applied in Vietnam; and for coordination, see Michael
H. Schoelwer, 'The Failure of the US Intelligence Community in Low-Intensity Conflict',
in Loren Thompson (ed.), Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern
World (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1989, pp. 145-64.
9. For the lack of work on intelligence, see Richard Popplewell, "Lacking Intelligence":
Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-Insurgency, 1900-1960',
Intelligence and National Security 10/2 (April 1995) pp.336-52, p.350. For Malayan
intelligence overviews: Clutterbuck (note 2) Chs.9-14; for agents, Clutterbuck's (note 8);
and Kitson (note 7) Chs.6-7. For further details of a SB/CID operation, see Peter Clague,
Iron Spearhead: The True Story of a Communist Killer Squad in Singapore (Singapore:
Heinemann Educational (Asia) 1980). For police, A.J. Stockwell, 'Policing during the
Malayan Emergency, 1948-60', in D. Anderson and D. Killingray, Policing and
Decolonisation (Manchester UP 1992) pp.105-26.
10. 'October 1951' because there were several documents, with various dates in Sept. and Oct.
1951.
11. For hydraulic imagery on the Emergency see Anthony Short, Communist Insurrection in
148 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Malaya (London: F. Muller 1975), which sees 1950-51 as stagnation - 'slack water',
followed by a changing tide in 1952.
12. Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free (London: Gollancz 1954) p.6. Purcell accused
Templer of installing a police state. He was wrong on many counts, no doubt influenced by
a row with Templer in 1952. But he was an ex-Malayan Civil Service expert on Malayan
Chinese, and a Cambridge academic. See also Short (note 11) pp.318, 379-87.
13. Harry Miller, The Story of Malaysia (London: Faber 1965) p.181.
14. An experienced Straits Times journalist (based in Kuala Lumpur in the 1950s).
15. As DOO he 'directed' all security services in the campaign; being High Commissioner
gave him authority over civilian appointments, and over the Commissioner of Police.
16. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1954 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1955) p.9.
For MPAJA reprisals on Malay collaborators in 1945, see A.B. Shamsul, From British to
Bumiputera Rule (Singapore: ISEAS 1988) pp.59-60.
17. For the 'wind-blown' Chinese, see CO1022/148, R.P. Bingham, Secretary for Chinese
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Affairs, Federation of Malaya, paper on Chinese for Secretary of Defence, Malaya. This is
attached as Appendix B to a memo for the Malaya Borneo Committee, MBDC (51) 74, 16
June 1951.
18. The term is used by Short (note 11) pp.160-9. See also Stubbs (note 6) pp.67-93.
19. See Short (note 11) pp.160-9; and Stubbs (note 6) Ch.3.
20. Briggs was still under the High Commissioner. The Commissioner of Police and service
commanders retained executive control of their services, and the former could appeal to the
High Commissioner.
21. Rho: Young Papers, 'Short history of the MCP', by Operations Information Branch, Police
HQ, 21 Oct. 1952, for 429 New Villages and 385,000 resettled by end 1951, just 80,000
remaining.
22. Short (note 11) pp.235ff for Briggs's 'Federation Plan for the Elimination of the
Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya' of May 1950.
23. From 1952-53 the Security Forces also focused on the orang asli (aborigines) - which the
MCP were increasing links with as they withdrew into deep jungle. In 1953-54 jungle forts
(10 by 1954) and patrols brought 3,500 of 6,000 communist-influenced aborigines under
government control. See Annual Report (note 16) pp.253-5, 410-11. This also meant using
RAF intelligence, for instance photo-reconnaissance to identify jungle cultivation.
24. Briggs also called for a country-wide framework of locally based army units, which
facilitated the army's post-1950 move from large operations, towards longer, intensive area
patrolling: Tim Jones, 'The British Army and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition,
1944-1952', Small Wars and Insurgencies 7/3 (Winter 1996) pp.265-308, esp. p.293. By
1952 more lengthy area patrols of up to 15 men made up the bulk of patrolling, and
accounted for 35 per cent of all contacts.
25. John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1992) pp.89-91 suggests six out of over 500 were
abandoned by 1960.
26. Short (note 11) pp.275-74 for 'slack water', 'worst of times' and tide analogies. Mawai
was abandoned on 19 Oct. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) pp.99-111, 126, 186
for the 'fitting epitaph', p.110 for 'worst of times' (and Short supra p.305); and Stubbs
(note 6) pp.133-40.
27. Ibid. p.126.
28. See Karl Hack, 'Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and
Ethnicity', in Hans Antlöv and Stein T0nnesson, Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian
Nationalism (London: Curzon 1995) pp.83-109; and Lee Ting Hui, The Open United
Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore: 1954-1966 (Singapore: South Seas Society
1996) pp.14, 34 fn 43, for a version based on Special Branch sources.
29. One problem is that this argument is often seen as anti-Templer (as it was in Purcell's
Malaya: Communist or Free), or pro-Communist (which it cannot be, since it assumes the
Communists were forced to act because of failure). The reason for the latter is possibly a
Communist 'peace' line, that having pressurized Britain into accelerating decolonization,
the MCP post-1951 wanted to rejoin the constitutional process. See Gen. Dato Kitti
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 149
Ratanachaya, Communist Party of Malaya, Malaysia and Thailand (Bangkok: Duangkaew
1996) pp.53, 71, 74-5, 256-60.
30. Three British planters and two Chinese assistants were killed on 16 June in Perak,
catapulting government into declaring a nation-wide Emergency by the 18th.
31. The issue of how well intelligence performed in the Emergency outbreak is highly
controversial, and will require another article. Some idea of the issues can be found in A.J.
Stockwell, '"A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya"?',
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21/3 (Sept. 1993) pp.66-89; Coates,
Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) pp.7, 25-6; John Cloake, Templer, Tiger of Malaya
(London: Harrap 1985) p.197; D. Mackay, The Domino That Stood: The Malayan
Emergency: 1948-60 (London: Brassey's 1997) pp.31, 159, fn10; Stubbs (note 6) pp.66-9;
and Short (note 11) pp.39-61, 79-90. Note the MSS did warn in 1947-8 that squatters
should be moved, and that the MCP might turn violent. The FO warned in early 1948 that
international Communist policy seemed to be shifting. But there was no hard evidence of
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plans, and MSS warnings were overshadowed by equal concentration on militant Malay
nationalists.
32. Short (note 11) pp.65-94; CO 1030/16; Rho: MSS Indian Ocean s251, Dal1ey Papers. Short
supra pp.139-40. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency (note 25) p.45, fn 49.
33. Ibid. p.41, note 8. The MSS had bases in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur (Selangor, national
capital), Penang, Ipoh (Perak) and Seremban (Negri Sembilan).
34. Coates (note 25) p.24, suggests MSS's separate status and lack of rural presence prevented
it drawing conclusions from rural police detection of rising violence, but post-war Malaya's
record of crime, gangsterism, KMT and secret societies, made attributing rising crime to
communism problematical. Stockwell (note 31); Susan Carruthers, Winning Hearts and
Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-insurgency 1944-1960
(London: Leicester UP 1995) Ch.2.
35. See The Federation of Malaya Annual Report: 1947 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1948)
p.97, and 1948, p. 124. The MSS and then SB were parts of a range of intelligence agencies,
including that of the army's Headquarters Malaya Command, which issued weekly
intelligence appreciations. The creation of a pan-Malayan MSS probably reflected
Britain's post-1945 vision, which was of working towards a wider 'Dominion of South East
Asia', to include Malaya and Singapore if not British Borneo. A Singapore-based MSS
paralleled the appointment of Malcolm MacDonald as first Governor-General of British
territories in SEA (1946-48), then as Commissioner-General from 1948.
36. See Guy Madoc interviews in Rho: Granada End of Empire, Malaya Volumes 2 and 4.
37. See note 41 below.
38. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53.
39. Short (note 11) p.236. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53. For 1951, see Annual Report on
the Federation of Malaya: 1951, pp.209-10. Briggs was echoing the March 1950 report of
the Police Mission to Malaya (three British senior police) which found intelligence lacking
and Chinese officers too few, see A. Stockwell, Malaya (British Documents on the End of
Empire, London: HMSO 1995) p.176, note 8. For contract officers see Rho: Young Papers,
Mss S486/3/1 (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952', especially Part II. For intelligence
the link with India seems important (the first two DOIs had India links), but the process
may have been mostly one of displacement, overseas recruits replacing Malayan uniformed
police, who could then go to SB.
40. See the following footnote. The figures include special constables, who were part-timers.
41. This was certainly true with the police, which received vital if partially resented Palestinian
reinforcements. Unfortunately, detailed SB data is not available, and one should stress that
the majority of SBs highest officers seem to have been long-serving Malayan policemen.
See also note 39, and Tim Jones (note 24) pp.265-308.
42. The majority of inspectors and rank and file were of course Malay. Contrast the Annual
Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1954) pp.xiii,
232-3, with that of 1948 (ibid. 1949) p.122. Comparing these, in 1948 under 5 per cent (12
of 253) of Police Officers were in SB, in a then under-strength force. Relevant SB figures
(from above sources) are:
150 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
and 402 Constables and subordinate Officers) in 1947 to c10 per cent (49 of 569 gazetted
officers and 368 of 1,198 Inspectors) in 1956.
44. See DOO Report, p.28, para. 86 for inspectors; and Clutterbuck (note 2) p. 179.
45. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1954 (Kuala Lumpur: Govt Printer 1955)
p.410. From 1952 central control of intelligence operations was by the Federal SB Planning
Committee (with a counterpart in each contingent), meeting fortnightly under SB's newly
appointed SAC 'E'. The DOI attended most meetings, Heads of Contingent SBs were
present in turn.
46. Called the JIAC (Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee) initially, by 1957 it was known
simply as the Federal Intelligence Committee. DOO Report, 1957, p.15, para. 53-4. It
contained representatives of the Police, Armed Services, Department of Information,
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, the Labour Department and Security Intelligence Far East.
See DOO Report, p.15, 'It provides for a free exchange of information and, while it does
not make policy, it may make recommendations.' For Directive No 1 and the Briggs Plan,
see Air20/2777.
47. Morton seems to have wielded influence, probably not because as regional MI5 head
(called Singapore Intelligence Far East or 'SIFE') he had any formal authority, but because
of his Indian and MI5 experience, and because he was accessible to high officials and
commanders in Singapore.
48. Popplewell (note 9) notes the neglect of Indian influence. Jenkin was a former
Superintendant, Indian Political Services (where he was Morton's superior) and Deputy
Director, Intelligence Bureau. He was brought out of retirement in May 1950 to reorganize
Malayan CID, becoming DOI Aug. 1950. He resigned 1 Sept. 1951, see Stockwell, Malaya
(note 39) pp.174 (fn 7), 306.
49. Coates (note 25) p.125; and Rho: Granada End of Empire series, MSS Brit. Emp 527/9,
Malaya Volumes 2 and 4, interviews. Madoc (correspondence, received 2 April 1998)
maintains 'intelligence did not develop under Jenkin', and his 'morning prayers' (9am
meetings of all staff at HQ) were resented as a waste of time. See also Stockwell, Malaya
(note 39) Vol. II, p.344.
50. Jenkin first tendered resignation in Sept. 1951, and left on 14 Jan. 1952. Morton took over
1 April 1952. Short (note 11) pp.275-76.
51. See Coates (note 25) p.31; and Short (note 11) pp.276-91, 356.
52. Stockwell, 'Policing during the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60: Communism,
Communalism and Decolonisation' in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.)
Policing and Decolonisation, Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester
UP 1992) pp.110-12. See also Commonwealth Records Archives (Canberra, Autralalia):
A5954/1: 2292/4, 'Malaya 1949-52', for 'The Police of Malaya', 26 May 1952, submitted
by office of the Australian Commissioner in Singapore.
53. Rho: Young Papers, MSS s486/3/l (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952'. pp.17 ff. Young
increased the departments, each with a SAC, to five in addition to Field Force under his
Deputy Commissioner: (a) Administration, (b) Operations, (c) Supplies, (d) CID and (e)
SB. Young viewed joint CID-SB SAC Nichol as inadequate, having little relevant
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 151
1951) all CID was concentrated on Emergency intelligence. In the CID school's first six
months, 287 officers attended.
57. SIFE also lent a training officer to brief senior SB officers for two weeks at a time before
the school was established. See Rho: Young Papers, Mss s486/3/l (2), 'Review of
Developments in 1952', esp. pp. 18 ff; and Annual Report 1954, p.278. By late 1954 it had
instructed 4,004, including 232 from government departments, the Army and countries
including Thailand and Burma. See also Annual Report, 1952, p.1; Cloake (note 31) p.232;
Short (note 11) p.360, fn 19; and Rho: Granada interviews, Malaya Vol.2, pp.106-10.
Claude Fenner (pre-war Malay police, SAC of SB, 1954-58) headed the new SB school
1952-54.
58. Lyttelton suggested a DOI on roughly these lines before Templer's appointment, see
Stockwell (note 39) Vol II, p.325, for Lytttelton's Cabinet Memo on Malaya of 21 Dec.
1951. But perhaps it was Templer who made the DOI responsible to himself (as DOO), not
to the new post of Deputy DOO, who was responsible for operational direction under
Templer. See also DOO Report 1957, pp.14-15. The DOI was to coordinate all intelligence
activity, including 'the collation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence and advises
the Director of Operations'. See also Cloake (note 31) p.228.
59. See the Annual Report of 1952, p.1; and Cloake (note 31) pp.227-8.
60. Clutterbuck (note 2) p.179. The classic case for this was Tanjong Malim's week-long 22
hour curfew and ration reduction of April 1952, see Stubbs (note 6) pp.164-5. There were
a few other exemplary group punishments, such as the collective detention of Peramatang
Tinggi's 62 villagers in Aug. 1952.
61. 'Live' meaning intelligence gained without the Communists knowing; as opposed to
'blown' or 'dead'. 'Operational' meaning of use in launching operations, rather than as
background information.
62. SB units or officers, to which MIOs were now increasingly attached, were present at
detention centres, police hq. and posts, and attached to District and State War Executive
Committees. Annual Report 1953, p.232. Mockaitis (note 3) p.118 notes intelligence
committees paralleling the Executive Committee structure under Briggs and the early use
of MIOs.
63. See Coates (note 25) p.125, saying MIOs were attached to SWECs with, he says,
substantial results; and Short (note 11) pp.359-65.
64. Townshend (note 7) pp.26-30.
65. Young now tried to increase SB capacity not just to gather information, but to penetrate
MCP organizations, and to target those leaders the MCP could least afford to lose. See Rho:
Young Papers, Mss s486/3/l (2), 'Review of Developments in 1952', esp. p.18, and Part II;
and 'Progress of the Emergency', c1953, by Operations Information Branch, Federal Police
HQ. For peak efficiency, see also Coates (note 25) p.124. Cloake (note 31) p.198.
66. Cloake (note 31) pp.228-9, and 234-5. Rho: Granada End of Empire, Malaya Vol. 2,
pp.117-18.
67. See Schoelwer (note 8) pp. 145-64.
68. Cloake (note 31) pp.229.
152 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
69. See Harper, 'The Colonial Inheritance' (Unpub. Cambridge D.Phil thesis 1991) pp.192-3.
Harper uses CO537/7260 on unionist-turned insurgent-turned government propagandist
Lam Swee. On touring Johore in late 1951 Lam Swee found 'great fear' spreading in New
Villages that those who surrendered would betray previous helpers, leading to 'A
confesional kind of politics'. Chinese Home Guards also proved a convenient channel of
information. There were over 50,000 of the latter in 1954.
70. See Short (note 11) p. 155, for inadequate exchange of information between uniformed
officers and CID, inadequate checking and collating of police information, and the army
sometimes acting on little more than riding 'to the sound of guns'.
71. Oliver Lyttelton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: Bodley Head 1962) pp.366-7,
as quoted in Coates (note 25) p.111. According to Lyttelton's memoirs 'Intelligence was
scanty and unco-ordinated between the Military and civil authorities.' He was Secretary of
State for the Colonies under the new 1951 Conservative government, and visited Malaya
in Nov. 1951.
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72. See for instance, DOO Report 1957, p.27, para. 96, and map (Appendix D) of insurgent
locations.
73. Short (note 11) p.424, gives SEP as: 1949 (251), 1950 (147), 1951 (201), 1952 (257), 1953
(373). For the wartime MCP's MPAJA, Spencer Chapman was 'surprised' at the rate of
betrayals, see F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London: Chatto 1950)
pp.155-6, 182, 280. Chapman cites the importance of personal relations, and a quick
Chinese tendency to 'pique'. See also Lucien Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya
(Princeton UP 1956), a sociological analysis of SEP interviews, also noting the importance
of personal relations — rather than ideology or nationalism. DOO Report, 1957, p.16, para
55 (d), also found SEP 'surprisingly willing to lead SF patrols back to the camps ... and to
give other detailed information ...'.
74. For wartime betrayal see Chapman (note 73) pp.155-6, 182, 280.
75. For MNLA numbers I have accepted the figures in DOO Report, 1957, p.4, namely: 1951
(7,292); 1952 (5,765); 1953 (4,373); 1954 (3,402); 1955 (2,798); 1956 (2,231); 1957
(1,830). By 1957 just 200 of 1,830 insurgents were fighters, the rest 'in the command
organisation'.
76. See for instance Cloake (note 31) p.239. Templer recorded a message in Jan. 1954.
77. Food control measures included reducing rations, licensing food movements, reducing
stocks in shops and puncturing tins. Also communal cooking of rice (dry rice lasted a long
time), searches for MRLA food dumps, spraying jungle crops, and patrols to increase
insurgent movement.
78. Rho: Young Papers, 'Progress of the Emergency', c1953, Operations Info. Branch, Police HQ.
79. Annual Report (note 45) p.4, stated that, 'Food supplies remained the greatest problem
facing the terrorists.'
80. Clutterbuck (note 2) Chs.11-12 (pp.195-219). See also DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 55
(a), on 'Agents', defined as 'Communist supporters who remain in touch with the CTs'.
81. DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 55 (a).
82. See Guy Madoc quoted in Allen (note 55) pp.299-301. Madoc was a pre-war Malayan
policeman (1930ff), Deputy Dir. MSS, trained in Bangkok and London cl947-50,
Assistant Superintendent SB 1950, Dir. SB 1952, DOI 1954-58.
83. Yoji Akashi, 'Lai Teck, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Malaya, 1939-1947',
Journal of the South Seas Society 49 (1994) pp.87-95 esp. p.77, for MCP willingness to
kill members feared tainted after arrest in 1943-44. British propaganda made use of the
fear of elimination, see King's College London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives,
Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell Papers 7/1-7, eg., Leaflet 1534 (22 Jan. 1953). For family
witnesses, see Shamsul (note 16) pp.59-60. For graphic details of a traitor elimination, see
Clague (note 9) pp.30-37, passim.
84. Coates (note 25) p.40.
85. See Clutterbuck (note 9) pp.93-94.
86. Once recruited, agents' identity could protected by using intermediaries or 'cut-outs' to
collect information, such as shop-keepers or taxi-drivers. Clutterbuck (note 2) pp.93-4,
179.
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 153
87. For it increasing information and facilitating food control, Prem8/1406, 4 June 1951, MAL
C(51) 1, 'Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation by the High Commissioner
and DOO.
88. By 1954, most insurgent eliminations were based on SB information. See Coates (note 25)
p.125. In 1957 the DOO still saw food operations as central to combating the few remaining
'hostile' MRLA area by 'screwing down the people in the strongest and sternest manner', see
WO216/901, DOO to Templer, 15 March 1956; and DOO Report 1957, p.15, para.55 (c).
Until late in the Emergency, penetration was only significantly achieved for this outer ring of
MRLA sympathisers. See Coates (note 25) p.125 for Templer on this in April 1952.
89. For resettlement progress by late 1951, see ISEAS: Tan Cheng Lok Papers folio 24,
'Resettlement', Appendix C, dated 10 Nov. 1951, attached with memoranda for the next
Federal War Council meeting; and Rho: Young Papers (note 21).
90. Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Arrow ed. 1992;
orig. pub. Collins 1972) p.161 for the first quotation, pp.157-9 for the second.
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91. The following summary is based on the English-language text of the Oct. 1951 Directives,
as found in CO1022/187, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 31 Dec. 1952.
Henceforth referred to as the 'Oct. Resolutions', numbers 1-6 are not SB translations, but
'English versions ... recovered from a camp in RAUB towards the end of September,
1952'. Analysis based on Chinese-language versions - not so far available to this author -
could conceivably lead to slightly different conclusions.
92. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1, C.C. Too in the New Straits Times, 3 Dec. 1989, p.lOff. Too was
writing just after the MCP agreed to lay down its arms in Dec. 1989.
93. DOO Report, 1957, p.12, para. 44.
94. Barber (note 90) p.159, and p.250. The meeting was held in Sept.-Oct. 1951.
95. CO1022/145, Officer Administering Government Malaya to CO, 5 Jan. 1952, said the
Times report of reinforcements was based on Singapore correspondent (Heren) access to
RAF Intelligence summaries, showing a recent post-air attack SEP claimed to have come
from China. Heren had a history of suggesting the MRLA was getting aid, see Carruthers
(note 34) pp.107ff.
96. See Aloysius Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Vinpress 1994)
pp.62-3 on illnesses such as tuberculosis; and for Malayan official views on the reports see,
CO1022/145, (18) Officer Administering Government to Secretary of State, 5 Jan. 1952.
According to this they were based on RAF intelligence of a single Chinese SEP, who
claimed he had come from China, and ibid, (17) reports of a landing by c20 Indonesians
near Malacca who insurgents were awaiting.
97. Rho: Young Papers, 'Notes for the Commissioner of Police lecture, p.3; and Rho; Mss
S486/3/3, pp. 114ff, correspondence between Young and the CO in Aug. 1953 over a
lecture Young gave at the Imperial Defence College. See also CO1022/145, minute of 31
July 1952 and papers at (7), (10) and (14) on the controversy over Young's Imperial
Defence College lecture.
98. Coates (note 25) p.74, fn 60.
99. Ralph B. Smith, 'China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective, 1951',
Journal of South East Asia 19/1 (March 1988) pp.97-110.
100. See 'Oct. Resolutions, Struggle for Greater Victories in the War'.
101. See Smith (note 99).
102. CO1022/46, SSB 4019/19, Report from the Director of SB (Singapore) to the
Commissioner of Police (Singapore), 11 Sept. 1953.
103. Smith (note 99).
104. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1., (note 92) p.10ff.
105. CO1022/187, 'FZ1016/9/G', 'Captured Communist Party Documents', 27 Nov. 1953.
106. CO1022/148, (13), MBDC (51)74, 31 Oct. 1951, quoting a Commissioner-General Office
report of May 1951 by Mr Kitson (now Acting Commissioner-General for Foreign
Affairs).
107. The call for theoretical thinking and general strategy to be related back to the 'concrete'
and 'extant' conditions in Malaya is a leitmotif in the Directives. See October Resolutions,
passim.
154 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
108. For MCP communications, see Leon Comber, '"The weather ... has been horrible":
Malayan Communist Communications during "The Emergency" (1948-60)', Asian Studies
Review 19/2 (1995).
109. Clutterbuck (note 2) p. 180.
110. Pye (note 73) pp.105-06.
111. Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya: 1951, p.4.
112. The government emphasized truth in propaganda, but was not immune to over-optimism —
seeing turning points from 1948-51 - and deception. In 1950 several men, possibly former
SOE, with deception experience were sent to Malaya. See Jones (note 24) pp.292-3.
113. See DOO Report 1957, p.15, para. 54 (c); Short (note 11) p.360; and Cloake (note 31)
p.229, who says Dick Noone, from Australia's AIS, was secretary of the CIS and of the
Federation Intelligence Committee (chaired by the DOI), and that the CIS worked closely
with the Combined Emergency Planning Staff, 'who used their briefs as a basis for
planning operations'.
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114. In 1951 incidents averaged 110 a week, in the second, third and fourth quarters of 1952
they fell to weekly averages of 90, 56 and 31 respectively, see Defe 11/47, 'Malaya Report',
March 1952 (c).
115. Rho: Young Papers, MSS British Empire s486/2/3, CIS(52)(7)(Final), 'Combined
Intelligence Staff Review of the Emergency as at 30th September 1952, 10 October 1952,
especially p.28. This will subsequently be called simply 'CIS Review'. For role of the CIS,
see DOO Report 1957, p. 15, para. 54 (c) and Short (note 11) p.360.
116. See Carruthers (note 34) Ch.2; Cloake (note 31) pp.292-3; and CIS Review, p.28; and for
the quotation, Rho: Young Papers, MSS s486/3/3, p.132, for Young on Heren.
117. Carruthers (note 34) p.87.
118. CIS Review, especially paras. 6 -10.
119. Rho: Young Papers, Mss British Empire s486/2/l, (F), 'Review of the Security Situation in
Malaya: Aim and Strategy of the MCP', c1952-53, esp. paras. 5 and 6.
120. Rho: Young Papers (note 119). Item T , Review of the Security Situation in Malaya', esp.
para. 5.
121. CIS Review, adapted from appendices A-G.
122. Too (note 92) pp.l5ff, also sees the Directives as forced for similar reasons.
123. Rho: Young Paper, Mss486/2/l (Miscellaneous, pp.53ff) 'Short History of the Emergency',
operations Information Branch, Federal police HQ, 21 Oct. 1952.
124. Short (note 11) pp.292-3, 305-6, and 381 respectively for quotations. Short also says
(p.381), 'Barbed wire fences were lacking [and] ... perimeter lighting was lacking ...'
125. Oct. Resolutions, p.72, introducing the 'Urgent Tasks of the Party' and explaining the
interconnection between the government's 'starvation policy' (also p.143ff) and masses
organization.
126. Short (note 11) pp.309-21.
127. Clutterbuck (note 2) pp. 172-4.
128. Ibid. pp.172-5. This union was banned in 1948.
129. ISEAS: DOC M104 c. 1, C.C. Too (note 92) p.10ff.
130. For the Korean War Boom, see Stubbs (note 6) pp.107-14; and Richard Stubbs, Counter-
Insurgency and the Economic Factor (Singapore: ISEAS 1974).
131. Harper (note 69) pp.190-91 and fn 23; and Oct. Resolutions, pp.121-2, 126-7.
132. Stubbs (note 6) pp.107-13, for the boom. Shamsul (note 16) pp.63-4, for Malay villagers
paying off debt, even buying refrigerators for which there was no electricity.
133. Oct. Resolutions, pp.106ff, esp. pp.117-18 for stopping attacks on villages and trees.
134. Oct. Resolutions, p.78, and 116-20 (in the Functional Directives) on grenades etc,
pp.131-2 (pregnant women), 139-40 (corpses, grenades again etc).
135. See Coates (note 25) p.99; and...Rho: Young Papers (note 21).
136. Coates (note 25) p.27 for up to 50 per cent of 'bandit' casualties coming from public
information after resettlement, p.42 for captured documents revealing supply problems.
137. October Resolutions, p.72.
138. CO1022/I87, p.165, 'Precis of a cyclostyled booklet, dated 25th Sept. 1951, containing a
Directive of the Central Politbureau: entitled "The Central Politbureau's Decision on the
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND COIN IN MALAYA 155
Security of Min Yuen Executives". This precis of an MCP document notes the policies
'will reduce the strength of MRLA forces in the Districts'. It insists something, at least
under-strength platoons, be kept in districts.
139. Oct. Resolutions, pp.144-5, from the directive on 'clearing and planting'.
140. Ibid., pp.67-8, 82.
141. Ibid., p.72, section on 'The Party's Achievements and Mistakes', sub-section 4, 'The
Urgent Tasks of the Party', task 1.
142. Oct. Resolutions, pp.65-6, for geography. Failure to solve this geo-supply problem before
concentrating forces was seen as one of the main deviations of the MCP's Dec. 1948
Directives.
143. Ibid. pp.85, 141-50.
144. Ibid. pp.137 ff for MCP subscriptions.
145. DOO Report 1957, p.18, para. 67, on the 50-60,000 orang asli, and government tactics of
establishing 11 jungle forts, medical assistance etc. See especially point (iii) for
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intelligence. For orang asli in general, see John Leary, Violence and the Dream People:
The Orang Asli in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (Athens: Ohio UP 1995).
146. Pye (note 73) Part III, esp. pp.324-42.
147. The fact that most authors fail to see what is — from an Asian perspective — an obvious
parallel is indicative of the 'colonial' or 'European' mindsets which most (predominantly
European or ex-settler colony born and based) Emergency writers share. The CCP's heroic
6,000 mile Long March of 1934-35 saved it from destruction, and established in Yen'an a
viable northern base. See for instance, Dick Wilson, The Long March of 1935: The Epic of
Chinese Communism's Survival (London: Hamish Hamilton 1971).
148. The Betong salient and border area became the MCP's main base until the 1989 agreement
to end hostilities. See Comber (note 108) p.49 note 6; but the MCP idea of the 'Little "Long
March"' was confirmed by CC Chin - based at the Australian National University and
working on MCP documents. The 10th and 8th Regiment moved in 1954. Of course, the
MCP hoped to make a come-back. On the British side, a Frontier Intelligence Bureau was
set up by Aug. 1953.
149. DOO Report 1957, p.16, 'Success breeds information and information breeds more
success'.
150. See Popplewell (note 9) p.341.
151. Han Suyin, And the Rain My Drink (London: Cape 1956) is normally cited, but it is a novel
based on knowledge as a doctor and from her then Special Branch husband, Leonard
Comber. Her autobiographical My House Has Two Doors (Granada, 1982 ed.) pp.77-9, 81,
232-3 is more satisfactory. See also Loh Kok Wah, Beyond the Tin Mines (Oxford: OUP
1988) Chs.3-4; and Observer, 4 Jan. 1953 for a Johore Resettlement Officer thinking 75
per cent of New Villagers were 'choking with animosity against us', as quoted in
Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds (note 34) p.121.
152. DOO Report, p.7, para. 21.
153. See Hack in Antlöv and T0nnesson (note 28) pp.83-109; and 'British Strategy and South
East Asia, 1941-57' (Unpub. D.Phil thesis, Oxford 1995) pp. 143-88, 200-04.
154. Consider the centrality of communalism in Cyprus in D. Anderson, 'Policing and
Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954-60', Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 21/3 (Sept. 1993) pp. 189-94. It could also be argued that stalemate
in Northern Ireland was a function of balanced Loyalist and Republican abilities to wreak
violence on each other. E.g. see David Sharrock, 'Inside the Mind of Ulster's King Rat',
Guardian Weekly, 11 Jan. 1998, p.11, for paramilitary thinking.